The "New Space" era has transformed space into a critical domain for security, commerce, and digital infrastructure, but it has also introduced significant cybersecurity challenges. The digitalization of satellite systems has expanded the attack surface for cyber threats, making Anti-Satellite (ASAT) cyber operations a growing concern. This paper examines the intersection of cyberspace and space security, highlighting satellite vulnerabilities, supply chain risks, and global stability implications. It also explores the European Union’s strategic response, including the EUSSD, strengthened legislation, and inter-agency cooperation. Addressing cyber-ASAT threats will require international collaboration, strong cybersecurity policies, and proactive mitigation strategies to ensure space resilience.
Myanmar’s discriminatory policies against the Rohingya have been extensively addressed by academics. However, wartime sexual violence and its impact on Rohingya women have been overlooked, therefore requiring more detailed research. Attention must be dedicated to how mass rapes are being conducted against women, causing severe physical and psychological harm.
Sexual violence perpetrated as a weapon of war is an unfortunately common phenomenon for Latin America and the Caribbean regions, especially during conflicts and civil wars. This article will trace back such practices to their origins in colonialism and the culture of machismo that permeates the region. It will do so by focusing on the exemplary case of Guatemala as the first case of a national court holding a hearing for sexual slavery perpetrated by military officials during armed conflicts as a war crime, and the success story of the indigenous women of Sepur Zarco in receiving justice for the crimes they were victims of during the 1960-1996 Guatemalan civil war. [1]
By Giulia Prior
Studies carried out in Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) highlight how sexual violence (especially against women) is a serious problem for the region. These studies also show how the region has gained international recognition for the progress made there in the field of legal reforms aimed at addressing violence against women. [2] In fact, LAC was the first region where all countries ratified the Convention for the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women (1993), and the first to sign a regional treaty aimed at eliminating such violence (the Inter-American Convention on the Prevention, Punishment and Eradication of Violence Against Women or Convention of Belem do Para, 1994). [3] The problem, however, is that the enforcement of such laws is often weak, owing to a general culture of impunity that characterises the region. Therefore, most of the protection the laws offer remains theoretical and without practical application.
The 2010 Desk Review of the Sexual Violence Research Initiative identifies the following as the most common forms of violence against women by non-partners: sexual abuse of children and youth, trafficking and sexual exploitation, sexual violence during the migration process, sexual harassment in the workplace, and sexual violence in emergencies or settings of armed conflict.
‘Rape is an instrument or weapon of war. It is a way to attack the country, killing or raping the victims. The woman was seen as a military objective.’ These were the words of Yassmin Barrios, the chief judge of a Guatemalan court that made history in February 2016 for being the first national court to hear charges of sexual slavery perpetuated during armed conflicts as a war crime. [4] The court sentenced two former members of the military to prison for sexually enslaving and murdering indigenous women (of the Maya Q’eqchi’ communities) in the military outpost of Sepur Zarco, during the 1960-1996 Guatemalan civil war. [5]
Rape used as a weapon of war in the Americas can be traced back to colonialism, when Europeans started conquering the newly discovered West and imposing their patriarchy and their views onto Indigenous people. In this period, colonisers used rape to take power over Indigenous people, to dominate Indigenous societies and to take possession of their lands. [6]
Professor Rita Laura Segato explains:
In the old conventional wars, with conquered territories came the insemination of women’s bodies. Soldiers raped the women of conquered territories as if women’s bodies were extensions of those territories. [7]
More recently the region has experienced high levels of violence, in particular during the 20th century civil wars and military dictatorships. Guatemala is an exemplary case: during the 1960-1996 civil war, under the leadership of Efrain Rios Montt, and backed by the U.S., the Indigenous population of Guatemala was targeted with massacres, forced displacement, and systemic rape employed as a tool of genocide. [8] Data shows that during this internal armed conflict, more than 100,000 women were victims of systemic rape and the main perpetrators were identified in armed groups, government, and paramilitary forces. [9]
The issue with systemic violence is that often it continues in post-conflict periods, as a legacy of war. [10] In Guatemala, nearly 10 out of 100,000 women are killed on a yearly basis and the country ranks third worldwide in the killings of women. [11]
Such high degrees of violence can be traced back to the culture of machismo that is characteristic of the LAC region. Machismo is a stereotypical concept that emphasises hypermasculinity, and in Latin America is a legacy of the Spanish conquistadores (as the conquerors of the Spanish and Portuguese Empires were identified during the colonisation of Latin America), who shaped the region’s gender identity and gender relationships. This culture manifests itself mostly through aggressive imposition on women. [12] This patriarchal culture perpetuates narratives of impunity, violence, and discrimination that have contributed to leaving millions of women voiceless to abuses for years.
The consequences of the instrumentalisation of rape against women are not merely physical. Much deeper is the psychological trauma these women endure, the stigma from their communities, and rejection from their husbands. [13] A large number of cases go undetected because women are too afraid of the consequences of speaking up against their abusers. Moreover, resources to treat the victims in these countries are often lacking. In the words of Doctors Without Borders’ head of mission in Guatemala, Fabio Forgione: ‘In Guatemala nobody speaks about sexual violence. Survivors are stigmatised and they cannot easily find treatment in Guatemala yet. There are no resources and too little comprehension of patients’ needs by the doctors.’ [14]
The Sepur Zarco case was emblematic in this regard. In fact, the Guatemalan court also issued a reparations decision, ‘which is perhaps the strongest example to date of a national court instituting transformative and comprehensive reparations for women,’ says UN Women Regional Director for the Americas and the Caribbean, Luiza Carvalho. [15] Other than individual monetary compensation, the decision provided for the installation of a health center in Sepur Zarco, for improving education infrastructure, and providing scholarships for women, girls, and the whole community. Additionally, these reparations include reopening dossiers for land restitution and calling for the Government to institute local community development projects. [16] These measures seek to address the broader causes and consequences of the violences perpetrated against these women and their communities.
While there have been some major steps forward that have created the conditions for women such as the Sepur Zarco abuelas (as these women are respectfully referred to) [17] to be empowered and to speak up, with actual judicial consequences, there is still a long way to go, and there are still sectors of society that remain voiceless. [18] As the article has shown, the problem of gender-based violence in Latin America is one that needs continued international attention and immediate action. This will help in shedding light on such barbaric practices, and in finding ways to overcome them.
[1] UN Women (2018), ‘Sepur Zarco case: The Guatemalan women who rose for justice in a war-torn nation’, [online] available from https://www.unwomen.org/en/news/stories/2018/10/feature-sepur-zarco-case, accessed on 31st December 2020.
[2] Sexual Violence Research Initiative SVRI (2010) ‘Sexual Violence in Latin America and the Caribbean: A Desk Review’, [online] available from https://www.svri.org/sites/default/files/attachments/2016-07-19/f_0024041_19595_original.pdf, accessed on 30th December 2020.
[3] Ibid.
[4] Reynolds, L (2016) ‘Landmark sexual slavery case in Guatemala examines use of rape as weapon of war’, [online] available from https://ticotimes.net/2016/02/18/sexual-slavery-case-guatemala, accessed on 12th January 2021.
[5] Castillo, M (2016) ‘Guatemala sentences two to 360 years in sex slave case’, [online] available from https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/2/27/guatemala-sentences-two-to-360-years-in-sex-slave-case, accessed on 29th December 2020.
[6] Muñoz, M (2017) ‘10 Reasons Why Colonialism Strengthened Rape Culture In Latinx Communities’, [online] available from https://everydayfeminism.com/2017/07/colonialism-latinx-rape-culture/, accessed on 29th December 2020.
[7] Uribe-Uran, V. M (2013) ‘An Academic’s Search for Answers to Violence against Women: An Interview with Professor Rita Laura Segato’, [online] available from https://lacc.fiu.edu/hemisphere/volume-22.pdf, accessed on 31st December 2020.
[8] Susskind, Y (2016) ‘Guilty: What the Sepur Zarco Trial Means for Women’s Rights Worldwide’, [online] available from https://www.madre.org/press-publications/article/guilty-what-sepur-zarco-trial-means-women%E2%80%99s-rights-worldwide, accessed on 30th December 2020.
[9] De Pablo, O et al. (2011) ‘Guatemalan war rape survivors: 'We have no voice'’, [online] available from https://www.theguardian.com/lifeandstyle/2011/jul/28/guatemalan-women-mass-rape-give-evidence, accessed on 31st December 2020.
[10] Sexual Violence Research Initiative SVRI (2010) ‘Sexual Violence in Latin America and the Caribbean: A Desk Review’, [online] available from https://www.svri.org/sites/default/files/attachments/2016-07-19/f_0024041_19595_original.pdf, accessed on 30th December 2020.
[11] Guinan, J (2015) ‘Nearly 20 years after peace pact, Guatemala's women relive violence’, [online] available from https://edition.cnn.com/2015/04/02/world/iyw-guatemala-gender-violence/index.html, accessed on 31st December 2020.
[12] Hardin, M (2002) ‘Altering Masculinities: The Spanish Conquest and the Evolution of the Latin American Machismo’, International Journal of Sexuality and Gender Studies, Vol. 7, No. 1, pp. 1-22.
[13] Lund, G (2019) ‘The Hidden Victims of Sexual Violence in War’, [online] available from https://www.warchild.org.uk/whats-happening/blogs/hidden-victims-sexual-violence-war, accessed on 6th January 2021.
[14] Doctors Without Borders (2009) ‘Guatemala: Treating Sexual Violence, Breaking the Cycle of Fear’, [online] available from https://www.doctorswithoutborders.org/what-we-do/news-stories/news/guatemala-treating-sexual-violence-breaking-cycle-fear, accessed on 31st December 2020.
[15] UN Women (2016), ‘Landmark ruling in Guatemala a victory against sexual violence in armed conflict’, [online] available from https://www.unwomen.org/en/news/stories/2016/3/guatemala-victory-against-sexual-violence-in-armed-conflict, accessed on 31st December 2020.
[16] Ibid.
[17] UN Women (2018), ‘Sepur Zarco case: The Guatemalan women who rose for justice in a war-torn nation’, [online] available from https://www.unwomen.org/en/news/stories/2018/10/feature-sepur-zarco-case, last accessed on 31st December 2020.
[18] Joffily, M (2016) ‘Sexual Violence in the military dictatorships of Latin America: Who wants to know?’, [online] available from https://sur.conectas.org/en/who-wants-to-know/, accessed on 31st December 2020.
Rare Earth Elements are a group of seventeen minerals that are vital for many industries, including renewable energies, high-tech, as well as defence industries. Thus, they are essential for modern economies and their armed forces. They are difficult to acquire, considering the expensive mining and refining practices necessary to exploit them. These minerals gained attention in 2010, when China, with a near-monopoly on the market, imposed a short-lived embargo on rare earth exports to Japan. More than a mere trade dispute, this incident raised concerns and questions over China’s possible use of economic statecraft. Concerned by the situation, both the United States and the European Union have engaged in taking actions that aim to strengthen their positions in the global supply chain and diminish the risks of future disruptions.
Rare Earth Elements (REEs), also known as rare earth metals or rare earths,[1] are defined by the United States Geological Survey (USGS), as a group of seventeen elements; these are scandium, yttrium and the lanthanides.[2] They are divided into light and heavy categories.[3] The light REEs have atomic numbers between 57, 60, and 62, and are more abundant than the heavy ones. As a result, heavy REEs with atomic numbers 63 to 71 are scarcer and therefore, more expensive.
Contrary to what the name might suggest, REEs are not actually scarce.[4] Cerium (Ce) for example, the most common rare earth, with an abundance of 60 parts per million, is more common than lead (pb).[5] The least abundant, lutetium, has a crustal abundance of 0.5 parts per million. This makes it 200 times more abundant than gold.[6] They are called rare due to the fact that in the 19th century only one exploitable deposit was known: a quarry in the town of Ytterby, located in Sweden.[7]`
Nonetheless, it is important to highlight that their exploitation remains difficult to this day.[8] They are not found individually, but rather in low concentrations as part of bigger rock formations, most abundantly in the minerals bastnaesite and monazite. As a result, mining and sorting processes are very expensive.
Both the European Union (EU) and the United States (US) consider these materials to be critical.[9] This means that they are essential for the well-being of their economies, while their supply may be challenged by scarcity, geopolitical disputes, trade policies or otherwise.[10] Their importance comes from their many uses. REEs are employed in almost every electronic device, in hybrid and electric vehicles, energy efficient lighting, renewable energy generation, and even fossil fuel processing.[11] In terms of military applications, rare earths are needed in the production of precision guided ammunition, lasers, defence radar systems, and even night-vision goggles.[12] They are employed in strong and permanent magnets that can resist extreme temperatures without losing their magnetic strength. As a result, they are the best option for applications such as missile control systems and fighter jets or satellite communication systems. For example, a F35 Lightning Two aircraft requires more than 400 kilograms of rare earth elements.[13] This means that every country with a modern military is to a certain extent dependent on the REE supply chain, as most of these technologies would be infeasible without them.[14] In addition, it is worth noting that today’s technology has a limited ability to recycle REEs, and there are very few other minerals that have the potential to substitute them.[15] Therefore, uninterrupted access to these elements is a worry shared by governments and defense industries alike.
With regard to the production and development of rare earths, the EU highlights that as of 2020, 98% of heavy Rare Earth production, as well as 99% of Light Rare Earth production, takes place on Chinese soil.[16] With control over approximately one third of the global proven reserves of rare earths, the country has held nearly monopolistic control of the international rare earth market ever since the 1990s. Until the late 1980s, the US was a net exporter of REEs, mainly thanks to the Mountain Pass mine in the Mojave Desert, California.[17] At that time China lowered its production prices to strengthen its own position, driving competition out of business.[18] Before joining the World Trade Organization, the PRC had introduced quotas, a list of eligible exporters, as well as prohibiting exports for processing purposes, which remained after it joined the organization.[19] Such a situation led to a decrease in funding for research and education in the US.
REEs returned to the spotlight internationally, in September 2010, after the infamous Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands incident which led to the Chinese embargo on REE exports to Japan.[20] Tensions started with a collision between the Japanese coast guard and a Chinese trawler in the East Chinese Sea, where the the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu islands are situated. Japan detained the captain of the Chinese vessel but was released shortly after.[21] It is reported that in response, Chinese authorities stopped all rare earth exports to Japan.[22]
It must be acknowledged that this was a one-time event. But considering the relevance of these materials, and China’s control over the market, the fear of future restrictions and supply chain bottlenecks remains ever-present.[23] Moreover, this event also highlighted the possibility that China could leverage its control over the REE markets to pursue its foreign policy and security goals, such as influencing its territorial disputes with neighbouring countries.[24] International actors have taken measures aimed at avoiding any similar situations in the future.
In the US, the Obama administration supported research and development specifically focusing on the downstream businesses of energy and defence.[25] Resource diplomacy focused on trade policy coordination and information sharing with allied countries. However, it did not clearly support upstream production, and there was limited engagement with the private sector and trade policy.[26] This is evidenced by the fact that Mountain Pass mine started operating once again in 2012. By 2015, however, the company declared bankruptcy due to an oversupply of products in the international market. At the beginning of the Trump administration, there seemed to be a mission to reverse decades long dependence on foreign imports,[27] highlighting the risks and threats for American national security originating from this dependence. Similarly, this administration showed interest in increasing funds and support for domestic upstream production. However, it can be argued that the implementation was lacklustre as budget and programme cuts have, for example, harmed interagency cooperation.[28]
In the European case, there was already a raw materials initiative in place in 2008. It was created with the aim of achieving a fair and sustainable supply of raw materials from global markets, a sustainable supply of raw materials within the EU, and resource efficiency and supply of ‘secondary raw materials’ through recycling.[29] Moreover, since 2011, the EU has addressed the markets for critical raw materials (CRM) and released a list of these materials every three years, highlighting the rate of import and substitutability.[30] As of 2020 it lists thirty CRMs.
The European Rare Earth Competency Network report in 2015 highlighted issues the EU might face and made valuable recommendations.[31] For instance, the potential of REE mining in Sweden and Greenland, which could secure European supply for decades. However, the report also highlighted that in order to make this a viable option there would need to be viable downstream processing capabilities.[32] It would be challenging to keep the process environmentally sound and to provide access to the necessary capital.
More recently, in September 2020, the European Commission presented an Action Plan on Critical Raw Materials, the 2020 List of Critical Raw Materials, and a foresight study considering the 2030 and 2050 perspectives.[33] The action plan addresses the challenges in achieving the goals set by the EU Green Deal; the Union will become more reliant on Critical Raw Materials and therefore REEs as well.[34] In the latter case, the demand of those REEs used in permanent magnets could increase tenfold by 2050. Ten actions that must be implemented are highlighted in the document. The creation of the European Raw Materials Alliance is the first one. It was created with the aim of bolstering the creation of environmentally sustainable and socially equitable innovations and infrastructure. It focuses on implementing a circular economy of complex products, supporting Europe’s raw material industry capability to extract, design, manufacture, and recycle raw materials.[35]
China remains as the sole power in the rare earths industry, but these initiatives indicate that there is a reinforced interest in securing access to rare earths, both in the United States and European Union. However, considering the capital-intensive nature of some of the actions,[36] they will prove useful in the mid- to long-term, and therefore their effectiveness remains to be seen. Moreover, in times when international trade is a source of tension, a EU seeking to achieve more sovereignty over critical raw materials could bring a broader trade skirmish in return.[37]
[1] Voncken J.H.L. (2016) ‘The Rare Earth Elements—A Special Group of Metals’. In: The Rare Earth Elements. SpringerBriefs in Earth Sciences. Springer, Cham. Available from https://doi-org.ezproxy.lib.gla.ac.uk/10.1007/978-3-319-26809-5_1, Accessed on 3rd December 2020.
[2] U.S. Geological Survey (n.d.) ‘Rare Earths Statistics and Information’, [online] available from https://www.usgs.gov/centers/nmic/rare-earths-statistics-and-information, accessed on 3th December 2020.
[3] Kalantzakos, Sophia (2018) ‘What are Rare Earths?’ In China and the Geopolitics of Rare Earths. New York: Oxford University Press.
[4] Ibid.
[5] Voncken J.H.L. (2016) ‘The Rare Earth Elements—A Special Group of Metals’. In: The Rare Earth Elements. SpringerBriefs in Earth Sciences. Springer, Cham. [online] Available from https://doi-org.ezproxy.lib.gla.ac.uk/10.1007/978-3-319-26809-5_1, Accessed on 3rd December 2020.
[6] Ibid.
[7] Ibid.
[8] Wilson, J.D. (2017). ‘Securitising rare earth minerals’. In International Resource Politics in the Asia-Pacific. Pp: 167-188. Cheltenham: Edward Edgar Publishing.
