Drugs and Diplomacy in Syria

This article tackles the involvement of the Syrian government in drug trafficking, to then delve into and evaluate the economic, diplomatic and military measures undertaken by Western governments and Arab states to curtail the smuggling of Captagon.

BY Marco Malaguzzi 


A narcoregime

Captagon, the commercial name of Fenethylline, is a synthetic drug first produced in West Germany in the 1960s to treat depression, attention deficit disorder and narcolepsy. It became illegal in most nations when, in 1986, the World Health Organization (WTO) blacklisted Fenethylline because of its addictive properties. Nonetheless, today Captagon is the most common recreational drug sold in Western Asia, and the origin of this illicit trade can be traced back to Lebanon and Syria [1].

Both the United Kingdom and the United States have accused the Assads’ regime to be directly involved in the trafficking of Captagon [2]. The seizure in Greece of a ship that carried drugs worth $113 million, en route from the government’s stronghold of Latakia, seems to confirm this allegation, being hardly possible for the regime to not be aware of such a significant shipment [3]. An investigation of the New York Times has found out that Maher al-Assad, brother of the Syrian president and commander of the Fourth Armored Division, oversees the production and distribution of this drug [4]. Jordanian security officials have also accused some Syrian military units deployed close to the border of being involved in drug smuggling [5]. The British government estimates that the Syrian regime has earned more than $57 billion selling Captagon, a business which is “worth approximately 3 times the combined trade of the Mexican cartels” [2].

Sanctions, diplomacy and raids

The estimates of the profits vary, but most observers recognize that the drug trade provides a financial lifeline to the Syrian government. In December 2022, in the attempt to stop the drug flows, the Biden’s administration signed the Captagon Act, which increased the cooperation between agencies belonging to different branches of the US government on this issue. This is just the latest measure that the United States has imposed on Syria. The Assads’ regime was first sanctioned by the US government in 1979, when the Department of States inserted Syria in the list of “State Sponsors of Terrorism”. In 2004, additional sanctions were imposed by the Bush’s administration, to punish the Syrian government which at the time was trying to develop weapons of mass destruction. Nonetheless, the heaviest sanctions came only in 2011. After the beginning of the civil war, the European Union, the United States and their allies harshened and widened their economic measures against the Assads’ regime [6].

Several Arab states have also increased their efforts to disrupt the drug flows. On the 27th of January 2022, the Jordanian army announced that it had killed 27 smugglers in a shootout that had taken place in a village close to the border with Syria, during a raid which led to the confiscation of large quantities of narcotics [7]. Moreover, Saudi authorities have recently announced the largest seizure of drugs in the history of the kingdom, when the border police found 46 million of pills hidden in a shipment of flour. Six Syrians were arrested in the operation [8]. Observers have recently attributed an airstrike in Syria that killed Marai al-Ramthan, a suspected drug smuggler, to the Jordanian air force, which has refused to comment on this allegation. Nonetheless, this bombing took place shortly after a statement by Jordanian authorities in which they warned that they were willing to use force in Syria to stop the smuggling [9]. Similar operations could lead to further foreign involvement and escalation in the Syrian conflict, especially now that Russia, sponsor of the regime, had to reduce its troops in the country to consolidate its position in Ukraine.

Regardless of the level of effort that states invest in border controls and antidrug operations, diplomacy may prove to be more effective than crackdowns. In February 2023, when a major earthquake struck Northern Syria and Southern Turkey, Saudi planes landed for the first time in airports controlled by the Assads’ regime carrying humanitarian aid. This began a rapprochement between Syria and Gulf states which, during the civil war, had supported the insurgents. The participation of the Syrian president Bashar al-Assad in the summit of the Arab League that occurred on the 19th of May 2023 signals that negotiations are taking place behind the scenes.

