North-Eastern Syria: Lasting Peace Unlikely as Instability and Conflict Is Set to Increase

Russia and Turkey’s deal halted the Turkish-led operation in North-Eastern Syria and avoided direct confrontation between Turkey and Syrian forces. The situation remains tenuous, however, as lasting peace settlements between all sides remains a distant prospect. The continuing presence of Turkish-backed rebels in former SDF areas along with a worsening humanitarian crisis will gradually destabilise the area, making conflict likely to resume.

by Keir Watt

On the 6th of October 2019, U.S. President Donald Trump suddenly announced the withdrawal of U.S. forces from areas held by the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in North-Eastern Syria. The move cleared the way for the Turkish-led OPERATION PEACE SPRING against the SDF, which had served as a key U.S. partner in the coalition against the Islamic State (I.S.). 

Within weeks of the announcement, Russia brokered a deal with Turkey which halted their advance and ended the heavy fighting while leaving the SDF precariously reliant on the Syrian government. The deal brought temporary peace to the region, but the Turkish operation has already sowed the seeds of further violence which will hamper lasting peace in the future.

The operation began on October 9th when the Turkish military and their allies the Syrian National Army (SNA) invaded SDF controlled territory along Syria’s north-eastern border with Turkey. Turkey attacked the SDF because the Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG) are the largest of the various groups within the SDF and exert overall control.[i]

The YPG is an affiliate of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), which has been engaged in armed conflict with Turkey since 1984 and is considered a terrorist group by NATO and the European Union. Turkey vowed never to allow the YPG to establish an enclave in Syria which it fears would support the PKK in Turkey. Turkey’s attack has been anticipated since Donald Trump agreed the U.S. would withdraw in December 2018.

On the 17th of October, the U.S. brokered a ceasefire which ended the intense fighting. Shortly after, Presidents Putin and Erdogan agreed to a deal to halt the Turkish advance. It required the SDF to withdraw from a 30km deep ‘safe zone’ along the Syrian-Turkish border whilst Russian and Syrian government forces took over former SDF positions.[ii]

Syrian government forces had already begun to deploy to SDF areas as they quickly agreed to cooperate against the Turkish offensive, but the deal brings Syrian President Bashar al- Assad closer to finally controlling the SDF territories which constitute almost a third of Syria as a whole.

Turning to Assad was simply the best way for the SDF to avoid being defeated by the Turks. The SDF had no effective way of resisting the Turkish offensive without U.S. support, anti-tank and anti-aircraft weapons, and after the U.S. convinced them to dismantle their northern defences to placate Turkish concerns last year. The YPG and SDF have been coordinating with the Assad regime since their substantial victories in 2015.[iii] Moreover, the swift and well-coordinated deployment of regime forces to support SDF positions suggests the two had already planned for a Turkish invasion.

The Turkish operation has brought the Assad regime and the SDF closer together, but the fate of the YPG remains very uncertain. Arab leaders within the SDF such as Sheikh Humaydi Daham al-Hadi, leader of the Shammar tribe, have been discussing peace settlements with Assad for months,[iv] which probably led to the cooperation against the Turkish operation. However, YPG negotiations with the Syrian government have failed whilst their Arab partners’ have progressed; suggesting they could be left isolated as the rest of the SDF join with Assad.

At the same time, the future of the YPG will be impacted by any cooperation between Turkey and Syria. A year ago, Russia suggested the Adana Agreement (1998) could be a path for cooperation between Syria and Turkey. Under the agreement Syria expelled the PKK and ended their presence in Syria until the civil war in 2011. President Erdogan’s recent comments that Turkey will “allow no place for the YPG in Syria’s future” suggests it would still form the basis of cooperation.[v] Such an agreement would suit both parties and be disastrous for the YPG. 

However, the Assad regime remains in talks with the YPG. Unlike the PKK in the 1990s, the YPG’s strong military force means a political settlement is preferable to the Assad regime rather than years of more fighting. Making the expulsion of the YPG an unlikely policy of the Assad regime. 

The Assad regime would also demand Turkey withdraw all its forces from Syria as part of any deal. And while Turkey may be willing to withdraw its military, removing the SNA rebels would be significantly harder.

