Weaponisation of Female Bodies: the case of Guatemala as a representative for Latin America

ABSTRACT

Sexual violence perpetrated as a weapon of war is an unfortunately common phenomenon for Latin America and the Caribbean regions, especially during conflicts and civil wars. This article will trace back such practices to their origins in colonialism and the culture of machismo that permeates the region. It will do so by focusing on the exemplary case of Guatemala as the first case of a national court holding a hearing for sexual slavery perpetrated by military officials during armed conflicts as a war crime, and the success story of the indigenous women of Sepur Zarco in receiving justice for the crimes they were victims of during the 1960-1996 Guatemalan civil war. [1]

By Giulia Prior

Studies carried out in Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) highlight how sexual violence (especially against women) is a serious problem for the region. These studies also show how the region has gained international recognition for the progress made there  in the field of legal reforms aimed at addressing violence against women. [2] In fact, LAC was the first region where all countries ratified the Convention for the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women (1993), and the first to sign a regional treaty aimed at eliminating such violence (the Inter-American Convention on the Prevention, Punishment and Eradication of Violence Against Women or Convention of Belem do Para, 1994). [3] The problem, however, is that the enforcement of such laws is often weak, owing to a general culture of impunity that characterises the region. Therefore, most of the protection the laws offer remains theoretical and without practical application.

The 2010 Desk Review of the Sexual Violence Research Initiative identifies the following as the most common forms of violence against women by non-partners: sexual abuse of children and youth, trafficking and sexual exploitation, sexual violence during the migration process, sexual harassment in the workplace, and sexual violence in emergencies or settings of armed conflict.

‘Rape is an instrument or weapon of war. It is a way to attack the country, killing or raping the victims. The woman was seen as a military objective.’ These were the words of Yassmin Barrios, the chief judge of a Guatemalan court that made history in February 2016 for being the first national court to hear charges of sexual slavery perpetuated during armed conflicts as a war crime. [4] The court sentenced two former members of the military to prison for sexually enslaving and murdering indigenous women (of the Maya Q’eqchi’ communities) in the military outpost of Sepur Zarco, during the 1960-1996 Guatemalan civil war. [5]

Rape used as a weapon of war in the Americas can be traced back to colonialism, when Europeans started conquering the newly discovered West and imposing their patriarchy and their views onto Indigenous people. In this period, colonisers used rape to take power over Indigenous people, to dominate Indigenous societies and to take possession of their lands. [6]

Professor Rita Laura Segato explains:

In the old conventional wars, with conquered territories came the insemination of women’s bodies. Soldiers raped the women of conquered territories as if women’s bodies were extensions of those territories. [7]

More recently the region has experienced high levels of violence, in particular during the 20th century civil wars and military dictatorships. Guatemala is an exemplary case: during the 1960-1996 civil war, under the leadership of Efrain Rios Montt, and backed by the U.S., the Indigenous population of Guatemala was targeted with massacres, forced displacement, and systemic rape employed as a tool of genocide. [8] Data shows that during this internal armed conflict, more than 100,000 women were victims of systemic rape and the main perpetrators were identified in armed groups, government, and paramilitary forces. [9]

The issue with systemic violence is that often it continues in post-conflict periods, as a legacy of war. [10] In Guatemala, nearly 10 out of 100,000 women are killed on a yearly basis and the country ranks third worldwide in the killings of women. [11]

Such high degrees of violence can be traced back to the culture of machismo that is characteristic of  the LAC region. Machismo is a stereotypical concept that emphasises hypermasculinity, and in Latin America is a legacy of the Spanish conquistadores (as the conquerors of the Spanish and Portuguese Empires were identified during the colonisation of Latin America), who shaped the region’s gender identity and gender relationships. This culture manifests itself mostly through aggressive imposition on women. [12] This patriarchal culture perpetuates narratives of impunity, violence, and discrimination that have contributed to leaving millions of women voiceless to abuses for years.

The consequences of the instrumentalisation of rape against women are not merely physical. Much deeper is the psychological trauma these women endure, the stigma from their communities, and rejection from their husbands. [13] A large number of cases go undetected because women are too afraid of the consequences of speaking up against their abusers. Moreover, resources to treat the victims in these countries are often lacking. In the words of Doctors Without Borders’ head of mission in Guatemala, Fabio Forgione: ‘In Guatemala nobody speaks about sexual violence. Survivors are stigmatised and they cannot easily find treatment in Guatemala yet. There are no resources and too little comprehension of patients’ needs by the doctors.’ [14]

The Sepur Zarco case was emblematic in this regard. In fact, the Guatemalan court also issued a reparations decision, ‘which is perhaps the strongest example to date of a national court instituting transformative and comprehensive reparations for women,’ says UN Women Regional Director for the Americas and the Caribbean, Luiza Carvalho. [15] Other than individual monetary compensation, the decision provided for the installation of a health center in Sepur Zarco, for improving education infrastructure, and providing scholarships for women, girls, and the whole community. Additionally, these reparations include reopening dossiers for land restitution and calling for the Government to institute local community development projects. [16] These measures seek to address the broader causes and consequences of the violences perpetrated against these women and their communities.

While there have been some major steps forward that have created the conditions for women such as the Sepur Zarco abuelas (as these women are respectfully referred to) [17] to be empowered and to speak up, with actual judicial consequences, there is still a long way to go, and there are still sectors of society that remain voiceless. [18] As the article has shown, the problem of gender-based violence in Latin America is one that needs continued international attention and immediate action. This will help in shedding light on such barbaric practices, and in finding ways to overcome them.

SOURCES

[1] UN Women (2018), ‘Sepur Zarco case: The Guatemalan women who rose for justice in a war-torn nation’, [online] available from https://www.unwomen.org/en/news/stories/2018/10/feature-sepur-zarco-case, accessed on 31st December 2020.

[2] Sexual Violence Research Initiative SVRI (2010) ‘Sexual Violence in Latin America and the Caribbean: A Desk Review’, [online] available from https://www.svri.org/sites/default/files/attachments/2016-07-19/f_0024041_19595_original.pdf, accessed on 30th December 2020.

[3] Ibid.

[4] Reynolds, L (2016) ‘Landmark sexual slavery case in Guatemala examines use of rape as weapon of war’, [online] available from https://ticotimes.net/2016/02/18/sexual-slavery-case-guatemala, accessed on 12th January 2021.

[5] Castillo, M (2016) ‘Guatemala sentences two to 360 years in sex slave case’, [online] available from https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/2/27/guatemala-sentences-two-to-360-years-in-sex-slave-case, accessed on 29th December 2020.

[6] Muñoz, M (2017) ‘10 Reasons Why Colonialism Strengthened Rape Culture In Latinx Communities’, [online] available from https://everydayfeminism.com/2017/07/colonialism-latinx-rape-culture/, accessed on 29th December 2020.

[7] Uribe-Uran, V. M (2013) ‘An Academic’s Search for Answers to Violence against Women: An Interview with Professor Rita Laura Segato’, [online] available from https://lacc.fiu.edu/hemisphere/volume-22.pdf, accessed on 31st December 2020.

[8] Susskind, Y (2016) ‘Guilty: What the Sepur Zarco Trial Means for Women’s Rights Worldwide’, [online] available from https://www.madre.org/press-publications/article/guilty-what-sepur-zarco-trial-means-women%E2%80%99s-rights-worldwide, accessed on 30th December 2020.

[9] De Pablo, O et al. (2011) ‘Guatemalan war rape survivors: 'We have no voice'’, [online] available from https://www.theguardian.com/lifeandstyle/2011/jul/28/guatemalan-women-mass-rape-give-evidence, accessed on 31st December 2020.

[10] Sexual Violence Research Initiative SVRI (2010) ‘Sexual Violence in Latin America and the Caribbean: A Desk Review’, [online] available from https://www.svri.org/sites/default/files/attachments/2016-07-19/f_0024041_19595_original.pdf, accessed on 30th December 2020.

[11] Guinan, J (2015) ‘Nearly 20 years after peace pact, Guatemala's women relive violence’, [online] available from https://edition.cnn.com/2015/04/02/world/iyw-guatemala-gender-violence/index.html, accessed on 31st December 2020.

[12] Hardin, M (2002) ‘Altering Masculinities: The Spanish Conquest and the Evolution of the Latin American Machismo’, International Journal of Sexuality and Gender Studies, Vol. 7, No. 1, pp. 1-22.

[13] Lund, G (2019) ‘The Hidden Victims of Sexual Violence in War’, [online] available from https://www.warchild.org.uk/whats-happening/blogs/hidden-victims-sexual-violence-war, accessed on 6th January 2021.