[9] He, Yujia. (2018). ‘The trade-security nexus and U.S. policy making in critical minerals’. Resources Policy 59: 238-249.
European Commission. (n.d.) ‘Critical Raw Materials. International Market, Industry, Entrepreneurship and SMEs’. [Online] Available from: https://ec.europa.eu/growth/sectors/raw-materials/specific-interest/critical_en . Accessed on 4th December 2020.
National Science and Technology Council (NSTC) (2016) Assessment of Critical Minerals: Screening Methodology and Initial Application. [Online] Available from: https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/whitehouse.gov/files/images/CSMSC%20Assessment%20of%20Critical%20Minerals%20Report%202016-03-16%20FINAL.pdf
[10] Geoscience Australia. (n. d.). ‘Critical Minerals: Introduction’. [Online] Available from https://www.ga.gov.au/about/projects/resources/critical-minerals. Accessed on December 21st 2020.
[11] Hensel, N.D. (2011) ‘Economic Challenges in the Clean Energy Supply Chain: The Market for Rare Earth Minerals and Other Critical Inputs’. Business Economics 46, No. 3: 171-184.
[12] Hurst, Cindy A. (2010) ‘China’s Ace in the hole: Rare Earth Elements’. Joint Force Quarterly 59: 121-126. [Online] Available from: https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Portals/68/Documents/jfq/jfq-59/jfq-59_121-126_Hurst.pdf.
[13] GRasso, V. B. (2013. ‘Rare Earth Elements in National Defense: Background, Oversight Issues, and Options for Congress’. Congressional Research Service Report.
[14] Voncken J.H.L. (2016)
[15] He, Yujia. (2018).
[16] European Commission. (n.d.) ‘Critical Raw Materials. International Market, Industry, Entrepreneurship and SMEs’. [Online] Available from: https://ec.europa.eu/growth/sectors/raw-materials/specific-interest/critical_en . Accessed on 4th December 2020.
[17] Kalantzakos, Sophia (2018).
[18] Wilson, J.D. (2017).
[19] PRC State Economic and Trade Commission (2002) Announcement of Year 2003 Export Quota, Total Volume Distribution Criteria and Application Procedure for Export of Important Industrial Products.
PRC State Planning Commission. (2000). 10th Five Year Plan for China’s Rare Earth Industry.
[20] Wilson, J.D. (2017).
[21]McCurry, Justin (2010) ‘Japan-China row Scalates over fishing boat collision’, The Guardian. Available from: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/sep/09/japan-china-fishing-boat-collision. Accessed on 4th December 2020.
[22] King, Amy; Armstrong, Shiro (2013) ‘Did China really ban rare earth exports to Japan?’. East Asia Forum. [Online] Available from: https://crawford.anu.edu.au/news-events/news/2432/digging-rare-earth-embargo Accessed on 4th December 2020.
Bradsher, Keith (2010) ‘Amid Tension, China Blocks Vital Exports to Japan’, The New York Times. [Online] Available from: https://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/23/business/global/23rare.html. Accessed on 4th January 2020.
[23] Kalantzakos, Sophia (2018).
[24] Ibid.
[25] He, Yujia (2018).
[26] Ibid.
[27] Ibid.
[28] Ibid.
[29] European Commission (n.d.)
[30] European Commission (2011) Communication for the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, The European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions Tackling the Challenges in Commodity Markets and on Raw Materials. [Online] Available from: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:52011DC0025&locale=en
European Commission (2014) Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions On the review of the list of critical raw materials for the EU and the implementation of the Raw Materials Initiative. Available from: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:52014DC0297
European Commission (2014) COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT On the implementation of the Raw Materials Initiative. [Online] Available from: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52014SC0171&from=EN
European Commission (2014) Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, The Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions On the review of the list of critical raw materials for the EU and the implementation of the Raw Materials Initiative. Available from: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52014DC0297&from=EN
[31] The European Rare Earths Competency Network (EROCON) (2015) Strengthening the European Rare Earths Supply Chain. Challenges and Policy Options. Ref. Ares(2015)2544417 - 17/06/2015
[32] Ibid.
[33] European Commission (2020) ‘Commission announces actions to make Europe’s raw materials supply more secure and sustainable’. [Online] Available from: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_20_1542. Accessed 7th December 2020.
[34] European Commission (2020) Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions. Critical Raw Materials Resilience: Charting a Path towards greater Security and Sustainability. [Online] Available from: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52020DC0474&from=EN
[35] European Raw Materials Alliance (n.d.) ‘European Raw Materials Alliance’. [Online] Available from: https://erma.eu. Accessed 7th December 2020.
[36] Paron, Francesco (2018) ‘Europe’s Dependence on Critical Raw Materials: Implications for the Competitiveness and Independence of Strategic Industries’. IAI Commentaries 18 , 45.
[37] White and Case (2020) ‘EU unveils action plan to secure access to critical raw materials’. [Online] Available from: https://www.whitecase.com/publications/alert/eu-unveils-action-plan-secure-access-critical-raw-materials. Accessed 7th December 2020.
Comfort women were girls and young women working as sexual slaves for the Imperial Japanese Army during World War II. The term is a translation of the Japanese word ianfu, which means “prostitute(s).” [1] Usually the women employed were poor and non-Japanese, as the country wanted to preserve the purity of its own women. [2] Hence, the majority of comfort women were found in Japanese occupied countries — primarily, Korea, China, and the Philippines. [3]
The existence of atrocious systems such as comfort stations, exemplifies the weaponisation of female bodies in Japan. Even though this episode of forced prostitution ended, the idea behind it remains rooted in Japanese society as the country today continues to refuse to acknowledge their crimes. The topic of weaponisation of female bodies will be discussed deeply this month, as a series of articles will be published on the matter. This article will explore the topic of comfort women — particularly, the reasons behind its existence and the consequences of this phenomenon.
By Camilla Carlesi
Even though the brothels started by employing solely voluntary prostitutes, many women ended up being forced to work there. Most of the women were abducted from their homes with promises of false job opportunities in restaurants or hospitals. At times, they were lured by propaganda supporting gender equality and female education. [4] Due to these false pretenses, the Japanese army — guided by the orders of the general office and the ministry of the army, in particular, of the supreme commander — managed to recruit and imprison an incredible number of sex workers. There is not an agreed number on the quantity of workers involved; however, the majority of historians estimate that there were around 200,000 women. [5] Among them, 80% came from Korea. [6]
The conditions of the brothels and the way in which these women were treated were horrendous. They were humiliated in multiple ways, deprived of their identity, culture and language. [7] If they were pregnant, they were forced to abort their children. If they refused to have sex, these women were raped, beaten, or even murdered. A survivor of these crimes, Jan Ruff O’Herne, witnesses:
‘I was systematically beaten and raped day and night. Even the Japanese doctor raped me each time he visited the brothel to examine us for venereal disease. And to humiliate us even more the doors and windows were left open, so the Japanese could watch us being examined.’ [8]
Today, these crimes are recognized by most countries in Asia and elsewhere, including the Philippines, Canada, Taiwan, Germany, and Australia. In 2007, the U.S. called for the historical recognition of Japanese sexual slavery and asked Japan to publicly apologize for their atrocious actions. Japan’s response to the American request has been extremely controversial. The former Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe refused to abide by the U.S.’s demand and stated that the government already addressed the topic in the past by giving aid funds to former sex slaves, while part of the Japanese population denies the existence of evidence on the topic. [9] Even though the country devoted 1 billion yen ($8.3 million) to the cause, the money does not pay for the decades of atrocities experienced by these women, especially when Japan refuses to publicly acknowledge these mistakes.
The Japanese army justified the use of comfort women in many ways; among them, the decrease of rape and the prevention of secret-leakage, internal revolts, and the spread of diseases.
I) Reduce Rape Crimes
After the atrocities which took place in the past – when Japan expanded in Manchukuo, Nanjing, Shanghai and committed mass sexual violence – the country attempted to reduce sexual crimes by providing prostitutes to its personnel. [10] According to the Japanese government, decreasing rape crimes during occupation would help the colonized countries to better accept their invasion.
II) Prevent the Leak of Information from Soldiers
By confining the military sexual interactions with comfort women to specific controlled locations, the government was able to avoid the spread of information about the Japanese military plans. The comfort stations protected against the leakage of strategic information because if any incident would have ever occurred, it would have been almost impossible for the international press to know about it. What was said in these locations stayed in these locations. [11]
III) Avoid Internal Discontent
The Japanese government believed that comfort stations offered soldiers the opportunity to let out their stress and sexual impulses. By improving the conditions of their military personnel, the authorities decreased the likelihood of internal riots and enhanced their ability to fight. [12]
IV) Decrease Venereal Diseases
Because Japanese soldiers were highly exposed to sexually transmitted infections (STIs), the government implemented comfort stations to decrease such problem. Brothels had better sanitary conditions and were more controlled by doctors, which they thought would decrease transmission. [13]
I) Increase of Rape Crimes and Sexual Transmitted Infections
Even though the comfort stations originated from the need to decrease STDs and rape, they ended up worsening both issues. With time, the number of people infected by diseases rose incredibly, as these brothels allowed soldiers to have intercourse more often; thus, to get sick more often. In addition, the more frequent sexual interactions only increased the sexual appetite of the army. [14] Overall, the comfort women system did not bring the results that the Japanese government was expecting.
II) Rise of Mental Illnesses
The comfort women system also fueled high levels of mental illnesses. The physical abuse which these women experienced greatly impacted their psychological health. Some of the main symptoms were anger, emotional stress, and distorted perceptions. [15] Post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) was also a very common problem. Forced sexual labor in WWII brought acute consequences to the lives of these women, but also long-term ones. Thus, a study found that even 60 years beyond the end of the war, the women were still prone to mental illnesses. [16]
III) Stigmatization of Survivors
Other than psychological diseases, there are many additional long-term implications that followed the end of Japanese forced prostitution. For instance, women who were employed as sexual workers were rejected and abandoned by their families and communities. As a consequence of this marginalization, multiple survivors committed suicide. Today, former comfort women are still stigmatized by some of their communities for their past. [17]
IV) Negative International Response
Lastly, the legalization of forced prostitution and the mishandling of the issue by the Japanese government caused a severing of ties with the rest of the world. The issue fueled tensions with South Korea, as Japan refused to engage in an historical debate in regards to the issue. Moreover, the humanitarian crimes committed by the Japanese army shed a bad light on the country in front of the global community.
The comfort women system was a barbaric program implemented by the Japanese government. Women were forced into prostitution, beaten, and obliged to live in terrible conditions. According to the Japanese government, comfort stations appeared to be an efficient way to reduce rape, ensure secrecy, improve soldiers’ wellbeing and decrease venereal diseases. Although, this forced prostitution structure only brought a boost of STDs, rape crimes, and mental illnessess. Today, the traces of this program are still visible in Japan, where survivors are neglected and marginalized. Issues continue outside Japan as well, as the comfort women atrocities have negatively impacted the global community’s view of Japan.
This analysis of the case of comfort women is one example of the lack of an adequate response to sexual violence in the context of global gender security. The lack of a sufficient apology from the Japanese authorities damages the state’s global image and is detrimental to the fight for women’s rights and equity. The next articles of this series will further explore the topic of women as a weapon of war through other case studies and will emphasize the need for a stronger international fight for women security.
[1] Soh, CS (2009). ‘The Comfort Women: Sexual Violence and Postcolonial Memory in Korea and Japan. University of Chicago Press.
[2] Yoshimi, Y (2002). ‘Comfort Women: Sexual Slavery in the Japanese Military during WWII.’ Columbia University Press, pp. 155.
[3] (2013). ‘Women and World War II – Comfort Women.’ Womenshistory.about.com.
[4] Yoshimi, 2002.
[5] (2007). ‘Japanese opposition calls on prime minister to acknowledge WWII sex slaves, International Herald Tribune.’
[6] Gamble, A, Watanabe, T (2004). ‘A Public Betrayed.’ Regnery Publishing.
[7] Watanabe, K (1999). ‘Trafficking in Women's Bodies, Then and Now: The Issue of Military "Comfort Women".‘ Women's Studies Quarterly, pp. 19-31, available from http://www.jstor.org/stable/40003395.
[8] O'Herne, JR (February 15, 2007). ‘Statement of Jan Ruff O'Herne AO, Subcommittee on Asia, Pacific and the Global Environment.’ Committee on Foreign Affairs, U.S. House of Representatives.
[9] Constante, A (2019). ‘Who Are the 'Comfort Women,' and Why Are U.S.-Based Memorials for Them Controversial?’ NBCNews.com, NBCUniversal News Group, available from https://www.nbcnews.com/news/asian-america/who-are-comfort-women-why-are-u-s-based-memorials-n997656.
[10] Tanaka, Y (2002). ‘Japan’s Comfort Women: Sexual Slavery and Prostitution during World War II and the US Occupation,’ Routledge, pp. 45, 60.
[11] Asian Women's Fund (2007). ‘The "Comfort Women" Issue and the Asian Women's Fund.’ Asian Women's Fund.
[12] Korea Times (2007). ‘Comfort women used to prevent military revolt during war.’
[13] ‘Why Did the Japanese Military Establish the ‘Comfort Women’ System?’ Fight for Justice, available from http://fightforjustice.info/?page_id=2762.
[14] Korea Times, 2007.
[15] Min SK, Lee CH, Kim JY, Shim EJ (November 2004). ‘Posttraumatic Stress Disorder of Former Comfort Women for Japanese Army during World War II’. Journal of Korean Neuropsychiatric Association (in Korean), pp. 740–748.
[16] Ibid.
[17] Watanabe, 1999.
After the breakout of the civil war, Libya’s fragmented political landscape led to internal partitions and the rise of two political establishments, in addition to other armed militias. In the ongoing conflict, all belligerent parts are fighting for the control of oil, among other things. More specifically, Libya’s hydrocarbon sector has long been a magnet for non-state groups such as armed militias and even terrorist organisations, which are trying to gain control over oil facilities with the purpose of gaining political power and capitalising on illicit oil smuggling. This paper aims to delve into the role of oil in the Libyan crisis, by briefly investigating what sort of political outcomes each belligerent faction would obtain by control of oil facilities.
By Elisa Marra
In addition to being an economic instrument, oil is also a political one. In comparison with other war-torn countries, Libya owns the largest crude oil reserves in Africa. The hydrocarbons sector is the country’s main source of income. As the African Development Bank reports, ‘over 2014-18, the oil, gas, and related extractive sectors accounted for more than 65% of GDP, more than 95% of export earnings, and 96% of the budget.’ [1] In Libya, petroleum turned out to be the most powerful factor dictating the dynamics of the political crisis. Indeed, the abundance of hydrocarbons had always been used as a powerful tool to control tensions derived from the country’s intricate social fabric. [2] However, the importance of oil in the Libyan political crisis became especially tangible after the outbreak of the civil war and the country’s partition into seperate spheres of influence. Evidently, the various factions realised that whoever controls oil also holds political power. Therefore, the unstoppable battle for dominance of energy sources became one of the principal disputes in the conflict, involving not only the two official administrations, – the Government of National Accord and the House of Representatives backed by the Libyan National Army – but also a series of armed militias and non-state actors who seek to take advantage of the fragmented political landscape. [3]
To understand the role of oil in the Libyan crisis, it is necessary to clarify the current fragmentation into different spheres of influence, as well as the country’s politics more generally. Galvanised by the outbreak of revolutions in neighbouring Arab countries, in 2011 the Libyan population revolted against long-reigning dictator Muammar Gaddafi. However, the revolution soon morphed into a bloody civil war, which not only led to Gaddafi’s death, but also divided the already socially ruptured country into different areas of influence. Nowadays, Libya is divided into two main regions: the Tripoli-based United Nations (UN)-backed Government of National Accord (GNA), headed by Fayez al-Serraj, which controls western Libya; and the Tobruk-based House of Representatives, in control of eastern and central Libya and supported by the Libyan National Army (LNA). The latter is an anti-Islamist armed group led by Marshal Khalifa Haftar, a retired Gaddafi-era general. Moreover, a series of armed militias are belligerent actors as well. Among them are the Benghazi Defence Brigades, revolutionary Islamic fighters opposing the LNA, and the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant. [4]
Gaddafi’s fall broke the previous status quo of resource distribution, and thus control of oil created tensions and conflict among all these factions. [5] The reason is found in the inevitable interdependence between the hydrocarbon sector and Libyan politics. First, some academics, such as Chivvis and Martini, argue that Libya is a victim of the ‘Resource Curse’: a theory according to which countries rich in natural resources tend to have less democratic regimes and lower economic growth. [6] According to the oil or resource curse theory, authoritarianism or even the collapse of the state are much more likely to occur in a country rich in hydrocarbons, and especially when this sector is controlled by the state. Reliance on extractive industry may stimulate the spread of corruption or even lead to state capture by individuals or groups. Secondly, lack of security, political turbulence, and violence allowed terrorist groups and armed militias to take control of multiple oil production facilities, therefore impeding economic stabilisation. [7]
Undoubtedly, all belligerent factions are fighting for control of fuels as revenue sources. More notably, as Jason Pack argues, ‘it is not much of an oversimplification to state that the Libyan militias themselves are fighting primarily over money.’ [8] First and foremost, oil represents yet another factor of conflict between Haftar and Serraj. In particular, Haftar is unable to capitalise on the oil facilities controlled by the LNA, since the majority of international companies only negotiate with the Tripoli-based National Oil Corporation (NOC). Therefore, the GNA obtains the majority of the revenues. [9] However, the mounting economic crisis represents a major challenge for the government of Tripoli, which is unable to pay salaries. Although this might seem an irrelevant detail, it is important to understand why factions are competing for the control of fuels. The government’s inability to pay salaries to employees might play significantly into the hands of armed militias. Indeed, if the government fails to provide a significant form of prestige and social positions, rebels may consider the alternative of joining other armed militias or even terrorist organisations. Ultimately, this might contribute to the strengthening of already powerful non-state actors, who may succeed in controlling significant territories. [10]
The fragmented political landscape has indeed already provided non-state groups with the chance to become stronger. Since the outbreak of the conflict, these groups have attempted to consolidate their control over economic sectors, primarily that of energy. What are the reasons for this? First and foremost, as previously explained, controlling fuel implies gaining political power. Blocking a pipeline or even being able to control an oil reservoir is a successful political instrument. The reasons for these blockages range from political demands, to extortion in exchange for money or prisoners, to instruments aimed at debilitating the opponent. [11] In addition, the control of oil terminals represents a source of revenue for non-state actors. Terrorist organisations such as the Islamic State have increasingly attacked oil and gas infrastructures. Undoubtedly, the group is seeking a way to increase its income through illicit activities, and more specifically the Islamic State is seeking to profit from oil and gas smuggling, just as it has done in Iraq and Syria. [12] Therefore, by gaining control over the oil sector, these non-state actors are not only able to leverage the smuggling of fuels, but they would also gain in strength and political power.
