Georgia Passes Anti-LGBTQ+ Law: A Reflection of Russian Legislation and Influence

In late September 2024, Georgia's Parliament passed a law on "family values and protection of minors," cloaked as a defence of tradition but, in reality, a severe rollback of LGBTQ+ rights. This legislation, which prohibits same-sex marriages, LGBTQ+ adoptions, and positive media representation of queer individuals, aligns with Russia's influence and the Orthodox Church’s anti-LGBTQ+ stance. As Georgia nears the October elections, populist, anti-Western rhetoric intensifies, weaponising anti-LGBTQ+ sentiments. Pro-Russian parties leverage these sentiments to sway voters. The Georgian Dream Party, led by oligarch Bidzina Ivanishvili, stands poised to capitalise on this, hoping to cement Georgia’s ties with Moscow and looking forward to criminalising even more LGBTQ+ communities.

By Andrea Di Marcoberardino

Introduction

At the end of September (2024), the Speaker of the Georgian Parliament signed into law a bill on ‘family values and protection of minors’ [1] that, in reality, is a trojan horse that introduces several reductions to the freedom of LGBTQ+ people in the country. The law was introduced twice given that Georgian President Salome Zourabichvili refused to sign it and sent it back to the parliament; however, the “old-Christian culture and tradition”[2] rhetoric of the conservative groups succeeded, approving the law on its second reading. The law includes prohibitions on same-sex marriages, adoptions by LGBTQ+ couples, and the public portrayal or support of LGBTQ+ relationships and individuals in the media. It also restricts access to gender-affirming healthcare and prevents changes to gender markers on official documents.[3] The Orthodox Church influence, together with the widespread anti-LGBTQ+ disinformation campaign promoted by the Russian Federation, has facilitated the approval of this law that promotes restrictions similar to the ones implemented by Russia. The result is an institutionalisation of homophobia and discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender identity by the state.

The Populist Discourse, the Orthodox Church and the Russian State 

Civilisation populism has a highly relevant role in the Georgian political scene, with many parties resorting to populist messages connected to the Orthodox traditions of the country to spread discrimination against the LGBTQ+ communities. In some cases, even parties whose core ideology may not be inherently populist employ populist language in their messaging to gain support or mobilise voters, with a turn to anti-LGBTQ+ rhetoric.[4] In 2016, Paata Jibladze, representative of the Leftist Alliance, a pro-Kremlin political party that in 2020 decided to join forces with the Patriot Alliance, a right-wing pro-Russian party, declared: “You know what, the starting point for us is our Orthodox Christianity, our traditions, our culture. For us, same-sex marriages, which are supported and protected by European countries, USA, are also unacceptable.”[5] Once again, the typical ‘us ‘ versus ‘them’ populist rhetoric is used to justify restrictive laws against LGBTQ+ minorities. Jibladze reinforces the idea of a typical Georgian person who is orthodox and heterosexual, using the same discourse used by the Kremlin, the discourse of a Western world that wants to impose queerness on countries that are “inherently” heterosexual. However, it is not only the traditional Orthodox rhetoric that is used to promote populist anti-LGBTQ+ discourse but, in fact, it is the Georgian Orthodox Church itself that directly promotes homophobic, discriminatory and violent discourse against sexual and gender minorities (SGM). In 2007, the Georgian Orthodox Church declared: “We want to stress once again that abnormal sexual relations are a mortal sin and have to be confessed. The public propagation of such behaviour will expose the nation to grave danger”[6] Afterwards, a local journal misleadingly reported the realisation of a gay parade, which was not a parade but rather a planned event by the Council of Europe titled «All Different, All Equal,» in which LGBTQ+ speakers participated.[7] This discourse is so eradicated in specific layers of Georgia’s civil society that it is identified as one of the leading causes of its polarisation. As analysed by Geguchadze and Urushadze in Georgia, those with conservative perspectives often see LGBTQ+ matters as the most contentious and vulnerable aspect of Western values; they essentially interpret it as promoting “LGBTQ+ propaganda” rather than safeguarding the rights of individuals with diverse sexual orientations.[8]

The Upcoming elections 

The timing of the new restrictive law's approval is not to be considered coincidental. With the general elections being held on the 26th of October (2024), a new restrictive law gives the anti-Western, anti-LGBTQ+, and pro-Kremlin discourse new vital energy, gaining in this way popular support and consensus that could eventually lead anti-Russian conservatives to vote for Russian-backed parties. Public sentiment in Georgia sends a strong signal that there is significant demand for policies favouring ethnonationalism and the exclusion of various marginalised groups, such as LGBTQ+ individuals, national and ethnic minorities, religious minorities, immigrants, and others.[9] Surveys reveal that the Georgian population tends to be both traditionalist and ethnocentric, with 85% of respondents considering Georgian culture superior to all others.[10] This explains why such restrictive law is not only fuelling a populist discourse but has been purposely approved so close to the elections to polarise civil society and to catalyse conservative ethnocentric votes. 

