COVID Continues - Part I, with Jonáš Syrovátka

An Interview Series on the Political Implications of the Pandemic

By Fabiana Natale and Gilles de Valk

Over the summer of 2020, Fabiana Natale and Gilles de Valk conducted the ‘Conversing COVID’ interview series on the political implications of the pandemic. Now that many countries are experiencing another wave of infections and the world has learned more about the virus, Fabiana and Gilles are launching a second interview series: ‘COVID Continues’. They will speak to experts from different backgrounds on the (geo)political, security, and societal consequences of this pandemic. 

For this first episode of our second interview series, we interviewed Jonáš Syrovátka, Program Manager at the Prague Security Studies Institute (PSSI). Mr. Syrovátka primarily works on projects concerning Russian influence activities in the Czech Republic. During our conversation we discussed the ‘infodemic’ amid the pandemic.

Can you tell us something about the Prague Security Studies Institute (PSSI) and the work you do?

PSSI was established in 2002, filling a gap in the field of security studies in the Czech Republic. Since then, it has developed as a prominent centre for security affairs, bringing together professionals and academics, and focusing on issues such as economic warfare and space- and cybersecurity. I started doing research at the Institute in late 2016, focusing on disinformation. I look at disinformation in elections, at disinformation business models of online platforms, and now also at disinformation throughout the pandemic, among other things.

The pandemic has led to an increase of online activity and a proliferation of disinformation. What are your most important observations regarding disinformation during the corona crisis?

It was interesting to see that people who are behind various conspiracy websites were actually surprised by the pandemic. They did not have a narrative at hand that they could start pushing, but soon enough they tried to incorporate this event into their broader agenda. Conspiracy websites tend to be critical about the West and the European Union in particular. Before the pandemic, for example, the EU would be criticised for migration issues, but now the handling of the coronavirus became their main point of criticism. Narratives about how the EU handled the pandemic fit into the broader narrative of the EU’s failures. I would say the coronavirus became a driver for such platforms, pushing their long-term agenda.

Who are the main actors of disinformation activities? 

Disinformation in the Czech Republic is centred around dozens of websites, which are very diverse. People who are spreading disinformation are not only some mad men or proxies of foreign powers, but also entrepreneurs trying to benefit from people’s fear or longing for alternative explanations. So, there are ideological blogs, but also platforms that are trying to make money out of spreading conspiracy theories. Furthermore, these ideas are being shared on social media such as Facebook, so it is a very dynamic process. In a way, platforms are creating some kind of echo system that is interconnected.

In one of your reports on the ‘infodemic’, you made the distinction between different types of websites, such as ‘quasi-media platforms’, ‘conspiracy sites’, and the ‘blogosphere’. Could you explain their differences and why is it important to make these distinctions?

Quasi-media platforms attempt to present themselves as regular news outlets, providing  some objective content, but a substantial part of their coverage is biased and problematic. Then there are conspiracy websites, producing outright lies and dubious theories. The third category is the blogosphere, where opinion pieces on fringe views circulate. They tend to mix some conspiracy thinking into their arguments. It is important to be aware of these distinctions when drafting strategies to counter those who are spreading disinformation and conspiracy theories.

Are there any distinct trends in what you called the ‘Czech disinformation ecosystem’ in one of your reports when compared to other countries?

Although I am not an expert on other countries, the Czech disinformation ecosystem is unique because it is also used by a Slovak audience. Czech conspiracy websites often have quite some follow-up in Slovakia. Czech disinformation and conspiracy websites often have quite some follow-up in Slovakia. For instance, this is significant for Russian news agency Sputnik, which has a Czech branch, but not a Slovakian one. Hence, the Czech website is supposed to serve the Slovak audience as well.

How has the response of the Czech government been so far in debunking disinformation narratives? 

Initially, the response was good. Already in 2016, a National Security Audit was adopted, which focused on terrorism and migration, but also on disinformation. In 2017, the Centre Against Terrorism and Hybrid Threats was established by the Ministry of Interior. Furthermore, the Czech military made some great progress regarding communication in the past years. Unfortunately however, some developments halted because of a lack of political will, even though the plans on how to proceed are there. Still, the initiative seems to lie within the individual departments. It is not systemic enough and I think the communication problem of the Czech government has been made visible during the pandemic. 

Conspiracy theories were considered harmless for a long time. Are we still underestimating their reach? And, are we dealing with them better than before? 

I actually think we tend to overestimate their reach and influence in society at the moment, but we have to be careful and we need more research. In particular, we need more sociological studies on why people believe conspiracy theories and if or when people are willing to act upon them. Without this knowledge, we will not be able to reach out to these people and to return them back into the democratic discussion. 

It seems like the coronavirus is here to stay for at least another couple of months. How do you think the spread of disinformation and conspiracy theories will develop over the course of, and after, the pandemic? 

I think conspiracy theories will become more embedded in the everyday rhetoric. They will become especially dangerous when there are specific topics to interact with, such as a vaccine. This is an opportunity for engagement with pre-existing scepticism towards vaccination. I expect this to become an important topic. We will have to accept that after the pandemic, there will still be people who believe in conspiracy theories. However, this should be of no surprise, because we have had extremist politicians for the last thirty years, spreading dubious narratives. Nevertheless, the question is not whether conspiracy theories will stay or go, the question is how to limit their influence and how to make sure they will not lead to radicalisation and to people doing things that are really dangerous.

How closely affiliated are conspiracy theorists and rightwing extremists?

We should not underestimate the coalition between extremists and conspiracy theorists. Conspiracy theories provide a comfortable place for the buildup of an internal logic to support certain political positions, isolating them from the rest of the debate, which can be very dangerous. We should watch their engagement closely.

How can we counter disinformation?

There are multiple answers and we should realise countering disinformation is not only a security question, but also socio-political one. The crucial thing is to have a conversation about how the state should operate in the information space in the twenty-first century and how we can enforce laws in the online space. Secondly, breaking down advertising on disinformation websites by private parties could be an important step in limiting such websites’ outreach. On top of that, social media platforms should rethink their algorithms and how they approach their content. Nevertheless, I think the personal aspect is as important as the algorithms. Not only do we get information via social media, but also from friends, family, colleagues, and a number of other personal sources. Usually, we trust people around us the most, rather than Facebook. 

What lessons should we learn from the pandemic?

The pandemic is a great case study for disinformation, because there is a set group of people in a set period of time focusing on a single topic. This helps us to better understand which actors are present in the information space and also to learn how to communicate with each other about our beliefs and opinions. 2020 is a terrible year to live in, but will be an interesting year to look back at. 

The prison dilemma

The current pandemic and overcrowded jails form a dangerous cocktail. In addition to insalubrious detention conditions, they present a real challenge in terms of sanitary risks. The first responses aimed to ensure better social distancing to limit the spread of the disease. However, they posed certain issues in regards to human rights protection. [1]

Therefore, several countries opted for a drastic reduction of the number of inmates, which could not have occurred without loud reactions from civil society, shouting claims of justice and safety. In France, for instance, where occupation rates in jail can reach 200%, the liberation all at once of 8,000 inmates who had almost completed their sentence was not sufficient to ensure optimal health and safety conditions. The prospect of also releasing defendants who were awaiting trial launched a heated nation-wide discussion on who deserves liberty. [2]

In Italy, prisons are equally overpopulated. The ban on family visits and the poor handling in front of the high contagion risk led to prison riots that resulted in the death of 14 detainees and 72 escapes. Despite a huge and successful manhunt, the simple fact that dangerous mafiosi had escaped, already inflamed public debate. Adding fuel to the fire, the question of the intentional release of mafia bosses based on the need for medical care provoked a national scandal. [3]

These dilemmas raise a fundamental question: why do we feel the need to lock up criminals in detention facilities in the first place?

By Fabiana Natale

Those two cases reflect a certain understanding of safety and justice in our societies, which irremediably pairs with incarceration. But where does this conception come from and why do we feel the need to put criminals in jail? Usually, four factors are to be taken into consideration by the judge: retribution for wrongdoing, rehabilitation, community safety, and deterrence. [4] 

However, crime punishment would be less necessary if crime itself could be prevented.

CRIME PREVENTION AS A KEY STARTER

Indeed, much can be done in order to prevent, or at least reduce, crime.

First, one should consider the huge expenditure represented by detention facilities. Even just economic considerations would be a strong argument for more prevention activities. Indeed cost-benefit calculations of criminal justice policies show that investments for education or police are incredibly more effective than those for incarceration: as such, the return  on investment for education reaches 100% and 83% for the police, against only 29% for detention facilities. [5]

Nevertheless, public safety should remain the first concern. In that regard, adopting a public health approach to violence could contribute to significant reductions in crime. Some key elements would be more investments in education, increased access to healthcare, improved neighbourhood infrastructures, and reinforced local communities. Finally, developing drug rehabilitation centres instead of ignoring drug addiction and sanctioning it, has also proven particularly valuable. [6]

Needless to say, it would be impossible to rely exclusively on prevention. Responses to crime are still needed, which brings us back to the question of incarceration.

A FEW REFLEXIONS ON INCARCERATION

Traditionally, incarceration has not always been the answer to deter crime. Before, exile and physical punishment were. Just as jails today, they carried a retribution dimension, met the need for community safety, and fulfilled the requirement of the wrongdoers’ exclusion. Now, in the light of human rights (the respect of which is questionable in today’s jails though) imprisonment seems to be a meaningful solution. Nevertheless, is it the only viable option?

When it comes to short term sentences, for minor offenses and crimes, could curfews, house arrests, and probation not be a better solution? Could community service not serve the same purpose and be even more useful? Why put in jail a cannabis user instead of fining them? And do problem-solving courts and community-based programmes not provide a fairer and more successful response towards public interest? [7]

On the other hand, long-term incarcerations are also questionable. Aside from being costly to taxpayers, they prevent a portion of the population from contributing to their society. So why do we apply them? [8] 

One argument is that they represent retribution for the victims. But studies show that a majority of victims of violence would prefer a reduced prison sentence and more efforts for the rehabilitation of abusers and the prevention of new crimes. Another common argument relies on public safety: if they are locked up, they cannot use violence against other citizens. However, it has been proven that, on average, violence drastically decreases as a person matures. Also, the psychological and ethical advancement of a detainee is brought to the fore as a justification for the prison system, as if jails would just help them become more “moral”. But experience also shows that long imprisonments deeply change personalities, in a way that can often be traumatizing for the inmate, especially in terms of trust. [9]

Finally, a key motivation for long incarcerations is to avoid recidivism; however, reoffending is still common.

THE QUESTION OF RECIDIVISM

Incarceration could actually serve this purpose, if it somehow helped rehabilitating offenders, incapacitating the most dangerous ones, or if its experience alone would deter crime. Yet, it can also bring opposite results by preventing proper post-release employment opportunities or provoking a feeling of resentment in the inmates, who further identify as delinquents, while reinforced social stigmas worsen their feeling of alienation. [10]

The concomitance of such conditions explains why recidivism is still so common, at least for small crimes such as robberies. Indeed, violent crimes are usually either the result of a complex and very specific context (and often perpetrated by a former victim), which explains why they would not reoccur, or might be committed due to mental illnesses and need, therefore, to be treated differently. Certainly, one should avoid the pitfall of stigmatization of mentally-ill criminals, especially as they are not a majority. However, when talking about recidivism, their handling cannot be ignored as they are four times more likely to reoffend. For them, jails are an expensive and ineffective response, and proper mental care is needed. In that regard, the Netherlands constitute a valid and valuable example, as they provide their mentally-ill prisoners with the necessary care. [11]

DEVELOPING ALTERNATIVES

This being said, our argument is that crime should be responded to through a combination of solutions. This involves the alternatives we mentioned earlier, but also jail, to some extent. Indeed, this piece does not aim to oppose incarceration, but simply raise questions on its efficiency, fairness and lastly, the meaningfulness of its use today, which we know, could be improved. As a matter of fact, more efforts could be made on in-jail education, rehabilitation (through virtual role-play treatment programmes for instance), or post-release reintegration. [12]

We can conclude with the case of Norway, which the author deems to be an example to follow, as its alternative system has shown promising results. Its new prisons, even when described as maximum-security facilities, apply a certain laissez-faire approach, with no barred windows or security cameras. The guards are unarmed and develop actual relationships with the inmates. These “open prisons” have proven very effective: they are cheaper, with sentences of only eight months in average, built on prisoner trust and personal responsibility, and with positive results in terms of rehabilitation and recidivism (with one of the lowest rates in the world: 20%). [13] 

Sources

[1] WDR (2020), “Corona im Gefängnis: "Ohne Besuche zerbrechen Familien" [online] available at :  https://www1.wdr.de/nachrichten/themen/coronavirus/corona-gefaengnis-gewerkschaft-100.html

Gomez, François-Xavier (2020), “Prisons : la double peine de la pandémie” Libération [online] available at :

https://www.liberation.fr/planete/2020/04/09/prisons-la-double-peine-de-la-pandemie_1784773 

DW (2020), “German prison system buckling under threat of overcrowding” [online] available at : https://www.dw.com/en/german-prison-system-buckling-under-threat-of-overcrowding/a-4354

Penal reform (undated) “Overcrowding” [online] available at : 8583 https://www.penalreform.org/issues/prison-conditions/key-facts/overcrowding/ (accessed on 24/10/2020)

Global Initiative (2020), “Lockdown in lock-up: Italy's prison system has been plunged into crisis by the pandemic – and by the mafia.” [online] available at : https://globalinitiative.net/italy-prisons-covid/

[2] Observatoire International des Prisons (2020), “Surpopulation carcérale” [online] available at : https://oip.org/decrypter/thematiques/surpopulation-carcerale/

Vie Publique (2020), “Lutte contre le COVID-19 en prison : des mesures jugées insuffisantes” [online] available at : https://www.vie-publique.fr/en-bref/274113-covid-19-en-prison-des-mesures-insuffisantes-selon-la-cglpl

DW (2020), “German prison system buckling under threat of overcrowding” [online] available at : https://www.dw.com/en/german-prison-system-buckling-under-threat-of-overcrowding/a-4354

Global Initiative (2020), “Lockdown in lock-up: Italy's prison system has been plunged into crisis by the pandemic – and by the mafia.” [online] available at : https://globalinitiative.net/italy-prisons-covid/

Revenu, Nathalie (2020), “Coronavirus : libérations en série pour les détenus en fin de peine à la prison de Villepinte” Le Parisien  [online] available at : http://www.leparisien.fr/seine-saint-denis-93/coronavirus-liberations-en-serie-pour-les-detenus-en-fin-de-peine-a-la-prison-de-villepinte-05-04-2020-8294346.php 

Libération (2020) “Coronavirus : près de 8000 détenus en moins dans les prisons françaises” [online] available at : https://www.liberation.fr/direct/element/coronavirus-pres-de-8-000-detenus-en-moins-dans-les-prisons-francaises_112040/