In conclusion, Libya’s wealth seems to represent a curse, rather than a blessing. Indeed, the country’s abundance of hydrocarbons has not only prevented its economic stabilisation and the development of its democratic institutions, but has also played a significant role in the continuing bloody conflict. Certainly, control over hydrocarbons represents one, or even the main, factor pitting the belligerent factions against one another. Furthermore, dominance over oil facilities and infrastructure is also tempting for armed militias and terrorist organisations, which aim at gaining control over the fuel sector for much the same reasons as other belligerents. Against this background, Libya’s dependence on hydrocarbons represents a significant challenge to stability in the years to come.
[1] African Development Bank Group. ‘Libya Economic Outlook’ [online] available from: https://www.afdb.org/en/countries/north-africa/libya/libya-economic-outlook. Accessed on 27th November 2020.
BP. ‘Statistical Review of World Energy 2020’ [online] available from: https://www.bp.com/content/dam/bp/business-sites/en/global/corporate/pdfs/energy-economics/statistical-review/bp-stats-review-2020-full-report.pdf. Accessed on 27th November 2020.
[2] Marinone, Lorenzo. ‘Il Ruolo Del Petrolio Nella Crisi Libica.’ RIENERGIA, 2018. [Online] available from: rienergia.staffettaonline.com/articolo/33103/Il+ruolo+del+petrolio+nella+crisi+libica/Marinone. Accessed 27th November 2020.
Arfaras, Giorgio. ‘La Libia e noi: Storia delle Crisi Petrolifere.’ Limes, rivista di Geopolitica, 2011. [Online] available from: https://www.limesonline.com/la-libia-e-noi-storia-delle-crisi-petrolifere/20615. Accessed 27th November 2020.
Kabouche, Leo. ‘The Energy Briefing: The never-ending battle for Libya’s Oil Crescent.’ Global Risk Insight, 2018. [Online] available from: https://oilprice.com/Energy/Crude-Oil/The-Never-Ending-Battle-For-Libyas-Oil-Crescent.html. Accessed 25th November 2020.
[3] Suñer Marzari, Ricard. ‘The war in Libya and its oil resources: order inside chaos?’ Atalayar, 2020. [Online] available from: https://atalayar.com/en/blog/war-libya-and-its-oil-resources-order-inside-chaos. Accessed 25th November 2020.
[4] Wehrey, Frederic. Introduction. ‘This War Is Out of Our Hands’ in The Internationalization of Libya’s Post-2011 Conflicts From Proxies to Boots on the Ground. New America, 2020, pp. 7–11. www.jstor.org/stable/resrep26366.4.
Abdessadok, Zineb. ‘Libya Today: From Arab Spring to Failed State’. AlJazeera, 2017. [Online] available from: https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2017/5/30/libya-today-from-arab-spring-to-failed-state. Accessed 25th November 2020.
[5] Wehrey, p.10.
[6] Chivvis, Christopher and Martini, Jeffrey. ‘Economic Stabilization and the Oil Economy.’ in Libya After Qaddafi: Lessons and Implications for the Future. RAND Corporation, 2014, pp. 53–64. JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/10.7249/j.ctt6wq7w7.11
[7] ‘Oil and Gas in the new Libyan Era: Conflict and Continuity’. The Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, 2019. https://www.oxfordenergy.org/wpcms/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/Oil-and-Gas-in-a-New-Libyan-Era-Conflict-and-Continuity-MEP-22.pdf
[8] Pack, Jason. ‘How Libya’s economic structures enrich the militias’. Middle East Institute, 2019. https://www.mei.edu/publications/how-libyas-economic-structures-enrich-militias
[9] See Suñer Marzari, Ricard. ‘The war in Libya and its oil resources: order inside chaos?’ Atalayar, 2020.
[10] See Chivvis, Christopher and Martini, Jeffrey. ‘Economic Stabilization and the Oil Economy.’ in Libya After Qaddafi: Lessons and Implications for the Future.
[11] See Suñer Marzari, Ricard. ‘The war in Libya and its oil resources: order inside chaos?’ Atalayar, 2020.
[12] ‘Extremist Groups’ in LIBYA, EXTREMISM, & THE CONSEQUENCES OF COLLAPSE. Soufan Group, 2016, pp. 11–15. www.jstor.org/stable/resrep10785.9.
Geiger, Julianne. ‘Can ISIS gain power over Libya’s Oil?’ USA Today Money. Online available from: https://eu.usatoday.com/story/mon ey/markets/2016/01/16/can-isis-gain-power-over-libyas-oil/78873374/ . Accessed 27th November 2020.
An Interview Series on the Political Implications of the Pandemic
By Fabiana Natale and Gilles de Valk
Over the summer of 2020, Fabiana Natale and Gilles de Valk conducted the ‘Conversing COVID’ interview series on the political implications of the pandemic. Now that many countries are experiencing another wave of infections and the world has learned more about the virus, Fabiana and Gilles are launching a second interview series: ‘COVID Continues’. They will speak to experts from different backgrounds on the (geo)political, security, and societal consequences of this pandemic.
For this second episode, we spoke with Giancarlo Fiorella, Investigator and Trainer for Latin America at Bellingcat. Giancarlo is also a PhD student at the University of Toronto, writing his thesis on protest policing in Venezuela, focusing on the role of civilian armed groups. During our conversation, we discussed the benefits of open source investigation as well as the impact of the pandemic in Venezuela.
Could you give us an example of what you have been working on for Bellingcat recently?
In the last weeks, I have been working on an academic journal article that is a combination of my academic work and my work for Bellingcat. Bellingcat investigates the authenticity of user-generated content online, by verifying the time and location of videos and pictures, for example. We tried to apply this methodology to the academic context with two colleagues, making the argument that it can be as useful for academic researchers as it has been for non-academic and human rights investigators.
Another project I have been working on recently is the development of a database of aviation related to Venezuela. In Venezuela, there is no public aircraft register, which are usually held by national aviation authorities and are publicly available in other countries. I have been developing this for a year, mostly through flight tracking. It was very interesting to discover, for instance, that a plane that looked like a simple commercial airplane, was actually a luxurious jet used by the Venezuelan President, Nicolás Maduro, and his friends.
What are the benefits of open source investigation?
Open source investigation can be very beneficial when it comes to investigating human rights abuses, war crimes, or crimes against humanity. One of the more practical benefits is reactive fact checking, which can be achieved with a wide range of digital tools, ranging from Google, Yandex, or Bing searches to reverse image searches.
These tools can be applied, for example, to press conferences held by Venezuelan government officials, in order to verify their claims. It can also be used to verify stories that are spread via Twitter accounts with large amounts of followers. A person can share an image or a video from ten years ago in combination with an unrelated event that is happening right now. This happens every single day and it is important to debunk such information before it causes widespread panic.
Besides, open source investigation is so broad that you can apply it in lots of different areas. In that sense, your imagination is the limit. It also works well in academia, for instance. I am doing my thesis on protest policing in Venezuela, but did not need to go into the field, because I was able to access hundreds of pictures and videos from protests that people had shared online.
Can you tell us about the impact of the pandemic in Venezuela?
I noticed a couple of trends in Venezuela early on in the pandemic. First of all, there was a malignant underreporting of Covid-19 cases by the government. While Colombia would report hundreds of cases per day, Venezuela would report six or seven. Although the low numbers occurred due to a lack of testing capabilities and appropriate infrastructure, the government celebrated those low figures. Eventually, testing ramped up and their record reached hundreds of cases a day. To compare, they reported over 28,000 cases in September and only 190 in April.
Another interesting thing to look at is the government’s quarantine measures. While the incubation period is considered to last up to two weeks, the Venezuelan government implemented the so-called ‘seven by seven’ (siete por siete) quarantine. It means that you can go out for seven days and then you stay home for seven days. This scheme came across as nonsensical and maybe unique in the world, but it might have been motivated by economic considerations. Even on the days that one has to stay home, hardly anybody can afford to do it. When large segments of the population are chronically poor, people cannot wait for tomorrow as they need to make money.
Finally, another trend is the government’s demonisation of migrants, who were coming back to Venezuela from Colombia. Maduro himself accused the Colombian government of purposefully infecting people with Covid-19 and sending them to Venezuela to spread the virus, and state officials engaged with this rhetoric of ‘biological warfare’.
What was the impact of this demonisation of refugees?
There was already a humanitarian crisis happening in Venezuela before the pandemic hit, with a mass exodus of refugees, and this rhetoric only worsened it. Quarantine camps were set up at the border and migrants are kept in quarantine before they are allowed to travel further into the country. Several shocking testimonies revealed that the conditions of the camps are deplorable. They are overcrowded, inhabited both by sick people and pregnant women. People have been denied clothing, sleeping quarters, and access to food and medicine. The way those camps operate are the result of this demonisation. When the country’s leader accuses migrants of being walking weapons, it is impossible to implement a policy aimed to improve their well-being.
How did the public react to the government downplaying the situation and demonising refugees?
That is hard to say, but I suspect that people followed these government announcements with caution. The majority of Venezuelans are used to having a government that lies. There is no meaningful counterbalance, as the government has a tight grip on the media. Because of the lack of reliable sources, there is a general disinterest in what the government says, also when it comes to the number of reported cases of Covid-19.
Regarding the demonisation of refugees, some Venezuelan human rights organisations denounced state officials’ comments about migrants being biological warfare agents, as well as the poor treatment of refugees at the border. However, the average citizen is not necessarily aware of those issues.
Did the relationship between police and society change in Venezuela during the pandemic?
For my thesis, I am interviewing people about how they feel about the official government forces, which are the police and the national guards, and about the civilian armed groups (colectivos armados) that attack protesters. People tend to empathise somewhat with the police and national guards. Even though they do not agree with the repression, they understand that those forces are simply doing their job. I do not think that the pandemic changed anything in this sense. If anything, there have been fewer protests, so people are being less exposed to antagonistic contact with the police.
You mentioned civilian armed groups that also intervene in protest policing. Are they motivated by overlapping interests with the police in stopping the protests?
The colectivos armados are usually regarded as pro-government groups. Some of them are directly financed by the government to repress protestors or they may receive privileges, such as priority access to housing. However, they also include people who are not in direct contact with the government.
In most countries, there are no civilian groups repressing protests alongside the police. In the United States, however, this is starting to change, with neo-Nazi groups and other white supremacist militias. They are not officially allied with the police and are usually even against the police, but in that specific protest window, those civilian groups and the police have an overlapping interest in repressing it.
Do you think that such violence against protesters has increased since the beginning of the pandemic?
In Venezuela, such responses to protests go back to 2014, when Maduro faced the first anti-government protests. Nevertheless, the precursors to these colectivos armados already existed in the 1960s, when leftist guerrilla groups were operating across the country. Today, you still see protests happening in Caracas. They are mostly short in time and related to a specific sector, like a week of demonstrations by nurses, but major nation-wide demonstrations occurred in 2014 and 2017.
Furthermore, the pandemic has led to an increased dissemination of conspiracy theories. Did this make your job at Bellingcat more difficult in any way?
This did not necessarily make our job harder, because most Covid-19 conspiracy theories are not really new. Many of them are simply modifications of existing ones. For instance, the idea that 5G towers are causing Covid-19 is piggybacking on the theory that 5G is harmful, which is based on the belief that electrical transmission towers are dangerous. Either way, the fast spread of conspiracy theories related to Covid-19 demonstrated that there is a certain segment of the population that will not seek the scientific truth and will simply accept such theories without double checking. However, I see my job at Bellingcat to give the most fact-based account of events, but not to convince people of a particular thing.
What can we learn from this pandemic?
The pandemic has taught us that a significant segment of the population will not listen to reason and will not take the most basic and reasonable steps that are needed for their own good and for the good of others. This is especially worrying to me when I think about what we will have to do against climate change, which will demand larger sacrifices. The kinds of sacrifices we are asked to make to face Covid-19, such as not going to a bar or wearing a face mask, are not comparable to those we will have to make against climate change. It makes me sceptical about whether we can deal with the climate crisis in an effective manner as a species.
A positive element, though, is that we were able to come up with a vaccine in record time. Thus, it also shows our ability to react in extreme situations and that results can come from a concerted effort. In that sense, I think we can say that crises bring out both the best and the worst of societies.
The COVID-19 pandemic has become the focal point of world affairs and relegated other pressing matters to the background. One item that has not gained the attention it deserves is the decision of the U.S. government to revise their anti-personnel landmine (APL) policy. On the 31st of January 2020, the U.S. Secretary of Defense announced the withdrawal from Barack Obama’s Presidential Policy Directive 37 (PPD-37)[1], which had largely prohibited the usage, production, stockpiling, and transfer of APLs outside of the Korean peninsula.[2] In this article I will express strong reservations towards this policy shift, arguing that the Trump administration has made a short-sighted and unnecessary decision which will have dangerous repercussions.
Over the past few decades, numerous anti-mine lobby initiatives (often led by prominent figures) and international agreements have strived to put a ban on these devastating hidden-killers, and with steady success. Since the ratification of the Ottawa Treaty – to which 164 countries are party, the highest number of any disarmament agreement – in December 1997, the number of innocent people maimed or killed by mines and other explosive remnants of war has been in serious decline, from an estimated 24,000 victims in 1996 to roughly 7,000 casualties in 2018.[3] However, these humanitarian accomplishments and the overall objective to attain an APL-free world are now at serious risk due to this shift in American policy. Not only is it morally reprehensible, but it also sends a dangerous signal to the rest of the world, giving other states the green light to exploit APLs. But what is most curious about the reform is that the motivations lying behind it are remarkably weak.
The U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) defended their decision on the grounds of strategic and military necessity.[4] A bankrupt argument, to say the least, because history evidences that the effectiveness of mines as a warfare instrument is peripheral at best, and in some instances even counterproductive. Take the Gulf War, for instance: out of the estimated 9 million mines sown in Kuwait, few – if any – resulted in damage to armed forces. Similarly, numerous high-level U.S. commanders have long argued that APLs are no real ‘force multipliers.’[5] Former U.S. Marine Corps four-star general Alfred M. Gray Jr. stated aptly: “I know of no situation in the Korean War, nor in the five years I served in Southeast Asia, nor in Panama, nor Desert Shield-Desert Storm, where our use of mine warfare truly channelized the enemy and brought him into a destructive pattern. I’m not aware of any operational advantage from the broad deployment of mines.”[6] Similarly, the International Commission of the Red Cross already established in 1996 that the APL only delays missions and ‘has become less relevant to modern armoured warfare’.[7]
Even stronger objections can be levelled at the DoD’s technical justification to reemploy APLs. The Department claims that their so-called “smart mine” with a self-destructive mechanism will be ‘more protective of non-combatants.’[8] This oxymoron reminds me of another controversial U.S. policy supported by the Trump Administration: the U.S. government once euphemistically termed torture practices as ‘enhanced interrogation.’[9] It sounds appealing, but is not: APLs destroy innocent lives rather than protect them. They are not « smart » either, at least not intelligent enough to distinguish soldiers from civilians. Besides, their self-destructive feature has been heavily contested because of their inaccuracy and malfunctioning.[10] This is not to say that their performance matters: my point is that mines are inherently dangerous and sugar-coating them will inevitably lead us down a slippery slope. In fact, their long-term nature is undeniable, as APLs planted during World War II and the Vietnam War, for example, still injure and kill people today.[11] Moreover, designating mines as “smart” is nothing more than a poor attempt to justify an unnecessary and dangerous policy. Smart mines do not build a safer world; only abandoning them does.
Although APLs have not become any smarter, modern mine technology has made them far more lethal and harder to detect. For example, the U.S. M16 has a casualty radius of up to 30 meters and is partly buried underground, which makes it extremely difficult to spot with the human eye.[12] In light of this, I cannot stress enough that to this day half of all mine victims are children. Consider the tragic story of Sot Tol: he lost his left leg to an APL when he and three of his friends, who all died from the incident, had mistaken it for a toy.[13] But APLs can have more devastating effects, as they are usually employed from the air, covering large territory: they create widespread “death-zones” in which human life has become impossible. The use of minefields therefore results in mass migration that, in turn, sparks conflict elsewhere.[14] Additionally, the devastating effects of APLs – these are not limited to physical injuries, they also include the agonising psychological suffering – often overburden the healthcare systems in countries where mines are deployed on a massive scale.
Furthermore, in policymaking it is vital to make a trade-off between the benefits and the drawbacks of a policy, something that has clearly been overlooked with the 2020 revision of the APL ban. The doubtful strategic advantage of APLs is not, however, worth the severe human suffering they bring about. It must also be noted that imposing the American sense of morality on the world comes with far-reaching responsibilities. This is to say that the U.S., in its self-designated role as the world’s moral leader, should not always fight fire with fire. This means that President-elect Joe Biden has to, besides tackling the COVID-19 pandemic, another important mission to pursue, give the world a strong signal to exterminate APLs. Obama’s PPD-37 was an important move in the right direction; unfortunately, the Trump administration took a dangerous turn for the worse. It is now up to a new U.S. government to help build a safe and APL-free world.
[1] In the Barack Obama Administration, the directives that are used to promulgate Presidential decisions on national security matters are designated Presidential Policy Directives (PPDs). Retrieved at: http://the-monitor.org/en-gb/reports/2015/united-states/mine-ban-policy.aspx
[2] Memorandum for Secretaries of the Military Departments of January 31st, 2020, DoD Policy on Landmines. Retrieved at: https://media.defense.gov/2020/Jan/31/2002242359/-1/-1/1/DOD-POLICY-ON-LANDMINES.PDF
[3] Monitor, Landmine, Ban Policy and Mine Action. “Landmine Monitor 2018.” Concord: International Campaign to ban Landmines (2010).
[4] DoD Policy on Landmines, p. 1.
[5] Blagden, Paddy. "Anti-Personnel Landmines-Friend or Foe." A Study of the Military Use and Effectiveness of Anti—Personnel Mines (1996), 44.
[6] Ibid., 41.
[7] Blagden, Anti-Personnel Landmines-Friend or Foe, 42.
[8] DoD Policy on Landmines, 2.
[9] See for example: https://thesecuritydistillery.org/all-articles/why-torture-is-ethically-unjustifiable-1?rq=maarten
[10] Blagden, Anti-Personnel Landmines-Friend or Foe, 59-60, and see also John Ismay, 13 November 2018, The U.S. Army Is Trying to Develop New Land Mines — Ones That Don’t Harm Civilians, New York Times https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/13/magazine/army-landmines.html
[11] Roberts, Shawn, and Jody Williams. After the guns fall silent: The enduring legacy of landmines. Oxfam (1995), 5-6.
