Doctors with dilemmas - Goma 1994-1995

Médecins Sans Frontières

This article is based on an interview with Rachel Kiddell-Monroe, who worked in Zaire and Rwanda with Médecins Sans Frontières Holland before, during and after the genocide against the Tutsis.

The views expressed in this article do not necessarily reflect those of Médecins Sans Frontières/Doctors without Borders.

By Johanna Cottin

When Rachel Kiddell-Monroe became Head of Mission for a drug distribution programme run by Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) in December 1993, she had been told this would be a quiet, peaceful posting in Goma, former Zaire, just across the border from Rwanda. At that time, no-one could have predicted that Goma would soon become the emergency refuge for over a million people fleeing a genocide in Rwanda. [1]

Back in 1993, Goma was not the international organisation hotspot it is today. MSF was among a few international organisations working on regular development projects and drug distribution programmes in the Kivu region. MSF France had been sending volunteers to Rwanda since 1982 [2] and other MSF sections had been present in the Great Lakes region since the early 1990s. [3] Yet, despite MSF’s presence in the region for over a decade, the organisation failed to properly understand the political context in which it was operating and thus the dynamics of the ensuing conflict and refugee crisis. [4] MSF was confronted with ethical dilemmas which challenged its role as an impartial aid organisation in the midst of a genocide.

The genocide against the Tutsis began on the 6th of April 1994 in Rwanda. At the same time, pogroms against Tutsis in the Zairean Masisi region had been intensifying. Rachel Kiddell-Monroe had been gathering information from locals and documenting the incidents against Zairean Tutsis and she alerted the MSF Holland headquarters in Amsterdam. As she recalls:

This is 1994. There is no internet, no facebook, no social media. There is no communication except through a satellite telephone and very, very limited possibilities to send something through a computer. That is really important to understand because it completely impacted the way we talked about, understood and responded to the genocide. [5]

The headquarters initially dismissed the nature and severity of the conflict, creating tensions between Amsterdam and the field team in Goma.

So when I talked to people in Amsterdam and told them that there was a genocide, they thought I was overreacting. It was really hard because there was a denialism going on in Amsterdam. And that caused delays within the organisation. [6] 

The denialism or fatalistic attitude of humanitarian organisations towards the Rwandan conflict was rooted in a colonial mindset, and a tendency to explain African conflicts as ‘tribal wars’. [7] The MSF teams on the ground were preoccupied with the technical aspect of their work, providing medical aid and tending to the injured rather than focusing on the political climate in which they were working. MSF’s initial analysis of the conflict as an inter-ethnic conflict was based on a colonial historiography of Rwanda and thus failed to recognize it as a politically designed genocide. [8]

As the ongoing massacres in Rwanda intensified and the number of victims grew, MSF began preparing camps in the neighbouring countries for refugees to arrive from Rwanda. The MSF programmes in Zaire were placed under the direction of the emergency department and Rachel Kiddell-Monroe became the MSF Field Emergency Coordinator in Goma. However, according to Kiddell-Monroe the refugees did not come right away:  ’What happened is that Rwanda was sealed off. People were kept inside. It was like a fishbowl: we could look in and see what was happening but we couldn’t get in and people couldn’t get out’. [9] The Rwandan military and militias were guarding the borders and preventing the Tutsis from leaving the country. [10] MSF could not evacuate Rwandan Tutsis over the border, not even their own local staff. [11]

Nonetheless, on May 11th, 1994, 30,000 Rwandans had reached Zaire. [12] That number increased to somewhere between 800,000 and 1,000,000 by mid-July [13]:

I don’t think it was ever contemplated that there was going to be this huge outpour [Sic] of refugees towards Goma. The understanding of Rwanda was that the Western side of the country tended to be more safe, less reactionary, with a strong society, whereas the Eastern side was much more fragile. It was believed that there would be a much bigger exodus of people in the East. That was some kind of understanding about Rwanda that proved to be false. [14]

As the Tutsi-led Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) advanced into Rwanda and the conflict intensified, many Rwandans fled to Zaire. Facilitated by the French military presence in the West, the defeated Hutu militiamen and génocidaires crossed the border among the refugees and reached the MSF Goma refugee camp. While the field team was aware that armed soldiers and perpetrators were among the refugees, the MSF Charter mandated them to remain non-partisan and treat everyone in their camp indiscriminately [15]:

Seeing people crossing the border, I could not see the difference between Tutsi and Hutu. There is no difference. I did not know who perpetrated and who was a victim. They all came across with nothing and desperate, so the only response from my team was to help those people. [16]

Once refugees settled in Goma and the camp became more established, leadership among the refugees began to form: the instigators and perpetrators of the genocide were gaining influence within the camp, notably taking leadership roles within the food distribution programme. Although the number of refugees in the camp was largely overestimated and the UNHCR delivered food and aid supplies accordingly, malnutrition was still affecting 10% of the refugee population in November 1994. [17] This was a clear sign that food supplies were not reaching the most vulnerable and that aid was being diverted by the militias present in the camp [18]:

There were team discussion about this. Some were saying that what we’re doing is being taken completely the wrong way. We tried to access women and children directly and put a focus on water and food supplies. But we weren’t the only NGO there and we were working with other organisations. The inter-agency work was complicated because some agencies did not believe there were any aid diversions. [19] 

The security climate in the camp deteriorated and refugees willing to return to Rwanda were regularly threatened or killed by the militias. [20] Refugees suspected of being Tutsi or accused of being RPF spies were also killed by the militias, sometimes in front of MSF workers. [21] The defeated Hutu government spread fear among the Rwandan population using radio and urged the Rwandans to join the refugee camps, where the leaders of the genocide could expand their control and re-establish their power. [22] Essentially, the refugees became “hostages” of the militiamen in Zaire who were exploiting refugees as a human shield and benefiting from foreign aid to rebuild and strengthen their armed groups in order to attack the RPF forces in Rwanda.

The camps replicated a “mini-Rwanda” and perpetrators inside were infiltrating into the leadership of the camp. It was a million people camp, this was the size of Montreal, so there was a lot of space for leaders to take their place. That’s when we started to ask ourselves, should we really be here or not? [23]

MSF came to face multiple ethical dilemmas: should it continue its work in Goma even though its aid was being exploited by militias with the intention to pursue their genocidal goals? Or should MSF leave the camps, thus cutting the resources and aid supplies of the militias but at the same time depriving vulnerable populations in need? [24]

While there was a consensus among the different MSF sections that the current aid diversion by former génocidaires was unacceptable, opinions diverged on how to deal with the situation. Some sections believed staying in the camp was a form of humanitarian resistance to the perpetrators of the genocide. [25] Furthermore, their presence as an international NGO would enable them to witness and document what was happening in the region and continue to draw media attention to the cause. MSF France, on the contrary, was determined to pull out its programmes, and argued that diversion of aid was a violation of its fundamental principles and continuing their distribution of food and aid supplies to militias was a form of complicity. [26]

MSF Holland in Goma first requested the UN Security Council to deploy an international police force to protect the refugees from the perpetrators in the refugee camps, a request that was never fulfilled. [27] Advocacy through media and lobbying the international community to intervene were also strategies used by MSF. However, since the security situation was already precarious in Zaire, MSF was very careful with its public statements regarding the militias in the camps, to avoid putting their field staff in further danger. [28] Yet, the international community failed to intervene and by the end of 1995, all sections of MSF had withdrawn from the camps. [29]

The ethical dilemmas MSF was confronted with in the refugee camps shows that humanitarian aid is only effective when it is provided jointly with judicial and political action. [30] As a medical, non-partisan humanitarian organisation, MSF cannot and should not fulfill all these mandates. In times of armed conflict, population displacements and gross violations of human rights, humanitarian relief in the form of medical assistance, water supply, and food distribution is simply not enough. [31] The refugee crisis in what is now the Democratic Republic of the Congo proved that an international intervention would have been critical to prevent the militias from instrumentalising humanitarian aid with full impunity and pursuing their genocidal agenda. Yet, since the refugee crisis was solely treated as a humanitarian crisis, its political dimensions were ignored and the international community failed to intervene in time.