[3] Global Initiative (2020), “Lockdown in lock-up: Italy's prison system has been plunged into crisis by the pandemic – and by the mafia.” [online] available at : https://globalinitiative.net/italy-prisons-covid/

[4] Lufkin, Bryan (2020), “Do long prison sentences deter crime?” BBC, Criminal Myths  [online] available at :  https://www.bbc.com/future/article/20180514-do-long-prison-sentences-deter-crime

[5] Council of Economic Advisers of the executive office of the President of the United States (2016), “Economic Perspectives on Incarceration and the Criminal Justice System” [online] available at : http://www.antoniocasella.eu/nume/Economic.perspectives_april2016.pdf

[6] Grissom, Brandi (2013) “Report: Investing in Drug Treatment Could Save State Millions of Dollars” [online] available at : https://www.texastribune.org/2013/01/10/report-invest-drug-treatment-instead-punishment/ 

US Department of Education (2015), “Investing in Teachers Instead of Prisons” [online] available at : https://www.ed.gov/news/speeches/investing-teachers-instead-prisons 

Foundations Recovery Network (undated), “Drug Rehab Instead of Prison Could Save Billions” [online] available at :
https://dualdiagnosis.org/drug-rehab-instead-of-prison-could-save-billions-says-report-2/ (accessed on 24/10/20)

Jones, Alexis (2020), “Reforms without Results:

Why states should stop excluding violent offenses from criminal justice reforms” Prison Policy [online] available at : https://www.prisonpolicy.org/reports/violence.html 

[7] Why states should stop excluding violent offenses from criminal justice reforms” Prison Policy [online] available at : https://www.prisonpolicy.org/reports/violence.html 

Justice Policy Institute (2009), “Pruning Prisons: How Cutting Corrections Can Save Money and Protect Public Safety” [online] available at : http://www.justicepolicy.org/images/upload/09_05_REP_PruningPrisons_AC_PS.pdf

[8] Why states should stop excluding violent offenses from criminal justice reforms” Prison Policy [online] available at : https://www.prisonpolicy.org/reports/violence.html 

Lufkin, Bryan (2020), “Do long prison sentences deter crime?” BBC, Criminal Myths  [online] available at :  https://www.bbc.com/future/article/20180514-do-long-prison-sentences-deter-crime

[9] Why states should stop excluding violent offenses from criminal justice reforms” Prison Policy [online] available at : https://www.prisonpolicy.org/reports/violence.html 

Jarett, Christian (2018) “how prison changes people” BBC, Criminal Myths [online] available at : https://www.bbc.com/future/article/20180430-the-unexpected-ways-prison-time-changes-people

[10]  Council of Economic Advisers of the executive office of the President of the United States (2016), “Economic Perspectives on Incarceration and the Criminal Justice System” [online] available at : http://www.antoniocasella.eu/nume/Economic.perspectives_april2016.pdf

[11] Why states should stop excluding violent offenses from criminal justice reforms” Prison Policy [online] available at : https://www.prisonpolicy.org/reports/violence.html Justice Policy Institute (2009), “Pruning Prisons: How Cutting Corrections Can Save Money and Protect Public Safety” [online] available at : http://www.justicepolicy.org/images/upload/09_05_REP_PruningPrisons_AC_PS.pdf

Hogenboom, Melissa (2018), “The Unique Way the Dutch treat mentally ill prisoners” BBC, Criminal Myths [online] available at : https://www.bbc.com/future/article/20180423-the-unique-way-the-dutch-treat-mentally-ill-prisoners

Nuwer, Rachel (2018), “Is there a link between mass shootings and mental illness?” BBC, Criminal Myths [online] available at : https://www.bbc.com/future/article/20180509-is-there-a-link-between-mass-shooting-and-mental-illness

Geddes, Linda (2018), “Can you ever change a violent psychopath’s mind?” BBC, Criminal Myths [online] available at : https://www.bbc.com/future/article/20180518-can-you-ever-change-a-violent-psychopaths-mind

Hoffmann, Morris B. and Kiehl, Kent A. (2014), “The Criminal Psychopath : History, Neuroscience, Treatment, and Economics” [online] available at : https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4059069/

[12] Bender, Kathleen (2018), “Education Opportunities in Prison Are Key to Reducing Crime” Center for American Progress [online] available at : https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/education-k-12/news/2018/03/02/447321/education-opportunities-prison-key-reducing-crime/ 

Geddes, Linda (2018), “Can you ever change a violent psychopath’s mind?” BBC, Criminal Myths [online] available at : https://www.bbc.com/future/article/20180518-can-you-ever-change-a-violent-psychopaths-mind

[13] Lufkin, Bryan (2020), “Do long prison sentences deter crime?” BBC, Criminal Myths [online] available at : https://www.bbc.com/future/article/20180514-do-long-prison-sentences-deter-crime

Make America Lead Again

The SARS-CoV-2 pandemic has set the arena for the United States (U.S.) to demonstrate its leadership and proclaimed better position in the world in comparison with China. Nonetheless, its isolationist policy under the administration of President Donald J. Trump led the U.S. to produce poor international confidence and support based on its worrying figures from pandemic management. Boosted by COVID-19, this left a path clear for the U.S.’s main rival, China, to present its aspirations for a different world order.

By Pablo Cisneros Yánez

Since the global outbreak of the SARS-CoV-2 (causing COVID-19 disease) pandemic in early 2020, two main issues have become a priority for all governments: cooperation and leadership. As China was the first country to deal with the virus, it was expected to help the rest of the world and demonstrate an efficient way to tackle COVID-19, especially considering that China suffered from SARS in 2003, and A (H1N1)pdm09 in 2009. [1] At the same time, given its historical global position and  well-equipped health structure, U.S. was called upon to show the world how a leader would manage this crisis at every level. [2] However, none of that happened. [3] Beijing has faced accusations of hiding information about the virus, while Washington records the highest numbers of cases and deaths - in fact, some U.S. states hold worse figures than entire countries. Besides the pandemic, some nations rely on U.S. cooperation for help with other issues; as a world leader it is expected that the U.S. would help tackle COVID-19 globally.

No one can deny that defeating the virus is a difficult task, leaving a clear path to international cooperation and coordination between countries in order to teach and learn from each other’s experiences. Factually, the handling of the containment of COVID-19 had more success in democratic nations such as Germany, South Korea, and Taiwan [4]; the U.S, could have used any of these examples from which to learn. As the global hegemon, it was expected that President Donald J. Trump would take these experiences and transform them into important guidelines to lead other countries that rely upon Washington and to show how this shoud be handled in the big leagues. [5] Leadership, respect, and confidence are built by example. The U.S. demonstrated none of that, neither at a national nor international level.

The U.S. is continuing to lose the chance to become a leader in battling the new coronavirus. Its current foreign policy of America First has diminished the fellowship and trust for international cooperation, especially with traditional allies. [6] In some other cases, Washington could not match its aspirations to those of its supposed partners. For instance, in a 2019 survey taken by ASEAN countries, the majority said that they “[…] had little to no confidence that ‘the United States will do the right thing” in contributing to global peace, security, prosperity and governance’ [7] considering American behaviour with regards to international agreements such as: Paris, Iran Nuclear Deal, and the Transpacific Partnership. If America expects cooperation and willingness, it needs to offer a viable alternative. [8]

However, not everything is lost. There are three essential pillars that may allow the U.S. to lead again, as Campbell & Doshi (2020) suggest: “managing the problem at home, supplying global public goods, and coordinating a global response”. [9] The last issue is the simplest to accomplish and will be the topic of the rest of this article. If the World Health Organisation lost credibility in the U.S. as in many other countries, [10] the White House has a golden opportunity to demonstrate how to handle the current crisis, in order to reform world dependency on the United Nations (U.N.) in the future.

Notwithstanding, several warnings from the scientific community about a new possible pandemic were ignored by most governments. [11] The U.S. was not an exception. Instead of imposing national restrictions, as scientists suggested, the White House prioritised the economy over public health, and the numbers of cases and deaths speak for themselves. [12] Internationally, America was expected to help other countries that lacked resources [13] to deal with the SARS-CoV-2 pandemic. [14] As a response, the U.S. offered only a few ventilators, while China was thanked by Mexico [15], the Czech Republic, and Italy, among others, for its distribution of personal protective equipment (PPE) and medical supplies. These actions cleansed China’s image [16] and shadowed America’s. [17]

The foreign policy of America First and a “social distancing” from global affairs led the U.S. to lose its positive standing amongst historic allies [18] and beneficiaries of its cooperation. [19] If one of the main goals of the Trump administration is to “combat” Chinese leadership, blaming the virus, Trump should have arranged countries under his leadership that could back his position on the international stage, by creating a sort of alliance or group. However, this never happened and the U.S.’s solitude was reflected at the 75th U.N. General Assembly and at the U.N. Security Council, when American speeches directly accused China of a lack of action and transparent information about the forthcoming pandemic. No country backed this position, not even historic allies such as the United Kingdom (U.K.) or the European Union (E.U.). Rather, China replied saying that these accusations were unfounded, which Russia supported. [20] Rather than pointing to China as the one to blame for the SARS-CoV-2 outbreak, the vast majority of governments appealed to question and perhaps redesign the U.N. system and the dependency it causes, or reinforce multilateralism as a tool of recovery from the COVID-19 pandemic.

In order to present a fresh and helpful image across the world as an ally, China is acting quickly. [21] By September, Chinese diplomats made a European tour to reinforce cooperation and understanding, with generally positive results besides the exception of the Czech Republic with whom there is a diplomatic impasse due to relations with Taiwan. [22] Even with this new Chinese approach of cooperation, an opportunity for leadership has been presented to the U.S.. [23] This opportunity comes alongside an increasingly unfavourable perception of Chinese management of the virus. [24] With the U.S. inadvertently calling the world’s attention towards its domestic problems only, China has a clear path to implant its vision on the international system, as stated by Rapp-Hopper (2020) “If the United States continues to founder while China offers supplies and coordination, international partners will naturally perceive China’s leadership to have strengthened, although they will not lose sight of its flaws”. [25]

The COVID-19 crisis combined with the America First foreign policy may result in a a shift in the international order. If the U.S. does not act cleverly, it is China who might take its place rapidly, as some scholars and professionals estimate. [26] The post-COVID-19 world will definitely need leadership that encourages and aids countries to “heal” through multilateralism. An analysis presented by the Asian Development Bank projects an impact on global economy up to £7.1 trillion. [27] With this scenario, who should pay this bill? Who are the actors called to lead recovery and the reorganisation of the world order? Will the U.S. learn from its mistakes? [28] Joe Biden and Donald Trump still have the chance to Make America Lead Again.

With the U.S. Presidential election at our door, whoever sits in the Oval Office by January 2021 must recover America’s image and leadership, which has diminished by the handling of the pandemic. Beyond the consequences of the pandemic as a catalyst for geopolitical clashes, it may only accelerate. In the great powers game, if America wants to maintain its principle world role, it must lead countries by example, not by image. The U.S. must avoid the mistake that led China to its Century of Humiliation (1839-1949); it must view itself as a place where countries seek to cooperate, and not work outside the international system. It must not make the Chinese mistake if it wants to succeed. [29]

SOURCES

[1] Campbell, K. & Doshi R. (2020) “The Coronavirus Could Reshape Global Order”. Foreign Affairs. Available at: https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2020-03-18/coronavirus-could-reshape-global-order (Accessed: 4 Oct 2020).

[2] Ibid.

[3] Rapp-Hooper, M. (2020) “China, America, and the International Order after the Pandemic”. War on the Rocks. Available at: https://warontherocks.com/2020/03/china-america-and-the-international-order-after-the-pandemic/ (Accessed 1 Oct 2020).

[4] Kahl C. & Berengaut A. (2020) “Aftershocks: The Coronavirus Pandemic and the New World Disorder”. War on the Rocks. Available at: https://warontherocks.com/2020/04/aftershocks-the-coronavirus-pandemic-and-the-new-world-disorder/ (Accessed 12 Oct 2020).

[5] Oltermann P. (2020) “Do not assume US still aspires to be a world leader, Merkel warns”. The Guardian. Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/jun/26/do-not-assume-us-still-aspires-to-be-world-leader-merkel-warns (Accessed 30 Oct 2020).

[6] Campbell & Doshi (2020).

[7] Rapp-Hooper (2020).

[8] Packard N. & Jensen B. (2020) "Washington needs a bold rethink of its China Strategy". War on the Rocks. Available at: https://warontherocks.com/2020/06/washington-needs-a-bold-rethink-of-its-china-strategy/ (Accessed 16 Oct 2020).

[9] Packard & Jensen (2020).

[10] Hernández J. (2020) “Trump Slammed the W.H.O. Over Coronavirus. He’s Not Alone.” The New York Times. Available at: https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/08/world/asia/trump-who-coronavirus-china.html (Accessed 30 Oct 2020).

Campbell & Doshi (2020).

[11] Global Preparedness Monitoring Board (2019) “A World at Risk: Annual report on global      preparedness for health emergencies”, 6.

[12] Kahl & Berengaut (2020).

[13] Ibid.

[14] Ibid.

[15] Cortes R., Esposito A. & Cooney P. (2020) “U.S. sends Mexico planeload of ventilators to fight coronavirus”. Reuters. Available at: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-health-coronavirus-mexico-usa-idUSKBN22H2T1 (Accessed 30 Oct 2020).

[16] Campbell & Doshi (2020).

[17] Kahl & Berengaut (2020).

[18] Ibid.

[19] Rapp-Hooper (2020).

[20] Lederer E. (2020) “At UN, China, Russia and US clash over pandemic responses”. The Washington Post. Available at: https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/at-un-china-russia-and-us-clash-over-pandemic-responses/2020/09/24/17697a5e-fe89-11ea-b0e4-350e4e60cc91_story.html (Accessed 24 Sep 2020).

[21] Kahl & Berengaut (2020).

[22] Al Jazeera (2020) “‘I am Taiwanese’, Czech Speaker Vystrcil tells Taiwan parliament”. Available at: https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/9/1/i-am-taiwanese-czech-speaker-vystrcil-tells-taiwan-parliament (Accessed 19 Oct 2020).

[23] Packard & Jensen (2020).

[24] Silver L., Devlin K. & Huang C. (2020) “Unfavorable Views of China Reach Historic Highs in Many Countries”. Pew Research Center. Available at: https://www.pewresearch.org/global/2020/10/06/unfavorable-views-of-china-reach-historic-highs-in-many-countries/ (Accessed 6 Oct 2020).

[25] Rapp-Hooper (2020).

[26] Ibid.

