Colombia has been dealing with longstanding internal conflicts provoked by both structural and immediate causes. Against this backdrop, the current government led by Gustavo Petro has adopted an innovative approach to deal with increasing levels of violence and the proliferation of armed groups. This article proposes an early assessment of the first year of Petro’s mandate, highlighting the results he achieved as well as the main challenges he is facing.
BY Elena Potitò
Over the past five decades, Colombia has grappled with internal armed conflicts, resulting in 9,610,391 direct and indirect victims [1]. These conflicts have involved numerous armed groups operating through diverse purposes and modi operandi. While several governments have attempted to counter this issue, violence is still widespread in the country. President Gustavo Petro has adopted innovative approaches to tackle the root causes of armed groups’ proliferation, mainly by embracing the concept of human security. However, after over a year in office, Petro’s government is still not delivering the expected results.
The causes of the Colombian Internal conflicts
The evolution of internal conflicts in Colombia stems from two main structural factors: disputes over land use and possession, as well as the historical failure of the State to establish an inclusive political system [2]. Criminal groups thrive in regions marked by unaddressed inequalities, where the State struggles to guarantee its presence and services to local communities.
These issues have resulted in the proliferation of guerrillas driven by political ideologies or based on purely lucrative aims. The most affected regions are notably in the North and Western parts of the country (see Fig. 1 and 2).
Figure 1. Political violence events in 2022 in Colombia (Source: Acled, Conflict Watchlist 2023).
Figure 2. Share in number of political violence events in Colombian departments, 2022. (Source: ACLED, data elaboration of the author).
While negotiations and Disarmament, Demobilisation, and Reintegration (DDR) initiatives have been carried out since the 1990s, it was only in August 2016 that the Juan Manuel Santos-led government signed the Final Peace Agreement with the main insurgent group in the country, Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia-Ejército del Pueblo (FARC-EP) [3]. Aiming to address the root causes of the war, the accord comprised provisions on political participation, the fight against illicit drugs, comprehensive rural reform, security guarantees, and human rights protection.
This agreement represented a watershed in the history of armed conflicts in Colombia. Nevertheless, the DDR of the FARC-EP created a vacuum in marginalised and predominantly rural areas that had been under this group’s control. Since 2016, the State has been unable to fill this void, yielding the proliferation of new guerrillas and the enlargement of influential armed groups in these territories. The country has since witnessed the fragmentation of active groups and an overall increase in affected municipalities (see Fig. 3).
Figure 3. Number of municipalities affected by armed groups in Colombia 2016-2022 (Source: FIP, Fundación para la Paz, 2023).
Challenges in the implementation phase of peace agreements and ceasefires further intensify internal conflicts. In these cases, a significant issue arises during the gradual demilitarisation of affected territories, as it often leads to heightened clashes among groups vying for territorial control in the absence of military presence.
This is particularly concerning as major groups have been gaining influence, mainly due to increasingly diversified revenue sources and heightened political power. In fact, while many guerrillas lack a distinct ideology, their political significance cannot be ignored since, in certain regions, they have established a power structure that is parallel to the State [4].
Petro’s strategy in an increasingly violent environment
Elected in August 2022, President Gustavo Petro has engaged in overcoming traditional security policies, focusing on the root causes of the conflicts. His approach marks a relevant shift due to his attempt to restore a whole-of-government and whole-of-society approach. This attitude represents a change of course with respect to former President Iván Duque, who undermined the implementation of the 2016 peace accords. The current President not only pledged to advance this process but also proposed a new strategy to address escalating violence [5]. Indeed, over the past decade, the humanitarian impact of armed groups’ activities has steadily risen (see Fig. 4).
Figure 4. Events of humanitarian impact per variable 2014-2023 (August-July) (Source: FIP, Fundación para la Paz, 2023).
Petro has employed both operations of immediate scope as well as long-sighted plans to fight insecurity and demobilise armed groups. Among the former are the emergency plans Puestos de Mando Unificado por la Vida (PMUV) and the Estrategia Integral e Interistitucional para la Vida y la Paz, while the latter comprehend the Paz Total and the Politica de Seguridad, Defensa y Convivencia Ciudadana.
The PMUV aims to deploy prevention interventions to protect social leaders and human rights defenders. Nonetheless, it is still not showing the expected results, as the number of threats has remained stable, and extortion cases have risen. Still, while homicides have overall increased, they have diminished in the municipalities where the PMUV was implemented [6].
Secondly, the Estrategia Integral e Interinstitucional para la Vida y la Paz is a comprehensive policy engaging multiple institutions in the demobilisation of armed groups. It consists of three components: military interventions targeting criminal structures, police efforts to dismantle funding networks, and the judiciary overseeing investigations into group activities.
