Abstract
The Sluzhba vneshney razvedki (SVR) or Foreign Intelligence Service continues to be an extremely potent organisation and key component of Russia’s Security Council in implementing the foreign policy aims of the Kremlin. Accusations of election interference, social manipulation and widespread cyber attacks have put a spotlight on this branch of the Russian intelligence services. This article will provide an overview of the SVR, outlining its origins from the 1990s and how it operates in relation to the Russian President, Vladimir Putin. It will then detail the SVR’s utilisation of active measures (aktivnye meropriyatiya) in the Kremlin’s continuing conflict with the West.
By Adam Campbell
What is the SVR?
“All these claims about cyber-attacks, poisonings, hacks, interference in elections which are blamed on Russia are so absurd, and in some cases so pathetic...it doesn’t seem appropriate to comment. These claims are like a bad crime novel” [1].
- Sergei Naryshkin, SVR Director
The SVR is Russia’s foreign intelligence service responsible for collecting/disseminating intelligence on the Kremlin’s external adversaries After the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991 into its post-Soviet nation-states, the world’s most far-reaching intelligence department, the Komitet Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti (KGB) followed a similar trajectory and splintered into several different and competing agencies. The SVR assumed the role of the KGB’s First Chief Directorate, Pérvoye glávnoye upravléniye (PGU), in dealing with foreign intelligence collection [2].
The current Director of the SVR, Sergei Naryshkin, spent time as Chief of the Presidential Administration in 2008 and as Chairman of the Historical Truth Commission in 2009. A true silovik, some sources find he studied at the KGB Red Banner Institute with fellow alumni Vladimir Putin [3]. His experience with Russia’s foreign policy and time in the upper echelons of the Kremlin has made him a particularly adept figure to lead the SVR in the face of increasing tensions with the West. Naryshkin’s responses to Western accusations have been continually in line with classic Kremlin retaliation, as his denunciations fan the flames of confusion and mistruth that Putin’s hybrid war aims to perpetuate.
Function and Relation to the President
The official role of the SVR is best outlined in the Law “On Foreign Intelligence Organs” passed by the State Duma in 1995, which authorises the SVR to carry out a wide array of activities [4]. Primarily, the SVR focuses on the collection of foreign intelligence. Unlike its military counterpart, the Glavnoje Razvedyvatel'noye Upravlenije (GRU), which gathers intelligence on foreign militaries, among other nefarious activities, the SVR focuses on the collection of strategic intelligence including, economic, scientific and technological intelligence on target individuals, groups or sectors. While the Feraedl'naya sluzhba bezopasnosti (FSB), GRU and SVR’s jurisdictions and activities have increasingly overlapped, the SVR tasks itself with purely foreign intelligence collection and operations.
The law also gives legal authority to the SVR to carry out a range of operations including the recruitment of foreign agents, counterintelligence, electronic surveillance, protection of Russian government officials, as well as protection of Russians overseas. Given the Russian diaspora which followed the collapse of the Soviet Union, this gives the SVR a wide remit in a whole host of countries, which is not clearly defined [5]. Whilst the effectiveness of the SVR’s ability to run operations in countries across the world may be up for debate, the perception that its agents have global reach projects an image of an omniscient organisation, and an omnipresent Russia.
The SVR, like the FSB, provides Putin with a daily report of relevant foreign intelligence issues, allowing significant access to the commander in chief. This shapes not only what Putin sees, but what is produced for him. Putin maintains a relatively open mind in terms of receiving intelligence, enabling the SVR to guide the conversation or prompt wider discussions on certain issues and thus the scope to influence Kremlin policy and operations [6].
As domestic support for Russia’s strongman can peak and trough, the SVR is important in solidifying narratives of external threats in defending against foreign interference. The psychological benefits that come with (seemingly) succeeding in efforts to divide Russia’s enemies and perpetuate their threat is significant to domestic political support for Putin and offers a great deal of purpose to the SVR.
Activities and Structure
Renowned for its discretion, the SVR’s main strategic operations can be generally defined as active measures. A continuation of Soviet methods, these techniques are utilised by a number of other Russian intelligence agencies including the GRU and FSB. Active measures range from waging disinformation campaigns to assassinations. Western governments, intelligence agencies and media outlets have accused this shadowy intelligence service of assassinations, election interference and large-scale cyber-attacks [7]. However, overestimating their role in these activities would be unwise. According to a Russian official, ‘[the SVR] are still more about gathering information and compromising foreigners than killing them; that is usually the job of others’ [8]. Despite Russia’s efforts to deny these operations, active measures have been deployed by the SVR to project Russian power beyond its relative means.