[27] Roades, T. & Winberg D. (2020) “In Pandemic response, Health and Wealth go hand in hand”. Health Finance Institute. Available at: https://medium.com/@healthfininst/in-pandemic-response-health-and-wealth-go-hand-in-hand-af534490b5fd (Accessed 5 Oct 2020).

[28] Biden, J. (2020) “Why America Must Lead Again”. Foreign Affairs. Available at: https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2020-01-23/why-america-must-lead-again (Accessed 5 Oct 2020).

[29] Packard & Jensen (2020).

Caste Oppression and Gender Security in India

Caste oppression in India affects more than 16% of the population who are  considered ‘subhuman’ according to the traditional Hindu Varna system. [1] Many gruesome acts of sexual violence against women of this community have been recorded in the 21st century owing to their vulnerability and limited access to civil rights protection. This article explores the dynamics which perpetuate such crimes and the ideologies which pose massive barriers to the security of scheduled caste women.

By Nishant Joshi

The Indian Constitution affords every citizen equal rights under national law. However, in practice, virtue of birth determines social acceptance within many communities. Harrowing narratives of class oppression still dominate popular discourse in society. In the specific context of the Hindu Varna system, the ‘untouchables’ fall outside of all social categorizations, meaning that their access to civil liberties remains problematic as per preordained tradition. Especially in rural India, the Dalit community bears the brunt of caste discrimination such as restricted access to water, land, trade, and institutions of worship. [2] Most of their business is conducted outside of normative physical boundaries. While caste oppression affects every member of the Dalit community, the heaviest brunt of retributory wrath is borne by women. Dalit women occupy the lowest position in society according to the archaic Varna system. [3] Due to conventional ideological perspectives on chastity and conformism, women are often victimised by virtue of being easy targets. Dalit activist and scholar, BR Ambedkar recognised women as being gateways to the caste system, regardless of the heirerchical positions they occupy within or outside the Varna system. [4] His belief was that control over women within a community translated into imposition of authority over that entire community owing to women’s adjudged vulnerability. In the name of preserving tradition and maintaining clear segmentation between social classes, upper-caste women as well as Dalit women have endured incessant subjugation.

Perpetual deprecation is essential for maintaining such hierarchies, which is why the dignity of Dalits is targeted whenever signs of revolt come to notice. In almost every regional language in India, the colloquial definition of ‘rape’ is equivalent to ‘tarnishing the honour’ of a community or family. Since by virtue of their existence, Dalit women have no ‘honour’ to begin with, their rights to preservation against sexual violence are met with limited redressl if any. [5] In pre-independence India, sanctioning of Dalit women as Devadasis (servants of Devas) was enforced by men of the upper-caste to perpetuate ritualised prostitution. [6] Women who were indentured into such servitude were considered shared property of the entire village. Unfortunately, in many rural communities this practice is observed to this day, but the stories rarely receive notice.

In September 2020, a surging media outcry highlighted a story of sexual violence perpetrated against a teenager belonging to the Dalit community, who succumbed to her injuries and lost her life. The incident came to light after reporters witnessed state police disposing of her body in the dead of night while family members were barricaded inside their house. [7] Unfortunately, this is not an isolated incident. While stories of sexual violence against women in cities manage to engage public attention, rural narratives fail to see the light of day. This recent incident can clearly be contrasted with the Nirbhaya incident of 2012, where a brutal assault on a woman resulted in national outrage and eventually the death penalty being awarded to three of the four perpetrators. [8] When compared with the incident involving the Dalit girl, abundant support in favour of the accused was vocalised within the upper-caste community, claiming that the story was fabricated and that a conspiracy against the Thakur community was underway. [9] This comes after concrete evidence, including medico-legal findings concluding use of force [10] and a dying declaration provided by the teenager confirming rape, had been widely circulated in the media. [11]

A common grievance amongst Dalit activists regards the media bias against the safety of women in their community. Outrage on the issue of caste-based sexual violence quickly becomes urbanised, leaving the original narrative behind. In India, the #MeToo movement took flight after Dalit Law student, Raya Sarkar, collated a list of sexual harassers in academia. The social media storm which ensued included scores of privileged urbanites narrating their stories while Dalit narratives quickly became side-lined in favour of Savarna and western feminist perspectives. [12] Activists have continually spoken out against such elitism, sometimes partly attributing subjugation to exclusivist feminism.

Despite issues of complicit attitudes of upper-caste women towards the oppression of Dalits raised by activists and academics, upper-cast women do not hold total emancipatory power. While the honour of Dalit women is perceptually an expendable resource, the chastity of upper-caste women is considered sanctimonious. Sexual purity is still enforced by banning inter-caste marriages, imposing lifelong widowhood, and encouraging pre-pubescent marriages. [13] The ritual of Sati is apparently extinct due to its grim nature of burning widows alive with their husbands’ funeral pyre, but systemic oppression in many other forms still prevails within the upper-castes. Ideals of preservation of the family line remain strictly directed towards women and their reproductive capabilities. The conservative morality of ‘respectable, chaste, and devoted women’ is visceral to the sustainability of the Varna system. Rewards for compliance include protection and permission to raise offspring within the community and thus gain honour. [14] ‘Honour’ is considered to be such a powerful social construct that some people would choose death as preferable to living without it. [15]

The Dalit community has reiterated their observation that Western and Savarna feminism is not the best model for their emancipatory requirements. Along with threats to personal security and the struggle for opportunities, they have to face subjugation and silencing on a deeper level. Historically, female empowerment in India has always followed an elitist narrative. 19th century feminism in India was almost entirely Anglo-centric, as witnessed by Josephine Butler’s review on the empowerment of Indian women. Seen from her perspective, emancipation meant taking power away from Indian patriarchal structures and embracing British imperial social structures. [16] Despite biases and apparent superiority complexes in both imperial and upper-caste feminism, it would not be fair to lay the blame on factional feminist ideologies alone. Choices within the constructs of such ideologies are limited by the conundrum between standing up for strangers and being loyal to one's ‘own people’. [17] It is folly to perpetuate women’s security by popularising a narrative repeatedly until it makes sense. It is important to ensure that the identities of Dalit women are not whitewashed and their voices are not muted by the volume of the non-Dalit women speaking on their behalf. [18]

Sources

[1] “Topic: Dalits And Adivasis In India". Statista, 2020, https://www.statista.com/topics/4946/dalits-and-adivasis-in-india/.

[2] Gorringe, Hugo. "Afterword: gendering caste: honor, patriarchy and violence." South Asia Multidisciplinary Academic Journal 19 (2018).

[3] Patil, Prachi. "Understanding sexual violence as a form of caste violence." Journal of Social Inclusion 7.1 (2016).

[4] Ambedkar, B. R. "Caste in India." Caste and democratic politics in India (2002): 83-107.

[5] Rege, Sharmila. "Caste and gender: the violence against women in India." (1996).

[6] Patil, 2016.

[7] Story, Cover. "Rape, Torture, And A Hurried Funeral: Hathras Victim Cremated In The Dead Of Night With No Family Participation". Mumbai Mirror, 2020, https://mumbaimirror.indiatimes.com/mumbai/cover-story/rape-torture-and-a-hurried-funeral/articleshow/78417269.cms.

[8] Bansode, Rupali. "The missing dalit women in testimonies of# MeToo sexual violence: Learnings for social movements." Contributions to Indian Sociology 54.1 (2020): 76-82.

[9] "Hathras Case | Upper Caste Group Holds Meet In Support Of Accused". The Hindu, 2020, https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/other-states/up-police-lathi-charge-sp-and-rld-members/article32765023.ece.

[10] "Exclusive: Aligarh Hospital MLC Report On Hathras Victim Shatters UP Police's 'No Rape' Claim". The Wire, 2020, https://thewire.in/women/aligarh-jnmch-hathras-victim-mlc-report-up-police-rape.

[11] Hathras Gangrape पीड़िता का आखिरी Video आया सामने, मौत से पहले किया बड़ा खुलासा। Rape Victim Video. 2020, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Tj1-frRpbHY. Accessed 19 Oct 2020.

[12] Bansode, 2020.

[13] Rao, Anupama. "The Sexual Politics of Caste Violence and the Ritual Archaic." 2019.

[14] Dutta, Debolina, and Oishik Sircar. "India's Winter of Discontent: Some feminist Dilemmas in the Wake of a Rape." Feminist Studies 39.1 (2013): 293-306.

[15] Gorringe, 2018.

[16] Burton, Antoinette M. "The white woman's burden: British feminists and the Indian woman, 1865–1915." Women's Studies International Forum. Vol. 13. No. 4. Pergamon, 1990.

[17] Rege, 1996.

[18] Guru, Gopal. "Dalit women talk differently." Economic and Political Weekly (1995): 2548-2550

Everyday Peace Indicators

In this new entry in the Security Distillery's lectures series, conducted by Ethan Pate, we have been focusing on the concept of Everyday Peace Indicators, and the usefulness of bottom up approaches in peace operations.

Dr. Pamina Firchow is the Principal Investigator and CEO of Everyday Peace Indicators, as well as an Associate Professor in the Conflict Resolution and Coexistence program within the Heller School for Social Policy and Management at Brandeis University. Her research interests include political violence, transitional justice (especially victim reparations), reconciliation, and peacebuilding.

Download the report of the lecture here

Gender Mainstream Beyond EU Borders: from Theory to Practice

Ever since the endorsement of the Amsterdam Treaty in 1997, the European Union (EU) has committed itself to implementing the concept of “gender mainstreaming” into all its policies and institutions. At the time, the term was considered “potentially revolutionary” [1] since it aimed to transform the meaning of including a gendered dimension in the EU by challenging the status quo of gender relations. However, since the treaty entered into force 21 years ago, feminist scholars have argued that the EU has failed to incorporate gender mainstreaming. [2] This article is aimed to introduce the reader to the concept of gender mainstream and its application to the EU´s external relations. It details the ways in which gender mainstreaming has been implemented and, in turn, influenced the capacity of the EU to bring theory to practice.     

By Cecilia de Diego Manrique

Introducing Gender Mainstreaming in the European Union

To this day, there exists a conceptual confusion globally among the actors working in the area of gender equality. This can be seen particularly in the case of gender mainstreaming, within its meaning and application. [3] Hence, we can never overstress definitions.

Gender mainstreaming has been defined as “the (re)organisation, improvement, development and evaluation of policy processes, so that a gender equality perspective is incorporated in all policies at all levels and at all stages, by the actors normally involved in policy-making”. [4] The confusion with this term appears when it is used interchangeably with other practices whose aim is also to promote gender equality. Gender mainstreaming goes beyond concepts such as gender balance or gender equity (which focus on increasing the number of women in an organisation). It recognises that gender equality is not possible without “transforming gender relations” [5] and consequently questions the institutional norms and values existent in the international arena. [6] This means that any policy or action aiming to include effective gender mainstreaming should go beyond positive actions and ultimately tackle the root of inequalities between men and women.

Adding to this conceptual confusion is the fact that, despite the popularity of the term, the distinct ways of putting it into practice are rarely discussed outside of academia. It is fundamental to remind ourselves that how the actors decide to approach and apply it is what determines if gender mainstreaming fulfils its transformative power. In this regard, unfortunately, the EU has not been an exception to the norm. Indeed, it has been argued that gender mainstreaming was presented to the EU as “a single concept, with no accompanying analysis of gender, gender relations, gender impact assessments and other related concepts and instruments”. [7] The EU´s most recent framework to include a gender mainstreaming strategy in its external relations, named Gender Action Plan 2016-2020, unintentionally supports this message.

In this document, the EU presents a way of assessing gender mainstreaming that underestimates the importance of a focus on how to include it’s practices, placing all the attention instead on whether it is or is not included. This is reflected in the main goal of the document which is to ensure that 85 % of all EU´s new programmes are marked as ‘G1’ or ‘G2’ by 2020. The gendered dimension of each project is measured following the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development gender equality policy markers, where ‘G1’ corresponds to projects where gender equality is the main goal and ‘G2’ to those that include gender equality as a significant aim of it. [8] While this allows us to recognize which projects are related to the promotion of gender equality, it does not assess how gender equality is promoted. Rather, it promotes the idea that the inclusion of a gendered dimension is a “tick box exercise” in the EU’s documentation. [9]

On top of this, it is fundamental to understand that gender mainstreaming in the EU is implemented through “soft law” such as guidelines for the member states and non-binding communications. [10] This limits the capacity of the EU to effectively enforce and incorporate gender mainstreaming. In the end, the inclusion of gender mainstreaming in EU external relations relies largely on the goodwill of the member states and other actors involved. This sparks a debate on the need for the EU to take a stronger stance if it wishes to fully implement gender mainstreaming at all levels of decision-making.

The EU and its Comprehensive approach towards the UNWPS

The United Nations Women, Peace and Security (UNWPS) agenda is the central instrument employed by the EU to bring a gendered perspective into its external actions. Hence, if one aims to understand how the EU applies gender mainstreaming, it is important to acknowledge the main aspects of the UNWPS agenda.

Although the UNWPS Resolutions are a major victory for the organisations and activists around the globe fighting for the recognition of women in security, they (re)produce a specific understanding of men’s and, especially, women's role in security. [11] While masculinity is usually associated with strength, militarism, rationality, and protection, femininity is connected with peace, weakness, relational character, and protected subjects. [12] Therefore, although it recognises that women experience conflict and peace differently than men and claims that women should play an active role in peacebuilding, UNWPS Resolutions still provide a very limited understanding of gender relations. [13] In line with this, several studies have demonstrated that the UNWPS agenda is indeed about bringing women, and not gender, into the peace process. [14] Hence, the transformative power that is characteristic of gender mainstreaming is not per se promoted through these Resolutions.

Nevertheless, it must be noted that the UNWPS agenda does not provide a clear guideline to follow, but rather has a “confused and confusing” character. [15] In other words, it can and has indeed during the years been understood, applied, and translated in different ways. [16] Thus, while it may not originally represent gender mainstreaming, it leaves an open space for actors to include it.

For the time being, the EU has followed uncritically the initial application of the agenda. [17] This remains clear in the EU´s documentation, in particular the well-known “Comprehensive approach to the EU implementation of the United Nations Security Council Resolutions 1325 and 1820 on Women, Peace and Security”. Adopted in 2008, this document aims to introduce a gendered element to all of the EU´s external actions, from conflict-related actions to development cooperation. In particular, it highlights the necessity of incorporating both men’s and women’s concerns into policies. Despite the intention of including both sexes, a detailed analysis of the document has highlighted the underrepresentation of men “with 193 references to women or girls, compared to just 26 to men or boys”. [18] This approach, known as “adding women and stirring”, does not correspond with gender mainstreaming.

