Undocumented Women Domestic Workers in South Africa: An Intersectional Look at Marginalisation and Inequality

Many women from southern African countries migrate without legal documentation to South Africa to seek better economic prospects. However, they often face marginalisation and discrimination in transit and upon arrival. Once they reach their destination there are barriers to their security and stability; namely, the legal code in South Africa hosts a policy gap that exacerbates exploitation by employers. [1] This article centres these women’s experiences as important and deserving of study and protection.

By Emma Lin Hurlbert

Many undocumented women choose to become live-in domestic workers for South African families, which offers them many benefits, but also costs them greatly. Women are highly concentrated in this sector, with 80% of domestic workers in South Africa being female. [2] The benefits afforded through this arrangement include cash payments and accommodation at the job site, which solves a logistical problem of finding accommodation, but can also provide protection from or mediation with immigration enforcement or police officers. Additionally, in kind payments from employers in the form of clothing, transportation costs, and children’s school fees are commonly received. [3] However, these benefits come at the cost of exploitability and dependence.

Undocumented workers exist on the margins of society, in a legal situation that excludes them, in actuality and out of fear, from accessing their rights. [4] Furthermore, since domestic work is considered to exist within the private sphere and the informal sector, policymakers have failed to create legislative protections regulating the industry. [5] Therefore, undocumented workers in general, and this industry in particular, exist in a policy gap that allows for exploitation by individual employers.

Because they have little legal protection, undocumented workers live precariously and almost entirely dependent on their employers. They report very low wages, which are determined by the employer, long working hours with continuous on call time, and limited personal leave. [6] The constant fear of deportation makes it difficult - if not  impossible - for these women to join legally recognised organisations, such as labour unions, which serve to protect the rights of workers and bargain for fair wages. Therefore, it is observed that the lack of collective action among these workers serves to lower the bargaining power of each individual worker. [7] They are replaceable and can easily be dismissed if they do not agree to the employers’ suggested wages or work conditions. [8] Furthermore, live-in status means that these women work for practically all of their waking hours and are often on call for the children when they are asleep. Finally, personal leave for holidays and visits back home are not treated as a right, but are granted at the discretion of the employer, and can be withheld. [9] It should be noted that not all employers exploit undocumented women domestic workers in these ways; however, the choice of an employer not to exploit does not diminish the exploitability or vulnerability of this group. [10]

In 2008 labour protections and rights were extended to all undocumented migrant workers, [11] undoubtedly intended to improve the work situation and increase security for them. Yet many undocumented migrant women still feel as though they have no rights in South Africa and are therefore unable to seek formal and legal support in enforcing their rights, [12] which means that their exploitability and vulnerability have not been ameliorated by the protections. Furthermore, undocumented migrants who are aware of their rights established through United Nations Declarations and South African national law, said they were fearful of reporting rights violations to the police because of the possibility of detention and deportation, which could cost their livelihood. [13]

Intersectionality as a Lens for Understanding Marginalisation

In this section, I discuss the continued low pay faced by undocumented women domestic workers, despite the introduction of laws meant to increase their pay security. I use the theory of intersectionality to understand this phenomenon. In this context, intersectionality refers to the overlapping types of marginalisation faced by these women, including their gender, migrant and illegal status, race, and labour status, which combine to create a complex situation of exploitability and marginalisation. I argue that laws targeting low pay are only marginally effective at increasing equality and empowerment, because they view this issue only as a function of labour rights and fail to address the other aspects of disadvantage that consort to produce persistent low wages.

In actuality, low pay is also a function of status as an illegal migrant, womanhood, and race. [14] It is evident that migrants in general make less money than South African nationals. Undocumented migrants make even less than their documented counterparts because they have little legal redress against unfair wages through the justice system, cluster in low paid jobs, and face discrimination based on their migration status. [15] Undocumented migrant status further contributes to low pay because these women are often not comfortable forming collectives that can bargain on their behalf for better working conditions and remuneration, for fear of deportation. [16] In fact, many women domestic workers from Lesotho perceive that they do not have any rights in South Africa, because of their illegal migrant status, though this is not true. [17] Since access to human rights is often tied up with citizenship, irregular migration status can be linked with a denial of various human rights. [18]

Additionally, gender factors heavily into the equation; women in general are paid less than men. [19] Women may have left their home countries due to gender inequality and discrimination, which increases the motivation for them to remain in their destination country and could create a situation in which they tolerate worse pay and more abuse than men would. [20] Furthermore, women in general receive less education than men, which can cause them more difficulties in accessing their rights and legal protections, again increasing their toleration of low pay and abuse. [21] And finally, women are much more vulnerable to sexual abuse than men, which could be perpetrated by their employer, thereby increasing inequality in the employer / employee relationship and decreasing their likelihood to advocate for better pay.

Finally, race also contributes to low pay for Black Africans. South Africa is a society with a long history of racial discrimination and violence, and though legally racial equality now exists, in reality Black Africans receive less pay than white, Asian, and coloured South Africans. On average, Black South Africans earn about 40% of the wages that white South Africans do. [22] In a country with high levels of wage differentials based on race, combined with migration status, Black undocumented migrants surely make less than their South African counterparts. Because of these overlapping systems of inequality and marginalisation, it is clear that targeting low pay as exclusively an employment sector issue is largely ineffective. Since labour rights are not the only cause of the low pay, increasing labour rights alone would not solve the issue.

Sources

[1] Altman, M. and Pannell, K. (2012) ‘Policy Gaps and Theory Gaps: Women And Migrant Domestic Labor’, Feminist Economics, 18(2), pp. 291–315. doi: 10.1080/13545701.2012.704149.

Wiego Law and Informality Project (2014) ‘Domestic Workers’ Laws  and Legal Issues in South Africa’.

[2] Dinkelman, T. and Ranchhod, V. (2012) ‘Evidence on the impact of minimum wage laws in an informal sector: Domestic workers in South Africa’, Journal of Development Economics, 99(1), pp. 27–45. doi: 10.1016/j.jdeveco.2011.12.006, p. 29.

[3] Griffin, L. (2011) ‘Unravelling Rights: “Illegal” Migrant Domestic Workers in South Africa’, South African Review of Sociology, 42(2), pp. 83–101. doi: 10.1080/21528586.2011.582349, pp. 91-92.

[4] Bloch, A. (2010) ‘The Right to Rights?: Undocumented Migrants from Zimbabwe Living in South Africa’, Sociology. SAGE Publications Ltd, 44(2), pp. 233–250. doi: 10.1177/0038038509357209, p. 245.

[5] Altman and Pannell, 2012, p. 295.

[6] Griffin, 2011, p. 89.

[7] Griffin, 2011, pp. 86-87.

[8] Griffin, 2011, pp. 92-93.

[9] Griffin, 2011, p. 90.

[10] Ibid.

[11] Griffin, 2011, p. 83.

[12] Griffin, 2011, p. 86.

[13] Bloch, 2010, pp. 237-243.

[14] Nyamnjoh, F. B. (2013) Insiders and Outsiders: Citizenship and Xenophobia in Contemporary Southern Africa. Zed Books Ltd.

[15] Trad, S., Tsunga, A. and Rioufol, V. (2008) Surplus People? Undocumented and other vulnerable migrants in South Africa. Paris: Fédération internationale pour les droits humains, pp. 1–48. Available at: https://www.fidh.org/IMG/pdf/za486a.pdf, pp. 29-30.

Bloch, 2010, p. 242.

[16] Griffin, 2011, pp. 86-87.

[17] Ibid.

[18] Bloch, 2010, pp. 238-239.

[19] Bloch, 2010, p. 242.

[20] Magidimisha, H. H. (2018) ‘Gender, Migration and Crisis in Southern Africa: Contestations and Tensions in the Informal Spaces and “Illegal Labour” Market’, in Crisis, Identity and Migration in Post-Colonial Southern Africa. Springer, Cham, pp. 75–88.

[21] Kawar, M. (2004) ‘Gender and migration: why are women more vulnerable?’, in Femmes Et Mouvement: Genre, Migrations Et Nouvelle Division International Du Travail. Geneva: Graduate Institute Publications, pp. 71–87.

[22] Pupwe, O. K. (2015) Three Essays on Racial Wage Differentials in South Africa. Western Michigan University. Available at: https://scholarworks.wmich.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1539&context=dissertations, p. 88.

COVID-19 Pandemic Exacerbating Threats to Democracy

For this interview series, Fabiana Natale and Gilles de Valk are interviewing experts from different backgrounds on the political implications of the COVID-19 pandemic. From their living rooms in France and the Netherlands they will explore the consequences the pandemic will have for (geo)political, security, and societal affairs. This interview series marks the launch of a new type of content for the Security Distillery, one which we hope can provide entertaining and informative analysis of an uncertain and evolving development in global politics.

After seven episodes, we have produced a succinct analysis of the trends observed so far.
Download the brief here

Can Tanzania be the Next Big LNG Exporter?

Energy export and production can be a source of political leverage for producers (America, Australia, Qatar) and a vulnerability for non-producing countries (the Baltic states) and developing energy producers (Nigeria, Equatorial Guinea). New energy entrants like Tanzania stand to benefit if resources are properly managed and invested. The recent discovery of over 46 trillion cubic feet (TCF) of offshore natural gas in Tanzania places the East African country as a significant competitor in the global Liquified Natural Gas (LNG) market. [1] Their proximity to the Asian LNG market heightens the expectation of this resource for power generation, regional supply, and intercontinental export. However, the political, legal, and security environment, along with the collapse in oil prices (to which most liquified gas exports are linked) and increased demand for cheaper and cleaner energy sources caused by COVID-19 all present challenges to Tanzania.

This paper will examine the political, legal, and security factors that may affect the viability of the new energy power, Tanzania, as a global competitor in the LNG market. Using secondary data, I observe an increasing level of repression in Tanzania, compounded with a failure to manage the expectations of job creation and social security. Therefore, LNG exploration could result in civil unrest and protests in Tanzania. Tanzania must therefore work twice as hard to attract and retain investors that will develop hard (roads, pipelines, railway) and soft infrastructure (capacity building, skilled labour, training) and establish legal frameworks that enable the people to have a stake in the resource.

 By Ugo Igariwey Iduma

INTRODUCTION

The first offshore discovery of natural gas in Tanzania was made in 2010, which fuelled expectations of development and talks of its opportunities for the East African region and the continent overall. [2] Previous literature has focused on how the significant share of natural gas production can be used for power generation, transportation, and fertilizer production. [3] [4]. Recent studies, however, have failed to look at the structural, political, legal, and security factors that may affect new energy powers. Ernst and Young (2012) attempt to give an overall risk assessment of Tanzania. Yet, there is a need for an updated evaluation of the situation in Tanzania given the increasing rates of urbanization and the effects of the COVID-19 outbreak, which has forced millions of people to adapt to working from home, and therefore, increasing domestic energy consumption. [5] This paper runs a SWOT analysis (Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats) of Tanzania and LNG exploration. A SWOT analysis will enable us to answer the question ‘Can Tanzania be the Next Global LNG Exporter?'

STRENGTHS AND OPPORTUNITIES

The high costs of generating electricity are causing Africans to demand further access to LNG because it is a relatively cheap, clean, and abundant source of energy. The large discoveries of LNG off the shore of Tanzania is expected to meet the rapidly growing worldwide energy demand, while also serving as an effective energy solution in East Africa. [6] Their proximity to India and South Asia instills optimism that if LNG plants are completed and production commences, Tanzania could be a significant LNG exporter. Being a significant exporter could lead to poverty reduction, job creation, and social security, creating the possibility of Tanzania climbing up the development ladder to middle-income status. [7]

THREATS

The increase of American unconventional gas production in 2006 coupled with the expansion of the Panama Canal in 2016, has caused the LNG market to become oversaturated and extremely competitive, [8] making it difficult for Tanzania to penetrate the market. In addition to their newness to the market, Tanzania must play catch-up to create relationships with foreign investors and secure buyers. Domestically, Tanzania struggles to secure financial investment to establish hard and soft infrastructures. COVID-19 has also made it increasingly challenging to keep existing investors, as the pandemic has caused foreign investors to retreat inwards to their home countries, causing a delay in plans to start LNG production. [9]

Infrastructure issues are compounded with the fiscal and regulatory uncertainties relating to taxation, domestic supply obligations, and local content requirements. [10] The 2013, Production Sharing Agreement Model (PSAM) local content policy requires firms to use domestically-manufactured and supplied goods and services is yet to be adopted effectively. Until the local content policies address the needs of the local communities, exploration and production (E&P), companies cannot begin production and expect a return on investment. [11] The stern local content requirements became a politically sensitive issue for Tanzania as violent protests broke out in 2013 over the construction of the Mtwara pipeline. Unless expectations are better managed, an LNG project could trigger similar unrest.

Additionally, the fall in oil prices in March 2020 also poses a risk to the commercialisation of LNG for Tanzania. LNG contracts remain heavily indexed to oil. With the development of export terminals at a high cost, lowering oil prices leaves the Tanzania LNG project at an estimated breakeven price of USD10.10 per million British thermal units (mmBtu) (excluding shipping). [12] In comparison to the United States (USD5.56 per mmBtu) and Australia (USD 3 per mmBtu) breakeven prices, Tanzania has to export its LNG at a higher price to make profits. [13] From these breakeven prices and oil prices dependency, Tanzania is put in an even more critical position in developing their LNG project.

WEAKNESS

Furthermore, the operational and legal constraints have forced Tanzania to prioritise domestic and regional markets over international counterparts. [14] Tanzania's domestic demand for natural gas is large, but the percentage of the population that can afford LNG energy is small.  The problem becomes, can local people pay for electricity or will the government subsidise it? Government subsidies would not be sustainable economically if anchor industries (BG Group {Shell}, Equinor, Ophir Energy, Statoil and ExxonMobil) do not pay off the excesses allowing the government to subsidise the consumer. The commitment to payoff excesses is proven to be a loss for leading International Oil Companies in Tanzania, who are not short of alternative LNG projects to plough investment and expertise into as their focus is on sales and securing supply contracts. Shell and ExxonMobil, for instance, are both in the running to develop new Qatari trains and also have major North American projects lined up. Furthermore, Equinor lacks the capacity to pay off Tanzania LNG project without the support of other large players. [15] Their connectivity to other markets in the region also remains limited. LNG demand from neighbouring Burundi, Kenya, Congo, Malawi, Zambia, Zimbabwe are low ( see table 1). [16] There are also limited opportunities for gas pipeline exports from Tanzania to neighbouring countries, for instance, Harare, Zimbabwe is 2,170.6 KM away from Tanzania (Mtwara) and Lusaka, Zambia is 1,982.0 KM from Mkuranga, Tanzania locations with drilling wells. Therefore, these high distances restrict options for export and investment without further infrastructure development.

Table 1: Natural Gas demand in East African countries

Source: [17]

From the table we see that power demand and generation are low in neighbouring countries such as Burundi, Kenya, Malawi, Rwanda, Zimbabwe, with power consumption of less than 1bn KWh. Despite power consumption being less than 1bn KWh in 2019, demand for LNG specifically from Kenya is increasing at the rate of 3.6% annually representing an opportunity for Tanzania to become a regional exporter, but the potential is limited without substantial aid in the construction of gas pipelines in the destination market. [18]

            Furthermore, the 1990s gold rush gave Tanzania a peripheral reputation of being exploited by foreign gold mining companies. As a result, much of Tanzania’s gold revenues accrued to gold corporations, while the needs of local people were neglected. In the eyes of ordinary Tanzanians, gas exploration is no different. Tanzania’s one-party system has cracked down on the media, civil society, and statistics, and the growing authoritarianism is breeding more organised opposition and lower confidence in government. This could result in protests or civil unrest particularly if the country does not peacefully reform to a multi-party system,, thus posing a risk to future investors and delaying LNG development. [19]

Under the current president John Magufuli, Tanzania has gone through a “mining revolution” that has left the President clashing with foreign mining corporations. In 2017 Magufuli accused foreign mining companies of theft and exploitation, fast-tracking three bills through parliament that included provisions of reviewing and annulling mining contracts that were under “unconscionable terms”. [20] Acacia Mining, the largest stakeholder in the Tanzanian gold sector – announced in 2017 that it was considering the full closure of its operations in the country so as to “protect our cash pile”. [21] Shock waves were sent not only through the gold, but also the gas sector, as the host government’s agreement to the construction of a gas terminal was still under negotiation at that time. These acts of political sniping have created delays in LNG production. 

