An Interview Series on the Political Implications of the Pandemic
By Fabiana Natale and Gilles de Valk
For this interview series, Fabiana Natale and Gilles de Valk speak to experts from different backgrounds on the political implications of the COVID-19 pandemic in their respective fields. From their living rooms in France and The Netherlands, they will explore the (geo)political, security, and societal consequences of this pandemic. This interview series marks the launch of a new type of content for the Security Distillery, one which we hope can provide informative and entertaining analyses of an uncertain and evolving development in global politics.
In this third episode, we are interviewing Belén Rodríguez, Research Associate at the NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence (NATO StratCom COE). Rodríguez mainly focuses on Russian ‘information laundering’, a “process [in which] false or deceitful information is legitimised through a network of intermediaries that apply gradually a set of techniques in order to de-contextualise it and obscure the original source”. In our conversation with Rodríguez, we discussed different information laundering techniques, examples of information laundering during the corona crisis, and the future of the NATO-Russia relations.
Firstly, could you tell us something about your work at the NATO StratCom COE?
I arrived at the NATO StratCom COE fifteen months ago and started collaborating with the tech branch’s Robotrolling report, which researches online information manipulation. I was then asked to support the Nordic Baltic Project, which analyses Russian information manipulation targeting the Nordic Baltic region. It is a very comprehensive study that involves aspects from narrative research to target audience analysis.
My contribution to the project started with investigating whether disinformation activities follow a specific structure. I tried to see if I could apply a metaphor of the framework developed to investigate money laundering to research disinformation activities, hence the term ‘information laundering’. Indeed, it appeared that we could develop a standardised framework that would allow national institutions to better understand the life cycle of information and influence activities.
In this regard, the Information Laundering project is not merely a research paper. It is also a tool to inform national governments and European institutions on information laundering activities as part of a larger process that aims at manipulating public opinion. It can help those governments and institutions to research disinformation and understand those supposedly isolated issues as part of a process of manipulation.
In that respect, the NATO StratCom CEO is not there to actively counter information laundering, but rather has a training and advisory role to governments, institutions, policymakers, or journalists.
There are several information laundering techniques. Could you tell us something about the most prevalent ones?
Among the most frequent ones you find disinformation, which is the manipulation of information by creating false news or false components. It is often used in short laundering processes, especially when they target a key event such as the corona crisis, in which it is easy to speculate about the origin of the virus. However, disinformation can also occur outside a laundering process. On the other hand, a laundering process does not necessarily include disinformation. For example, there can simply be a mix of contexts and different stories or the use of unrelated and purely sensational headlines to present an alternative version of the news.
Such processes involve other interesting information laundering techniques that are gaining ground over disinformation, such as ‘misappropriation’ and the ‘woozle effect’.
Misappropriation is a technique which modifies factual data by removing important elements, adding wrong contexts, or emphasising specific content in order to change the angle of understanding for the reader. This technique is frequently used regarding NATO military exercises. For example, Sky News would publish articles about military exercises with purely factual data [1]. Sputnik [a Russian news agency with international coverage] shares the same content and adds a paragraph explaining how Russia is sophisticating its military capabilities in order to counter ‘threats’ coming from NATO and how NATO is operating close to its border. This is not actually false. But for the reader, it creates the impression that NATO is being reckless and could destabilize international relations and bring the world to collapse.
The woozle effect is a technique which uses real quotes from public figures, but within a misleading context in order to support an unrelated argument. For instance, there are quotes from Finnish Prime Minister Sauli Niinistö taken out of their original context to suggest that he was withdrawing support from continuing EU sanctions against Russia. [2]
The combination of misappropriation and the woozle effect is the most effective mix of techniques, because the use of real news and real quotes makes it very difficult to debunk, despite the altered interpretation.
You already mentioned several actors that can take part to the information laundering process. Could you expand more on their roles?
Different actors participate in information laundering processes, although it is important to keep in mind that information laundering includes both voluntary and accidental steps; not all actors participate knowingly.
Regarding information manipulation coordinated by the Kremlin, you would look at the involvement of official Kremlin media. Additionally, most information laundering processes tend to be transnational, therefore involving foreign pro-Kremlin media, which share information and create original content aligned with the Kremlin’s strategic interests.
After that, proxy and accidental actors intervene. The latter are particularly dangerous because they are the most unpredictable users. Accidental actors are individuals that engage with pro-Kremlin content. Such actors amplify information laundering processes, but not necessarily willingly. For example, a person can decide to share information on their blog with a sensational headline just to get visibility. Even though such content was written without the intention of contributing to spreading Moscow’s influence, it can be referenced by a journalist that might have more malicious intentions. This creates a snowball effect.
Now that we have a clear overview of the information laundering mechanisms, could you present us an example of information laundering you have observed since the beginning of the corona crisis?
Although NATO is not yet specifically investigating information laundering regarding the pandemic, we have come across a lot of coronavirus-related cases. At the beginning of the crisis, we observed many blank disinformation and short information laundering processes. For instance, this included discussions on the involvement of Bill Gates in the spreading of the virus, or speculations on the use of biological weapons to control populations. Sometimes, it was older information laundering processes that were brought back while incorporating this new element: the pandemic. In this way, conspiracy theories about 5G technologies have been fueled, the pandemic allegedly being the embodiment of the dangers about which we had been warned a year ago.
