ABSTRACT
The article attempts to analyse the situation in Taliban-ruled Afghanistan and its possible implications for the neighbouring countries and global powers. It builds arguments based on the ongoing developments in Afghanistan, challenges faced by the Taliban regime, apprehensions of neighbouring countries and risks for competing global powers. It also highlights that the present scenario has the potential of returning Afghanistan back to the status of a hub of transnational terrorist outfits and becoming a field of competition between rival global powers.
BY MUHAMMAD AND SAMAND MUHAMMAD SHAHI
Taliban takeover and the developments thereupon have pushed Afghanistan into multifold crises. The Western-backed state apparatus has collapsed, and the foreign-aid dependent economy is on the brink, as most of the international assistance has halted [1]. The financial sector is paralyzed after the freezing of offshore reserves and the conditions are prone to further deterioration given the rising inflation, greater food insecurity, and increased poverty, on the pretext of which international agencies are warning of a looming humanitarian crisis [2]. The concerns of the international community related to governance and human rights have largely been overlooked by the new regime. While the security vacuum, arising from the withdrawal of U.S. forces, has further exacerbated the situation, posing serious threats to peace and stability in the region.
CHALLENGES FACED BY THE TALIBAN REGIME
This is the Taliban’s second reign but, this time, they face drastically changed dynamics. On the diplomatic front, they stand largely isolated. No country has yet recognized them as a legitimate government, awaiting progress on the major demands of the international community [3] for an inclusive and broad-based government, recognition of human and women’s rights, and to cut ties with transnational and regional terrorist groups. The population which they are going to rule now is ostensibly different than that in 1996. Most of the population is young [4] and was born or raised during the post-US invasion period. It will be difficult for them to give up their freedoms, and the situation may eventually result in unrest and brain drain. But have the Taliban also changed? Despite the gestures shown and pledges made prior to take over, their subsequent actions have left very little room for optimism.
The Taliban are clearly facing a trade-off between the pragmatism required for legitimacy and the hard-line ideological stance required to keep the movement intact. The Taliban movement is united under the umbrella of a hard-line ideology. The propaganda they used to further their cause will now hinder their own path, preventing them from offering concessions to international concerns. Effective progress towards an inclusive government, human rights, and counterterrorism efforts risks not only maintenance of internal cohesion, but also potential gains to their strategic and ideological rival – the Islamic State of Khorasan (IS-K) [5]. Similarly, denying a share in the power structure to other ethnicities (which combined comprise the majority of the population [6]) and political groups could frustrate them to a level where they might also launch a well-coordinated insurgency against the Taliban.
IMPLICATIONS FOR NEIGHBOURING COUNTRIES
In the region, Afghanistan’s neighbouring countries are concerned over the situation and possible repercussions for them. With the possibility of Afghanistan once again becoming a hotbed for regional and transnational Jihadist groups, bordering countries are in trepidation of facing the terrorist spill over in their homelands. Although the Taliban have repeatedly assured that they will not allow the use of Afghan territory for terrorism in any other country, the situation remains problematic. It seems unlikely that the Taliban will effectively cut ties with or counter their jihadist allies like Al Qaeda and other like-minded groups. Such groups have remained in association with the Taliban prior to and throughout their decades-long struggle. The Taliban may not be able to afford to abandon or alienate them at a time when they face the threat of jihadist rivals such as IS-K, even though they have regained control of Afghanistan. In the case of IS-K too, the Taliban’s ability to effectively counter it has yet to be demonstrated. Since the takeover of Afghanistan, as the Taliban struggle to consolidate power and establish their authority and legitimacy, IS-K is conducting deadly attacks in the country.