In conclusion, Tanzania’s threats and weakness include a lack of infrastructure, oversaturation of the global market, non-existent local content policies that include local communities, and increasing levels of authoritarianism. According to my analysis, these outweigh the strengths and opportunities of a large commercial resource deposit and proximity to lucrative Asian markets. Therefore, I deduce that Tanzania will not be a significant LNG exporter in its current situation. To overcome its weaknesses, Tanzania should design a "unitization initiative" with other East African LNG explorers (such as Kenya and Uganda) to pool their resources and market together to cut LNG production costs, gain access to hard and soft infrastructures, and greater competitiveness, while curbing construction time. As Tanzania’s gas sector focuses on regional and domestic LNG exports, it becomes important to pool the resources of other East African countries to construct their individual gas pipelines and terminals for Tanzanian LNG.  

SOURCES

[1] British Petroleum (2016) BP Statistical Review of World Energy.

[2] Ledesma, D., (2013) East Africa gas–the potential for export. Oxford Institute for Energy Studies.

[3] Foell, W., Pachauri, S., Spreng, D. and Zerriffi, H., (2011) 'Household cooking fuels and technologies in developing economies. Energy policy', 39(12), pp.7487-7496.

[4] Schlag, N. and Zuzarte, F. (2008) Market Barriers to Clean Cooking Fuels in Sub-Saharan Africa: A Review of Literature. Sweden.

[5] Denton F. (2020) Will COVID-19 leave fuel-rich African countries gasping for breath? International institute for environment and development. (online) Available from:https://www.iied.org/will-covid-19-leave-fuel-rich-african-countries-gasping-for-breath\

[6] International Energy Agency (2014) Medium-term Gas Market Report 2014: Market Analysis and Forecasts to 2019. International Energy Agency.

[7] US Energy Information Administration (2016) International Energy Outlook.  Energy Information Administration (EIA), 2016.

[8] Leather, D.T., Bahadori, A., Nwaoha, C. and Wood, D.A., (2013) 'A review of Australia's natural gas resources and their exploitation.  Journal of Natural Gas Science and Engineering, 10, pp.68-88.

[9] Demierre, J., Bazilian, M., Carbajal, J., Sherpa, S. and Modi, V., (2015) 'Potential for regional use of East Africa's natural gas'. Applied energy, 143, pp.414-436.

[10] Boersma, T., Ebinger, C.K. and Greenley, H.L. (2015) An assessment of US natural gas exports. The Brookings Institution, Washington, DC.

[11] Sisa J. (2014) Local policies set back East Africa oil and gas projects. (online) Available from:https://globalriskinsights.com/2014/11/local-policies-may-set-back-e-africa-oil-gas-projects/

[12] Business monitoring institute (BMI) (2016) Tanzania oil and gas report: Includes 10-year forecast to 2025. Q4. BMI.

[13] Russell, C. (2020) Column: Asian LNG prices take bigger coronavirus hit than Brent crude. Reuter. (Online) Availiable from: https://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-column-russell-lng-asia/column-asian-lng-prices-take-bigger-coronavirus-hit-than-brent-crude-idUKKCN2290YC#:~:text=Most%20Australian%20LNG%20projects%20are,to%20need%20slightly%20higher%20prices

[14] The United Republic of Tanzania (2013) The Natural Gas Policy of Tanzania., Dar es Salaam: October 2013, 14. Available from: http://www.tanzania.go.tz/egov_uploads/documents/Natural_Gas_Policy_-_Approved_sw.pdf.

[15] Petroleum Economist (2020) LNG spot trading continues to surge. (Online) available from: https://www.petroleum-economist.com/articles/midstream-downstream/lng/2020/lng-spot-trading-continues-to-surge

[16] Ledesma, p. 22

[17] Ibid, p.27

[18] International Energy Agency (2019) Kenya Energy Outlook: Analysis from Africa Energy Outlook 2019. International Energy Agency.

[19]   Polus, A. and Tycholiz, W., (2019) 'David versus Goliath: Tanzania's Efforts to Stand Up to Foreign Gas Corporations'. Africa Spectrum, 54(1), pp.61-72

[20] The Parliament of Tanzania (2017) The Permanent Sovereignty Act, Part III. Printed by the Government Printer, Dar Es Salaam, 7 July 2017.

[21] Hume N (2017) Acacia warns of mine closure unless Tanzania lifts export ban. (online) Available from: https://www.ft.com/content/fe0a33b6-6e06-11e7-bfeb-33fe0c5b7eaa

Baltic Security: An Inward Look at Ethnic Tension in Estonia and its Threat to Democracy

Since the fall of the Soviet Union, Estonia has been recognised as a leader of the Baltic states in their transition to becoming democratic powers. Estonia is often portrayed as a technological powerhouse; due to its Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre, Estonia plays a prominent role in Baltic regional security. Besides transitioning into an essential security position through technological advancement, the state also boasts the highest level of political participation from its citizens out of all post-Soviet states.[1] However, Estonian policies towards its Russian-speaking* minority creates a divide in the state’s population. With the COVID-19 pandemic wreaking havoc globally, one wonders how the virus will impact a state that struggles to include roughly a quarter of its population in civic participation. This article will explore the subject in detail, providing an analysis of Estonia’s policies as they relate to the country’s Russian-speaking minority, and the potential for COVID-19 to increase the rift between the Estonian population due to its economic impact on the state.

By Taylor Pehrson

Estonia gained independence on 20 August 1991 after 47 years of occupation by the Soviet Union. A fundamental objective of the 1992 Estonian Constitution is the perseverance of the ‘Estonian people, language and culture’. [2] This goal marks the sense of national pride the Estonian people had at the time of independence. However, it also set a precedent for a national division of those living in Estonia - a precedent that can be traced through the Constitution and various other Acts published in and after 1992. Through the nationalisation of Estonian verbiage, these documents markedly separate the country’s large Russian-speaking population.

After the Citizenship Act was enacted in 1992, 90% of ethnic-Estonians automatically became citizens while only 8-10% of non-Estonians gained citizenship. This is due to a law that granted citizenship to those who were living in Estonia before 1940, which was the year of Soviet annexation. [3] Because of the law, those that moved or were born in Estonia after 1940 during Soviet times had to apply for citizenship. New numbers show that ‘as of April 2012, 93,774 persons (6.9% of the population) remain stateless, while approximately 95,115 (7% of the population) have chosen Russian citizenship as an alternative to statelessness’. [4] Because many Russian-speakers have not been able to gain citizenship, this combined 13.9% of the population does not have the right to participate in Estonian democracy. Therefore, the question stands as to the legitimacy of Estonia’s democracy.

In order to provide answers, a thorough examination of Estonian citizenship policies and legislation is needed: How do they serve core democratic values, such as the civic participation of the whole population? Therefore, it is important to investigate Estonian elections and their impact on ethnic tension. Going further, this article will then analyse how the current global pandemic will impact both the strides the Estonian government has made since 1992 and how the virus could exacerbate ethnic divisions, particularly in relation to the Estonian economy.

Although Estonian policy has recently changed as a result of the state’s engagement with the EU and NATO regulations and standards, there is still a long way ahead before the gap between Estonian and Russian-speaking populations can be bridged. One of the main distinctions and roadblocks between the two populations is language. Within the Constitution, Language Act, Citizenship Act, Riigikogu Election Act, and numerous other government directives, language is a main feature.

The 1992 Constitution made speaking Estonian a requirement for gaining Estonian citizenship. Efforts to curb the language obstacle for gaining citizenship started in 1995, when the Language Act provided Estonian language courses for anyone taking the citizenship exam. [5] This included a government reimbursement program for the courses (provided one passes the exams), clarification that only a B1 level of proficiency is needed for citizenship, and the Department of Education providing language tutors for the courses. [6] Thus, language is dissipating as a barrier to citizenship in the state. However, due to the heavy influx of those applying for citizenship and limited state funding, this process is only slowly moving forward.

Language remains nonetheless a decisive barrier for anyone hoping to engage in civic participation in the state. As stated in the Language Act of 2011, ‘the language of public administration in state agencies and local government authorities is Estonian… [this] extend[s] to the majority of state-owned companies, foundations established by state and non-profit organizations with state participation’. [7] While the Act does make an exception for local governments in districts where half the population or more speaks another language, all other government operations must use Estonian and only Estonian. [8] This means that in order to be elected to any government position, a person must be fluent in Estonian.

Besides the Russian-speaking population not being represented in government positions, the right to vote and join political parties is also restricted. In order to vote in Estonia, one must be an Estonian citizen and 18 years of age. [9] Moreover, only Estonian citizens can join political parties. [10] Thus, because of the language barrier to citizenship that is only slowly easing, Russian-speaking people in Estonia who do not meet citizenship requirements are limited in their civic participation abilities. This means they may not vote or voice their opinions on matters relating to jobs and visas, issues that pertain particularly to the Russian-speaking population. A recently published study by the EU Marie Curie Research Training Network*  found that ethnic-Estonians are twice as likely to vote in any municipal election than Russian-speakers. [11] While one could argue that Russian-speakers do not have an interest in civically engaging and thus their numbers are low, consideration of Russian-speakers’ limitations to participation should be acknowledged first to ensure the limitations do not prevent a significant portion of the population from participating.

If a large quantity of Russian-speakers are not able to vote or join political parties, or run for a government position, Estonia is losing out on the input of a significant portion of their population. It is no wonder that election season usually brings tensions to a boil. This became apparent in the Estonian parliamentary elections of 2019 when, two months before the elections, signs labeled ‘only Estonians here’ and ‘only Russians here’ were put up on different parts of Tram stops in Tallinn. [12] The action, done by a small political party, Eesti 200, ignited tensions in the capital that prompted the immediate removal of the signs and put Russian-speakers’ citizenship at the forefront of political debate. A small instance created waves of action and protest; one then wonders what the impact of a major event could have on the small Baltic state where tensions are waiting under the surface.

Estonia and the other Baltic states have fared well in the global COVID-19 pandemic in comparison with the rest of Europe, with trends of low numbers of cases and deaths. Part of the success may be due to Estonia’s societal emphasis on technology, as the transition to quarantine was rather seamless due to technological capabilities. [13] However, a large concern remains for both Estonians and the Russian-speaking population: the economy.

Because of the potential for an economic downturn caused by the pandemic, the Estonian Conservative Peoples Party with Mart Helme at the helm drafted a new bill in April. This bill would terminate the visas of unemployed workers from non-EU countries and expire long-term visas. [14] Helme commented on the bill, saying “in the current difficult time, when our own fellow country people are short of jobs and there are more people every day who have lost their jobs, we must support the residents of Estonia.” [15]

There has been a public outcry from the Russian-speaking community on the bill which would give more power to the employer to choose Estonian citizens over other workers. Because of the restrictions to Estonian citizenship and COVID-19, the process of citizenship has slowed dramatically; Russian-speakers now face deportation and the loss of visas due to the government attempting to provide Estonians with the jobs that are usually reserved for Russian-speakers. It is no wonder that in a poll taken in April 2020, 72% of the Russian-speaking population in Estonia was worried about the economic well-being of the state. [16]

However, other sources have implied that the pandemic has brought the Estonian population together. According to Dr. Tonis Saarts of Tallinn University, the pandemic has put prominent Russian-speakers, such as the chief medical officer of the Estonian Health Board, Dr. Arkadi Popov, at the forefront of the fight against COVID-19. [17] This has created a unifying image of the Russian-speakers and ethnic-Estonians coming together to defeat a common enemy. Alas, Saarts also comments that “the looming economic crisis will hit Russians harder than it will Estonians.” [18] Furthermore, due to the language division in the state, there is a distinct separation of Estonian versus Russian-speakers’ jobs, Russian-speakers being limited to mostly blue collar positions as they do not require knowledge of Estonian. Therefore, the pandemic’s unifying ability will soon be tested through the economy, as can be seen in the Estonian governments’ drafted bill to end certain visas.

Definitions of democracy, though all slightly different, all include civic engagement by the population as democracy’s cornerstone. In Estonia, the question of who qualifies as a citizen as well as language barriers prevent a portion of their population from civic engagement. With COVID-19 potentially destabilising the economy of the state, Russian-speakers now risk losing jobs and visas with little political representation in the matter. While the world slowly moves forward from the devastation the pandemic caused, a call to action in Estonia and other post-Soviet states is needed as the economy may override their work towards establishing democracy in the wake of the virus.

*The term Russian-speaker is used here to describe those that have Russian, Polish, Belarusian or other Eastern European background, but have lived in Estonia or were born in the state after 1940 (the year of Soviet occupation). Russian-speaker is used to replace the term ethnic-Russian since some migrants that entered Estonia during Soviet occupation were not ethnically Russian and instead, adopted Russian as the main language. This population is commonly grouped together under the term “Russian-speaking” in legislation, laws, and news sources in the Baltic region.

*The Integration of the European Second Generation Survey (TIES): this survey started in 2006 through a collaboration of research institutes in 11 European countries and Turkey. The survey sought to collect data on European second generation migrants. Within the Baltics, the survey measured the civic participation of different ethnic groups.

Sources

[1] Schulze, J. (2014) "The Ethnic Participation Gap: Comparing Second Generation Russian Youth and Estonian Youth", Journal on Ethnopolitics and Minority Issues in Europe, 13(1) pp. 19-56. Available at: https://heinonline-org.ezproxy.lib.gla.ac.uk/HOL/Page?handle=hein.journals/jemie2014&id=19&collection=journals&index=journals/jemie (Accessed: 21 June 2020). p. 24.

[2] The Constitution of the Republic of Estonia 1992. Available at: https://www.riigiteataja.ee/en/eli/530102013003/consolide (Accessed: 28 June 2020). p. 1.

[3] Kirch, M. & Kirch, A. (1995) "Ethnic relations: Estonians and non-Estonians", Nationalities Papers, 23(1), pp. 43-59. Available at: http://tinyurl.com/qqzbx9k (Accessed: 6 March 2020). p 49.

[4] Schulze, J. (2014) "The Ethnic Participation Gap: Comparing Second Generation Russian Youth and Estonian Youth", Journal on Ethnopolitics and Minority Issues in Europe, 13(1) pp. 19-56. Available at: https://heinonline-org.ezproxy.lib.gla.ac.uk/HOL/Page?handle=hein.journals/jemie2014&id=19&collection=journals&index=journals/jemie (Accessed: 21 June 2020). p. 26.

[5] Citizenship Act 1995. Available at: https://www.riigiteataja.ee/en/eli/512022015001/consolide (Accessed: 29 June 2020).

[6] Ibid.

[7] Language Act 2011. Available at: https://www.riigiteataja.ee/en/eli/506112013016/ (Accessed: 29 June 2020). p. 2.

[8] Ibid.

[9] Riigikogu Election Act 2002. Available at: https://www.riigiteataja.ee/en/eli/510032014001/consolide (Accessed: 30 June 2020). p. 1.

[10] The Constitution of the Republic of Estonia 1992. Available at: https://www.riigiteataja.ee/en/eli/530102013003/consolide (Accessed: 28 June 2020). p. 5.

[11] Schulze, J. (2014) "The Ethnic Participation Gap: Comparing Second Generation Russian Youth and Estonian Youth", Journal on Ethnopolitics and Minority Issues in Europe, 13(1) pp. 19-56. Available at: https://heinonline-org.ezproxy.lib.gla.ac.uk/HOL/Page?handle=hein.journals/jemie2014&id=19&collection=journals&index=journals/jemie (Accessed: 21 June 2020). p. 35.

