Securing the Nation, Reproducing Insecurity: Terrorism and Identity Politics at the India–Bangladesh Border.
/By Nico Marcucci, edited by Orla Ryan
Introduction
The act of building walls and borders has increased after terrorist incidents in the first two decades after 2000: by 2019, 31.000km of borders had been fortified, erecting 72 walls around the world. Significantly, 47% of the wall-building states were democratic, undermining the notion that security barriers are exclusively authoritarian tools (Vallet, 2021).
The assumption of equal protection and/or reduction of the threat is misleading. Securitisation of borders is selective. States exploit the perception of a threat in order to reinforce a politically constructed one, which in turn gives them political legitimacy. Borders and their securitisation not only resolve people’s insecurity, but also create a paradox in which they are both the product and the initial driver of the politically constructed threat.
This essay explores the nexus between terrorism and border security along the India-Bangladesh border, considering various theoretical frameworks, examining the development of the threat's construction, and the consequential practices that aim to both confront and reinforce it. Ultimately, the paper briefly evaluates the consequences and the human challenges that border security creates, engaging with border studies scholars and sociological approaches.
Terrorism, Narrative, Securitisation
India was the thirteenth most affected country in the 2026 Global Terrorism Index, and the third most in South Asia after Pakistan and Afghanistan, proving terrorism as a central threat in the region (Institute for Economics & Peace, 2026).
Indian framework on terrorism, especially jihadi terrorism, is peculiar because it rests on the assumption that domestic Jihadi groups are sponsored by the Pakistani intelligence services (ISI). This assumption perpetuates tensions even within multilateral frameworks such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), a forum born to counter terrorism and emerging security threats in Central and South Asia. Prime Minister Modi insisted that the forum should not allow states that sponsor terrorism, because “there is no good or bad terrorist”, implicitly referring to Pakistan, an SCO member since 2017 (Government of India, 2025).
Bangladesh, formerly East Pakistan, has been exploited by ISI-sponsored groups and transnational terrorist organisations to host training camps for terrorists (Rather, 2014, p.789). However, India and Bangladesh have developed strong ties throughout time. Since the early 70s, India supported the Awmi League, which played a central role in the struggle for Bangladesh’s independence (Jayarama, 2025, p.60). In 2025, the party was banned, and its leader fled to India where she was welcomed by Modi’s government. (Jayarama, 2025, p.73).
Modi’s narrative and rhetoric does not put Pakistan and Bangladesh on the same level. However, they are both Muslim-majority countries, in which Islamic principles and values are central to the state. Modi’s approach to Muslim communities can be considered aggressive (Travelli and Raj, 2024). However, Modi's support for Hasina was deep, even though she represented the second-largest Muslim-majority country in the region, she represented Bangladesh's secularism. At the core of this puzzle is the Muslim community and the rise of islamophobia in India. The legacy of the Indian partition and religious sectarianism continues to play out in political rhetoric. Modi’s anti-Muslim narrative reflects this legacy, he called Muslims “infiltrators” invoking fear of their demographic growth, and the negative consequence for the Indian state(Travelli and Raj, 2024).
India Hate Lab reported nearly 1500 hate speeches in India last year, showing how 98% targeted Muslims and 88% came from Modi’s Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP). (India Hate Lab, 2026). The report shows how hate speech is rising and how there are specific time frames in which those speeches increase systematically: for example, after the terroristic attack in Phalgam 2025, 158 speeches alone were recorded, making April the month with the highest prevalence of hate speeches in India (India Hate Lab, 2026). This data shows a pattern in which terrorism is material threat as well as a constructed threat through identity driven political rhetoric.
Building on this, the analysis shifts from the threat itself to its political construction. Drawing on Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde’s (1998) concept of securitisation, political actors frame an issue as an existential threat, seeking to justify exceptional measures against it. In the Indian case, this lens helps explain how political narratives portray Muslim communities as a threat to the nation, extending beyond concerns about terrorism to broader questions of identity and belonging. This framing reinforces a division between “we” and “them”, presenting some as defenders of the nation and others as a threat to its survival, potentially legitimising their marginalisation (Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde, 1998, p. 43).
