Abstract
Any talk of the Soviet Union or the Cold War inevitably includes the Soviet Committee for State Security (KGB). Just as the Russian Federation succeeded the Soviet Union, so too did a number of organisations and agencies succeed the KGB. This first article will explore one of these institutions, the Federal Security Service (FSB). Beginning with the history and how the service came to be in modern Russia, this piece will go on to explore the nominal role and functions of the FSB. It will also shine a light on the actual role played by the Federal Security Service in Russian politics and society today, as well as touch on some of the controversy that surrounds this organisation. The purpose of this article is to illuminate the FSB as a service and inspire readers to dig a little deeper into the world of the security services of Russia.
By Nickolas Bruetsch
Series Overview
The Security and Intelligence services of the Russian Federation hold a special place in popular culture and imagination. Drawing upon the legacy of the KGB of the Soviet Union, these organisations are sometimes seen as a monolith or the private instrument of the Russian president. This series aims to shine a light on the following five organisations: The Federal Security Service (FSB), the Main Intelligence Directorate of the Russian Armed Forces (GRU), the Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR), the Ministry of Interior Affairs and the Special Police (MVD and OMON) and finally the Russian National Guard (RosGvardia). Each instalment will be dedicated to exploring the formation, nominal role and how each service is employed in modern Russia. By providing a brief but concise overview this series will serve as a source for newcomers and veterans of Russian security alike.
What is the FSB?
The FSB stands as arguably the most well-known of the modern Russian security services. The FSB is one of the direct descendants of the Soviet Committee for State Security (KGB). During the chaos of the 1990s the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic evolved into the Russian Federation. So too the KGB evolved into a number of successor organisations. Parts of the KGB split up and formed the Federal Service for Counterintelligence (FSK). The FSK took over the roles and responsibilities of the KGB directorates it absorbed. These were Counterintelligence, Military Counterintelligence, Ideology and Dissidents, and Covert Surveillance [1] [2]. The FSK was then reformed in 1995 to be the Federal Security Service (FSB). The FSB has only been led by a handful of men since 1995, notably among them current Russian president Vladimir Putin between 1998 and 1999. Since the presidency of Vladimir Putin, the FSB has only had two chiefs, both of whom are considered to be close Putin allies.
Function and Relation to President
The Federal Security Service is headquartered in the former KGB Lubyanka building, a mere 10-minute walk from the Red Square. As its name implies, the FSB is an internal security service of the Russian Federation. Nominally the FSB has a number of roles it fulfills. While these mostly comprise internal and border security, the FSB also has directorates for military medical units, forensic and scientific subdivisions, as well as special forces and educational centres [3]. The Service also has an anti-corruption unit and an entire subsection of its website devoted to anti-corruption efforts in Russia [4]. There is a certain irony here in that the activities of the FSB are overseen by the President of the Russian Federation, while Alexei Navalny and Catherine Belton have gone through great pains to underline the corruption of President Putin [5] [6]. Overall, the FSB, and its current head Aleksandr Vasilievich Bortnikov, enjoy a seemingly good relationship with Vladimir Putin. Bortnikov was a member of the KGB Counterintelligence service in Leningrad (St. Petersburg) between 1975 and 2004 [7]. While there, he almost certainly knew of and worked[1] [2] with Putin either in the KGB or during Putin’s time as a deputy Mayor.
The relationships between the highest echelons of the Russian Federation and President Putin through the security services is indicative of a broader trend. A 2006 study by Russian sociologist Olga Kryshtanovskaya found that at that time approximately 78% of leading figures across all areas of the government had served in the KGB or one of its succeeding organisations in Russia [8]. These numbers reflect the work of Andrey Soldatov and Irina Borogan who explore the resurgence of the security services in Russia and the Chekist ethos from which the FSB draws [9]. Chekism has its origins in the first Soviet secret police and is the mentality that the security services are the sword and shield of society [10]. Chekism includes the notion that the members of these institutions are not only the best and brightest of society but also above the law [11]. Chekists are called to do everything in their power to preserve the state [12].
Controversies
The actual remit of the FSB goes far beyond its nominal role and is not without controversy. FSB units have been deployed to every major conflict fought by Russia since the First Chechen War in the late 1990s. There are allegations that the FSB was behind the apartment bombing in Moscow in 1999 that ultimately led to the First Chechen War [13]. The FSB was also called to respond to the two most devastating terrorist attacks in Russia. One of these was the Dubrovka Theatre Siege (also known as the Nord Ost Siege). In October 2002, some 40 Chechen terrorists occupied the Dubrovka theatre and took around 850 spectators hostage. The terrorists threatened to blow up the theatre and demanded that Russia end the war in Chechnya within a week [14]. Fearing the worst, the FSB filled the theatre with Fentanyl gas to incapacitate the terrorists [15]. FSB special forces were able to successfully eliminate the terrorists, but did not tend to the theatre goers who suffered from the gas as well. As a result, 130 hostages died, but only five of those at the hands of the terrorists [15]. Another example of the heavy-handed tactics of the FSB is the subsequent 2004 Beslan school hostage crisis, which took place over 3 days and resulted in the deaths of approximately 330 people, including some 180 children [16].