[12] Luxmoore, M. and Alliksaar, K. (2019) ‘”Only Estonians Here”: Outrage After Election Poster Campaign Singles Out Russian Minority”, RadioFreeLiberty, 10 January. Available at: https://www.rferl.org/a/estonia-election-posters-russian-minority-outrage/29702111.html (Accessed: 20 June 2020).

[13] Sander, G. F. (2020) ‘The pandemic has united us: A media divide fades in the Baltics’, Christian Science Monitor, Riga, 18 June. Available at: https://www.csmonitor.com/World/Europe/2020/0618/The-pandemic-has-united-us-A-media-divide-fades-in-the-Baltics (Accessed: 20 June 2020).

[14] Ed. Nomm, A. and Wright, H. (2020) ‘Interior ministry drafting bill to send unemployed foreign workers home’ ERR News, 1 April. Available at: https://news.err.ee/1071501/interior-ministry-drafting-bill-to-send-unemployed-foreign-workers-home (Accessed: 20 June 2020).

[15] Ibid.

[16] Ed. Vahtla, A. (2020) ‘Poll Coronavirus awareness nearly equal among Estonian-, Russian-speakers’, ERR News, 5 April. Available at: https://news.err.ee/1072982/poll-coronavirus-awareness-nearly-equal-among-estonian-russian-speakers (Accessed: 20 June 2020).

[17] Sander, G. F. (2020) ‘The pandemic has united us: A media divide fades in the Baltics’, Christian Science Monitor, Riga, 18 June. Available at: https://www.csmonitor.com/World/Europe/2020/0618/The-pandemic-has-united-us-A-media-divide-fades-in-the-Baltics (Accessed: 20 June 2020).

[18] Ibid.

Doctors with dilemmas - Goma 1994-1995

Médecins Sans Frontières

This article is based on an interview with Rachel Kiddell-Monroe, who worked in Zaire and Rwanda with Médecins Sans Frontières Holland before, during and after the genocide against the Tutsis.

The views expressed in this article do not necessarily reflect those of Médecins Sans Frontières/Doctors without Borders.

By Johanna Cottin

When Rachel Kiddell-Monroe became Head of Mission for a drug distribution programme run by Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) in December 1993, she had been told this would be a quiet, peaceful posting in Goma, former Zaire, just across the border from Rwanda. At that time, no-one could have predicted that Goma would soon become the emergency refuge for over a million people fleeing a genocide in Rwanda. [1]

Back in 1993, Goma was not the international organisation hotspot it is today. MSF was among a few international organisations working on regular development projects and drug distribution programmes in the Kivu region. MSF France had been sending volunteers to Rwanda since 1982 [2] and other MSF sections had been present in the Great Lakes region since the early 1990s. [3] Yet, despite MSF’s presence in the region for over a decade, the organisation failed to properly understand the political context in which it was operating and thus the dynamics of the ensuing conflict and refugee crisis. [4] MSF was confronted with ethical dilemmas which challenged its role as an impartial aid organisation in the midst of a genocide.

The genocide against the Tutsis began on the 6th of April 1994 in Rwanda. At the same time, pogroms against Tutsis in the Zairean Masisi region had been intensifying. Rachel Kiddell-Monroe had been gathering information from locals and documenting the incidents against Zairean Tutsis and she alerted the MSF Holland headquarters in Amsterdam. As she recalls:

This is 1994. There is no internet, no facebook, no social media. There is no communication except through a satellite telephone and very, very limited possibilities to send something through a computer. That is really important to understand because it completely impacted the way we talked about, understood and responded to the genocide. [5]

The headquarters initially dismissed the nature and severity of the conflict, creating tensions between Amsterdam and the field team in Goma.

So when I talked to people in Amsterdam and told them that there was a genocide, they thought I was overreacting. It was really hard because there was a denialism going on in Amsterdam. And that caused delays within the organisation. [6] 

The denialism or fatalistic attitude of humanitarian organisations towards the Rwandan conflict was rooted in a colonial mindset, and a tendency to explain African conflicts as ‘tribal wars’. [7] The MSF teams on the ground were preoccupied with the technical aspect of their work, providing medical aid and tending to the injured rather than focusing on the political climate in which they were working. MSF’s initial analysis of the conflict as an inter-ethnic conflict was based on a colonial historiography of Rwanda and thus failed to recognize it as a politically designed genocide. [8]

As the ongoing massacres in Rwanda intensified and the number of victims grew, MSF began preparing camps in the neighbouring countries for refugees to arrive from Rwanda. The MSF programmes in Zaire were placed under the direction of the emergency department and Rachel Kiddell-Monroe became the MSF Field Emergency Coordinator in Goma. However, according to Kiddell-Monroe the refugees did not come right away:  ’What happened is that Rwanda was sealed off. People were kept inside. It was like a fishbowl: we could look in and see what was happening but we couldn’t get in and people couldn’t get out’. [9] The Rwandan military and militias were guarding the borders and preventing the Tutsis from leaving the country. [10] MSF could not evacuate Rwandan Tutsis over the border, not even their own local staff. [11]

Nonetheless, on May 11th, 1994, 30,000 Rwandans had reached Zaire. [12] That number increased to somewhere between 800,000 and 1,000,000 by mid-July [13]:

I don’t think it was ever contemplated that there was going to be this huge outpour [Sic] of refugees towards Goma. The understanding of Rwanda was that the Western side of the country tended to be more safe, less reactionary, with a strong society, whereas the Eastern side was much more fragile. It was believed that there would be a much bigger exodus of people in the East. That was some kind of understanding about Rwanda that proved to be false. [14]

As the Tutsi-led Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) advanced into Rwanda and the conflict intensified, many Rwandans fled to Zaire. Facilitated by the French military presence in the West, the defeated Hutu militiamen and génocidaires crossed the border among the refugees and reached the MSF Goma refugee camp. While the field team was aware that armed soldiers and perpetrators were among the refugees, the MSF Charter mandated them to remain non-partisan and treat everyone in their camp indiscriminately [15]:

Seeing people crossing the border, I could not see the difference between Tutsi and Hutu. There is no difference. I did not know who perpetrated and who was a victim. They all came across with nothing and desperate, so the only response from my team was to help those people. [16]

Once refugees settled in Goma and the camp became more established, leadership among the refugees began to form: the instigators and perpetrators of the genocide were gaining influence within the camp, notably taking leadership roles within the food distribution programme. Although the number of refugees in the camp was largely overestimated and the UNHCR delivered food and aid supplies accordingly, malnutrition was still affecting 10% of the refugee population in November 1994. [17] This was a clear sign that food supplies were not reaching the most vulnerable and that aid was being diverted by the militias present in the camp [18]:

There were team discussion about this. Some were saying that what we’re doing is being taken completely the wrong way. We tried to access women and children directly and put a focus on water and food supplies. But we weren’t the only NGO there and we were working with other organisations. The inter-agency work was complicated because some agencies did not believe there were any aid diversions. [19] 

The security climate in the camp deteriorated and refugees willing to return to Rwanda were regularly threatened or killed by the militias. [20] Refugees suspected of being Tutsi or accused of being RPF spies were also killed by the militias, sometimes in front of MSF workers. [21] The defeated Hutu government spread fear among the Rwandan population using radio and urged the Rwandans to join the refugee camps, where the leaders of the genocide could expand their control and re-establish their power. [22] Essentially, the refugees became “hostages” of the militiamen in Zaire who were exploiting refugees as a human shield and benefiting from foreign aid to rebuild and strengthen their armed groups in order to attack the RPF forces in Rwanda.

The camps replicated a “mini-Rwanda” and perpetrators inside were infiltrating into the leadership of the camp. It was a million people camp, this was the size of Montreal, so there was a lot of space for leaders to take their place. That’s when we started to ask ourselves, should we really be here or not? [23]

MSF came to face multiple ethical dilemmas: should it continue its work in Goma even though its aid was being exploited by militias with the intention to pursue their genocidal goals? Or should MSF leave the camps, thus cutting the resources and aid supplies of the militias but at the same time depriving vulnerable populations in need? [24]

While there was a consensus among the different MSF sections that the current aid diversion by former génocidaires was unacceptable, opinions diverged on how to deal with the situation. Some sections believed staying in the camp was a form of humanitarian resistance to the perpetrators of the genocide. [25] Furthermore, their presence as an international NGO would enable them to witness and document what was happening in the region and continue to draw media attention to the cause. MSF France, on the contrary, was determined to pull out its programmes, and argued that diversion of aid was a violation of its fundamental principles and continuing their distribution of food and aid supplies to militias was a form of complicity. [26]

MSF Holland in Goma first requested the UN Security Council to deploy an international police force to protect the refugees from the perpetrators in the refugee camps, a request that was never fulfilled. [27] Advocacy through media and lobbying the international community to intervene were also strategies used by MSF. However, since the security situation was already precarious in Zaire, MSF was very careful with its public statements regarding the militias in the camps, to avoid putting their field staff in further danger. [28] Yet, the international community failed to intervene and by the end of 1995, all sections of MSF had withdrawn from the camps. [29]

The ethical dilemmas MSF was confronted with in the refugee camps shows that humanitarian aid is only effective when it is provided jointly with judicial and political action. [30] As a medical, non-partisan humanitarian organisation, MSF cannot and should not fulfill all these mandates. In times of armed conflict, population displacements and gross violations of human rights, humanitarian relief in the form of medical assistance, water supply, and food distribution is simply not enough. [31] The refugee crisis in what is now the Democratic Republic of the Congo proved that an international intervention would have been critical to prevent the militias from instrumentalising humanitarian aid with full impunity and pursuing their genocidal agenda. Yet, since the refugee crisis was solely treated as a humanitarian crisis, its political dimensions were ignored and the international community failed to intervene in time.

Sources

[1] UNHCR. (2000) ‘The State of the World’s Refugees 2000’, Chapter 10, p.246

[2] Bradol, J-H and Le Pape, M. (2017) ‘Humanitarian aid, genocide and mass killings, Médecins Sans Frontières, The Rwandan Experience, 1982-97’, Manchester University Press. 10

[3] MSF. (2014) ‘Genocide of Rwandan Tutsi 1994’, Speaking Out, p.11

[4] Bradol, J-H and Le Pape, M. 24

[5] The author’s interview with Rachel Kiddell Monroe on the 10th of June 2020

[6] Ibid.

[7] Stapleton, T. (2018) ‘Africa : War and Conflict in the Twentieth Century’, Routledge.

[8] Bradol, J-H and Le Pape, M. 24

[9] The author’s interview with Rachel Kiddell Monroe on the 10th of June 2020

[10] MSF. (2014) ‘Genocide of Rwandan Tutsi 1994’, 17

[11] Ibid. 16

[12] Ibid. 31

[13] Bradol, J-H and Le Pape, M. 47

[14] The author’s interview with Rachel Kiddell Monroe on the 10th of June 2020

[15] Bradol, J-H and Le Pape, M. 47

[16] The author’s interview with Rachel Kiddell Monroe on the 10th of June 2020

[17] MSF. (2014) ‘Rwandan Refugee Camps in Zaire and Tanzania, 1994-1995’, Speaking Out, 55

[18] Ibid. 32

[19] The author’s interview with Rachel Kiddell Monroe on the 10th of June 2020

[20] Bradol, J-H and Le Pape, M. 59

[21] MSF. (2014) ‘Rwandan Refugee Camps in Zaire and Tanzania, 1994-1995, 55

[22] Ibid. 28

[23] The author’s interview with Rachel Kiddell Monroe on the 10th of June 2020

[24] MSF. (2014) ‘Rwandan Refugee Camps in Zaire and Tanzania, 1994-1995’, 8

[25] Bradol, J-H and Le Pape, M. 62

[26] Ibid. 63

[27] Ibid. 8

[28] Bradol, J-H and Le Pape, M. 4

[29] Ibid. 4

[30] Ibid. 88

[31] Ibid. 91

Workshop series : Humanitarian Programme Development Workshop

In this first entry in the Security Distillery's workshop series, conducted by Ethan Pate, we have been focusing on programme development in humanitarian response. Dr Caitriona Dowd has led the workshop which introduced participants to the process of developing project proposals, seeking funding, and incorporate key aspects of design such as contextual analysis, needs assessments, and partnerships.

Download the report of the workshop here

Organised crime in the Sahel, an inextricable puzzle?

For eight years now, we have heard about the Sahel as the theatre of a war on terror. Sparked in Mali with the Tuareg rebellion of 2012, the conflict, largely waged by jihadist organisations, quickly spread beyond the borders. Islamist groups have constantly been striving to expand their influence. They have built up their power by exploiting state weaknesses in the face of deeply rooted economic issues and socio-ethnic tensions already amplified by climate change. [1] However, a key ingredient of their success lies in the dangerous potential of organised crime and trafficking networks in the Sahel. This piece will first look at the criminal rings that have contributed to turning the Sahel into a powder keg, and for which the conflict has played a catalyzing effect. [2] Then, it will develop the argument that those trafficking practices nurture each other, which makes them even more arduous to overcome. 

By Fabiana Natale

Overview of a region hustled by its criminal plurality

War and instability, combined with weak and corruptible states, have stirred the development of criminal trafficking routes and their overlap with terrorist networks. [3] Indeed, the Sahel, the boundary between Africa’s desert north and savannah south, and traditionally a land of passage with its caravan routes, is a valuable transit hub for licit and illicit trade today. Among the scourges that consume the Sahel, organised crime appears at the forefront, with its transnational trafficking networks. While a variety of illicit activities take place, migrant smuggling and trafficking in persons, arms, and drugs prove the most profitable. [4]

Migrant smugglers lead a very lucrative activity in a region with porous borders and severe violence. In the G5 Sahel countries (Burkina Faso, Chad, Mauritania, Mali, Niger) alone, the conflict has caused over 19,000  deaths. [5] With 2,000 attacks registered since 2012, [6] the armed efforts of jihadist groups led to the displacement of 900,000 people. [7] The addition of economic, political, and environmental concerns results in fluxes of over seven million international migrants per year, [8] creating great opportunities for smugglers. Exact figures are obviously hard to find due to the unlawful character of those activities, but the profit generated only through smuggling routes from the Sahel to Europe is estimated around $300 million per year, without mentioning considerable amounts of intra-regional migration. [9]

Furthermore, while migrant smuggling and human trafficking should be clearly distinguished from each other, they often end up being coupled as one issue. The purpose can differ depending on the population targeted. For instance, Nigerian women are the most common victims of sexual exploitation in Africa, [10] while men are mainly used for criminal activities or as workforce in fields and mines. Children, mostly coming from Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger, have been victims of the sex industry. [11] However, in the last decade, there has been an unfortunate resurgence of the soldier children phenomenon, especially among terrorist groups. [12]

Regarding weapons circulating in the region, they mostly come from previous local conflicts or from arms trafficking. The most sought-after products are assault rifles and ammunition. [13] They can be sold or leased by corrupt members of security forces or imported from abroad. Since the Cold War, they were mostly issued in Warsaw Pact countries. However, since the outbreak of the conflict, Chinese-made weapons seem to dominate the market. [14] Eritrea and Djibouti, as the “African gateway”, play a key role in supplying arms to the Sahel. [15] More locally, the leading actors are terrorist groups.

Those organisations also play a central role in trafficking drugs. [16] It is not a recent development that literature on the involvement of terrorists in criminal activities is dominated by references to the drug trade. [17] The practice has a twofold purpose: it generates income, but can also weaken enemies through its addictive nature. [18] While non-state actors in West Africa have been playing a solely logistical role for years, providing a corridor from Latin America to Europe, the last decade has even allowed local drug production to appear in the Sahel. [19]

Complex nexuses between trafficking networks allow mutual consolidation

The  major challenge is nonetheless the combination of all these criminal phenomena. They cannot be faced separately. Indeed, while Edmund Burke taught us that “slavery is a weed that grows on every soil”, certain soils might be more fertile – when shared with drug plantations for example. As a matter of fact, drug trafficking, with the addiction, financial issues, and community conflicts it causes, makes people more vulnerable to human trafficking. Additionally, it goes without saying that drugs, with their inhibitory effects, are valuable for people’s exploitation. [20]

On the other hand, trafficking in persons provides financial means, human resources, as well as networks for all sorts of criminal activities like weapons trafficking. An analysis of the organized crime index reveals a proportional evolution of arms and human trafficking in Africa and in the Sahel (cf. Appendix). [21] Weapons provide criminals with the necessary coercive power they need to subdue their human trafficking victims.