Sources

[1] UNHCR. (2000) ‘The State of the World’s Refugees 2000’, Chapter 10, p.246

[2] Bradol, J-H and Le Pape, M. (2017) ‘Humanitarian aid, genocide and mass killings, Médecins Sans Frontières, The Rwandan Experience, 1982-97’, Manchester University Press. 10

[3] MSF. (2014) ‘Genocide of Rwandan Tutsi 1994’, Speaking Out, p.11

[4] Bradol, J-H and Le Pape, M. 24

[5] The author’s interview with Rachel Kiddell Monroe on the 10th of June 2020

[6] Ibid.

[7] Stapleton, T. (2018) ‘Africa : War and Conflict in the Twentieth Century’, Routledge.

[8] Bradol, J-H and Le Pape, M. 24

[9] The author’s interview with Rachel Kiddell Monroe on the 10th of June 2020

[10] MSF. (2014) ‘Genocide of Rwandan Tutsi 1994’, 17

[11] Ibid. 16

[12] Ibid. 31

[13] Bradol, J-H and Le Pape, M. 47

[14] The author’s interview with Rachel Kiddell Monroe on the 10th of June 2020

[15] Bradol, J-H and Le Pape, M. 47

[16] The author’s interview with Rachel Kiddell Monroe on the 10th of June 2020

[17] MSF. (2014) ‘Rwandan Refugee Camps in Zaire and Tanzania, 1994-1995’, Speaking Out, 55

[18] Ibid. 32

[19] The author’s interview with Rachel Kiddell Monroe on the 10th of June 2020

[20] Bradol, J-H and Le Pape, M. 59

[21] MSF. (2014) ‘Rwandan Refugee Camps in Zaire and Tanzania, 1994-1995, 55

[22] Ibid. 28

[23] The author’s interview with Rachel Kiddell Monroe on the 10th of June 2020

[24] MSF. (2014) ‘Rwandan Refugee Camps in Zaire and Tanzania, 1994-1995’, 8

[25] Bradol, J-H and Le Pape, M. 62

[26] Ibid. 63

[27] Ibid. 8

[28] Bradol, J-H and Le Pape, M. 4

[29] Ibid. 4

[30] Ibid. 88

[31] Ibid. 91

Workshop series : Humanitarian Programme Development Workshop

In this first entry in the Security Distillery's workshop series, conducted by Ethan Pate, we have been focusing on programme development in humanitarian response. Dr Caitriona Dowd has led the workshop which introduced participants to the process of developing project proposals, seeking funding, and incorporate key aspects of design such as contextual analysis, needs assessments, and partnerships.

Download the report of the workshop here

Organised crime in the Sahel, an inextricable puzzle?

For eight years now, we have heard about the Sahel as the theatre of a war on terror. Sparked in Mali with the Tuareg rebellion of 2012, the conflict, largely waged by jihadist organisations, quickly spread beyond the borders. Islamist groups have constantly been striving to expand their influence. They have built up their power by exploiting state weaknesses in the face of deeply rooted economic issues and socio-ethnic tensions already amplified by climate change. [1] However, a key ingredient of their success lies in the dangerous potential of organised crime and trafficking networks in the Sahel. This piece will first look at the criminal rings that have contributed to turning the Sahel into a powder keg, and for which the conflict has played a catalyzing effect. [2] Then, it will develop the argument that those trafficking practices nurture each other, which makes them even more arduous to overcome. 

By Fabiana Natale

Overview of a region hustled by its criminal plurality

War and instability, combined with weak and corruptible states, have stirred the development of criminal trafficking routes and their overlap with terrorist networks. [3] Indeed, the Sahel, the boundary between Africa’s desert north and savannah south, and traditionally a land of passage with its caravan routes, is a valuable transit hub for licit and illicit trade today. Among the scourges that consume the Sahel, organised crime appears at the forefront, with its transnational trafficking networks. While a variety of illicit activities take place, migrant smuggling and trafficking in persons, arms, and drugs prove the most profitable. [4]

Migrant smugglers lead a very lucrative activity in a region with porous borders and severe violence. In the G5 Sahel countries (Burkina Faso, Chad, Mauritania, Mali, Niger) alone, the conflict has caused over 19,000  deaths. [5] With 2,000 attacks registered since 2012, [6] the armed efforts of jihadist groups led to the displacement of 900,000 people. [7] The addition of economic, political, and environmental concerns results in fluxes of over seven million international migrants per year, [8] creating great opportunities for smugglers. Exact figures are obviously hard to find due to the unlawful character of those activities, but the profit generated only through smuggling routes from the Sahel to Europe is estimated around $300 million per year, without mentioning considerable amounts of intra-regional migration. [9]

Furthermore, while migrant smuggling and human trafficking should be clearly distinguished from each other, they often end up being coupled as one issue. The purpose can differ depending on the population targeted. For instance, Nigerian women are the most common victims of sexual exploitation in Africa, [10] while men are mainly used for criminal activities or as workforce in fields and mines. Children, mostly coming from Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger, have been victims of the sex industry. [11] However, in the last decade, there has been an unfortunate resurgence of the soldier children phenomenon, especially among terrorist groups. [12]

Regarding weapons circulating in the region, they mostly come from previous local conflicts or from arms trafficking. The most sought-after products are assault rifles and ammunition. [13] They can be sold or leased by corrupt members of security forces or imported from abroad. Since the Cold War, they were mostly issued in Warsaw Pact countries. However, since the outbreak of the conflict, Chinese-made weapons seem to dominate the market. [14] Eritrea and Djibouti, as the “African gateway”, play a key role in supplying arms to the Sahel. [15] More locally, the leading actors are terrorist groups.

Those organisations also play a central role in trafficking drugs. [16] It is not a recent development that literature on the involvement of terrorists in criminal activities is dominated by references to the drug trade. [17] The practice has a twofold purpose: it generates income, but can also weaken enemies through its addictive nature. [18] While non-state actors in West Africa have been playing a solely logistical role for years, providing a corridor from Latin America to Europe, the last decade has even allowed local drug production to appear in the Sahel. [19]

Complex nexuses between trafficking networks allow mutual consolidation

The  major challenge is nonetheless the combination of all these criminal phenomena. They cannot be faced separately. Indeed, while Edmund Burke taught us that “slavery is a weed that grows on every soil”, certain soils might be more fertile – when shared with drug plantations for example. As a matter of fact, drug trafficking, with the addiction, financial issues, and community conflicts it causes, makes people more vulnerable to human trafficking. Additionally, it goes without saying that drugs, with their inhibitory effects, are valuable for people’s exploitation. [20]

On the other hand, trafficking in persons provides financial means, human resources, as well as networks for all sorts of criminal activities like weapons trafficking. An analysis of the organized crime index reveals a proportional evolution of arms and human trafficking in Africa and in the Sahel (cf. Appendix). [21] Weapons provide criminals with the necessary coercive power they need to subdue their human trafficking victims.

Besides, a dense and armed criminal network contributes to creating the proper environment to trigger violence and thus, exploit people’s weaknesses. Indeed, the growing black market in conventional weaponry has parallelled the escalation of violence in the region. [22] This relies in part on the supply available for rebel and terrorist groups, who disrupt an already unstable environment and further weaken national governments. They do so by damaging their territorial integrity, which hinders state-centric responses and allows a reinforcement of all the above-mentioned criminal phenomena. [23] Additionally, they induce financial losses by forcing the states to concentrate their efforts and resources on this asymmetric fight.