[12] Pike, John. M14/M16 Anti-personnel Mines (AP), Military Analysis Network https://fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/land/apm.htm
[13] Perry, Mark. Not Even the Military Thinks Landmines Are A ‘Vital Tool’, The American Conservative https://www.theamericanconservative.com/articles/not-even-the-military-thinks-landmines-are-a-vital-tool/
[14] Larsen, Kaj. Op-ed: Reversing the landmine ban will explode on Us, Navy Times https://www.navytimes.com/news/your-navy/2020/02/17/op-ed-reversing-the-landmine-ban-will-explode-on-us/
Last year, the world watched in utter shock as Australia burned. In Australia, bushfires are a natural phenomenon that affects numerous parts of the country yearly. However, the fires of the “Black Summer period” of 2019/2020 were unprecedented in nature and scope. By March 2020, the fires had engulfed over 19 million hectares of Australian land, destroyed over 3000 houses, killed 33 people and over 1 billion animals. [1] One would think that the extensive economic and social heartache that resulted from these fires would create a political and cultural shift in recognising climate change as a priority at a national level. However, in the aftermath of this crisis, a political and cultural persistence of climate change denial trickles down from the national level to the Australian population who are thus more likely to believe that climate change is not at all a serious issue. Australian news readers are more likely to believe that climate change is not at all a serious issue compared to their global counterparts. [2]
This should come as no surprise, considering Australia’s climate policies inherently lack urgency, and remain stagnant in their effectiveness of meeting the Paris Agreements proposed net-zero emission goals by 2050. In fact, it has been projected that if these policies remain as they are, Australia’s greenhouse gas emissions are projected to increase by 8.6% above 2005 levels by 2030. [3] This projection combined with the recent fires should come as a clear warning call to Australian officials to recognise climate change as a threat to Australia’s national security and as something worth prioritising. This article sets out to explain why there seems to be a sense of climate denial inherent throughout Australian politics and society, which ultimately stagnates Australia’s progress towards net-zero emissions and subjects Australia to global criticism in the race against climate change.
By Christie Hawking
Over the course of the last decades Australian politics have been tumultuous in nature. With a continuous stream of coalition governments overthrowing each other, it is no surprise that maintaining an adequate climate change strategy has proven to be challenging. The issue of climate change in Australian politics had its first turning point in 1997, with the signing of the Kyoto Protocol under the first Howard government. [4] What was interesting about this deal was that Australia was one of only three countries permitted to increase its emissions, but only by 8% above 1990 level onwards to 2010.[1] In order to manage this goal amidst a projected rapid population growth, John Howard announced an 180 million dollar greenhouse package outlining reforms and ongoing commitment to the Greenhouse Challenge Program. [5] This momentum was short-lived as Howard’s cabinet resolved not to ratify the Kyoto treaty in 2001.
Going into the 2007 elections, public support grew for climate abatement strategies as Australia was blanketed by punishing droughts. Labor won the election, who campaigned to introduce a more comprehensive emissions trading scheme. As both coalitions agreed on some level that a new emissions scheme was needed, a combined effort by Labor's environmental minister and then Liberal leader Malcolm Turnbull closed a deal to legislate the Carbon Pollution Reduction Scheme (CPRS) in 2009. Due to internal disagreement within the opposition party, the iberal Leader was voted out by his own party, and replaced by a minister who was a renowned climate change sceptic, in turn, blocking support of the CPRS. This was met with an influx of news media reporting the commitment reversal, producing an immediate crash in public support for the Labor Leader, prompting a resignation and instatement of a new Labor Leader. Labor remained in power after the 2010 election and introduced a “temporary” carbon tax, which was not welcomed by the opposition. Liberal returned to power via an early election, and in a surprising turn of events, the then Liberal Leader who had opposed all previous climate policy, committed Australia to the Paris agreement in reducing emissions by 26% from 2005 levels by 2030. [6] In 2015, Liberal won the scheduled election, but the leader was ousted in 2018 because of his plan to implement modest emission targets on the energy sector. [7] He was replaced by Liberal Conservative Scott Morrison, the current Prime Minister, who has proven to be a loyalist to Australia’s huge coal industry. [8] Simultaneously, the previous Prime minister who signed the Paris Agreement in 2014, has been campaigning for Australia to withdraw from the Paris agreement, based on the premise that Australia would have not joined the treaty without the United States, that had recently withdrawn from the agreement in 2017 under the Trump Administration. [9]
With three Prime Ministers ousted with progressive climate policy ideas and the shifting viewpoints between major actors, it is no wonder many Australians are sceptical of the causes of climate change. However, this is not the only major influence fostering a sense of climate denial. Since the 1970s, political science researchers have suggested that the Australian political system resembles an elite top down system of governance, allowing for the media and politicians together to set the daily agenda of what is newsworthy, and what should be accepted as the dominant narrative and the truth. [10] When analysing the power dynamics between media and politics in Australia, it has been argued that NewsCorp, run by Rupert Murdoch, who controls 70% of local newspapers in Australia is “the most powerful political force in Australia”. [11] The notion that a media conglomerate is possibly the driving factor behind political discourse is not unique to Australia. Rupert Murdoch has been subject to multiple inquiries in the UK and the USA, and was criticised by politicians and editors of his newspapers that he would interfere with the content, and had a “determination to impose his will”. [12] This involved shifting blame to the left, protecting conservative leaders and diverting attention from climate change. [13]
NewsCorp was criticised over a new stream of misinformation reporting throughout the bushfire crisis that aimed at protecting the fossil fuel industry, as over 100 million tonnes of new coal extraction was approved by state and federal governments. [14] Furthermore, it was found that 75% of all NewsCorp articles denied the influence of climate change on the wild fires, which, in turn, ignited a rapid circulation of bush fire disinformation on social media. [15] Adding more controversy, former Prime Minister Kevin Rudd has recently launched a petition for a royal commission inquiry into the tight ownership of Australian media by Murdoch. [16] As Newscorp owns 70% of newspaper media in Australia and all newspapers in Queensland, it is claimed that this lack of diversity in news reporting has sowed doubt, and obscured fact rather than introduce fact to disperse doubt. [17] A study on climate change was included in the Australian version of the Digital News Report, and results found that news consumers who get their news from “left-wing” sources were more concerned about climate change than those who get their news from “right-wing” sources. [18]This study also found Australia had three times more climate change deniers than the global average, ranking it third in climate change denial, only behind the USA and Sweden.
As it stands, Australia has not made any new commitments in relation to carbon neutrality. However, with the new Biden Administration taking effect in January in the USA, this makes Australia an outlier on climate inaction and will revert the spotlight back on them once Biden officially re-joins the Paris Agreement as set out in his election campaign. This combined with the mounting pressure put on Australian institutions to diversify media ownership away from the Murdoch empire, as well as increasing global criticisms over Australia’s stagnant stance in the race against climate change will hopefully see a positive shift away from climate denial.
[1]Filkov, Alexander I., et al. "Impact of Australia's catastrophic 2019/20 bushfire season on communities and environment. Retrospective analysis and current trends." Journal of Safety Science and Resilience 1.1 (2020): 44-56.
[2] Fischer, Caroline & Park, Sora (2020). The number of climate deniers in Australia is more than double the global average, new survey finds. Retrieved from: https://theconversation.com/the-number-of-climate-deniers-in-australia-is-more-than-double-the-global-average-new-survey-finds-140450
[3] Climate Analytics (2020). Evaluating Australia's climate policy action
https://climateanalytics.org/briefings/evaluating-australias-climate-policy-action/
[4] Crabb, Annabel, (2018). Australia's recent climate change policy: A brief history of seven killings. ABC News. Retrieved from: https://www.abc.net.au/news/2018-08-23/climate-change-policy-a-brief-history-of-seven-killings/10152616
[5] Kay, Paul (1998) Terms and Impacts of the Kyoto Protocol
[6] Crabb, Annabel, (2018). Australia's recent climate change policy: A brief history of seven killings. ABC News. Retrieved from: https://www.abc.net.au/news/2018-08-23/climate-change-policy-a-brief-history-of-seven-killings/10152616
[7] Pach, James (2013). Australian PM Julia Gillard Ousted, Kevin Rudd Back. THE DIPLOMAT. https://thediplomat.com/2013/06/australian-pm-julia-gillard-ousted-kevin-rudd-back/
[8]Chow, Lorraine (2018). Australian Prime Minister Ousted Over Climate Policy. Eco Watch. Retrieved from: https://www.ecowatch.com/australia-prime-minister-climate-policy-2598685521.html
[9] France 24 (2020). Australian parliament to probe Murdoch media dominance. Retrieved from:https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20201111-australian-parliament-to-probe-murdoch-media-dominance
[10] Shearman, David (2020). Denial is at the heart of PM Scott Morrison’s delusional refusal to treat the cancer of climate change. The News Daily.
https://thenewdaily.com.au/life/science/environment/2020/01/09/denial-climate-change-scott-morrison/
[11] Garden, Rose (2017). Statement by President Trump on the Paris Climate Accord. Government publication:
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/statement-president-trump-paris-climate-accord/
[12] Taylor, Maria (2014) Global Warming and Climate Change: What Australia Knew and Buried. Australian National University. Retrieved from: https://press-files.anu.edu.au/downloads/press/p303951/html/Chapt07.xhtml?referer=&page=12
[13] Beecher, Eric (2020). Murdoch’s power: how it works and how it debases Australia. Retrieved from: https://www.crikey.com.au/2020/10/23/rupert-murdoch-power/
[14]Jones, Ed (2019). Five reasons why we don’t have a free and independent press in the UK and what we can do about it. https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/opendemocracyuk/five-reasons-why-we-don-t-have-free-and-independent-press-in-uk-and-what-we-can-do-about/
[15] Covering Climate Now (2020). Robert Murdoch Climate Fires. Retrieved from: https://www.coveringclimatenow.org/climate-beat/climate-coverage-improved-in-2019-but-2020-is-the-real-test
[16] Brailsford, Louis (2020) Burnt Country. Greenpeace Australia Pacific. Retrieved from.
https://www.greenpeace.org.au/wp/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/Dirty-Power-Burnt-Country_Report_FINAL.pdf
[17] SBS NEWS (2020). 'Cancer on our democracy': Kevin Rudd calls for inquiry into Murdoch media dominance. Retrieved from: https://www.sbs.com.au/news/cancer-on-our-democracy-kevin-rudd-calls-for-inquiry-into-murdoch-media-dominance
[18]Park, Sora et al. (2020). Digital News Report: Australia 2020. University of Canberra. Retrieved from: https://apo.org.au/sites/default/files/resource-files/2020-06/apo-nid305057.pdf
An Interview Series on the Political Implications of the Pandemic
By Fabiana Natale and Gilles de Valk
Over the summer of 2020, Fabiana Natale and Gilles de Valk conducted the ‘Conversing COVID’ interview series on the political implications of the pandemic. Now that many countries are experiencing another wave of infections and the world has learned more about the virus, Fabiana and Gilles are launching a second interview series: ‘COVID Continues’. They will speak to experts from different backgrounds on the (geo)political, security, and societal consequences of this pandemic.
For this first episode of our second interview series, we interviewed Jonáš Syrovátka, Program Manager at the Prague Security Studies Institute (PSSI). Mr. Syrovátka primarily works on projects concerning Russian influence activities in the Czech Republic. During our conversation we discussed the ‘infodemic’ amid the pandemic.
Can you tell us something about the Prague Security Studies Institute (PSSI) and the work you do?
PSSI was established in 2002, filling a gap in the field of security studies in the Czech Republic. Since then, it has developed as a prominent centre for security affairs, bringing together professionals and academics, and focusing on issues such as economic warfare and space- and cybersecurity. I started doing research at the Institute in late 2016, focusing on disinformation. I look at disinformation in elections, at disinformation business models of online platforms, and now also at disinformation throughout the pandemic, among other things.
The pandemic has led to an increase of online activity and a proliferation of disinformation. What are your most important observations regarding disinformation during the corona crisis?
It was interesting to see that people who are behind various conspiracy websites were actually surprised by the pandemic. They did not have a narrative at hand that they could start pushing, but soon enough they tried to incorporate this event into their broader agenda. Conspiracy websites tend to be critical about the West and the European Union in particular. Before the pandemic, for example, the EU would be criticised for migration issues, but now the handling of the coronavirus became their main point of criticism. Narratives about how the EU handled the pandemic fit into the broader narrative of the EU’s failures. I would say the coronavirus became a driver for such platforms, pushing their long-term agenda.
Who are the main actors of disinformation activities?
Disinformation in the Czech Republic is centred around dozens of websites, which are very diverse. People who are spreading disinformation are not only some mad men or proxies of foreign powers, but also entrepreneurs trying to benefit from people’s fear or longing for alternative explanations. So, there are ideological blogs, but also platforms that are trying to make money out of spreading conspiracy theories. Furthermore, these ideas are being shared on social media such as Facebook, so it is a very dynamic process. In a way, platforms are creating some kind of echo system that is interconnected.
In one of your reports on the ‘infodemic’, you made the distinction between different types of websites, such as ‘quasi-media platforms’, ‘conspiracy sites’, and the ‘blogosphere’. Could you explain their differences and why is it important to make these distinctions?
Quasi-media platforms attempt to present themselves as regular news outlets, providing some objective content, but a substantial part of their coverage is biased and problematic. Then there are conspiracy websites, producing outright lies and dubious theories. The third category is the blogosphere, where opinion pieces on fringe views circulate. They tend to mix some conspiracy thinking into their arguments. It is important to be aware of these distinctions when drafting strategies to counter those who are spreading disinformation and conspiracy theories.
Are there any distinct trends in what you called the ‘Czech disinformation ecosystem’ in one of your reports when compared to other countries?
Although I am not an expert on other countries, the Czech disinformation ecosystem is unique because it is also used by a Slovak audience. Czech conspiracy websites often have quite some follow-up in Slovakia. Czech disinformation and conspiracy websites often have quite some follow-up in Slovakia. For instance, this is significant for Russian news agency Sputnik, which has a Czech branch, but not a Slovakian one. Hence, the Czech website is supposed to serve the Slovak audience as well.
How has the response of the Czech government been so far in debunking disinformation narratives?
Initially, the response was good. Already in 2016, a National Security Audit was adopted, which focused on terrorism and migration, but also on disinformation. In 2017, the Centre Against Terrorism and Hybrid Threats was established by the Ministry of Interior. Furthermore, the Czech military made some great progress regarding communication in the past years. Unfortunately however, some developments halted because of a lack of political will, even though the plans on how to proceed are there. Still, the initiative seems to lie within the individual departments. It is not systemic enough and I think the communication problem of the Czech government has been made visible during the pandemic.
Conspiracy theories were considered harmless for a long time. Are we still underestimating their reach? And, are we dealing with them better than before?
I actually think we tend to overestimate their reach and influence in society at the moment, but we have to be careful and we need more research. In particular, we need more sociological studies on why people believe conspiracy theories and if or when people are willing to act upon them. Without this knowledge, we will not be able to reach out to these people and to return them back into the democratic discussion.
It seems like the coronavirus is here to stay for at least another couple of months. How do you think the spread of disinformation and conspiracy theories will develop over the course of, and after, the pandemic?
I think conspiracy theories will become more embedded in the everyday rhetoric. They will become especially dangerous when there are specific topics to interact with, such as a vaccine. This is an opportunity for engagement with pre-existing scepticism towards vaccination. I expect this to become an important topic. We will have to accept that after the pandemic, there will still be people who believe in conspiracy theories. However, this should be of no surprise, because we have had extremist politicians for the last thirty years, spreading dubious narratives. Nevertheless, the question is not whether conspiracy theories will stay or go, the question is how to limit their influence and how to make sure they will not lead to radicalisation and to people doing things that are really dangerous.
How closely affiliated are conspiracy theorists and rightwing extremists?
We should not underestimate the coalition between extremists and conspiracy theorists. Conspiracy theories provide a comfortable place for the buildup of an internal logic to support certain political positions, isolating them from the rest of the debate, which can be very dangerous. We should watch their engagement closely.
How can we counter disinformation?
There are multiple answers and we should realise countering disinformation is not only a security question, but also socio-political one. The crucial thing is to have a conversation about how the state should operate in the information space in the twenty-first century and how we can enforce laws in the online space. Secondly, breaking down advertising on disinformation websites by private parties could be an important step in limiting such websites’ outreach. On top of that, social media platforms should rethink their algorithms and how they approach their content. Nevertheless, I think the personal aspect is as important as the algorithms. Not only do we get information via social media, but also from friends, family, colleagues, and a number of other personal sources. Usually, we trust people around us the most, rather than Facebook.
What lessons should we learn from the pandemic?
The pandemic is a great case study for disinformation, because there is a set group of people in a set period of time focusing on a single topic. This helps us to better understand which actors are present in the information space and also to learn how to communicate with each other about our beliefs and opinions. 2020 is a terrible year to live in, but will be an interesting year to look back at.
The current pandemic and overcrowded jails form a dangerous cocktail. In addition to insalubrious detention conditions, they present a real challenge in terms of sanitary risks. The first responses aimed to ensure better social distancing to limit the spread of the disease. However, they posed certain issues in regards to human rights protection. [1]
Therefore, several countries opted for a drastic reduction of the number of inmates, which could not have occurred without loud reactions from civil society, shouting claims of justice and safety. In France, for instance, where occupation rates in jail can reach 200%, the liberation all at once of 8,000 inmates who had almost completed their sentence was not sufficient to ensure optimal health and safety conditions. The prospect of also releasing defendants who were awaiting trial launched a heated nation-wide discussion on who deserves liberty. [2]
In Italy, prisons are equally overpopulated. The ban on family visits and the poor handling in front of the high contagion risk led to prison riots that resulted in the death of 14 detainees and 72 escapes. Despite a huge and successful manhunt, the simple fact that dangerous mafiosi had escaped, already inflamed public debate. Adding fuel to the fire, the question of the intentional release of mafia bosses based on the need for medical care provoked a national scandal. [3]
These dilemmas raise a fundamental question: why do we feel the need to lock up criminals in detention facilities in the first place?
Those two cases reflect a certain understanding of safety and justice in our societies, which irremediably pairs with incarceration. But where does this conception come from and why do we feel the need to put criminals in jail? Usually, four factors are to be taken into consideration by the judge: retribution for wrongdoing, rehabilitation, community safety, and deterrence. [4]
However, crime punishment would be less necessary if crime itself could be prevented.
Indeed, much can be done in order to prevent, or at least reduce, crime.
