ABSTRACT
On February 24th, Russia launched a full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Although evidence detected by United States (US) intelligence services revealed that the Kremlin was planning an invasion [1], the attack nonetheless came as a shock to the whole world. The war in Ukraine is the largest invasion in Europe since the Second World War which has already caused the deaths of thousands and forced millions to become refugees. In light of these devastating developments, it is essential to look back and ask how we got here. For many in the West, Moscow’s actions seem unprecedented. Unfortunately, the Kremlin’s revisionist plans have long been clear for Russia’s immediate neighbours. However, alarms raised about Vladimir Putin’s imperial ambitions were willfully refused until the Kremlin’s tanks crossed Ukraine’s border.
BY ELENE JANADZE
INTRODUCTION
There is still a prevalent assumption in the West that were it not for the West’s liberal illusions [2], the war in Ukraine would have never happened. The famous political scientist John Mearsheimer, who believes the “expansion of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)” [3] provoked Russia, has been one of the most unequivocal advocates of this argument. Some scholars refer to this narrative as the “westsplaining” [4] of conflicts in Eastern Europe. There are two significant problems with this way of thinking. First, it shifts the focus from the actual aggressor to the West, falsely portraying the invasion as an act of self-defence from the Russian state. Interpreting Russia’s invasion of Ukraine as a proxy war between NATO and Russia is not only wrong but also dangerous as it endorses the Kremlin’s own rhetoric. Second, this narrative portrays the world as a chessboard of great powers, ignoring the free will of small states. The theory turns a blind eye to the fact that Eastern European countries have long had a strong desire to join Western institutions. Had it not been for Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary, and later the Baltic states seeking membership in the alliance, NATO enlargement would have never happened. Similarly, the vast majority of Georgian [5] and Ukrainian [6] people support their countries’ becoming members of the European Union (EU) and NATO.
THE KREMLIN’S REVISIONIST AGENDA
For Georgians, the war in Ukraine revives painful memories of the 2008 Russian aggression against Georgia. Some articles have highlighted similarities between the two conflicts, suggesting that the Kremlin re-enacted its Georgia playbook in Ukraine [7]. Indeed, many parallels could be established, especially at the early stages of the conflict—among these are false claims of military withdrawal followed by the recognition of breakaway regions. The strategy that Moscow used in Ukraine was already well-tested in Georgia. Ironically, Putin’s presidential decrees that recognized the separatist enclaves of Georgia back in 2008 and those in Ukraine in 2022 were almost identical [8]. It goes without saying that as the fighting progresses, significant differences emerge between the two countries [9]. However, many Georgians view this war as yet another manifestation of Russia’s revisionist agenda, which seeks to reverse the post-cold war balance of power on the international stage and enable Russia’s emergence as a great power. Indeed, its invasion of Ukraine is not the first time that Russia has attacked a sovereign country, questioning its legitimacy and posing a significant danger to the international order.
As the centre of the global economy shifts eastward, Western scholars and pundits view Russia as a declining power, as opposed to China which is believed to pose the largest threat to the United States in the long run. Despite the rhetoric of a declining Russia, there were many reasons for raising alarms over the Kremlin's hostile behaviour in the past few years. Not only did Russia occupy and annex territories in Georgia and Ukraine, but Moscow also managed to increase its influence over Armenia and Azerbaijan by deploying its "peace-keeping" troops in Nagorno-Karabakh. Russian troops are additionally stationed in Transnistria, a breakaway strip of Moldovan territory along Ukraine's south-western border. Recently, Russia gained complete control over Belarus as Europe’s last dictator [10] Alexander Lukashenka effectively ceded control of his country to the Kremlin in exchange for his regime's security guarantees.
At the same time, Moscow's great power ambitions were hardly limited to its historic sphere of influence. The Kremlin's 2015 military intervention in Syria played a major role in helping President Bashar al-Assad, the dictator accused of using chemical weapons against his population, remain in power. Russia intensified its hostile actions in cyberspace and disinformation efforts to exasperate divisions within Western societies and undermine their democratic processes by meddling in elections. Being preoccupied with internal problems and struggling with increased disunity, the West allowed Putin to fill a global power vacuum and assert its great power status by consolidating authoritarian regimes and undermining fundamental principles of international law.
APPEASING PUTIN
Despite the written promise of the 2008 Bucharest Summit that Ukraine and Georgia would become members of NATO [11], the West has been dragging its feet over granting the two countries a Membership Action Plan (MAP). The hesitation is mostly linked with the fear of provoking the Kremlin’s wrath. Indeed, it can be argued that the 2014 sanctions on Russia after Moscow’s annexation of Crimea were rather futile. Western states have continued their partnerships with Russia even after 2014, be those in the energy or financial sector, encouraging the Kremlin’s further assertiveness. The narrative of Western disengagement solidified after the United States withdrew from Afghanistan.
There is room to speculate that had the West not avoided confronting Russia for its actions in Georgia, the invasion of Ukraine could have been avoided. Some Western analysts and scholars went so far as to argue that Georgia was to be blamed for the 2008 war [12], as then-president Mikheil Saakashvili was provoked by the Russian forces and failed to avoid the war. Now that Russian missiles strike Ukrainian cities, that interpretation is rendered wrong if not damaging, as it enabled downgrading the threats posed by the Kremlin regime for years. In this light, it does not seem entirely irrational that Putin decided to launch a full-scale invasion of Ukraine in the hope that the West, still preoccupied with its internal problems, would not be able to deter Russia.
CONCLUSION
Gladly, President Putin was wrong in his calculations that the EU would fail to solidify its efforts against the Kremlin. The EU and NATO are united like never before. The United States and its Western allies have imposed numerous financial and economic sanctions against Russia, including its removal from the SWIFT bank payments system. Given the strict economic sanctions on Russia, there is hope that the war in Ukraine will bring an end to Putin’s regime. The sanctions have destroyed the long-standing reputation of Vladimir Putin as a provider of economic stability within one week. However, the sanctions are designed to have long-term effects. In the short run, Ukraine and its citizens need immediate help. The heroism of Ukrainian society is astonishing, but they will require continuous support to confront Russia’s full-scale invasion. Ukraine might already be a moral winner of the war, however, the human cost of this tragedy is unbearable and a lot depends on whether the West continues to establish a decisive action to confront Russia.
REFERENCES
[1] Pilkington, Ed. ‘US Intelligence Believes Russia Has Ordered Ukraine Invasion – Reports’. The Guardian, 20 February 2022, sec. US news. https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2022/feb/20/russia-invasion-ukraine-biden-blinken-us-national-security-council.
[2] Walt, Stephen M. ‘Liberal Illusions Caused the Ukraine Crisis’. Foreign Policy (blog), 19 January 2022. https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/01/19/ukraine-russia-nato-crisis-liberal-illusions/.
[3] Mearsheimer, John J. ‘John Mearsheimer on Why the West Is Principally Responsible for the Ukrainian Crisis’. The Economist, 11 March 2022. https://www.economist.com/by-invitation/2022/03/11/john-mearsheimer-on-why-the-west-is-principally-responsible-for-the-ukrainian-crisis.
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[9] Gamkrelidze, Natia, and Tinatin Japaridze. ‘The Limits of the Georgia Prism in Ukraine’. Middle East Institute, 2 March 2022. https://www.mei.edu/publications/limits-georgia-prism-ukraine.
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