By Emma Hurlbert
I. The current situation: Influx of refugees, violence, and terrorism
The circumstances of refugees in Kenya are defined by the protracted crises in neighboring countries. The ongoing Somali Civil War, conflict in South Sudan, the Rwandan Genocide, the Congo Wars, and violence in eastern part of the Democratic Republic of Congo have caused hundreds of thousands of people to flee to Kenya.[1] As of May 2019, the refugee population in Kenya is estimated at 476,695 people, the majority of whom are housed in Dadaab Refugee Complex close to the border with Somalia, and Kakuma Refugee Settlement close to South Sudan.[2]
Violence in and around the camps is a significant threat to the refugees themselves and the local populations in proximity.[3] Tension and aggression exist between the refugees and local populations adjacent to the camps.[4] Near Kakuma, the indigenous Turkana people live in tension with the refugees, especially as the camp expands into Turkana grazing areas.[5] Furthermore, violence is common among refugee identity populations. Violent or traditional justice is also common within refugee communities, as consequences according to indigenous justice systems.[6]
Armed robbery is a notable problem near Dadaab, which targets refugees, aid agencies and staff, traveling vehicles, and drug traders at night. They steal cash and low-value items that can be sold.[7] Lastly, sexual abuse and violence is an immediate and acute threat to many women and children in the camps. Rape is commonplace in deserted areas around the camps.[8] Female Genital Mutilation is also common within the Somali communities in Dadaab.[9] The amount of violence in and around Dadaab and Kakuma is a major security concern for the refugees, aid workers, and the local populations, which the government should address.
Furthermore, as refugee flows increased into Kenya due to neighboring conflicts, so too did violence and terrorism, especially attacks orchestrated by al-Shabaab and al-Qaeda. Attacks in the last few decades have included the 1998 US Embassy bombing in Nairobi and mass shootings in 2013 at Westgate Mall and in 2015 at Garissa University, both conducted by al-Shabaab.[10] Following terrorist attacks, there have been backlashes and increasing xenophobia within local Kenyan populations against refugee populations, particularly Somalis.[11]
II. Securitization: Linking the refugees with terrorism
The Kenyan government has experienced domestic pressure to protect the country against terrorism, and xenophobia has grown against refugees.[12] Therefore they use securitizing rhetoric to link the refugee populations with terrorism and al-Shabaab, making them into an existential threat to Kenyan society, the audience of the securitizing rhetoric.[13] Therefore, the refugees themselves, rather than the violence affecting both them and local populations, become the threat perceived by the audience. This action justifies extraordinary measures, which would otherwise be unacceptable, in order to exert control over refugee populations and satisfy the concerns of the local population.[14]
Since 2012, the Encampment Policy has required refugees to live exclusively within their assigned camps and they can only travel with a Movement Pass.[15] The Policy remains strictly enforced; refugees may receive six months of jail time for leaving the camp without a permit.[16] Furthermore, refugees require a work permit obtained in Nairobi,[17] in order to legally join the labour market because they are treated as foreigners.[18] It is documented that Kenya has only granted work permits in a few isolated cases since 2004.[19] These institutional limitations make it unrealistic for refugees to obtain legal working status.
Furthermore, it is almost impossible for refugees to attain naturalized citizenship. According to the Constitution, refugees are eligible for citizenship, if they ‘have entered Kenya legally’, which has been used to deny citizenship to refugees. In practice, ‘Kenya does not appear to grant citizenship to refugees’. [20] Through these policies, refugees remain aid reliant because they cannot legally provide for themselves.
Moreover, the government has attempted to limit the refugee population to 150,000 or close the camps altogether, which would require refugees to return to a dangerous home country. These threats mark a departure from the 1951 UN Convention on Refugees principle of non-refoulement, or not returning refugees their country of origin if it remains unsafe.[21] However, national courts have blocked these attempts to limit the refugee population.
Kenya has also engaged in both explicit and encouraged refoulement of refugees.[22] In 2007 the government forcibly refouled about 400 refugees from Somalia.[23] Furthermore, there have been extensive attempts to refoule refugees using softer language, so as to mask the extraordinary measures taken. In 2013 Kenya, Somalia, and the UNHCR agreed to facilitate ‘the voluntary repatriation of Somali refugees’ over three years. [24] Though this policy hides behind the language of freedom and voluntary choice, it is a continuation of previous refoulement operations, which break the international law and norm of non-refoulement.
Notably, none of these policies directly address the violence facing the refugees, neighboring Kenyan populations, nor the workers that serve them in the camps. This absence of action demonstrates that the government does not consider the refugees as part of the population which they are responsible to protect, echoing the idea that the refugees themselves are the threat.