Besides, a dense and armed criminal network contributes to creating the proper environment to trigger violence and thus, exploit people’s weaknesses. Indeed, the growing black market in conventional weaponry has parallelled the escalation of violence in the region. [22] This relies in part on the supply available for rebel and terrorist groups, who disrupt an already unstable environment and further weaken national governments. They do so by damaging their territorial integrity, which hinders state-centric responses and allows a reinforcement of all the above-mentioned criminal phenomena. [23] Additionally, they induce financial losses by forcing the states to concentrate their efforts and resources on this asymmetric fight.

The direct outcome is thus the government’s failure to protect and provide for its citizens, leading to popular dissatisfaction. People can then deduce that they either need to provide for themselves – which can lead to an increase of the demand for light weapons – or to seek help from alternative groups. This is how the vacuum left by state authorities, if taken advantage of, can lead to considerable gain in legitimacy for criminal and terrorist organisations. [24]

These nexus are simply an illustration of how multiple aggravating factors can converge, leading to the vicious cycle for the Sahel security question. The region has been facing a diversity of geopolitical and humanitarian challenges that have not successfully been tackled despite five years of cooperation of local governments through the G5 Sahel, the French military intervention since 2013, and efforts of the international community. [25]

As shown, a major obstacle is the interconnection of multiple criminal activities which cannot be solved individually. Furthermore, a strictly regional response is not sufficient since the Sahel is not a closed-off area and constitutes a pivotal international hub for illicit markets and a central platform for drug trafficking [26]. Lastly, the financial fluxes and incomes generated by these trades cannot be ignored, especially in light of the role of the underground economy in Africa.

To conclude, in the last decade, the Sahel has been a puzzle of security challenges aggravated by humanitarian crises. As illustrated in this piece, the issues are deeply rooted and intertwined, which makes the bigger picture appear inextricable. Yet, the new decade began with further threats weighing in on the region: climate change and the coronavirus. On one side, the reduction in trafficking they caused is a reason to be hopeful. On the other, a more structured response is needed urgently, now that light has been shed on states in increasingly weak and precarious positions, therefore creating new opportunities for crime.

Appendix 1

https://ocindex.enactafrica.org/explorer/human_trafficking

Sources

[1] Le Monde Afrique (2020), ‘Comprendre la guerre au Sahel ( Les cartes du Monde Afrique, épisode 1)’ [online] Available from  https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=j1tLiD6yjXM

[2] Enhancing Africa’s reponse to transnational organised crime (2019) ‘Organised Crime Index Africa 2019’ [online] Available from https://enact-africa.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/2019-09-24-oc-index-2019.pdf 

[3] Ibid.

[4] US Aid, Bureau for Africa (2020), ‘Strengthening Rule of Law Approaches to Address Organized Crime Criminal Market Convergence’ [online] Available from https://globalinitiative.net/strengthening-rule-of-law-approaches-to-address-organized-crime-criminal-market-convergence/

[5] ACLED (2020), ‘The Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project’ [online] Available from  https://acleddata.com/dashboard/#/dashboard 

[6] Ibid.

[7] Le Monde Afrique (2020), ‘Comprendre la guerre au Sahel ( Les cartes du Monde Afrique, épisode 1)’ [online] Available from  https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=j1tLiD6yjXM

[8] Ibid.

[9] United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (2006), ‘Organized Crime and Irregular Migration from Africa to Europe’ [online] Available from https://sherloc.unodc.org/res/cld/bibliography/organized-crime-and-irregular-migration-from-africa-to-europe_html/Migration_Africa.pdf

[10] United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (2013) ‘Criminalité Transnationale Organisée en Afrique de l’Ouest : Une Evaluation des Menaces’ [online] Available from https://sherloc.unodc.org/res/cld/bibliography/2013/transnational_organized_crime_in_west_africa_a_threat_assessment_html/FRANCAIS_West_Africa_TOCTA_2013_FR.pdf

[11] United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (2006), ‘Organized Crime and Irregular Migration from Africa to Europe’ [online] Available from https://sherloc.unodc.org/res/cld/bibliography/organized-crime-and-irregular-migration-from-africa-to-europe_html/Migration_Africa.pdf

[12] RFI (2020), ‘Sahel: le chef de Barkhane alerte sur le recrutement d'enfants soldats par les jihadistes’ [online] Available from https://www.rfi.fr/fr/afrique/20200710-barkhane-bilan-inquietude-emploi-enfants-soldats-jihadiste

[13] United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (2013) ‘Criminalité Transnationale Organisée en Afrique de l’Ouest : Une Evaluation des Menaces’ [online] Available from https://sherloc.unodc.org/res/cld/bibliography/2013/transnational_organized_crime_in_west_africa_a_threat_assessment_html/FRANCAIS_West_Africa_TOCTA_2013_FR.pdf

[14] Ibid.

[15] Hansrod, Zeenat (2018) ‘Djibouti emerges as arms trafficking hub for Horn of Africa’ [online] Available from https://www.rfi.fr/en/africa/20180915-djibouti-emerges-arms-trafficking-hub-horn-africa

[16] Labrousse, Alan and Laniel Laurent (1999), ‘The world geopolitics of drugs’ Geopolitical Drug Watch [online] Available from https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/bfm%3A978-94-017-3505-6%2F1.pdf

[17]  McCarthy, Deborah (2003) ‘Hearing Before the Committee on the Judiciary United States Senate, Washington DC’

[18]  Enhancing Africa’s reponse to transnational organised crime (2019) ‘Organised Crime Index Africa 2019’ [online] Available from https://enact-africa.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/2019-09-24-oc-index-2019.pdf 

[19] United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (2013) ‘Criminalité Transnationale Organisée en Afrique de l’Ouest : Une Evaluation des Menaces’ [online] Available from https://sherloc.unodc.org/res/cld/bibliography/2013/transnational_organized_crime_in_west_africa_a_threat_assessment_html/FRANCAIS_West_Africa_TOCTA_2013_FR.pdf

[20] United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (2013) ‘Criminalité Transnationale Organisée en Afrique de l’Ouest : Une Evaluation des Menaces’ [online] Available from https://sherloc.unodc.org/res/cld/bibliography/2013/transnational_organized_crime_in_west_africa_a_threat_assessment_html/FRANCAIS_West_Africa_TOCTA_2013_FR.pdf

[21]  Enhancing Africa’s reponse to transnational organised crime (2019) ‘Organised Crime Index Africa 2019’ [online] Available from https://enact-africa.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/2019-09-24-oc-index-2019.pdf 

[22] Antoine, Jean-Charles (2015), ‘Trafic d’armes, l’étude des filières est une démarche majeure dans la compréhension des crises géopolitiques’ Diploweb [online] Available from https://www.diploweb.com/Trafic-d-armes-l-etude-des.html

[23] Enhancing Africa’s reponse to transnational organised crime (2019) ‘Organised Crime Index Africa 2019’ [online] Available from https://enact-africa.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/2019-09-24-oc-index-2019.pdf 

[24] Natale, Fabiana and de Valk Gilles (2020), ‘Conversing COVID - Part II, with Mikel Irizar’ The Security Distillery [online] Available from https://thesecuritydistillery.org/all-articles/conversing-covid-part-ii

[25] Athénaïs Porret, Anastasia (2020) ‘Les déplacés du Sahel : une urgence humanitaire’ Les Yeux du Monde [online] Available from https://les-yeux-du-monde.fr/actualite/43802-les-deplaces-du-sahel-une-urgence-humanitaire

[26] US Aid, Bureau for Africa (2020), ‘Strengthening Rule of Law Approaches to Address Organized Crime Criminal Market Convergence’ [online] Available from https://globalinitiative.net/strengthening-rule-of-law-approaches-to-address-organized-crime-criminal-market-convergence/

Conversing COVID – Part VI, with Daniela Pisoiu

An Interview Series on the Political Implications of the Pandemic

By Fabiana Natale and Gilles de Valk

For this interview series, Fabiana Natale and Gilles de Valk speak to experts from different backgrounds on the political implications of the COVID-19 pandemic in their respective fields. From their living rooms in France and The Netherlands, they will explore the (geo)political, security, and societal consequences of this pandemic. This interview series marks the launch of a new type of content for the Security Distillery, one which we hope can provide informative and entertaining analyses of an uncertain and evolving development in global politics.

For this sixth episode, we interviewed Daniela Pisoiu, Senior Researcher at the Austrian Institute for International Affairs (OIIP) and expert of the Radicalisation Awareness Network. She has over fifteen years of experience in Islamist, right-wing and left-wing radicalisation, extremism, and terrorism, and is specialised in individual radicalisation processes. Her fieldwork includes interviews with (former) radicals and analyses of court files. In terms of regional focus, she works on Austria and Germany, as well as the Western Balkans and Europe more broadly. In our conversation, we first discussed radicalisation and deradicalisation mechanisms and then the exploitation of the pandemic by extremists. 

Radicalisation is a gradual process and occurs in small steps. What is key when it comes to preventing it?

There are many important aspects, depending on who your target is and what stage one is at in the radicalisation process. To avoid this process from happening at all, however, an important concept to work with is critical thinking. Young people need to be provided with the capacity to use (social) media in a critical way, in order to resist indoctrination. If they do not, ideas can flow and evolve very quickly, especially due to the suggestion algorithms. Once you are in an environment where only similar ideas are propagated, it can be very difficult to get out of it.

You have interviewed returning foreign fighters for your research. How was it for you to talk with them about their experiences? And to what extent was it possible for you to understand their motives?

It is interesting and usually not so difficult. Sometimes I meet people who do not want to deal with what happened, they simply want to forget. Most of the time though, they do not have any problem with talking to me. However, some of them have their narratives already figured out for the trial and simply repeat it. 

Not everyone believes what returning foreign fighters say, but I think it is true when they say they experienced a real shock and disappointment. They all left with that dream of a utopian, supportive, and just society, where children go to school and women can work. Then, they find out that those ideas are not implemented and they experience violence on a daily basis. They are disappointed with their comrades and the ideology, which is why they disengage.

As soon as they come back to Europe, they are thrown into prison. Some of them did not even regard themselves as criminals and never touched a weapon. However, according to the law, they are amongst the worst offenders as they are accused of terrorism. This is a huge psychological burden, on top of the sense of guilt some have towards their family and children. Of course, I am not saying they are victims, but we should invest more in this psychological and social aspect.

Nevertheless, there are also returning fighters who still strongly believe in the ideology of IS after coming back.

How is Europe currently dealing with returning foreign fighters and what could be improved?

Most European governments were and are not particularly eager to take people back because they fear they might lose support domestically. Besides, it is a very complicated process. There are more people coming back than are convicted, because it is not always possible to find evidence. Then there are cases of people who have already been in prisoner camps in Syria before coming back, which counts for their sentence once they are convicted in Europe. Therefore, if we wait too long to let them return, they will directly be free once they arrive. There are also debates regarding women, because some consider them as victims that have been lured, while others say they are responsible and might have taken part in the morality police in Syria. Finally, there are also divergences concerning children. In France, they are separated from their family straight away and receive psychological counselling. In Austria, authorities try to place them with other family members. Either way, those decisions are taken on a case-by-case basis. There is no standard procedure and no incentive to establish one.

In Kosovo, however, 110 individuals, mostly women and children, have been actively brought back by the government and there is an elaborate reintegration plan. Women are not put in prison and families receive support for education and social care. Kosovo is very advanced in this regard and other Western countries are now taking it as an example.

Given the depth of indoctrination of both returning foreign fighters and extremists who stayed in Europe, what are the keys of de-radicalisation?  

The result of a de-radicalisation process has to do with the length and intensity of counselling. When a person radicalises, they enter a new world of ideas, and it takes time to reverse this; besides, accepting one’s own mistakes is difficult. 

Social networks are usually considered as the key element in de-radicalisation, because one is indoctrinated and radicalised through other people. Therefore, changing the social environment of the person can help induce a change in their values.

Additionally, having an occupation is crucial. Being jobless is not a risk, but it creates opportunities, because you have more time to engage with radical ideas and people. Besides, occupations reflect factors such as self-esteem and the need to do something meaningful and this plays an important role, both in radicalisation and in de-radicalisation processes.

On top of that, the pandemic has led to a considerable increase in online activities. Did it also create new opportunities for radicalisation via propaganda on social media?

Internet plays a key role in radicalisation, because all kinds of information are available out there, even instructions on how to build a bomb. However, propaganda does not work on its own. Networks are even more important, because radicalisation is a social phenomenon and always happens with a feedback loop. Online, interactions simply happen at a higher speed and sometimes also intensity than offline, while the social and psychological process remains the same.

As internet and social media create more opportunities for propaganda and radicalisation, extremist groups obviously picked up on the increased online activities during the pandemic. This has been exploited by jihadis, presenting the coronavirus as a punishment of Allah for the West, by right-wing extremist movements denouncing a Jewish plot, and by individuals and groups promoting various conspiracy theories, which are the first step into indoctrination.

However, when analysing such mechanisms, it is essential to look at both the recruiting organisation and the people. On the one hand, there is the thriving offer by extremist organisations. On the other hand, there is the internet user who is sitting at home, isolated, eager to have meaningful interactions, and perhaps psychologically affected by the crisis. Indeed, those circumstances increase people’s vulnerability to believe in simple explanations.

Thus, I suspect that we will see a consistent increase of radicalisation, especially the right-wing kind. Furthermore, we might have a hard time countering those phenomena, since frontline fighters against online propaganda are chiefly not state authorities, but private companies such as Google or Facebook, with their content analysis algorithms and social scientists.

Not long after IS presented the pandemic as a punishment for the West, their occupied territories were affected by the virus. How did IS react to this? To what extent could they take advantage of the crisis?

Generally, as state authorities are trying to deal with the pandemic, they can allocate less resources in the fight against terrorist groups, which have the opportunity to flourish. IS reacted quickly as the virus reached them. They applied the measures suggested by the World Health Organisation, even though they were critical about closing mosques. In this sense, it is an opportunity for them to portray themselves as an actual state and to show what they are capable of. They want to prove they are better able to take care of the populations than local governments. Thus, they are able, yet again, to take advantage of unstable institutions and gain popularity against weak states, such as countries in the Sahel. 

In that respect, terrorist and extremist groups are growing during the pandemic. Yet, we do not seem to focus on this issue as much as before the pandemic. Are we still well aware of the problem?

Media are currently paying less attention to terrorist and extremist groups, which is a good thing, since they live off publicity. Within specialist circles, I have not seen less care for those topics.

In recent years, IS has been putting less emphasis on the West. This is not due to the pandemic, but because they are increasingly focusing on regions such as the Sahel or Afghanistan. In Europe, we seem relieved about this shift, but it is important to understand that IS is not gone and sooner or later the consequences of their presence in other regions will affect us, too. 

In the right-wing spectrum, we see an increase in activity and even attempts to weaponise the virus. We did not use to think of biological weapons as an asset that such organisations could manage, because of the medical and logistic skills it requires. However, this type of virus offers the opportunity for a significant individual empowerment. If used systematically and strategically, a simple cough can become a weapon and attempts have been already made in this regard. 

While it is normal that states use their resources for other priorities at the moment, we have to remain aware of such risks and how they might evolve in the future. 

What are the key takeaways from the pandemic regarding radicalisation and extremism?

In the Middle East and Africa, the pandemic can increase the importance of terrorism. We often underestimate this, because we tend to be Western-centric. In Europe, the crisis has accelerated the empowerment of right-wing radicals, which had already started in the last years, but has been largely ignored.