The SNA is an amalgamation of mostly Turkman and Arab militias which previously formed the Turkish-backed free Syrian Army and the National Liberation Front. These groups were unified under the ‘SNA’ just weeks before OPERATION PEACE SPRING began and frequently clashed in the past. This patchwork of rival groups is likely to destabilize as they establish territory, making it difficult for Ankara to exert the same control as when the operation started.

The SNA groups will also be extremely unwilling to leave now that they control territory and Ankara is unlikely to settle them in Turkey. Ankara would either abandon SNA militias which do not withdraw or incorporate their demands into a deal with Syria; making a final settlement with Assad very difficult.

Meanwhile, the ceasefire brought by Russia’s deal is unlikely to hold before a final peace agreement can be reached. The SNA’s hostility to Kurdish and Christian communities is being condemned as ethnic cleansing as communities are forcibly displaced.[vi] Creating a situation the SDF will struggle to tolerate, as they watch their communities and former territory thrown into chaos. The possibility of SDF retribution also increases as more reports surface of SNA war crimes committed during the Turkish-led offensive in October.[vii] 

Arab contingents within the SDF are also deeply opposed to Wahhabi groups in their territory. Which raises another source of conflict as the SNA have been widely accused of containing Jihadi elements. They were also reported to have recruited former I.S. fighters during the Turkish-led operation in Afrin last year.[viii] If SNA militias begin to assert Wahhabi doctrines upon the local populace hostilities will inevitably erupt. 

At the same time, there is a growing humanitarian crisis in the area caused by the disruption of essential services and the displacement of hundreds of thousands of civilians.[ix]. This crisis will grow in scale and intensity as winter arrives, bringing harsher conditions and reduced food supplies.  

Whilst all sides struggle to agree amongst themselves, they will inevitably fail to manage the humanitarian crisis effectively. Which will further destabilise the area and bring both sides closer to conflict. Russia and Turkey have advertised their deal as a big success, but in reality it has only temporarily halted the conflict. Sources of conflict and instability continue to fester, making a lasting deal more imperative but increasingly hard to achieve.

Sources:

[i] Barfi, B., 2016. Ascent of the PYD and the SDF. The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Research Notes, 32 [online]. Available at: https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/uploads/Documents/pubs/ResearchNote32-Barfi.pdf. [accessed 4 November 2019].p.3.

[ii] Turkey Syria offensive: Erdogan and Putin strike deal over Kurds. 2019. BBC [online]. Available at: https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-50138121.[Accessed 23/10/2019].

[iii] Barfi, B., 2016. Ascent of the PYD and the SDF. The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Research Notes, 32 [online]. Available at: https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/uploads/Documents/pubs/ResearchNote32-Barfi.pdf. [accessed 4 November 2019], pp.5-7.

[iv] Zaman, A., 2019. Syria’s Kurds increasingly isolated as Arab tribes cut deals with regime. Al Monitor [online]. Available at: https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2019/03/syria-kurds-isolated-arab-tribes-deals-damascus.html.

[v] Erdogan quoted in. Zontur, E.C., 2019. Turkey says YPG/PKK has no role in the future of Syria. AA [online]. Available at: https://www.aa.com.tr/en/middle-east/turkey-says-ypg-pkk-has-no-role-in-future-of-syria/1622247. [accessed 4 November 2019].

[vi] OCHA Syria Flash Update #5: Humanitarian impact of the military operation in northeastern Syria 14 October 2019. 2019. OCHA [online]. Available at: https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/ocha_syria_flash_update_5_nes_14_octoberfinal.pdf.[Accessed 21/10/2019].

[vii] Higgins, E., 2019. Video Evidence Sheds Light on Executions Near Turkey-Syria Border. Bellingcat [online]. Available at: https://www.bellingcat.com/news/mena/2019/10/31/video-evidence-sheds-light-on-executions-near-turkey-syria-border/. [accessed 4 November 2019]; Chulov, M., Rasool, M., 2019. Kurdish politician among nine civilians shot dead by pro-Turkey forces in Syria. 2019. Guardian [online]. Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/oct/13/female-kurdish-politician-among-nine-civilians-killed-by-pro-turkey-forces-in-syria-observers-say. [Accessed 21/10/2019]; Seligman, L., 2019. Turkish Proxies Appear to Be Using White Phosphorus in Syria. 2019. Foreign Policy [online]. Available at: https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/10/17/turkish-proxies-chemical-weapons-syria-kurds/. [Accessed 21/10/2019].