The SVR’s active measures consist of a wide range of operations. This included the placement and maintenance of what is referred to as “illegal” agents or those under deep cover. With the expansion of the internet age, however, the continuation of the deployment of “cyber illegals”, online sock-puppet accounts or social media troll accounts, to gain key strategic intelligence on the internet has continued in a bid to exacerbate socio-political schisms in target countries [9]. Disinformation and electoral influence campaigns have been waged with varying success since 2014, from the Scottish independence referendum to the 2020 U.S. elections.
Furthermore, they are responsible for the “collection” of technological, economic, and scientific intelligence [10]. Theft is perpetrated by SVR-associated advanced persistent threat actors (APT) which include the infamous hacker unit APT029 or “Cozy Bear”. Renowned for the hacking of the U.S. Democratic National Committee in 2016, they have been implicated in a range of thefts, including by the U.S., U.K. and Canadian intelligence services of attempting to steal vaccine technology from their governments and universities [11]. This APT has been linked to several agencies including the FSB and GRU.
Moreover, the SVR was singled out by Washington and London for their role in one of the most significant cyber-attacks suffered by the U.S. in its history [12]. The SVR was accused of infiltrating numerous U.S. government departments including the Treasury Department and for nine months by exploiting vulnerabilities in Microsoft and SolarWinds [13].
Although various publicly available diagrams exist outlining the structure of the SVR, very little contemporary information exists clarifying the inner structure [14]. However, it can be said with certainty that several directorates exist within the SVR, each with a deputy director that reports to the SVR’s Director [15].
The SVR’s second “Analytical” directorate is responsible for the collection and analysis of foreign intelligence. The Departments of Analysis and Information, Informatics, and Economic Intelligence are responsible for these tasks. This directorate is responsible for traditional intelligence collection and dissemination and less concerned with but may provide support to, the Kremlin’s aggressive active measures.
Conclusion
Although the SVR is primarily a force for collecting foreign intelligence and disseminating it to policymakers and the President, it has increasingly become the face of the Kremlin’s active measure campaigns, particularly in the cybersphere. Its inherited KGB DNA has informed how it conducts itself from top to bottom. Its operational focus and proclivity for cyber-attacks and disinformation campaigns prove itself to be a wary adversary for Western nations struggling with democracy promotion abroad and civil unrest at home.
Sources:
[1] BBC News (2021) Russia spy chief suggests West behind SolarWinds cyber-attack [Video] Youtube. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1GyRP3K-6Kk
[2] Galeotti, M. (2016) ‘Putin’s hydra: Inside Russia’s intelligence services’ European Council on Foreign Relations. Available at: https://ecfr.eu/publication/putins_hydra_inside_russias_intelligence_services/
[3] Gazeta.RU (2007) ‘Who is Naryshkin?’ Gazeta.RU. Available at: https://www.gazeta.ru/2007/02/15/oa_231787.shtml
[4] Federal Law of the Russian Federation of January 10, 1996. No. 5-FZ ‘About foreign Intelligence’. CIS Legislation. Available at: https://cis-legislation.com/document.fwx?rgn=1537
[5] Anderson, J. (2007) “The HUMINT Offensive from Putin's Chekist State”, International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, 20 (2), p. 262
[6] Galeotti, M. (2016). “Putin’s Hydra”, p. 12
[7] Muggah, R. (2021). “Why the Latest Cyber Attack Was Different.” Foreign Policy Magazine. January 11th. Available at: https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/01/11/cyberattack-hackers-russia-svr-gru-solarwinds-virus-internet/
[8] Galeotti, M. (2017) “Controlling Chaos: How Russia Manages its Political War in Europe.” European Council on Foreign Relations. Available at: https://ecfr.eu/wp-content/uploads/ECFR228_-_CONTROLLING_CHAOS1.pdf
[9] Riehle, K. P. (2020) “The ghosts of Russian intelligence: the challenges and evolution of Russia’s illegals program”, Intelligence and National Security, Routledge.
[10] Anderson, J. (2007) “The HUMINT Offensive” p. 263
[11] Barnes, J.E. (2020) “Russia Is Trying to Steal Virus Vaccine Data, Western Nations Say”, The New York Times. Available at: https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/16/us/politics/vaccine-hacking-russia.html
[12] National Cyber Security Centre (2021) “UK and US call out Russia for SolarWinds Compromise.” NCSC.gov.uk. Available at: https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/pdfs/news/uk-and-us-call-out-russia-for-solarwinds-compromise.pdf
[13] Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (2021) “Fact Sheet: Russian SVR Activities Related to SolarWinds Compromise” CISA.gov. Available at: https://us-cert.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/publications/CISA_Fact_Sheet-Russian_SVR_Activities_Related_to_SolarWinds_Compromise_508C.pdf
[14] See “Структура СВР России” (image). Foreign Intelligence Service of the Russian Federation website. Available at: http://svr.gov.ru/svr_today/struk_sh.htm
[15] SVR web page. “Structure and Leadership.” Foreign Intelligence Service of the Russian Federation Website. Available at: http://svr.gov.ru/svr_today/struktur.htm