[14] Doctors Without Borders (2009) ‘Guatemala: Treating Sexual Violence, Breaking the Cycle of Fear’, [online] available from https://www.doctorswithoutborders.org/what-we-do/news-stories/news/guatemala-treating-sexual-violence-breaking-cycle-fear, accessed on 31st December 2020.

[15] UN Women (2016), ‘Landmark ruling in Guatemala a victory against sexual violence in armed conflict’, [online] available from https://www.unwomen.org/en/news/stories/2016/3/guatemala-victory-against-sexual-violence-in-armed-conflict, accessed on 31st December 2020.

[16] Ibid.

[17] UN Women (2018), ‘Sepur Zarco case: The Guatemalan women who rose for justice in a war-torn nation’, [online] available from https://www.unwomen.org/en/news/stories/2018/10/feature-sepur-zarco-case, last accessed on 31st December 2020.

[18] Joffily, M (2016) ‘Sexual Violence in the military dictatorships of Latin America: Who wants to know?’, [online] available from https://sur.conectas.org/en/who-wants-to-know/, accessed on 31st December 2020.

Rare Earth Elements

Rare Earth Elements are a group of seventeen minerals that are vital for many industries, including renewable energies, high-tech, as well as defence industries. Thus, they are essential for modern economies and their armed forces. They are difficult to acquire, considering the expensive mining and refining practices necessary to exploit them. These minerals gained attention in 2010, when China, with a near-monopoly on the market, imposed a short-lived embargo on rare earth exports to Japan. More than a mere trade dispute, this incident raised concerns and questions over China’s possible use of economic statecraft. Concerned by the situation, both the United States and the European Union have engaged in taking actions that aim to strengthen their positions in the global supply chain and diminish the risks of future disruptions.

By Jon Saleji Martija

Rare Earth Elements (REEs), also known as rare earth metals or rare earths,[1] are defined by the United States Geological Survey (USGS), as a group of seventeen elements; these are scandium, yttrium and the lanthanides.[2] They are divided into light and heavy categories.[3] The light REEs have  atomic numbers between 57, 60, and 62, and are more abundant than the heavy ones. As a result, heavy REEs with atomic numbers 63 to 71 are scarcer and therefore, more expensive.

Contrary to what the name might suggest, REEs are not actually scarce.[4] Cerium (Ce) for example, the most common rare earth, with an abundance of 60 parts per million, is more common than lead (pb).[5] The least abundant, lutetium, has a crustal abundance of 0.5 parts per million. This makes it 200 times more abundant than gold.[6] They are called rare due to the fact that in the 19th century only one exploitable deposit was known: a quarry in the town of Ytterby, located in Sweden.[7]`

Nonetheless, it is important to highlight that their exploitation remains difficult to this day.[8] They are not found individually, but rather in low concentrations as part of bigger rock formations, most abundantly in the minerals bastnaesite and monazite. As a result, mining and sorting processes are very expensive.

Both the European Union (EU) and the United States (US) consider these materials to be critical.[9] This means that they are essential for the well-being of their economies, while their supply may be challenged by scarcity, geopolitical disputes, trade policies or otherwise.[10] Their importance comes from their many uses. REEs are employed in almost every electronic device, in hybrid and electric vehicles, energy efficient lighting, renewable energy generation, and even fossil fuel processing.[11] In terms of military applications, rare earths are needed in the production of precision guided ammunition, lasers, defence radar systems, and even night-vision goggles.[12] They are employed in strong and permanent magnets that can resist extreme temperatures without losing their magnetic strength. As a result, they are the best option for applications such as missile control systems and fighter jets or satellite communication systems. For example, a F35 Lightning Two aircraft requires more than 400 kilograms of rare earth elements.[13] This means that every country with a modern military is to a certain extent dependent on the REE supply chain, as most of these technologies would be infeasible without them.[14] In addition, it is worth noting that  today’s technology has a limited  ability to recycle REEs, and there are very few other minerals that have the potential to substitute them.[15] Therefore, uninterrupted access to these elements is a worry shared by governments and defense industries alike.

With regard to the production and development of rare earths, the EU highlights that as of 2020, 98% of heavy Rare Earth production, as well as 99% of Light Rare Earth production, takes place on Chinese soil.[16] With control over approximately one third of the global proven reserves of rare earths, the country has held nearly monopolistic control of the international rare earth market ever since the 1990s. Until the late 1980s, the US was a net exporter of REEs, mainly thanks to the Mountain Pass mine in the Mojave Desert, California.[17] At that time China lowered its production prices to strengthen its own position, driving competition out of business.[18] Before joining the World Trade Organization, the PRC had introduced quotas, a list of eligible exporters, as well as prohibiting exports for processing purposes, which remained after it joined the organization.[19] Such a situation led to a decrease in funding for research and education in the US.

REEs returned to the spotlight internationally, in September 2010, after the infamous Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands incident which led to the Chinese embargo on REE exports to Japan.[20] Tensions started with a collision between the Japanese coast guard and a Chinese trawler in the East Chinese Sea, where the  the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu islands are situated. Japan detained the captain of the Chinese vessel but was released shortly after.[21] It is reported that in response, Chinese authorities stopped all rare earth exports to Japan.[22]

It must be acknowledged that this was a one-time event. But considering the relevance of these materials, and China’s control over the market, the fear of future restrictions and supply chain bottlenecks remains ever-present.[23] Moreover, this event also highlighted the possibility that China could leverage its control over the REE markets to pursue its foreign policy and security goals, such as influencing its territorial disputes with neighbouring countries.[24] International actors have taken measures aimed at avoiding any similar situations in the future.

In the US, the Obama administration supported research and development specifically focusing on the downstream businesses of energy and defence.[25] Resource diplomacy focused on trade policy coordination and information sharing with allied countries. However, it did not clearly support upstream production, and there was limited engagement with the private sector and trade policy.[26] This is evidenced by the fact that Mountain Pass mine started operating once again in 2012. By 2015, however, the company declared bankruptcy due to an oversupply of products in the international market. At the beginning of the Trump administration, there seemed to be a mission to reverse decades long dependence on foreign imports,[27] highlighting the risks and threats for American national security originating from this dependence. Similarly, this administration showed interest in increasing funds and support for domestic upstream production. However, it can be argued that the implementation was lacklustre as budget and programme cuts have, for example, harmed interagency cooperation.[28]

In the European case, there was already a raw materials initiative in place in 2008. It was created with the aim of achieving a fair and sustainable supply of raw materials from global markets, a sustainable supply of raw materials within the EU, and resource efficiency and supply of ‘secondary raw materials’ through recycling.[29] Moreover, since 2011, the EU has addressed the markets for critical raw materials (CRM) and released a list of these materials every three years, highlighting the rate of import and substitutability.[30] As of 2020 it lists thirty CRMs.

The European Rare Earth Competency Network report in 2015 highlighted issues the EU might face and made valuable recommendations.[31] For instance, the potential of REE mining in Sweden and Greenland, which could secure European supply for decades. However, the report also highlighted that in order to make this a viable option there would need to be viable downstream processing capabilities.[32] It would be challenging to keep the process environmentally sound and to provide access to the necessary capital.

More recently, in September 2020, the European Commission presented an Action Plan on Critical Raw Materials, the 2020 List of Critical Raw Materials, and a foresight study considering the 2030 and 2050 perspectives.[33] The action plan addresses the challenges in achieving the goals set by the EU Green Deal; the Union will become more reliant on Critical Raw Materials and therefore REEs as well.[34] In the latter case, the demand of those REEs used in permanent magnets could increase tenfold by 2050. Ten actions that must be implemented are highlighted in the document. The creation of the European Raw Materials Alliance is the first one. It was created with the aim of bolstering the creation of environmentally sustainable and socially equitable innovations and infrastructure. It focuses on implementing a circular economy of complex products, supporting Europe’s raw material industry capability to extract, design, manufacture, and recycle raw materials.[35]

China remains as the sole power in the rare earths industry, but these initiatives indicate that there is a reinforced interest in securing access to rare earths, both in the United States and European Union. However, considering the capital-intensive nature of some of the actions,[36] they will prove useful in the mid- to long-term, and therefore their effectiveness remains to be seen. Moreover, in times when international trade is a source of tension, a EU seeking to achieve more sovereignty over critical raw materials could bring a broader trade skirmish in return.[37]

SOURCES

[1] Voncken J.H.L. (2016) ‘The Rare Earth Elements—A Special Group of Metals’. In: The Rare Earth Elements. SpringerBriefs in Earth Sciences. Springer, Cham. Available from https://doi-org.ezproxy.lib.gla.ac.uk/10.1007/978-3-319-26809-5_1, Accessed on 3rd December 2020.

