In 1991, Samuel P. Huntington espoused the concept of ‘democratic waves,’ in which he highlighted the democratisation of Latin America, among other regions, during the so-called ‘third wave.’ However, the rightward shift in politics and the expansion of executive powers for many presidents in the region may signal a reversal that will lead to new illiberal democracies on the continent. President Bukele consolidated his power in El Salvador through a prolonged state of emergency to fight las pandillas, while President Noboa is using the narco crisis to extend military power in Ecuador. In Argentina, President Milei is using the country's difficult economic situation to disempower the Argentinian Congress. This epidemic of autocratisation, also known as democratic backsliding, threatens the survival of liberal democratic values on the continent, casting the region's future in doubt.
BY Andrea Di Marcoberardino
In a book published in 1991 titled The Third Wave, Samuel P. Huntington talks about democratic waves, defining them as “a group of transitions from non-democratic to democratic regimes that occur within a specified period and that significantly outnumber transitions in the opposite directions.”[1] According to Huntington, the world has lived through three democratic waves. The first two were followed by a reversal moment in which autocratic shifts outpaced democratisation.[2] During the third wave in the 1980s, Latin America was the region that had the most countries transitioning into democracies. By the end of the 1970s, most of the region was ruled by autocratic leaders.[3] However, by 1995, Cuba and Haiti were the only countries still under authoritarian governments.[4]
The third wave is now receding, replaced by a new wave of illiberal governments which consolidate power in the hands of the president. The number of Latin American leaders who have sought or been granted exceptional power has risen significantly, weakening parliamentary authority and eroding the principle of separation of powers. The concept of advocating "for exceptional circumstances, also exceptional remedies"[5] is not to be interpreted absolutely. Exceptions should operate exclusively within the framework of the Constitution, adhering to its guidelines and fundamental principles, particularly when it comes to separation of powers.[6] Daniel Noboa, president of Ecuador, and Javier Geraldo Milei, president of Argentina, are the latest to request an increase of their powers from the national parliaments. The justification in Ecuador is the escalation of violence of narco groups, while in Argentina, it is ostensibly to fight the economic crisis. However, regardless of the various justifications, the practice of expanding executive power has become far more common.
El Salvador (2019)
The president of El Salvador, Nayib Armando Bukele Ortez, came to power with the promise to eradicate the country’s gangs (pandillas). His victory can be explained by the fact that at the time of Bukele's election, El Salvador was one of the most violent and corrupt countries in the world.[7] Bukele managed to reduce the number of homicides, kidnappings, aggressions and other violent crimes connected with the pandillas immensely. However, his method of arbitrary detention, particularly in lower-income areas, and continuous violation of human rights in the prisons raised much concern in the political opposition and international organisations. As is typical in regimes that experience a sudden increase in executive prerogatives, everything started with the declaration of a State of Emergency in March of 2022, which has been repeatedly renewed since. The State of Emergency has allowed Bukele to evade accountability to the national congress for his decisions. Over 66,000 arbitrary detentions have led to inhumane treatment of detainees, who are sometimes deprived of food, personal space, healthcare and other basic services. The United Nations (UN) High Commission for Human Rights wrote about the El Salvador prison situation: “Conditions in frequently overcrowded places of detention are also deeply concerning. We have received allegations of serious violations of prisoners’ rights, such as prolonged solitary confinement and inmates with chronic disease not receiving prescribed medication.”[8] Furthermore, Bukele has used his new powers to repress media coverage of political opponents and to run for a second term, which many jurists have declared unconstitutional in El Salvador. Although the country's Supreme Court ruled in favour of reelection, international lawyers and activists in El Salvador still decried the act's unconstitutionality.[9] They considered the court's ruling biased since most of the judges were appointed by Bukele’s government.[10]
Ecuador (2023)
On the 8th of January 2024, Ecuadorian President Daniel Noboa declared a 60-day State of Emergency in the country after the narco groups generated a spike of violence and terror in the prisons and the streets of Ecuador.[11] This situation allowed the President to give exceptional prerogatives to the armed forces. These included the chance to detain anyone without evidence and use any means necessary to capture what Noboa defined as a “Narco Terrorist.”[12] Even though the situation in Ecuador is chaotic; there is inherent danger to democracy in giving nearly unlimited power to a military answerable only to the President. Despite the apparent logic: concentrating power in the hands of the President during critical moments and extensive use of the military rest on undemocratic principles.[13] Noboa emphasised in an interview with CNN that Ecuador's situation is distinct from that of El Salvador and that Ecuadorian democracy remains strong.[14] However, there are concerns that the increased powers granted to the government and military to combat drug trafficking may not be fully reversed and set a dangerous precedent. It raises the question of whether this is the best approach to tackling narco gangs and if it is adversely affecting the state of democracy in the country.