Moving from the generics of these types of documents, we find that the main place for the UNWPS agenda implementation has been the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) of the EU. Specialists in gender studies and international politics, such as Annica Kronsell (2016), have analyzed CSDP´s official documents and conclude that the CSDP does not provide women with an active role in security.  Instead, women are mainly seen as the subject of protection, following the same pitfalls as the UNWPS agenda. As a result of CSDP´s undervaluation of women as security agents, the mediation has turned out to be a less developed element of the UNWPS agenda in  EU security practices. [19] Beyond this, the intergovernmental character of the CSDP and the prevalence of men in its organizational infrastructure pose a threat to the inclusion of gender mainstreaming, a strategy that challenges traditional conceptions of security. [20]

Conclusion 

Gender mainstreaming pushes us to think further on how to transform the constructed inequality embedded in gender relations. Thus, unlike other actions and policies inside the field of gender equality, gender mainstreaming demands change. It is precisely for this reason that it is fundamental for the EU to adopt gender mainstreaming uniformly, differentiating it from other positive actions towards gender equality. This article has shown the need for the EU to focus on how to approach gender mainstreaming, rather than simply its inclusion in official documentation. This could entail a reconsideration of its current soft approach in order to implement practices at all levels of policy-making, as well as the introduction of new instruments of gender analysis in the EU´s structure. Regarding the promotion of gender mainstreaming beyond EU borders, the EU should clarify, reshape, or introduce new elements in the UNWPS agenda to integrate gender mainstreaming more effectively. The EU has the capabilities to fulfil its full potential as an advocate of gender mainstreaming. It is a matter of thinking critically about certain practices that could be unintentionally causing poor outcomes.

Sources

[1] Hafner-Burton, E.M. & Pollack, M.A. (2009) "Mainstreaming Gender in the European Union: Getting the Incentives Right", Comparative European Politics, 7(1): 114-138, 134.

[2] Guerrina, R & Wright, K.A.M. (2016) "Gendering normative power europe: Lessons of the women, peace and security agenda". International Affairs, 92(2): 293-312.

Lombardo, E. & Meier, P (2006) "Gender Mainstreaming in the EU: Incorporating a Feminist Reading?", European Journal of Women's Studies, 13(2):151-166.

Mergaert, L. (2012). The Reality of Gender Mainstreaming Implementation: The Case of the EU Research Policy. PhD diss., Nimegen: Radboud Universiteit. Available at: http://bit.ly/Mergaert (Accessed: 15 Sep 2020)

Minto, R. & Mergaert, L. (2018) "Gender mainstreaming and evaluation in the EU: comparative perspectives from feminist institutionalism", International Feminist Journal of Politics, 20 (2): 204-220.

[3] AWID (2004). "Gender Mainstream, Can it Work for Women´s rights?" Spotlight, 3. Available at: http://bit.ly/GenderMainstream  (Accessed: 15 Sep 2020)

[4] Council of Europe (1998). Gender Mainstreaming: Conceptual Framework, Methodology and Presentation of Good Practice, EG-S-MS (98) 2. Strasbourg: Council of Europe, 13.

[5] Ibid., 14.

[6] Kronsell, A. (2012) “Gender, Sexuality, and Institutions of Hegemonic Masculinity”. In Gender, Sex, and the Potsnational Defense: Militarism and Peacekeeping. Oxford Scholarship Online.

[7] Stratigaki M. (2005) "Gender Mainstreaming vs Positive Action: An Ongoing Conflict in EU Gender Equality Policy". European Journal of Women’s Studies,12(2):165-186, 175.

[8] OECD (n.d). “DAC gender equality policy marker” Available at: https://www.oecd.org/dac/gender-development/dac-gender-equality-marker.htm   (Accessed: 11 March 2020)

[9] Chappell, L. and Guerrina, R. (2020) "Understanding the gender regime in the European External Action Service", Cooperation and Conflict, 55(2):261-280.

[10] Debusscher, P. (2012) "Gender Mainstreaming in European Union Development Policy toward Latin America: Transforming Gender Relations or Confirming Hierarchies? ", Latin American Perspectives, 39 (6): 181-197.

[11] Ellerby, Kara L. (2011). Engendered security: norms, peace and gender agreements. Arizona: The University of Arizona.

[12] Kennedy, C., & Dingli, S. (2016) “Gender and Security”. In Collins, A.  (Ed.) Contemporary Security Studies. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 155-167.

[13] Ellerby, 2011.

[14] Cockburn, Cynthia (2007) From Where We Stand: war, women‟s activism and feminist anlysis. London: Zed Books

Peterson, V. Spike and OECD (n.d). “DAC gender equality policy marker” Available at: https://www.oecd.org/dac/gender-development/dac-gender-equality-marker.htm   (Accessed: 11 March 2020)  Anne K. Runyan (2010). Global Gender Issues in the New Millennium. 3rd Ed. Westview: Pennsylvania.

Willett, S. (2010) "Introduction: Security Council Resolution 1325: Assessing the Impact on Women, Peace and Security", International Peacekeeping, 17(2):142-158.

Ellerby, 2011.

[15] Anderlini, Sanam Naraghi (2010) "What the women say: Participation and UNSCR 1325:A Case Study Assessment". International Civil Society Action Network and the MIT Center for International Studies, 15.

[16] Ibid.

[17] Haastrup, T. (2018) "Creating Cinderella? The Unintended Consequences of the Women Peace and Security Agenda for EU's Mediation Architecture", International Negotiation, 23(2): 218-237. Kennedy, C., & Dingli, S. (2016) “Gender and Security”. In Collins, A.  (Ed.) Contemporary Security Studies. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 155-167.

[18]  Guerrina & Wright, 2016, 308.

[19] Haastrup, 2018.

[20] Guerrina, R., Chappell, L. & Wright, K.A.M (2018) "Transforming CSDP? Feminist Triangles and Gender Regimes", JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies, 56 (5): 1036-1052.

Private Military & Security Companies in International Relations

In this new entry in the Security Distillery's lectures series, conducted by Ethan Pate, we have been focusing on the growth of PMSCs in recent decades and what their prominence could mean for the future of the international system.

Dr. Sean McFate is a foreign policy expert, author and novelist. He is a Senior Fellow at the Atlantic Council, a Washington DC think tank, and a professor of strategy at the National Defense University and Georgetown University’s School of Foreign Service. Additionally, he serves as an Advisor to Oxford University’s Centre for Technology and Global Affairs.

Download the report of the lecture here

Expert Panel on COVID-19 and the Global Migrant Crisis

In this new entry in the Security Distillery's expert panel series, moderated by Mac Hamilton, we have been focusing on the impacts of the COVID-19 upon the refugee and migrant crisis. The panelists are Myra Dahgaypaw, human rights advocate at the United Nations, Dan Sullivan senior advocate for human rights at Refugees International, Niemat Ahmadi Founder and President of Darfur Women Action Group and Yasmine Taeb Senior Policy Counsel for Demand Progress.

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Tribal districts of Pakistan – a safe haven for terrorists or misused piece of land?

During the Cold War, Pakistan became a staunch ally of the United States (US) and became part of the decades-long war between the two world powers and against terrorism. Pakistan protected its national interests during the Cold War but is still facing a number of challenges. Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) – now tribal districts[1] – had become a safe haven[2] for terrorists while suffering from militancy, insurgency, and a lack of peace during and after the Cold War served the interests of both Pakistan and the US. This article focuses on the question, how has this piece of land been misused for so many decades by both the national government and imperial powers?

By Fazal Wahab

Being the ally of the US, during the Cold War Pakistan provided every possible aid including ideological and logistical support against communism, and even the use of its territory. No doubt Pakistan also took advantage of the alliance and protected its national interest by strengthening its defence capabilities with the help of Saudi Arabia and the US. However, following the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, Pakistan was left to tackle the mujahideen, the then freedom fighters, of Afghanistan alone.

In British India and later in Pakistan, the tribal districts – Bajaur, Mohmand, Khyber, Orakzai, Kurram, North Waziristan and South Waziristan – were kept semi-autonomous under a special set of rules known as Frontier Crime Regulation Ordinance (FCR) 1901 [3], which is also locally termed as the “black law”. [4] Under these set of laws, the citizens of the Tribal Districts are not afforded the rights guaranteed to other Pakistani citizens under the constitution of Pakistan, in particular, they are excluded from access to the judicial system. Political Agents (PA) were responsible for the implementation of the FCR with the help of local elites and influential people known as maliks and nawabs. [5] The tribal belt shares a border with Afghanistan to the West and was of great strategic importance during the Cold War and then again after the September 11 attacks and the declaration of the War Against Terror in Afghanistan.

After the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, the CIA began a covert operation known as “Operation Cyclone”[6], aiming to support Afghan mujahideen through funding, training, and supplying weapons. Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) had been used and became the hub for the mujahideen training camps and were more suitable because of their mountainous nature and geographical location in relation to Afghanistan. The Pakistani establishment also used this tribal belt and nearby districts, particularly Peshawar, to host Afghan refugees in camps which were shut down in 2005 after the Pakistani army launched a series of operations against the Afghan Taliban and later against Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), a Taliban-affiliated movement in Pakistan. [7] With the help of the US and Middle Eastern countries, most prominently Saudi Arabia and Egypt, these refugee camps also provided a steady supply of mujahideen for the Afghan guerrilla war against the USSR. [8]

During the Cold War, the US used ‘all means available’ [9] to defeat communism. Firstly, the US accepted help from Saudi Arabia, which supported on the Wahhabi extremist version of Islam. During the Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan (1979 – 1991), Saudi Arabia spent $4 billion a year to finance mosques and madrassas in Pakistan. [10] These religious institutions mostly targeted and radicalised illiterate people using extreme interpretations and the Wahhabi version of Islam. Secondly, they used a wide variety of platforms for propaganda purposes against the USSR. From every mosque and madrassa, the extremist clerics gave lectures against the communist ideology and termed the Soviets as sur kafir (red non-believers). The propaganda was not confined to Pakistan; it even reached Europe. Many of the public libraries contained literature and documentaries on the Afghan mujahideen, portraying them as heroes. [11] This extremist version of Islam later became the base for the extremist ideology of Al Qaeda and Taliban in Afghanistan.

After the end of the Cold War, the Pakistani establishment retained close ties to the mujahideen. However, after the attacks of September 11, Pakistan became actively involved in the fight against terrorism supported by the US, while an influx of Afghan Taliban came across the border to the tribal districts. [12] In 2007, Baitullah Masood founded TTP in the tribal districts and soon developed links with Al Qaeda, the Afghan Taliban, and other local terrorist groups. Soon after its foundation, more than 27 terrorist groups pledged and submitted themselves to TTP. [13]

Furthermore, the Pakistani military launched a series of operations in the region coupled with the drone strikes from the US which were chasing down Al-Qaeda members that had fled to North Waziristan after the US invasion of Afghanistan. It is estimated that between 348 and 374 drone strikes had been launched between 2004–2013, which killed between 400-900 civilians depending on the reference used. However, this is a conservative estimate and should be taken with caution as the real number remains confidential with the US authorities. [14] Similarly, according to the FATA Disaster Management Authority, more than five million people were internally displaced, which also caused significant troubles as other provincial governments declined to host any internally displaced people. [15]

In summary, these tribal districts served the interests of both external powers and the government of Pakistan by violating the basic human and democratic rights of the people. The FCR remains imposed on the region with the purpose of suppressing the locals and protecting national and international interests by depriving Pakistani citizens of basic human and democratic rights. Here a number of questions arise: is it justifiable to deprive one from their basic rights to protect national interests? Are national interests more important than the rights of a specific group, race or ethnicity? And can it be ethically justified to fight an enemy at the expense of the citizens? Now the authorities need to give special attention to the said piece of land and formulate uniform laws -- based on humanity and freedom for all.

Sources

[1] FATA was kept semi-autonomous since 1901 by British India and later by Pakistan. These tribal areas were merged to the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province of Pakistan after the 25th constitutional amendment passed by the parliament and then signed by the president of Pakistan on May 28, 2018 Amir Wasim, ‘President Signs KP-Fata Merger Bill into Law’, DAWN.COM, 31 May 2018, https://www.dawn.com/news/1411156.

[2] Frank C. Urbancic, ‘Briefing on Release of 2006 Country Reports on Terrorism’ (Department Of State. The Office of Electronic Information, Bureau of Public Affairs., 30 April 2007), https://2001-2009.state.gov/s/ct/rls/rm/07/83999.htm.

[3] Fair C. Christine, Nicholas Howenstein, and Thier J. Alexnder, ‘Troubles on the Pakistan-Afghanistan Border: U.S. Institute of Peace’, December 2006, https://web.archive.org/web/20090509031256/http://www.usip.org/pubs/usipeace_briefings/2006/1207_pakistan_afghanistan_border.html.

[4] Waseem Ahmad Shah, ‘Black Law of FCR Continues to Evade Legislators’ Attention’, DAWN.COM, 8 September 2014, http://www.dawn.com/news/1130619.

[5] Benjamin D. Hopkins, ‘The Frontier Crimes Regulation and Frontier Governmentality’, The Journal of Asian Studies 74, no. 2 (May 2015): 369–89, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0021911815000030.

[6] Todd Greentree, ‘Afghanistan: Remembering the Long, Long War We Would Rather Forget’, War on the Rocks, 5 February 2019, https://warontherocks.com/2019/02/afghanistan-remembering-the-long-long-war-we-would-rather-forget/.

[7] Zahid Ali Khan, ‘Military Operations in FATA and PATA: Implications for Pakistan’, Strategic Studies 31/32 (2011): 129–46, https://doi.org/10.2307/48527641.

[8] Robert Pear, ‘Arming Afghan Guerrillas: A Huge Effort Led by U.S.’, The New York Times, 18 April 1988, sec. World, https://www.nytimes.com/1988/04/18/world/arming-afghan-guerrillas-a-huge-effort-led-by-us.html.

[9] Pear.

[10] Greentree, ‘Afghanistan’.

[11] Omar Nasiri, Inside the Global Jihad. How I Infiltrated Al Qaeda and Was Abandoned by Western Intelligence. (London United Kingdom: C. Hurst & Co (publishers) Ltd., 2006).

[12] Rohan Gunaratna and Anders Nielsen, ‘Al Qaeda in the Tribal Areas of Pakistan and Beyond’, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 31, no. 9 (10 September 2008): 775–807, https://doi.org/10.1080/10576100802291568.

[13] Qandeel Siddique, ‘Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan: An Attempt to Deconstruct the Umbrella Organization and the Reasons for Its Growth in Pakistan’s North-West’ (København: Dansk Institut for Internationale Studier, 2010), https://www.diis.dk/files/media/publications/import/extra/rp2010-12-tehrik-e-taliban_web_1.pdf.

[14] Amnesty International, ‘US Drone Strikes in Pakistan’, 2013, 76.

[15] Dawn, ‘No Camps for IDPs to Be Set up in Punjab’, DAWN.COM, 31 May 2009, http://beta.dawn.com/news/940913/no-camps-for-idps-to-be-set-up-in-punjab.