III. Limitations: Consequences of this approach
The policies which the Kenyan government has created through the securitization of refugees are limiting and problematic. They violate the rights of refugees, forcing them to remain aid-dependent, negate their potential to contribute to Kenyan society, break the international law and norm of non-refoulement, and foster animosity and radicalization. Additionally, the policies do not address the security threats facing the refugees themselves. The human rights of refugees are abused by their captivity within the camps and their inability to work legally, although they legally reside within the country. The refugees are therefore forced to remain aid-dependent, and they remain a drain on UNHCR resources, as well as the Kenyan economy. These effects directly undermine the goals of the UNHCR for the self-reliance of refugees.[25]
Furthermore, through the process of securitization, the government invokes extraordinary measures, which would otherwise be considered unacceptable in the international community. All of the policies outlined in the previous section break international norms, many of which have been codified into law. Perhaps most notably, refoulement is a glaring exploitation of refugee rights, breaks the agreement of the 1951 UN Convention on Refugees, and should not be acceptable.
In conclusion, these measures negatively impact Kenya’s goal of increased security. By labeling the refugees as an existential threat, the government fosters further tension and animosity between the local population and the refugees. Moreover, perhaps through their dire and unfair conditions, the camps could actually become the havens for radicalization which the government seeks to protect against. Kenyan policies pursued through the securitization of refugees are, in fact, counterproductive and harmful to both refugee and local communities.
Sources
[1] “Somali Civil War.” In New World Encyclopedia, 2015. https://www.newworldencyclopedia.org/entry/Somali_Civil_War.
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees “Somalia.” January 2018. https://www.unhcr.org/somalia.html.
“South Sudan Profile - Timeline.” British Broadcasting Corporation, August 6, 2018. https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-14019202.
“Q&A: DR Congo Conflict.” British Broadcasting Corporation, November 20, 2012. https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-11108589.
[2] United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees: Kenya. “Figures at a Glance.”, n.d. https://www.unhcr.org/ke/figures-at-a-glance.
[3] Jeff Crisp. "A State of Insecurity: The Political Economy of Violence in Kenya's Refugee Camps." African Affairs 99, no. 397 (2000): 601-632.
[4] Ibid., 610-611.
[5] Ibid., 610-611.
[6] Ibid., 603-604.
[7] Ibid., 607.
[8] Ibid., 604-607.
[9] Ibid., 604.
[10] Federation of American Scientists. “Report of the Accountability Review Boards Bombing of the US Embassies in Nairobi, Kenya and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania on August 7, 1998: Nairobi: Discussion and Findings.” January 1999. https://fas.org/irp/threat/arb/board_nairobi.html
“Foreign travel advice: Kenya: Terrorism.” UK Government. https://www.gov.uk/foreign-travel-advice/kenya/terrorism
[11] “New Encampment Policy Fuels Xenophobia in Kenya.” Human Rights First, February 8, 2013. https://www.humanrightsfirst.org/2013/02/08/new-encampment-policy-fuels-xenophobia-in-kenya.
[12] Oscar Gakuo Mwangi. "Securitisation, Non-Refoulement and the Rule of Law in Kenya: The Case of Somali Refugees." The International Journal of Human Rights 22, no. 10 (2018): 1321.
[13] Nienke Voppen "The securitization of Somali refugees in Kenya: The plan to close Dadaab refugee camp,” Utrecht University. 2017: 18-19.
[14] Columba Peoples, Nick Vaughan-Williams, and Askews & Holts Library Services. Critical Security Studies: An Introduction. Second ed. London: Routledge, Taylor and Francis, 2015: 92-106.
[15] Goitom, Refugee Law and Policy.
[16] Andrew Maina. “Development of Refugee Law in Kenya.” World Policy, March 29, 2016. https://worldpolicy.org/2016/03/29/development-of-refugee-law-in-kenya/.
[17] Maina,“Development of Refugee Law in Kenya.”
[18] Republic of Kenya Laws of Kenya, Refugees Act No. 12 of 2006. National Council for Law Reporting. http://kenyalaw.org/kl/fileadmin/pdfdownloads/Acts/RefugeeAct_No13of2006.pdf:12.
[19] Refugee Consortium of Kenya. “Asylum Under Threat.” June 2012. https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Asylum_Under_Threat.pdf
[20] Ibid.
Anna Lindley. "Between a Protracted and a Crisis Situation: Policy Responses to Somali Refugees in Kenya." Refugee Survey Quarterly 30, no. 4 (2011): 36.
Goitom, Refugee Law and Policy: Kenya.
[21] Ibid.
[22] United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. “Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees.” 1951. https://www.unhcr.org/uk/3b66c2aa10.
[23] Mwangi, "Securitisation, Non-Refoulement and the Rule of Law”, 1320-1321.
[24] Ibid., 1321.
[25] United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. “Promoting Livelihoods and Self Reliance.” 2011. https://www.unhcr.org/uk/publications/operations/4eeb19f49/promoting-livelihoods-self-reliance-operational-guidance-refugee-protection.html