Recent allegations of Kim Jong Un’s death have triggered old questions regarding succession within the Kim dynasty and sparked new controversies regarding North Korea’s approach to nuclear weapons. However, these issues have been raised in the middle of a global crisis, namely the COVID-19 pandemic. This article will move the focus from North Korean nuclear weapons to biological weapons capabilities, after introducing the present situation of the country, and will assess its potential for production and use of those weapons.
By Chiara Artico
Over the last month, the news of Kim Jong Un’s alleged death has been bouncing back and forth in the media all over the world. In fact, North Korea’s Supreme Leader had very suspiciously missed a key anniversary on 15 April 2020 [1]. Eventually, the Supreme Leader’s appearance in public on 1 May 2020 silenced the speculation. Nevertheless, some reasonable doubts remain since the credibility of the released footage showing him inaugurating a fertiliser factory cannot be verified [2].
The alleged death of North Korea’s leader sparked a long-standing debate on who his successor would be if he died soon. His health conditions (obesity, smoking, alcohol use, family history of heart diseases) will, sooner or later, represent an issue for his succession [3]. In fact, the dynasty lacks an heir. Kim Jong Un is supposed to have three children, the eldest of whom should be 10 years old, not old enough to take over power [4]. The alternative scenarios range from his younger sister, Kim Yo Jong, to Vice Marshal Choe Ryong Hae. However, it is almost certain that, regardless of the person in power, North Korea would maintain the existing status quo in regards to weapons of mass destruction (WMD) [5]. Nevertheless, despite the sanctions imposed by the United States (US) and the United Nations (UN) on the country’s nuclear policy [6], these are not the only type of WMD.
In the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic, it seems extremely important to analyse another, often overlooked category of WMD: biological weapons. As reported by the World Health Organization (WHO), ‘biological weapons are microorganisms like virus, bacteria, fungi, or other toxins that are produced and released deliberately to cause disease and death in humans, animals or plants’ [7]. It is undeniable that the voluntary employment of a weaponised biological agent by any actor in the international arena would cause inconceivable harm. As stated by William C. Patrick III, an expert on germ warfare in service for the US, ‘a single gallon of anthrax, if suitably distributed, could end human life on Earth’ [8].
In a report published by the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs in 2017, it was stated that North Korea not only has an interest in sustaining a biological weapons program, but also the capability. Taken into account the difficulties in gaining credible information on the totalitarian regime, there are several elements that confirm the concerns of North Korea being a potential producer of biological weapons. It is believed that Kim Il Sung started the program in the early 1960s, after falsely attributing outbreaks of cholera, typhus, and smallpox in the country to biological attacks by the US during the Korean War (1950-1953) [9]. More recently, Kim Jong Un repeatedly denied the existence of such a program, even claiming that it is the US that wants to engage in biological warfare using anthrax against his country [10]. Despite these statements, indicators suggest that North Korea has at least 13 different pathogens at its disposal [11].
Furthermore, North Korea is assumed to have several institutes adequate to produce dual use equipment, that is equipment to be used for both civilian and military purposes. For example, in 2015, official state media released images that showed the Pyongyang Biotechnical Institute, whose structures raised concern among experts precisely as regards dual use. Moreover, it appears that non-compliance to the security standards of these structures should not be considered as an indicator of the non-existence of weapons production. In fact, it was claimed that North Korea has been using human subjects in testing this technology, as further proof of the impossibility to adhere to human rights standards when evaluating the danger that North Korea might pose [12].
Even more important than the availability of the pathogens and the capabilities of producing them in large scale, is the capability of weaponising them. Here is where evaluation difficulties show up. So far, we have outlined some issues that, even with a shadow of a doubt, are reasonably true and known about North Korea. Less certain is the extent to which the country possesses the ability to weaponise the biological agents. Weaponisation demands the capacity to stabilise the agents to make them suitable for dissemination [13]. At first glance, this might seem complex. However, it is assumed that ‘any country having pharmaceutical, cosmetic, or advanced food storage industries will have stabilization facilities similar to those that could be used for biological weapons’ [14]. It remains unclear whether the country would be able to weaponise all 13 different agents since these need different processes and quantities for large-scale production. As stated in the Belfer Center report, some experts assert that North Korea is not yet ready for mass production of biological weapons, but the possibility cannot be ruled out completely [15]. Once the biological agents are weaponised, they would need to be delivered.
Different means of delivery are suitable to different biological agents, depending on several structural factors. The potential categories include missiles, drones, sprayers, and even human vectors [16]. In recent years, Pyongyang has invested in the development of long-range ballistic missiles. In July 2017, the regime first tested the Hwasong-14, an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), followed a couple of months later by its bigger brother, the Hwasong-15. The Center for Strategic and International Studies’ (CSIS) Missile Defense Project elaborated the following two infographics, which perfectly convey the scope of North Korea’s delivery capabilities [17].