We usually think of extremism as an abnormal phenomenon at the margin of society, but now it is developing in the middle of it, especially given the appeal of conspiracy theories. Earlier, we distinguished American white supremacism from European neo-Nazism and treated them as isolated cases with low potential. Today, those trends are gaining a strong transnational character and are appealing to more and more people on both sides of the Atlantic.

However, this is no surprise, because crises have always been good market opportunities for radicals to capitalise on. In times of crisis, people feel insecure and these groups provide them with easy answers.

The views and opinions expressed are solely those of the interviewee and do not reflect those of the Security Distillery, the IMSISS consortium or its partners and affiliates.

Conversing COVID – Part V, with Floris van Straaten

An Interview Series on the Political Implications of the Pandemic

By Fabiana Natale and Gilles de Valk

For this interview series, Fabiana Natale and Gilles de Valk speak to experts from different backgrounds on the political implications of the COVID-19 pandemic in their respective fields. From their living rooms in France and The Netherlands, they will explore the (geo)political, security, and societal consequences of this pandemic. This interview series marks the launch of a new type of content for the Security Distillery, one which we hope can provide informative and entertaining analyses of an uncertain and evolving development in global politics.

For this fifth episode, we interviewed Floris van Straaten, Middle East Editor at NRC Handelsblad, a Dutch daily newspaper. He was previously Asia Editor at the same newspaper and he worked in Pakistan as a freelancer during the 1980s, covering the war in Afghanistan, among other things. In our conversation, we discussed the political and economic consequences of the pandemic for the Middle East.

This interview was conducted on June 17th.

Figures on COVID-19 cases across countries in the Middle East vary largely. What does this tell us about how the region is dealing with the pandemic?

In the Gulf states and Northern Africa, it seems the figures are not very high. However, the real figures could be well above what officials tell you, as they do not do a great deal of testing. Iran, however, still has one of the highest numbers of COVID-19 cases in the region. And still, people think the real figure is in fact higher. From Iran, many infections spread to several other Middle Eastern countries, such as Lebanon and Iraq. And in Bahrain, for example, nearly half of the first batch of people that was repatriated from Iran was infected with COVID-19.

In Iran, health workers were threatened by the Iranian government to prevent them from disclosing actual numbers of COVID-19 deaths to the media [1]. What does this mean for how the Iranian government is perceived?

Economically, Iran was already in dire straits before corona started, because of the sanctions imposed by the United States (US) and widespread corruption in the country. Iranians could be doing much better if there was better economic management by the government. Thus, the corona crisis came at a very awkward moment for the Iranian authorities. The first reports on COVID-19 cases in Iran indicated there were infections in the city of Qom, a holy city for Shia Muslims. Those reports were covered up by the authorities, because they were hesitant to close mosques and first wanted to hold legislative elections, which were to take place in February. The ‘hardliners’, who oppose engagement with the west and who the powerful religious establishment sympathises with, were likely to win. Eventually, the elections did take place without restrictions, even in Qom. This probably contributed to the spread of the virus. In March, the number of infections rose very quickly and there were informal reports saying the real figures of people who had died were much higher than what the authorities claimed. Videos of mass graves near the city of Qom appeared.

The Iranian authorities handled matters in a way they do most often, by suppressing the news. Similar incidents occurred over the last year. In November, the government had tried to increase the fuel prices, which led to an outbreak of large-scale protests. The government suppressed the protests with a lot of bloodshed; hundreds of people were killed. In January, Iranian general Qasem Soleimani was killed in Iraq. This was followed by a wave of sympathy in Iran, but it was immediately squandered by the clumsy mistake of downing a passenger flight from Tehran to Ukraine. The Iranian government tried to cover it up for days, wiping out the little confidence they had just regained. So, when COVID-19 struck, many people in Iran were very sceptical about anything the government was saying.

The crisis seems to be an extra blow to Iran on top of the current state of the US-Iran relations. What do you think will be consequences of the pandemic for the relations between the two?

Some people hope this crisis might lead to some rapprochement between the two, as some other countries realised that Iran was in serious trouble and were willing to offer help. The US, however, were more severe in their response and added more sanctions, which obviously did not improve the relations with Iran. This makes the lives of the Iranian people even more difficult.

Recently, the Iranian government decided to open up, ending a lockdown that only lasted three weeks. The authorities said they could not afford to maintain the lockdown any longer, because it would lead to financial problems and food shortages for many people. Now that the lockdown is suspended the metro and buses in Tehran are full again and the number of infections is increasing again. Some people say it is the beginning of a second wave. Iranians, however, seem to be beyond caring. They have a somewhat fatalistic approach; if it happens, it is God’s will. You can also see this in other countries, as the patience of people is running out.

At the same time, in one of your articles you argued the corona crisis could be a chance for Iran to abolish its isolated position. China and European countries, for example, were offering help to Iran [2]. How exactly could this be an opportunity for Iran?

They could try to reinforce the ties with the European countries and China. I think China was already intensifying its relations with Iran, as it realised that many Western companies have left Iran because of the sanctions. On the other hand, Iran has not been very accommodating, maintaining its old rhetoric of how bad the West is and how they leave the Iranians to their fate. The US in particular are being vilified, like before.

What is the impact of Iran’s economic problems on its allies in Lebanon and Syria, for example?

Currently, Iran has less money than it had fifteen years ago to support Hezbollah in Lebanon or the Syrian president Bashar al-Assad’s regime, for example. They also cannot help Syria much with reconstructing the country. Furthermore, the US installed new sanctions against Syria, which will make things more difficult for the Syrian population. The US are also hoping to hurt Iran with these sanctions, as it will be more difficult for Iran to maintain its presence in Syria.

Also Lebanon is dealing with political instability during the pandemic. The outbreak of the virus was an argument for politicians to say it was too dangerous to go out on the streets to demonstrate for health reasons. Despite that, protests continued after the outbreak of infections.

Not only US sanctions are hitting Middle Eastern economies. Several economies in the region are highly dependent on oil production and export, but there has been a significant drop in oil prices. How are states that rely heavily on income from fossil fuels responding to this?

The drop in oil prices is a major problem for all the oil producing countries, such as the Gulf states, Iran, and Algeria. They all face enormous budget deficits and debt mountains that are rapidly increasing. Saudi Arabia, for example, had reserves of 750 billion US Dollars about five years ago. That has already dwindled to less than 500 billion US Dollars. They can afford to carry on for some time, but they have to realise that income from oil is not guaranteed. Even when the pandemic is over, the economy will not immediately be the same as before, because the demand for oil could remain lower than it used to be, especially if European countries would really turn into green economies, using fewer fossil fuels.

The Saudi Arabian economy might also be hit because of the cancellations of pilgrimages, which usually attract millions of people. Could this affect Saudi Arabia’s power position in the Middle East?

Saudi Arabia prides itself in hosting the most important holy places for Muslims, Mecca and Medina, but already had to cancel several pilgrimages. So indeed, it is a blow not only in economic terms. However, I do not think it will affect its power position so much, because it still possesses the aforementioned reserves. Nevertheless, it will have to think about its foreign policy, especially regarding the war in Yemen. This war has cost them billions, while they are basically in the same place as five years ago when they started their armed intervention. It might be wise for Saudi Arabia to come to some sort of peace agreement with the Houthis.

What other consequences is Yemen facing because of the pandemic?

It is disastrous for Yemen. About two-thirds of the population needs humanitarian assistance. Corona came on top of a terrible cholera epidemic, which is still not entirely gone. The number of COVID-19 cases in Yemen seems limited, but there are reports coming from hospitals – the ones that have not been destroyed yet – that corona patients are turned down because there is not enough room for them. However, I talked to some people from Yemen who said: “We have so many issues, this one extra problem does not make a difference. Our main wish is to get peace.” Furthermore, a lockdown is simply not feasible in Yemen, because there are so many refugees and people who lost their homes, who now have to stay together in rooms and tents with large families.

Which other developments have you observed in the Middle East regarding the pandemic?

Firstly, several governments in the Middle East are developing systems of surveillance that go much beyond what was already there. Amnesty International has expressed its concern about COVID-19 contact tracing apps in countries such as Kuwait and Bahrain, which allows governments to see exactly where people are, among other things. So, many governments in the Middle East have used the pandemic to increase their already considerable power over their population. This could lead to even less freedom in the Middle East.

Secondly, the pandemic exposes inequality. I think you can already see how the weakest are becoming the main victims. They cannot afford to go to hospitals. In Egypt, for instance, public hospitals are getting crowded and the service is poor; sometimes dentists have to treat the corona patients. If you have money, on the other hand, you can go to private clinics, where you will not be treated by a dentist. In several Gulf states, there are many foreign workers who often have to live in dirty, crowded places. Some states are trying to get rid of foreign workers by paying for flights to their home countries, but many of them do not want to go back because they need the money.

Finally, the pandemic shows many Middle Eastern countries are even more dependent on oil than we thought and that they need to diversify their economies. It is risky to be dependent on just one commodity like oil or gas. It is not easy to turn an economy into a more modern one, but they could and should try harder than they have done until now. 

Sources

[1] Van Straaten, Floris (2020), ‘Ayatollahs verliezen tegen het virus’ NRC

[2] Ibid

The views and opinions expressed are solely those of the interviewee and do not reflect those of the Security Distillery, the IMSISS consortium or its partners and affiliates.

Allyship for Women Who Have Experienced Intimate Partner Violence in Tanzania

In this study I investigate Intimate Partner Violence (IPV) in Tanzania, a security issue affecting about one third of women globally, [1] but about 65% of women in Tanzania. [2] Most quantitative articles have focused on measuring levels of IPV in different demographic groups; however, it is particularly difficult to measure due to low reporting, social stigma, and various other factors. In order to look at the issue from a different angle, I study allyship to women who have experienced IPV and the groups of individuals who are their strongest allies. I use data from the 2005 WHO Multi-country Study on Women’s Health and Domestic Violence against Women report, as the only suitable dataset centring women’s experiences and offering information on their allies. [3]

My findings indicate that institutionalised resources such as the police and health care workers are the weakest allies to women. On the other hand, neighbours are the strongest, indicated by high rates of reporting by women and even higher rates of offering help. This important information should prompt a reevaluation of which resources are valuable, and which should be supported by programming aimed at ending IPV.

By Emma Lin Hurlbert

IPV comprises physical, sexual, and emotional violence which can include hitting or beating, forced or humiliating sex, and isolation or controlling behaviour, respectively. [4] Furthermore, it has many negative physical, psychological, and emotional consequences for women and their families, including premature death, injury, chronic disease, HIV infection, stress, depression, and poor development in children. [5]

Halim et al. discuss some of the challenges in accurately reporting on IPV, asserting that many measurement instruments may be inaccurate. Most rely almost completely on recall which can cause biases of memory, misunderstanding questions, or concealing information. [6] There are additional methodological problems encountered, including clear definitions of IPV, access to rural or other difficult to reach areas, and systematic collection of data. This plethora of challenges regarding data collection make it very difficult to create full and robust datasets on the issue.

In an effort to contribute to the scarce baseline of quantitative knowledge, I have chosen to focus on how women in Tanzania respond to IPV by studying who they report to and how helpful those people are; I study allyship to women. I answer the questions: 1. To which actors are women most likely to report IPV? And 2. Which actors are most likely to offer help to women who have experienced IPV? Creating a clear picture of the allyship situation is important for efforts to end IPV, as it is clear from my results that certain groups are extremely helpful to women and others fall far short. Governments and social programmes can support the groups that are already strong allies, as a means of providing resources to women.

Methods

In order to measure a baseline of allyship to women who have experienced IPV in Tanzania, I use data from the WHO Multi-country Study on Women’s Health and Domestic Violence against Women report published in 2005, as a uniquely suitable dataset, and the only one I found addressing allyship. [7] This report surveys the distribution of health outcomes and the responses to IPV by 24,000 women in 10 countries between 2000-2003. It centres women’s experiences and offers specifics of those experiences which allows for a detailed and nuanced analysis, characteristics that are missing from many other datasets.

I use nationally aggregated data focused on how women have coped with IPV - particularly who they informed and who offered them help. The categories of individuals in the WHO report are as follows: friends, parents, siblings, uncle or aunt, partner’s family, children, neighbours, police, doctor / health worker, priest, counsellor, NGO / women’s organisation, and local leaders. These groups are all therefore categories in my analysis. I also created a measurement for strength of allyship by taking % of women who received offers of help / % of women who reported IPV for each type of actor, for which I use the shorthand rate of offer / report. I use this value to measure the strength of allyship, with higher values indicating stronger allyship, and values over one indicating that help was offered to women more often than they reported IPV.

Findings

As shown in Chart 1, 31.05% of women reported IPV to their parents and 29.35% reported to their partner’s family. These were the two highest groups to which women turned, probably because they were trusted and accessible. However, it is also evident that these actors were far from the strongest allies.

Chart 2 depicts the rate of offer / report for each type of individual, and it is evident that neighbours and children are the two groups that had the highest rates, at 1.262 and 1.387 respectively. These were the only groups which had a rate of higher than 1, i.e. they offered to help women more often than they were told about IPV. These two groups appear to be the most responsive and therefore the strongest allies to women. However, neighbours were both reported to and offered help on a much larger scale than children, who were involved in less than 3% of both types of occurrences. The data supports the conclusion that neighbours are the strongest allies to women, based on their rate of offer / report and the percentage of interactions in which they were involved.

It is clear that more formal reporting systems do not function as strong allies to women. Police, doctors / health care workers, counsellors, and NGOs / women’s organisations are all reported to by less than 5% of women. Furthermore, in those few cases of reporting, they do not consistently respond, showing rates of offer / report all less than .2, meaning that they offer help in less than one in five incidents of reported IPV. These resources are likely not trusted by women, which may be reinforced by their lack of response when they receive reports.

Discussion

From my findings, there are two systems for women to engage with when dealing with IPV, one informal and one formal. Of the informal system, the strongest allies to women are their neighbours, or their immediate communities. Since these communities are both trusted and responsive, indicated by high levels of reporting and offers of help, they should be supported in responding to IPV and perhaps strengthened in their ability to change norms surrounding it.

There is also the formal reporting system, which consists of law enforcement, the justice system, and social and health services. This system is very behind in both its institutional development, as indicated by a lack of legal protection against IPV and extremely low conviction rates [8], and public trust, indicated by a lack of reporting through these systems. This report shows that in Tanzania commonly thought sources of aid to women are not actually the most sought after by the women themselves, prompting a reevaluation of the type of aid governments and NGO’s can provide to IPV victims.

While the findings of this study are powerful, it is essential to note their meaningful limitations. The WHO dataset was published in 2005 using data from 2000-2003 which therefore limits it as only a benchmark, rather than a study over time. This data has provided a starting point for measuring allyship, and since my research question seeks to do just that, it is still an appropriate source.

Additionally, the data and my analysis are nationally aggregated; therefore, my analysis provides a national benchmark which may be useful for a general understanding or drafting national programmes. However, nuances and differences in dealing with IPV based on other identity groupings such as region, tribe, age, and economic status are not captured by my analysis, which limits its utility for localized project implementation. In order to design specific programmes for different demographic groups, more disaggregated data and analysis should be conducted. While it is beyond the scope of this work to further disaggregate, I acknowledge that limitation and consider the results to still be valuable.

Furthermore, this study describes the situation in Tanzania only, and the conclusions should not be applied to other countries without adequate research and analysis. Lastly, IPV research is always limited in its quantitative accuracy due to challenges of data collection, so the WHO data most likely suffers from underreporting.

Sources

[1] Katiti, Victor, Geofrey Nimrod Sigalla, Jane Rogathi, Rachel Manongi, and Declare Mushi. “Factors Influencing Disclosure among Women Experiencing Intimate Partner Violence during Pregnancy in Moshi Municipality, Tanzania.” BMC Public Health 16, no. 1 (December 2016): 2. https://doi.org/10.1186/s12889-016-3345-x.