The direct outcome is thus the government’s failure to protect and provide for its citizens, leading to popular dissatisfaction. People can then deduce that they either need to provide for themselves – which can lead to an increase of the demand for light weapons – or to seek help from alternative groups. This is how the vacuum left by state authorities, if taken advantage of, can lead to considerable gain in legitimacy for criminal and terrorist organisations. [24]

These nexus are simply an illustration of how multiple aggravating factors can converge, leading to the vicious cycle for the Sahel security question. The region has been facing a diversity of geopolitical and humanitarian challenges that have not successfully been tackled despite five years of cooperation of local governments through the G5 Sahel, the French military intervention since 2013, and efforts of the international community. [25]

As shown, a major obstacle is the interconnection of multiple criminal activities which cannot be solved individually. Furthermore, a strictly regional response is not sufficient since the Sahel is not a closed-off area and constitutes a pivotal international hub for illicit markets and a central platform for drug trafficking [26]. Lastly, the financial fluxes and incomes generated by these trades cannot be ignored, especially in light of the role of the underground economy in Africa.

To conclude, in the last decade, the Sahel has been a puzzle of security challenges aggravated by humanitarian crises. As illustrated in this piece, the issues are deeply rooted and intertwined, which makes the bigger picture appear inextricable. Yet, the new decade began with further threats weighing in on the region: climate change and the coronavirus. On one side, the reduction in trafficking they caused is a reason to be hopeful. On the other, a more structured response is needed urgently, now that light has been shed on states in increasingly weak and precarious positions, therefore creating new opportunities for crime.

Appendix 1

https://ocindex.enactafrica.org/explorer/human_trafficking

Sources

[1] Le Monde Afrique (2020), ‘Comprendre la guerre au Sahel ( Les cartes du Monde Afrique, épisode 1)’ [online] Available from  https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=j1tLiD6yjXM

[2] Enhancing Africa’s reponse to transnational organised crime (2019) ‘Organised Crime Index Africa 2019’ [online] Available from https://enact-africa.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/2019-09-24-oc-index-2019.pdf 

[3] Ibid.

[4] US Aid, Bureau for Africa (2020), ‘Strengthening Rule of Law Approaches to Address Organized Crime Criminal Market Convergence’ [online] Available from https://globalinitiative.net/strengthening-rule-of-law-approaches-to-address-organized-crime-criminal-market-convergence/

[5] ACLED (2020), ‘The Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project’ [online] Available from  https://acleddata.com/dashboard/#/dashboard 

[6] Ibid.

[7] Le Monde Afrique (2020), ‘Comprendre la guerre au Sahel ( Les cartes du Monde Afrique, épisode 1)’ [online] Available from  https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=j1tLiD6yjXM

[8] Ibid.

[9] United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (2006), ‘Organized Crime and Irregular Migration from Africa to Europe’ [online] Available from https://sherloc.unodc.org/res/cld/bibliography/organized-crime-and-irregular-migration-from-africa-to-europe_html/Migration_Africa.pdf

[10] United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (2013) ‘Criminalité Transnationale Organisée en Afrique de l’Ouest : Une Evaluation des Menaces’ [online] Available from https://sherloc.unodc.org/res/cld/bibliography/2013/transnational_organized_crime_in_west_africa_a_threat_assessment_html/FRANCAIS_West_Africa_TOCTA_2013_FR.pdf

[11] United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (2006), ‘Organized Crime and Irregular Migration from Africa to Europe’ [online] Available from https://sherloc.unodc.org/res/cld/bibliography/organized-crime-and-irregular-migration-from-africa-to-europe_html/Migration_Africa.pdf

[12] RFI (2020), ‘Sahel: le chef de Barkhane alerte sur le recrutement d'enfants soldats par les jihadistes’ [online] Available from https://www.rfi.fr/fr/afrique/20200710-barkhane-bilan-inquietude-emploi-enfants-soldats-jihadiste

[13] United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (2013) ‘Criminalité Transnationale Organisée en Afrique de l’Ouest : Une Evaluation des Menaces’ [online] Available from https://sherloc.unodc.org/res/cld/bibliography/2013/transnational_organized_crime_in_west_africa_a_threat_assessment_html/FRANCAIS_West_Africa_TOCTA_2013_FR.pdf

[14] Ibid.

[15] Hansrod, Zeenat (2018) ‘Djibouti emerges as arms trafficking hub for Horn of Africa’ [online] Available from https://www.rfi.fr/en/africa/20180915-djibouti-emerges-arms-trafficking-hub-horn-africa

[16] Labrousse, Alan and Laniel Laurent (1999), ‘The world geopolitics of drugs’ Geopolitical Drug Watch [online] Available from https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/bfm%3A978-94-017-3505-6%2F1.pdf

[17]  McCarthy, Deborah (2003) ‘Hearing Before the Committee on the Judiciary United States Senate, Washington DC’

[18]  Enhancing Africa’s reponse to transnational organised crime (2019) ‘Organised Crime Index Africa 2019’ [online] Available from https://enact-africa.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/2019-09-24-oc-index-2019.pdf 

[19] United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (2013) ‘Criminalité Transnationale Organisée en Afrique de l’Ouest : Une Evaluation des Menaces’ [online] Available from https://sherloc.unodc.org/res/cld/bibliography/2013/transnational_organized_crime_in_west_africa_a_threat_assessment_html/FRANCAIS_West_Africa_TOCTA_2013_FR.pdf

[20] United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (2013) ‘Criminalité Transnationale Organisée en Afrique de l’Ouest : Une Evaluation des Menaces’ [online] Available from https://sherloc.unodc.org/res/cld/bibliography/2013/transnational_organized_crime_in_west_africa_a_threat_assessment_html/FRANCAIS_West_Africa_TOCTA_2013_FR.pdf

[21]  Enhancing Africa’s reponse to transnational organised crime (2019) ‘Organised Crime Index Africa 2019’ [online] Available from https://enact-africa.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/2019-09-24-oc-index-2019.pdf 

[22] Antoine, Jean-Charles (2015), ‘Trafic d’armes, l’étude des filières est une démarche majeure dans la compréhension des crises géopolitiques’ Diploweb [online] Available from https://www.diploweb.com/Trafic-d-armes-l-etude-des.html

[23] Enhancing Africa’s reponse to transnational organised crime (2019) ‘Organised Crime Index Africa 2019’ [online] Available from https://enact-africa.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/2019-09-24-oc-index-2019.pdf 

[24] Natale, Fabiana and de Valk Gilles (2020), ‘Conversing COVID - Part II, with Mikel Irizar’ The Security Distillery [online] Available from https://thesecuritydistillery.org/all-articles/conversing-covid-part-ii

[25] Athénaïs Porret, Anastasia (2020) ‘Les déplacés du Sahel : une urgence humanitaire’ Les Yeux du Monde [online] Available from https://les-yeux-du-monde.fr/actualite/43802-les-deplaces-du-sahel-une-urgence-humanitaire

[26] US Aid, Bureau for Africa (2020), ‘Strengthening Rule of Law Approaches to Address Organized Crime Criminal Market Convergence’ [online] Available from https://globalinitiative.net/strengthening-rule-of-law-approaches-to-address-organized-crime-criminal-market-convergence/

Conversing COVID – Part VI, with Daniela Pisoiu

An Interview Series on the Political Implications of the Pandemic

By Fabiana Natale and Gilles de Valk

For this interview series, Fabiana Natale and Gilles de Valk speak to experts from different backgrounds on the political implications of the COVID-19 pandemic in their respective fields. From their living rooms in France and The Netherlands, they will explore the (geo)political, security, and societal consequences of this pandemic. This interview series marks the launch of a new type of content for the Security Distillery, one which we hope can provide informative and entertaining analyses of an uncertain and evolving development in global politics.

For this sixth episode, we interviewed Daniela Pisoiu, Senior Researcher at the Austrian Institute for International Affairs (OIIP) and expert of the Radicalisation Awareness Network. She has over fifteen years of experience in Islamist, right-wing and left-wing radicalisation, extremism, and terrorism, and is specialised in individual radicalisation processes. Her fieldwork includes interviews with (former) radicals and analyses of court files. In terms of regional focus, she works on Austria and Germany, as well as the Western Balkans and Europe more broadly. In our conversation, we first discussed radicalisation and deradicalisation mechanisms and then the exploitation of the pandemic by extremists. 