[2] U.S. Geological Survey (n.d.) ‘Rare Earths Statistics and Information’, [online] available from https://www.usgs.gov/centers/nmic/rare-earths-statistics-and-information, accessed on 3th December 2020.

[3] Kalantzakos, Sophia (2018) ‘What are Rare Earths?’ In China and the Geopolitics of Rare Earths. New York: Oxford University Press.

[4] Ibid.

[5] Voncken J.H.L. (2016) ‘The Rare Earth Elements—A Special Group of Metals’. In: The Rare Earth Elements. SpringerBriefs in Earth Sciences. Springer, Cham. [online] Available from https://doi-org.ezproxy.lib.gla.ac.uk/10.1007/978-3-319-26809-5_1, Accessed on 3rd December 2020.

[6] Ibid.

[7] Ibid.

[8] Wilson, J.D. (2017). ‘Securitising rare earth minerals’. In International Resource Politics in the Asia-Pacific. Pp: 167-188. Cheltenham: Edward Edgar Publishing.

[9] He, Yujia. (2018). ‘The trade-security nexus and U.S. policy making in critical minerals’. Resources Policy 59: 238-249.

European Commission. (n.d.) ‘Critical Raw Materials. International Market, Industry, Entrepreneurship and SMEs’. [Online] Available from: https://ec.europa.eu/growth/sectors/raw-materials/specific-interest/critical_en . Accessed on 4th December 2020.

National Science and Technology Council (NSTC) (2016) Assessment of Critical Minerals: Screening Methodology and Initial Application. [Online] Available from: https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/whitehouse.gov/files/images/CSMSC%20Assessment%20of%20Critical%20Minerals%20Report%202016-03-16%20FINAL.pdf

[10] Geoscience Australia. (n. d.). ‘Critical Minerals: Introduction’. [Online] Available from https://www.ga.gov.au/about/projects/resources/critical-minerals. Accessed on December 21st 2020.

[11] Hensel, N.D. (2011) ‘Economic Challenges in the Clean Energy Supply Chain: The Market for Rare Earth Minerals and Other Critical Inputs’. Business Economics 46, No. 3: 171-184.

[12] Hurst, Cindy A. (2010) ‘China’s Ace in the hole: Rare Earth Elements’. Joint Force Quarterly 59: 121-126. [Online] Available from: https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Portals/68/Documents/jfq/jfq-59/jfq-59_121-126_Hurst.pdf.

[13] GRasso, V. B. (2013. ‘Rare Earth Elements in National Defense: Background, Oversight Issues, and Options for Congress’. Congressional Research Service Report.

[14] Voncken J.H.L. (2016)

[15] He, Yujia. (2018).

[16] European Commission. (n.d.) ‘Critical Raw Materials. International Market, Industry, Entrepreneurship and SMEs’. [Online] Available from: https://ec.europa.eu/growth/sectors/raw-materials/specific-interest/critical_en . Accessed on 4th December 2020.

[17] Kalantzakos, Sophia (2018).

[18] Wilson, J.D. (2017).

[19] PRC State Economic and Trade Commission (2002) Announcement of Year 2003 Export Quota, Total Volume Distribution Criteria and Application Procedure for Export of Important Industrial Products. 

PRC State Planning Commission. (2000). 10th Five Year Plan for China’s Rare Earth Industry.

[20] Wilson, J.D. (2017).

[21]McCurry, Justin (2010) ‘Japan-China row Scalates over fishing boat collision’, The Guardian. Available from: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/sep/09/japan-china-fishing-boat-collision. Accessed on 4th December 2020.

[22]  King, Amy; Armstrong, Shiro (2013) ‘Did China really ban rare earth exports to Japan?’. East Asia Forum. [Online] Available from:  https://crawford.anu.edu.au/news-events/news/2432/digging-rare-earth-embargo Accessed on 4th December 2020.

Bradsher, Keith (2010) ‘Amid Tension, China Blocks Vital Exports to Japan’, The New York Times. [Online] Available from: https://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/23/business/global/23rare.html. Accessed on 4th January 2020.

[23] Kalantzakos, Sophia (2018).

[24] Ibid.

[25] He, Yujia (2018).

[26] Ibid.

[27] Ibid.

[28] Ibid.

[29] European Commission (n.d.)

[30] European Commission (2011) Communication for the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, The European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions Tackling the Challenges in Commodity Markets and on Raw Materials. [Online] Available from: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:52011DC0025&locale=en

 European Commission (2014) Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions On the review of the list of critical raw materials for the EU and the implementation of the Raw Materials Initiative. Available from: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:52014DC0297

European Commission (2014) COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT On the implementation of the Raw Materials Initiative. [Online] Available from: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52014SC0171&from=EN

 European Commission (2014) Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, The Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions On the review of the list of critical raw materials for the EU and the implementation of the Raw Materials Initiative. Available from: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52014DC0297&from=EN

[31] The European Rare Earths Competency Network (EROCON) (2015) Strengthening the European Rare Earths Supply Chain. Challenges and Policy Options. Ref. Ares(2015)2544417 - 17/06/2015

[32] Ibid.

 [33] European Commission (2020) ‘Commission announces actions to make Europe’s raw materials supply more secure and sustainable’. [Online] Available from:  https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_20_1542. Accessed 7th December 2020.

 [34] European Commission (2020) Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions. Critical Raw Materials Resilience: Charting a Path towards greater Security and Sustainability. [Online] Available from: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52020DC0474&from=EN

 [35] European Raw Materials Alliance (n.d.) ‘European Raw Materials Alliance’. [Online] Available from: https://erma.eu. Accessed 7th December 2020.

[36] Paron, Francesco (2018) ‘Europe’s Dependence on Critical Raw Materials: Implications for the Competitiveness and Independence of Strategic Industries’. IAI Commentaries 18 , 45.

 [37] White and Case (2020) ‘EU unveils action plan to secure access to critical raw materials’. [Online] Available from: https://www.whitecase.com/publications/alert/eu-unveils-action-plan-secure-access-critical-raw-materials. Accessed 7th December 2020.

Weaponisation of Female Bodies — Part I, “Comfort Women”

Comfort women were girls and young women working as sexual slaves for the Imperial Japanese Army during World War II. The term is a translation of the Japanese word ianfu, which means “prostitute(s).” [1] Usually the women employed were poor and non-Japanese, as the country wanted to preserve the purity of its own women. [2] Hence, the majority of comfort women were found in Japanese occupied countries — primarily, Korea, China, and the Philippines. [3]

The existence of atrocious systems such as comfort stations, exemplifies the weaponisation of female bodies in Japan. Even though this episode of forced prostitution ended, the idea behind it remains rooted in Japanese society as the country today continues to refuse to acknowledge their crimes. The topic of weaponisation of female bodies will be discussed deeply this month, as a series of articles will be published on the matter. This article will explore the topic of comfort women — particularly, the reasons behind its existence and the consequences of this phenomenon.

By Camilla Carlesi

FRAMING THE ISSUE

Even though the brothels started by employing solely voluntary prostitutes, many women ended up being forced to work there. Most of the women were abducted from their homes with promises of false job opportunities in restaurants or hospitals. At times, they were lured by propaganda supporting gender equality and female education. [4] Due to these false pretenses, the Japanese army — guided by the orders of the general office and the ministry of the army, in particular, of the supreme commander — managed to recruit and imprison an incredible number of sex workers. There is not an agreed number on the quantity of workers involved; however, the majority of historians estimate that there were around 200,000 women. [5] Among them, 80% came from Korea. [6]

The conditions of the brothels and the way in which these women were treated were horrendous. They were humiliated in multiple ways, deprived of their identity, culture and language. [7] If they were pregnant, they were forced to abort their children. If they refused to have sex, these women were raped, beaten, or even murdered. A survivor of these crimes, Jan Ruff O’Herne, witnesses:

‘I was systematically beaten and raped day and night. Even the Japanese doctor raped me each time he visited the brothel to examine us for venereal disease. And to humiliate us even more the doors and windows were left open, so the Japanese could watch us being examined.’ [8]

Today, these crimes are recognized by most countries in Asia and elsewhere, including the Philippines, Canada, Taiwan, Germany, and Australia. In 2007, the U.S. called for the historical recognition of Japanese sexual slavery and asked Japan to publicly apologize for their atrocious actions. Japan’s response to the American request has been extremely controversial. The former Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe refused to abide by the U.S.’s demand and stated that the government already addressed the topic in the past by giving aid funds to former sex slaves, while part of the Japanese population denies the existence of evidence on the topic. [9] Even though the country devoted 1 billion yen ($8.3 million) to the cause, the money does not pay for the decades of atrocities experienced by these women, especially when Japan refuses to publicly acknowledge these mistakes.