The last factor to consider is the potential motivations for North Korea to actually use biological weapons. According to the security experts interviewed by the Belfer Center, North Korea would prefer to use them for tactical purposes, for instance at the beginning of a conflict to seriously damage the enemy’s society and army, sparing its own soldiers [18]. This might also explain why the North Korean army is vaccinated against smallpox [19], a disease which was declared eradicated from our society in 1980 [20] Moreover, Kim, Philipp, and Chung argue it is alarming that ‘North Korea’s broad objective is to “drive out the aggressive forces of the U.S., terminate the dominance and interference of foreign forces… and fight for the unification of the motherland through the unite [sic] of our nation [the Korean peninsula].”’ [21]
For all these reasons, it is evident that the North Korean biological programme might represent a huge threat to international security. Warnings came not only from the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) since 2003 [22], but also from the international security experts of the last three US Presidents, who even described North Korea’s biological weapons program as ‘a global threat’ [23]. Given the power and influence that this might confer to North Korea, it is likely that, as explained regarding its nuclear program, a change of top authority would not entail a change in the approach to such a topic either. After all, Depetris leaves it clear: “balance-of-power dynamics, regional politics, diplomatic relationships, and core security interests are more important than individuals” [24].
Sources
[1] Madden, Michael (May 2, 2020) ‘Kim Jong-un and the brutal North Korea rumour mill’. [Online] Available from: https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-52511812. [Accessed 27 May 2020]
[2] BBC NEWS (May 2, 2020) ‘Kim Jong-un appears in public, North Korean state media report’. [Online] Available from: https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-52508437. [Accessed 27 May 2020]
[3] Terry, Sue Mi (April 26, 2020) ‘What happens if Kim Jong Un dies? No one knows’. [Online] Available from: https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2020/04/26/what-happens-if-kim-jong-un-dies-no-one-knows/. [Accessed 27 May 2020]
[4] ISPI Online Publications (April 27, 2020) ‘Mistero a Pyongyang. La scomparsa di Kim Jong Un’. [Online] Available from: https://www.ispionline.it/it/pubblicazione/mistero-pyongyang-25907?fbclid=IwAR2BB0cMB3a9eUXOABhqpHoZnx37JluGCPA5c6sC-5Z6xwvH5Egg7It7eso. [Accessed 27 May 2020]
[5] Terry (2020) ‘What happens if Kim Jong Un dies? No one knows’.
[6] Depetris, Daniel (April 25, 2020) ‘What If Kim Jong Un Dies?’ [Online] Available from: https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2020/04/what-if-kim-dies/164910/. [Accessed 27 May 2020]
[7] World Health Organization (n.d.) ‘Biological weapons’ [Online] Available from: https://www.who.int/health-topics/biological-weapons#tab=tab_1. [Accessed 27 May 2020]
[8] Baumgaertner, Emily and Broad, William J. (January 15, 2019) ‘North Korea’s Less-Known Military Threat: Biological Weapons’ [Online] Available from: https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/15/science/north-korea-biological-weapons.html. [Accessed 27 May 2020]
[9] Kim, Hyun-Kyung; Philipp, Elizabeth and Chung, Hattie (2017) The Known and Unknown - North Korea’s Biological Weapons Program. Available from: https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/north-koreas-biological-weapons-program-known-and-unknown. [Accessed 27 May 2020]
[10] The Guardian (June 12, 2015) ‘North Korea accuses US of targeting it with anthrax and asks UN for help’ [Online] Available from: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jun/12/north-korea-anthrax-united-states. [Accessed 27 May 2020]
[11] Kim, Philipp and Chung (2017) The Known and Unknown - North Korea’s Biological Weapons Program.
[12] Ibid.
[13] Ibid.
[14] GlobalSecurity.org (n.d.) ‘Biological Warfare Agent Delivery’ [Online] Available from: https://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/intro/bio_delivery.htm. [Accessed 27 May 2020]
[15] Kim, Philipp and Chung (2017) The Known and Unknown - North Korea’s Biological Weapons Program.
[16] Ibid.
[17] Missile Defense Project (June 14, 2018), ‘Missiles of North Korea’, Missile Threat, Center for Strategic and International Studies. [Online] Available from: https://missilethreat.csis.org/country/dprk/. Last modified March 4, 2020. [Accessed 27 May 2020]
[18] Kim, Philipp and Chung (2017) The Known and Unknown - North Korea’s Biological Weapons Program.
[19] Ibid.
[20] World Health Organization (2001) ‘Smallpox’ [Online] Available from: https://web.archive.org/web/20121023143819/http://www.who.int/mediacentre/factsheets/smallpox/en/index.html. [Accessed 27 May 2020]
[21] Kim, Philipp and Chung (2017) The Known and Unknown - North Korea’s Biological Weapons Program, p. 13.
[22] CIA (2003) Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions. Available from: https://www.cia.gov/library/reports/archived-reports-1/july_dec2003.htm#5. [Accessed 27 May 2020]
[23] Baumgaertner and Broad (2019) ‘North Korea’s Less-Known Military Threat: Biological Weapons’.
[24] Depetris (2020) ‘What If Kim Jong Un Dies?’.