Radicalisation is a gradual process and occurs in small steps. What is key when it comes to preventing it?

There are many important aspects, depending on who your target is and what stage one is at in the radicalisation process. To avoid this process from happening at all, however, an important concept to work with is critical thinking. Young people need to be provided with the capacity to use (social) media in a critical way, in order to resist indoctrination. If they do not, ideas can flow and evolve very quickly, especially due to the suggestion algorithms. Once you are in an environment where only similar ideas are propagated, it can be very difficult to get out of it.

You have interviewed returning foreign fighters for your research. How was it for you to talk with them about their experiences? And to what extent was it possible for you to understand their motives?

It is interesting and usually not so difficult. Sometimes I meet people who do not want to deal with what happened, they simply want to forget. Most of the time though, they do not have any problem with talking to me. However, some of them have their narratives already figured out for the trial and simply repeat it. 

Not everyone believes what returning foreign fighters say, but I think it is true when they say they experienced a real shock and disappointment. They all left with that dream of a utopian, supportive, and just society, where children go to school and women can work. Then, they find out that those ideas are not implemented and they experience violence on a daily basis. They are disappointed with their comrades and the ideology, which is why they disengage.

As soon as they come back to Europe, they are thrown into prison. Some of them did not even regard themselves as criminals and never touched a weapon. However, according to the law, they are amongst the worst offenders as they are accused of terrorism. This is a huge psychological burden, on top of the sense of guilt some have towards their family and children. Of course, I am not saying they are victims, but we should invest more in this psychological and social aspect.

Nevertheless, there are also returning fighters who still strongly believe in the ideology of IS after coming back.

How is Europe currently dealing with returning foreign fighters and what could be improved?

Most European governments were and are not particularly eager to take people back because they fear they might lose support domestically. Besides, it is a very complicated process. There are more people coming back than are convicted, because it is not always possible to find evidence. Then there are cases of people who have already been in prisoner camps in Syria before coming back, which counts for their sentence once they are convicted in Europe. Therefore, if we wait too long to let them return, they will directly be free once they arrive. There are also debates regarding women, because some consider them as victims that have been lured, while others say they are responsible and might have taken part in the morality police in Syria. Finally, there are also divergences concerning children. In France, they are separated from their family straight away and receive psychological counselling. In Austria, authorities try to place them with other family members. Either way, those decisions are taken on a case-by-case basis. There is no standard procedure and no incentive to establish one.

In Kosovo, however, 110 individuals, mostly women and children, have been actively brought back by the government and there is an elaborate reintegration plan. Women are not put in prison and families receive support for education and social care. Kosovo is very advanced in this regard and other Western countries are now taking it as an example.

Given the depth of indoctrination of both returning foreign fighters and extremists who stayed in Europe, what are the keys of de-radicalisation?  

The result of a de-radicalisation process has to do with the length and intensity of counselling. When a person radicalises, they enter a new world of ideas, and it takes time to reverse this; besides, accepting one’s own mistakes is difficult. 

Social networks are usually considered as the key element in de-radicalisation, because one is indoctrinated and radicalised through other people. Therefore, changing the social environment of the person can help induce a change in their values.

Additionally, having an occupation is crucial. Being jobless is not a risk, but it creates opportunities, because you have more time to engage with radical ideas and people. Besides, occupations reflect factors such as self-esteem and the need to do something meaningful and this plays an important role, both in radicalisation and in de-radicalisation processes.

On top of that, the pandemic has led to a considerable increase in online activities. Did it also create new opportunities for radicalisation via propaganda on social media?

Internet plays a key role in radicalisation, because all kinds of information are available out there, even instructions on how to build a bomb. However, propaganda does not work on its own. Networks are even more important, because radicalisation is a social phenomenon and always happens with a feedback loop. Online, interactions simply happen at a higher speed and sometimes also intensity than offline, while the social and psychological process remains the same.

As internet and social media create more opportunities for propaganda and radicalisation, extremist groups obviously picked up on the increased online activities during the pandemic. This has been exploited by jihadis, presenting the coronavirus as a punishment of Allah for the West, by right-wing extremist movements denouncing a Jewish plot, and by individuals and groups promoting various conspiracy theories, which are the first step into indoctrination.

However, when analysing such mechanisms, it is essential to look at both the recruiting organisation and the people. On the one hand, there is the thriving offer by extremist organisations. On the other hand, there is the internet user who is sitting at home, isolated, eager to have meaningful interactions, and perhaps psychologically affected by the crisis. Indeed, those circumstances increase people’s vulnerability to believe in simple explanations.

Thus, I suspect that we will see a consistent increase of radicalisation, especially the right-wing kind. Furthermore, we might have a hard time countering those phenomena, since frontline fighters against online propaganda are chiefly not state authorities, but private companies such as Google or Facebook, with their content analysis algorithms and social scientists.

Not long after IS presented the pandemic as a punishment for the West, their occupied territories were affected by the virus. How did IS react to this? To what extent could they take advantage of the crisis?

Generally, as state authorities are trying to deal with the pandemic, they can allocate less resources in the fight against terrorist groups, which have the opportunity to flourish. IS reacted quickly as the virus reached them. They applied the measures suggested by the World Health Organisation, even though they were critical about closing mosques. In this sense, it is an opportunity for them to portray themselves as an actual state and to show what they are capable of. They want to prove they are better able to take care of the populations than local governments. Thus, they are able, yet again, to take advantage of unstable institutions and gain popularity against weak states, such as countries in the Sahel. 

In that respect, terrorist and extremist groups are growing during the pandemic. Yet, we do not seem to focus on this issue as much as before the pandemic. Are we still well aware of the problem?

Media are currently paying less attention to terrorist and extremist groups, which is a good thing, since they live off publicity. Within specialist circles, I have not seen less care for those topics.

In recent years, IS has been putting less emphasis on the West. This is not due to the pandemic, but because they are increasingly focusing on regions such as the Sahel or Afghanistan. In Europe, we seem relieved about this shift, but it is important to understand that IS is not gone and sooner or later the consequences of their presence in other regions will affect us, too. 

In the right-wing spectrum, we see an increase in activity and even attempts to weaponise the virus. We did not use to think of biological weapons as an asset that such organisations could manage, because of the medical and logistic skills it requires. However, this type of virus offers the opportunity for a significant individual empowerment. If used systematically and strategically, a simple cough can become a weapon and attempts have been already made in this regard. 

While it is normal that states use their resources for other priorities at the moment, we have to remain aware of such risks and how they might evolve in the future. 

What are the key takeaways from the pandemic regarding radicalisation and extremism?

In the Middle East and Africa, the pandemic can increase the importance of terrorism. We often underestimate this, because we tend to be Western-centric. In Europe, the crisis has accelerated the empowerment of right-wing radicals, which had already started in the last years, but has been largely ignored.

We usually think of extremism as an abnormal phenomenon at the margin of society, but now it is developing in the middle of it, especially given the appeal of conspiracy theories. Earlier, we distinguished American white supremacism from European neo-Nazism and treated them as isolated cases with low potential. Today, those trends are gaining a strong transnational character and are appealing to more and more people on both sides of the Atlantic.

However, this is no surprise, because crises have always been good market opportunities for radicals to capitalise on. In times of crisis, people feel insecure and these groups provide them with easy answers.

The views and opinions expressed are solely those of the interviewee and do not reflect those of the Security Distillery, the IMSISS consortium or its partners and affiliates.