First, one should consider the huge expenditure represented by detention facilities. Even just economic considerations would be a strong argument for more prevention activities. Indeed cost-benefit calculations of criminal justice policies show that investments for education or police are incredibly more effective than those for incarceration: as such, the return on investment for education reaches 100% and 83% for the police, against only 29% for detention facilities. [5]
Nevertheless, public safety should remain the first concern. In that regard, adopting a public health approach to violence could contribute to significant reductions in crime. Some key elements would be more investments in education, increased access to healthcare, improved neighbourhood infrastructures, and reinforced local communities. Finally, developing drug rehabilitation centres instead of ignoring drug addiction and sanctioning it, has also proven particularly valuable. [6]
Needless to say, it would be impossible to rely exclusively on prevention. Responses to crime are still needed, which brings us back to the question of incarceration.
Traditionally, incarceration has not always been the answer to deter crime. Before, exile and physical punishment were. Just as jails today, they carried a retribution dimension, met the need for community safety, and fulfilled the requirement of the wrongdoers’ exclusion. Now, in the light of human rights (the respect of which is questionable in today’s jails though) imprisonment seems to be a meaningful solution. Nevertheless, is it the only viable option?
When it comes to short term sentences, for minor offenses and crimes, could curfews, house arrests, and probation not be a better solution? Could community service not serve the same purpose and be even more useful? Why put in jail a cannabis user instead of fining them? And do problem-solving courts and community-based programmes not provide a fairer and more successful response towards public interest? [7]
On the other hand, long-term incarcerations are also questionable. Aside from being costly to taxpayers, they prevent a portion of the population from contributing to their society. So why do we apply them? [8]
One argument is that they represent retribution for the victims. But studies show that a majority of victims of violence would prefer a reduced prison sentence and more efforts for the rehabilitation of abusers and the prevention of new crimes. Another common argument relies on public safety: if they are locked up, they cannot use violence against other citizens. However, it has been proven that, on average, violence drastically decreases as a person matures. Also, the psychological and ethical advancement of a detainee is brought to the fore as a justification for the prison system, as if jails would just help them become more “moral”. But experience also shows that long imprisonments deeply change personalities, in a way that can often be traumatizing for the inmate, especially in terms of trust. [9]
Finally, a key motivation for long incarcerations is to avoid recidivism; however, reoffending is still common.
Incarceration could actually serve this purpose, if it somehow helped rehabilitating offenders, incapacitating the most dangerous ones, or if its experience alone would deter crime. Yet, it can also bring opposite results by preventing proper post-release employment opportunities or provoking a feeling of resentment in the inmates, who further identify as delinquents, while reinforced social stigmas worsen their feeling of alienation. [10]
The concomitance of such conditions explains why recidivism is still so common, at least for small crimes such as robberies. Indeed, violent crimes are usually either the result of a complex and very specific context (and often perpetrated by a former victim), which explains why they would not reoccur, or might be committed due to mental illnesses and need, therefore, to be treated differently. Certainly, one should avoid the pitfall of stigmatization of mentally-ill criminals, especially as they are not a majority. However, when talking about recidivism, their handling cannot be ignored as they are four times more likely to reoffend. For them, jails are an expensive and ineffective response, and proper mental care is needed. In that regard, the Netherlands constitute a valid and valuable example, as they provide their mentally-ill prisoners with the necessary care. [11]
This being said, our argument is that crime should be responded to through a combination of solutions. This involves the alternatives we mentioned earlier, but also jail, to some extent. Indeed, this piece does not aim to oppose incarceration, but simply raise questions on its efficiency, fairness and lastly, the meaningfulness of its use today, which we know, could be improved. As a matter of fact, more efforts could be made on in-jail education, rehabilitation (through virtual role-play treatment programmes for instance), or post-release reintegration. [12]
We can conclude with the case of Norway, which the author deems to be an example to follow, as its alternative system has shown promising results. Its new prisons, even when described as maximum-security facilities, apply a certain laissez-faire approach, with no barred windows or security cameras. The guards are unarmed and develop actual relationships with the inmates. These “open prisons” have proven very effective: they are cheaper, with sentences of only eight months in average, built on prisoner trust and personal responsibility, and with positive results in terms of rehabilitation and recidivism (with one of the lowest rates in the world: 20%). [13]
[1] WDR (2020), “Corona im Gefängnis: "Ohne Besuche zerbrechen Familien" [online] available at : https://www1.wdr.de/nachrichten/themen/coronavirus/corona-gefaengnis-gewerkschaft-100.html
Gomez, François-Xavier (2020), “Prisons : la double peine de la pandémie” Libération [online] available at :
https://www.liberation.fr/planete/2020/04/09/prisons-la-double-peine-de-la-pandemie_1784773
DW (2020), “German prison system buckling under threat of overcrowding” [online] available at : https://www.dw.com/en/german-prison-system-buckling-under-threat-of-overcrowding/a-4354
Penal reform (undated) “Overcrowding” [online] available at : 8583 https://www.penalreform.org/issues/prison-conditions/key-facts/overcrowding/ (accessed on 24/10/2020)
Global Initiative (2020), “Lockdown in lock-up: Italy's prison system has been plunged into crisis by the pandemic – and by the mafia.” [online] available at : https://globalinitiative.net/italy-prisons-covid/
[2] Observatoire International des Prisons (2020), “Surpopulation carcérale” [online] available at : https://oip.org/decrypter/thematiques/surpopulation-carcerale/
Vie Publique (2020), “Lutte contre le COVID-19 en prison : des mesures jugées insuffisantes” [online] available at : https://www.vie-publique.fr/en-bref/274113-covid-19-en-prison-des-mesures-insuffisantes-selon-la-cglpl
DW (2020), “German prison system buckling under threat of overcrowding” [online] available at : https://www.dw.com/en/german-prison-system-buckling-under-threat-of-overcrowding/a-4354
Global Initiative (2020), “Lockdown in lock-up: Italy's prison system has been plunged into crisis by the pandemic – and by the mafia.” [online] available at : https://globalinitiative.net/italy-prisons-covid/
Revenu, Nathalie (2020), “Coronavirus : libérations en série pour les détenus en fin de peine à la prison de Villepinte” Le Parisien [online] available at : http://www.leparisien.fr/seine-saint-denis-93/coronavirus-liberations-en-serie-pour-les-detenus-en-fin-de-peine-a-la-prison-de-villepinte-05-04-2020-8294346.php
Libération (2020) “Coronavirus : près de 8000 détenus en moins dans les prisons françaises” [online] available at : https://www.liberation.fr/direct/element/coronavirus-pres-de-8-000-detenus-en-moins-dans-les-prisons-francaises_112040/
[3] Global Initiative (2020), “Lockdown in lock-up: Italy's prison system has been plunged into crisis by the pandemic – and by the mafia.” [online] available at : https://globalinitiative.net/italy-prisons-covid/
[4] Lufkin, Bryan (2020), “Do long prison sentences deter crime?” BBC, Criminal Myths [online] available at : https://www.bbc.com/future/article/20180514-do-long-prison-sentences-deter-crime
[5] Council of Economic Advisers of the executive office of the President of the United States (2016), “Economic Perspectives on Incarceration and the Criminal Justice System” [online] available at : http://www.antoniocasella.eu/nume/Economic.perspectives_april2016.pdf
[6] Grissom, Brandi (2013) “Report: Investing in Drug Treatment Could Save State Millions of Dollars” [online] available at : https://www.texastribune.org/2013/01/10/report-invest-drug-treatment-instead-punishment/
US Department of Education (2015), “Investing in Teachers Instead of Prisons” [online] available at : https://www.ed.gov/news/speeches/investing-teachers-instead-prisons
Foundations Recovery Network (undated), “Drug Rehab Instead of Prison Could Save Billions” [online] available at :
https://dualdiagnosis.org/drug-rehab-instead-of-prison-could-save-billions-says-report-2/ (accessed on 24/10/20)
Jones, Alexis (2020), “Reforms without Results:
Why states should stop excluding violent offenses from criminal justice reforms” Prison Policy [online] available at : https://www.prisonpolicy.org/reports/violence.html
[7] Why states should stop excluding violent offenses from criminal justice reforms” Prison Policy [online] available at : https://www.prisonpolicy.org/reports/violence.html
Justice Policy Institute (2009), “Pruning Prisons: How Cutting Corrections Can Save Money and Protect Public Safety” [online] available at : http://www.justicepolicy.org/images/upload/09_05_REP_PruningPrisons_AC_PS.pdf
[8] Why states should stop excluding violent offenses from criminal justice reforms” Prison Policy [online] available at : https://www.prisonpolicy.org/reports/violence.html
Lufkin, Bryan (2020), “Do long prison sentences deter crime?” BBC, Criminal Myths [online] available at : https://www.bbc.com/future/article/20180514-do-long-prison-sentences-deter-crime
[9] Why states should stop excluding violent offenses from criminal justice reforms” Prison Policy [online] available at : https://www.prisonpolicy.org/reports/violence.html
Jarett, Christian (2018) “how prison changes people” BBC, Criminal Myths [online] available at : https://www.bbc.com/future/article/20180430-the-unexpected-ways-prison-time-changes-people
[10] Council of Economic Advisers of the executive office of the President of the United States (2016), “Economic Perspectives on Incarceration and the Criminal Justice System” [online] available at : http://www.antoniocasella.eu/nume/Economic.perspectives_april2016.pdf
[11] Why states should stop excluding violent offenses from criminal justice reforms” Prison Policy [online] available at : https://www.prisonpolicy.org/reports/violence.html Justice Policy Institute (2009), “Pruning Prisons: How Cutting Corrections Can Save Money and Protect Public Safety” [online] available at : http://www.justicepolicy.org/images/upload/09_05_REP_PruningPrisons_AC_PS.pdf
Hogenboom, Melissa (2018), “The Unique Way the Dutch treat mentally ill prisoners” BBC, Criminal Myths [online] available at : https://www.bbc.com/future/article/20180423-the-unique-way-the-dutch-treat-mentally-ill-prisoners
Nuwer, Rachel (2018), “Is there a link between mass shootings and mental illness?” BBC, Criminal Myths [online] available at : https://www.bbc.com/future/article/20180509-is-there-a-link-between-mass-shooting-and-mental-illness
Geddes, Linda (2018), “Can you ever change a violent psychopath’s mind?” BBC, Criminal Myths [online] available at : https://www.bbc.com/future/article/20180518-can-you-ever-change-a-violent-psychopaths-mind
Hoffmann, Morris B. and Kiehl, Kent A. (2014), “The Criminal Psychopath : History, Neuroscience, Treatment, and Economics” [online] available at : https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4059069/
[12] Bender, Kathleen (2018), “Education Opportunities in Prison Are Key to Reducing Crime” Center for American Progress [online] available at : https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/education-k-12/news/2018/03/02/447321/education-opportunities-prison-key-reducing-crime/
Geddes, Linda (2018), “Can you ever change a violent psychopath’s mind?” BBC, Criminal Myths [online] available at : https://www.bbc.com/future/article/20180518-can-you-ever-change-a-violent-psychopaths-mind
[13] Lufkin, Bryan (2020), “Do long prison sentences deter crime?” BBC, Criminal Myths [online] available at : https://www.bbc.com/future/article/20180514-do-long-prison-sentences-deter-crime
The SARS-CoV-2 pandemic has set the arena for the United States (U.S.) to demonstrate its leadership and proclaimed better position in the world in comparison with China. Nonetheless, its isolationist policy under the administration of President Donald J. Trump led the U.S. to produce poor international confidence and support based on its worrying figures from pandemic management. Boosted by COVID-19, this left a path clear for the U.S.’s main rival, China, to present its aspirations for a different world order.
By Pablo Cisneros Yánez
Since the global outbreak of the SARS-CoV-2 (causing COVID-19 disease) pandemic in early 2020, two main issues have become a priority for all governments: cooperation and leadership. As China was the first country to deal with the virus, it was expected to help the rest of the world and demonstrate an efficient way to tackle COVID-19, especially considering that China suffered from SARS in 2003, and A (H1N1)pdm09 in 2009. [1] At the same time, given its historical global position and well-equipped health structure, U.S. was called upon to show the world how a leader would manage this crisis at every level. [2] However, none of that happened. [3] Beijing has faced accusations of hiding information about the virus, while Washington records the highest numbers of cases and deaths - in fact, some U.S. states hold worse figures than entire countries. Besides the pandemic, some nations rely on U.S. cooperation for help with other issues; as a world leader it is expected that the U.S. would help tackle COVID-19 globally.
No one can deny that defeating the virus is a difficult task, leaving a clear path to international cooperation and coordination between countries in order to teach and learn from each other’s experiences. Factually, the handling of the containment of COVID-19 had more success in democratic nations such as Germany, South Korea, and Taiwan [4]; the U.S, could have used any of these examples from which to learn. As the global hegemon, it was expected that President Donald J. Trump would take these experiences and transform them into important guidelines to lead other countries that rely upon Washington and to show how this shoud be handled in the big leagues. [5] Leadership, respect, and confidence are built by example. The U.S. demonstrated none of that, neither at a national nor international level.
The U.S. is continuing to lose the chance to become a leader in battling the new coronavirus. Its current foreign policy of America First has diminished the fellowship and trust for international cooperation, especially with traditional allies. [6] In some other cases, Washington could not match its aspirations to those of its supposed partners. For instance, in a 2019 survey taken by ASEAN countries, the majority said that they “[…] had little to no confidence that ‘the United States will do the right thing” in contributing to global peace, security, prosperity and governance’ [7] considering American behaviour with regards to international agreements such as: Paris, Iran Nuclear Deal, and the Transpacific Partnership. If America expects cooperation and willingness, it needs to offer a viable alternative. [8]
However, not everything is lost. There are three essential pillars that may allow the U.S. to lead again, as Campbell & Doshi (2020) suggest: “managing the problem at home, supplying global public goods, and coordinating a global response”. [9] The last issue is the simplest to accomplish and will be the topic of the rest of this article. If the World Health Organisation lost credibility in the U.S. as in many other countries, [10] the White House has a golden opportunity to demonstrate how to handle the current crisis, in order to reform world dependency on the United Nations (U.N.) in the future.
Notwithstanding, several warnings from the scientific community about a new possible pandemic were ignored by most governments. [11] The U.S. was not an exception. Instead of imposing national restrictions, as scientists suggested, the White House prioritised the economy over public health, and the numbers of cases and deaths speak for themselves. [12] Internationally, America was expected to help other countries that lacked resources [13] to deal with the SARS-CoV-2 pandemic. [14] As a response, the U.S. offered only a few ventilators, while China was thanked by Mexico [15], the Czech Republic, and Italy, among others, for its distribution of personal protective equipment (PPE) and medical supplies. These actions cleansed China’s image [16] and shadowed America’s. [17]
The foreign policy of America First and a “social distancing” from global affairs led the U.S. to lose its positive standing amongst historic allies [18] and beneficiaries of its cooperation. [19] If one of the main goals of the Trump administration is to “combat” Chinese leadership, blaming the virus, Trump should have arranged countries under his leadership that could back his position on the international stage, by creating a sort of alliance or group. However, this never happened and the U.S.’s solitude was reflected at the 75th U.N. General Assembly and at the U.N. Security Council, when American speeches directly accused China of a lack of action and transparent information about the forthcoming pandemic. No country backed this position, not even historic allies such as the United Kingdom (U.K.) or the European Union (E.U.). Rather, China replied saying that these accusations were unfounded, which Russia supported. [20] Rather than pointing to China as the one to blame for the SARS-CoV-2 outbreak, the vast majority of governments appealed to question and perhaps redesign the U.N. system and the dependency it causes, or reinforce multilateralism as a tool of recovery from the COVID-19 pandemic.
In order to present a fresh and helpful image across the world as an ally, China is acting quickly. [21] By September, Chinese diplomats made a European tour to reinforce cooperation and understanding, with generally positive results besides the exception of the Czech Republic with whom there is a diplomatic impasse due to relations with Taiwan. [22] Even with this new Chinese approach of cooperation, an opportunity for leadership has been presented to the U.S.. [23] This opportunity comes alongside an increasingly unfavourable perception of Chinese management of the virus. [24] With the U.S. inadvertently calling the world’s attention towards its domestic problems only, China has a clear path to implant its vision on the international system, as stated by Rapp-Hopper (2020) “If the United States continues to founder while China offers supplies and coordination, international partners will naturally perceive China’s leadership to have strengthened, although they will not lose sight of its flaws”. [25]
The COVID-19 crisis combined with the America First foreign policy may result in a a shift in the international order. If the U.S. does not act cleverly, it is China who might take its place rapidly, as some scholars and professionals estimate. [26] The post-COVID-19 world will definitely need leadership that encourages and aids countries to “heal” through multilateralism. An analysis presented by the Asian Development Bank projects an impact on global economy up to £7.1 trillion. [27] With this scenario, who should pay this bill? Who are the actors called to lead recovery and the reorganisation of the world order? Will the U.S. learn from its mistakes? [28] Joe Biden and Donald Trump still have the chance to Make America Lead Again.
With the U.S. Presidential election at our door, whoever sits in the Oval Office by January 2021 must recover America’s image and leadership, which has diminished by the handling of the pandemic. Beyond the consequences of the pandemic as a catalyst for geopolitical clashes, it may only accelerate. In the great powers game, if America wants to maintain its principle world role, it must lead countries by example, not by image. The U.S. must avoid the mistake that led China to its Century of Humiliation (1839-1949); it must view itself as a place where countries seek to cooperate, and not work outside the international system. It must not make the Chinese mistake if it wants to succeed. [29]
[1] Campbell, K. & Doshi R. (2020) “The Coronavirus Could Reshape Global Order”. Foreign Affairs. Available at: https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2020-03-18/coronavirus-could-reshape-global-order (Accessed: 4 Oct 2020).
[2] Ibid.
[3] Rapp-Hooper, M. (2020) “China, America, and the International Order after the Pandemic”. War on the Rocks. Available at: https://warontherocks.com/2020/03/china-america-and-the-international-order-after-the-pandemic/ (Accessed 1 Oct 2020).
[4] Kahl C. & Berengaut A. (2020) “Aftershocks: The Coronavirus Pandemic and the New World Disorder”. War on the Rocks. Available at: https://warontherocks.com/2020/04/aftershocks-the-coronavirus-pandemic-and-the-new-world-disorder/ (Accessed 12 Oct 2020).
[5] Oltermann P. (2020) “Do not assume US still aspires to be a world leader, Merkel warns”. The Guardian. Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/jun/26/do-not-assume-us-still-aspires-to-be-world-leader-merkel-warns (Accessed 30 Oct 2020).
[6] Campbell & Doshi (2020).
[7] Rapp-Hooper (2020).