[2] Kazaura, Method R., Mangi J. Ezekiel, and Dereck Chitama. “Magnitude and Factors Associated with Intimate Partner Violence in Mainland Tanzania.” BMC Public Health 16, no. 1 (June 1, 2016): 1. https://doi.org/10.1186/s12889-016-3161-3.

[3] Garcia-Moreno, Claudia, Henrika A.F.M. Jansen, Mary Ellsberg, Lori Heise, and Charlotte Watts. “WHO Multi-Country Study on Women’s Health and Domestic Violence against Women.” World Health Organization. World Health Organization, 2005. http://www.who.int/reproductivehealth/publications/violence/24159358X/en/.

[4] Katiti et al., 2.

[5] Halim, Nafisa, Ester Steven, Naomi Reich, Lilian Badi, and Lisa Messersmith. “Variability and Validity of Intimate Partner Violence Reporting by Couples in Tanzania.” Edited by Soraya Seedat. PLOS ONE 13, no. 3 (March 8, 2018): 2. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0193253.

Katiti et al., 2.

Simmons, Elizabeth, Nafisa Halim, Maria Servidone, Ester Steven, Naomi Reich, Lilian Badi, Nelson Holmes, Philbert Kawemama, and Lisa J. Messersmith. “Prevention and Mitigation of Intimate-Partner Violence: The Role of Community Leaders in Tanzania.” Violence Against Women 26, no. 3–4 (March 1, 2020): 360. https://doi.org/10.1177/1077801219832923.

[6] Halim et al., 2.

[7] Garcia-Moreno et al.

[8] Tanzania Women Lawyers Association. Review of Laws and Policies related to gender based violence of Tanzania mainland. (2014): 11-40. Available at: http://www.svri.org/sites/default/files/attachments/2016-07-05/Tanzanian%20review%20GBV%20report%202014%20by%20TAWLA%20TAMWA%20CRC%20TGNP%20ZAFELA.pdf.

Conversing COVID – Part IV, with Velina Tchakarova

An Interview Series on the Political Implications of the Pandemic

By Fabiana Natale and Gilles de Valk

For this interview series, Fabiana Natale and Gilles de Valk speak to experts from different backgrounds on the political implications of the COVID-19 pandemic in their respective fields. From their living rooms in France and The Netherlands, they will explore the (geo)political, security, and societal consequences of this pandemic. This interview series marks the launch of a new type of content for the Security Distillery, one which we hope can provide informative and entertaining analyses of an uncertain and evolving development in global politics.

For this fourth episode, we interviewed Velina Tchakarova, Head of Institute at the Austrian Institute of European and Security Policy (AIES). In our conversation, we discussed the future of the global order and Europe’s role in it.

Can you tell us something about AIES and your work?

AIES was launched in 1996 following the accession of Austria to the European Union (EU) in 1995. The institute aims to cover all relevant European and global developments related to foreign, security, and defence policy and their impact on Austria as a member. 

My research area for the last ten years has been twofold. On the one hand, I cover the six countries (Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Armenia) that are located between the EU and Russia. In this so-called ‘grey zone’, some countries are closer to the EU and others are closer to Russia, so this area is relevant to Europe’s foreign and security policy. On the other hand, I focus on ‘Global System Transformation’, trying to make sense of global networks and structures, how they are interlinked, and what happens when they are under pressure. By now, I have placed myself at the intersection of these two areas. It's a merger of politics and economy, where I try to understand the long-term implications of geoeconomic and geopolitical developments.

Could you tell us a bit more about ‘Global System Transformation’? And are we witnessing a global system transformation right now? 

Global affairs have become increasingly complex. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the bipolar system gave way to a period of unilateral United States (US) leadership and globalisation, creating intertwined networks, which facilitated the flow of people, goods, capital, services, and now also data. Globalisation, however, is not a new phenomenon, but a cyclical systemic development that rises and declines over the time. Now, we are in the middle of a de-globalisation cycle. Anyway, these developments and networks merged into something called the ‘global system’. This means that if something happens to one of these networks, it will have long term implications for the others.

Can you give an example?

The 2007/2008 financial crisis, for instance, started in the financial system, but it spread very quickly to the economic and trade system. Hence, the globalisation cycle was then replaced by a de-globalisation cycle. A transformation occurred. 

What is really dangerous, however, is a phenomenon called ‘systemic risks’. This concerns shocks with unforeseen effects on other networks and those shocks cannot be absorbed by the system any longer. This actually happened following the 2007/2008 financial crisis, but it is a possible outcome of the Covid-19 pandemic as well. Before the pandemic, we were already in a transitional period of de-globalisation, economic and trade stagnation, determined by fears of a recession, and shocks to the energy system. The sum of all these shocks might produce a large-scale shock to the global system, which will produce a transformational moment and we do not know in which direction it will lead (collapse or adaptation to a new system).

At an online conference in March, you said the pandemic will probably cause a greater shock to the global system than the 2007/2008 financial crisis [1]. Why would that be the case?

The supply chains, which are the bloodlines of the global system, became highly stressed because of the restrictions many countries implemented to contain the pandemic. It caused a crash on the demand side, but also on the supply side. Even when China started to exit the lockdown, there was little demand for Chinese products, as many other countries were still in lockdown.

Now, we are still in a situation of global supply chain stress. Several foreign companies are considering withdrawing from China, as it became clear that some had become dependent on one single state actor. This dependency makes the system less adaptable and robust. Reconfiguring those supply chains, however, is not something that takes one or two years; and it is not sure whether it will be successful. Companies will face defaults or will disappear from the market. Then again, governments will be busy bailing out the big players to save their economies.

I think the pandemic already caused a much bigger and quicker shock than the financial crisis in 2007/08. However, governments and financial institutions were quick in their response compared to the financial crisis and they launched measures of unprecedented scope.

You pointed out the need for European countries to become less dependent on one country, such as China. But will Europe be able to do that, considering the fact that China has large technological assets?

There is no such thing as 100% independence in international relations, although some countries are more dependent than others. China, for instance, will seek autonomy when it comes to technological developments. On the other hand, the EU and its member states can be regarded as a large trade and economic power. However, Europe cannot translate this economic power into geopolitical leverage and hard power, so we are not considered as a powerful collective geopolitical actor. I do not think this is going to change much in the next decade, although I expect there will be efforts by the EU and its member states in all these areas. If this does not succeed, Europe will have to play along geopolitical and geo-economic interests of other external actors, which would be shaping its agenda, or it will be squeezed between rivaling powers.

Personally, I think Europe’s efforts are too late and too little. The EU will not be able to compete with China or the US on a technological level unless there will be tremendous funding, which I do not see happening anytime soon because of the financial impact of the pandemic. The only option would be to align with like-minded third countries. 

Do you think the pandemic could be an opportunity for the EU to implement some of the changes that are necessary to become a major geopolitical actor?

I expect there will be a reconfiguration of the supply chains to some extent, bringing production processes back to Europe. However, if I look at the current signals coming from EU institutions and some member states, it seems they try to navigate the muddy waters of volatile, insecure politics. On the one hand, they are trying to be a loyal security partner to the US, while keeping the business relations with China, on the other. I think this is an unsustainable attitude in the long term, because at some point, there will be a moment when relevant actors like the EU and its member states will have to take a side. This will become more difficult the longer they postpone it, even though I understand it might seem better for now. There will be a struggle until the political system finds a new equilibrium and right now, we need more people who have ambitions for our European future, otherwise someone else (external actors) is going to shape it.

In your article ‘The Global Covid-19 System Crisis’, you outlined two possible scenarios: 1) a ‘violent’ systemic decoupling, or 2) a systemic co-existence between a US-led and China-led bloc [2]. Which scenario is the most likely at the moment and why?

In the short term, we are moving towards a ‘violent’ systemic decoupling between US and China. With ‘violent’, I do not mean an armed conflict, but another range of confrontations, such as economic, financial, and trade warfare, that we could already witness last year. I think this will take place regardless of the outcome of the US elections. It might take a different shape under a Democratic president, but it is important to understand that this systemic decoupling has been taking place for the last seven to eight years, so also under the Obama administration. When it comes to the US elections, I think Trump’s only competitor is the way he tackles the pandemic. Prior to March, I did not see a real chance for Democratic candidate Joe Biden, but now I would say the chances are fifty-fifty. 

In the long term, however, a new kind of bipolar global order is more likely. A new equilibrium could be reached in global affairs with a US-led and a China-led bloc, while the most relevant geopolitical actors would have to take a side. Nevertheless, it is going to be a very fluid global order. Meanwhile, China’s domestic struggles could change the outcome. Because of COVID-19, China is going through a phase of growing internal pressure. In response, Xi Jinping has begun to centralise his power and to create networks that can consolidate it. In order to be a global competitor, it is necessary to secure power within a country.

However, this does not seem to prevent China from trying to consolidate (economic) power abroad, also in Europe. What can you say about China’s, but also other foreign actors’ activities in the Western Balkans?

We should recognise the fact that foreign actors are active in this region. The Western Balkans are part of China’s Belt and Road Initiative. Ultimately, it aims for the industrial heart of the EU in Western Europe, but it sees the Western Balkans as a possible backdoor entry.  Meanwhile, China seeks to gain a political and economic foothold by offering loans for transportation or energy projects, for example. Hence, Europe needs a grand strategic project that focuses on connectivity and infrastructure. As long as this is not in place, other actors will try to offer their projects.

Russia, on the other hand, tries to gain political influence in the region. If China and Russia would merge their economic and political activities, it would be really worrisome for Europe. 

The US are present in the region as a security provider and are very much respected. Though when it comes to investments, they are not a substantial actor. On top of that, Turkey and the Gulf States are trying to deepen the relations with countries in the region as well.

Meanwhile, the EU has mobilised a package to support the Western Balkans in addressing the pandemic. To what extent will this package improve the relations between the EU and the Western Balkans, since the relations worsened over disputes regarding EU accession?

The EU is by far the greatest financial supporter in the region but is not always perceived as such. If you look at recent polls in Serbia, for instance, citizens were asked which foreign actor was the greatest contributor - the majority thought it was Russia. This does not reflect the reality. This shows support is also about PR and creating a narrative.

Nevertheless, I would describe the EU accession processes of the countries in the region as positive, because most of those countries as well as most EU member states are interested in their accession. My expectation is that the EU will push for a quicker process and will seek to integrate them rather sooner than later. The region is a big gap on the European map regarding connectivity.  

What are the key takeaways of the pandemic?

Pandemics happened in the past and will happen in the future, so we have to make sure that we are better prepared institutionally, politically, economically, and in terms of our health systems. When it comes to a European response, we will have to do better next time on the level of the European institutions as well as the member states. On top of that, we have to realise a pandemic can become a security matter. In that sense, the pandemic was also an eyeopener.

Sources

[1] No Author (2020), ‘Coping with Coronavirus – Euro-Gulf Perspectives’, AIES
https://www.aies.at/aktuell/2020/coping-with-coronavirus.php *

[2] Tchakarova, Velina (2020), ‘The Global Covid-19 System Crisis’, Medium https://medium.com/@vtchakarova/the-global-covid-19-system-crisis-d8d803fade50

The views and opinions expressed are solely those of the interviewee and do not reflect those of the Security Distillery, the IMSISS consortium or its partners and affiliates.

Ex Africa Semper Aliquid Novi: New Challenges for Digital Infrastructure in Kenya

Kenya’s status as a major technological innovator in recent years has positioned it as Africa’s Silicon Valley, but what implications does this have for the continent’s future prospects? And how can we mitigate the burgeoning shortcomings? This piece looks at some of the most salient challenges of digital technologies in Kenya today.

Keywords: Africa, Digital Infrastructure, Privacy, China, Surveillance, Statehood, Liberation, Development

By Jessica Poon

The past two decades have seen a 400% rise in internet access throughout Sub-Saharan Africa - the fastest growth rate of any region in history. [1] The academic literature surrounding development in Africa is somewhat ambivalent on the use of digital technologies and internet access as an emancipatory tool. [2] However, salient arguments have been made for an Africa-first brand of digital innovation and governance, breaking from the tendency to see Africa as a subservient figure within its partnerships. This position posits that emerging technologies might be used to reinsert African agency rather than colouring the continent’s ambitions with neocolonial tropes. This potential for innovation and governance is particularly advanced in Kenya, often hailed as “Silicon Savannah” in the wider grey literature, for its fast-growing tertiary industry and increasingly connected consumer demographic. [3]

Kenya’s rapidly-advancing digital infrastructure brings with it growing web access and a greater proliferation of mobile technology. Furthermore, digital technologies have provided Kenya with a chance to amplify its voice on the world stage, having previously been filtered through representatives and international bodies ranging from autocrats to NGOs. While the emancipatory potential of new technologies cannot be denied, the key challenges outlined here lie questionable export models, mainly from China, a dominant trade partner for the African continent. Lack of accountability at the state-level in Kenya, as a technology hub, could lead to a loss of civil liberties in the long-term if partnerships and their supply chains are not met with the appropriate level of scrutiny.

Kenya has one of the highest concentrations of mobile users on the continent, with 89% of Kenyans reporting access to mobile devices. [4] Such technologies are not merely a nexus at which economy and governance meet, but also give rise to digital networks which parallel existing community structures; these technologies reach and connect those outside the boundaries of a traditional community. Mobile phone proliferation and the networks of communities allow for development projects to be effectively scaled to a more local level. For instance, technology has been used to accommodate distinct domestic needs, evidenced in the participatory community-based responses to issues ranging from governance, agriculture, and microfinance. Software and applications such as Ushahidi, Digicow, and M-Pesa have forged substantive networks in their respective communities, bridging communication gaps and sharing information at a scale more typically found at state-level. Kenya sees communication technologies adapting to suit the needs of local people, attesting to an enthusiasm for collaborating and exercising agency at a grassroots level. [5]

Recent years however, have witnessed a shift from traditional infrastructure projects such as railways and tramlines, to more software-oriented projects in fibre optic cables, telecoms, and surveillance. [6] The shift towards digital infrastructure is not without contentions, given the governance systems that accompany these developments. Kenya’s technological turn has led to greater means of networked public sharing and exchange of information, which distributes power in less concentrated ways, redressing the dynamic between traditional hierarchies of citizen and state. [7] The ability of ordinary Kenyans to assert their agency through technology is also reflected in trends on freedom and accountability, with a majority (60%) of Kenyans believing that there is greater freedom of speech than in previous years. [8] Despite the wider benefits that these technologies bring, they also embroil the country in issues that have traditionally been the preserve of the Global North, such as disinformation campaigns and election-meddling. These challenges are mirrored in Kenya’s burgeoning digital capabilities, notably during the 2007 elections that resulted in outbreaks of violence across the country. [9]

The benefits brought by digital infrastructure projects are often tempered by wider political agendas. The major players in the Kenyan technology market, namely Huawei and ZTE, are state-affiliated companies whose products are designed with a Chinese governance model in mind. [10] These provide what Nanjala Nyabola identifies as ‘surveillance architecture’. [11] Bugging, data leaks, and backdoor mechanisms are all part of a wider “mass data sweep” which affects those at a civilian and state-level alike. [12] This export model implicates Kenya’s trade deals at state-level in Chinese politics at a corresponding level, thereby weakening democractic accountability and consumer trust. It also sees human rights issues surface when the political asymmetry of China’s offering is taken into account. China’s authoritarian use of technology as a means of state surveillance is evidenced domestically in Chinese territories as well as further afield in its African partnerships, most notably in Addis Ababa, where the African Union’s headquarters were allegedly bugged with the information returned to Chinese sources. [13] This could be seen as legitimising similar actions to those taken during Kenya’s 2007 election, in which state-level surveillance of civilians was carried across forums and social media to quash rights to free speech and political protest. [14]

Another challenge lies in a lack of supply chain transparency when it comes to looking at data as a key asset for the country’s development. Kenya’s burgeoning digital economy has joined a globalised sphere which views data as the new oil. But unlike siphoning off a physical commodity like oil, the transfer of high volumes of data is more opaque, with information moving surreptitiously across borders constantly. This data can be used for the improvement of public services or for the surveillance and repression of civilians in equal measure. Civilians need to know that they can trust the deals brokered at an elite level, as well as what to demand from the future iterations of digital infrastructure. [15] Given Kenya’s proven appetite for adapting existing technologies to local needs, there is some feasibility for leveraging community-based networks local and sub-national structures for greater democratic traction. In addition to this, a network of digital rights advocates uniting multilaterals, nation states, and private sector organisations could further support accountable leadership. Kenya’s leadership in the digital governance space needs to ensure that its technological offering is accountable to consumers at every level of society. This will not only tackle emerging domestic issues, but lay the foundations for Africa’s late-adopting digital regions. [16]

Though Kenya’s status as an innovation hub is still in its infancy, it is a country which highlights some of the key digital developments to come. What has been presented here is a timely discussion of trends which will likely develop greater momentum within the next few years. For the moment, digital infrastructure in Africa needs to be examined on a case-by-case basis. However, given the rapidly-changing digital landscape and increasing geopolitical interest in what Africa can offer as a mutual partner, there is scope for the lessons learned from Kenya’s digital leadership to be applied to concurrent developments in the near future.