India provides a peculiar case in which the Hindu identity is securitised to the extent of becoming central in the political agenda, and vice versa. Hence, the BJP’s political core is the protection of the Hindu identity group due to Modi’s nationalistic political vision rooted in religion. Identity groups are established through mutual identification based on shared social markers that carry social expectations about how members behave, act, pray or even appear (Gutmann, 2009 p.9). Gutmann (2009) shows how religious groups in identity politics challenge the “two-way protection” model of the secular state, in which the state and religion are equally protected toward each other, yet with unequal power. The “one-way protection” advanced by identity religious groups unbalances the dynamic shifting towards a more institutionalised protection of religion. Domestically, the PM is rooting his political agenda in the shared identity of a religious group, framing as a vision of nationhood, blurring the distinction between religious and national identity.
Furthermore, PM Modi is applying a double standard in sustaining secularism and secular leaders, such as Sheikh Hasina, in Bangladesh. Nevertheless, it creates an asymmetry in which some religions are preferred or privileged, whereas others are targeted as threats. Although India is a complex and diverse country, with linguistic diversity, religious variety, and a deeply flawed caste system, a pluralistic containment strategy necessitates the recognition of distinctiveness as a pillar of national stability (Pingle and Varshney, 2006). Therefore, this dynamic generates a form of paradox in which Hindu nationalism builds the foundation not only in the jus soli concept, which provides citizenship according to the place of birth, but also in the more debatable jus sanguinis, which establishes the right to obtain citizenship according to that of one’s parents. A Hindu views India as fatherland and Holyland combined. In contrast, as mentioned by Savarkar[1], the others’ religion is defined as separate love from their love for India, which has no religious meaning, pointing out the “absolute legitimisation” of an Indian Hindu in their land (Pingle and Varshney, 2006, p.368). The nationalistic vision of the religious identity group, though, has dangerous potential in the validation of anti-democratic sentiments implanted in former oppressive sentiments that the political elite could exploit (Bernstein, 2005). Nevertheless, reframing the BJP political narrative and the hate speech campaign against Muslims, shows how jihadi terrorism, beyond the psychological impact, reinforces the nationalistic sentiment that generates a more constructed, systemic existential threat.
Securitisation practices, the border
The Paris school of securitization offers an important sociological lens through which to understand security, focusing on everyday practices and their diverse fields of application (Bigo and McCluskey, 2018). From this perspective, (in)securitisation cannot be limited to speech acts but also involves the practices through which insecurity is managed.
The Indian case presents similar patterns: the securitisation of an existential threat involves both its construction through political speech and narrative and the security practices through which it is addressed. These practices are material, but their meaning is socially constructed, shaping how tough security measures are justified to Indian society. Expanding on this, Balzacq et al. (2016) show how practices lead to the routinisation of exceptionalism: once-exceptional security measures become embedded in the administrative system and assimilated into the everyday functioning of the state, becoming nearly invisible to the public. The “analytics of government” offers a framework for examining how security regimes operate through these practices (Balzacq, Léonard and Ruzicka, 2016, p. 520).
The theoretical shift is necessary to understand India's move towards a practical
securitisation of the threat. Specifically, the highly securitised borders serve as a crucial example of securitisation in practice. The behavioural paradox shapes the Indian approach toward the borders. Focusing on the India-Bangladesh border sparks interesting discussion when compared with the India-Pakistani and India-Myanmar borders, highlighting inconsistent strategies toward similar threats. This dynamic reinforces the constructivist nature of securitisation, showing how it involves a deliberate selection of the target threat that goes beyond the real physical threat.
Borders are the product of the Westphalian system in which states recognise their reciprocal sovereignty and respect their boundaries, and what it means if these are crossed without permission (Husain, 2024, p. 3). The idea can be applied to the India-Bangladesh border; however, Indian borders are the product of C. Radcliffe's cynical gesture of drawing a line on a map in 1947, demarcating an arbitrary division that ignored ethnic lines and agricultural dynamics (Husain, 2024, p. 10). The partition created a 4095 km-long border, placed where populations shared religion, culture, linguistic and economic values, as well as rooted societal dynamics (Ganguly and Alffram, 2010, p. 12). This framework created an environment in which crossing the border is often driven by personal values and economic necessity. Today, the India-Bangladesh border is one of the longest on earth and also one of the most securitised, with a fenced, surveilled area covering almost 80% of it. The management of the area is entrusted to the Border Security Forces (BSF) to defend Indian soil and the Border Guard Bangladesh (BGB) to administer the Bangladesh border territories. The BSF was established in 1965 in order to protect the Indian borderlands in times of peace and prevent cross-border crimes. BSF are not only precautionary forces, but they are also deployed as counter-insurgency forces in the region of Jammu and Kashmir, to confront secessionist campaigns. BSF personnel can therefore be deployed on either border, even though the two borders face different levels of threat. However, despite the administrative task, the India-Bangladesh border is a theatre of exploitation and use of force and violent behaviour by the Indian personnel, as reported by Human Rights Watch (Ganguly and Alffram, 2010).