Once More Unto the Breach: War, Peace, and Moral Imperatives in US Security

Rhetoric has always been a powerful tool for winning hearts and minds, but how has moral imperative evolved in times of war and peace? This piece examines success as a moral imperative within the US National Security Strategies written between 2002 – 2017. It traces the recent canon of success as a moral imperative in George W. Bush’s strategy of military primacy and preemptive measures, Barack Obama’s push for technological primacy and diplomatic values, and Donald Trump’s rhetoric of economic fortitude.

By Jessica Poon

Keywords: Rhetoric, Ethics, Security, US, Primacy

After 9/11, George W. Bush’s 2004 campaign slogan of “A Safer World and a More Hopeful America'' was traded for the opening remark that “America is at war” in the national security strategy (NSS) from 2006. [1] Despite three changes of leadership between 2002 and 2017, a singular, moral spirit of military success pervades the five NSSs written during this period. This tension between morality and democratic leadership is something that Joseph Nye teases out with no small conviction in examining the gap between presidential actions and words. Nye claims this ‘moral foreign policy’ is part of a broader Western tradition which mobilises rhetoric to maintain the balance of power. [2]

This is evidenced in the successive declarations of war that have been made over the last decade and a half. A “War on Terror” and a “War on Drugs” are the most immediate examples that come to mind here, but Donald Trump’s disruptive style of governance has also parsed the threat of war numerous times – not least in the assasination of Iranian major general, Qasem Soleimani, in 2019. [3] Though economic and military fortitude are cornerstones of US security, the Trump administration has refashioned the moral imperative into a new, all-encompassing mythology which infamously pits the US as victors against the world: "We’re going to win. We’re going to win so much. We’re going to win at trade, we’re going to win at the border. We’re going to win so much, you’re going to be so sick and tired of winning.” [4]

But Trump and Bush are not the only culpable figures here. The canon of moral imperatives, which follows from Trump’s rhetoric of economic fortitude and Bush’s strategy of military primacy and preemptive measures, sees Barack Obama push for success (although softer) via technological primacy and diplomatic values: “the technology we harness can light the path to peace, or forever darken it.” [5] To frame this using the language of the Copenhagen School, the moral imperatives posited by the NSSs can be interpreted as a form of securitisation borne from speech acts. [6] In this instance, it creates the perception of American success and posits change to come. This securitisation process is inclusive of other Presidential outputs such as campaign slogans and public addresses. But the NSS as a tool for channelling these moral imperatives is the particular focus here, as it establishes the groundwork for moral action in war and peace. [7] This article briefly outlines how this moral imperative takes shape within the NSSs under Bush, Obama and Trump. From this, a presidential mythology of success begins to emerge, advocating for American primacy and democratic values as a moral good – not just for domestic prosperity but for global order.

The moral imperative plays out under Bush’s recourse to preemption in times of war. From 2002’s “axis of evil” (Iraq, Iran and North Korea) to 2006’s “heptagon of hate” (North Korea, Iran, Syria, Cuba, Belarus, Burma, and Zimbabwe), a mythology of success is fashioned through the idea of the triumph of the US’s moral, democratic values over “evil” in the form of terrorism and its accessories. [8] Though there is a shift away from the narrative of preemption, Trump’s 2017 NSS is not dissimilar in borrowing from this moral rhetoric of good and bad, renewing it for an established digital age under a “strategy of principled realism that is guided by outcomes, not ideology… American principles are a lasting force for good in the world.” [9] For both strategies in their respective contexts, securing success comes out of seizing opportunities presented by taking charge of foreign responsibilities through cooperation, acknowledging that “the distinction between domestic and foreign affairs is diminishing. In a globalised world, events beyond America’s borders have a greater impact inside them.” [10] Whilst both pose a somewhat paradoxical stance in looking to secure peace by preparing for war, the rhetoric of moral imperatives in a globalised world continues to characterise the security challenges met by the Obama administration.

Further moral imperatives are seen in the NSS written under Obama, with relative peacetime affording more diplomatic reflections on this mythology of success. The legacies of 9/11 and the Iraq War make a tangible impression on Obama’s NSSs from 2010 and 2015 which are determined to recuperate influence in the aftermath of these political milestones as well as the economic deficit of a global economic crisis in the early years of Obama’s presidency. This is particularly explicit in the 2010 NSS which sees a revived interest in complementing tactical defence with economic growth: “America’s growing economic strength is the foundation of our national security and a critical source of our influence abroad.” [11] The moral imperative for America to take the lead (economically and politically) is advanced again in Trump’s 2017 security strategy, starting with a forthright pledge to deliver on domestic industry and “make America great again.” [12] The difference between how mythologies of success manifest under conditions of war and peace are thrown into stark contrast once more when one recalls Obama’s mediation between a domestic and foreign focus, positing “American innovation as a foundation for American power.”[13] While the two NSSs under Obama help bridge the mythologies of success held by two war-prone presidents, there can be no doubt to its moral imperatives of success, albeit in moving towards “diplomacy instead of war.” [14]

 Even when placed in the wider context of an ever-shifting geopolitical landscape, the NSS’ ability to posit success as a moral imperative is potent. The decline of American primacy has been furthered by the Trump Administration’s economic tariff war since 2018 against a formidable rising adversary in China which has reacted proportionately, embroiling both manufacturing giants in global supply chain complications. The broader US reaction to the COVID-19 outbreak has also created further geopolitical Sino-US tension. Alongside a loss of primacy on the world stage, the domestic instability that has erupted as a result of mass protests at the murder of George Floyd. These protests have unveiled the extent of police brutality as a critical issue in the US. The true extent of these combined factors is yet to be determined, but it is not a far cry to suggest that the US can hardly call itself a success or feign to spread the “success” to foreign nations. This piece has briefly sketched out the potency of success as a moral imperative within the US’s broader ambitions to maintain power on the global stage. It has traced the recent canon of success as a moral imperative under the Bush, Obama, and Trump administrations in war and in relative peacetime. But as preparations for the next iteration of the NSS are underway, who knows how well this well-honed rhetoric will serve for leveraging a soft power stance in the context of the uncertainties of the coming decade and waning American influence.

Sources

[1] UNITED STATES. 2006. The National Security Strategy of the United States of America. [Washington], George W. Bush.

[2]  Nye, J.S., 2020. Do Morals Matter?: Presidents and Foreign Policy from FDR to Trump, Oxford University Press.

[3] Nelson, L. & Houck, C., 2020. US airstrike kills Iranian Gen. Qassem Soleimani: what we know. Available at: https://www.vox.com/2020/1/2/21047588/qasem-soleimani-airstrike-iraq-killed. Vox, accessed 8 June 2020.

“Trump’s National Security Strategy isn’t much of a strategy at all: It’s less coherent policy framework than strained justification for the president’s prejudices and blind spots” 2017, The Washington Post, accessed 15 December 2019.

[4] Trump, D.J., 2019. Donald Trump Rally [Online]. 11 April 2016. Times Union Center, Albany, New York. [Accessed 10 December 2019]. Available from: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-tJfeF2-Cq0#action=share

[5] UNITED STATES. 2010. The National Security Strategy of the United States of America. [Washington], Barack Obama.

[6] Balzacq, T., 2005. "The Three Faces of Securitization: Political Agency, Audience and Context", European Journal of International Relations, vol. 11, no. 2, pp. 171-201.

[7] Hollis-Brusky, A., 2019. Plausible legality: legal culture and political imperative in the global war on terror. International Affairs, 95(3), pp.749–750.

[8] UNITED STATES. 2002. The National Security Strategy of the United States of America. [Washington], George W. Bush.

UNITED STATES. 2006. The National Security Strategy of the United States of America. [Washington], George W. Bush.

[9] UNITED STATES. 2017. The National Security Strategy of the United States of America. [Washington], Donald J. Trump.

[10] UNITED STATES. 2006. The National Security Strategy of the United States of America. [Washington], George W. Bush.

[11] DeYoung, K., 2010, “Obama redefines national security strategy, looks beyond military might”, Washington Post, 27 May, accessed 15 December 2019, https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/05/27/AR2010052701044.html?hpid=sec-politics

[12] UNITED STATES. 2017. The National Security Strategy of the United States of America. [Washington], Donald J. Trump.

[13]  UNITED STATES. 2010. The National Security Strategy of the United States of America. [Washington], Barack Obama.

[14] MacAskil, E., 2010, “Barack Obama sets out security strategy based on diplomacy instead of war“, The Guardian, 27 May, accessed 15 December 2019, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/may/27/us-national-security-strategy-report

The Securitisation of COVID-19: Implications for Civilian Privacy

COVID-19 has been disrupting people’s lives and forcing governments to take measures rapidly to contain the virus and prevent further deaths. It took governments by surprise and revealed their lack of preparedness, leading them to formulate policy responses which engaged with securitisation. [1] To fight the pandemic, authorities have introduced measures that drastically infringed upon citizens’ personal freedoms, starting with their freedom of movement. They engaged in a process of securitising COVID-19 using these exceptional times as a rationale to enact exceptional measures. A glaring example is the introduction of contact tracing apps: for citizens to be able to move around freely again, governments had to find a way to track the virus by identifying contaminated citizens and their contacts. Seen by some as an open door to governments collecting more health data, this measure is questionable in terms of ethics and privacy. This article argues that the introduction of contact tracing apps is the result of a securitisation process that stems from governments’ desire to show that they are taking action and controlling the situation.

By Apolline Rolland

Securitising Global Health

            The securitisation process refers to the action of defining an issue as a threat and framing it as a security issue that calls for exceptional measures. It gives legitimacy to governments to enact measures that would not have been accepted by the audience under different circumstances. Securitisation is performed through speech acts and requires a securitising actor, here governments, a securitising move, here calling COVID-19 a security threat, and a target audience that needs to accept the securitising move, here the citizenry. Generally, an issue becomes securitised when it poses a threat to the values and norms of a society. 

In recent years, global health has been increasingly subject to securitisation. In the case of COVID-19, the pandemic was framed as an ‘existential threat to the people’s lives and the regular functioning of societies’. [2] COVID-19 is not as deadly as viruses such as Ebola or AIDS, but it has a higher mortality rate than that of influenza and is also more contagious. [3] As it is a new strain of virus, governments quickly engaged in exceptional measures such as confinement, social distancing policies, the collection of citizens’ health data, and made numerous emergency declarations. This virus quickly became a threat to the public health of all states as it had the potential to spread internationally due to globalisation and the rapid flows of people transnationally. [4]

The securitisation of diseases is dangerous as it gives good ground to the militarisation of public health, which shifts the focus from civil society to intelligence and military agencies, undermining personal freedoms. [5] In fact, diseases are usually development and poverty issues rather than security issues. [6] It is therefore important to incorporate oversight in mitigation policies to ensure that the COVID-19 crisis does not unduly erode individual freedoms in democracies.

The use of the Word ‘Pandemic’

            On March 11th, 2020, the World Health Organization (WHO) finally declared the COVID-19 epidemic a pandemic, constituting the speech act in securitisation theory. In its classical definition, a pandemic is ‘an epidemic occurring worldwide, or over a very wide area, crossing international boundaries and usually affecting a large number of people’. [7] It considers who is infected and where they got sick. [8] A pandemic occurs when chains of transmissions multiply throughout the world and clusters appear beyond the birthplace of the outbreak. What does this qualification change in practice? In reality, not much; it simply allows the WHO to legally make recommendations, unlock funding, and provide political support to affected countries. [9] However, the word can trigger fear easily. The WHO was late to announce the pandemic and was careful to use the terminology to prevent unnecessary suffering and panic. [10] Indeed, although the qualification does not change many things in practice, it does mean that the virus is no longer contained. The focus shifts towards slowing down the spread of the disease by introducing mitigation policies. [11]

Framing COVID-19 as a Security Issue in Political Discourses

First presented as a distant health issue, COVID-19 quickly became a fundamental security threat which required exceptional measures. [12] It bypassed normal politics and impacted the regular functioning of health services, of nations, and of society as a whole.

In the academic literature, two different kinds of discourses have appeared since the pandemic was announced. [13] First, it was framed as a common threat to citizens from across the globe which required a coordinated and global response. This discourse was usually found in the speeches of representatives of international institutions, examples include qualifying COVID-19 as ‘an enemy against humanity’ (Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus) and ‘a common threat’ (António Guterres).

Secondly, it was framed as a national security threat. This rhetoric was more likely to be found in the speeches of world leaders addressing their nations. [14] Examples include Emmanuel Macron’s ‘Nous sommes en guerre’, Boris Johnson’s declaration of a ‘national fightback’ against COVID-19 calling for the need of ‘drastic action’ and ‘extreme measures’, as well as his call for victory against the virus — ‘we’re going to win, we’re going to beat it’ ‘we have the resolve and the resources to win the fight’. [15] [16] This war rhetoric reflects the securitisation process, invoking a sense of emergency and state power to claim the legitimate use of extraordinary measures, which have the potential to undermine sovereignty of the people. [17]

Technology to the Rescue?

National economic output stopped suddenly as lockdowns were introduced all over the world. This choice was not adopted as the optimal strategy, rather as the only option available given the lack of government preparedness. [18] In many countries, which quickly became overwhelmed by the amount of deaths, this lack of preparedness was the result of years of budget cuts which have reduced the capacity of health systems to answer to such crises efficiently, and showed how vulnerable the neoliberal model is. [19]

Governments faced a security dilemma every time they had to make a choice between pursuing lockdown measures to preserve public health and the life of their citizens or easing the measures to prevent a worse economic crisis from occurring. [20] Being able to track and trace the whereabouts of citizens to know if they had been in contact with infected individuals seemed to become a prerequisite to return to ‘normal life’, therefore governments introduced contact tracing apps. To cite a few examples: the Chinese government opted for issuing QR codes to allow its citizens to go out or to enforce quarantine. [21] In South Korea and Taiwan, personal data was used to ensure that people respected quarantine measures. [22] Israeli intelligence services used counterterrorism tools to locate Israelis’ phones and order a quarantine to those who had come into contact with infected people. [23] In Europe, downloading the app relied on a voluntary basis due to privacy concerns, but health authorities have been able to receive data from telephonic operators to see movements of populations when lockdown measures were introduced, such as in France or Italy. [24]

 As Pr. Didier Bigo of Science Po Paris-CERI puts it, government officials were quick to embrace the “folly of technological solutionism”, or in other words, in ‘the belief that one can solve every problem with a click’. [25] Was it really a necessity or rather a willingness of governments to prove that they were in control and ready to react?

Governments have looked at what we have to gain from the development of contact tracing apps: the ability to regain our freedom of movement during the pandemic. But have we, the people, weighed what we could lose? In reality, contact tracing apps in Europe have mostly been developed safely. However, they normalise mass data collection by governments from populations. Today we accept it for our health, but we must at least question whether we want this to become the norm to solve any issues without real safeguards and oversight.