THE RATIONALE BEHIND COMFORT STATIONS

The Japanese army justified the use of comfort women in many ways; among them, the decrease of rape and the prevention of secret-leakage, internal revolts, and the spread of diseases.

I) Reduce Rape Crimes

After the atrocities which took place in the past – when Japan expanded in Manchukuo, Nanjing, Shanghai and committed mass sexual violence – the country attempted to reduce sexual crimes by providing prostitutes to its personnel. [10] According to the Japanese government, decreasing rape crimes during occupation would help the colonized countries to better accept their invasion.

II) Prevent the Leak of Information from Soldiers

By confining the military sexual interactions with comfort women to specific controlled locations, the government was able to avoid the spread of information about the Japanese military plans. The comfort stations protected against the leakage of strategic information because if any incident would have ever occurred, it would have been almost impossible for the international press to know about it. What was said in these locations stayed in these locations. [11]

III) Avoid Internal Discontent

The Japanese government believed that comfort stations offered soldiers the opportunity to let out their stress and sexual impulses. By improving the conditions of their military personnel, the authorities decreased the likelihood of internal riots and enhanced their ability to fight. [12]

IV) Decrease Venereal Diseases

Because Japanese soldiers were highly exposed to sexually transmitted infections (STIs), the government implemented comfort stations to decrease such problem. Brothels had better sanitary conditions and were more controlled by doctors, which they thought would decrease transmission. [13]

CONSEQUENCES OF THE COMFORT WOMEN SYSTEM

I) Increase of Rape Crimes and Sexual Transmitted Infections

Even though the comfort stations originated from the need to decrease STDs and rape, they ended up worsening both issues. With time, the number of people infected by diseases rose incredibly, as these brothels allowed soldiers to have intercourse more often; thus, to get sick more often. In addition, the more frequent sexual interactions only increased the sexual appetite of the army. [14] Overall, the comfort women system did not bring the results that the Japanese government was expecting.

II) Rise of Mental Illnesses

The comfort women system also fueled high levels of mental illnesses. The physical abuse which these women experienced greatly impacted their psychological health. Some of the main symptoms were anger, emotional stress, and distorted perceptions. [15] Post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) was also a very common problem. Forced sexual labor in WWII brought acute consequences to the lives of these women, but also long-term ones. Thus, a study found that even 60 years beyond the end of the war, the women were still prone to mental illnesses. [16]

III) Stigmatization of Survivors

Other than psychological diseases, there are many additional long-term implications that followed the end of Japanese forced prostitution. For instance, women who were employed as sexual workers were rejected and abandoned by their families and communities. As a consequence of this marginalization, multiple survivors committed suicide. Today, former comfort women are still stigmatized by some of their communities for their past. [17]

IV) Negative International Response

Lastly, the legalization of forced prostitution and the mishandling of the issue by the Japanese government caused a severing of ties with the rest of the world. The issue fueled tensions with South Korea, as Japan refused to engage in an historical debate in regards to the issue. Moreover, the humanitarian crimes committed by the Japanese army shed a bad light on the country in front of the global community.

CONCLUSION

The comfort women system was a barbaric program implemented by the Japanese government. Women were forced into prostitution, beaten, and obliged to live in terrible conditions. According to the Japanese government, comfort stations appeared to be an efficient way to reduce rape, ensure secrecy, improve soldiers’ wellbeing and decrease venereal diseases. Although, this forced prostitution structure only brought a boost of STDs, rape crimes, and mental illnessess. Today, the traces of this program are still visible in Japan, where survivors are neglected and marginalized. Issues continue outside Japan as well, as the comfort women atrocities have negatively impacted the global community’s view of Japan.

This analysis of the case of comfort women is one example of the lack of an adequate response to sexual violence in the context of global gender security. The lack of a sufficient apology from the Japanese authorities damages the state’s global image and is detrimental to the fight for women’s rights and equity. The next articles of this series will further explore the topic of women as a weapon of war through other case studies and will emphasize the need for a stronger international fight for women security.

SOURCES

[1] Soh, CS (2009). ‘The Comfort Women: Sexual Violence and Postcolonial Memory in Korea and Japan. University of Chicago Press. 

[2] Yoshimi, Y (2002). ‘Comfort Women: Sexual Slavery in the Japanese Military during WWII.’ Columbia University Press, pp. 155.

[3] (2013). ‘Women and World War II – Comfort Women.’ Womenshistory.about.com.

[4] Yoshimi, 2002.

[5] (2007). ‘Japanese opposition calls on prime minister to acknowledge WWII sex slaves, International Herald Tribune.’

[6] Gamble, A, Watanabe, T (2004). ‘A Public Betrayed.’ Regnery Publishing.

[7] Watanabe, K (1999). ‘Trafficking in Women's Bodies, Then and Now: The Issue of Military "Comfort Women".‘ Women's Studies Quarterly, pp. 19-31, available from http://www.jstor.org/stable/40003395.

[8] O'Herne, JR (February 15, 2007). ‘Statement of Jan Ruff O'Herne AO, Subcommittee on Asia, Pacific and the Global Environment.’ Committee on Foreign Affairs, U.S. House of Representatives.

[9] Constante, A (2019). ‘Who Are the 'Comfort Women,' and Why Are U.S.-Based Memorials for Them Controversial?’ NBCNews.com, NBCUniversal News Group, available from https://www.nbcnews.com/news/asian-america/who-are-comfort-women-why-are-u-s-based-memorials-n997656.

[10] Tanaka, Y (2002). ‘Japan’s Comfort Women: Sexual Slavery and Prostitution during World War II and the US Occupation,’ Routledge, pp. 45, 60.

[11] Asian Women's Fund (2007). ‘The "Comfort Women" Issue and the Asian Women's Fund.’ Asian Women's Fund.

[12] Korea Times (2007). ‘Comfort women used to prevent military revolt during war.’

[13] ‘Why Did the Japanese Military Establish the ‘Comfort Women’ System?’ Fight for Justice, available from http://fightforjustice.info/?page_id=2762.

[14] Korea Times, 2007.

[15] Min SK, Lee CH, Kim JY, Shim EJ (November 2004). ‘Posttraumatic Stress Disorder of Former Comfort Women for Japanese Army during World War II’. Journal of Korean Neuropsychiatric Association (in Korean), pp. 740–748.

[16] Ibid.

[17] Watanabe, 1999.

Your blessing will be your curse: the role of oil in the Libyan crisis

After the breakout of the civil war, Libya’s fragmented political landscape led to internal partitions and the rise of two political establishments, in addition to other armed militias. In the ongoing conflict, all belligerent parts are fighting for the control of oil, among other things. More specifically, Libya’s hydrocarbon sector has long been a magnet for non-state groups such as armed militias and even terrorist organisations, which are trying to gain control over oil facilities with the purpose of gaining political power and capitalising on illicit oil smuggling. This paper aims to delve into the role of oil in the Libyan crisis, by briefly investigating what sort of political outcomes each belligerent faction would obtain by control of oil facilities.

