The Credibility and Security Challenge Posed by Serbia to the European Union
/Benjamin Turquier, edited by Pia Haavik
On September 9th, 2026, then-president Aleksandar Vučić called a snap parliamentary election two years after the collapse of the Novi Sad railway station canopy sparked mass protests. These protests were driven by suspicions of corruption among those in power. Protesters have demanded accountability and systemic reforms (Woldeselasse, 2025) to strengthen the rule of law and democracy in Serbia. Since 2017, Vučić has spent almost a decade weakening public institutions, the rule of law and civil liberties (Associated Press, 2026). As a result, Serbia, which was granted candidate status in 2012, has seen European Union (EU) accession negotiations slow to a standstill (Kekic, 2026).
On the one hand, the EU continues to demand reforms to ensure Serbia's compliance with the Copenhagen criteria and to align with EU foreign policy, especially regarding sanctions against Russia (European Parliament, 2026). While the result of the parliamentary election on October 25th, 2026, remains uncertain, two main contenders have emerged: United Serbia (Aleksandar Vučić’s coalition, for which he is running for Prime Minister) and the Student List, the main political opponent (Election Tracker, 2026). A Student List victory would likely bring Serbia closer to the EU, given its reform agenda. Nevertheless, both parties regard Kosovo as part of Serbia, in line with the Serbian constitution (Burazer, 2026). This position could limit EU accession discussions, as the normalisation of Prishtina-Belgrade relations became a condition to both countries’ EU accession through the Ohrid Agreement (EEAS Press Team, 2023, Article 2).
On the other hand, keeping diplomatic channels open on Serbia’s EU accession can also help prevent increased Russian influence in the Western Balkans’ largest country (Weissmann, 2023). Previously, Serbia's proximity to Russia has caused security incidents targeting EU and North American officials, including a phishing campaign on the margins of the Belgrade Security Conference 2025 (Bandovic, 2026). Serbia therefore presents a twofold challenge: how to ensure the EU’s credibility as an attractive partner that works with countries committed to meeting the conditions for EU membership (I), whilst continuing to engage with Serbia to prevent any increase in Russian influence in that country, which could pose security challenges within the Union (II).
I. Remaining a credible and attractive actor committed to working with partners that move toward the EU
The European Union presents the promotion of democracy and human rights as central to its external action. Its Action Plan on Human Rights and Democracy 2020-2027 states that “promoting a global system for human rights and democracy is at the core of the EU’s commitment to strengthening multilateralism” (European Union, s.d., p. 22). The EU’s credibility therefore depends on its ability to uphold these principles consistently, particularly in candidate countries seeking closer integration.
However, the EU has remained relatively quiet in response to repeated democratic backsliding in Serbia. This limited response creates a gap between the EU’s values and its approach to Serbian authorities. Benjamin Couteau, Research Fellow at Centre Grande Europe, argues that the EU has not clearly sided with the part of the Serbian population expressing democratic aspirations (Couteau, 2025).
The EU’s approach to North Macedonia further illustrates the credibility problem created by its relationship with Serbia. Although negotiations for North Macedonia’s accession to the EU formally began in July 2022, progress has been slow. Nevertheless, the country has maintained its commitment to EU integration, despite uneven progress in implementing the Copenhagen criteria (European Commission, 2025). This contrast between Serbia and North Macedonia further undermines the credibility of EU conditionality: North Macedonia’s reform and alignment efforts have brought limited progress, whereas the EU has continued engaging with Serbia despite its democratic backsliding and weaker alignment with EU foreign policy.
This inconsistency calls the wider enlargement process's reputation into question. The EU’s response to developments in Serbia sets a threshold for what candidate countries can do without facing significant consequences. If the EU does not defend democratic standards consistently, it risks weakening both the attractiveness of its model and the credibility of its commitment to working with partners that genuinely move toward EU values and membership. However, Serbia poses not only a credibility challenge to the EU, but also a security risk because of its links with Russia. In a context of heightened tensions between Moscow and the EU, these connections raise concerns that Serbia could serve as a channel for Russian influence.