The emergence of these new monitoring technologies are understandable during the crisis to fight the pandemic. But the real question is whether this will become a lasting feature of our democracies under the guise of security purposes. [26] The risk we run is the normalisation and the trivialisation of data collection.

Sources

[1] Sears, N A (2020) ‘The Securitization of COVID-19: Three Political Dilemma,’ [online] available from https://www.globalpolicyjournal.com/blog/25/03/2020/securitization-covid-19-three-political-dilemmas, accessed on 25th August 2020.

[2] Nunes, J (2020) ‘The COVID-19 pandemic: securitization, neoliberal crisis, and global vulnerabilization,’ Cadernos de Saúde Pública, Vol. 36, No. 4, pp. 1-4.

[3] Breteau, P (2020) ‘Coronavirus, Zika, Ebola… quelles maladies sont les plus contagieuses ou les plus mortelles?,’ [online] available from https://www.lemonde.fr/les-decodeurs/article/2020/01/29/coronavirus-zika-ebola-quelles-maladies-sont-les-plus-contagieuses-ou-les-plus-mortelles_6027661_4355770.html, accessed on 25th August 2020.

[4] Ventura, D (2016) ‘From Ebola to Zika: international emergencies and the securitization of global health,’ Cadernos de Saúde Pública, Vol. 32, No. 4, pp. 1-4.

[5] Bigo, D (2020) ‘Covid-19 tracking apps, or: how to deal with a pandemic most unsuccessfully,’ [online] available from https://aboutintel.eu/covid-digital-tracking/, accessed 25th August 2020.

[6] Baele, S (2020) ‘On the Securitization of COVID-19,’ [online] available from https://pandemipolitics.net/baele/, accessed on 25th August 2020.

[7] Kelly, H (2011) ‘The classical definition of a pandemic is not elusive,’ Bulletin of the World Health Organization Vol. 89, No. 7, pp. 540-541.

[8] McKeever, A (2020) ‘Coronavirus is officially a pandemic. Here is why that matters.,’  [online] available from https://www.nationalgeographic.com/science/2020/02/how-coronavirus-could-become-pandemic-and-why-it-matters/, accessed on 25th of August 2020.

[9] Ibid.

[10] Ibid.

[11] Ibid.

[12] Baele, 2020.

[13] Sears, 2020.

[14] Ibid.

[15] Le Monde, Transcription of the speech  ‘‘Nous sommes en guerre’: le verbatim du discours d’Emmanuel Macron,’ [online] available from  https://www.lemonde.fr/politique/article/2020/03/16/nous-sommes-en-guerre-retrouvez-le-discours-de-macron-pour-lutter-contre-le-coronavirus_6033314_823448.html, accessed on 25th August 2020.

[16] Baele, 2020.

[17] Hanrieder, T and Christian Kreuder-Sonnen (2014) ‘WHO decides on the exception? Securitization and emergency governance in global health,’ Security Dialogue, Vol. 45, No. 4, pp.331-348.

[18] Bigo, 2020.

[19] Nunes, p. 2.

[20] Eves, L and James Thedam ‘Applying Securitzation’s Second Generation to COVID-19,’ [online] available from  https://www.e-ir.info/2020/05/14/applying-securitizations-second-generation-to-covid-19/, accessed 25th August 2020.

[21] Mozur, P, Raymond Zhong and Aaron Krolik (2020) ‘In coronavirus fight, China gives citizens a color code, with red flags,’ [online] available from https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/01/business/china-coronavirus-surveillance.html, accessed 14th September 2020.

[22] Utersinger, M (2020) ‘Contre la pandémie due au coronavirus, de nombreux pays misent sur la surveillance permise par le “big data”,’ [online] available from https://www.lemonde.fr/pixels/article/2020/03/20/contre-la-pandemie-de-nombreux-pays-misent-sur-la-surveillance-permise-par-le-big-data_6033851_4408996.html, accessed 14th September 2020.

[23] Halbfinger, D M ,  Isabel Kershner and Ronen Bergman (2020) ‘To track coronavirus, Israel moves to tap secret trove of cellphone data,’ [online] available from https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/16/world/middleeast/israel-coronavirus-cellphone-tracking.html, accessed 14th September 2020.

[24] Utersinger, 2020.

[25] Sears, 2020.

[26] Bigo, 2020.

Social Media – A Tool for Terrorism?

The post 9-11 “War on Terror” era is characterized by the parallel ascension of social media. Social media has become a strategic tool to communicate and enact terrorism, thereby revolutionizing its impact. It has also been a key medium in the rise of radicalization and the dissemination of online extremist content around the world. This has offered terrorists groups the unprecedented ability to disseminate images and sentiments at a rapid pace to a borderless audience. While there has always been a relationship between terrorism and traditional media in the forms of print and television, social media networks have given terrorists the ability to have their acts communicated in a more potent and instantaneous way – with a lens that can been distorted by their bias.

By Kajal Saxena

With its ability to circumvent traditional media, social media enables its own access into the lives of billions of people around the world. As of September 2013, 90% of all 18-29 year-olds in the United States (US) used social media, followed by 78% of adults aged 30-49. [1] The direct accessibility to these audiences and the ease of which their attention can be garnered by a few taps on a phone or computer, highlights the possible reach of terrorism propaganda and media. [2] These effects can be felt on multiple levels of society and can serve to reach terrorists’ objectives of disrupting and frustrating state responses, as well as creating serious fear among the global population. In 2013 and 2014 social media networks such as Twitter overtook internet forums as the preferred space for Jihadist propaganda. [3] Jihadi groups are known to use mainstream media platforms like Twitter and Facebook to post their content and create sponsored accounts where they release news statements and videos. [4] The instantaneous nature of social media networks also allow for the immediate, almost real-time viewings of terrorist attacks and their aftermath, which can deliver maximum impact of fear. The 2013 Westgate Mall hostage crisis in Nairobi is an example of how the terrorist group Al-Shabaab used Twitter to narrate their attack while it was occurring and share an alternate perspective to challenge the accounts of those witnessing the terrorist attack from the outside. [5] Al-Shabaab and its supporters were able to garner worldwide mainstream media attention, and broadcasted their attack through engagement on Twitter. [6] Therefore, social media texts and images have become a strategic part of the terrorist attacks as well. [7]

The effects of the borderless flow of terrorist propaganda is reflected in the number of Jihadist terrorist attacks in the Western world, like Canada, France, the US and the United Kingdom (UK). Social media has provided terrorist groups with the infrastructure to evolve their internet presence into meaningful online social communities that engage in the spread of online disinformation worldwide. As cybersecurity security specialist Dr. Maura Conway suggests, “today’s internet does not simply allow for the dissemination and consumption of extremist material in a one-way broadcast from producer and consumer, it also facilitates high levels of online social interaction around this material”. [8]

Internet subcultures allow users to manipulate news frames, set agendas and facilitate the spread of disinformation, while supporting a conducive environment for media manipulation. [9] In the case of the Islamic State’s (IS) online strategy, it was initially used to motivate foreign fighters to join IS campaigns in Syria and Iraq. It also quickly became a way in which social media users contribute to the increase in volume of IS-related content that proliferates websites like Twitter and YouTube. [10] A similar strategy was adopted by right-wing extremist groups online. With a focus on far-right movements and men’s rights activists, ideologically-driven blogs like Infowars and Roosh V’s blog Return of Kings are important online sources of information for the far-right. [11] Forums and message boards like 4chan and 8chan facilitate online social communities of like-minded people who engage with and share extremist messaging and media. Therefore, social media networks like Twitter, Facebook, and YouTube are used by members of the far-right to spread extreme messages to large numbers of people, and also are central platforms to spread misinformation in the form of memes or images. [12] This has created a thriving online community where terrorist groups like IS and right-wing groups use “small teams of social media users to lavish attention on potential recruits and move the conversation to more secure online platforms – therefore, while Twitter may not be the place where recruitment ends, growing evidence suggests that identifiable patterns of recruitment begin on Twitter”. [13] While the far-right movement’s usage of social media networks is relatively understudied by terrorism scholars, it is possible to see patterns with Jihadist terrorist groups in their usage of social media as a tool to communicate and enact terrorism.

Propaganda has always been central in communicating terrorism. Perhaps the most central accomplishment of Al Qaeda on 9/11 was not killing several thousand people, but rather instilling fear in millions of people worldwide through the reports and images of the attacks, and the creating a blueprint for modern terrorist practices. [14] The borderless flow of information enabled by social media has been utilized as a tool by terrorist groups to spread their messages globally, facilitate online social communities and spread fear and disruption. Terrorists have been highly adaptable to changes in how their messages are disseminated around the world. In order to keep pace with the evolution of terrorist strategy, states and social media networks must adapt their counter-terrorism measures to meet these inevitable challenges.

 Sources

[1] Sullivan, R. 2014, "Live-tweeting terror: a rhetorical analysis of @HSMPress_ Twitter updates during the 2013 Nairobi hostage crisis", Critical Studies on Terrorism, vol. 7, no. 3, pp. 422-433.

[2] Ibid.

[3] Weimann, G.J. 2019, "Competition and Innovation in a Hostile Environment: How Jabhat Al-Nusra and Islamic State Moved to Twitter in 2013-2014", Studies in Conflict & Terrorism: Islamic States Online Activity and Responses, vol. 42, no. 1-2, pp. 25-42.

[4] Klausen, J. 2015, "Tweeting the Jihad: Social Media Networks of Western Foreign Fighters in Syria and Iraq", Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, vol. 38, no. 1, pp. 1-22.

[5] Sullivan, 2014.

[6] Ibid.

[7] Ibid.

[8] Conway, M. 2017, "Determining the Role of the Internet in Violent Extremism and Terrorism: Six Suggestions for Progressing Research", Studies in Conflict & Terrorism: Terrorist Online Propaganda and Radicalization, vol. 40, no. 1, pp. 77-98.

[9] Marwick, Alice, and Rebecca Lewis. 2017, “Media Manipulation and Disinformation Online”. Plaats van uitgave onbekend: Data and Society Research Institute, pp. 1-104

[10] Benigni, M.C., Joseph, K. & Carley, K.M. 2017, "Online extremism and the communities that sustain it: Detecting the ISIS supporting community on Twitter", PloS one, vol. 12, no. 12, pp. e0181405.

[11] Marwick and Lewis, 2017.

[12] Ibid.

[13] Benigni, Kenneth and Carley, 2017.

[14] Seib, P.M., Janbek, D.M. & ProQuest (Firm) 2010, Global terrorism and new media: the post-Al Qaeda generation, Routledge, New York.

Undocumented Women Domestic Workers in South Africa: An Intersectional Look at Marginalisation and Inequality

Many women from southern African countries migrate without legal documentation to South Africa to seek better economic prospects. However, they often face marginalisation and discrimination in transit and upon arrival. Once they reach their destination there are barriers to their security and stability; namely, the legal code in South Africa hosts a policy gap that exacerbates exploitation by employers. [1] This article centres these women’s experiences as important and deserving of study and protection.

By Emma Lin Hurlbert

Many undocumented women choose to become live-in domestic workers for South African families, which offers them many benefits, but also costs them greatly. Women are highly concentrated in this sector, with 80% of domestic workers in South Africa being female. [2] The benefits afforded through this arrangement include cash payments and accommodation at the job site, which solves a logistical problem of finding accommodation, but can also provide protection from or mediation with immigration enforcement or police officers. Additionally, in kind payments from employers in the form of clothing, transportation costs, and children’s school fees are commonly received. [3] However, these benefits come at the cost of exploitability and dependence.

Undocumented workers exist on the margins of society, in a legal situation that excludes them, in actuality and out of fear, from accessing their rights. [4] Furthermore, since domestic work is considered to exist within the private sphere and the informal sector, policymakers have failed to create legislative protections regulating the industry. [5] Therefore, undocumented workers in general, and this industry in particular, exist in a policy gap that allows for exploitation by individual employers.

Because they have little legal protection, undocumented workers live precariously and almost entirely dependent on their employers. They report very low wages, which are determined by the employer, long working hours with continuous on call time, and limited personal leave. [6] The constant fear of deportation makes it difficult - if not  impossible - for these women to join legally recognised organisations, such as labour unions, which serve to protect the rights of workers and bargain for fair wages. Therefore, it is observed that the lack of collective action among these workers serves to lower the bargaining power of each individual worker. [7] They are replaceable and can easily be dismissed if they do not agree to the employers’ suggested wages or work conditions. [8] Furthermore, live-in status means that these women work for practically all of their waking hours and are often on call for the children when they are asleep. Finally, personal leave for holidays and visits back home are not treated as a right, but are granted at the discretion of the employer, and can be withheld. [9] It should be noted that not all employers exploit undocumented women domestic workers in these ways; however, the choice of an employer not to exploit does not diminish the exploitability or vulnerability of this group. [10]

In 2008 labour protections and rights were extended to all undocumented migrant workers, [11] undoubtedly intended to improve the work situation and increase security for them. Yet many undocumented migrant women still feel as though they have no rights in South Africa and are therefore unable to seek formal and legal support in enforcing their rights, [12] which means that their exploitability and vulnerability have not been ameliorated by the protections. Furthermore, undocumented migrants who are aware of their rights established through United Nations Declarations and South African national law, said they were fearful of reporting rights violations to the police because of the possibility of detention and deportation, which could cost their livelihood. [13]

Intersectionality as a Lens for Understanding Marginalisation

In this section, I discuss the continued low pay faced by undocumented women domestic workers, despite the introduction of laws meant to increase their pay security. I use the theory of intersectionality to understand this phenomenon. In this context, intersectionality refers to the overlapping types of marginalisation faced by these women, including their gender, migrant and illegal status, race, and labour status, which combine to create a complex situation of exploitability and marginalisation. I argue that laws targeting low pay are only marginally effective at increasing equality and empowerment, because they view this issue only as a function of labour rights and fail to address the other aspects of disadvantage that consort to produce persistent low wages.

In actuality, low pay is also a function of status as an illegal migrant, womanhood, and race. [14] It is evident that migrants in general make less money than South African nationals. Undocumented migrants make even less than their documented counterparts because they have little legal redress against unfair wages through the justice system, cluster in low paid jobs, and face discrimination based on their migration status. [15] Undocumented migrant status further contributes to low pay because these women are often not comfortable forming collectives that can bargain on their behalf for better working conditions and remuneration, for fear of deportation. [16] In fact, many women domestic workers from Lesotho perceive that they do not have any rights in South Africa, because of their illegal migrant status, though this is not true. [17] Since access to human rights is often tied up with citizenship, irregular migration status can be linked with a denial of various human rights. [18]

Additionally, gender factors heavily into the equation; women in general are paid less than men. [19] Women may have left their home countries due to gender inequality and discrimination, which increases the motivation for them to remain in their destination country and could create a situation in which they tolerate worse pay and more abuse than men would. [20] Furthermore, women in general receive less education than men, which can cause them more difficulties in accessing their rights and legal protections, again increasing their toleration of low pay and abuse. [21] And finally, women are much more vulnerable to sexual abuse than men, which could be perpetrated by their employer, thereby increasing inequality in the employer / employee relationship and decreasing their likelihood to advocate for better pay.

