In August 2016, Morocco introduced a new gas pipeline project - one that extends all the way to Nigeria. This project is in line with Morocco’s South-South Agenda; a key focus of Rabat’s foreign policy for greater engagement with Sub-Saharan Africa. The Morocco-Nigeria pipeline, both onshore and offshore, would supply gas to 13 countries in West and North Africa as a continuation of the existing West Africa Gas Pipeline (WAGP) between Nigeria, Benin, Togo and Ghana. With a possible extension to Europe through Spain, the Morocco-Nigeria pipeline would be one of the longest worldwide (5,660 kilometers, or 3,517 miles), and a new opportunity for socio-economic development in Western Africa. Yet, the project faces fundamental obstacles. Indeed, this initiative could become an open door to more corruption and disastrous environmental issues — one of the main reasons behind slow social and economic development in West Africa. Furthermore, the pipeline seems to rekindle cross-border tensions regarding the exploitation of natural resources.
By Sahar Lahdifi
Since Morocco’s King Mohammed VI visited Abuja in December 2016, several meetings have followed to assess the technical and economic viability of the project. Two protocols of the agreement have been signed between Morocco and Nigeria, discussing the construction of a gas pipeline and an LNG terminal, a facility allowing for the regasification of Liquified Natural Gas. The 5,660 km pipeline aims to enhance the quality of life – by providing full electrification to the 13 countries – and promote economic and social progress. Indeed, resource extraction is the most important sector of the Nigerian economy, as the country is rich in crude oil and natural gas [1]. Further highlighting the importance of this sector in the region is the fact that the Western region of Africa represents around 30% of the continental natural gas reserves [2], Nigeria being a world leader in gas export.
Following the inability of Algeria to meet its 2002 commitment to construct the Trans-Saharan pipeline [3] linking the country to Nigeria through Niger, Morocco has taken advantage of this vacuum to establish a project in line with its agenda to strengthen cooperation with its sub-Saharan counterparts. This South-South Agenda highlights one of Morocco’s main goals of becoming the ‘electricity hub for North and West Africa’ [4] in terms of electricity traded, capacity building and innovation. However, this Agenda also reveals underlying tensions and competition with Morocco’s neighbour Algeria, the second African leader in gas exports behind Nigeria.
These tensions began during the long-lasting Western Sahara conflict, following the Spanish de-colonisation of the territory in 1975. While Morocco claims sovereignty over Western Sahara, Algeria fully supports the Sahrawi secessionist group Front Polisario for independence. More than a question of identity, this conflict became an issue around access and exploitation of the natural resources of the Sahrawi region, namely phosphate and fisheries. [5]
Notably, after leaving the African Union in 1984 due to the Western Sahara conflict, Morocco rejoined the organization in 2017 [6]. In the same year, Rabat also applied for membership to the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) [7], demonstrating its will to tie a solid relationship with Sub-Saharan Africa. In line with this political advance, the Morocco-Nigeria pipeline seems to be a strong tool for the Moroccan government (Makhzen) to fulfil its aspirations in investing in intra-African exchange and cooperative development projects.
Additionally, cooperation with Europe remains present in Morocco’s agenda. The Morocco-Nigeria pipeline aims at supplying gas to Europe through Spain, as the successful Algerian Maghreb-Europe pipeline already does. Furthermore, the new pipeline is of particular interest for European countries, considering their desire to lessen growing dependence on Russia’s Gazprom pipeline. As Russia is currently constructing a new pipeline, Nord Stream II, it is in Europe’s interest to seek additional energy sources, including those from Africa [8].