[8] Packard N. & Jensen B. (2020) "Washington needs a bold rethink of its China Strategy". War on the Rocks. Available at: https://warontherocks.com/2020/06/washington-needs-a-bold-rethink-of-its-china-strategy/ (Accessed 16 Oct 2020).
[9] Packard & Jensen (2020).
[10] Hernández J. (2020) “Trump Slammed the W.H.O. Over Coronavirus. He’s Not Alone.” The New York Times. Available at: https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/08/world/asia/trump-who-coronavirus-china.html (Accessed 30 Oct 2020).
Campbell & Doshi (2020).
[11] Global Preparedness Monitoring Board (2019) “A World at Risk: Annual report on global preparedness for health emergencies”, 6.
[12] Kahl & Berengaut (2020).
[13] Ibid.
[14] Ibid.
[15] Cortes R., Esposito A. & Cooney P. (2020) “U.S. sends Mexico planeload of ventilators to fight coronavirus”. Reuters. Available at: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-health-coronavirus-mexico-usa-idUSKBN22H2T1 (Accessed 30 Oct 2020).
[16] Campbell & Doshi (2020).
[17] Kahl & Berengaut (2020).
[18] Ibid.
[19] Rapp-Hooper (2020).
[20] Lederer E. (2020) “At UN, China, Russia and US clash over pandemic responses”. The Washington Post. Available at: https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/at-un-china-russia-and-us-clash-over-pandemic-responses/2020/09/24/17697a5e-fe89-11ea-b0e4-350e4e60cc91_story.html (Accessed 24 Sep 2020).
[21] Kahl & Berengaut (2020).
[22] Al Jazeera (2020) “‘I am Taiwanese’, Czech Speaker Vystrcil tells Taiwan parliament”. Available at: https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/9/1/i-am-taiwanese-czech-speaker-vystrcil-tells-taiwan-parliament (Accessed 19 Oct 2020).
[23] Packard & Jensen (2020).
[24] Silver L., Devlin K. & Huang C. (2020) “Unfavorable Views of China Reach Historic Highs in Many Countries”. Pew Research Center. Available at: https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2020/10/06/unfavorable-views-of-china-reach-historic-highs-in-many-countries/ (Accessed 6 Oct 2020).
[25] Rapp-Hooper (2020).
[26] Ibid.
[27] Roades, T. & Winberg D. (2020) “In Pandemic response, Health and Wealth go hand in hand”. Health Finance Institute. Available at: https://medium.com/@healthfininst/in-pandemic-response-health-and-wealth-go-hand-in-hand-af534490b5fd (Accessed 5 Oct 2020).
[28] Biden, J. (2020) “Why America Must Lead Again”. Foreign Affairs. Available at: https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2020-01-23/why-america-must-lead-again (Accessed 5 Oct 2020).
[29] Packard & Jensen (2020).
Caste oppression in India affects more than 16% of the population who are considered ‘subhuman’ according to the traditional Hindu Varna system. [1] Many gruesome acts of sexual violence against women of this community have been recorded in the 21st century owing to their vulnerability and limited access to civil rights protection. This article explores the dynamics which perpetuate such crimes and the ideologies which pose massive barriers to the security of scheduled caste women.
By Nishant Joshi
The Indian Constitution affords every citizen equal rights under national law. However, in practice, virtue of birth determines social acceptance within many communities. Harrowing narratives of class oppression still dominate popular discourse in society. In the specific context of the Hindu Varna system, the ‘untouchables’ fall outside of all social categorizations, meaning that their access to civil liberties remains problematic as per preordained tradition. Especially in rural India, the Dalit community bears the brunt of caste discrimination such as restricted access to water, land, trade, and institutions of worship. [2] Most of their business is conducted outside of normative physical boundaries. While caste oppression affects every member of the Dalit community, the heaviest brunt of retributory wrath is borne by women. Dalit women occupy the lowest position in society according to the archaic Varna system. [3] Due to conventional ideological perspectives on chastity and conformism, women are often victimised by virtue of being easy targets. Dalit activist and scholar, BR Ambedkar recognised women as being gateways to the caste system, regardless of the heirerchical positions they occupy within or outside the Varna system. [4] His belief was that control over women within a community translated into imposition of authority over that entire community owing to women’s adjudged vulnerability. In the name of preserving tradition and maintaining clear segmentation between social classes, upper-caste women as well as Dalit women have endured incessant subjugation.
Perpetual deprecation is essential for maintaining such hierarchies, which is why the dignity of Dalits is targeted whenever signs of revolt come to notice. In almost every regional language in India, the colloquial definition of ‘rape’ is equivalent to ‘tarnishing the honour’ of a community or family. Since by virtue of their existence, Dalit women have no ‘honour’ to begin with, their rights to preservation against sexual violence are met with limited redressl if any. [5] In pre-independence India, sanctioning of Dalit women as Devadasis (servants of Devas) was enforced by men of the upper-caste to perpetuate ritualised prostitution. [6] Women who were indentured into such servitude were considered shared property of the entire village. Unfortunately, in many rural communities this practice is observed to this day, but the stories rarely receive notice.
In September 2020, a surging media outcry highlighted a story of sexual violence perpetrated against a teenager belonging to the Dalit community, who succumbed to her injuries and lost her life. The incident came to light after reporters witnessed state police disposing of her body in the dead of night while family members were barricaded inside their house. [7] Unfortunately, this is not an isolated incident. While stories of sexual violence against women in cities manage to engage public attention, rural narratives fail to see the light of day. This recent incident can clearly be contrasted with the Nirbhaya incident of 2012, where a brutal assault on a woman resulted in national outrage and eventually the death penalty being awarded to three of the four perpetrators. [8] When compared with the incident involving the Dalit girl, abundant support in favour of the accused was vocalised within the upper-caste community, claiming that the story was fabricated and that a conspiracy against the Thakur community was underway. [9] This comes after concrete evidence, including medico-legal findings concluding use of force [10] and a dying declaration provided by the teenager confirming rape, had been widely circulated in the media. [11]
A common grievance amongst Dalit activists regards the media bias against the safety of women in their community. Outrage on the issue of caste-based sexual violence quickly becomes urbanised, leaving the original narrative behind. In India, the #MeToo movement took flight after Dalit Law student, Raya Sarkar, collated a list of sexual harassers in academia. The social media storm which ensued included scores of privileged urbanites narrating their stories while Dalit narratives quickly became side-lined in favour of Savarna and western feminist perspectives. [12] Activists have continually spoken out against such elitism, sometimes partly attributing subjugation to exclusivist feminism.
Despite issues of complicit attitudes of upper-caste women towards the oppression of Dalits raised by activists and academics, upper-cast women do not hold total emancipatory power. While the honour of Dalit women is perceptually an expendable resource, the chastity of upper-caste women is considered sanctimonious. Sexual purity is still enforced by banning inter-caste marriages, imposing lifelong widowhood, and encouraging pre-pubescent marriages. [13] The ritual of Sati is apparently extinct due to its grim nature of burning widows alive with their husbands’ funeral pyre, but systemic oppression in many other forms still prevails within the upper-castes. Ideals of preservation of the family line remain strictly directed towards women and their reproductive capabilities. The conservative morality of ‘respectable, chaste, and devoted women’ is visceral to the sustainability of the Varna system. Rewards for compliance include protection and permission to raise offspring within the community and thus gain honour. [14] ‘Honour’ is considered to be such a powerful social construct that some people would choose death as preferable to living without it. [15]
The Dalit community has reiterated their observation that Western and Savarna feminism is not the best model for their emancipatory requirements. Along with threats to personal security and the struggle for opportunities, they have to face subjugation and silencing on a deeper level. Historically, female empowerment in India has always followed an elitist narrative. 19th century feminism in India was almost entirely Anglo-centric, as witnessed by Josephine Butler’s review on the empowerment of Indian women. Seen from her perspective, emancipation meant taking power away from Indian patriarchal structures and embracing British imperial social structures. [16] Despite biases and apparent superiority complexes in both imperial and upper-caste feminism, it would not be fair to lay the blame on factional feminist ideologies alone. Choices within the constructs of such ideologies are limited by the conundrum between standing up for strangers and being loyal to one's ‘own people’. [17] It is folly to perpetuate women’s security by popularising a narrative repeatedly until it makes sense. It is important to ensure that the identities of Dalit women are not whitewashed and their voices are not muted by the volume of the non-Dalit women speaking on their behalf. [18]
[1] “Topic: Dalits And Adivasis In India". Statista, 2020, https://www.statista.com/topics/4946/dalits-and-adivasis-in-india/.
[2] Gorringe, Hugo. "Afterword: gendering caste: honor, patriarchy and violence." South Asia Multidisciplinary Academic Journal 19 (2018).
[3] Patil, Prachi. "Understanding sexual violence as a form of caste violence." Journal of Social Inclusion 7.1 (2016).
[4] Ambedkar, B. R. "Caste in India." Caste and democratic politics in India (2002): 83-107.
[5] Rege, Sharmila. "Caste and gender: the violence against women in India." (1996).
[6] Patil, 2016.
[7] Story, Cover. "Rape, Torture, And A Hurried Funeral: Hathras Victim Cremated In The Dead Of Night With No Family Participation". Mumbai Mirror, 2020, https://mumbaimirror.indiatimes.com/mumbai/cover-story/rape-torture-and-a-hurried-funeral/articleshow/78417269.cms.
[8] Bansode, Rupali. "The missing dalit women in testimonies of# MeToo sexual violence: Learnings for social movements." Contributions to Indian Sociology 54.1 (2020): 76-82.
[9] "Hathras Case | Upper Caste Group Holds Meet In Support Of Accused". The Hindu, 2020, https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/other-states/up-police-lathi-charge-sp-and-rld-members/article32765023.ece.
[10] "Exclusive: Aligarh Hospital MLC Report On Hathras Victim Shatters UP Police's 'No Rape' Claim". The Wire, 2020, https://thewire.in/women/aligarh-jnmch-hathras-victim-mlc-report-up-police-rape.
[11] Hathras Gangrape पीड़िता का आखिरी Video आया सामने, मौत से पहले किया बड़ा खुलासा। Rape Victim Video. 2020, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Tj1-frRpbHY. Accessed 19 Oct 2020.
[12] Bansode, 2020.
[13] Rao, Anupama. "The Sexual Politics of Caste Violence and the Ritual Archaic." 2019.
[14] Dutta, Debolina, and Oishik Sircar. "India's Winter of Discontent: Some feminist Dilemmas in the Wake of a Rape." Feminist Studies 39.1 (2013): 293-306.
[15] Gorringe, 2018.
[16] Burton, Antoinette M. "The white woman's burden: British feminists and the Indian woman, 1865–1915." Women's Studies International Forum. Vol. 13. No. 4. Pergamon, 1990.
[17] Rege, 1996.
[18] Guru, Gopal. "Dalit women talk differently." Economic and Political Weekly (1995): 2548-2550
In this new entry in the Security Distillery's lectures series, conducted by Ethan Pate, we have been focusing on the concept of Everyday Peace Indicators, and the usefulness of bottom up approaches in peace operations.
Dr. Pamina Firchow is the Principal Investigator and CEO of Everyday Peace Indicators, as well as an Associate Professor in the Conflict Resolution and Coexistence program within the Heller School for Social Policy and Management at Brandeis University. Her research interests include political violence, transitional justice (especially victim reparations), reconciliation, and peacebuilding.
Ever since the endorsement of the Amsterdam Treaty in 1997, the European Union (EU) has committed itself to implementing the concept of “gender mainstreaming” into all its policies and institutions. At the time, the term was considered “potentially revolutionary” [1] since it aimed to transform the meaning of including a gendered dimension in the EU by challenging the status quo of gender relations. However, since the treaty entered into force 21 years ago, feminist scholars have argued that the EU has failed to incorporate gender mainstreaming. [2] This article is aimed to introduce the reader to the concept of gender mainstream and its application to the EU´s external relations. It details the ways in which gender mainstreaming has been implemented and, in turn, influenced the capacity of the EU to bring theory to practice.
To this day, there exists a conceptual confusion globally among the actors working in the area of gender equality. This can be seen particularly in the case of gender mainstreaming, within its meaning and application. [3] Hence, we can never overstress definitions.
Gender mainstreaming has been defined as “the (re)organisation, improvement, development and evaluation of policy processes, so that a gender equality perspective is incorporated in all policies at all levels and at all stages, by the actors normally involved in policy-making”. [4] The confusion with this term appears when it is used interchangeably with other practices whose aim is also to promote gender equality. Gender mainstreaming goes beyond concepts such as gender balance or gender equity (which focus on increasing the number of women in an organisation). It recognises that gender equality is not possible without “transforming gender relations” [5] and consequently questions the institutional norms and values existent in the international arena. [6] This means that any policy or action aiming to include effective gender mainstreaming should go beyond positive actions and ultimately tackle the root of inequalities between men and women.
Adding to this conceptual confusion is the fact that, despite the popularity of the term, the distinct ways of putting it into practice are rarely discussed outside of academia. It is fundamental to remind ourselves that how the actors decide to approach and apply it is what determines if gender mainstreaming fulfils its transformative power. In this regard, unfortunately, the EU has not been an exception to the norm. Indeed, it has been argued that gender mainstreaming was presented to the EU as “a single concept, with no accompanying analysis of gender, gender relations, gender impact assessments and other related concepts and instruments”. [7] The EU´s most recent framework to include a gender mainstreaming strategy in its external relations, named Gender Action Plan 2016-2020, unintentionally supports this message.
In this document, the EU presents a way of assessing gender mainstreaming that underestimates the importance of a focus on how to include it’s practices, placing all the attention instead on whether it is or is not included. This is reflected in the main goal of the document which is to ensure that 85 % of all EU´s new programmes are marked as ‘G1’ or ‘G2’ by 2020. The gendered dimension of each project is measured following the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development gender equality policy markers, where ‘G1’ corresponds to projects where gender equality is the main goal and ‘G2’ to those that include gender equality as a significant aim of it. [8] While this allows us to recognize which projects are related to the promotion of gender equality, it does not assess how gender equality is promoted. Rather, it promotes the idea that the inclusion of a gendered dimension is a “tick box exercise” in the EU’s documentation. [9]
On top of this, it is fundamental to understand that gender mainstreaming in the EU is implemented through “soft law” such as guidelines for the member states and non-binding communications. [10] This limits the capacity of the EU to effectively enforce and incorporate gender mainstreaming. In the end, the inclusion of gender mainstreaming in EU external relations relies largely on the goodwill of the member states and other actors involved. This sparks a debate on the need for the EU to take a stronger stance if it wishes to fully implement gender mainstreaming at all levels of decision-making.
The United Nations Women, Peace and Security (UNWPS) agenda is the central instrument employed by the EU to bring a gendered perspective into its external actions. Hence, if one aims to understand how the EU applies gender mainstreaming, it is important to acknowledge the main aspects of the UNWPS agenda.
Although the UNWPS Resolutions are a major victory for the organisations and activists around the globe fighting for the recognition of women in security, they (re)produce a specific understanding of men’s and, especially, women's role in security. [11] While masculinity is usually associated with strength, militarism, rationality, and protection, femininity is connected with peace, weakness, relational character, and protected subjects. [12] Therefore, although it recognises that women experience conflict and peace differently than men and claims that women should play an active role in peacebuilding, UNWPS Resolutions still provide a very limited understanding of gender relations. [13] In line with this, several studies have demonstrated that the UNWPS agenda is indeed about bringing women, and not gender, into the peace process. [14] Hence, the transformative power that is characteristic of gender mainstreaming is not per se promoted through these Resolutions.
Nevertheless, it must be noted that the UNWPS agenda does not provide a clear guideline to follow, but rather has a “confused and confusing” character. [15] In other words, it can and has indeed during the years been understood, applied, and translated in different ways. [16] Thus, while it may not originally represent gender mainstreaming, it leaves an open space for actors to include it.
For the time being, the EU has followed uncritically the initial application of the agenda. [17] This remains clear in the EU´s documentation, in particular the well-known “Comprehensive approach to the EU implementation of the United Nations Security Council Resolutions 1325 and 1820 on Women, Peace and Security”. Adopted in 2008, this document aims to introduce a gendered element to all of the EU´s external actions, from conflict-related actions to development cooperation. In particular, it highlights the necessity of incorporating both men’s and women’s concerns into policies. Despite the intention of including both sexes, a detailed analysis of the document has highlighted the underrepresentation of men “with 193 references to women or girls, compared to just 26 to men or boys”. [18] This approach, known as “adding women and stirring”, does not correspond with gender mainstreaming.
Moving from the generics of these types of documents, we find that the main place for the UNWPS agenda implementation has been the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) of the EU. Specialists in gender studies and international politics, such as Annica Kronsell (2016), have analyzed CSDP´s official documents and conclude that the CSDP does not provide women with an active role in security. Instead, women are mainly seen as the subject of protection, following the same pitfalls as the UNWPS agenda. As a result of CSDP´s undervaluation of women as security agents, the mediation has turned out to be a less developed element of the UNWPS agenda in EU security practices. [19] Beyond this, the intergovernmental character of the CSDP and the prevalence of men in its organizational infrastructure pose a threat to the inclusion of gender mainstreaming, a strategy that challenges traditional conceptions of security. [20]
Gender mainstreaming pushes us to think further on how to transform the constructed inequality embedded in gender relations. Thus, unlike other actions and policies inside the field of gender equality, gender mainstreaming demands change. It is precisely for this reason that it is fundamental for the EU to adopt gender mainstreaming uniformly, differentiating it from other positive actions towards gender equality. This article has shown the need for the EU to focus on how to approach gender mainstreaming, rather than simply its inclusion in official documentation. This could entail a reconsideration of its current soft approach in order to implement practices at all levels of policy-making, as well as the introduction of new instruments of gender analysis in the EU´s structure. Regarding the promotion of gender mainstreaming beyond EU borders, the EU should clarify, reshape, or introduce new elements in the UNWPS agenda to integrate gender mainstreaming more effectively. The EU has the capabilities to fulfil its full potential as an advocate of gender mainstreaming. It is a matter of thinking critically about certain practices that could be unintentionally causing poor outcomes.
[1] Hafner-Burton, E.M. & Pollack, M.A. (2009) "Mainstreaming Gender in the European Union: Getting the Incentives Right", Comparative European Politics, 7(1): 114-138, 134.
[2] Guerrina, R & Wright, K.A.M. (2016) "Gendering normative power europe: Lessons of the women, peace and security agenda". International Affairs, 92(2): 293-312.
Lombardo, E. & Meier, P (2006) "Gender Mainstreaming in the EU: Incorporating a Feminist Reading?", European Journal of Women's Studies, 13(2):151-166.