Finally, race also contributes to low pay for Black Africans. South Africa is a society with a long history of racial discrimination and violence, and though legally racial equality now exists, in reality Black Africans receive less pay than white, Asian, and coloured South Africans. On average, Black South Africans earn about 40% of the wages that white South Africans do. [22] In a country with high levels of wage differentials based on race, combined with migration status, Black undocumented migrants surely make less than their South African counterparts. Because of these overlapping systems of inequality and marginalisation, it is clear that targeting low pay as exclusively an employment sector issue is largely ineffective. Since labour rights are not the only cause of the low pay, increasing labour rights alone would not solve the issue.

Sources

[1] Altman, M. and Pannell, K. (2012) ‘Policy Gaps and Theory Gaps: Women And Migrant Domestic Labor’, Feminist Economics, 18(2), pp. 291–315. doi: 10.1080/13545701.2012.704149.

Wiego Law and Informality Project (2014) ‘Domestic Workers’ Laws  and Legal Issues in South Africa’.

[2] Dinkelman, T. and Ranchhod, V. (2012) ‘Evidence on the impact of minimum wage laws in an informal sector: Domestic workers in South Africa’, Journal of Development Economics, 99(1), pp. 27–45. doi: 10.1016/j.jdeveco.2011.12.006, p. 29.

[3] Griffin, L. (2011) ‘Unravelling Rights: “Illegal” Migrant Domestic Workers in South Africa’, South African Review of Sociology, 42(2), pp. 83–101. doi: 10.1080/21528586.2011.582349, pp. 91-92.

[4] Bloch, A. (2010) ‘The Right to Rights?: Undocumented Migrants from Zimbabwe Living in South Africa’, Sociology. SAGE Publications Ltd, 44(2), pp. 233–250. doi: 10.1177/0038038509357209, p. 245.

[5] Altman and Pannell, 2012, p. 295.

[6] Griffin, 2011, p. 89.

[7] Griffin, 2011, pp. 86-87.

[8] Griffin, 2011, pp. 92-93.

[9] Griffin, 2011, p. 90.

[10] Ibid.

[11] Griffin, 2011, p. 83.

[12] Griffin, 2011, p. 86.

[13] Bloch, 2010, pp. 237-243.

[14] Nyamnjoh, F. B. (2013) Insiders and Outsiders: Citizenship and Xenophobia in Contemporary Southern Africa. Zed Books Ltd.

[15] Trad, S., Tsunga, A. and Rioufol, V. (2008) Surplus People? Undocumented and other vulnerable migrants in South Africa. Paris: Fédération internationale pour les droits humains, pp. 1–48. Available at: https://www.fidh.org/IMG/pdf/za486a.pdf, pp. 29-30.

Bloch, 2010, p. 242.

[16] Griffin, 2011, pp. 86-87.

[17] Ibid.

[18] Bloch, 2010, pp. 238-239.

[19] Bloch, 2010, p. 242.

[20] Magidimisha, H. H. (2018) ‘Gender, Migration and Crisis in Southern Africa: Contestations and Tensions in the Informal Spaces and “Illegal Labour” Market’, in Crisis, Identity and Migration in Post-Colonial Southern Africa. Springer, Cham, pp. 75–88.

[21] Kawar, M. (2004) ‘Gender and migration: why are women more vulnerable?’, in Femmes Et Mouvement: Genre, Migrations Et Nouvelle Division International Du Travail. Geneva: Graduate Institute Publications, pp. 71–87.

[22] Pupwe, O. K. (2015) Three Essays on Racial Wage Differentials in South Africa. Western Michigan University. Available at: https://scholarworks.wmich.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1539&context=dissertations, p. 88.

COVID-19 Pandemic Exacerbating Threats to Democracy

For this interview series, Fabiana Natale and Gilles de Valk are interviewing experts from different backgrounds on the political implications of the COVID-19 pandemic. From their living rooms in France and the Netherlands they will explore the consequences the pandemic will have for (geo)political, security, and societal affairs. This interview series marks the launch of a new type of content for the Security Distillery, one which we hope can provide entertaining and informative analysis of an uncertain and evolving development in global politics.

After seven episodes, we have produced a succinct analysis of the trends observed so far.
Download the brief here

Can Tanzania be the Next Big LNG Exporter?

Energy export and production can be a source of political leverage for producers (America, Australia, Qatar) and a vulnerability for non-producing countries (the Baltic states) and developing energy producers (Nigeria, Equatorial Guinea). New energy entrants like Tanzania stand to benefit if resources are properly managed and invested. The recent discovery of over 46 trillion cubic feet (TCF) of offshore natural gas in Tanzania places the East African country as a significant competitor in the global Liquified Natural Gas (LNG) market. [1] Their proximity to the Asian LNG market heightens the expectation of this resource for power generation, regional supply, and intercontinental export. However, the political, legal, and security environment, along with the collapse in oil prices (to which most liquified gas exports are linked) and increased demand for cheaper and cleaner energy sources caused by COVID-19 all present challenges to Tanzania.

This paper will examine the political, legal, and security factors that may affect the viability of the new energy power, Tanzania, as a global competitor in the LNG market. Using secondary data, I observe an increasing level of repression in Tanzania, compounded with a failure to manage the expectations of job creation and social security. Therefore, LNG exploration could result in civil unrest and protests in Tanzania. Tanzania must therefore work twice as hard to attract and retain investors that will develop hard (roads, pipelines, railway) and soft infrastructure (capacity building, skilled labour, training) and establish legal frameworks that enable the people to have a stake in the resource.

 By Ugo Igariwey Iduma

INTRODUCTION

The first offshore discovery of natural gas in Tanzania was made in 2010, which fuelled expectations of development and talks of its opportunities for the East African region and the continent overall. [2] Previous literature has focused on how the significant share of natural gas production can be used for power generation, transportation, and fertilizer production. [3] [4]. Recent studies, however, have failed to look at the structural, political, legal, and security factors that may affect new energy powers. Ernst and Young (2012) attempt to give an overall risk assessment of Tanzania. Yet, there is a need for an updated evaluation of the situation in Tanzania given the increasing rates of urbanization and the effects of the COVID-19 outbreak, which has forced millions of people to adapt to working from home, and therefore, increasing domestic energy consumption. [5] This paper runs a SWOT analysis (Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats) of Tanzania and LNG exploration. A SWOT analysis will enable us to answer the question ‘Can Tanzania be the Next Global LNG Exporter?'

STRENGTHS AND OPPORTUNITIES

The high costs of generating electricity are causing Africans to demand further access to LNG because it is a relatively cheap, clean, and abundant source of energy. The large discoveries of LNG off the shore of Tanzania is expected to meet the rapidly growing worldwide energy demand, while also serving as an effective energy solution in East Africa. [6] Their proximity to India and South Asia instills optimism that if LNG plants are completed and production commences, Tanzania could be a significant LNG exporter. Being a significant exporter could lead to poverty reduction, job creation, and social security, creating the possibility of Tanzania climbing up the development ladder to middle-income status. [7]

THREATS

The increase of American unconventional gas production in 2006 coupled with the expansion of the Panama Canal in 2016, has caused the LNG market to become oversaturated and extremely competitive, [8] making it difficult for Tanzania to penetrate the market. In addition to their newness to the market, Tanzania must play catch-up to create relationships with foreign investors and secure buyers. Domestically, Tanzania struggles to secure financial investment to establish hard and soft infrastructures. COVID-19 has also made it increasingly challenging to keep existing investors, as the pandemic has caused foreign investors to retreat inwards to their home countries, causing a delay in plans to start LNG production. [9]

Infrastructure issues are compounded with the fiscal and regulatory uncertainties relating to taxation, domestic supply obligations, and local content requirements. [10] The 2013, Production Sharing Agreement Model (PSAM) local content policy requires firms to use domestically-manufactured and supplied goods and services is yet to be adopted effectively. Until the local content policies address the needs of the local communities, exploration and production (E&P), companies cannot begin production and expect a return on investment. [11] The stern local content requirements became a politically sensitive issue for Tanzania as violent protests broke out in 2013 over the construction of the Mtwara pipeline. Unless expectations are better managed, an LNG project could trigger similar unrest.

Additionally, the fall in oil prices in March 2020 also poses a risk to the commercialisation of LNG for Tanzania. LNG contracts remain heavily indexed to oil. With the development of export terminals at a high cost, lowering oil prices leaves the Tanzania LNG project at an estimated breakeven price of USD10.10 per million British thermal units (mmBtu) (excluding shipping). [12] In comparison to the United States (USD5.56 per mmBtu) and Australia (USD 3 per mmBtu) breakeven prices, Tanzania has to export its LNG at a higher price to make profits. [13] From these breakeven prices and oil prices dependency, Tanzania is put in an even more critical position in developing their LNG project.

WEAKNESS

Furthermore, the operational and legal constraints have forced Tanzania to prioritise domestic and regional markets over international counterparts. [14] Tanzania's domestic demand for natural gas is large, but the percentage of the population that can afford LNG energy is small.  The problem becomes, can local people pay for electricity or will the government subsidise it? Government subsidies would not be sustainable economically if anchor industries (BG Group {Shell}, Equinor, Ophir Energy, Statoil and ExxonMobil) do not pay off the excesses allowing the government to subsidise the consumer. The commitment to payoff excesses is proven to be a loss for leading International Oil Companies in Tanzania, who are not short of alternative LNG projects to plough investment and expertise into as their focus is on sales and securing supply contracts. Shell and ExxonMobil, for instance, are both in the running to develop new Qatari trains and also have major North American projects lined up. Furthermore, Equinor lacks the capacity to pay off Tanzania LNG project without the support of other large players. [15] Their connectivity to other markets in the region also remains limited. LNG demand from neighbouring Burundi, Kenya, Congo, Malawi, Zambia, Zimbabwe are low ( see table 1). [16] There are also limited opportunities for gas pipeline exports from Tanzania to neighbouring countries, for instance, Harare, Zimbabwe is 2,170.6 KM away from Tanzania (Mtwara) and Lusaka, Zambia is 1,982.0 KM from Mkuranga, Tanzania locations with drilling wells. Therefore, these high distances restrict options for export and investment without further infrastructure development.

Table 1: Natural Gas demand in East African countries

Source: [17]

From the table we see that power demand and generation are low in neighbouring countries such as Burundi, Kenya, Malawi, Rwanda, Zimbabwe, with power consumption of less than 1bn KWh. Despite power consumption being less than 1bn KWh in 2019, demand for LNG specifically from Kenya is increasing at the rate of 3.6% annually representing an opportunity for Tanzania to become a regional exporter, but the potential is limited without substantial aid in the construction of gas pipelines in the destination market. [18]

            Furthermore, the 1990s gold rush gave Tanzania a peripheral reputation of being exploited by foreign gold mining companies. As a result, much of Tanzania’s gold revenues accrued to gold corporations, while the needs of local people were neglected. In the eyes of ordinary Tanzanians, gas exploration is no different. Tanzania’s one-party system has cracked down on the media, civil society, and statistics, and the growing authoritarianism is breeding more organised opposition and lower confidence in government. This could result in protests or civil unrest particularly if the country does not peacefully reform to a multi-party system,, thus posing a risk to future investors and delaying LNG development. [19]

Under the current president John Magufuli, Tanzania has gone through a “mining revolution” that has left the President clashing with foreign mining corporations. In 2017 Magufuli accused foreign mining companies of theft and exploitation, fast-tracking three bills through parliament that included provisions of reviewing and annulling mining contracts that were under “unconscionable terms”. [20] Acacia Mining, the largest stakeholder in the Tanzanian gold sector – announced in 2017 that it was considering the full closure of its operations in the country so as to “protect our cash pile”. [21] Shock waves were sent not only through the gold, but also the gas sector, as the host government’s agreement to the construction of a gas terminal was still under negotiation at that time. These acts of political sniping have created delays in LNG production. 

In conclusion, Tanzania’s threats and weakness include a lack of infrastructure, oversaturation of the global market, non-existent local content policies that include local communities, and increasing levels of authoritarianism. According to my analysis, these outweigh the strengths and opportunities of a large commercial resource deposit and proximity to lucrative Asian markets. Therefore, I deduce that Tanzania will not be a significant LNG exporter in its current situation. To overcome its weaknesses, Tanzania should design a "unitization initiative" with other East African LNG explorers (such as Kenya and Uganda) to pool their resources and market together to cut LNG production costs, gain access to hard and soft infrastructures, and greater competitiveness, while curbing construction time. As Tanzania’s gas sector focuses on regional and domestic LNG exports, it becomes important to pool the resources of other East African countries to construct their individual gas pipelines and terminals for Tanzanian LNG.  

SOURCES

[1] British Petroleum (2016) BP Statistical Review of World Energy.

[2] Ledesma, D., (2013) East Africa gas–the potential for export. Oxford Institute for Energy Studies.

[3] Foell, W., Pachauri, S., Spreng, D. and Zerriffi, H., (2011) 'Household cooking fuels and technologies in developing economies. Energy policy', 39(12), pp.7487-7496.

[4] Schlag, N. and Zuzarte, F. (2008) Market Barriers to Clean Cooking Fuels in Sub-Saharan Africa: A Review of Literature. Sweden.

[5] Denton F. (2020) Will COVID-19 leave fuel-rich African countries gasping for breath? International institute for environment and development. (online) Available from:https://www.iied.org/will-covid-19-leave-fuel-rich-african-countries-gasping-for-breath\

[6] International Energy Agency (2014) Medium-term Gas Market Report 2014: Market Analysis and Forecasts to 2019. International Energy Agency.

[7] US Energy Information Administration (2016) International Energy Outlook.  Energy Information Administration (EIA), 2016.

[8] Leather, D.T., Bahadori, A., Nwaoha, C. and Wood, D.A., (2013) 'A review of Australia's natural gas resources and their exploitation.  Journal of Natural Gas Science and Engineering, 10, pp.68-88.

[9] Demierre, J., Bazilian, M., Carbajal, J., Sherpa, S. and Modi, V., (2015) 'Potential for regional use of East Africa's natural gas'. Applied energy, 143, pp.414-436.

[10] Boersma, T., Ebinger, C.K. and Greenley, H.L. (2015) An assessment of US natural gas exports. The Brookings Institution, Washington, DC.