Conversing COVID – Part V, with Floris van Straaten

An Interview Series on the Political Implications of the Pandemic

By Fabiana Natale and Gilles de Valk

For this interview series, Fabiana Natale and Gilles de Valk speak to experts from different backgrounds on the political implications of the COVID-19 pandemic in their respective fields. From their living rooms in France and The Netherlands, they will explore the (geo)political, security, and societal consequences of this pandemic. This interview series marks the launch of a new type of content for the Security Distillery, one which we hope can provide informative and entertaining analyses of an uncertain and evolving development in global politics.

For this fifth episode, we interviewed Floris van Straaten, Middle East Editor at NRC Handelsblad, a Dutch daily newspaper. He was previously Asia Editor at the same newspaper and he worked in Pakistan as a freelancer during the 1980s, covering the war in Afghanistan, among other things. In our conversation, we discussed the political and economic consequences of the pandemic for the Middle East.

This interview was conducted on June 17th.

Figures on COVID-19 cases across countries in the Middle East vary largely. What does this tell us about how the region is dealing with the pandemic?

In the Gulf states and Northern Africa, it seems the figures are not very high. However, the real figures could be well above what officials tell you, as they do not do a great deal of testing. Iran, however, still has one of the highest numbers of COVID-19 cases in the region. And still, people think the real figure is in fact higher. From Iran, many infections spread to several other Middle Eastern countries, such as Lebanon and Iraq. And in Bahrain, for example, nearly half of the first batch of people that was repatriated from Iran was infected with COVID-19.

In Iran, health workers were threatened by the Iranian government to prevent them from disclosing actual numbers of COVID-19 deaths to the media [1]. What does this mean for how the Iranian government is perceived?

Economically, Iran was already in dire straits before corona started, because of the sanctions imposed by the United States (US) and widespread corruption in the country. Iranians could be doing much better if there was better economic management by the government. Thus, the corona crisis came at a very awkward moment for the Iranian authorities. The first reports on COVID-19 cases in Iran indicated there were infections in the city of Qom, a holy city for Shia Muslims. Those reports were covered up by the authorities, because they were hesitant to close mosques and first wanted to hold legislative elections, which were to take place in February. The ‘hardliners’, who oppose engagement with the west and who the powerful religious establishment sympathises with, were likely to win. Eventually, the elections did take place without restrictions, even in Qom. This probably contributed to the spread of the virus. In March, the number of infections rose very quickly and there were informal reports saying the real figures of people who had died were much higher than what the authorities claimed. Videos of mass graves near the city of Qom appeared.

The Iranian authorities handled matters in a way they do most often, by suppressing the news. Similar incidents occurred over the last year. In November, the government had tried to increase the fuel prices, which led to an outbreak of large-scale protests. The government suppressed the protests with a lot of bloodshed; hundreds of people were killed. In January, Iranian general Qasem Soleimani was killed in Iraq. This was followed by a wave of sympathy in Iran, but it was immediately squandered by the clumsy mistake of downing a passenger flight from Tehran to Ukraine. The Iranian government tried to cover it up for days, wiping out the little confidence they had just regained. So, when COVID-19 struck, many people in Iran were very sceptical about anything the government was saying.

The crisis seems to be an extra blow to Iran on top of the current state of the US-Iran relations. What do you think will be consequences of the pandemic for the relations between the two?

Some people hope this crisis might lead to some rapprochement between the two, as some other countries realised that Iran was in serious trouble and were willing to offer help. The US, however, were more severe in their response and added more sanctions, which obviously did not improve the relations with Iran. This makes the lives of the Iranian people even more difficult.

Recently, the Iranian government decided to open up, ending a lockdown that only lasted three weeks. The authorities said they could not afford to maintain the lockdown any longer, because it would lead to financial problems and food shortages for many people. Now that the lockdown is suspended the metro and buses in Tehran are full again and the number of infections is increasing again. Some people say it is the beginning of a second wave. Iranians, however, seem to be beyond caring. They have a somewhat fatalistic approach; if it happens, it is God’s will. You can also see this in other countries, as the patience of people is running out.

At the same time, in one of your articles you argued the corona crisis could be a chance for Iran to abolish its isolated position. China and European countries, for example, were offering help to Iran [2]. How exactly could this be an opportunity for Iran?

They could try to reinforce the ties with the European countries and China. I think China was already intensifying its relations with Iran, as it realised that many Western companies have left Iran because of the sanctions. On the other hand, Iran has not been very accommodating, maintaining its old rhetoric of how bad the West is and how they leave the Iranians to their fate. The US in particular are being vilified, like before.

What is the impact of Iran’s economic problems on its allies in Lebanon and Syria, for example?

Currently, Iran has less money than it had fifteen years ago to support Hezbollah in Lebanon or the Syrian president Bashar al-Assad’s regime, for example. They also cannot help Syria much with reconstructing the country. Furthermore, the US installed new sanctions against Syria, which will make things more difficult for the Syrian population. The US are also hoping to hurt Iran with these sanctions, as it will be more difficult for Iran to maintain its presence in Syria.

Also Lebanon is dealing with political instability during the pandemic. The outbreak of the virus was an argument for politicians to say it was too dangerous to go out on the streets to demonstrate for health reasons. Despite that, protests continued after the outbreak of infections.

Not only US sanctions are hitting Middle Eastern economies. Several economies in the region are highly dependent on oil production and export, but there has been a significant drop in oil prices. How are states that rely heavily on income from fossil fuels responding to this?

The drop in oil prices is a major problem for all the oil producing countries, such as the Gulf states, Iran, and Algeria. They all face enormous budget deficits and debt mountains that are rapidly increasing. Saudi Arabia, for example, had reserves of 750 billion US Dollars about five years ago. That has already dwindled to less than 500 billion US Dollars. They can afford to carry on for some time, but they have to realise that income from oil is not guaranteed. Even when the pandemic is over, the economy will not immediately be the same as before, because the demand for oil could remain lower than it used to be, especially if European countries would really turn into green economies, using fewer fossil fuels.

The Saudi Arabian economy might also be hit because of the cancellations of pilgrimages, which usually attract millions of people. Could this affect Saudi Arabia’s power position in the Middle East?

Saudi Arabia prides itself in hosting the most important holy places for Muslims, Mecca and Medina, but already had to cancel several pilgrimages. So indeed, it is a blow not only in economic terms. However, I do not think it will affect its power position so much, because it still possesses the aforementioned reserves. Nevertheless, it will have to think about its foreign policy, especially regarding the war in Yemen. This war has cost them billions, while they are basically in the same place as five years ago when they started their armed intervention. It might be wise for Saudi Arabia to come to some sort of peace agreement with the Houthis.

What other consequences is Yemen facing because of the pandemic?

It is disastrous for Yemen. About two-thirds of the population needs humanitarian assistance. Corona came on top of a terrible cholera epidemic, which is still not entirely gone. The number of COVID-19 cases in Yemen seems limited, but there are reports coming from hospitals – the ones that have not been destroyed yet – that corona patients are turned down because there is not enough room for them. However, I talked to some people from Yemen who said: “We have so many issues, this one extra problem does not make a difference. Our main wish is to get peace.” Furthermore, a lockdown is simply not feasible in Yemen, because there are so many refugees and people who lost their homes, who now have to stay together in rooms and tents with large families.

Which other developments have you observed in the Middle East regarding the pandemic?

Firstly, several governments in the Middle East are developing systems of surveillance that go much beyond what was already there. Amnesty International has expressed its concern about COVID-19 contact tracing apps in countries such as Kuwait and Bahrain, which allows governments to see exactly where people are, among other things. So, many governments in the Middle East have used the pandemic to increase their already considerable power over their population. This could lead to even less freedom in the Middle East.

Secondly, the pandemic exposes inequality. I think you can already see how the weakest are becoming the main victims. They cannot afford to go to hospitals. In Egypt, for instance, public hospitals are getting crowded and the service is poor; sometimes dentists have to treat the corona patients. If you have money, on the other hand, you can go to private clinics, where you will not be treated by a dentist. In several Gulf states, there are many foreign workers who often have to live in dirty, crowded places. Some states are trying to get rid of foreign workers by paying for flights to their home countries, but many of them do not want to go back because they need the money.