II. The proximity to Russia challenging the EU security
Serbia’s case remains particularly sensitive because of its geographical position in the EU’s immediate neighbourhood and its enduring political, economic, and strategic ties with Russia (European Parliament, 2023; European Commission, 2025, p. 103). The European Commission’s 2025 report explicitly states that Serbia has not aligned with EU sanctions related to Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine and needs to improve its alignment with the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (European Commission, 2025, p.103). This position is particularly significant given Serbia’s status as an EU candidate country, since it highlights the continuing gap between the country’s formal EU ambitions and its foreign-policy orientation.
Serbia’s relationship with Russia is not limited to political rhetoric or historical and cultural ties but also has concrete security implications for EU member states. Following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, the EU and several European governments expelled Russian diplomats in response to activities considered incompatible with their diplomatic status and potentially threatening European security (EEAS Press Team, 2022). Serbia, by contrast, has allowed the Russian embassy and trade mission in Belgrade to maintain a large presence. According to an open-source investigation reported by N1, at least twenty-nine of seventy-eight employees of the Russian embassy in Belgrade had confirmed or possible links to Russian intelligence or security structures, including nineteen connected to the Russian Ministry of Defence or the Main Intelligence Directorate -GRU- (N1 Belgrade, 2026). Serbia’s continued acceptance of such an extensive Russian presence may therefore provide Moscow with an important operational environment close to the EU’s borders, particularly as Russian officials expelled from EU member states can no longer operate as easily from within the Union.
The security implications of this situation are not necessarily confined to Serbia itself. In France, for example, three Serbian nationals were involved in depositing pig heads outside nine mosques and Muslim cultural centres in the Paris region in an apparent attempt to provoke religious tensions and deepen social divisions. A Serbian court subsequently convicted the individuals after finding that they had received instructions and funding from structures connected to Russian intelligence services (Chastand, 2026). Although this example should not automatically apply to every Russian official operating in Serbia, it illustrates how individuals based in, or connected to, Serbia can become involved in activities that affect the internal security of an EU member state.
By keeping close ties with Moscow and tolerating a large Russian diplomatic and intelligence presence in Belgrade, Serbia risks creating a security vulnerability on the EU’s immediate periphery. The phishing campaign conducted around the 2025 Belgrade Security Conference, organised by the Belgrade Centre for Security Policy, illustrates this broader problem. The cyber campaign reportedly involved compromised email accounts, the impersonation of conference staff and the creation of a fraudulent conference website intended to obtain participants’ credentials (Belgrade Centre for Security Policy, 2025).
The conference was intended to encourage discussion on various security topics. Nevertheless, partners linked to this conference were targeted through coordinated phishing and impersonation attempts. Microsoft’s Threat Intelligence Centre attributed the compromise of certain accounts to Forest Blizzard, also known as APT28, a Russian state-sponsored group (Belgrade Centre for Security Policy, 2025). This incident is particularly concerning because it suggests that civil-society representatives, researchers and other participants in public debates may face digital surveillance or intimidation when engaging with politically sensitive issues. It also demonstrates that the security challenge extends beyond conventional espionage to cyber operations directed against individuals and organisations supporting democratic governance and public debate.
The fact that such an attack targeted a major security conference in an EU candidate country further exposes the contradiction at the centre of Serbia’s relationship with the Union. Taken together, these examples show that Serbia’s geopolitical position is not merely a diplomatic difficulty for the EU. It may also facilitate transnational influence, intelligence and cyber activities capable of affecting EU territory. For the EU, Serbia’s accession is therefore as much a security question as a political one.
Conclusion
The parliamentary election scheduled for October 25, 2026, will determine whether Serbia continues its current political trajectory or moves towards systemic reform. For the EU, the stakes extend beyond Serbia’s domestic politics. By continuing to engage with a candidate country affected by democratic backsliding and limited foreign-policy alignment, the EU risks undermining the credibility of its values and enlargement policy. At the same time, Serbia’s close ties with Russia and its exposure to Russian intelligence, influence and cyber activities create security concerns that may extend into EU territory. Serbia therefore represents a twofold challenge: the EU must preserve the credibility of its democratic commitments while protecting itself from security threats emerging on its immediate periphery.
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