[11] Sisa J. (2014) Local policies set back East Africa oil and gas projects. (online) Available from:https://globalriskinsights.com/2014/11/local-policies-may-set-back-e-africa-oil-gas-projects/

[12] Business monitoring institute (BMI) (2016) Tanzania oil and gas report: Includes 10-year forecast to 2025. Q4. BMI.

[13] Russell, C. (2020) Column: Asian LNG prices take bigger coronavirus hit than Brent crude. Reuter. (Online) Availiable from: https://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-column-russell-lng-asia/column-asian-lng-prices-take-bigger-coronavirus-hit-than-brent-crude-idUKKCN2290YC#:~:text=Most%20Australian%20LNG%20projects%20are,to%20need%20slightly%20higher%20prices

[14] The United Republic of Tanzania (2013) The Natural Gas Policy of Tanzania., Dar es Salaam: October 2013, 14. Available from: http://www.tanzania.go.tz/egov_uploads/documents/Natural_Gas_Policy_-_Approved_sw.pdf.

[15] Petroleum Economist (2020) LNG spot trading continues to surge. (Online) available from: https://www.petroleum-economist.com/articles/midstream-downstream/lng/2020/lng-spot-trading-continues-to-surge

[16] Ledesma, p. 22

[17] Ibid, p.27

[18] International Energy Agency (2019) Kenya Energy Outlook: Analysis from Africa Energy Outlook 2019. International Energy Agency.

[19]   Polus, A. and Tycholiz, W., (2019) 'David versus Goliath: Tanzania's Efforts to Stand Up to Foreign Gas Corporations'. Africa Spectrum, 54(1), pp.61-72

[20] The Parliament of Tanzania (2017) The Permanent Sovereignty Act, Part III. Printed by the Government Printer, Dar Es Salaam, 7 July 2017.

[21] Hume N (2017) Acacia warns of mine closure unless Tanzania lifts export ban. (online) Available from: https://www.ft.com/content/fe0a33b6-6e06-11e7-bfeb-33fe0c5b7eaa

Baltic Security: An Inward Look at Ethnic Tension in Estonia and its Threat to Democracy

Since the fall of the Soviet Union, Estonia has been recognised as a leader of the Baltic states in their transition to becoming democratic powers. Estonia is often portrayed as a technological powerhouse; due to its Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre, Estonia plays a prominent role in Baltic regional security. Besides transitioning into an essential security position through technological advancement, the state also boasts the highest level of political participation from its citizens out of all post-Soviet states.[1] However, Estonian policies towards its Russian-speaking* minority creates a divide in the state’s population. With the COVID-19 pandemic wreaking havoc globally, one wonders how the virus will impact a state that struggles to include roughly a quarter of its population in civic participation. This article will explore the subject in detail, providing an analysis of Estonia’s policies as they relate to the country’s Russian-speaking minority, and the potential for COVID-19 to increase the rift between the Estonian population due to its economic impact on the state.

By Taylor Pehrson

Estonia gained independence on 20 August 1991 after 47 years of occupation by the Soviet Union. A fundamental objective of the 1992 Estonian Constitution is the perseverance of the ‘Estonian people, language and culture’. [2] This goal marks the sense of national pride the Estonian people had at the time of independence. However, it also set a precedent for a national division of those living in Estonia - a precedent that can be traced through the Constitution and various other Acts published in and after 1992. Through the nationalisation of Estonian verbiage, these documents markedly separate the country’s large Russian-speaking population.

After the Citizenship Act was enacted in 1992, 90% of ethnic-Estonians automatically became citizens while only 8-10% of non-Estonians gained citizenship. This is due to a law that granted citizenship to those who were living in Estonia before 1940, which was the year of Soviet annexation. [3] Because of the law, those that moved or were born in Estonia after 1940 during Soviet times had to apply for citizenship. New numbers show that ‘as of April 2012, 93,774 persons (6.9% of the population) remain stateless, while approximately 95,115 (7% of the population) have chosen Russian citizenship as an alternative to statelessness’. [4] Because many Russian-speakers have not been able to gain citizenship, this combined 13.9% of the population does not have the right to participate in Estonian democracy. Therefore, the question stands as to the legitimacy of Estonia’s democracy.

In order to provide answers, a thorough examination of Estonian citizenship policies and legislation is needed: How do they serve core democratic values, such as the civic participation of the whole population? Therefore, it is important to investigate Estonian elections and their impact on ethnic tension. Going further, this article will then analyse how the current global pandemic will impact both the strides the Estonian government has made since 1992 and how the virus could exacerbate ethnic divisions, particularly in relation to the Estonian economy.

Although Estonian policy has recently changed as a result of the state’s engagement with the EU and NATO regulations and standards, there is still a long way ahead before the gap between Estonian and Russian-speaking populations can be bridged. One of the main distinctions and roadblocks between the two populations is language. Within the Constitution, Language Act, Citizenship Act, Riigikogu Election Act, and numerous other government directives, language is a main feature.

The 1992 Constitution made speaking Estonian a requirement for gaining Estonian citizenship. Efforts to curb the language obstacle for gaining citizenship started in 1995, when the Language Act provided Estonian language courses for anyone taking the citizenship exam. [5] This included a government reimbursement program for the courses (provided one passes the exams), clarification that only a B1 level of proficiency is needed for citizenship, and the Department of Education providing language tutors for the courses. [6] Thus, language is dissipating as a barrier to citizenship in the state. However, due to the heavy influx of those applying for citizenship and limited state funding, this process is only slowly moving forward.

Language remains nonetheless a decisive barrier for anyone hoping to engage in civic participation in the state. As stated in the Language Act of 2011, ‘the language of public administration in state agencies and local government authorities is Estonian… [this] extend[s] to the majority of state-owned companies, foundations established by state and non-profit organizations with state participation’. [7] While the Act does make an exception for local governments in districts where half the population or more speaks another language, all other government operations must use Estonian and only Estonian. [8] This means that in order to be elected to any government position, a person must be fluent in Estonian.

Besides the Russian-speaking population not being represented in government positions, the right to vote and join political parties is also restricted. In order to vote in Estonia, one must be an Estonian citizen and 18 years of age. [9] Moreover, only Estonian citizens can join political parties. [10] Thus, because of the language barrier to citizenship that is only slowly easing, Russian-speaking people in Estonia who do not meet citizenship requirements are limited in their civic participation abilities. This means they may not vote or voice their opinions on matters relating to jobs and visas, issues that pertain particularly to the Russian-speaking population. A recently published study by the EU Marie Curie Research Training Network*  found that ethnic-Estonians are twice as likely to vote in any municipal election than Russian-speakers. [11] While one could argue that Russian-speakers do not have an interest in civically engaging and thus their numbers are low, consideration of Russian-speakers’ limitations to participation should be acknowledged first to ensure the limitations do not prevent a significant portion of the population from participating.

If a large quantity of Russian-speakers are not able to vote or join political parties, or run for a government position, Estonia is losing out on the input of a significant portion of their population. It is no wonder that election season usually brings tensions to a boil. This became apparent in the Estonian parliamentary elections of 2019 when, two months before the elections, signs labeled ‘only Estonians here’ and ‘only Russians here’ were put up on different parts of Tram stops in Tallinn. [12] The action, done by a small political party, Eesti 200, ignited tensions in the capital that prompted the immediate removal of the signs and put Russian-speakers’ citizenship at the forefront of political debate. A small instance created waves of action and protest; one then wonders what the impact of a major event could have on the small Baltic state where tensions are waiting under the surface.

Estonia and the other Baltic states have fared well in the global COVID-19 pandemic in comparison with the rest of Europe, with trends of low numbers of cases and deaths. Part of the success may be due to Estonia’s societal emphasis on technology, as the transition to quarantine was rather seamless due to technological capabilities. [13] However, a large concern remains for both Estonians and the Russian-speaking population: the economy.

Because of the potential for an economic downturn caused by the pandemic, the Estonian Conservative Peoples Party with Mart Helme at the helm drafted a new bill in April. This bill would terminate the visas of unemployed workers from non-EU countries and expire long-term visas. [14] Helme commented on the bill, saying “in the current difficult time, when our own fellow country people are short of jobs and there are more people every day who have lost their jobs, we must support the residents of Estonia.” [15]

There has been a public outcry from the Russian-speaking community on the bill which would give more power to the employer to choose Estonian citizens over other workers. Because of the restrictions to Estonian citizenship and COVID-19, the process of citizenship has slowed dramatically; Russian-speakers now face deportation and the loss of visas due to the government attempting to provide Estonians with the jobs that are usually reserved for Russian-speakers. It is no wonder that in a poll taken in April 2020, 72% of the Russian-speaking population in Estonia was worried about the economic well-being of the state. [16]

However, other sources have implied that the pandemic has brought the Estonian population together. According to Dr. Tonis Saarts of Tallinn University, the pandemic has put prominent Russian-speakers, such as the chief medical officer of the Estonian Health Board, Dr. Arkadi Popov, at the forefront of the fight against COVID-19. [17] This has created a unifying image of the Russian-speakers and ethnic-Estonians coming together to defeat a common enemy. Alas, Saarts also comments that “the looming economic crisis will hit Russians harder than it will Estonians.” [18] Furthermore, due to the language division in the state, there is a distinct separation of Estonian versus Russian-speakers’ jobs, Russian-speakers being limited to mostly blue collar positions as they do not require knowledge of Estonian. Therefore, the pandemic’s unifying ability will soon be tested through the economy, as can be seen in the Estonian governments’ drafted bill to end certain visas.

Definitions of democracy, though all slightly different, all include civic engagement by the population as democracy’s cornerstone. In Estonia, the question of who qualifies as a citizen as well as language barriers prevent a portion of their population from civic engagement. With COVID-19 potentially destabilising the economy of the state, Russian-speakers now risk losing jobs and visas with little political representation in the matter. While the world slowly moves forward from the devastation the pandemic caused, a call to action in Estonia and other post-Soviet states is needed as the economy may override their work towards establishing democracy in the wake of the virus.

*The term Russian-speaker is used here to describe those that have Russian, Polish, Belarusian or other Eastern European background, but have lived in Estonia or were born in the state after 1940 (the year of Soviet occupation). Russian-speaker is used to replace the term ethnic-Russian since some migrants that entered Estonia during Soviet occupation were not ethnically Russian and instead, adopted Russian as the main language. This population is commonly grouped together under the term “Russian-speaking” in legislation, laws, and news sources in the Baltic region.

*The Integration of the European Second Generation Survey (TIES): this survey started in 2006 through a collaboration of research institutes in 11 European countries and Turkey. The survey sought to collect data on European second generation migrants. Within the Baltics, the survey measured the civic participation of different ethnic groups.

Sources

[1] Schulze, J. (2014) "The Ethnic Participation Gap: Comparing Second Generation Russian Youth and Estonian Youth", Journal on Ethnopolitics and Minority Issues in Europe, 13(1) pp. 19-56. Available at: https://heinonline-org.ezproxy.lib.gla.ac.uk/HOL/Page?handle=hein.journals/jemie2014&id=19&collection=journals&index=journals/jemie (Accessed: 21 June 2020). p. 24.

[2] The Constitution of the Republic of Estonia 1992. Available at: https://www.riigiteataja.ee/en/eli/530102013003/consolide (Accessed: 28 June 2020). p. 1.

[3] Kirch, M. & Kirch, A. (1995) "Ethnic relations: Estonians and non-Estonians", Nationalities Papers, 23(1), pp. 43-59. Available at: http://tinyurl.com/qqzbx9k (Accessed: 6 March 2020). p 49.

[4] Schulze, J. (2014) "The Ethnic Participation Gap: Comparing Second Generation Russian Youth and Estonian Youth", Journal on Ethnopolitics and Minority Issues in Europe, 13(1) pp. 19-56. Available at: https://heinonline-org.ezproxy.lib.gla.ac.uk/HOL/Page?handle=hein.journals/jemie2014&id=19&collection=journals&index=journals/jemie (Accessed: 21 June 2020). p. 26.

[5] Citizenship Act 1995. Available at: https://www.riigiteataja.ee/en/eli/512022015001/consolide (Accessed: 29 June 2020).

[6] Ibid.

[7] Language Act 2011. Available at: https://www.riigiteataja.ee/en/eli/506112013016/ (Accessed: 29 June 2020). p. 2.

[8] Ibid.

[9] Riigikogu Election Act 2002. Available at: https://www.riigiteataja.ee/en/eli/510032014001/consolide (Accessed: 30 June 2020). p. 1.

[10] The Constitution of the Republic of Estonia 1992. Available at: https://www.riigiteataja.ee/en/eli/530102013003/consolide (Accessed: 28 June 2020). p. 5.

[11] Schulze, J. (2014) "The Ethnic Participation Gap: Comparing Second Generation Russian Youth and Estonian Youth", Journal on Ethnopolitics and Minority Issues in Europe, 13(1) pp. 19-56. Available at: https://heinonline-org.ezproxy.lib.gla.ac.uk/HOL/Page?handle=hein.journals/jemie2014&id=19&collection=journals&index=journals/jemie (Accessed: 21 June 2020). p. 35.

[12] Luxmoore, M. and Alliksaar, K. (2019) ‘”Only Estonians Here”: Outrage After Election Poster Campaign Singles Out Russian Minority”, RadioFreeLiberty, 10 January. Available at: https://www.rferl.org/a/estonia-election-posters-russian-minority-outrage/29702111.html (Accessed: 20 June 2020).

[13] Sander, G. F. (2020) ‘The pandemic has united us: A media divide fades in the Baltics’, Christian Science Monitor, Riga, 18 June. Available at: https://www.csmonitor.com/World/Europe/2020/0618/The-pandemic-has-united-us-A-media-divide-fades-in-the-Baltics (Accessed: 20 June 2020).

[14] Ed. Nomm, A. and Wright, H. (2020) ‘Interior ministry drafting bill to send unemployed foreign workers home’ ERR News, 1 April. Available at: https://news.err.ee/1071501/interior-ministry-drafting-bill-to-send-unemployed-foreign-workers-home (Accessed: 20 June 2020).

[15] Ibid.

[16] Ed. Vahtla, A. (2020) ‘Poll Coronavirus awareness nearly equal among Estonian-, Russian-speakers’, ERR News, 5 April. Available at: https://news.err.ee/1072982/poll-coronavirus-awareness-nearly-equal-among-estonian-russian-speakers (Accessed: 20 June 2020).

[17] Sander, G. F. (2020) ‘The pandemic has united us: A media divide fades in the Baltics’, Christian Science Monitor, Riga, 18 June. Available at: https://www.csmonitor.com/World/Europe/2020/0618/The-pandemic-has-united-us-A-media-divide-fades-in-the-Baltics (Accessed: 20 June 2020).

[18] Ibid.