Mergaert, L. (2012). The Reality of Gender Mainstreaming Implementation: The Case of the EU Research Policy. PhD diss., Nimegen: Radboud Universiteit. Available at: http://bit.ly/Mergaert (Accessed: 15 Sep 2020)
Minto, R. & Mergaert, L. (2018) "Gender mainstreaming and evaluation in the EU: comparative perspectives from feminist institutionalism", International Feminist Journal of Politics, 20 (2): 204-220.
[3] AWID (2004). "Gender Mainstream, Can it Work for Women´s rights?" Spotlight, 3. Available at: http://bit.ly/GenderMainstream (Accessed: 15 Sep 2020)
[4] Council of Europe (1998). Gender Mainstreaming: Conceptual Framework, Methodology and Presentation of Good Practice, EG-S-MS (98) 2. Strasbourg: Council of Europe, 13.
[5] Ibid., 14.
[6] Kronsell, A. (2012) “Gender, Sexuality, and Institutions of Hegemonic Masculinity”. In Gender, Sex, and the Potsnational Defense: Militarism and Peacekeeping. Oxford Scholarship Online.
[7] Stratigaki M. (2005) "Gender Mainstreaming vs Positive Action: An Ongoing Conflict in EU Gender Equality Policy". European Journal of Women’s Studies,12(2):165-186, 175.
[8] OECD (n.d). “DAC gender equality policy marker” Available at: https://www.oecd.org/dac/gender-development/dac-gender-equality-marker.htm (Accessed: 11 March 2020)
[9] Chappell, L. and Guerrina, R. (2020) "Understanding the gender regime in the European External Action Service", Cooperation and Conflict, 55(2):261-280.
[10] Debusscher, P. (2012) "Gender Mainstreaming in European Union Development Policy toward Latin America: Transforming Gender Relations or Confirming Hierarchies? ", Latin American Perspectives, 39 (6): 181-197.
[11] Ellerby, Kara L. (2011). Engendered security: norms, peace and gender agreements. Arizona: The University of Arizona.
[12] Kennedy, C., & Dingli, S. (2016) “Gender and Security”. In Collins, A. (Ed.) Contemporary Security Studies. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 155-167.
[13] Ellerby, 2011.
[14] Cockburn, Cynthia (2007) From Where We Stand: war, women‟s activism and feminist anlysis. London: Zed Books
Peterson, V. Spike and OECD (n.d). “DAC gender equality policy marker” Available at: https://www.oecd.org/dac/gender-development/dac-gender-equality-marker.htm (Accessed: 11 March 2020) Anne K. Runyan (2010). Global Gender Issues in the New Millennium. 3rd Ed. Westview: Pennsylvania.
Willett, S. (2010) "Introduction: Security Council Resolution 1325: Assessing the Impact on Women, Peace and Security", International Peacekeeping, 17(2):142-158.
Ellerby, 2011.
[15] Anderlini, Sanam Naraghi (2010) "What the women say: Participation and UNSCR 1325:A Case Study Assessment". International Civil Society Action Network and the MIT Center for International Studies, 15.
[16] Ibid.
[17] Haastrup, T. (2018) "Creating Cinderella? The Unintended Consequences of the Women Peace and Security Agenda for EU's Mediation Architecture", International Negotiation, 23(2): 218-237. Kennedy, C., & Dingli, S. (2016) “Gender and Security”. In Collins, A. (Ed.) Contemporary Security Studies. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 155-167.
[18] Guerrina & Wright, 2016, 308.
[19] Haastrup, 2018.
[20] Guerrina, R., Chappell, L. & Wright, K.A.M (2018) "Transforming CSDP? Feminist Triangles and Gender Regimes", JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies, 56 (5): 1036-1052.
In this new entry in the Security Distillery's lectures series, conducted by Ethan Pate, we have been focusing on the growth of PMSCs in recent decades and what their prominence could mean for the future of the international system.
Dr. Sean McFate is a foreign policy expert, author and novelist. He is a Senior Fellow at the Atlantic Council, a Washington DC think tank, and a professor of strategy at the National Defense University and Georgetown University’s School of Foreign Service. Additionally, he serves as an Advisor to Oxford University’s Centre for Technology and Global Affairs.
In this new entry in the Security Distillery's expert panel series, moderated by Mac Hamilton, we have been focusing on the impacts of the COVID-19 upon the refugee and migrant crisis. The panelists are Myra Dahgaypaw, human rights advocate at the United Nations, Dan Sullivan senior advocate for human rights at Refugees International, Niemat Ahmadi Founder and President of Darfur Women Action Group and Yasmine Taeb Senior Policy Counsel for Demand Progress.
During the Cold War, Pakistan became a staunch ally of the United States (US) and became part of the decades-long war between the two world powers and against terrorism. Pakistan protected its national interests during the Cold War but is still facing a number of challenges. Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) – now tribal districts[1] – had become a safe haven[2] for terrorists while suffering from militancy, insurgency, and a lack of peace during and after the Cold War served the interests of both Pakistan and the US. This article focuses on the question, how has this piece of land been misused for so many decades by both the national government and imperial powers?
By Fazal Wahab
Being the ally of the US, during the Cold War Pakistan provided every possible aid including ideological and logistical support against communism, and even the use of its territory. No doubt Pakistan also took advantage of the alliance and protected its national interest by strengthening its defence capabilities with the help of Saudi Arabia and the US. However, following the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, Pakistan was left to tackle the mujahideen, the then freedom fighters, of Afghanistan alone.
In British India and later in Pakistan, the tribal districts – Bajaur, Mohmand, Khyber, Orakzai, Kurram, North Waziristan and South Waziristan – were kept semi-autonomous under a special set of rules known as Frontier Crime Regulation Ordinance (FCR) 1901 [3], which is also locally termed as the “black law”. [4] Under these set of laws, the citizens of the Tribal Districts are not afforded the rights guaranteed to other Pakistani citizens under the constitution of Pakistan, in particular, they are excluded from access to the judicial system. Political Agents (PA) were responsible for the implementation of the FCR with the help of local elites and influential people known as maliks and nawabs. [5] The tribal belt shares a border with Afghanistan to the West and was of great strategic importance during the Cold War and then again after the September 11 attacks and the declaration of the War Against Terror in Afghanistan.
After the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, the CIA began a covert operation known as “Operation Cyclone”[6], aiming to support Afghan mujahideen through funding, training, and supplying weapons. Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) had been used and became the hub for the mujahideen training camps and were more suitable because of their mountainous nature and geographical location in relation to Afghanistan. The Pakistani establishment also used this tribal belt and nearby districts, particularly Peshawar, to host Afghan refugees in camps which were shut down in 2005 after the Pakistani army launched a series of operations against the Afghan Taliban and later against Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), a Taliban-affiliated movement in Pakistan. [7] With the help of the US and Middle Eastern countries, most prominently Saudi Arabia and Egypt, these refugee camps also provided a steady supply of mujahideen for the Afghan guerrilla war against the USSR. [8]
During the Cold War, the US used ‘all means available’ [9] to defeat communism. Firstly, the US accepted help from Saudi Arabia, which supported on the Wahhabi extremist version of Islam. During the Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan (1979 – 1991), Saudi Arabia spent $4 billion a year to finance mosques and madrassas in Pakistan. [10] These religious institutions mostly targeted and radicalised illiterate people using extreme interpretations and the Wahhabi version of Islam. Secondly, they used a wide variety of platforms for propaganda purposes against the USSR. From every mosque and madrassa, the extremist clerics gave lectures against the communist ideology and termed the Soviets as sur kafir (red non-believers). The propaganda was not confined to Pakistan; it even reached Europe. Many of the public libraries contained literature and documentaries on the Afghan mujahideen, portraying them as heroes. [11] This extremist version of Islam later became the base for the extremist ideology of Al Qaeda and Taliban in Afghanistan.
After the end of the Cold War, the Pakistani establishment retained close ties to the mujahideen. However, after the attacks of September 11, Pakistan became actively involved in the fight against terrorism supported by the US, while an influx of Afghan Taliban came across the border to the tribal districts. [12] In 2007, Baitullah Masood founded TTP in the tribal districts and soon developed links with Al Qaeda, the Afghan Taliban, and other local terrorist groups. Soon after its foundation, more than 27 terrorist groups pledged and submitted themselves to TTP. [13]
Furthermore, the Pakistani military launched a series of operations in the region coupled with the drone strikes from the US which were chasing down Al-Qaeda members that had fled to North Waziristan after the US invasion of Afghanistan. It is estimated that between 348 and 374 drone strikes had been launched between 2004–2013, which killed between 400-900 civilians depending on the reference used. However, this is a conservative estimate and should be taken with caution as the real number remains confidential with the US authorities. [14] Similarly, according to the FATA Disaster Management Authority, more than five million people were internally displaced, which also caused significant troubles as other provincial governments declined to host any internally displaced people. [15]
In summary, these tribal districts served the interests of both external powers and the government of Pakistan by violating the basic human and democratic rights of the people. The FCR remains imposed on the region with the purpose of suppressing the locals and protecting national and international interests by depriving Pakistani citizens of basic human and democratic rights. Here a number of questions arise: is it justifiable to deprive one from their basic rights to protect national interests? Are national interests more important than the rights of a specific group, race or ethnicity? And can it be ethically justified to fight an enemy at the expense of the citizens? Now the authorities need to give special attention to the said piece of land and formulate uniform laws -- based on humanity and freedom for all.
[1] FATA was kept semi-autonomous since 1901 by British India and later by Pakistan. These tribal areas were merged to the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province of Pakistan after the 25th constitutional amendment passed by the parliament and then signed by the president of Pakistan on May 28, 2018 Amir Wasim, ‘President Signs KP-Fata Merger Bill into Law’, DAWN.COM, 31 May 2018, https://www.dawn.com/news/1411156.
[2] Frank C. Urbancic, ‘Briefing on Release of 2006 Country Reports on Terrorism’ (Department Of State. The Office of Electronic Information, Bureau of Public Affairs., 30 April 2007), https://2001-2009.state.gov/s/ct/rls/rm/07/83999.htm.
[3] Fair C. Christine, Nicholas Howenstein, and Thier J. Alexnder, ‘Troubles on the Pakistan-Afghanistan Border: U.S. Institute of Peace’, December 2006, https://web.archive.org/web/20090509031256/http://www.usip.org/pubs/usipeace_briefings/2006/1207_pakistan_afghanistan_border.html.
[4] Waseem Ahmad Shah, ‘Black Law of FCR Continues to Evade Legislators’ Attention’, DAWN.COM, 8 September 2014, http://www.dawn.com/news/1130619.
[5] Benjamin D. Hopkins, ‘The Frontier Crimes Regulation and Frontier Governmentality’, The Journal of Asian Studies 74, no. 2 (May 2015): 369–89, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0021911815000030.
[6] Todd Greentree, ‘Afghanistan: Remembering the Long, Long War We Would Rather Forget’, War on the Rocks, 5 February 2019, https://warontherocks.com/2019/02/afghanistan-remembering-the-long-long-war-we-would-rather-forget/.
[7] Zahid Ali Khan, ‘Military Operations in FATA and PATA: Implications for Pakistan’, Strategic Studies 31/32 (2011): 129–46, https://doi.org/10.2307/48527641.
[8] Robert Pear, ‘Arming Afghan Guerrillas: A Huge Effort Led by U.S.’, The New York Times, 18 April 1988, sec. World, https://www.nytimes.com/1988/04/18/world/arming-afghan-guerrillas-a-huge-effort-led-by-us.html.
[9] Pear.
[10] Greentree, ‘Afghanistan’.
[11] Omar Nasiri, Inside the Global Jihad. How I Infiltrated Al Qaeda and Was Abandoned by Western Intelligence. (London United Kingdom: C. Hurst & Co (publishers) Ltd., 2006).
[12] Rohan Gunaratna and Anders Nielsen, ‘Al Qaeda in the Tribal Areas of Pakistan and Beyond’, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 31, no. 9 (10 September 2008): 775–807, https://doi.org/10.1080/10576100802291568.
[13] Qandeel Siddique, ‘Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan: An Attempt to Deconstruct the Umbrella Organization and the Reasons for Its Growth in Pakistan’s North-West’ (København: Dansk Institut for Internationale Studier, 2010), https://www.diis.dk/files/media/publications/import/extra/rp2010-12-tehrik-e-taliban_web_1.pdf.
[14] Amnesty International, ‘US Drone Strikes in Pakistan’, 2013, 76.
[15] Dawn, ‘No Camps for IDPs to Be Set up in Punjab’, DAWN.COM, 31 May 2009, http://beta.dawn.com/news/940913/no-camps-for-idps-to-be-set-up-in-punjab.
Rhetoric has always been a powerful tool for winning hearts and minds, but how has moral imperative evolved in times of war and peace? This piece examines success as a moral imperative within the US National Security Strategies written between 2002 – 2017. It traces the recent canon of success as a moral imperative in George W. Bush’s strategy of military primacy and preemptive measures, Barack Obama’s push for technological primacy and diplomatic values, and Donald Trump’s rhetoric of economic fortitude.
By Jessica Poon
Keywords: Rhetoric, Ethics, Security, US, Primacy
After 9/11, George W. Bush’s 2004 campaign slogan of “A Safer World and a More Hopeful America'' was traded for the opening remark that “America is at war” in the national security strategy (NSS) from 2006. [1] Despite three changes of leadership between 2002 and 2017, a singular, moral spirit of military success pervades the five NSSs written during this period. This tension between morality and democratic leadership is something that Joseph Nye teases out with no small conviction in examining the gap between presidential actions and words. Nye claims this ‘moral foreign policy’ is part of a broader Western tradition which mobilises rhetoric to maintain the balance of power. [2]
This is evidenced in the successive declarations of war that have been made over the last decade and a half. A “War on Terror” and a “War on Drugs” are the most immediate examples that come to mind here, but Donald Trump’s disruptive style of governance has also parsed the threat of war numerous times – not least in the assasination of Iranian major general, Qasem Soleimani, in 2019. [3] Though economic and military fortitude are cornerstones of US security, the Trump administration has refashioned the moral imperative into a new, all-encompassing mythology which infamously pits the US as victors against the world: "We’re going to win. We’re going to win so much. We’re going to win at trade, we’re going to win at the border. We’re going to win so much, you’re going to be so sick and tired of winning.” [4]
But Trump and Bush are not the only culpable figures here. The canon of moral imperatives, which follows from Trump’s rhetoric of economic fortitude and Bush’s strategy of military primacy and preemptive measures, sees Barack Obama push for success (although softer) via technological primacy and diplomatic values: “the technology we harness can light the path to peace, or forever darken it.” [5] To frame this using the language of the Copenhagen School, the moral imperatives posited by the NSSs can be interpreted as a form of securitisation borne from speech acts. [6] In this instance, it creates the perception of American success and posits change to come. This securitisation process is inclusive of other Presidential outputs such as campaign slogans and public addresses. But the NSS as a tool for channelling these moral imperatives is the particular focus here, as it establishes the groundwork for moral action in war and peace. [7] This article briefly outlines how this moral imperative takes shape within the NSSs under Bush, Obama and Trump. From this, a presidential mythology of success begins to emerge, advocating for American primacy and democratic values as a moral good – not just for domestic prosperity but for global order.
The moral imperative plays out under Bush’s recourse to preemption in times of war. From 2002’s “axis of evil” (Iraq, Iran and North Korea) to 2006’s “heptagon of hate” (North Korea, Iran, Syria, Cuba, Belarus, Burma, and Zimbabwe), a mythology of success is fashioned through the idea of the triumph of the US’s moral, democratic values over “evil” in the form of terrorism and its accessories. [8] Though there is a shift away from the narrative of preemption, Trump’s 2017 NSS is not dissimilar in borrowing from this moral rhetoric of good and bad, renewing it for an established digital age under a “strategy of principled realism that is guided by outcomes, not ideology… American principles are a lasting force for good in the world.” [9] For both strategies in their respective contexts, securing success comes out of seizing opportunities presented by taking charge of foreign responsibilities through cooperation, acknowledging that “the distinction between domestic and foreign affairs is diminishing. In a globalised world, events beyond America’s borders have a greater impact inside them.” [10] Whilst both pose a somewhat paradoxical stance in looking to secure peace by preparing for war, the rhetoric of moral imperatives in a globalised world continues to characterise the security challenges met by the Obama administration.
Further moral imperatives are seen in the NSS written under Obama, with relative peacetime affording more diplomatic reflections on this mythology of success. The legacies of 9/11 and the Iraq War make a tangible impression on Obama’s NSSs from 2010 and 2015 which are determined to recuperate influence in the aftermath of these political milestones as well as the economic deficit of a global economic crisis in the early years of Obama’s presidency. This is particularly explicit in the 2010 NSS which sees a revived interest in complementing tactical defence with economic growth: “America’s growing economic strength is the foundation of our national security and a critical source of our influence abroad.” [11] The moral imperative for America to take the lead (economically and politically) is advanced again in Trump’s 2017 security strategy, starting with a forthright pledge to deliver on domestic industry and “make America great again.” [12] The difference between how mythologies of success manifest under conditions of war and peace are thrown into stark contrast once more when one recalls Obama’s mediation between a domestic and foreign focus, positing “American innovation as a foundation for American power.”[13] While the two NSSs under Obama help bridge the mythologies of success held by two war-prone presidents, there can be no doubt to its moral imperatives of success, albeit in moving towards “diplomacy instead of war.” [14]
Even when placed in the wider context of an ever-shifting geopolitical landscape, the NSS’ ability to posit success as a moral imperative is potent. The decline of American primacy has been furthered by the Trump Administration’s economic tariff war since 2018 against a formidable rising adversary in China which has reacted proportionately, embroiling both manufacturing giants in global supply chain complications. The broader US reaction to the COVID-19 outbreak has also created further geopolitical Sino-US tension. Alongside a loss of primacy on the world stage, the domestic instability that has erupted as a result of mass protests at the murder of George Floyd. These protests have unveiled the extent of police brutality as a critical issue in the US. The true extent of these combined factors is yet to be determined, but it is not a far cry to suggest that the US can hardly call itself a success or feign to spread the “success” to foreign nations. This piece has briefly sketched out the potency of success as a moral imperative within the US’s broader ambitions to maintain power on the global stage. It has traced the recent canon of success as a moral imperative under the Bush, Obama, and Trump administrations in war and in relative peacetime. But as preparations for the next iteration of the NSS are underway, who knows how well this well-honed rhetoric will serve for leveraging a soft power stance in the context of the uncertainties of the coming decade and waning American influence.
[1] UNITED STATES. 2006. The National Security Strategy of the United States of America. [Washington], George W. Bush.
[2] Nye, J.S., 2020. Do Morals Matter?: Presidents and Foreign Policy from FDR to Trump, Oxford University Press.