Argentina (2023)
The newly elected President of Argentina, Javier Gerardo Milei, conscious of his lack of support inside the national congress, decided to start his presidency with a Necessity and Urgency Decree (Decreto de necesidad y urgencia) of 82 pages to act without approval from the Argentine parliament. Such a significant decree can be partially explained by a plan to privatise all national companies, deregulate work and repress protests and opposition. However, Milei did not limit himself to acting within the emergency decree. He also presented Congress with a massive legal proposal called “ley omnibus,” containing over 500 articles,[15] some of which discuss establishing new powers for the president and his government. In the case of Argentina, the executive’s desire to increase its power does not rely on the justification of a war on organised crime, but rather on the long-standing economic crisis. The outcome of these policies is similar: an increase of power for the President and his inner circle. At the same time, the opposition is prevented from balancing this power, inside or outside of governmental institutions.
Conclusion
El Salvador, Ecuador, and Argentina are just some of the most recent examples of what can be defined as an epidemic of illiberal democracies, with Latin America being one of the most affected continents. Other countries in the region, like Venezuela and Cuba, have long-standing autocratic governments. The trend of governments expanding executive power is worrying in a continent that has long suffered from dictatorship and political instability. Backsliding democracies can discredit the principles of civil and social rights while still showing some democratic appearance. In the words of Fareed Zakaria, “[i]lliberal democracies gain legitimacy, and thus strength, from the fact that they are reasonably democratic. Conversely, the greatest danger that illiberal democracy poses – other than to its own people – is that it will discredit liberal democracy itself, casting a shadow on democratic governance.”[16] A healthy democracy depends on the principle of constitutional liberalism and with it, the principles of fair competition and separation of powers.[17]
References
[1] Huntington, Samuel P. The Third Wave. University of Oklahoma Press, 1991.
[2] Ibid
[3] Zanatta, Loris. Storia dell’America Latina Contemporanea. Editori Laterza. 2010.
[4] Ibid
[5] Rendón, Carlos Adolfo Zúñiga. “The Separation of powers in the state of exception.” Revista de la Facultad de Jurisprudencia Pontificia Universidad Católica del Ecuador, 2020: 221-247.
[6] Ibid
[7] Freedom House. Freedom in the world 2018: El Salvador. 2018. https://freedomhouse.org/country/el-salvador/freedom-world/2018
[8] United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner. “El Salvador state of emergency.” United Nations. 28 March 2023. https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-briefing-notes/2023/03/el-salvador-state-emergency
[9] Associated Press. El Salvador’s president is running for reelection, though critics say the constitution prohibits him. 2023. https://apnews.com/article/el-salvador-nayib-bukele-reelection-constitution-fd0ba55b47db603b8cb7719e2a87fc34
[10] Ibid
[11] CNN Español. Así funciona el estado de excepción en Ecuador: restricciones, horarios y duración. 2024.https://cnnespanol.cnn.com/2024/01/10/asi-funciona-estado-de-excepcion-ecuador-restricciones-horarios-duracion-orix/#:~:text=(CNN%20Espa%C3%B1ol)%20%2D%2D%20Ecuador%20se,la%20seguridad%20de%20los%20ciudadanos.
[12] Noboa, Daniel. Interview. By Amanpour Christiane. CNN News. 2024
[13] Rendón, Carlos Adolfo Zúñiga. “The Separation of powers in the state of exception.” Revista de la Facultad de Jurisprudencia Pontificia Universidad Católica del Ecuador, 2020: 221-247.
[14] Noboa, Daniel. Interview. By Amanpour Christiane. CNN News. 2024
[15] Criales, José Pablo. Milei propone un alto al fuego sobre su ley de desguace del Estado y renuncia a sus principales reformas fiscales. 2024. https://elpais.com/argentina/2024-01-28/milei-propone-un-alto-al-fuego-sobre-su-ley-omnibus-y-desiste-de-sus-principales-reformas-fiscales.html
[16] Zakaria, Fareed. “The Rise of Illiberal Democracy.” Foreign Affairs, 1997: 22-43
[17] Ibid.
