The history of humankind is a history of people movements, with new perceptions of space as a triggering factor for major historical breaks. [1] Migration, defined as ‘the process of people travelling to a new place to live’ [2], has, indeed, always been a common feature of human societies. [3] But, while migrations have significantly enriched European societies in the era of mass movement [4], a shift seems to have occurred in our understanding of national borders. How did public opinion in the European Union suddenly start to feel threatened by such an ordinary, non-violent phenomenon? Does this reaction result from existing risks, or does it simply reflect the exacerbation of nationalism by a securitisation process? More specifically, this piece will touch upon the divides in how to handle the so-called “migrant crisis” in the European Union.
To briefly set the context, according to the European Commission, the migrant crisis refers to the period between 2015 and March 2019, during which particularly high immigration rates were recorded in Europe. The civil war in Syria, the expansion of the Islamic State and Boko Haram, and the economic crisis in the horn of Africa were all contributing factors to the flux increase that provoked – or rather revealed – deep cleavages in Europe.
Those rifts emerged in the form of a double rhetoric towards migrants. As per Claudia Aradau’s model, two contrasting discourses coexist: a humanitarian discourse, inspiring pity, and a security-based one, implying risk. [5] The first one, advocated by the proponents of an open-door policy, has been magnified by the empathy-building pictures relayed by the media. One could think here of the images portraying Aylan Kurdi on the sand, lonely pregnant women on makeshift boats, or the Mediterranean Sea as it became the ‘anonymous graveyard’ of thousands of castaways. [6] On the other side, an abrasive discourse in regard to migration came in from the cold, carried by both citizens and protectionist political parties. Those two fundamentally opposed views resulted in what Aradau would define as ‘schizophrenic identifications’. [7] They are the product of both the politicisation and securitisation processes that occurred vis-à-vis the migrants.
As elaborated in our previous publications, politicisation aims at bringing a topic into the sphere of public speech, by presenting it as a shared matter, usually under the terms of economic challenges. The next step is the securitisation itself, when an actor with legitimacy, such as a politician, identifies the topic as a security issue. [8] In the case at hand, the 2014 ‘Report on the implementation of the Global Approach to Migration and Mobility’ defines the threat on two different levels. On one side, migration is considered as a potential danger for migrants themselves, insofar as it exposes them to life-threatening conditions in their journeys and makes them vulnerable to crime, especially trafficking and slavery networks. On the other side, migrants personify a foreign body, coming inside the European Union, and carrying destabilisation. [9]
Despite its attempt to distinguish itself as a human rights protector, the European Union policies, led to the appearance of a new schism between the “good” refugee, victim of external conditions, and the “clandestine” immigrant, a potential foreign fighter, whose arrival would damage the European community. Through the latter, migration is rhetorically put in relation to radicalisation, terrorism, and criminal activities attemoting to penetrate the European economy. [10] Then, while securitisation is clearly expressed in regard to the need to fight illegal migration, it also operates against legal immigrants. In fact, both categories face the same issue. Concerning legal migration, the topics brought up are usually related to economic resilience, social cohesion and political stability. [11] One can find regular references to urgent crisis management in relation to the “mass influxes” the Union will have to handle, both in terms of asylum claims processing and the economic impact on the labor market. Furthermore, the European Union is repeatedly referred to as a socio-cultural unity, whose cohesion might be endangered by the arrival of foreigners. [12]
However, such a securitisation move does not necessarily entail a closed-door policy. As a matter of fact, the European institutions have never advocated against all forms of immigration. The securitisation process was rather a justification for multilateral cooperation, largely carried by the German government. This European solidarity was then materialised through economic support for host countries and a quota system based on each State’s capacity. [13] However it seems that such a solidarity-enforcing policy actually contributed to revealing a lack of consensus and internal divergences in the allegedly unified European society.