[3] Nelson, L. & Houck, C., 2020. US airstrike kills Iranian Gen. Qassem Soleimani: what we know. Available at: https://www.vox.com/2020/1/2/21047588/qasem-soleimani-airstrike-iraq-killed. Vox, accessed 8 June 2020.
“Trump’s National Security Strategy isn’t much of a strategy at all: It’s less coherent policy framework than strained justification for the president’s prejudices and blind spots” 2017, The Washington Post, accessed 15 December 2019.
[4] Trump, D.J., 2019. Donald Trump Rally [Online]. 11 April 2016. Times Union Center, Albany, New York. [Accessed 10 December 2019]. Available from: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-tJfeF2-Cq0#action=share
[5] UNITED STATES. 2010. The National Security Strategy of the United States of America. [Washington], Barack Obama.
[6] Balzacq, T., 2005. "The Three Faces of Securitization: Political Agency, Audience and Context", European Journal of International Relations, vol. 11, no. 2, pp. 171-201.
[7] Hollis-Brusky, A., 2019. Plausible legality: legal culture and political imperative in the global war on terror. International Affairs, 95(3), pp.749–750.
[8] UNITED STATES. 2002. The National Security Strategy of the United States of America. [Washington], George W. Bush.
UNITED STATES. 2006. The National Security Strategy of the United States of America. [Washington], George W. Bush.
[9] UNITED STATES. 2017. The National Security Strategy of the United States of America. [Washington], Donald J. Trump.
[10] UNITED STATES. 2006. The National Security Strategy of the United States of America. [Washington], George W. Bush.
[11] DeYoung, K., 2010, “Obama redefines national security strategy, looks beyond military might”, Washington Post, 27 May, accessed 15 December 2019, https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/05/27/AR2010052701044.html?hpid=sec-politics
[12] UNITED STATES. 2017. The National Security Strategy of the United States of America. [Washington], Donald J. Trump.
[13] UNITED STATES. 2010. The National Security Strategy of the United States of America. [Washington], Barack Obama.
[14] MacAskil, E., 2010, “Barack Obama sets out security strategy based on diplomacy instead of war“, The Guardian, 27 May, accessed 15 December 2019, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/may/27/us-national-security-strategy-report
COVID-19 has been disrupting people’s lives and forcing governments to take measures rapidly to contain the virus and prevent further deaths. It took governments by surprise and revealed their lack of preparedness, leading them to formulate policy responses which engaged with securitisation. [1] To fight the pandemic, authorities have introduced measures that drastically infringed upon citizens’ personal freedoms, starting with their freedom of movement. They engaged in a process of securitising COVID-19 using these exceptional times as a rationale to enact exceptional measures. A glaring example is the introduction of contact tracing apps: for citizens to be able to move around freely again, governments had to find a way to track the virus by identifying contaminated citizens and their contacts. Seen by some as an open door to governments collecting more health data, this measure is questionable in terms of ethics and privacy. This article argues that the introduction of contact tracing apps is the result of a securitisation process that stems from governments’ desire to show that they are taking action and controlling the situation.
By Apolline Rolland
The securitisation process refers to the action of defining an issue as a threat and framing it as a security issue that calls for exceptional measures. It gives legitimacy to governments to enact measures that would not have been accepted by the audience under different circumstances. Securitisation is performed through speech acts and requires a securitising actor, here governments, a securitising move, here calling COVID-19 a security threat, and a target audience that needs to accept the securitising move, here the citizenry. Generally, an issue becomes securitised when it poses a threat to the values and norms of a society.
In recent years, global health has been increasingly subject to securitisation. In the case of COVID-19, the pandemic was framed as an ‘existential threat to the people’s lives and the regular functioning of societies’. [2] COVID-19 is not as deadly as viruses such as Ebola or AIDS, but it has a higher mortality rate than that of influenza and is also more contagious. [3] As it is a new strain of virus, governments quickly engaged in exceptional measures such as confinement, social distancing policies, the collection of citizens’ health data, and made numerous emergency declarations. This virus quickly became a threat to the public health of all states as it had the potential to spread internationally due to globalisation and the rapid flows of people transnationally. [4]
The securitisation of diseases is dangerous as it gives good ground to the militarisation of public health, which shifts the focus from civil society to intelligence and military agencies, undermining personal freedoms. [5] In fact, diseases are usually development and poverty issues rather than security issues. [6] It is therefore important to incorporate oversight in mitigation policies to ensure that the COVID-19 crisis does not unduly erode individual freedoms in democracies.
On March 11th, 2020, the World Health Organization (WHO) finally declared the COVID-19 epidemic a pandemic, constituting the speech act in securitisation theory. In its classical definition, a pandemic is ‘an epidemic occurring worldwide, or over a very wide area, crossing international boundaries and usually affecting a large number of people’. [7] It considers who is infected and where they got sick. [8] A pandemic occurs when chains of transmissions multiply throughout the world and clusters appear beyond the birthplace of the outbreak. What does this qualification change in practice? In reality, not much; it simply allows the WHO to legally make recommendations, unlock funding, and provide political support to affected countries. [9] However, the word can trigger fear easily. The WHO was late to announce the pandemic and was careful to use the terminology to prevent unnecessary suffering and panic. [10] Indeed, although the qualification does not change many things in practice, it does mean that the virus is no longer contained. The focus shifts towards slowing down the spread of the disease by introducing mitigation policies. [11]
First presented as a distant health issue, COVID-19 quickly became a fundamental security threat which required exceptional measures. [12] It bypassed normal politics and impacted the regular functioning of health services, of nations, and of society as a whole.
In the academic literature, two different kinds of discourses have appeared since the pandemic was announced. [13] First, it was framed as a common threat to citizens from across the globe which required a coordinated and global response. This discourse was usually found in the speeches of representatives of international institutions, examples include qualifying COVID-19 as ‘an enemy against humanity’ (Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus) and ‘a common threat’ (António Guterres).
Secondly, it was framed as a national security threat. This rhetoric was more likely to be found in the speeches of world leaders addressing their nations. [14] Examples include Emmanuel Macron’s ‘Nous sommes en guerre’, Boris Johnson’s declaration of a ‘national fightback’ against COVID-19 calling for the need of ‘drastic action’ and ‘extreme measures’, as well as his call for victory against the virus — ‘we’re going to win, we’re going to beat it’ ‘we have the resolve and the resources to win the fight’. [15] [16] This war rhetoric reflects the securitisation process, invoking a sense of emergency and state power to claim the legitimate use of extraordinary measures, which have the potential to undermine sovereignty of the people. [17]
National economic output stopped suddenly as lockdowns were introduced all over the world. This choice was not adopted as the optimal strategy, rather as the only option available given the lack of government preparedness. [18] In many countries, which quickly became overwhelmed by the amount of deaths, this lack of preparedness was the result of years of budget cuts which have reduced the capacity of health systems to answer to such crises efficiently, and showed how vulnerable the neoliberal model is. [19]
Governments faced a security dilemma every time they had to make a choice between pursuing lockdown measures to preserve public health and the life of their citizens or easing the measures to prevent a worse economic crisis from occurring. [20] Being able to track and trace the whereabouts of citizens to know if they had been in contact with infected individuals seemed to become a prerequisite to return to ‘normal life’, therefore governments introduced contact tracing apps. To cite a few examples: the Chinese government opted for issuing QR codes to allow its citizens to go out or to enforce quarantine. [21] In South Korea and Taiwan, personal data was used to ensure that people respected quarantine measures. [22] Israeli intelligence services used counterterrorism tools to locate Israelis’ phones and order a quarantine to those who had come into contact with infected people. [23] In Europe, downloading the app relied on a voluntary basis due to privacy concerns, but health authorities have been able to receive data from telephonic operators to see movements of populations when lockdown measures were introduced, such as in France or Italy. [24]
As Pr. Didier Bigo of Science Po Paris-CERI puts it, government officials were quick to embrace the “folly of technological solutionism”, or in other words, in ‘the belief that one can solve every problem with a click’. [25] Was it really a necessity or rather a willingness of governments to prove that they were in control and ready to react?
Governments have looked at what we have to gain from the development of contact tracing apps: the ability to regain our freedom of movement during the pandemic. But have we, the people, weighed what we could lose? In reality, contact tracing apps in Europe have mostly been developed safely. However, they normalise mass data collection by governments from populations. Today we accept it for our health, but we must at least question whether we want this to become the norm to solve any issues without real safeguards and oversight.
The emergence of these new monitoring technologies are understandable during the crisis to fight the pandemic. But the real question is whether this will become a lasting feature of our democracies under the guise of security purposes. [26] The risk we run is the normalisation and the trivialisation of data collection.
[1] Sears, N A (2020) ‘The Securitization of COVID-19: Three Political Dilemma,’ [online] available from https://www.globalpolicyjournal.com/blog/25/03/2020/securitization-covid-19-three-political-dilemmas, accessed on 25th August 2020.
[2] Nunes, J (2020) ‘The COVID-19 pandemic: securitization, neoliberal crisis, and global vulnerabilization,’ Cadernos de Saúde Pública, Vol. 36, No. 4, pp. 1-4.
[3] Breteau, P (2020) ‘Coronavirus, Zika, Ebola… quelles maladies sont les plus contagieuses ou les plus mortelles?,’ [online] available from https://www.lemonde.fr/les-decodeurs/article/2020/01/29/coronavirus-zika-ebola-quelles-maladies-sont-les-plus-contagieuses-ou-les-plus-mortelles_6027661_4355770.html, accessed on 25th August 2020.
[4] Ventura, D (2016) ‘From Ebola to Zika: international emergencies and the securitization of global health,’ Cadernos de Saúde Pública, Vol. 32, No. 4, pp. 1-4.
[5] Bigo, D (2020) ‘Covid-19 tracking apps, or: how to deal with a pandemic most unsuccessfully,’ [online] available from https://aboutintel.eu/covid-digital-tracking/, accessed 25th August 2020.
[6] Baele, S (2020) ‘On the Securitization of COVID-19,’ [online] available from https://pandemipolitics.net/baele/, accessed on 25th August 2020.
[7] Kelly, H (2011) ‘The classical definition of a pandemic is not elusive,’ Bulletin of the World Health Organization Vol. 89, No. 7, pp. 540-541.
[8] McKeever, A (2020) ‘Coronavirus is officially a pandemic. Here is why that matters.,’ [online] available from https://www.nationalgeographic.com/science/2020/02/how-coronavirus-could-become-pandemic-and-why-it-matters/, accessed on 25th of August 2020.
[9] Ibid.
[10] Ibid.
[11] Ibid.
[12] Baele, 2020.
[13] Sears, 2020.
[14] Ibid.
[15] Le Monde, Transcription of the speech ‘‘Nous sommes en guerre’: le verbatim du discours d’Emmanuel Macron,’ [online] available from https://www.lemonde.fr/politique/article/2020/03/16/nous-sommes-en-guerre-retrouvez-le-discours-de-macron-pour-lutter-contre-le-coronavirus_6033314_823448.html, accessed on 25th August 2020.
[16] Baele, 2020.
[17] Hanrieder, T and Christian Kreuder-Sonnen (2014) ‘WHO decides on the exception? Securitization and emergency governance in global health,’ Security Dialogue, Vol. 45, No. 4, pp.331-348.
[18] Bigo, 2020.
[19] Nunes, p. 2.
[20] Eves, L and James Thedam ‘Applying Securitzation’s Second Generation to COVID-19,’ [online] available from https://www.e-ir.info/2020/05/14/applying-securitizations-second-generation-to-covid-19/, accessed 25th August 2020.
[21] Mozur, P, Raymond Zhong and Aaron Krolik (2020) ‘In coronavirus fight, China gives citizens a color code, with red flags,’ [online] available from https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/01/business/china-coronavirus-surveillance.html, accessed 14th September 2020.
[22] Utersinger, M (2020) ‘Contre la pandémie due au coronavirus, de nombreux pays misent sur la surveillance permise par le “big data”,’ [online] available from https://www.lemonde.fr/pixels/article/2020/03/20/contre-la-pandemie-de-nombreux-pays-misent-sur-la-surveillance-permise-par-le-big-data_6033851_4408996.html, accessed 14th September 2020.
[23] Halbfinger, D M , Isabel Kershner and Ronen Bergman (2020) ‘To track coronavirus, Israel moves to tap secret trove of cellphone data,’ [online] available from https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/16/world/middleeast/israel-coronavirus-cellphone-tracking.html, accessed 14th September 2020.
[24] Utersinger, 2020.
[25] Sears, 2020.
[26] Bigo, 2020.
The post 9-11 “War on Terror” era is characterized by the parallel ascension of social media. Social media has become a strategic tool to communicate and enact terrorism, thereby revolutionizing its impact. It has also been a key medium in the rise of radicalization and the dissemination of online extremist content around the world. This has offered terrorists groups the unprecedented ability to disseminate images and sentiments at a rapid pace to a borderless audience. While there has always been a relationship between terrorism and traditional media in the forms of print and television, social media networks have given terrorists the ability to have their acts communicated in a more potent and instantaneous way – with a lens that can been distorted by their bias.
By Kajal Saxena
With its ability to circumvent traditional media, social media enables its own access into the lives of billions of people around the world. As of September 2013, 90% of all 18-29 year-olds in the United States (US) used social media, followed by 78% of adults aged 30-49. [1] The direct accessibility to these audiences and the ease of which their attention can be garnered by a few taps on a phone or computer, highlights the possible reach of terrorism propaganda and media. [2] These effects can be felt on multiple levels of society and can serve to reach terrorists’ objectives of disrupting and frustrating state responses, as well as creating serious fear among the global population. In 2013 and 2014 social media networks such as Twitter overtook internet forums as the preferred space for Jihadist propaganda. [3] Jihadi groups are known to use mainstream media platforms like Twitter and Facebook to post their content and create sponsored accounts where they release news statements and videos. [4] The instantaneous nature of social media networks also allow for the immediate, almost real-time viewings of terrorist attacks and their aftermath, which can deliver maximum impact of fear. The 2013 Westgate Mall hostage crisis in Nairobi is an example of how the terrorist group Al-Shabaab used Twitter to narrate their attack while it was occurring and share an alternate perspective to challenge the accounts of those witnessing the terrorist attack from the outside. [5] Al-Shabaab and its supporters were able to garner worldwide mainstream media attention, and broadcasted their attack through engagement on Twitter. [6] Therefore, social media texts and images have become a strategic part of the terrorist attacks as well. [7]
The effects of the borderless flow of terrorist propaganda is reflected in the number of Jihadist terrorist attacks in the Western world, like Canada, France, the US and the United Kingdom (UK). Social media has provided terrorist groups with the infrastructure to evolve their internet presence into meaningful online social communities that engage in the spread of online disinformation worldwide. As cybersecurity security specialist Dr. Maura Conway suggests, “today’s internet does not simply allow for the dissemination and consumption of extremist material in a one-way broadcast from producer and consumer, it also facilitates high levels of online social interaction around this material”. [8]
Internet subcultures allow users to manipulate news frames, set agendas and facilitate the spread of disinformation, while supporting a conducive environment for media manipulation. [9] In the case of the Islamic State’s (IS) online strategy, it was initially used to motivate foreign fighters to join IS campaigns in Syria and Iraq. It also quickly became a way in which social media users contribute to the increase in volume of IS-related content that proliferates websites like Twitter and YouTube. [10] A similar strategy was adopted by right-wing extremist groups online. With a focus on far-right movements and men’s rights activists, ideologically-driven blogs like Infowars and Roosh V’s blog Return of Kings are important online sources of information for the far-right. [11] Forums and message boards like 4chan and 8chan facilitate online social communities of like-minded people who engage with and share extremist messaging and media. Therefore, social media networks like Twitter, Facebook, and YouTube are used by members of the far-right to spread extreme messages to large numbers of people, and also are central platforms to spread misinformation in the form of memes or images. [12] This has created a thriving online community where terrorist groups like IS and right-wing groups use “small teams of social media users to lavish attention on potential recruits and move the conversation to more secure online platforms – therefore, while Twitter may not be the place where recruitment ends, growing evidence suggests that identifiable patterns of recruitment begin on Twitter”. [13] While the far-right movement’s usage of social media networks is relatively understudied by terrorism scholars, it is possible to see patterns with Jihadist terrorist groups in their usage of social media as a tool to communicate and enact terrorism.
Propaganda has always been central in communicating terrorism. Perhaps the most central accomplishment of Al Qaeda on 9/11 was not killing several thousand people, but rather instilling fear in millions of people worldwide through the reports and images of the attacks, and the creating a blueprint for modern terrorist practices. [14] The borderless flow of information enabled by social media has been utilized as a tool by terrorist groups to spread their messages globally, facilitate online social communities and spread fear and disruption. Terrorists have been highly adaptable to changes in how their messages are disseminated around the world. In order to keep pace with the evolution of terrorist strategy, states and social media networks must adapt their counter-terrorism measures to meet these inevitable challenges.
Sources
[1] Sullivan, R. 2014, "Live-tweeting terror: a rhetorical analysis of @HSMPress_ Twitter updates during the 2013 Nairobi hostage crisis", Critical Studies on Terrorism, vol. 7, no. 3, pp. 422-433.
[2] Ibid.
[3] Weimann, G.J. 2019, "Competition and Innovation in a Hostile Environment: How Jabhat Al-Nusra and Islamic State Moved to Twitter in 2013-2014", Studies in Conflict & Terrorism: Islamic States Online Activity and Responses, vol. 42, no. 1-2, pp. 25-42.
[4] Klausen, J. 2015, "Tweeting the Jihad: Social Media Networks of Western Foreign Fighters in Syria and Iraq", Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, vol. 38, no. 1, pp. 1-22.
[5] Sullivan, 2014.
[6] Ibid.
[7] Ibid.
[8] Conway, M. 2017, "Determining the Role of the Internet in Violent Extremism and Terrorism: Six Suggestions for Progressing Research", Studies in Conflict & Terrorism: Terrorist Online Propaganda and Radicalization, vol. 40, no. 1, pp. 77-98.
[9] Marwick, Alice, and Rebecca Lewis. 2017, “Media Manipulation and Disinformation Online”. Plaats van uitgave onbekend: Data and Society Research Institute, pp. 1-104
[10] Benigni, M.C., Joseph, K. & Carley, K.M. 2017, "Online extremism and the communities that sustain it: Detecting the ISIS supporting community on Twitter", PloS one, vol. 12, no. 12, pp. e0181405.
[11] Marwick and Lewis, 2017.
[12] Ibid.
[13] Benigni, Kenneth and Carley, 2017.
[14] Seib, P.M., Janbek, D.M. & ProQuest (Firm) 2010, Global terrorism and new media: the post-Al Qaeda generation, Routledge, New York.
