Abstract
The final instalment in this series will explore Rosgvardiya the newly formed National Guard in Russia. From its creation and the roles it fulfils, to its leadership and its future uses, the National Guard of the Russian Federation is a force to be reckoned with. This article will delve into all of these themes and underline how Rosgvardiya fits into the security apparatus of the Russian Federation. Readers should ask themselves the following throughout: Is Rosgvardiya a new and improved method of maintaining the internal security, or is the National Guard the personal police of the Russian President?
Introduction
Security is among the most fundamental in Maslow’s Hierarchy of needs [1], and it is sought after by individuals, societies and governments alike. The internal security of a country is usually maintained by a Police force, the Ministry of Internal Affairs or the Ministry of Justice. The previous article in this series explored the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation (MVD). Following on that piece, this article will dive deeper into the role of the newest of the Security Services in Russia: The National Guard of the Russian Federation.
Creation, Formation and Leadership
The National Guard of the Russian Federation, Rosgvardiya, was created under Presidential Decree by Russian President Vladimir Putin in April 2016 [2]. It was not intended to be a new force, but rather a catalyst for reorganising the domestic security forces. Drawing troops from the MVD and others, Rosgvardiya grew to 340’000 staff by November 2016 [3, 5]. Eminent scholar and Russia-watcher Mark Galeotti called the creation of the Rosgvardiya “the biggest shake-up of the security services in decades” [5]. The Service is divided into eight administrative regions that span the entire Russian Federation. While Rosgvardiya lacks the heavy artillery of the Russian Armed Forces, it is similarly organised recognizing both military and police ranks of its staff and those seconded to work there. Moreover, the National Guard of Russia uses some of the same vehicles, aircraft and vessels as the Russian Armed Forces, but has direct access and command over them [4]. Since its creation, Rosgvardiya has been captained by General of the Army (OF-9) Viktor Vasilyevich Zolotov. Zolotov began his career in the KGB in Leningrad as a bodyguard. In the 1990s, he went on to serve as a member of the Presidential Security Service, and later as a member and deputy head of the Federal Security Service (FSB). Within the last decade Zolotov served as deputy (2013) and then commander (2014) of the MVD [6, 7]. Zolotov’s connection to Vladimir Putin runs deep. It is unknown how long the two have known each other, but they both worked for former St. Petersburg Mayor Anatoly Sobchak, and served in the KGB in Leningrad together. Zolotov is seen as one of the hardliners and key silokivi (strong men) in the Kremlin, though Galeotti notes that Zolotov is seen as more of a personal henchman, than a close friend of Putin’s [8]. As Rosgvardiya reports directly to the Russian President, it is unsurprising that Putin would appoint one of his oldest and most loyal allies to lead it [9].
What does Rosgvardiya do?
Vladimir Putin stated that Russia needed a new force to face new challenges when he established the National Guard of Russia. In May 2016 Zolotov said in an interview that Rosgvardiya will work for the “the good of society, the state and law and order” [10]. Rosgvardiya serves a number of nominal roles in the Russian Federation’s security architecture. These include dealing with interior threats, anti-terrorism operations and the protection of strategic facilities [3, 9]. There are two key points that need to be underlined in relation to these roles. The first is that most of the roles Rosgvardiya is tasked with were already assigned to the MVD and its organs, raising the question of whether the creation of Rosgvardiya was actually necessary. The second critical point is that Rosgvardiya has unrivalled freedom and is not subject to external oversight. Given that the force is directly subordinate to the president, critics are justified in referring to it as Putin’s personal police force.
In 2018, the Crimean bridge linking southwestern Russia to the Crimean Peninsula was completed across the Kerch strait. Later that year it was announced that a new marine brigade would be created within Rosgvardiya [11, 12]. This new brigade’s express purpose would be to protect the bridge. This might not seem out of the ordinary at first, but further, inspection highlights a conclusion and a question. First, the existence of a special brigade tasked solely with protecting a bridge emphasizes the significance of the road and rail link between Russia and Crimea. Not only is the bridge an impressive feat of engineering it also acts as a legitimizing symbol of the 2014 Russian annexation and rules over Crimea. This new brigade also begs the question, from whom does the bridge need protecting? The official answer from the Kremlin is the threat of Ukrainian saboteurs [13]. Regardless of their purpose, this new brigade is but one step in the expansion of the capabilities and uses of Rosgvardiya.
Every year the Russian Federation holds a large-scale military exercise to test the readiness and interoperability of its troops. In preparation for the Zapad-2021 (West) exercise due to being carried out in September, Rosgvardiya held exercises of its own. Over several weeks in July, the National Guard was involved in “a number of training tasks aimed at elimination of threats to national and public security of Russia” [14]. Dubbed Zaslon-2021 (Screen), the Rosgvardiya exercise was larger than originally announced and was held simultaneously across almost all regions of the Russian Federation. The exercise included local police, border forces and specialised units of the Russian Armed Forces [15]. At the time of writing, it is unclear what role Rosgvardiya will play in the upcoming Zapad-2021 exercise, but recent activity in Belarus may be an important indicator.