However, this African project does not come without obstacles. In March 2018, 40 non-governmental organisations (NGOs) signed a joint-declaration [9] raising fundamental environmental, social, and economic concerns. Indeed, the construction of this pipeline would have considerable environmental implications, as the ‘increase of extraction and consumption of fossil resources’ [10] constitutes one of the main causes of climate change. The use of methane remains uncertain and volatile, and could disturb marine fauna. These environmental impacts, in addition to the risk of chemical waste and potential leaks on fisheries, would fundamentally impact millions of people’s livelihoods, as has already happened in Nigeria. The company Shell, active in Nigeria since 1937, has been accused of causing massive environmental degradation, impacting fisheries and farming. Once again, the current project is criticized as being “top-down”, sidelining the actual needs of the populations in the 13 countries, and the environment. It also goes against Morocco’s main ambition to increase its part of renewable energy sources in the capacity mix, up to 52% by 2030 [11].
When taking a financial stance, the initial US $20bn estimated for the construction of the pipeline would ultimately be more than doubled, constituting ‘an exponential increase of the debt burden’ [12] on highly corrupt countries. The risk is reminiscent of Frank Timis’ bribery scandal in Senegal, where Petro-Tim obtained rights of exploration in 2012, despite their lack of expertise. Evidence has finally been found in 2019 that President of Senegal Macky Sall’s family was granted a significant amount of money from the Timis Corporation, even employing his brother Aliou Sall at $25,000 per month. Oil and gas company British Petroleum is suspected to be complicit in this scandal, as they bought Petro-Tim, and is expected to pay them between $9bn and $12bn in the next year as a royalty rate [13]. Corruption has been one of the main reasons behind slow social and economic development in West Africa, and a new pipeline linking the whole coast would provide more opportunities to potentially aggravate the situation.
Ultimately, the difficulties are not only environmental and socio-economic. Indeed, many armed groups, including Boko Haram, are present in the Delta Region of Nigeria, which could disturb the supply and provision of gas in neighboring countries [14]. In Morocco, the pipeline is supposed to supply the Western Sahara region, despite a frozen conflict that has persisted there. Technical difficulties are also foreseeable, as the 13 countries need to seek governmental approval and legislative concordance for the project, slowing down implementation. Indeed, twelve years were already required for the implementation of the pipeline between Nigeria, Benin, Togo and Ghana (WAGP), and the current multiple geopolitical obstacles facing the project will make it even more difficult for the new project to come to fruition in the near future.
Sources
[1] West Africa Oil & Gas Upstream Market 2019-2024: Increasing Exploration & Production Activities - Nigeria to Dominate the Market, Business Wire, 2019.
[2] L’Afrique de l’Ouest détient les tiers des réserves de pétrole et de gaz du continent, Jeune Afrique, 2008.
[3] Augé B. Le Trans Saharan Gas Pipeline, Mirage ou Réelle Opportunité ? Ifri, Programme Afrique subsaharienne, 2010.
[4] Office National de l’Electricité et de l’Eau (ONEE) au Maroc et en Afrique, Brochure 2015.
[5] See literature on the Western Sahara conflict (e.g. Sahara Occidental, Conflit oublié, population en mouvement, Collection “Civilisation étrangères”, Presses universitaires François-Rabelais, 2018)
[6] Morocco rejoins the African Union after 33 years, Al Jazeera, 2017. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/01/morocco-rejoins-african-union-33-years-170131084926023.html
[7] ECOWAS agrees to admit Morocco to West African body, BBC News, 2017. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-40158089
[8] See literature about the European dependence on Russia for gas import and its risks since the annexation of Crimea (2014) (E.g. Europe’s energy security - caught between short term needs and long-term goals, The Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, Oxford University, 2014).
[9] “Nigeria-Morocco gas pipeline: Not in our interest”, 2018. https://www.cadtm.org/Nigeria-Morocco-gas-pipeline-Not
[10] Ibid, 2018.
[11] Energy Policies Beyond IEA Countries - Morocco 2019, IEA, Country profile Morocco 2018, RES4Med.
[12] Nigeria-Morocco gas pipeline: Not in our interest”, 2018. https://www.cadtm.org/Nigeria-Morocco-gas-pipeline-Not
[13] See documentary BBC Africa “The $10 billion Energy Scandal”, 2019.
[14] Yata F. Les véritables enjeux du Gazoduc Africain Atlantique, La Nouvelle Tribunes, 2017.