Another important stakeholder

One of the numerous demands made by Arab leaders to the Syrian government is to repress the trade of Captagon [10]. Whether the regime is willing to do it or not has still to be determined. The destruction caused by the civil war, the harsh economic sanctions and the continued military confrontation with Israel and the militias that still control the Northern province of Idlib have made the regime extremely reliant on drug trafficking. The Gulf states will have to financially support Syria, to partially or totally substitute the incomes granted by Captagon.

Furthermore, despite the evidence on the Assads’ regime’s involvement in trafficking, it is not clear to what extent it controls the production and distribution of drugs. Some facilities supplying drugs are entirely controlled by Hezbollah, a Lebanese political party and militiaallied with the Syrian government. Some others are jointly run with the abovementioned Fourth Armored Division. Furthermore, other laboratories are independent. Hezbollah sent fighters to help the Assads’ regime during the civil war. Hence, it now controls not only the border between the two countries but also large swaths of land in Syria [11]. Analysing Hezbollah’s involvement in smuggling goes beyond the scope of this article, but many analyses show that drug trafficking is the main source of revenues for the group [12]. It is not clear if the Lebanese group will agree to close its production facilities in Syria, nor if the Assads’ regime would be able to impose their closure, because of its weak control of the territory, often outsourced to allied militias. Therefore, even if the Syrian government agree to do so, it is impossible to say to what extent the regime can stop the trafficking of Captagon that reaches other Arab states from Syria.

Conclusion

Despite Western governments’ and Arab states’ growing attention and effort to curtail Captagon trafficking, outcomes are still to be seen and the Assads’ regime may not be willing or able to meet their demand. This can prove to be a serious obstacle to any rapprochement between Syria and its neighbors and military actions like the one undertaken by Jordan may become more common in the near future.

References

[1] The National News, “What is Captagon, the highly addictive drug sweeping the Middle East?” (October 2021), https://www.thenationalnews.com/mena/captagon-crisis/2021/10/25/what-is-captagon-the-drug-sweeping-the-middle-east/

[2] Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office of the British government, “Tackling the illicit drug trade fuelling Assad's war machine” (March 2023), https://www.gov.uk/government/news/tackling-the-illicit-drug-trade-fuelling-assads-war-machine

[3] Reuters, “Greece seizes big drugs haul from Syrian freighter sailing for Libya” (December 2018), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-greece-drugs/greece-seizes-big-drugs-haul-from-syrian-freighter-sailing-for-libya-idUSKBN1OD1RF

[4] Ben Hubbard and Hwaida Saad, The New York Times, “On Syria’s ruins, a drug empire flourishes” (December 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/12/05/world/middleeast/syria-drugs-captagon-assad.html

[5] MEMO – Middle East Monitor, “Jordan army official confirms Syria military assists drug traffickers” (May 2022), https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20220518-jordan-army-official-confirms-syria-military-assists-drug-traffickers/

[6] U.S. Department of States, “Syria Sanctions”, https://www.state.gov/syria-sanctions/

[7] BBC World News, “Jordanian army says it killed 27 drug smugglers from Syria” (January 2022), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-60147224

[8] BBC World News, “Saudi Arabia seizes record 46 million amphetamine pills hidden in flour” (August 2022), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-62736126

[9] AlJazeera, “Jordan behind attack that killed drug trafficker in Syria: SOHR” (May 2023), https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/5/8/sohr-attack-that-killed-drug-trafficker-in-syria-was-by-jordan

[10] Alexander Longlois, Gulf International Forum, “Saudi Arabia and Syria’s Rapprochement: A Sign of Regional Shift in the Middle East”, https://gulfif.org/saudi-arabia-and-syrias-rapprochement-a-sign-of-regional-shift-in-the-middle-east/

[11] Lina Khatib, Global Initiative, “Lebanon’s role in Syria’s Captagon trade” (March 2022), https://globalinitiative.net/analysis/syria-lebanon-captagon-ocindex/

[12] Arab News, “Explained: How Hezbollah built a drug empire via its narcoterrorist strategy” (May 2021), https://www.arabnews.com/node/1852636/middle-east