Finally, the pandemic shows many Middle Eastern countries are even more dependent on oil than we thought and that they need to diversify their economies. It is risky to be dependent on just one commodity like oil or gas. It is not easy to turn an economy into a more modern one, but they could and should try harder than they have done until now. 

Sources

[1] Van Straaten, Floris (2020), ‘Ayatollahs verliezen tegen het virus’ NRC

[2] Ibid

The views and opinions expressed are solely those of the interviewee and do not reflect those of the Security Distillery, the IMSISS consortium or its partners and affiliates.

Allyship for Women Who Have Experienced Intimate Partner Violence in Tanzania

In this study I investigate Intimate Partner Violence (IPV) in Tanzania, a security issue affecting about one third of women globally, [1] but about 65% of women in Tanzania. [2] Most quantitative articles have focused on measuring levels of IPV in different demographic groups; however, it is particularly difficult to measure due to low reporting, social stigma, and various other factors. In order to look at the issue from a different angle, I study allyship to women who have experienced IPV and the groups of individuals who are their strongest allies. I use data from the 2005 WHO Multi-country Study on Women’s Health and Domestic Violence against Women report, as the only suitable dataset centring women’s experiences and offering information on their allies. [3]

My findings indicate that institutionalised resources such as the police and health care workers are the weakest allies to women. On the other hand, neighbours are the strongest, indicated by high rates of reporting by women and even higher rates of offering help. This important information should prompt a reevaluation of which resources are valuable, and which should be supported by programming aimed at ending IPV.

By Emma Lin Hurlbert

IPV comprises physical, sexual, and emotional violence which can include hitting or beating, forced or humiliating sex, and isolation or controlling behaviour, respectively. [4] Furthermore, it has many negative physical, psychological, and emotional consequences for women and their families, including premature death, injury, chronic disease, HIV infection, stress, depression, and poor development in children. [5]

Halim et al. discuss some of the challenges in accurately reporting on IPV, asserting that many measurement instruments may be inaccurate. Most rely almost completely on recall which can cause biases of memory, misunderstanding questions, or concealing information. [6] There are additional methodological problems encountered, including clear definitions of IPV, access to rural or other difficult to reach areas, and systematic collection of data. This plethora of challenges regarding data collection make it very difficult to create full and robust datasets on the issue.

In an effort to contribute to the scarce baseline of quantitative knowledge, I have chosen to focus on how women in Tanzania respond to IPV by studying who they report to and how helpful those people are; I study allyship to women. I answer the questions: 1. To which actors are women most likely to report IPV? And 2. Which actors are most likely to offer help to women who have experienced IPV? Creating a clear picture of the allyship situation is important for efforts to end IPV, as it is clear from my results that certain groups are extremely helpful to women and others fall far short. Governments and social programmes can support the groups that are already strong allies, as a means of providing resources to women.

Methods

In order to measure a baseline of allyship to women who have experienced IPV in Tanzania, I use data from the WHO Multi-country Study on Women’s Health and Domestic Violence against Women report published in 2005, as a uniquely suitable dataset, and the only one I found addressing allyship. [7] This report surveys the distribution of health outcomes and the responses to IPV by 24,000 women in 10 countries between 2000-2003. It centres women’s experiences and offers specifics of those experiences which allows for a detailed and nuanced analysis, characteristics that are missing from many other datasets.

I use nationally aggregated data focused on how women have coped with IPV - particularly who they informed and who offered them help. The categories of individuals in the WHO report are as follows: friends, parents, siblings, uncle or aunt, partner’s family, children, neighbours, police, doctor / health worker, priest, counsellor, NGO / women’s organisation, and local leaders. These groups are all therefore categories in my analysis. I also created a measurement for strength of allyship by taking % of women who received offers of help / % of women who reported IPV for each type of actor, for which I use the shorthand rate of offer / report. I use this value to measure the strength of allyship, with higher values indicating stronger allyship, and values over one indicating that help was offered to women more often than they reported IPV.

Findings

As shown in Chart 1, 31.05% of women reported IPV to their parents and 29.35% reported to their partner’s family. These were the two highest groups to which women turned, probably because they were trusted and accessible. However, it is also evident that these actors were far from the strongest allies.

Chart 2 depicts the rate of offer / report for each type of individual, and it is evident that neighbours and children are the two groups that had the highest rates, at 1.262 and 1.387 respectively. These were the only groups which had a rate of higher than 1, i.e. they offered to help women more often than they were told about IPV. These two groups appear to be the most responsive and therefore the strongest allies to women. However, neighbours were both reported to and offered help on a much larger scale than children, who were involved in less than 3% of both types of occurrences. The data supports the conclusion that neighbours are the strongest allies to women, based on their rate of offer / report and the percentage of interactions in which they were involved.

It is clear that more formal reporting systems do not function as strong allies to women. Police, doctors / health care workers, counsellors, and NGOs / women’s organisations are all reported to by less than 5% of women. Furthermore, in those few cases of reporting, they do not consistently respond, showing rates of offer / report all less than .2, meaning that they offer help in less than one in five incidents of reported IPV. These resources are likely not trusted by women, which may be reinforced by their lack of response when they receive reports.

Discussion

From my findings, there are two systems for women to engage with when dealing with IPV, one informal and one formal. Of the informal system, the strongest allies to women are their neighbours, or their immediate communities. Since these communities are both trusted and responsive, indicated by high levels of reporting and offers of help, they should be supported in responding to IPV and perhaps strengthened in their ability to change norms surrounding it.

There is also the formal reporting system, which consists of law enforcement, the justice system, and social and health services. This system is very behind in both its institutional development, as indicated by a lack of legal protection against IPV and extremely low conviction rates [8], and public trust, indicated by a lack of reporting through these systems. This report shows that in Tanzania commonly thought sources of aid to women are not actually the most sought after by the women themselves, prompting a reevaluation of the type of aid governments and NGO’s can provide to IPV victims.

While the findings of this study are powerful, it is essential to note their meaningful limitations. The WHO dataset was published in 2005 using data from 2000-2003 which therefore limits it as only a benchmark, rather than a study over time. This data has provided a starting point for measuring allyship, and since my research question seeks to do just that, it is still an appropriate source.

Additionally, the data and my analysis are nationally aggregated; therefore, my analysis provides a national benchmark which may be useful for a general understanding or drafting national programmes. However, nuances and differences in dealing with IPV based on other identity groupings such as region, tribe, age, and economic status are not captured by my analysis, which limits its utility for localized project implementation. In order to design specific programmes for different demographic groups, more disaggregated data and analysis should be conducted. While it is beyond the scope of this work to further disaggregate, I acknowledge that limitation and consider the results to still be valuable.

Furthermore, this study describes the situation in Tanzania only, and the conclusions should not be applied to other countries without adequate research and analysis. Lastly, IPV research is always limited in its quantitative accuracy due to challenges of data collection, so the WHO data most likely suffers from underreporting.

Sources

[1] Katiti, Victor, Geofrey Nimrod Sigalla, Jane Rogathi, Rachel Manongi, and Declare Mushi. “Factors Influencing Disclosure among Women Experiencing Intimate Partner Violence during Pregnancy in Moshi Municipality, Tanzania.” BMC Public Health 16, no. 1 (December 2016): 2. https://doi.org/10.1186/s12889-016-3345-x.

[2] Kazaura, Method R., Mangi J. Ezekiel, and Dereck Chitama. “Magnitude and Factors Associated with Intimate Partner Violence in Mainland Tanzania.” BMC Public Health 16, no. 1 (June 1, 2016): 1. https://doi.org/10.1186/s12889-016-3161-3.