The events of the early 2000s are not the only controversies surrounding the FSB. The poisoning of Kremlin critic Alexei Navalny in 2020 splashed across international headlines. The Bellingcat online research service conclusively linked this poisoning to the FSB [17]. Subsequent investigations showed that Dmitry Bykov, a journalist and intellectual, nearly died due to it in 2019. The FSB is also believed to be responsible for this poisoning. Further allegations include torture and corruption [18] [19] [20]. All of these examples underline the indiscriminate use of force by the FSB to achieve their goals. As evidenced by the events at Dubrovka and Beslan, a result is a steep cost in human life as more civilians died at the hands of the FSB than at those of the terrorists.
Conclusion
As a direct descendant of the KGB, the Federal Security Service remains the most prominent of the Russian security services. In part, this is due to the strong relationship with President Vladimir Putin, it is also partly due to the FSB’s role as the internal security agency of the Russian Federation. The prominence of the FSB is also due to the near unfettered power it enjoys in the Russian political system [21]. Over the years, the FSB has been involved in several scandals and today it continues to face serious allegations. While the Federal Security Service fulfils an important role, it also paints outside the proverbial lines of the law and engages in extralegal and extrajudicial activities [22]. This is unlikely to change unless there is a fundamental political shift in the power structures of the Russian Federation.
Sources
1 Christopher Andrew & Vasili Mitrokhin, The Mitrokhin Archive (New York: Basic Books, 1999) Appendix C.
2 John Pike, “FSB History,” FAS Intelligence, accessed 12 July 2021, https://fas.org/irp/world/russia/fsb/history.htm.
3 “Federal Security Service,” The Russian Government, accessed 12 July 2021, http://government.ru/en/department/113/.
4 “Pukovodstvo”, Federalnaya Sluzhba Bezopasnosti Rossiyskoy Federatsii, accessed 12 July 2021, http://www.fsb.ru/fsb/leadership.htm.
5 Alexei Navalny, “Putin’s Palace,” accessed 12 July 2021, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mMxqTae75Fs.
6 Catherine Belton, Putin’s People (London: William Collins, 2020) 15.
7 Country Profiles Russian Federation, “Biographies of the political leaders of the Medvedev Administration”, in CIDOB International Yearbook 2010, accessed 12 July 2021, https://www.cidob.org/en/layout/set/print/publications/publication_series/cidob_international_yearbook/international_yearbook_cidob_2010_country_profile_russian_federation.
8 Peter Finn, “In Russia, a secretive force widens,” Washington Post Foreign Service, December 12, 2006, accessed 12 July 2021, https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/12/11/AR2006121101434.html.
9 Andrei Soldatov and Irina Borogan, The New Nobility (New York, PublicAffairs, 2010).
10 Robert Coalson, “Russia, why the chekist mindset matters,” RFERL, 15 October 2007, https://www.rferl.org/a/1078954.html.
11 Kyle Wilson, “Putin the Chekist: a sacred calling,” The Strategist, 04 November 2015, https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/putin-the-chekist-a-sacred-calling/.
12 Ibid.
13 Mike Eckel, “Two decades on, smoldering questions about the Russian President’s vault to power,” RFERL, 07 August 2019, https://www.rferl.org/a/putin-russia-president-1999-chechnya-apartment-bombings/30097551.html.
14 Andrei Soldatov and Irina Borogan, The New Nobility (New York, PublicAffairs, 2010), 105.
15 Andrei Soldatov and Irina Borogan, The New Nobility (New York, PublicAffairs, 2010), 116.
16 Andrei Soldatov and Irina Borogan, The New Nobility (New York, PublicAffairs, 2010), 127.
17 “FSB Unit linked to Navalny Poisoning targeted prominent writer –Investigation,” The Moscow Times, 09 June 2021, https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2021/06/09/fsb-unit-linked-to-navalny-poisoning-targeted-prominent-writer-investigation-a74165.
18 “Crimean Tatar close to Dzhemilev says he was tortured by Russian FSB,” RFERL, 10 July 2018, https://www.rferl.org/a/crimean-tatar-close-to-dzhemilev-says-he-was-tortured-by-russian-fsb/29355350.html.
19 Viktor Filinkov, “You should understand: FSB officers always get their way!,”openDemocracy, 28 February 2018, https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/odr/fsb-officers-always-get-their-way/.
20 “Top official implicated in corruption scam with FSB links,” The Bell, 29 november 2020, https://thebell.io/en/top-official-implicated-in-corruption-scam-with-fsb-links/.
21 Ilya Matveev, “How Russia is Really Ruled,” Lecture, RANEPA, St. Petersburg, 08 July 2021.
22 Robert Coalson, “Russia, why the chekist mindset matters,” RFERL, 15 October 2007, https://www.rferl.org/a/1078954.html.