Reeves (2011) points out the chessboard formation of the border, which represents a series of disjointed points differently perceived by the diversity of people who try to cross the border, by those who trespass checkpoints, and by the technological tools that now constitute the “smart borders”. Under Project Vision 2047, India aims to celebrate its independence centenary while achieving strategic objectives across key areas. Within this project, a " roadmap " is projected towards a comprehensive integration of technology and AI in a proactive security architecture (Khyati and Patel, 2026, p.9). “Smart borders” are therefore a primary objective, enhancing security, leading high-tech development and reducing human dependency. Fostering “intelligent” systems means developing integrated surveillance systems, such as the Border Surveillance System (BOSS), the Comprehensive Integrated Border Management System (CIBMS), and the Border Electronically Dominated QRT Interception Technique (BOLD-QIT). These systems combine diverse high-tech components that encompass communication and surveillance structures, intelligent barriers, and sensors, which support geospatial intelligence and surveillance, providing the data needed for the further integration of AI (Khyati and Patel, 2026). Artificial Intelligence used in this framework raises crucial ethical concerns: its use in low-developed borderland areas creates an asymmetric dynamic compared to the real threat. A 2021 report made by the Indian Ministry of Home Affairs shows how the main concern in the India-Bangladesh border, aside from migration, is cattle smuggling and drug trafficking, which are main criminal activities in underdeveloped areas. (Bureau of Police Research and Development, 2021). The technological shift not only materialises what Balzacq et al. (2016) explained in their “Analytics of Government,” but also presents the consequences of the normalisation of routinised practices, which are now extremely dependent on technology.
Furthermore, linking to the identity politics of the BJP, the fortification of the borders reinforces the “us” vs “them” dynamic in which “we” need to defend against “them”. Garland’s (2001) argument draws this shift conceptually, showing how “smart borders” can be framed in anticipatory risk management, acting as preventive filters rather than pursuing a model based on punishment. This framework also has conceptual limits. By transforming the border into a preventative tool, states consolidate a culture of control in which people are viewed as potential risk actors. They are consequently turned into a political existential threat. (Garland, 2001).
Recent border management strategies have taken a paradoxical form. Increased border securitisation emerged after a series of events that would not immediately indicate the identification of an existential threat: India’s support for Bangladesh's independence in 1971; the long negotiations for the exchange of communities’ enclaves; India’s neighbouring policy; the political-economic ties with the secular Sheikh Hasina; and the asymmetrical terroristic threat compared to the India-Pakistan border. This dynamic presents the puzzle of securitisation: the social construction built on routinised practices. Finally, Bangladesh is a substantial trade actor in the region, especially in border markets, and as a strategic actor in water management and energy networks (Singhal et al., 2019).
Is securitisation of borders effective in reducing terrorism? And does securitisation have a positive impact on people living in both states?
Securitisation carries structural constraints and systemic consequences. Bigo and McCluskey (2018) describe it as a means to reduce insecurity, but the equation has structural and conceptual side effects.
As we noted in the first section, terrorism has a constructed dimension that functions as a reinforcement of nationalism and identity politics. Consequently, nationalism professed by identity politics is reinforcing the alienation of communities that can be exploited by terrorists or abandon themselves to terroristic activities (Bobic, 2014, p.253). In this framework, Bobic (2014) advances a human security approach to contrast terrorism, in a dimension in which terrorism and transnational organised crime mutually benefit from each other’s presence. The India-Bangladesh border materialises Bobic's (2014) argument. The critical border not only represents a land populated by communities that are politically targeted, but also represents an underdeveloped area that is profoundly damaged by the lack of human security principles ‘Freedom from fear’ and ‘freedom from want’ (Bobic, 2014, p.248).
The technologically equipped border creates a loop in which the concentration of power is constantly reinforced by economic profit (generated by increased spending on technology) and the political construction of the “perceived threat”. This loop, which Vallet (2021) calls “the border industrial complex”, entails a decrease in human security and a more fertile environment for terrorism. In the case of the India-Bangladesh border, this dynamic originated in a critical condition created by enclaves resulting from the partition. For 68 years, until 2015, almost 60.000 people lived stateless, without a concrete administration in a cartographic abstraction, where they struggled to maintain their own identity in a no man’s land that considered them “the others” (Rafiq, 2020, p. 493).