[3] Garcia-Moreno, Claudia, Henrika A.F.M. Jansen, Mary Ellsberg, Lori Heise, and Charlotte Watts. “WHO Multi-Country Study on Women’s Health and Domestic Violence against Women.” World Health Organization. World Health Organization, 2005. http://www.who.int/reproductivehealth/publications/violence/24159358X/en/.

[4] Katiti et al., 2.

[5] Halim, Nafisa, Ester Steven, Naomi Reich, Lilian Badi, and Lisa Messersmith. “Variability and Validity of Intimate Partner Violence Reporting by Couples in Tanzania.” Edited by Soraya Seedat. PLOS ONE 13, no. 3 (March 8, 2018): 2. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0193253.

Katiti et al., 2.

Simmons, Elizabeth, Nafisa Halim, Maria Servidone, Ester Steven, Naomi Reich, Lilian Badi, Nelson Holmes, Philbert Kawemama, and Lisa J. Messersmith. “Prevention and Mitigation of Intimate-Partner Violence: The Role of Community Leaders in Tanzania.” Violence Against Women 26, no. 3–4 (March 1, 2020): 360. https://doi.org/10.1177/1077801219832923.

[6] Halim et al., 2.

[7] Garcia-Moreno et al.

[8] Tanzania Women Lawyers Association. Review of Laws and Policies related to gender based violence of Tanzania mainland. (2014): 11-40. Available at: http://www.svri.org/sites/default/files/attachments/2016-07-05/Tanzanian%20review%20GBV%20report%202014%20by%20TAWLA%20TAMWA%20CRC%20TGNP%20ZAFELA.pdf.

Conversing COVID – Part IV, with Velina Tchakarova

An Interview Series on the Political Implications of the Pandemic

By Fabiana Natale and Gilles de Valk

For this interview series, Fabiana Natale and Gilles de Valk speak to experts from different backgrounds on the political implications of the COVID-19 pandemic in their respective fields. From their living rooms in France and The Netherlands, they will explore the (geo)political, security, and societal consequences of this pandemic. This interview series marks the launch of a new type of content for the Security Distillery, one which we hope can provide informative and entertaining analyses of an uncertain and evolving development in global politics.

For this fourth episode, we interviewed Velina Tchakarova, Head of Institute at the Austrian Institute of European and Security Policy (AIES). In our conversation, we discussed the future of the global order and Europe’s role in it.

Can you tell us something about AIES and your work?

AIES was launched in 1996 following the accession of Austria to the European Union (EU) in 1995. The institute aims to cover all relevant European and global developments related to foreign, security, and defence policy and their impact on Austria as a member. 

My research area for the last ten years has been twofold. On the one hand, I cover the six countries (Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Armenia) that are located between the EU and Russia. In this so-called ‘grey zone’, some countries are closer to the EU and others are closer to Russia, so this area is relevant to Europe’s foreign and security policy. On the other hand, I focus on ‘Global System Transformation’, trying to make sense of global networks and structures, how they are interlinked, and what happens when they are under pressure. By now, I have placed myself at the intersection of these two areas. It's a merger of politics and economy, where I try to understand the long-term implications of geoeconomic and geopolitical developments.

Could you tell us a bit more about ‘Global System Transformation’? And are we witnessing a global system transformation right now? 

Global affairs have become increasingly complex. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the bipolar system gave way to a period of unilateral United States (US) leadership and globalisation, creating intertwined networks, which facilitated the flow of people, goods, capital, services, and now also data. Globalisation, however, is not a new phenomenon, but a cyclical systemic development that rises and declines over the time. Now, we are in the middle of a de-globalisation cycle. Anyway, these developments and networks merged into something called the ‘global system’. This means that if something happens to one of these networks, it will have long term implications for the others.

Can you give an example?

The 2007/2008 financial crisis, for instance, started in the financial system, but it spread very quickly to the economic and trade system. Hence, the globalisation cycle was then replaced by a de-globalisation cycle. A transformation occurred. 

What is really dangerous, however, is a phenomenon called ‘systemic risks’. This concerns shocks with unforeseen effects on other networks and those shocks cannot be absorbed by the system any longer. This actually happened following the 2007/2008 financial crisis, but it is a possible outcome of the Covid-19 pandemic as well. Before the pandemic, we were already in a transitional period of de-globalisation, economic and trade stagnation, determined by fears of a recession, and shocks to the energy system. The sum of all these shocks might produce a large-scale shock to the global system, which will produce a transformational moment and we do not know in which direction it will lead (collapse or adaptation to a new system).

At an online conference in March, you said the pandemic will probably cause a greater shock to the global system than the 2007/2008 financial crisis [1]. Why would that be the case?

The supply chains, which are the bloodlines of the global system, became highly stressed because of the restrictions many countries implemented to contain the pandemic. It caused a crash on the demand side, but also on the supply side. Even when China started to exit the lockdown, there was little demand for Chinese products, as many other countries were still in lockdown.

Now, we are still in a situation of global supply chain stress. Several foreign companies are considering withdrawing from China, as it became clear that some had become dependent on one single state actor. This dependency makes the system less adaptable and robust. Reconfiguring those supply chains, however, is not something that takes one or two years; and it is not sure whether it will be successful. Companies will face defaults or will disappear from the market. Then again, governments will be busy bailing out the big players to save their economies.

I think the pandemic already caused a much bigger and quicker shock than the financial crisis in 2007/08. However, governments and financial institutions were quick in their response compared to the financial crisis and they launched measures of unprecedented scope.

You pointed out the need for European countries to become less dependent on one country, such as China. But will Europe be able to do that, considering the fact that China has large technological assets?

There is no such thing as 100% independence in international relations, although some countries are more dependent than others. China, for instance, will seek autonomy when it comes to technological developments. On the other hand, the EU and its member states can be regarded as a large trade and economic power. However, Europe cannot translate this economic power into geopolitical leverage and hard power, so we are not considered as a powerful collective geopolitical actor. I do not think this is going to change much in the next decade, although I expect there will be efforts by the EU and its member states in all these areas. If this does not succeed, Europe will have to play along geopolitical and geo-economic interests of other external actors, which would be shaping its agenda, or it will be squeezed between rivaling powers.

Personally, I think Europe’s efforts are too late and too little. The EU will not be able to compete with China or the US on a technological level unless there will be tremendous funding, which I do not see happening anytime soon because of the financial impact of the pandemic. The only option would be to align with like-minded third countries. 

Do you think the pandemic could be an opportunity for the EU to implement some of the changes that are necessary to become a major geopolitical actor?

I expect there will be a reconfiguration of the supply chains to some extent, bringing production processes back to Europe. However, if I look at the current signals coming from EU institutions and some member states, it seems they try to navigate the muddy waters of volatile, insecure politics. On the one hand, they are trying to be a loyal security partner to the US, while keeping the business relations with China, on the other. I think this is an unsustainable attitude in the long term, because at some point, there will be a moment when relevant actors like the EU and its member states will have to take a side. This will become more difficult the longer they postpone it, even though I understand it might seem better for now. There will be a struggle until the political system finds a new equilibrium and right now, we need more people who have ambitions for our European future, otherwise someone else (external actors) is going to shape it.

In your article ‘The Global Covid-19 System Crisis’, you outlined two possible scenarios: 1) a ‘violent’ systemic decoupling, or 2) a systemic co-existence between a US-led and China-led bloc [2]. Which scenario is the most likely at the moment and why?

In the short term, we are moving towards a ‘violent’ systemic decoupling between US and China. With ‘violent’, I do not mean an armed conflict, but another range of confrontations, such as economic, financial, and trade warfare, that we could already witness last year. I think this will take place regardless of the outcome of the US elections. It might take a different shape under a Democratic president, but it is important to understand that this systemic decoupling has been taking place for the last seven to eight years, so also under the Obama administration. When it comes to the US elections, I think Trump’s only competitor is the way he tackles the pandemic. Prior to March, I did not see a real chance for Democratic candidate Joe Biden, but now I would say the chances are fifty-fifty. 