By Elisa Marra

In addition to being an economic instrument, oil is also a political one. In comparison with other war-torn countries, Libya owns the largest crude oil reserves in Africa. The hydrocarbons sector is the country’s main source of income. As the African Development Bank reports, ‘over 2014-18, the oil, gas, and related extractive sectors accounted for more than 65% of GDP, more than 95% of export earnings, and 96% of the budget.’ [1] In Libya, petroleum turned out to be the most powerful factor dictating the dynamics of the political crisis. Indeed, the abundance of hydrocarbons had always been used as a powerful tool to control tensions derived from the country’s intricate social fabric. [2] However, the importance of oil in the Libyan political crisis became especially tangible after the outbreak of the civil war and the country’s partition into seperate spheres of influence. Evidently, the various factions realised that whoever controls oil also holds political power. Therefore, the unstoppable battle for dominance of energy sources became one of the principal disputes in the conflict, involving not only the two official administrations, – the Government of National Accord and the House of Representatives backed by the Libyan National Army – but also a series of armed militias and non-state actors who seek to take advantage of the fragmented political landscape. [3]

To understand the role of oil in the Libyan crisis, it is necessary to clarify the current fragmentation into different spheres of influence, as well as the country’s politics more generally. Galvanised by the outbreak of revolutions in neighbouring Arab countries, in 2011 the Libyan population revolted against long-reigning dictator Muammar Gaddafi. However, the revolution soon morphed into a bloody civil war, which not only led to Gaddafi’s death, but also divided the already socially ruptured country into different areas of influence. Nowadays, Libya is divided into two main regions: the Tripoli-based United Nations (UN)-backed Government of National Accord (GNA), headed by Fayez al-Serraj, which controls western Libya; and  the Tobruk-based House of Representatives, in control of eastern and central Libya and supported by the Libyan National Army (LNA). The latter  is an anti-Islamist armed group led by Marshal Khalifa Haftar, a retired Gaddafi-era general. Moreover, a series of armed militias are belligerent actors as well. Among them are the Benghazi Defence Brigades, revolutionary Islamic fighters opposing the LNA, and the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant. [4]

Gaddafi’s fall broke the previous status quo of resource distribution, and thus control of oil created tensions and conflict among all these factions. [5] The reason is found in the inevitable interdependence between the hydrocarbon sector and Libyan politics. First, some academics, such as Chivvis and Martini, argue that Libya is a victim of the ‘Resource Curse’: a theory according to which countries rich in natural resources tend to have less democratic regimes and lower economic growth. [6] According to the oil or resource curse theory, authoritarianism or even the collapse of the state are much more likely to occur in a country rich in hydrocarbons, and especially when this sector is controlled by the state. Reliance on extractive industry may stimulate the spread of corruption or even lead to state capture by individuals or groups. Secondly, lack of security, political turbulence, and violence allowed terrorist groups and armed militias to take control of multiple oil production facilities, therefore impeding economic stabilisation. [7]

Undoubtedly, all belligerent factions are fighting for control of fuels as revenue sources. More notably, as Jason Pack argues, ‘it is not much of an oversimplification to state that the Libyan militias themselves are fighting primarily over money.’ [8] First and foremost, oil represents yet another factor of conflict between Haftar and Serraj. In particular, Haftar is unable to capitalise on the oil facilities controlled by the LNA, since the majority of international companies only negotiate with the Tripoli-based National Oil Corporation (NOC). Therefore, the GNA obtains the majority of the revenues. [9] However, the mounting economic crisis represents a major challenge for the government of Tripoli, which is unable to pay salaries. Although this might seem an irrelevant detail, it is important to understand why factions are competing for the control of fuels. The government’s inability to pay salaries to employees might play significantly into the hands of armed militias. Indeed, if the government fails to provide a significant form of prestige and social positions, rebels may consider the alternative of joining other armed militias or even terrorist organisations. Ultimately, this might contribute to the strengthening of already powerful non-state actors, who may succeed in controlling significant territories. [10]

The fragmented political landscape has indeed already provided non-state groups with the chance to become stronger. Since the outbreak of the conflict, these groups have attempted to consolidate their control over economic sectors, primarily that of energy. What are the reasons for this? First and foremost, as previously explained, controlling fuel implies gaining political power. Blocking a pipeline or even being able to control an oil reservoir is a successful political instrument. The reasons for these blockages range from political demands, to extortion in exchange for money or  prisoners, to instruments aimed at debilitating the opponent. [11] In addition, the control of oil terminals represents a source of revenue for non-state actors. Terrorist organisations such as the Islamic State have increasingly attacked oil and gas infrastructures. Undoubtedly, the group is seeking a way to increase its income through illicit activities, and more specifically the Islamic State is seeking to profit from oil and gas smuggling, just as it has done in Iraq and Syria. [12] Therefore, by gaining control over the oil sector, these non-state actors are not only able to leverage the smuggling of fuels, but they would also gain in strength and political power.

In conclusion, Libya’s wealth seems to represent a curse, rather than a blessing. Indeed, the country’s abundance of hydrocarbons has not only prevented its economic stabilisation and the development of its democratic institutions, but has also played a significant role in the continuing bloody conflict. Certainly, control over hydrocarbons represents one, or even the main, factor pitting the belligerent factions against one another. Furthermore, dominance over oil facilities and infrastructure is also tempting for armed militias and terrorist organisations, which aim at gaining control over the fuel sector for much the same reasons as other belligerents. Against this background, Libya’s dependence on hydrocarbons represents a significant challenge to stability in the years to come.     

Sources

[1] African Development Bank Group. ‘Libya Economic Outlook’ [online] available from: https://www.afdb.org/en/countries/north-africa/libya/libya-economic-outlook. Accessed on 27th November 2020.

BP. ‘Statistical Review of World Energy 2020’ [online] available from: https://www.bp.com/content/dam/bp/business-sites/en/global/corporate/pdfs/energy-economics/statistical-review/bp-stats-review-2020-full-report.pdf. Accessed on 27th November 2020.

[2] Marinone, Lorenzo. ‘Il Ruolo Del Petrolio Nella Crisi Libica.’ RIENERGIA, 2018. [Online] available from: rienergia.staffettaonline.com/articolo/33103/Il+ruolo+del+petrolio+nella+crisi+libica/Marinone. Accessed 27th November 2020.  

Arfaras, Giorgio. ‘La Libia e noi: Storia delle Crisi Petrolifere.’ Limes, rivista di Geopolitica, 2011. [Online] available from: https://www.limesonline.com/la-libia-e-noi-storia-delle-crisi-petrolifere/20615. Accessed 27th November 2020.

Kabouche, Leo. ‘The Energy Briefing: The never-ending battle for Libya’s Oil Crescent.’ Global Risk Insight, 2018. [Online] available from: https://oilprice.com/Energy/Crude-Oil/The-Never-Ending-Battle-For-Libyas-Oil-Crescent.html. Accessed 25th November 2020.

[3] Suñer Marzari, Ricard. ‘The war in Libya and its oil resources: order inside chaos?’ Atalayar, 2020. [Online] available from: https://atalayar.com/en/blog/war-libya-and-its-oil-resources-order-inside-chaos. Accessed 25th November 2020.  

 [4] Wehrey, Frederic. Introduction. ‘This War Is Out of Our Hands’ in The Internationalization of Libya’s Post-2011 Conflicts From Proxies to Boots on the Ground. New America, 2020, pp. 7–11. www.jstor.org/stable/resrep26366.4.

Abdessadok, Zineb. ‘Libya Today: From Arab Spring to Failed State’. AlJazeera, 2017. [Online] available from: https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2017/5/30/libya-today-from-arab-spring-to-failed-state. Accessed 25th November 2020.  

[5] Wehrey, p.10.

[6] Chivvis, Christopher and Martini, Jeffrey. ‘Economic Stabilization and the Oil Economy.’ in Libya After Qaddafi: Lessons and Implications for the Future. RAND Corporation, 2014, pp. 53–64. JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/10.7249/j.ctt6wq7w7.11

[7] ‘Oil and Gas in the new Libyan Era: Conflict and Continuity’. The Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, 2019. https://www.oxfordenergy.org/wpcms/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/Oil-and-Gas-in-a-New-Libyan-Era-Conflict-and-Continuity-MEP-22.pdf

[8] Pack, Jason. ‘How Libya’s economic structures enrich the militias’. Middle East Institute, 2019. https://www.mei.edu/publications/how-libyas-economic-structures-enrich-militias

[9] See Suñer Marzari, Ricard. ‘The war in Libya and its oil resources: order inside chaos?’ Atalayar, 2020.

[10] See Chivvis, Christopher and Martini, Jeffrey. ‘Economic Stabilization and the Oil Economy.’ in Libya After Qaddafi: Lessons and Implications for the Future.

[11] See Suñer Marzari, Ricard. ‘The war in Libya and its oil resources: order inside chaos?’ Atalayar, 2020.

[12] ‘Extremist Groups’ in LIBYA, EXTREMISM, & THE CONSEQUENCES OF COLLAPSE. Soufan Group, 2016, pp. 11–15. www.jstor.org/stable/resrep10785.9.

Geiger, Julianne. ‘Can ISIS gain power over Libya’s Oil?’ USA Today Money. Online available from: https://eu.usatoday.com/story/mon ey/markets/2016/01/16/can-isis-gain-power-over-libyas-oil/78873374/ . Accessed 27th November 2020.