The combination of identity questions, underdevelopment, the consequent marginalisation and unmonitored stretches made the borderland function as a perfect environment for illegal operations and organised crime. Therefore, the consequent high securitisation of the area reinforces the marginalisation and the lack of basic needs of the local population, and serves as a political means, but does not provide a solution that addresses the roots of the problem. Vallet (2021) highlights how these areas reproduce a “xenophobic identity” employing a systemic alienisation of the “others”. Moreover, this process reveals the product of the BJP’s identity politics: security is not achieved by addressing insecurity through social policies and integration, but rather, insecurity is governed through the control of the perceived existential threat. In this context, borders are tools that manage insecurity, using discipline, too often violence, surveillance, and the restriction of mobility, but do not eliminate insecurity (Wacquant, 2009). Wacquant’s (2009) argument on Neoliberal states and social insecurity gains further explanatory clarity with the Indian backlash against Free Movement Regime (FMR) at the border with Myanmar, announcing a shift toward securitisation along the border.
The FMR was established in 1950 to support ethnic communities in maintaining family ties and local economic activities, its withdrawal could be used as a counterargument to this essay, framing India as a state that is relying on neoliberal actions in the security realm, without a systematically selected target, the so-called “infiltrators” as PM Modi claimed (Travelli and Raj, 2024). The Myanmar border shift signals a reinforcement of the neoliberal logic. However, for years, during the Free Movement Regime, it showed the selective logic of securitisation, because the asymmetric treatment to the borders of countries that contained similar threats.
Conclusion
In conclusion, securitisation of the borders has a political meaning that carries social repercussions to the local communities, alienating them as a siloed area that can be sacrificed to prevent control and separate the “others” to portray the feeling of security for the elites and population in the inner state.
The securitisation of the border originates in the selective approach to a politically constructed target, which does not eradicate the issue but controls and governs the feeling of insecurity it produces, creating a loop in which they reinforce each other. Therefore, the securitisation of borders reproduces insecurity, and it cannot be considered a failure within this scheme: it acts as a function. The India-Bangladesh border presents a perfect case study for understanding the political construction of the threat and the repercussions of the securitisation of the border, which deeply redesigns the borderland.
It is worth noting the regional and domestic political shifts in Bangladesh following Sheikh Hasina's protest and the rising of Bangladesh Nationalist Party in 2026 elections, and how the new political landscape could impact on the India-Bangladesh border.
There is a growing urgency to understand the development of border areas as tools of governance that shape order and security.
Bibliography
Balzacq, T., Léonard, S. and Ruzicka, J. (2016). ‘Securitization’ revisited: theory and cases. International Relations, 30(4), pp.494–531. doi:https://doi.org/10.1177/0047117815596590.
Bernstein, M. (2005). Identity Politics. Annual Review of Sociology, [online] 31(1), pp.47–74. Available at: https://www.jstor.org/stable/29737711 [Accessed 21 Apr. 2026].
Bigo, D. and McCluskey, E. (2018). What Is a PARIS Approach to (In)securitization? Political Anthropological Research for International Sociology. In: A. Gheciu and W.C. Wohlforth, eds., The Oxford Handbook of International Security. pp.115–130. doi:https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198777854.013.9.
Bissonnette, A. and Vallet, E. (2021). Borders and border walls : in-security, symbolism, vulnerabilities. Abingdon, Oxon ; New York, Ny: Routledge.
Bobic, M. (2014). Transnational organised crime and terrorism: Nexus needing a human security framework. Global Crime, 15(3-4), pp.241–258. doi:https://doi.org/10.1080/17440572.2014.927327.
Bureau of Police Research and Development (2021). Project Report on Integrated Border Management and National Security . Ministry of Home Affairs - Government of India.
Buzan, B., Wæver, O. and De Wilde, J. (1998). Security: A New Framework for Analysis. Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
Dheeraj , P.C. (2018). India’s PSYWAR Against Islamic Terrorism: A Trident Strategy. Terrorism and Political Violence, pp.1–24. doi:https://doi.org/10.1080/09546553.2017.1388792.
Bigo, D. and Tsoukala, A. (2008). Understanding (in)security. In: Terror, Insecurity and Liberty . [online] Routledge. Available at: https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203926765 [Accessed 27 Apr. 2026].