[viii] Cockburn, P., 2019. Turkey accused of recruiting ex-Isis fighters in their thousands to attack Kurds in Syria. Independent [online]. Available at: https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/turkey-isis-afrin-syria-kurds-free-syrian-army-jihadi-video-fighters-recruits-a8199166.html. [accessed 4 November 2019].

[ix] UNHCR. Hundreds of thousands in harm’s way in northern Syria. UNHCR [online]. Available at: https://www.unhcr.org/news/press/2019/10/5d9f10eb4/hundreds-thousands-harms-way-northern-syria.html. [accessed 4 November 2019].[x] Photo: Specialist Arnada Jones U.S. Combined Joint Task Force.https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Combined_Joint_U.S.,_Turkey_Patrols.jpg.

2019 Turkish Local Elections: An Explanation of the Ruling Party’s Failure

The Turkish local elections of 2019 resulted in a failure for President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and his ruling party, which lost votes in the country’s three largest cities: Izmir, Istanbul and the capital, Ankara. This crucial breakdown of the Justice and Development Party is an outcome of enduring political, economic, and social struggles within Turkish society which has expressed its discontent through elections, demonstrating its desire to implement fundamental changes. 

by Badri Belkania

The Turkish local elections of 2019 resulted in a major blow to President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and his ruling party, the Justice and Development Party (AKP), which lost control over the three largest cities of the country (Istanbul, Izmir, and the capital, Ankara) for the first time, after sixteen years in power. The phrase uttered by Erdoğan before the vote highlights the importance of the local elections for the government, especially in Turkey’s largest city: ‘if we lose Istanbul, we lose Turkey’ (Barkey 2019). This article examines the crucial reasons behind the AKP’s undeniably historic defeat.

Firstly, the premises behind the AKP’s setback in the 2019 local elections should be placed into the context of the continuous process of Erdoğan’s rising authoritarianism, which had been gradually reaching its peak subsequent to the 2016 failed coup d’etat attempt. 

Since the AKP took power in 2002, this shift toward autocracy and even dictatorship, as it has been frequently labeled in light of the 2016 events, has become more and more apparent. In the first years of his rule, Erdoğan, arguably, worked towards transforming Turkey into a democratic and free market based country, however, after the triumph in the 2007 presidential elections he substituted the party’s pluralistic ruling system for ‘a majoritarian one’ and ‘liberal sensibilities’ with ‘an authoritarian mind-set’ (Özsel et al., 2013, 552). As the 2019 local elections demonstrated, frustration within the Turkish population regarding Erdoğan’s authoritarian tendencies had accumulated throughout the years, which finally came to a tipping point at the ballot boxes. 

The events following the failed 2016 coup d’etat demonstrated Erdoğan’s intentions of seizing absolute power in Turkey. The thwarted coup d’etat, which was immediately attributed to the former ally of Erdoğan, and exiled Muslim cleric and businessman, Fethullah Gülen, became Erdoğan’s justification for launching an extensive purge against his political opponents and opposing journalists. As a result, by 2018 more than 107,000 people were dismissed from their jobs, approximately 1,000 people allegedly related to the coup were imprisoned, and 2,745 judges lost their seats. This ‘massive liquidation movement’ encompassed almost all professions in the country including soldiers, teachers, academics, and police officers (Azeri 2016; Morris 2018).

Frustration among Turkish citizens has risen in lockstep with autocracy in the country and the results of the 2019 local elections should not be perceived as an unexpected turn of events. For instance, the 2013 Gezi Park protests clearly demonstrated this growing civil discontent in the country. The demonstrations originally opposed the demolition of Gezi Park in Istanbul but expanded into a massive riot of crowds from different backgrounds in opposition to larger issues such as curtailment of civil rights, lack of freedom of speech, media control, corruption, and the turn away from secularism (Demiryol 2018).

Secondly, when analysing Erdoğan’s defeat in the largest cities of the country, the protracted Kurdish issue should not be neglected. There is definite hostility between Erdoğan and the Kurds, and they certainly played a role in the AKP’s defeat in the major cities of the country. There are approximately 20 million Kurds in Turkey (CIA 2018). They make up almost 25% of the country’s entire population, and many of these Kurds live in the largest cities of Turkey where the AKP suffered there most important defeats. We can fairly assume that the majority of this Kurdish population would have voted against the AKP which continues to rigidly pursue improper policies towards minorities.