COVID Continues - Part II, with Giancarlo Fiorella

An Interview Series on the Political Implications of the Pandemic

By Fabiana Natale and Gilles de Valk

Over the summer of 2020, Fabiana Natale and Gilles de Valk conducted the ‘Conversing COVID’ interview series on the political implications of the pandemic. Now that many countries are experiencing another wave of infections and the world has learned more about the virus, Fabiana and Gilles are launching a second interview series: ‘COVID Continues’. They will speak to experts from different backgrounds on the (geo)political, security, and societal consequences of this pandemic. 

For this second episode, we spoke with Giancarlo Fiorella, Investigator and Trainer for Latin America at Bellingcat. Giancarlo is also a PhD student at the University of Toronto, writing his thesis on protest policing in Venezuela, focusing on the role of civilian armed groups. During our conversation, we discussed the benefits of open source investigation as well as the impact of the pandemic in Venezuela.

Could you give us an example of what you have been working on for Bellingcat recently? 

In the last weeks, I have been working on an academic journal article that is a combination of my academic work and my work for Bellingcat. Bellingcat investigates the authenticity of user-generated content online, by verifying the time and location of videos and pictures, for example. We tried to apply this methodology to the academic context with two colleagues, making the argument that it can be as useful for academic researchers as it has been for non-academic and human rights investigators.

Another project I have been working on recently is the development of a database of aviation related to Venezuela. In Venezuela, there is no public aircraft register, which are usually held by national aviation authorities and are publicly available in other countries. I have been developing this for a year, mostly through flight tracking. It was very interesting to discover, for instance, that a plane that looked like a simple commercial airplane, was actually a luxurious jet used by the Venezuelan President, Nicolás Maduro, and his friends.

What are the benefits of open source investigation? 

Open source investigation can be very beneficial when it comes to investigating human rights abuses, war crimes, or crimes against humanity. One of the more practical benefits is reactive fact checking, which can be achieved with a wide range of digital tools, ranging from Google, Yandex, or Bing searches to reverse image searches. 

These tools can be applied, for example, to press conferences held by Venezuelan government officials, in order to verify their claims. It can also be used to verify stories that are spread via Twitter accounts with large amounts of followers. A person can share an image or a video from ten years ago in combination with an unrelated event that is happening right now. This happens every single day and it is important to debunk such information before it causes widespread panic.

Besides, open source investigation is so broad that you can apply it in lots of different areas. In that sense, your imagination is the limit. It also works well in academia, for instance. I am doing my thesis on protest policing in Venezuela, but did not need to go into the field, because I was able to access hundreds of pictures and videos from protests that people had shared online.

Can you tell us about the impact of the pandemic in Venezuela?

I noticed a couple of trends in Venezuela early on in the pandemic. First of all, there was a malignant underreporting of Covid-19 cases by the government. While Colombia would report hundreds of cases per day, Venezuela would report six or seven. Although the low numbers occurred due to a lack of testing capabilities and appropriate infrastructure, the government celebrated those low figures. Eventually, testing ramped up and their record reached hundreds of cases a day. To compare, they reported over 28,000 cases in September and only 190 in April.

Another interesting thing to look at is the government’s quarantine measures. While the incubation period is considered to last up to two weeks, the Venezuelan government implemented the so-called ‘seven by seven’ (siete por siete) quarantine. It means that you can go out for seven days and then you stay home for seven days. This scheme came across as nonsensical and maybe unique in the world, but it might have been motivated by economic considerations. Even on the days that one has to stay home, hardly anybody can afford to do it. When large segments of the population are chronically poor, people cannot wait for tomorrow as they need to make money.

Finally, another trend is the government’s demonisation of migrants, who were coming back to Venezuela from Colombia. Maduro himself accused the Colombian government of purposefully infecting people with Covid-19 and sending them to Venezuela to spread the virus, and state officials engaged with this rhetoric of ‘biological warfare’. 

What was the impact of this demonisation of refugees? 

There was already a humanitarian crisis happening in Venezuela before the pandemic hit, with a mass exodus of refugees, and this rhetoric only worsened it. Quarantine camps were set up at the border and migrants are kept in quarantine before they are allowed to travel further into the country. Several shocking testimonies revealed that the conditions of the camps are deplorable. They are overcrowded, inhabited both by sick people and pregnant women. People have been denied clothing, sleeping quarters, and access to food and medicine. The way those camps operate are the result of this demonisation. When the country’s leader accuses migrants of being walking weapons, it is impossible to implement a policy aimed to improve their well-being.

How did the public react to the government downplaying the situation and demonising refugees? 

That is hard to say, but I suspect that people followed these government announcements with caution. The majority of Venezuelans are used to having a government that lies. There is no meaningful counterbalance, as the government has a tight grip on the media. Because of the lack of reliable sources, there is a general disinterest in what the government says, also when it comes to the number of reported cases of Covid-19.

Regarding the demonisation of refugees, some Venezuelan human rights organisations denounced state officials’ comments about migrants being biological warfare agents, as well as the poor treatment of refugees at the border. However, the average citizen is not necessarily aware of those issues.

Did the relationship between police and society change in Venezuela during the pandemic? 

For my thesis, I am interviewing people about how they feel about the official government forces, which are the police and the national guards, and about the civilian armed groups (colectivos armados) that attack protesters. People tend to empathise somewhat with the police and national guards. Even though they do not agree with the repression, they understand that those forces are simply doing their job. I do not think that the pandemic changed anything in this sense. If anything, there have been fewer protests, so people are being less exposed to antagonistic contact with the police.

You mentioned civilian armed groups that also intervene in protest policing. Are they motivated by overlapping interests with the police in stopping the protests?

The colectivos armados are usually regarded as pro-government groups. Some of them are directly financed by the government to repress protestors or they may receive privileges, such as priority access to housing. However, they also include people who are not in direct contact with the government.

In most countries, there are no civilian groups repressing protests alongside the police. In the United States, however, this is starting to change, with neo-Nazi groups and other white supremacist militias. They are not officially allied with the police and are usually even against the police, but in that specific protest window, those civilian groups and the police have an overlapping interest in repressing it.

Do you think that such violence against protesters has increased since the beginning of the pandemic?

In Venezuela, such responses to protests go back to 2014, when Maduro faced the first anti-government protests. Nevertheless, the precursors to these colectivos armados already existed in the 1960s, when leftist guerrilla groups were operating across the country. Today, you still see protests happening in Caracas. They are mostly short in time and related to a specific sector, like a week of demonstrations by nurses, but major nation-wide demonstrations occurred in 2014 and 2017.

Furthermore, the pandemic has led to an increased dissemination of conspiracy theories. Did this make your job at Bellingcat more difficult in any way?

This did not necessarily make our job harder, because most Covid-19 conspiracy theories are not really new. Many of them are simply modifications of existing ones. For instance, the idea that 5G towers are causing Covid-19 is piggybacking on the theory that 5G is harmful, which is based on the belief that electrical transmission towers are dangerous. Either way, the fast spread of conspiracy theories related to Covid-19 demonstrated that there is a certain segment of the population that will not seek the scientific truth and will simply accept such theories without double checking. However, I see my job at Bellingcat to give the most fact-based account of events, but not to convince people of a particular thing. 

What can we learn from this pandemic? 

The pandemic has taught us that a significant segment of the population will not listen to reason and will not take the most basic and reasonable steps that are needed for their own good and for the good of others. This is especially worrying to me when I think about what we will have to do against climate change, which will demand larger sacrifices. The kinds of sacrifices we are asked to make to face Covid-19, such as not going to a bar or wearing a face mask, are not comparable to those we will have to make against climate change. It makes me sceptical about whether we can deal with the climate crisis in an effective manner as a species. 

A positive element, though, is that we were able to come up with a vaccine in record time. Thus, it also shows our ability to react in extreme situations and that results can come from a concerted effort. In that sense, I think we can say that crises bring out both the best and the worst of societies.

The Revision of the U.S. Anti-Personnel Landmine Ban: An Unnecessary Move That Will Detonate on Innocent People

 By Maarten Visser

The COVID-19 pandemic has become the focal point of world affairs and relegated other pressing matters to the background. One item that has not gained the attention it deserves is the decision of the U.S. government to revise their anti-personnel landmine (APL) policy. On the 31st of January 2020, the U.S. Secretary of Defense announced the withdrawal from Barack Obama’s Presidential Policy Directive 37 (PPD-37)[1], which had largely prohibited the usage, production, stockpiling, and transfer of APLs outside of the Korean peninsula.[2] In this article I will express strong reservations towards this policy shift, arguing that the Trump administration has made a short-sighted and unnecessary decision which will have dangerous repercussions.