In this context, the one with the most to gain is the powerful oligarch Bidzina Ivanishvili, former president of Georgia in 2012 and with strong ties with Moscow, where he made his political fortune. His wealth and influence played a crucial role in uniting opposition forces, leading to his rise to power in 2012; now, 12 years and three elections later, a similar coalition of opposition groups could lead to his downfall.[11] However, he is still a solid candidate, and with its economic strength and widespread support, its Georgian Dream Party is likely to be the most voted. Ivanishvili aims to get a constitutional majority, which means enough seats in the parliament to change the constitution and shape the political scene of Georgia for the decades to come. During the campaign, while trying to justify the need for a constitutional majority of the Georgian Dream Party, he declared: 

“In Georgia, the constitution will prohibit so-called same-sex civil partnerships, adoption by LGBT couples, gender reassignment surgeries, LGBT propaganda in media and schools, and so on. Anti-Christian forces are attempting to destroy national, state, and personal identities. Their goal is to make individuals devoid of dignity and morality. They seek to create people without national, religious, or personal identity. Such a person would not even be sure whether they are men or women. Pseudo-liberal ideology has already had the worst consequences for many countries. Therefore, we must resist its spread in Georgia, regardless of the external pressure on this issue.”[12]

His declarations show once again the strong civilisation of populist rhetoric exported from Russia that is used to justify discrimination and marginalisation of LGBTQ+ communities.

Conclusion 

The Russian interference, together with the influence of the Orthodox church, made populist anti-LGBTQ+ narratives very powerful and helped parties like the one of former president Bidzina Ivanishvili gain support. The next Georgian elections will likely shape the future of Georgia, especially in terms of its future positioning on the international scene.  A significant victory of the Georgian Dream Party will likely mean stronger ties of Tbilisi with Moscow, resulting in even stricter laws against LGBTQ+ communities that will lead towards arbitrary incarceration and state-promoted discrimination and violence. In this context, it is fundamental to keep monitoring the conditions of LGBTQ+ individuals in Georgia and trying to prevent the diffusion of Russian disinformation in post-Soviet countries, to avoid Moscow from gaining political influence in these areas and to protect all the communities that are attacked by Russian crafted fake news, of which the LGBTQ+ community is the most affected.

References

[1]Liz Throssell, “Georgia: Call to Rescind New Anti-LGBTIQ+ Law,” UN Human Rights Office, 2024.

[2]Associated Press, “Georgian Parliament Speaker Signs Anti-LGBTQ Law after President Refuses to Sign It,” 2024.

[3] Associated Press, 2024.

[4] George Gogsadze, “Populism in Georgia: Discourses and Narratives Against Sexual Minorities in Parliamentary Elections (2016-2020),” EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF TRANSFORMATION STUDIES 11 (2023): 7–26.

[5] Jibladze as quoted in, Gogsadze, 2023.

[6] Georgian Orthodox Church, as quoted in Ekaterine Aghdgomelashvili et al., Anti-Gender Movements on the Rise? Strategies for Gender Equality in Central and Eastern Europe, 2015.

[7] Aghdgomelashvili et al., 2015.

[8]  George GEGUCHADZE and Maia URUSHADZE, “The LGBTQ Issue as a Supplementary Tool for Polarization in Post-Soviet Countries – the Case of Georgia,” STRATEGIES XXI: The Complex and Dynamic Nature of the Security Environment, February 9, 2022, 84–93, https://doi.org/10.53477/2668-6511-22-09.

[9] Tamta Gelashvili, “Political Opportunities for the Extreme in Georgia” (Project MUSE, 2019).

[10] Pew Research Center. (2018). Eastern and Western Europeans Differ on the Importance of Religion, Views of Minorities, and Key Social Issues.  

[11] Giorgi Lomsadze, “Georgia Prepares for an All-against-One Election,” Euroasianet, October 2, 2024.

[12] Bidzina Ivanishvili, as quoted in Jam news, “Persecution of the Opposition, LGBT ‘Propaganda’ Ban, and Georgia’s Integrity – Bidzina Ivanishvili’s Statement,” August 22, 2024.