However, insufficient interinstitutional cooperation represents a significant drawback in implementing this plan.
Furthermore, Petro seeks to bring active groups to the negotiating table through the Paz Total policy. The latter aims to foster two means of dialogue: socio-political with groups aspiring to gain political status and socio-juridical with those still not subject to the judicial system. Currently, the groups included in this initiative are the following:
The ELN, with whom a historical 6-month ceasefire was signed in August 2023, now threatened by a recent abduction;
The Estado Mayor Central (EMC), a dissident faction of FARC-EP. The agreed ceasefire was compromised in May 2023, and no date was set to resume talks;
The Segunda Marquetalia, still denying the establishment of a negotiating table;
The Clan del Golfo (or Gaitanistas), with whom negotiations are stalled mainly because of the lack of a judicial framework applicable to the group;
Los Pachencas, with whom talks halted in the preliminary phase, leading to renewed violence, especially with the Gaitanistas;
Tables were also established in cities to deal with urban violence: Buenaventura, Medellín and Valle de Aburrá, Quibdó.
Mainly due to the absence of a detailed implementation plan for each negotiation table, the Paz Total's impact has not yet been significant.
Lastly, the Politica de Seguridad, Defensa y Convivencia Ciudadana introduces the notion of human security, overcoming the conception of security as the mere absence of violence. It broadens the perspective to necessitate radical changes in established socioeconomic frameworks, ensuring the respect of human rights. Aiming at restoring dignity to every Colombian, the policy seeks to secure violence-affected territories, implement crime prevention measures, and conduct investigations and prosecutions. It underscores the protection of human rights throughout all phases of defence operations. Currently, a primary challenge is the lack of coordination with the other policies of Petro's strategy.
Conclusion
Considering the complexity of the Colombian security environment and the highlighted strategy adopted by Petro, it is possible to draw some final considerations. Firstly, while the innovative shifts introduced in the government's approach to counter armed groups have yet to yield significant results, a comprehensive assessment will only be feasible in the long term. Secondly, a major flaw resulting from this analysis is that the current strategy is not conceived in close relation to the local dynamics in which groups operate. Its effectiveness is hampered by the insufficient consideration of the scale of disputes among groups, the level of violence, and their diverse tactics and strategies. Also, coordination across various administrative levels and governmental branches is still lacking. This context is further compounded by a recent fall in the price and supply of cocaine [8], which emphasized the discrepancy between enacted drug policies and the current security strategy. Ultimately, Paz Total’s effort to bring forward negotiating tables is particularly hampered by the lack of a legal framework allowing the formalisation of armed groups.
Given the challenges faced by Petro's government, it still has ample opportunity to address the identified shortcomings of its security strategy during the remaining three years in office. Thus, despite evident implementation flaws, there is a significant window of opportunity to turn its promises into tangible successes.
References
[1] “Registro Único de Víctimas (RUV)”, Unidad para las Victimas, July 10, 2017, https://www.unidadvictimas.gov.co/es/registro-unico-de-victimas-ruv/.
[2] Grasa, Rafael. “Colombia cuatro años después de los acuerdos de paz: un análisis prospectivo”, Documentos de Trabajo. (2020): 39.
[3] Piccone, Ted. “Peace with justice: The Colombian experience with transitional justice.” The Brookings Institution, July 2019. https://www.brookings.edu/research/peace-with-justice-the-colombian-experience-with-transitional-justice/.
[4] Ortiz, Roman D. “Guerrillas, Terrorists, or Criminals? The New Face of Antistate Violence”, in 2016 Routledge Handbook of Latin American Security, ed. David R. Mares and Arie M. Kacowicz (Routledge, 2016): 218.
[5] “Paz Total, Disputas E Inseguridad En El Primer Año Del Gobierno Petro.”, FIP, Fundación Ideas para la Paz, December 2023 . https://ideaspaz.org/publicaciones/investigaciones-analisis/2023-08/paz-total-disputas-e-inseguridad-en-el-primer-ano-del-gobierno-petro.
[6] Ibid
[7] “ELN Concedes Abduction of Diaz’s Father Was ‘Mistake,’ Vows Release.” France 24, November 4, 2023. https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20231104-eln-concedes-abduction-of-diaz-s-father-was-mistake-vows-release.
[8] Doherty, Sean. “Colombia’s Coca Market Crash Unlikely to Impact Cocaine Trade.” InSight Crime. April 29, 2023. https://insightcrime.org/news/colombias-coca-market-crash-unlikely-to-impact-cocaine-trade/.
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