Guarding the Future?
Belarus plays an important role in understanding the future of Rosgvardiya. It serves as an omen in part because it depicts a possible future in which an overly centralised and stagnant regime has resulted in popular unrest and discontent [3]. Analysts argue that Putin created Rosgvardiya with the express purpose of being able to put down such unrest and what are referred to as “color-revolutions” in the space of the former Soviet Union [16]. The future of Belarus is unclear as the anti-regime protests continue [17]. One of the worrying consequences of the unrest is that, as of November 2020, Rosgvardiya is permitted to conduct law enforcement operations within the territory of Belarus. The Cooperation Agreement between the Belarusian Ministry of Interior Affairs and Rosgvardiya [18] outlines areas of cooperation such as maintaining public order and safety, as well as combatting terrorism and extremism [19]. Coupled with the upcoming Zapad-2021 exercise, Rosgvardiya might play a key role in stabilising the Lukashenka regime in Belarus. The future of the National Guard of Russia remains unclear, but the force remains one of the strongest tools at President Putin’s disposal to implement his will.
Conclusion
The following is clear about Rosgvardiya. Although it is the youngest of the Security Services in the Russian Federation, it wields significant power. It enjoys no external oversight and takes its orders directly from the President of the Russian Federation. The National Guard fulfils a wide range of internal security roles, although many of these had been previously covered by the MVD. The remit of Rosgvardiya continues to grow, even crossing borders into neighbouring Belarus. The question still remains, whether the National Guard is playing a vital new role in maintaining the security of the Federation, or instead does this new service act more as Putin’s personal police? The future of Rosgvardiya is unclear but its leadership and structure leave the heavy-handed methods of this force clear as day. As Rosgvardiya continues to come into its own as a member of the Russian security community, it highlights that while the leadership of Russia is centralised around Putin, the Security Services are by no means a monolith.
Sources:
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[2] “Presidential Decree on the Federal Service of National Guard Troops”, President of the Russian Federation, last modified 5 April 2016, http://kremlin.ru/acts/news/51648.
[3] Jason P. Gresh, “Rosgvardiya: Hurtling Towards Confrontation?”, Center for Strategic and International Studies, 21 September 2020, https://www.csis.org/blogs/post-soviet-post/rosgvardiya-hurtling-towards-confrontation.
[4] “Russian National Guard Reaches 340,000 Men”, The Moscow Times, 25 November 2016, https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2016/11/25/russian-national-guard-reaches-340000-personnel-a56308.
[5] Mark Galeotti, “The Silovik-Industrial Complex: Russia’s National Guard as Coercive, Political, Economic and Cultural Force,” Demokratisatiya 29, 1 (Winter 2021): 3-30.
[6] “Viktor Zolotov,” Putin’s List, Database of Free Russia Forum, accessed 10 September 2021, https://www.spisok-putina.org/en/personas/zolotov-2/.
[7] Pete Earley, Comrade J (New York: Putnam, 2007), 240.
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[10] “The 21st Operational Brigade of the Russian National Guard Troops was awarded the Order of Zhukov”, Natsionalnaya Gvardiya Rossiiskoi Federatsii, 10 June 2016, https://web.archive.org/web/20160610231350/http://rosgvard.ru/21-ya-brigada-operativnogo-naznacheniya-vojsk-natsionalnoj-gvardii-rossii-nagrazhdena-ordenom-zhukova/.
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[13] Halya Coynash, “Russia brings in Putin’s ‘National Guard’ ‘to prevent sabotage’ or crush protest in occupied Crimea”, Kharkiv Human Rights Protection Group, 3 August 2018, https://khpg.org/en/1532205778.
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[15] Catherine Hodgson, Will Baumgardner, and Mason Clark, “Russian National Guard (Rosgvardia) Demonstrates New Capabilities in First-Ever Strategic Exercise”, Institute for the Study of War, 17 August 2021, https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-national-guard-rosgvardia-demonstrates-new-capabilities-first-ever-strategic.
[16] Zdzislaw Sliwa, “The Russian National Guard: A Warning or a Message?”, Center for Security and Strategic Research, Working Paper Series, 01/18, February 2018, 4.
[17] Luke Hurst, “Revolt, repression and reprisals: A look back at a year of turmoil in Belarus”, Euronews, updated 09 August 2021, https://www.euronews.com/2021/08/09/revolt-repression-and-reprisals-a-look-back-at-a-year-of-turmoil-in-belarus.
[18] “Cooperation agreement between the Ministry internal affairs of the Republic of Belarus and the Federal service of the troops of the national guard of the Russian Federation”, Pravo.by, 18 December 2021, https://pravo.by/document/?guid=12551&p0=I02000029&p1=1&p5=0.
[19] “Russia’s Rosgvardia Sets Foot in Belarus”, Warsaw Institute, 22 December 2021, https://warsawinstitute.org/russias-rosgvardia-sets-foot-belarus/.