Sources

[1] Internet World Stats, (2020) [online]. IWS. Available from: https://www.internetworldstats.com/stats1.htm [Accessed 21 Apr 2020].

[2] Ndemo, B. Weiss, T. & SpringerLink (Online service) (2017), Digital Kenya: An Entrepreneurial Revolution in the Making, Palgrave Macmillan UK, London.

[3] Mallonee, L., 2018. The Techies Turning Kenya Into a Silicon Savannah. Wired. Available at: https://www.wired.com/story/kenya-silicon-savannah-photo-gallery/ [Accessed 21 Apr 2020].

[4] Afrobarometer, (2016-18). The Online Data Analysis Tool [online]. Afrobarometer. Available from: https://afrobarometer.org/online-data-analysis/analyse-online [Accessed 21 Apr 2020].

[5] Diepeveen, S. (2019), "The limits of publicity: Facebook and transformations of a public realm in Mombasa, Kenya", Journal of Eastern African Studies, vol. 13, no. 1, pp. 158-174.

[6] Li, S. & SpringerLink (Online service) (2017), Mediatized China-Africa Relations: How Media Discourses Negotiate the Shifting of Global Order, Springer Singapore, Singapore.

[7] ibid.

[8] Afrobarometer, (2016-18). The Online Data Analysis Tool [online]. Afrobarometer. Available from: https://afrobarometer.org/online-data-analysis/analyse-online [Accessed 21 Apr 2020].=

[9] Goldstein, J., Rotich, J., 2008. Digitally Networked Technology In Kenya’s 2007-2008 Post-Election Crisis [online]. Berkman Klein Center. Available from: https://cyber.harvard.edu/publications/2008/Digitally_Networked_Technology_Kenyas_Post-Election_Crisis [Accessed 21 Apr 2020].

[10] Li, A. (2016), "Technology transfer in China-Africa relation: myth or reality", Transnational Corporations Review, vol. 8, no. 3, pp. 183-195.

[11] Tsalikis, C., (2019). Nanjala Nyabola On The “Digital Colonialism” Transforming Kenya’s Political Discourse [online]. Centre For International Governance Innovation. Available from: https://www.cigionline.org/articles/nanjala-nyabola-digital-colonialism-transforming-kenyas-political-discourse [Accessed 16 Apr 2020].

[12] ibid.

[13] Li, S. & SpringerLink (Online service) (2017), Mediatized China-Africa Relations: How Media Discourses Negotiate the Shifting of Global Order, Springer Singapore, Singapore.

[14] Olukotun, A., Omotoso, S.A. & SpringerLink (Online service) (2017), Political Communication in Africa, Springer International Publishing, Cham.

[15] Paradigm Initiative, 2020. Digital Rights In Africa Report 2019 [online]. Paradigm Initiative. Available from: https://paradigmhq.org/dra2019/ [Accessed 12 Apr 2020].

The New Morocco-Nigeria Pipeline: A Highly Risky Tool for the South-South Agenda of the Makhzen

In August 2016, Morocco introduced a new gas pipeline project - one that extends all the way to Nigeria. This project is in line with Morocco’s South-South Agenda; a key focus of Rabat’s foreign policy for greater engagement with Sub-Saharan Africa. The Morocco-Nigeria pipeline, both onshore and offshore, would supply gas to 13 countries in West and North Africa as a continuation of the existing West Africa Gas Pipeline (WAGP) between Nigeria, Benin, Togo and Ghana. With a possible extension to Europe through Spain, the Morocco-Nigeria pipeline would be one of the longest worldwide (5,660 kilometers, or 3,517 miles), and a new opportunity for socio-economic development in Western Africa. Yet, the project faces fundamental obstacles. Indeed, this initiative could become an open door to more corruption and disastrous environmental issues — one of the main reasons behind slow social and economic development in West Africa. Furthermore, the pipeline seems to rekindle cross-border tensions regarding the exploitation of natural resources.

By Sahar Lahdifi

Since Morocco’s King Mohammed VI visited Abuja in December 2016, several meetings have followed to assess the technical and economic viability of the project. Two protocols of the agreement have been signed between Morocco and Nigeria, discussing the construction of a gas pipeline and an LNG terminal, a facility allowing for the regasification of Liquified Natural Gas. The 5,660 km pipeline aims to enhance the quality of life –  by providing full electrification to the 13 countries – and promote economic and social progress. Indeed, resource extraction is the most important sector of the Nigerian economy, as the country is rich in crude oil and natural gas [1]. Further highlighting the importance of this sector in the region is the fact that the Western region of Africa represents around 30% of the continental natural gas reserves [2], Nigeria being a world leader in gas export.

Following the inability of Algeria to meet its 2002 commitment to construct the Trans-Saharan pipeline [3] linking the country to Nigeria through Niger, Morocco has taken advantage of this vacuum to establish a project in line with its agenda to strengthen cooperation with its sub-Saharan counterparts. This South-South Agenda highlights one of Morocco’s main goals of becoming the ‘electricity hub for North and West Africa’ [4] in terms of electricity traded, capacity building and innovation. However, this Agenda also reveals underlying tensions and competition with Morocco’s neighbour Algeria, the second African leader in gas exports behind Nigeria.

These tensions began during the long-lasting Western Sahara conflict, following the Spanish de-colonisation of the territory in 1975. While Morocco claims sovereignty over Western Sahara, Algeria fully supports the Sahrawi secessionist group Front Polisario for independence. More than a question of identity, this conflict became an issue around access and exploitation of the natural resources of the Sahrawi region, namely phosphate and fisheries. [5]

Notably, after leaving the African Union in 1984 due to the Western Sahara conflict, Morocco rejoined the organization in 2017 [6]. In the same year, Rabat also applied for membership to the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) [7], demonstrating its will to tie a solid relationship with Sub-Saharan Africa. In line with this political advance, the Morocco-Nigeria pipeline seems to be a strong tool for the Moroccan government (Makhzen) to fulfil its aspirations in investing in intra-African exchange and cooperative development projects.

Additionally, cooperation with Europe remains present in Morocco’s agenda. The Morocco-Nigeria pipeline aims at supplying gas to Europe through Spain, as the successful Algerian Maghreb-Europe pipeline already does. Furthermore, the new pipeline is of particular interest for European countries, considering their desire to lessen growing dependence on Russia’s Gazprom pipeline. As Russia is currently constructing a new pipeline, Nord Stream II, it is in Europe’s interest to seek additional energy sources, including those from Africa [8].

However, this African project does not come without obstacles. In March 2018, 40 non-governmental organisations (NGOs) signed a joint-declaration [9] raising fundamental environmental, social, and economic concerns. Indeed, the construction of this pipeline would have considerable environmental implications, as the ‘increase of extraction and consumption of fossil resources’ [10] constitutes one of the main causes of climate change. The use of methane remains uncertain and volatile, and could disturb marine fauna. These environmental impacts, in addition to the risk of chemical waste and potential leaks on fisheries, would fundamentally impact millions of people’s livelihoods, as has already happened in Nigeria. The company Shell, active in Nigeria since 1937, has been accused of causing massive environmental degradation, impacting fisheries and farming. Once again, the current project is criticized as being “top-down”, sidelining the actual needs of the populations in the 13 countries, and the environment. It  also goes against Morocco’s main ambition to increase its part of renewable energy sources in the capacity mix, up to 52% by 2030 [11].

When taking a financial stance, the initial US $20bn estimated for the construction of the pipeline would ultimately be more than doubled, constituting ‘an exponential increase of the debt burden’ [12] on highly corrupt countries. The risk is reminiscent of Frank Timis’ bribery scandal in Senegal, where Petro-Tim obtained rights of exploration in 2012, despite their lack of expertise. Evidence has finally been found in 2019 that President of Senegal Macky Sall’s family was granted a significant amount of money from the Timis Corporation, even employing his brother Aliou Sall at $25,000 per month. Oil and gas company British Petroleum is suspected to be complicit in this scandal, as they bought Petro-Tim, and is expected to pay them between $9bn and $12bn in the next year as a royalty rate [13]. Corruption has been one of the main reasons behind slow social and economic development in West Africa, and a new pipeline linking the whole coast would provide more opportunities to potentially aggravate the situation.

Ultimately, the difficulties are not only environmental and socio-economic. Indeed, many armed groups, including Boko Haram, are present in the Delta Region of Nigeria, which could disturb the supply and provision of gas in neighboring countries [14]. In Morocco, the pipeline is supposed to supply the Western Sahara region, despite a frozen conflict that has persisted there. Technical difficulties are also foreseeable, as the 13 countries need to seek governmental approval and legislative concordance for the project, slowing down implementation. Indeed, twelve years were already required for the implementation of the pipeline between Nigeria, Benin, Togo and Ghana (WAGP), and the current multiple geopolitical obstacles facing the project will make it even more difficult for the new project to come to fruition in the near future.

Sources

[1] West Africa Oil & Gas Upstream Market 2019-2024: Increasing Exploration & Production Activities - Nigeria to Dominate the Market, Business Wire, 2019.

[2]  L’Afrique de l’Ouest détient les tiers des réserves de pétrole et de gaz du continent, Jeune Afrique, 2008.

[3] Augé B. Le Trans Saharan Gas Pipeline, Mirage ou Réelle Opportunité ? Ifri, Programme Afrique subsaharienne, 2010.

[4] Office National de l’Electricité et de l’Eau (ONEE) au Maroc et en Afrique, Brochure 2015.

[5] See literature on the Western Sahara conflict (e.g. Sahara Occidental, Conflit oublié, population en mouvement, Collection “Civilisation étrangères”, Presses universitaires François-Rabelais, 2018)

[6] Morocco rejoins the African Union after 33 years, Al Jazeera, 2017. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/01/morocco-rejoins-african-union-33-years-170131084926023.html

[7] ECOWAS agrees to admit Morocco to West African body, BBC News, 2017. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-40158089

[8] See literature about the European dependence on Russia for gas import and its risks since the annexation of Crimea (2014) (E.g. Europe’s energy security - caught between short term needs and long-term goals, The Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, Oxford University, 2014).

[9] “Nigeria-Morocco gas pipeline: Not in our interest”, 2018. https://www.cadtm.org/Nigeria-Morocco-gas-pipeline-Not

[10] Ibid, 2018.

[11] Energy Policies Beyond IEA Countries - Morocco 2019, IEA, Country profile Morocco 2018, RES4Med.

[12] Nigeria-Morocco gas pipeline: Not in our interest”, 2018. https://www.cadtm.org/Nigeria-Morocco-gas-pipeline-Not

[13] See documentary BBC Africa “The $10 billion Energy Scandal”, 2019.

[14] Yata F. Les véritables enjeux du Gazoduc Africain Atlantique, La Nouvelle Tribunes, 2017.

Conversing COVID – Part III, with Belén Rodríguez

An Interview Series on the Political Implications of the Pandemic

By Fabiana Natale and Gilles de Valk

For this interview series, Fabiana Natale and Gilles de Valk speak to experts from different backgrounds on the political implications of the COVID-19 pandemic in their respective fields. From their living rooms in France and The Netherlands, they will explore the (geo)political, security, and societal consequences of this pandemic. This interview series marks the launch of a new type of content for the Security Distillery, one which we hope can provide informative and entertaining analyses of an uncertain and evolving development in global politics.

In this third episode, we are interviewing Belén Rodríguez, Research Associate at the NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence (NATO StratCom COE). Rodríguez mainly focuses on Russian ‘information laundering’, a “process [in which] false or deceitful information is legitimised through a network of intermediaries that apply gradually a set of techniques in order to de-contextualise it and obscure the original source”. In our conversation with Rodríguez, we discussed different information laundering techniques, examples of information laundering during the corona crisis, and the future of the NATO-Russia relations. 

Firstly, could you tell us something about your work at the NATO StratCom COE?

I arrived at the NATO StratCom COE fifteen months ago and started collaborating with the tech branch’s Robotrolling report, which researches online information manipulation. I was then asked to support the Nordic Baltic Project, which analyses Russian information manipulation targeting the Nordic Baltic region. It is a very comprehensive study that involves aspects from narrative research to target audience analysis.

My contribution to the project started with investigating whether disinformation activities follow a specific structure. I tried to see if I could apply a metaphor of the framework developed to investigate money laundering to research disinformation activities, hence the term ‘information laundering’. Indeed, it appeared that we could develop a standardised framework that would allow national institutions to better understand the life cycle of information and influence activities. 

In this regard, the Information Laundering project is not merely a research paper. It is also a tool to inform national governments and European institutions on information laundering activities as part of a larger process that aims at manipulating public opinion. It can help those governments and institutions to research disinformation and understand those supposedly isolated issues as part of a process of manipulation.

In that respect, the NATO StratCom CEO is not there to actively counter information laundering, but rather has a training and advisory role to governments, institutions, policymakers, or journalists.

There are several information laundering techniques. Could you tell us something about the most prevalent ones?

Among the most frequent ones you find disinformation, which is the manipulation of information by creating false news or false components. It is often used in short laundering processes, especially when they target a key event such as the corona crisis, in which it is easy to speculate about the origin of the virus. However, disinformation can also occur outside a laundering process. On the other hand, a laundering process does not necessarily include disinformation. For example, there can simply be a mix of contexts and different stories or the use of unrelated and purely sensational headlines to present an alternative version of the news.

Such processes involve other interesting information laundering techniques that are gaining ground over disinformation, such as ‘misappropriation’ and the ‘woozle effect’.

Misappropriation is a technique which modifies factual data by removing important elements, adding wrong contexts, or emphasising specific content in order to change the angle of understanding for the reader. This technique is frequently used regarding NATO military exercises. For example, Sky News would publish articles about military exercises with purely factual data [1]. Sputnik [a Russian news agency with international coverage] shares the same content and adds a paragraph explaining how Russia is sophisticating its military capabilities in order to counter ‘threats’ coming from NATO and how NATO is operating close to its border. This is not actually false. But for the reader, it creates the impression that NATO is being reckless and could destabilize international relations and bring the world to collapse.

The woozle effect is a technique which uses real quotes from public figures, but within a misleading context in order to support an unrelated argument. For instance, there are quotes from Finnish Prime Minister Sauli Niinistö taken out of their original context to suggest that he was withdrawing support from continuing EU sanctions against Russia. [2]

The combination of misappropriation and the woozle effect is the most effective mix of techniques, because the use of real news and real quotes makes it very difficult to debunk, despite the altered interpretation. 

 You already mentioned several actors that can take part to the information laundering process. Could you expand more on their roles?

Different actors participate in information laundering processes, although it is important to keep in mind that information laundering includes both voluntary and accidental steps; not all actors participate knowingly. 

Regarding information manipulation coordinated by the Kremlin, you would look at the involvement of official Kremlin media. Additionally, most information laundering processes tend to be transnational, therefore involving foreign pro-Kremlin media, which share information and create original content aligned with the Kremlin’s strategic interests.