Over the past few decades, numerous  anti-mine lobby initiatives (often led by prominent figures) and international agreements have strived to put a ban on these devastating hidden-killers, and with steady success. Since the ratification of the Ottawa Treaty – to which 164 countries are party, the highest number of any disarmament agreement – in December 1997, the number of innocent people maimed or killed by mines and other explosive remnants of war has been in serious decline, from an estimated 24,000 victims in 1996 to roughly 7,000 casualties in 2018.[3] However, these humanitarian accomplishments and the overall objective to attain an APL-free world are now at serious risk due to this shift in American policy. Not only is it morally reprehensible, but it also sends a dangerous signal to the rest of the world, giving other states the green light to exploit APLs. But what is most curious about the reform is that the motivations lying behind it are remarkably weak.

The U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) defended their decision on the grounds of strategic and military necessity.[4] A bankrupt argument, to say the least, because history evidences that the effectiveness of mines as a warfare instrument is peripheral at best, and in some instances even counterproductive. Take the Gulf War, for instance: out of the estimated 9 million mines sown in Kuwait, few – if any – resulted in damage to armed forces. Similarly, numerous high-level U.S. commanders have long argued that APLs are no real ‘force multipliers.’[5] Former U.S. Marine Corps four-star general Alfred M. Gray Jr. stated aptly: “I know of no situation in the Korean War, nor in the five years I served in Southeast Asia, nor in Panama, nor  Desert Shield-Desert Storm, where our use of mine warfare truly channelized the enemy and brought him into a destructive pattern. I’m not aware of any operational advantage from the broad deployment of mines.”[6] Similarly, the International Commission of the Red Cross already established in 1996 that the APL only delays missions and ‘has become less relevant to modern armoured warfare’.[7]

Even stronger objections can be levelled at the DoD’s technical justification to reemploy APLs. The Department claims that their so-called “smart mine” with a self-destructive mechanism will be ‘more protective of non-combatants.’[8] This oxymoron reminds me of another controversial U.S. policy supported by the Trump Administration: the U.S. government once euphemistically termed torture practices as ‘enhanced interrogation.’[9] It sounds appealing, but is not: APLs destroy innocent lives rather than protect them. They are not « smart » either, at least not intelligent enough to distinguish soldiers from civilians. Besides, their self-destructive feature has been heavily contested because of their inaccuracy and malfunctioning.[10] This is not to say that their performance matters: my point is that mines are inherently dangerous and sugar-coating them will inevitably lead us down a slippery slope. In fact, their long-term nature is undeniable, as APLs planted during World War II and the Vietnam War, for example, still injure and kill people today.[11] Moreover, designating mines as “smart” is nothing more than a poor attempt to justify an unnecessary and dangerous policy. Smart mines do not build a safer world; only abandoning them does.

Although APLs have not become any smarter, modern mine technology has made them far more lethal and harder to detect. For example, the U.S. M16 has a casualty radius of up to 30 meters and is partly buried underground, which makes it extremely difficult to spot with the human eye.[12] In light of this, I cannot stress enough that to this day half of all mine victims are children. Consider the tragic story of Sot Tol: he lost his left leg to an APL when he and three of his friends, who all died from the incident, had mistaken it for a toy.[13] But APLs can have more devastating effects, as they are usually employed from the air, covering large territory: they create widespread “death-zones” in which human life has become impossible. The use of minefields therefore results in mass migration that, in turn, sparks conflict elsewhere.[14] Additionally, the devastating effects of APLs – these are not limited to physical injuries, they also include the agonising psychological suffering – often overburden the healthcare systems in countries where mines are deployed on a massive scale.

Furthermore, in policymaking it is vital to make a trade-off between the benefits and the drawbacks of a policy, something that has clearly been overlooked with the 2020 revision of the APL ban. The doubtful strategic advantage of APLs is not, however, worth the severe human suffering they bring about. It must also be noted that imposing the American sense of morality on the world comes with far-reaching responsibilities. This is to say that the U.S., in its self-designated role as the world’s moral leader, should not always fight fire with fire. This means that President-elect Joe Biden has to, besides tackling the COVID-19 pandemic, another important mission to pursue, give the world a strong signal to exterminate APLs. Obama’s PPD-37 was an important move in the right direction; unfortunately, the Trump administration took a dangerous turn for the worse. It is now up to a new U.S. government to help build a safe and APL-free world.

Sources

[1] In the Barack Obama Administration, the directives that are used to promulgate Presidential decisions on national security matters are designated Presidential Policy Directives (PPDs). Retrieved at:  http://the-monitor.org/en-gb/reports/2015/united-states/mine-ban-policy.aspx

[2] Memorandum for Secretaries of the Military Departments of January 31st, 2020, DoD Policy on Landmines. Retrieved at: https://media.defense.gov/2020/Jan/31/2002242359/-1/-1/1/DOD-POLICY-ON-LANDMINES.PDF

[3] Monitor, Landmine, Ban Policy and Mine Action. “Landmine Monitor 2018.” Concord: International Campaign to ban Landmines (2010).

[4] DoD Policy on Landmines, p. 1.

[5] Blagden, Paddy. "Anti-Personnel Landmines-Friend or Foe." A Study of the Military Use and Effectiveness of Anti—Personnel Mines (1996), 44.

[6] Ibid., 41.

[7] Blagden, Anti-Personnel Landmines-Friend or Foe, 42.

[8] DoD Policy on Landmines, 2.

[9] See for example: https://thesecuritydistillery.org/all-articles/why-torture-is-ethically-unjustifiable-1?rq=maarten

[10] Blagden, Anti-Personnel Landmines-Friend or Foe, 59-60, and see also John Ismay, 13 November 2018, The U.S. Army Is Trying to Develop New Land Mines — Ones That Don’t Harm Civilians, New York Times https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/13/magazine/army-landmines.html

[11] Roberts, Shawn, and Jody Williams. After the guns fall silent: The enduring legacy of landmines. Oxfam (1995), 5-6.

[12] Pike, John. M14/M16 Anti-personnel Mines (AP), Military Analysis Network https://fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/land/apm.htm

[13] Perry, Mark. Not Even the Military Thinks Landmines Are A ‘Vital Tool’, The American Conservative  https://www.theamericanconservative.com/articles/not-even-the-military-thinks-landmines-are-a-vital-tool/

[14] Larsen, Kaj. Op-ed: Reversing the landmine ban will explode on Us, Navy Times https://www.navytimes.com/news/your-navy/2020/02/17/op-ed-reversing-the-landmine-ban-will-explode-on-us/

Climate Denial in Australia

Last year, the world watched in utter shock as Australia burned. In Australia, bushfires are a natural phenomenon that affects numerous parts of the country yearly. However, the fires of the “Black Summer period” of 2019/2020 were unprecedented in nature and scope. By March 2020, the fires had engulfed over 19 million hectares of Australian land, destroyed over 3000 houses, killed 33 people and over 1 billion animals. [1] One would think that the extensive economic and social heartache that resulted from these fires would create a political and cultural shift in recognising climate change as a priority at a national level. However, in the aftermath of this crisis, a political and cultural persistence of climate change denial trickles down from the national level to the Australian population who are thus more likely to believe that climate change is not at all a serious issue. Australian news readers are more likely to believe that climate change is not at all a serious issue compared to their global counterparts. [2]

This should come as no surprise, considering Australia’s climate policies inherently lack urgency, and remain stagnant in their effectiveness of meeting the Paris Agreements proposed net-zero emission goals by 2050. In fact, it has been projected that if these policies remain as they are, Australia’s greenhouse gas emissions are projected to increase by 8.6% above 2005 levels by 2030. [3] This projection combined with the recent fires should come as a clear warning call to Australian officials to recognise climate change as a threat to Australia’s national security and as something worth prioritising. This article sets out to explain why there seems to be a sense of climate denial inherent throughout Australian politics and society, which ultimately stagnates Australia’s progress towards net-zero emissions and subjects Australia to global criticism in the race against climate change.

 By Christie Hawking

Climate Change in Australian Politics

Over the course of the last decades Australian politics have been tumultuous in nature. With a continuous stream of coalition governments overthrowing each other, it is no surprise that maintaining an adequate climate change strategy has proven to be challenging. The issue of climate change in Australian politics had its first turning point in 1997, with the signing of the Kyoto Protocol under the first Howard government. [4] What was interesting about this deal was that Australia was one of only three countries permitted to increase its emissions, but only by 8% above 1990 level onwards to 2010.[1] In order to manage this goal amidst a projected rapid population growth, John Howard announced an 180 million dollar greenhouse package outlining reforms and ongoing commitment to the Greenhouse Challenge Program. [5] This momentum was  short-lived as Howard’s cabinet resolved not to ratify the Kyoto treaty in 2001.

