Myanmar's Juntas celebrated the 8th anniversary of signing the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) in the country's capital, Nay Pyi Daw, on October 15. However, this anniversary occurred against the backdrop of the February 2021 military coup, which cast doubt on the validity of the NCA, sparked armed conflict in minority ethnic areas, and expanded conflict theatres into Burman-dominated regions. The military's repressive actions against pro-democracy individuals and organisations have fueled armed resistance movements nationwide. Simultaneously, international initiatives to mediate dialogue remain elusive. This article attempts to decipher the complex and dynamic web of stakeholders and assess the existing efforts for dialogue.
BY Nyein Thant Aung
A Brief Retrospective on the Current Crisis in Myanmar
The Myanmar military conducted a coup on February 1, 2021, detaining civilian leaders and members of parliament and rejecting the results of the 2020 General Election based on allegations of electoral fraud. Peaceful mass demonstrations marked the first three months following the coup, eventually met with brutal repression by the regime. To resist, expelled MPs established the Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw (CRPH), a parallel parliament. On March 14, 2021, they asserted citizens' rights to engage in self-defence in response to terrorist violence.[1] Subsequently, community-based civil defence forces emerged to protect pro-democracy individuals and organisations from junta attempts to apprehend them. Unfortunately, the so-called counterterrorism operations of the junta led to an increase in the number of internally displaced persons. As a result, hundreds of young people sought refuge in border regions controlled by Ethnic Armed Organisations (EAOs), where they received rudimentary defence training and formed Local Defence Forces. [2]
CRPH and allied EAOs formed the National Unity Government of Myanmar (NUG) as a parallel government structure against the junta on April 16, 2021. On May 5, 2021, NUG’s Ministry of Defence proclaimed the formation of an official armed wing, the People's Defence Forces (PDF) [3] and declared the People’s Defensive War on September 7, 2021. As of early 2022, reports said there are more than 300 resistance forces, including NUG’s PDFs and local defence forces. [4] Before February 2021, most of the regime's military engagements were in regions bordering Bangladesh to the west, China to the north, and Thailand to the east. However, the conflict's scope has expanded in the plains region since the official announcement of the People’s Defensive War. [5]
International Responses and the Recognition Game
The United States was the first foreign nation to take action against the junta, three days after the coup, freezing USD 1 billion in assets held in the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. [6] China and other nations in the region have called for a constitutional and legal framework to resolve the crisis and preserve political and social stability. [7] Under Indonesia's leadership, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) attempted to mediate as a regional bloc by convening dialogues between the parties involved. [8] However, since the coup's inception, there has been an ongoing game of international recognition between the junta and the parallel entity, the NUG.
As of the time of writing, most countries, except Russia, do not recognise the junta as Myanmar's legitimate government. They have yet to invite the military regime to high-level official meetings or forums. In contrast, the United States, the United Kingdom, and European nations have welcomed the visits of NUG ministers of foreign affairs, human rights, health, and education. However, their official statements have predominantly supported the pro-democracy movement in Myanmar. The United Nations (UN) retains the ambassador of Myanmar, who refuses to represent the junta as a legitimate government. [9] Since the mutiny, Myanmar's highest-ranking officials have been conspicuously absent from ASEAN summits.
The ASEAN Leaders' Meeting reached the Five-Point Consensus (5PCs) on the Myanmar crisis on April 24, 2021. The 5PCs demanded an immediate cessation of violence, dialogue between all parties, the appointment of a special envoy by the ASEAN Chair, humanitarian assistance from the ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Humanitarian Assistance on Disaster Management (AHA Centre), and the visit of the special envoy and delegation to Myanmar to meet with all parties [10]. Although the coup leader was present at the meeting and agreed to the five-point consensus, the regime allowed only two visits by the special envoy appointed by Cambodia in 2022. [11] A significant shortcoming of the 5PCs is the need for a mechanism for implementing the consensus agreement. ASEAN's constant rotation of the special envoy undermines the possibility of constructive dialogue.
However, the game of recognition is convoluted because the military controls tangible resources, such as bureaucratic mechanisms, whereas the NUG enjoys de facto support. Although nations and regional institutions do not recognise the military juntas at high-level meetings, the European Union and ASEAN have yet to host any representatives from the NUG. ASEAN has invited Myanmar's non-political representatives to the Summit [12], but the seat for Myanmar remains vacant. The description of the 'non-political representative' remains ambiguous, with questions about whether the junta and the NUG can concur on a single representative or if each party must appoint a separate representative.
While ASEAN has yet to make progress in addressing the Myanmar crisis, neighbouring countries, including Thailand, China, and India, started convening the Track 1.5 dialogue, which is an informal platform for both government officials and academia where they can engage in discussions beyond the official agenda [13]. Critics assert that Thailand’s effort for Track 1.5 dialogue is to legitimise the junta by inviting the regime’s foreign affairs minister.[14] Conversely, the representation from NUG did not yield any reports.
The absence of NUG in Track 1.5 highlights the existence of structural limitations. One critical aspect is that a significant portion of the NUG's leadership is in exile. Furthermore, it is crucial to note that the NUG's de facto power is dependent on the level of public support, which is currently incompatible with the idea of engaging in dialogue with the military. This dynamic highlights the complexity of the crisis and the challenges of finding a solution through dialogue.