Ganguly, M. and Alffram, H. (2010). ‘Trigger Happy’, Excessive Use of Force by Indian Troops at the Bangladesh Border. Human Rights Watch.
Garland, D. (2001). The Culture of control: Crime and Social Order in Contemporary Society. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Government of India (2025). English Translation of Prime Minister’s statement during the 25th SCO Summit (September 01, 2025). [online] Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India. Available at: https://www.mea.gov.in/Speeches Statements.htm?dtl/40075/English_Translation_of_Prime_Ministers_statement_during_the_25th_SCO_Summit_September_01_2025 [Accessed 20 Apr. 2026].
Gutmann, A. (2009). The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly of Identity Politics. In: Identity in Democracy. Princeton University Press, pp.1–37. doi:https://doi.org/10.1515/9781400825523.1.
Husain, T. (2024). A Multidimensional Analysis of Border Security Challenges in Bangladesh: Navigating Operational Complexities, Transnational threats, and Humanitarian Crises. Journal of South Asian Research, 2(1), pp.1–20. doi:https://doi.org/10.47509/JSAR.2024.v02i01.01.
India Hate Lab (2026). Report 2025: Hate Speech Events in India . [online] India Hate Lab (IHL). Available at: https://indiahatelab.com/2026/01/13/hate-speech-events-in-india-2025/.
Institute for Economics & Peace (2026). Global Terrorism Index 2026: Measuring the impact of terrorism. [online] Sydney: Institute for Economics & Peace. Available at: http://visionofhumanity.org/resources [Accessed 20 Apr. 2026].
Jayarama, M. (2025). Revisiting the contours of India-Bangladesh relations under the Modi government: a roadmap to building a stronger cooperation. The Round Table, pp.1–24. doi:https://doi.org/10.1080/00358533.2025.2577747.
Khyati, D. and Patel, J. (2026). Using Technology for India’s Border Surveillance and Developing Vision 2047: Protecting Borders, Facilitating Progress. INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF NOVEL RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT (IJNRD), 11(1), pp.2456–4184.
Pingle, V. and Varshney, A. (2006). India’s Identity Politics: Then and Now. In: Managing globalization : lessons from China and India. New Jersey: World Scientific.
Rafiq, S. (2020). Linear Borders, Partition and Identity in Postcolonial South Asia. Geopolitics, 27(2), pp.478–500. doi:https://doi.org/10.1080/14650045.2020.1757652.
Ramachandran, S. (2025). Why India Will Not Extradite Sheikh Hasina. [online] Thediplomat.com. Available at: https://thediplomat.com/2025/11/why-india-will-not-extradite-sheikh-hasina/.
Rather, Z. (2014). Security Challenges to India-Bangladesh Relations: Some Visible Issues. International Journal of Research (IJR), 1(4).
Bengali, S. (2014). Al Qaeda leader says terrorist network branching out to India. [online] Los Angeles Times. Available at: https://www.latimes.com/world/asia/la-fg-al-qaeda-threatens-india-prompting-20140904-story.html [Accessed 24 Apr. 2026].
Siddiqui, M. (2025). Scrapping the Free Movement Regime With Myanmar Has Created Challenges for India. [online] Thediplomat.com. Available at: https://thediplomat.com/2025/02/scrapping-the-free-movement-regime-with-myanmar-has-created-challenges-for-india/.
Singhal, A., Gupta, S., Aggarwal, N. and Gupta, A. (2019). Smart border management - Contributing to a US$5 trillion economy. Kolkata: Ernst & Young LLP.
Siyech, M.S. (2020). Al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent: comparing the movement in India and Bangladesh. Journal of Policing, Intelligence and Counter Terrorism, 15(1), pp.64–82. doi:https://doi.org/10.1080/18335330.2020.1729394.
Travelli, A. and Raj, S. (2024). Modi Calls Muslims ‘Infiltrators’ Who Would Take India’s Wealth. The New York Times. [online] 22 Apr. Available at: https://www.nytimes.com/2024/04/22/world/asia/modi-speech-muslims.html.
Vallet, E. (2021). State of Border Walls in a Globalized World. In: Borders and border walls : in-security, symbolism, vulnerabilities. Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge.
Wacquant, L. (2009). Punishing the Poor: The Neoliberal Government of Social Insecurity. Duke University Press.
[1] Vinayak Damodar Savarkar (1883-1966) was an Indian nationalist and leading figure in the Hindu Mahasabha (“Great Society of Hindus”), a Hindu nationalist organization and political party.