UN estimates put the number of foreign terrorist fighters, present in Afghanistan, between 8,000-10,000 [7]. The presence of terrorist outfits like the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), the Islamic Jihad Union (IJU), and other splinter groups, has brought a whiff of fear in the Central Asian republics. Iran, however, seems happy with the withdrawal of the U.S. from its backyard but continues to face the challenge of the spread of Sunni jihadism towards it – particularly IS-K. Pakistan, despite cordial ties with the Taliban, faces the threat of Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) whose attacks have increased following the Taliban takeover [8]. Although at present the Taliban are mediating peace talks between the Pakistan government and TTP [9], the history of such engagements is not very encouraging [10]. TTP has already ended the ceasefire [11] and resumed attacks in Pakistan [12].
POWER COMPETITION AND SECURITY VACUUM
Regional actors and big powers might be aiming to accomplish their strategic goals, however, there is uncertainty, unpredictability, and concern about the growing security vacuum in Afghanistan. For instance, despite their earlier goodwill gestures, Russia and China seem to be sceptical rather than enthusiastic in moving forward. Despite potential for the desired regional connectivity and mineral extraction in Afghanistan, China seems concerned about the spillover of radicalization and terrorism to its neighbouring provinces due to the active presence of the East Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM) in Afghanistan. Such groups also pose a danger for Chinese interests in other countries – like Pakistan – the host of the multibillion-dollar China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). Similarly, Russia might also fear unchecked terrorist outreach in the region, particularly Central Asia. While the U.S. is geographically thousands of miles away, China and Russia are more vulnerable to any repercussions given their geographical proximity and wider presence in the region.
However, the U.S. reputation, as a power that could be relied upon, received a serious blow from the dramatic collapse of the Afghan government and abandonment of its former allies amid Taliban advances without a negotiated settlement. It has also created a wide space for other global and regional actors to fill the vacuum and further their interests in Afghanistan. While others may proceed with cosmetic measures, it would be difficult for the U.S. to do the same. Overtly cooperating with the Taliban, in fact, without addressing the concerns of the international community, may further compromise the U.S. reputation.
CONCLUSION
The fragility of Afghanistan under the Taliban means that it retains its potential of returning to the state of becoming a hotbed for terrorism. If the Taliban become unable or unwilling to dislodge their rival and allied jihadist groups and to check the spread of violent extremism, the region will likely face a new wave of terrorism. In every possible scenario, benefiting from the instability therein, rival global and regional players will compete on their security and geopolitical interests – each trying to mould the situation favourable to them. As a result, Afghanistan will remain an epicentre of regional and global power competition.
REFERENCES
[1] The World Bank (2021) ‘Setting Course to Recovery,’ [online] available from https://thedocs.worldbank.org/en/doc/e406b6f24c2b7fdeb93b56c3116ed8f1-0310012021/original/Afghanistan-Development-Update-FINAL.pdf, accessed on 1st December 2021.
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[3] United Nations Security Council (2021) ‘Adopting Resolution 2593 (2021), Security Council Condemns Deadly Attacks in Afghanistan, calls for Combating Terrorism, Upholding Human Rights,’ [online] available from https://www.un.org/press/en/2021/sc14620.doc.html, accessed on 2nd December 2021.
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[7] United Nations Security Council (2021) ‘Twelfth report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant to resolution 2557 (2020) concerning the Taliban and other associated individuals and entities constituting a threat to the peace stability and security of Afghanistan,’ [online] available from https://www.undocs.org/pdf?symbol=en/S/2021/486, 4th December 2021.
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[9] Al Jazeera (2021) ‘Afghan FM Confirms Kabul ‘Mediating’ Talks between Pakistan, TTP,’ [online] available from https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/11/15/afghan-taliban-mediating-pakistan-ttp-talks, accessed on 5th December 2021.
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[11] Rahim, A (2021) ‘Pakistani Taliban Ends Ceasefire, Future of Peace Talks Uncertain,’ [online] available from https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/12/10/pakistan-taliban-ceasefire-peace-talks-ttp, accessed on 11th December 2021.
[12] DAWN (2021) ‘Policeman Martyred in TTP Gun Attack,’ [online] available from https://www.dawn.com/news/1663300,accessed on 12th December 2021.