The probability of Dialogue
Cease-fire talk is not new in Myanmar. The military attempted to negotiate a cease-fire with armed ethnic groups in the 1990s in exchange for financial concessions, but they were unable to bring about peace. Three of the eight organisations that had signed the nationwide ceasefire agreement in 2015 withdrew when the conflict theatre widened after the coup. [15] Some significant progress remains to be made, even with the regime's negotiations with non-signatories since the coup. The literature on peacebuilding and ceasefire negotiations suggests that neither autocratic nor democratic governments would engage in dialogue with the newly formed armed group. [16] The application of this scenario to the Myanmar military implies that the regime is unwilling to engage in dialogue with the NUG.
NUG is not against the idea of dialogue, but they demand the immediate cessation of junta violence as a precondition. [17] Regarding the Track 1.5 debate, the NUG has emphasised adherence to the five-point consensus (5PCs) and expressed support for ASEAN's five-point consensus. Moreover, the NUG has put up an all-inclusive proposal due to its reliance on public support. It reflects that NUG’s current status is a consultative body rather than its role as a main dialogue partner. This underlines the strategic necessity for a cautious approach to discussion.
Finally, existing approaches to the Myanmar crisis lack two critical components: what issues the mediators seek to resolve. Is it an immediate cessation of violence or a consolidation of peace? Second, third-party mediators require conditions adaptable to the dynamic nature of the conflict. Without a shared objective and identified goal, all dialogue efforts risk failing. The path ahead is challenging, but clarity of purpose and an in-depth comprehension of all parties involved are essential for meaningful dialogue and peace in this complex setting.
References
[1] “Statement Informing the Right of Citizens to Practice Self-Defense in Response to Terrorist Violence.” Committee Representing Pyidaungsu Hluttaw, March 14, 2021. https://crphmyanmar.org/publications/statement-informing-the-right-of-citizens-to-practice-self-defense-in-response-to-terrorist-violence/.
[2] “Youths in Black: Myanmar Protesters Train to Fight Junta.” Reuters, April 27, 2021. https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/youths-black-myanmar-protesters-train-fight-junta-2021-04-27/.
[3] “Opponents of Myanmar Coup Announce Unity Government.” Politics News | Al Jazeera, April 16, 2021. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/4/16/myanmar-silent-strike.
[4] Hein, Ye Myo, and Lucas Myers. “Seizing the State: The Emergence of a Distinct Security Actor in Myanmar.” Wilson Center, November 2021. https://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/seizing-state-emergence-distinct-security-actor-myanmar.
[5] Hein, Ye Myo. “Guest Column: A New Politics Is Taking Shape in Myanmar.” The Irrawaddy, December 9, 2021. https://www.irrawaddy.com/opinion/guest-column/a-new-politics-is-taking-shape-in-myanmar.html.
[6] Lewis, Simon, and Humeyra Pamuk. “Exclusive: U.S. Blocked Myanmar Junta Attempt to Empty $1 Billion New York Fed Account - Sources.” Reuters, March 4, 2021. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-myanmar-politics-usa-fed-exclusive-idUSKCN2AW2MD.
[7] Tiezzi, Shannon. “What the Myanmar Coup Means for China.” – The Diplomat, February 3, 2021. https://thediplomat.com/2021/02/what-the-myanmar-coup-means-for-china/.
[8] Drajat, Gibran. “The Indonesia Factor in ASEAN’s Response to Myanmar.” East Asia Forum, May 21, 2021. https://www.eastasiaforum.org/2021/05/21/the-indonesia-factor-in-aseans-response-to-myanmar/.
[9] Tucker, Sydney. “Myanmar Reveals ASEAN’s Weak Spot Again.” Stimson Center, July 25, 2023. https://www.stimson.org/2023/myanmar-reveals-aseans-weak-spot-again/.
[10] “Myanmar: ASEAN’s Failed ‘5-Point Consensus’ a Year On.” Human Rights Watch, October 26, 2022. https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/04/22/myanmar-aseans-failed-5-point-consensus-year.
[11] Piromya, Kasit. “Reflections on ASEAN’s Special Envoys’ Efforts in Myanmar.” FULCRUM, February 8, 2023. https://fulcrum.sg/aseanfocus/af-reflections-on-aseans-special-envoys-efforts-in-myanmar/.
[12] Bandial, Ain. “ASEAN Excludes Myanmar Junta Leader from Summit in Rare Move.” Reuters, October 17, 2021. https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/asean-chair-brunei-confirms-junta-leader-not-invited-summit-2021-10-16/.
[13] Staats, Jennifer, Johnny Walsh, and Rosarie Tucci. “A Primer on Multi-Track Diplomacy: How Does It Work?” United States Institute of Peace, June 16, 2021. https://www.usip.org/publications/2019/07/primer-multi-track-diplomacy-how-does-it-work.
[14] Abuza, Zachary. “Myanmar, Neighbors Including Thailand Hold Track 1.5 Dialogue without ASEAN Members.” Radio Free Asia, April 29, 2023. https://www.rfa.org/english/commentaries/myanmar-asean-04282023140153.html.
[15] “Who’s Who in Myanmar’s NCA, Then and Now.” The Irrawaddy, October 13, 2023. https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/politics/whos-who-in-myanmars-nca-then-and-now.html.
[16] Powell, Jonathan. Talking to terrorists: How to End Armed Conflicts. London: Vintage, 2015.
[17] “Myanmar’s Civilian Govt Says No Talks with Junta until It Stops Killing Civilians, Quits Politics.” The Irrawaddy, December 2, 2022. https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/war-against-the-junta/myanmars-civilian-govt-says-no-talks-with-junta-until-it-stops-killing-civilians-quits-politics.html.