Going into the 2007 elections, public support grew for climate abatement strategies as Australia was blanketed by punishing droughts. Labor won the election, who campaigned to introduce a more comprehensive emissions trading scheme. As both coalitions agreed on some level that a new emissions scheme was needed, a combined effort by Labor's environmental minister and then Liberal leader Malcolm Turnbull closed a deal to legislate the Carbon Pollution Reduction Scheme (CPRS) in 2009. Due to internal disagreement within the opposition party, the iberal Leader was voted out by his own party, and replaced by a minister who was a renowned climate change sceptic, in turn, blocking support of the CPRS. This was met with an influx of news media reporting the commitment reversal, producing an immediate crash in public support for the Labor Leader, prompting a resignation and instatement of a new Labor Leader. Labor remained in power after the 2010 election and introduced a “temporary” carbon tax, which was not welcomed by the opposition. Liberal returned to power via an early election, and in a surprising turn of events, the then Liberal Leader who had opposed all previous climate policy, committed Australia to the Paris agreement in reducing emissions by 26% from 2005 levels by 2030. [6] In 2015, Liberal won the scheduled election, but the leader was ousted in 2018 because of his plan to implement modest emission targets on the energy sector. [7] He was replaced by Liberal Conservative Scott Morrison, the current Prime Minister, who has proven to be a loyalist to Australia’s huge coal industry. [8] Simultaneously, the previous Prime minister who signed the Paris Agreement in 2014, has been campaigning for Australia to withdraw from the Paris agreement, based on the premise that Australia would have not joined the treaty without the United States, that had recently withdrawn from the agreement in 2017 under the Trump Administration. [9]

 

Climate Denial and Media Power

With three Prime Ministers ousted with progressive climate policy ideas and the shifting viewpoints between major actors, it is no wonder many Australians are sceptical of the causes of climate change. However, this is not the only major influence fostering a sense of climate denial. Since the 1970s, political science researchers have suggested that the Australian political system resembles an elite top down system of governance, allowing for the media and politicians together to set the daily agenda of what is newsworthy, and what should be accepted as the dominant narrative and the truth. [10] When analysing the power dynamics between media and politics in Australia, it has been argued that NewsCorp, run by Rupert Murdoch, who controls 70% of local newspapers in Australia is “the most powerful political force in Australia”. [11] The notion that a media conglomerate is possibly the driving factor behind political discourse is not unique to Australia. Rupert Murdoch has been subject to multiple inquiries in the UK and the USA, and was criticised by politicians and editors of his newspapers that he would interfere with the content, and had a “determination to impose his will”. [12] This involved shifting blame to the left, protecting conservative leaders and diverting attention from climate change. [13]

NewsCorp was criticised over a new stream of misinformation reporting throughout the bushfire crisis that aimed at protecting the fossil fuel industry, as over 100 million tonnes of new coal extraction was approved by state and federal governments. [14] Furthermore, it was found that 75% of all NewsCorp articles denied the influence of climate change on the wild fires, which, in turn, ignited a rapid circulation of bush fire disinformation on social media. [15] Adding more controversy, former Prime Minister Kevin Rudd has recently launched a petition for a royal commission inquiry into the tight ownership of Australian media by Murdoch. [16] As Newscorp owns 70% of newspaper media in Australia and all newspapers in Queensland, it is claimed that this lack of diversity in news reporting has sowed doubt, and obscured fact rather than introduce fact to disperse doubt. [17] A study on climate change was included in the Australian version of the Digital News Report, and results found that news consumers who get their news from “left-wing” sources were more concerned about climate change than those who get their news from “right-wing” sources. [18]This study also found Australia had three times more climate change deniers than the global average, ranking it third in climate change denial, only behind the USA and Sweden.

Is a change of course imminent?

 As it stands, Australia has not made any new commitments in relation to carbon neutrality. However, with the new Biden Administration taking effect in January in the USA, this makes Australia an outlier on climate inaction and will revert the spotlight back on them once Biden officially re-joins the Paris Agreement as set out in his election campaign. This combined with the mounting pressure put on Australian institutions to diversify media ownership away from the Murdoch empire, as well as increasing global criticisms over Australia’s stagnant stance in the race against climate change will hopefully see a positive shift away from climate denial.

Sources

[1]Filkov, Alexander I., et al. "Impact of Australia's catastrophic 2019/20 bushfire season on communities and environment. Retrospective analysis and current trends." Journal of Safety Science and Resilience 1.1 (2020): 44-56.

 [2] Fischer, Caroline & Park, Sora (2020). The number of climate deniers in Australia is more than double the global average, new survey finds. Retrieved from: https://theconversation.com/the-number-of-climate-deniers-in-australia-is-more-than-double-the-global-average-new-survey-finds-140450

[3] Climate Analytics (2020). Evaluating Australia's climate policy action

https://climateanalytics.org/briefings/evaluating-australias-climate-policy-action/

[4] Crabb, Annabel, (2018). Australia's recent climate change policy: A brief history of seven killings. ABC News. Retrieved from: https://www.abc.net.au/news/2018-08-23/climate-change-policy-a-brief-history-of-seven-killings/10152616

[5] Kay, Paul (1998) Terms and Impacts of the Kyoto Protocol

https://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Parliamentary_Departments/Parliamentary_Library/Publications_Archive/CIB/CIB9798/98CIB10#AUST

[6] Crabb, Annabel, (2018). Australia's recent climate change policy: A brief history of seven killings. ABC News. Retrieved from: https://www.abc.net.au/news/2018-08-23/climate-change-policy-a-brief-history-of-seven-killings/10152616

[7] Pach, James (2013). Australian PM Julia Gillard Ousted, Kevin Rudd Back. THE DIPLOMAT. https://thediplomat.com/2013/06/australian-pm-julia-gillard-ousted-kevin-rudd-back/

https://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Parliamentary_Departments/Parliamentary_Library/Publications_Archive/CIB/CIB9798/98CIB10#AUST

[8]Chow, Lorraine (2018). Australian Prime Minister Ousted Over Climate Policy. Eco Watch. Retrieved from: https://www.ecowatch.com/australia-prime-minister-climate-policy-2598685521.html

[9] France 24 (2020). Australian parliament to probe Murdoch media dominance. Retrieved from:https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20201111-australian-parliament-to-probe-murdoch-media-dominance

[10] Shearman, David (2020). Denial is at the heart of PM Scott Morrison’s delusional refusal to treat the cancer of climate change. The News Daily.

https://thenewdaily.com.au/life/science/environment/2020/01/09/denial-climate-change-scott-morrison/

[11] Garden, Rose (2017). Statement by President Trump on the Paris Climate Accord. Government publication:

https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/statement-president-trump-paris-climate-accord/

[12] Taylor, Maria (2014) Global Warming and Climate Change: What Australia Knew and Buried. Australian National University. Retrieved from: https://press-files.anu.edu.au/downloads/press/p303951/html/Chapt07.xhtml?referer=&page=12

[13] Beecher, Eric (2020). Murdoch’s power: how it works and how it debases Australia. Retrieved from: https://www.crikey.com.au/2020/10/23/rupert-murdoch-power/

[14]Jones, Ed (2019). Five reasons why we don’t have a free and independent press in the UK and what we can do about it.  https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/opendemocracyuk/five-reasons-why-we-don-t-have-free-and-independent-press-in-uk-and-what-we-can-do-about/

[15] Covering Climate Now (2020). Robert Murdoch Climate Fires. Retrieved from: https://www.coveringclimatenow.org/climate-beat/climate-coverage-improved-in-2019-but-2020-is-the-real-test

[16] Brailsford, Louis (2020) Burnt Country. Greenpeace Australia Pacific. Retrieved from.

https://www.greenpeace.org.au/wp/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/Dirty-Power-Burnt-Country_Report_FINAL.pdf

[17] SBS NEWS (2020). 'Cancer on our democracy': Kevin Rudd calls for inquiry into Murdoch media dominance. Retrieved from: https://www.sbs.com.au/news/cancer-on-our-democracy-kevin-rudd-calls-for-inquiry-into-murdoch-media-dominance

[18]Park, Sora et al. (2020). Digital News Report: Australia 2020. University of Canberra. Retrieved from: https://apo.org.au/sites/default/files/resource-files/2020-06/apo-nid305057.pdf