On one side, Germany, led by Chancellor Angela Merkel, appeared as the major promoter of this project. The German Chancellor clearly set herself apart as she advocated for an open-door policy with a structured humanitarian support. In 2015, Germany had already accepted over one million refugees. [14] Considered as a model of openness by some, it has also been criticised for its will to impose quotas to countries that, unlike Germany, do not need to supplement their workforce. As a matter of fact, with its demographic trend and its aging population, Germany benefits from considerable room to maneuver in terms of the acceptance of migrant workers. However, after three years, it was overwhelmed by the realities of shouldering the migrant crisis. Escalating clashes were recorded in refugee centers, providing a pretext for a growing extreme right-wing in the country. As a direct result, increasingly louder dissent among the ranks of Chancellor Merkel’s government forced her to step back. Despite her initial iron will, she agreed on a compromise to reduce national immigration in July 2018. [15]
On the other hand, Hungary, for instance, set forth a different political line. Indeed, the Hungarian government was opposed to quotas imposed by the European Commission. It therefore decided to go its own way with the construction of fences at its borders to fulfill its duty to protect its population from the threat posed by the migrants. Furthermore, Hungary held a national referendum on the legitimacy and acceptance of the quotas in question, alleging that the European Union was not only neglecting the will of the people, but following an illegal procedure by quickly amending the Dublin Treaty. Those policies, while they made Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán earn the humorous designation of “dictator” by then-President of the European Commission Jean-Claude Juncker, revealed a deep split in the European Union and forecasted the decline of the uncontested French-German leadership over the Union. [16]
Generally, the success of securitisation depends on the legitimacy it provides to policy. Hence, the audience plays a critical role, insofar as this legitimacy comes from popular support and identification. [17] In this case, one can consider securitisation efforts successful to the extent that mass immigration was framed as an issue that demanded awareness as a potential threat to Europe, and actually gained public attention at the time. However, the success of such an operation also needs to be evaluated with respect to its motivations. If the goal was to reaffirm the legitimate sovereignty of the European Union as a strong and independent actor that would lead its member States to a constructive collaboration, then the assessment might need to be requalified. Finally, it would be prudent to complete this appraisal with an analysis of the consequences on migrant-origin-settled communities. [18]
Either way, the European Commission declared the end of the migrant crisis in March 2019. So, despite the still-existing migratory movements, they decided not to treat this phenomenon as a primary threat anymore. Thus at least on a European level, this issue has slowly been de-securitized. However, the long-term implications of this recent evolution have yet to be determined. Further research should thus be conducted on the resolution perspectives of this political fracture in the European Union.
Sources
[1] Gomart, T (2019) L’affolement du monde: 10 enjeux géopolitiques : Editions Tallandier.
[2] Cambridge Dictionary, “Migration”, [online] available from https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/migration, accessed on 9th February 2020.
[3] Centro Studi Immigrazione, Migrazione : una realtà di sempre, [online available from http://www.cestim.it/sezioni/materiali_didattici/md_cestim-mlal/schede/02.pdf, accessed on 9th February 2020.
[4] OECD, OECD Statistics, [online] available from https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?lang=en&SubSessionId=96968a29-5677-4fea-afaa-e81f879b4aa5&themetreeid=2 accessed on 9th February 2020.
[6] Cattaneo, C (2018), Naufraghi senza volto: Dare un nome alle vittime del Mediterraneo : Raffaello Cortina Editore.
[9] European Commission (2014) Report on the implementation of the Global Approach to Migration and Mobility 2014/096.
[11] Russo, R. (2008) “Security, Securitization and Human Capital: The New Wave of Canadian Immigration Laws,” International Journal of Human and Social Sciences, Vol 296, No 3, pp. 587-596.
[14] Unknown (2015) “Germany on course to accept one million refugees in 2015”, [online] available from https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/dec/08/germany-on-course-to-accept-one-million-refugees-in-2015, accessed on 9th February 2020.
[15] Connolly, K (2015), “Refugee crisis: Germany creaks under strain of open door policy”, [online] available from https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/oct/08/refugee-crisis-germany-creaks-under-strain-of-open-door-policy accessed on 9th February 2020.
[16] Al Jazeera (2016) “Talk to Al Jazeera - Peter Szijjarto: 'Migration became a security threat’”, Al Jazeera [online] available from : https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=k7_aVEtu9-U, accessed on 9th February 2020.