After that, proxy and accidental actors intervene. The latter are particularly dangerous because they are the most unpredictable users. Accidental actors are individuals that engage with pro-Kremlin content. Such actors amplify information laundering processes, but not necessarily willingly. For example, a person can decide to share information on their blog with a sensational headline just to get visibility. Even though such content was written without the intention of contributing to spreading Moscow’s influence, it can be referenced by a journalist that might have more malicious intentions. This creates a snowball effect. 

 Now that we have a clear overview of the information laundering mechanisms, could you present us an example of information laundering you have observed since the beginning of the corona crisis?

 Although NATO is not yet specifically investigating information laundering regarding the pandemic, we have come across a lot of coronavirus-related cases. At the beginning of the crisis, we observed many blank disinformation and short information laundering processes. For instance, this included discussions on the involvement of Bill Gates in the spreading of the virus, or speculations on the use of biological weapons to control populations. Sometimes, it was older information laundering processes that were brought back while incorporating this new element: the pandemic. In this way, conspiracy theories about 5G technologies have been fueled, the pandemic allegedly being the embodiment of the dangers about which we had been warned a year ago.

Besides, a broad information manipulation campaign occurred in order to discredit the Western system by criticizing its inefficient reaction to the pandemic. However, when Russia started registering an increasing number of COVID-19 infections, it could not promote this argument anymore and went back to a more conventional rhetoric on NATO, recycling traditional security-related topics that have the opportunity to be exploited now.

Let me give a concrete example of this. A new narrative element that has occurred is the reduction of NATO military exercises due to the virus, announced by the German international broadcaster Deutsche Welle. This has been interpreted by Russian media outlet иноTV as NATO losing its combat readiness as opposed to the Russian army which keeps reinforcing its capabilities [3]. Besides, it added that, with decreased capabilities, some regions might be abandoned. Finally, Rubaltic stated that Lithuania panicked about NATO withdrawal, but NATO did not withdraw, and Lithuania did not panic [4].

This is how, through misappropriation and the woozle effect, manipulation coordinated by the Kremlin created the impression that NATO would risk being weakened compared to Russia by the end of the crisis. It was not factually wrong that NATO reduced the personnel involved in the exercises, but it does not mean that Russia will be more powerful than NATO at the end of the pandemic. 

What will be the main consequences of the crisis for information laundering?

While the crisis advanced, we observed a sophistication of the laundering techniques and content. On top of that, the amplification is even more considerable than before, as disinformation is being spread throughout different media and languages. This is concerning, because it becomes complicated for a user to verify information.

After the crisis, information laundering will continue, and its actors will adapt. Domestic, international, and proxy actors will use any kind of event and opportunity to serve their strategic interests. Journalists should be particularly careful in their coverage of news events and try to approach them impartially, so they do not make easier the job of hostile actors by including, for example, sensationalised pieces or inaccurate data.

Over the next couple of years, what could be the impact of the coronavirus on the role of information laundering in the relationship between Russia and NATO?

 Russia is obviously not the only actor performing information manipulation on a large scale. However, it is the most evident one, and they will not stop using those techniques, because to them information laundering and influence operations are a way of maintaining power. In fact, I think they will continue to sophisticate their tactics and strategies. We should realise that Russia is much more experienced than us when it comes to information laundering tactics and strategies and we need to find our way of combating and countering those practices. In that respect, NATO member states’ governments and institutions need to understand that information laundering processes are taking place and are systematic.

However, if the global geopolitical context remains the same and supposing that the western societies will survive as they are, I do not think much will change. Russian disinformation activities targeting the European institutions or the United States will continue. Only the technicality will evolve, with the help of progresses in machine learning and artificial intelligence. In that sense, disinformation will be even more complicated to debunk, but generally, the reciprocal aims of NATO and Russia should stay the same.

Finally, what are the key takeaways of the crisis regarding NATO’s geopolitical position?

One of the biggest geopolitical risks of this crisis is the polarisation of public opinion towards democratic institutions. The western model and its institutions are facing a credibility crisis, and this is being exploited by state actors such as Russia and China but also non-state actors to some extent. As the European Union did not face the crisis most efficiently, initially, the trust of citizens in the domestic institutions has been affected. This opens a window of opportunity for discrediting western liberal democracy. This does not only apply to external rival actors, but also to domestic contexts. Political parties within NATO member states also use the crisis to polarise public opinion and to reach new audiences, which creates instability and goes against good crisis management.

In the longer term, the crisis will have direct consequences for the next electoral processes and might be harmful to NATO with the increasing popularity of extremist, nationalist parties holding anti-NATO narratives. The current crisis gives room to those domestic actors and to diverging opinions, potentially weakening bodies such as NATO, whose legitimacy and power in the international scene will also be challenged by countries such as Russia or China.

Sources

[1] Haynes, Deborah (2018) ‘NATO prepared for 'growing Russian threat' Sky News
https://news.sky.com/story/nato-ready-to-respond-to-growing-russian-threat-11524827

[2] No Author (2019) ‘Президент Финляндии не поддержал призыв Зеленского сохранять санкции против России’ тасс
https://tass.ru/mezhdunarodnaya-panorama/6882569

No Author (2019) ‘Kommentti: Niinistö muuttui valeuutiseksi’ Ilta-Sanomat
https://www.is.fi/ulkomaat/art-2000006238572.html

[3] No Author (2020) ‘Die Welt: пандемия ослабила боеготовность НАТО, а на Россию не повлияла’
https://russian.rt.com/inotv/2020-04-24/Die-Welt-pandemiya-oslabila-boegotovnost

[4] Носович, Александр (2020) ‘Литва панически испугалась ухода войск НАТО’ https://www.rubaltic.ru/article/politika-i-obshchestvo/27042020-litva-panicheski-ispugalas-ukhoda-voysk-nato/

The views and opinions expressed are solely those of the interviewee and do not reflect those of the Security Distillery, the IMSISS consortium or its partners and affiliates.

Conversing COVID – Part II, with Mikel Irizar

An Interview Series on the Political Implications of the Pandemic

By Fabiana Natale and Gilles de Valk

For this interview series, Fabiana Natale and Gilles de Valk speak to experts from different backgrounds on the political implications of the COVID-19 pandemic in their respective fields. From their living rooms in France and The Netherlands, they will explore the (geo)political, security, and societal consequences of this pandemic. This interview series marks the launch of a new type of content for the Security Distillery, one which we hope can provide informative and entertaining analyses of an uncertain and evolving development in global politics.

For this second episode, we interviewed Mikel Irizar, Operations Specialist at INTERPOL’s Command and Coordination Center in Buenos Aires, Argentina. In our conversation, we discussed the consequences of the pandemic for politics, economics, and organised crime in Latin America, and its impact on the work INTERPOL is doing.

Mikel Irizar’s views do not necessarily reflect those of INTERPOL or any of its member countries.

Can you tell us something about your work? How has your work changed since the start of the pandemic?

INTERPOL brings together police forces for a safer world. We are trying to offer member states the tools and capabilities they need from us, such as expertise, special operational support, or information from databases holding data from 194 countries. We monitor the information that we get from police forces all over the world and redistribute it when necessary.

The pandemic hit us all. Argentina was hit relatively late, but we were sent home at the beginning of March. The type of work has not changed so much, I simply have been working remotely ever since.

Indeed, many professionals have continued working as before, but remotely. While this movement has led to a decrease in crimes, such as murders and thefts, the new working environment has been favourable to an increase in cybercrime. What can you say about these trends? [1]

It is correct that we are seeing less reported crime across Latin America when it comes to murder or armed robberies, for example. In Chile and some other parts of the region, however, people feel like the crime level is staying the same or even rising. Cybercrime, including ransomware, phishing mails, and fraud, on the other hand, has been very present during the pandemic and is increasing since many people are working remotely. In Europe, even hospitals have been targeted.

In order to create cyber awareness globally, INTERPOL is trying to promote their media campaign #WashYourCyberHands. Usual precautions should be taken now more than ever, such as using firewalls, anonymising your online footprint, eliminating potentially harmful cookies, and browsing on secure networks. We should not be afraid to set strong cyber security standards.

The Economist recently published an article titled ‘The pandemic is creating fresh opportunities for organised crime’. Which ‘opportunities’ are the most striking? [2]

The biggest opportunity the pandemic is yielding for organised crime is the fact that criminal organisations are sitting down on billions of economic assets. It is incredible how much money these transnational organisations handle. They are taking this opportunity to see who is in trouble, now that economic turmoil is coming to every household. They have started to buy people, favours, and businesses; it is the perfect moment for such organisations to buy networks that are going to remain loyal in the future. Even though these economic transactions are potentially saving somebody’s problems now, these organisations will come back to haunt them in the near future.

At the same time, in South America, cartels and other large organised crime organisations such as the Cali Cartel in Colombia and Primeiro Comando da Capital and Comando Vermelho in Brazil are reaching out to peripheral areas or densely populated low-income urban centres where they have a strong position, as opposed to the state. In such areas that are populated by millions of people, they are replacing the state by enforcing the quarantine themselves, for example. Theoretically, they are taking care of the people who are in most need, even though it ultimately works against those people. In that sense, the cartels are solidifying their presence in areas where the state already had difficulties reaching out.

It seems organised crime is taking this opportunity to exploit the gap that states had left, helping people with basic needs such as food. This could result in a shift of legitimacy from the state to such organisations. Do you think this trend can be reversed with the end of the pandemic?

I think we have seen this trend for a long time already. It is not a secret that cartels have been considered to be the saviours of communities in Mexico, for example, but also elsewhere. This is a broader trend and, unfortunately, cinema has a lot to do with these false myths. In TV series we can often see how widely admired the figures of the Colombian narco world have been.

However, this trend is being tackled on a daily basis. Although states are currently preoccupied with providing health care for the entirety of their societies, combating organised crime remains a priority.

As the restrictions are easing and we are going back to normality, we can observe a shift back to strong national states. I think we are going to see states regaining the areas that were not well taken care of five years ago, for example, and they will come back and try to reassert themselves over these criminal organisations.

States seem to be increasingly focused on their national interests and state institutions seem to be trying to strengthen through new health and security policies. What does this development mean for INTERPOL and international cooperation in general?

After working here for some time, I believe this is going to make the organisation better. We want states to be strong, because that also means they will cooperate better in this international forum that INTERPOL provides.

However, politically and economically states are also becoming  more inward looking. We will need to readjust to whichever way member states change in the near future. We are going to be there, holding their hands at every step, no matter what. At the end of the day, we are international civil servants and we are at their disposal. Although we follow strict direction from international law and human rights, INTERPOL is an organisation that bases its actions on the member states’ contributions, although we rely on private partners for some projects here and there. We will keep trying to provide the same services, capabilities, and expertise.

Nevertheless, nationalist reflexes from states have arguably caused a crisis in multilateralism. How is this impacting INTERPOL and its cooperation with national governments and law enforcement agencies?

For international cooperation we need shared interests, which have always been difficult to find. At INTERPOL, we only go as far as member states allow us to go. However, the mechanisms for sharing of information at INTERPOL are very particular and are ultimately why INTERPOL has survived for almost 100 years. Our organisation is trying to anticipate the way member states would like us to work for them. Every day, we are making small changes to appease member states. So at the moment, nothing is changing in a substantial fashion, but I could not rule out a more substantial change in the future.

Countries such as Uruguay, Brazil, and Nicaragua have been tackling the pandemic very differently, resulting in large differences in the amount of cases they have. What role have the governments played in (limiting) the spread of the virus? [3]

Each country counts differently and it changes every other week, so it is hard to keep track of the actual amount of cases. Nonetheless, there are also other factors that play a role in the amount of cases.

Uruguay, for example, has a relatively small population of three to four million people and covers a geographically reduced area, which yields some benefits on controlling and eventually eradicating the virus outbreak. The Uruguayan success is also a result of several years of pretty solid public health and social policy.

It is not a secret that cases are skyrocketing in Brazil, which is concerning for all the countries in the region. However, it is such a large country when it comes to population and size, making it more difficult to manage the situation. I believe Brazil is trying to overcome these issues and that Brazilian health authorities will eventually get a more firm hand on the crisis.

Regarding Nicaragua, there are disparate opinions on the way the government is handling the crisis. To a certain degree, they have not considered the virus as grave of a threat as other countries. I think it was during Easter that religious processions in the streets were even promoted, for example. However, it seems that they have been able to put a certain level of control into place. Similarly, we have seen US President Trump clearly advocating for the opening of churches. Religion is part of national identities all over the world. 

Nevertheless, the aforementioned are very different, politically speaking.

Evidently, the crisis also has a huge economic impact. In Argentina, for instance, an increase in prices was registered and an underground economy is developing.

As far as information is available right now, Argentina is going to default and is in fact talking with the lenders in New York to extend the deadlines to pay back their loans. But the informal nature of business networks and the way people transact and transfer money is an intrinsic part of the region. Many of these matters go unregistered, which makes them very difficult to quantify even though we are living in the age of Big Data. Since a lot is happening under the radar, it is difficult to keep track of everything, from the amount of bank accounts, any given country’s precise population, to the amount of COVID cases right now.

However, countries like Spain see a huge potential in Latin America. So, what does this crisis mean strategically for Latin America and their international relations? [4]

The world is going through a time of geopolitical and geo-economic readjustment. We are witnessing an acceleration of global trends that were already going on before the pandemic.

Latin America is an economically emerging region with historical, linguistic, and cultural links to Europe. Geographically, it has an obvious link with the United States because of the continental mass connecting the two regions. In these times, it seems logical to me that the West relies on those who are more logical allies, so there are definitely opportunities for Latin America.

However, the region has a history of reluctance towards the West because of imperialism. Latin America is also a region that wants to break free from traditional structures of global power. Furthermore, this region is very fragmented. Over the years, Latin American countries have attempted to develop a cooperative framework in order to strengthen and promote better regional dynamics, but they have not yet been as effective as the European Union, for example.

At the end of the day, the region will look for external support or external leadership. In that sense, I see an alignment of common interest here; it is an opportunity for the West as well as Latin America.

What do you think are the key takeaways from this crisis?

We need wider international cooperation; this virus has proven no country is safe on its own. I think denying that does not make sense. Furthermore, we have been overlooking our healthcare systems for far too long. Specialists in global risks, big insurance companies, or international organisations were aware that national healthcare systems were underdeveloped. For years we have been debating how we would do if a pandemic like COVID-19 would strike the world, yet we did not do anything to strengthen our medical capabilities. Each time, we need to do a great exercise of internal deliberation, because if we let dormant vulnerabilities intact, we will suffer the consequences at some point. In this case, it means better equipping medical facilities and healthcare systems, making sure they are ready for the next pandemic. But that’s also applicable for a number of other vulnerabilities out there.

 What can INTERPOL learn from this crisis?  

I think that INTERPOL needs to continue developing its capabilities to work better for the global community, needs to establish better and more fluid channels of communication, and needs to continue enhancing what is eventually a large network of expertise across the world, in order to remain a reference point in international security.

Sources

[1] No Author (2020). ‘The pandemic is creating fresh opportunities for organised crime’. The Economist.
https://www.economist.com/international/2020/05/16/the-pandemic-is-creating-fresh-opportunities-for-organised-crime

[2] Ibid.

[3] Ríos, Ana Maria (2020). ‘Number of confirmed cases of novel coronavirus (COVID-19) in Latin America and the Caribbean as of June 15, 2020, by country.’ Statista. https://www.statista.com/statistics/1101643/latin-america-caribbean-coronavirus-cases/

[4] Fariza, Ignacio (2020). ‘España reafirma su apuesta por América Latina en el momento mas critico de la pandemia en la region’. El Pais.
https://elpais.com/economia/2020-05-25/espana-reafirma-su-apuesta-por-america-latina-en-el-momento-mas-critico-de-la-pandemia-en-la-region.html

More figures : https://public.flourish.studio/visualisation/2562261/

The views and opinions expressed are solely those of the interviewee and do not reflect those of the Security Distillery, the IMSISS consortium or its partners and affiliates.