Considering the minor difference between the final percentages of the competing candidates, it can be concluded that the antipathy of the Kurdish population towards the AKP would have played a fairly significant role in the fall of the ruling party’s contenders. This is supported by the fact that the People’s Democratic Party (HDP), the most popular party among Kurds, refrained from putting forward mayoral candidates in seven major municipalities in order to increase chances of the main opposition nominees (Daily Sabah 2019).

Immigration proved to be one of the most crucial points of contention between the public and the government, and to some extent cost Erdoğan votes. The Syrian civil war and Turkey’s involvement in the conflict contributed to the massive flow of Syrian refugees to the country which became an immense challenge for Turkey. 

According to UNHCR (2019), Turkey shelters 3.6 million registered Syrian refugees, which makes it the largest host-country in the world. However, the public position on the AKP’s foreign policy of accepting high amounts of refugees has been critical since the eruption of the Syrian civil war. Turkey witnessed a number of demonstrations against refugee policy in the major cities of the country, some of them ending in violent clashes with authorities (Middle East Eye 2014). 

Lastly, despite rising authoritarianism, oppression, and a number of domestic and foreign political challenges, Erdoğan and his party had still managed to retain public popularity throughout the previous 16 years. The main explanation for this apparent anomaly is found in the rapid economic development of the country during the early years of Erdoğan’s reign. In this particular period, the economy of Turkey reached its highest numbers in the modern history of the republic. However, this situation has worsened gradually since the economic peak in 2008, culminating in a total breakdown in Turkey’s economy last year. Compared to the 7.4% growth in 2017, last year (2018) reached only 2.6% (Pitel 2019). Erdoğan faces his first recession in a decade, while the country suffers from a 20% inflation, 13.5% unemployment rate, and high levels of corruption. 

The AKP’s failure in the 2019 Turkish elections was a complex outcome, one which cannot be explained through consideration of present processes alone and calls for a deeper examination of the party’s political narrative. However, though the existing economic problems cannot solely explain the AKP’s slump in the last vote, it can clarify why this happened this year and not in previous elections. The reason behind this development is that the recent economic crisis became the final piece in the puzzle of the public discontent with the AKP’s rule. Erdoğan’s party managed to retain the necessary popularity throughout previous elections, predominantly due to Turkey’s economic welfare and growth, but last year deprived many supporters of the AKP of their last remaining argument.

Sources:

Azeri, S., 2016. The July 15 Coup Attempt in Turkey: The Erdoğan–Gulen Confrontation and the Fall of ‘Moderate’ Political Islam. Critique: Journal of Socialist Theory, 44(4), pp. 465-478.

Barkey, H., 2019. 'If we lose Istanbul, we lose Turkey': why the mayoral election is so critical to Erdoğan's hold on power. The National. [Online] Available at: https://www.thenational.ae/opinion/comment/if-we-lose-istanbul-we-lose-turkey-why-the-mayoral-election-is-so-critical-to-erdogan-s-hold-on-power-1.876754

CIA, 2018. The World Factbook: Turkey. [Online] Available at: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/tu.html [Accessed 17 April 2019].

Daily Sabah, 2019. HDP says it won’t run candidates for Istanbul, Ankara, 5 other municipalities. [Online] Available at: https://www.dailysabah.com/elections/2019/01/28/hdp-says-it-wont-run-candidates-for-istanbul-ankara-5-other-municipalities [Accessed 18 June 2019].

Demiryol, G. İ., 2018. Turkey’s Arendtian Moment: Gezi Park Protests. Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies, 20(6), pp. 531-546. Middle East Eye, 2014. Istanbul residents in violent protest over Syrian refugees. [Online] Available at: https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/istanbul-residents-violent-protest-over-syrian-refugees [Accessed 19 June 2019].

Morris, C., 2018. Reality Check: The numbers behind the crackdown in Turkey. [Online] Available at: https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-44519112 [Accessed 14 April 2019].

Özsel, D., Öztürk, A. & Ince, H. O., 2013. A Decade of Erdoğan's JDP: Ruptures and. Critique: Journal of Socialist Theory, 41(4), pp. 551-570.

Pitel, L., 2019. Turkey falls into recession as lira crisis takes long-lasting toll. [Online] Available at: https://www.ft.com/content/92818e7c-43c6-11e9-b168-96a37d002cd3 [Accessed 21 April 2019].