Besides, a broad information manipulation campaign occurred in order to discredit the Western system by criticizing its inefficient reaction to the pandemic. However, when Russia started registering an increasing number of COVID-19 infections, it could not promote this argument anymore and went back to a more conventional rhetoric on NATO, recycling traditional security-related topics that have the opportunity to be exploited now.
Let me give a concrete example of this. A new narrative element that has occurred is the reduction of NATO military exercises due to the virus, announced by the German international broadcaster Deutsche Welle. This has been interpreted by Russian media outlet иноTV as NATO losing its combat readiness as opposed to the Russian army which keeps reinforcing its capabilities [3]. Besides, it added that, with decreased capabilities, some regions might be abandoned. Finally, Rubaltic stated that Lithuania panicked about NATO withdrawal, but NATO did not withdraw, and Lithuania did not panic [4].
This is how, through misappropriation and the woozle effect, manipulation coordinated by the Kremlin created the impression that NATO would risk being weakened compared to Russia by the end of the crisis. It was not factually wrong that NATO reduced the personnel involved in the exercises, but it does not mean that Russia will be more powerful than NATO at the end of the pandemic.
What will be the main consequences of the crisis for information laundering?
While the crisis advanced, we observed a sophistication of the laundering techniques and content. On top of that, the amplification is even more considerable than before, as disinformation is being spread throughout different media and languages. This is concerning, because it becomes complicated for a user to verify information.
After the crisis, information laundering will continue, and its actors will adapt. Domestic, international, and proxy actors will use any kind of event and opportunity to serve their strategic interests. Journalists should be particularly careful in their coverage of news events and try to approach them impartially, so they do not make easier the job of hostile actors by including, for example, sensationalised pieces or inaccurate data.
Over the next couple of years, what could be the impact of the coronavirus on the role of information laundering in the relationship between Russia and NATO?
Russia is obviously not the only actor performing information manipulation on a large scale. However, it is the most evident one, and they will not stop using those techniques, because to them information laundering and influence operations are a way of maintaining power. In fact, I think they will continue to sophisticate their tactics and strategies. We should realise that Russia is much more experienced than us when it comes to information laundering tactics and strategies and we need to find our way of combating and countering those practices. In that respect, NATO member states’ governments and institutions need to understand that information laundering processes are taking place and are systematic.
However, if the global geopolitical context remains the same and supposing that the western societies will survive as they are, I do not think much will change. Russian disinformation activities targeting the European institutions or the United States will continue. Only the technicality will evolve, with the help of progresses in machine learning and artificial intelligence. In that sense, disinformation will be even more complicated to debunk, but generally, the reciprocal aims of NATO and Russia should stay the same.
Finally, what are the key takeaways of the crisis regarding NATO’s geopolitical position?
One of the biggest geopolitical risks of this crisis is the polarisation of public opinion towards democratic institutions. The western model and its institutions are facing a credibility crisis, and this is being exploited by state actors such as Russia and China but also non-state actors to some extent. As the European Union did not face the crisis most efficiently, initially, the trust of citizens in the domestic institutions has been affected. This opens a window of opportunity for discrediting western liberal democracy. This does not only apply to external rival actors, but also to domestic contexts. Political parties within NATO member states also use the crisis to polarise public opinion and to reach new audiences, which creates instability and goes against good crisis management.
In the longer term, the crisis will have direct consequences for the next electoral processes and might be harmful to NATO with the increasing popularity of extremist, nationalist parties holding anti-NATO narratives. The current crisis gives room to those domestic actors and to diverging opinions, potentially weakening bodies such as NATO, whose legitimacy and power in the international scene will also be challenged by countries such as Russia or China.
Sources
[1] Haynes, Deborah (2018) ‘NATO prepared for 'growing Russian threat' Sky News
https://news.sky.com/story/nato-ready-to-respond-to-growing-russian-threat-11524827
[2] No Author (2019) ‘Президент Финляндии не поддержал призыв Зеленского сохранять санкции против России’ тасс
https://tass.ru/mezhdunarodnaya-panorama/6882569
No Author (2019) ‘Kommentti: Niinistö muuttui valeuutiseksi’ Ilta-Sanomat
https://www.is.fi/ulkomaat/art-2000006238572.html
[3] No Author (2020) ‘Die Welt: пандемия ослабила боеготовность НАТО, а на Россию не повлияла’
https://russian.rt.com/inotv/2020-04-24/Die-Welt-pandemiya-oslabila-boegotovnost
[4] Носович, Александр (2020) ‘Литва панически испугалась ухода войск НАТО’ https://www.rubaltic.ru/article/politika-i-obshchestvo/27042020-litva-panicheski-ispugalas-ukhoda-voysk-nato/
The views and opinions expressed are solely those of the interviewee and do not reflect those of the Security Distillery, the IMSISS consortium or its partners and affiliates.