In the long term, however, a new kind of bipolar global order is more likely. A new equilibrium could be reached in global affairs with a US-led and a China-led bloc, while the most relevant geopolitical actors would have to take a side. Nevertheless, it is going to be a very fluid global order. Meanwhile, China’s domestic struggles could change the outcome. Because of COVID-19, China is going through a phase of growing internal pressure. In response, Xi Jinping has begun to centralise his power and to create networks that can consolidate it. In order to be a global competitor, it is necessary to secure power within a country.

However, this does not seem to prevent China from trying to consolidate (economic) power abroad, also in Europe. What can you say about China’s, but also other foreign actors’ activities in the Western Balkans?

We should recognise the fact that foreign actors are active in this region. The Western Balkans are part of China’s Belt and Road Initiative. Ultimately, it aims for the industrial heart of the EU in Western Europe, but it sees the Western Balkans as a possible backdoor entry.  Meanwhile, China seeks to gain a political and economic foothold by offering loans for transportation or energy projects, for example. Hence, Europe needs a grand strategic project that focuses on connectivity and infrastructure. As long as this is not in place, other actors will try to offer their projects.

Russia, on the other hand, tries to gain political influence in the region. If China and Russia would merge their economic and political activities, it would be really worrisome for Europe. 

The US are present in the region as a security provider and are very much respected. Though when it comes to investments, they are not a substantial actor. On top of that, Turkey and the Gulf States are trying to deepen the relations with countries in the region as well.

Meanwhile, the EU has mobilised a package to support the Western Balkans in addressing the pandemic. To what extent will this package improve the relations between the EU and the Western Balkans, since the relations worsened over disputes regarding EU accession?

The EU is by far the greatest financial supporter in the region but is not always perceived as such. If you look at recent polls in Serbia, for instance, citizens were asked which foreign actor was the greatest contributor - the majority thought it was Russia. This does not reflect the reality. This shows support is also about PR and creating a narrative.

Nevertheless, I would describe the EU accession processes of the countries in the region as positive, because most of those countries as well as most EU member states are interested in their accession. My expectation is that the EU will push for a quicker process and will seek to integrate them rather sooner than later. The region is a big gap on the European map regarding connectivity.  

What are the key takeaways of the pandemic?

Pandemics happened in the past and will happen in the future, so we have to make sure that we are better prepared institutionally, politically, economically, and in terms of our health systems. When it comes to a European response, we will have to do better next time on the level of the European institutions as well as the member states. On top of that, we have to realise a pandemic can become a security matter. In that sense, the pandemic was also an eyeopener.

Sources

[1] No Author (2020), ‘Coping with Coronavirus – Euro-Gulf Perspectives’, AIES
https://www.aies.at/aktuell/2020/coping-with-coronavirus.php *

[2] Tchakarova, Velina (2020), ‘The Global Covid-19 System Crisis’, Medium https://medium.com/@vtchakarova/the-global-covid-19-system-crisis-d8d803fade50

The views and opinions expressed are solely those of the interviewee and do not reflect those of the Security Distillery, the IMSISS consortium or its partners and affiliates.

Ex Africa Semper Aliquid Novi: New Challenges for Digital Infrastructure in Kenya

Kenya’s status as a major technological innovator in recent years has positioned it as Africa’s Silicon Valley, but what implications does this have for the continent’s future prospects? And how can we mitigate the burgeoning shortcomings? This piece looks at some of the most salient challenges of digital technologies in Kenya today.

Keywords: Africa, Digital Infrastructure, Privacy, China, Surveillance, Statehood, Liberation, Development

By Jessica Poon

The past two decades have seen a 400% rise in internet access throughout Sub-Saharan Africa - the fastest growth rate of any region in history. [1] The academic literature surrounding development in Africa is somewhat ambivalent on the use of digital technologies and internet access as an emancipatory tool. [2] However, salient arguments have been made for an Africa-first brand of digital innovation and governance, breaking from the tendency to see Africa as a subservient figure within its partnerships. This position posits that emerging technologies might be used to reinsert African agency rather than colouring the continent’s ambitions with neocolonial tropes. This potential for innovation and governance is particularly advanced in Kenya, often hailed as “Silicon Savannah” in the wider grey literature, for its fast-growing tertiary industry and increasingly connected consumer demographic. [3]

Kenya’s rapidly-advancing digital infrastructure brings with it growing web access and a greater proliferation of mobile technology. Furthermore, digital technologies have provided Kenya with a chance to amplify its voice on the world stage, having previously been filtered through representatives and international bodies ranging from autocrats to NGOs. While the emancipatory potential of new technologies cannot be denied, the key challenges outlined here lie questionable export models, mainly from China, a dominant trade partner for the African continent. Lack of accountability at the state-level in Kenya, as a technology hub, could lead to a loss of civil liberties in the long-term if partnerships and their supply chains are not met with the appropriate level of scrutiny.

Kenya has one of the highest concentrations of mobile users on the continent, with 89% of Kenyans reporting access to mobile devices. [4] Such technologies are not merely a nexus at which economy and governance meet, but also give rise to digital networks which parallel existing community structures; these technologies reach and connect those outside the boundaries of a traditional community. Mobile phone proliferation and the networks of communities allow for development projects to be effectively scaled to a more local level. For instance, technology has been used to accommodate distinct domestic needs, evidenced in the participatory community-based responses to issues ranging from governance, agriculture, and microfinance. Software and applications such as Ushahidi, Digicow, and M-Pesa have forged substantive networks in their respective communities, bridging communication gaps and sharing information at a scale more typically found at state-level. Kenya sees communication technologies adapting to suit the needs of local people, attesting to an enthusiasm for collaborating and exercising agency at a grassroots level. [5]

Recent years however, have witnessed a shift from traditional infrastructure projects such as railways and tramlines, to more software-oriented projects in fibre optic cables, telecoms, and surveillance. [6] The shift towards digital infrastructure is not without contentions, given the governance systems that accompany these developments. Kenya’s technological turn has led to greater means of networked public sharing and exchange of information, which distributes power in less concentrated ways, redressing the dynamic between traditional hierarchies of citizen and state. [7] The ability of ordinary Kenyans to assert their agency through technology is also reflected in trends on freedom and accountability, with a majority (60%) of Kenyans believing that there is greater freedom of speech than in previous years. [8] Despite the wider benefits that these technologies bring, they also embroil the country in issues that have traditionally been the preserve of the Global North, such as disinformation campaigns and election-meddling. These challenges are mirrored in Kenya’s burgeoning digital capabilities, notably during the 2007 elections that resulted in outbreaks of violence across the country. [9]

The benefits brought by digital infrastructure projects are often tempered by wider political agendas. The major players in the Kenyan technology market, namely Huawei and ZTE, are state-affiliated companies whose products are designed with a Chinese governance model in mind. [10] These provide what Nanjala Nyabola identifies as ‘surveillance architecture’. [11] Bugging, data leaks, and backdoor mechanisms are all part of a wider “mass data sweep” which affects those at a civilian and state-level alike. [12] This export model implicates Kenya’s trade deals at state-level in Chinese politics at a corresponding level, thereby weakening democractic accountability and consumer trust. It also sees human rights issues surface when the political asymmetry of China’s offering is taken into account. China’s authoritarian use of technology as a means of state surveillance is evidenced domestically in Chinese territories as well as further afield in its African partnerships, most notably in Addis Ababa, where the African Union’s headquarters were allegedly bugged with the information returned to Chinese sources. [13] This could be seen as legitimising similar actions to those taken during Kenya’s 2007 election, in which state-level surveillance of civilians was carried across forums and social media to quash rights to free speech and political protest. [14]

Another challenge lies in a lack of supply chain transparency when it comes to looking at data as a key asset for the country’s development. Kenya’s burgeoning digital economy has joined a globalised sphere which views data as the new oil. But unlike siphoning off a physical commodity like oil, the transfer of high volumes of data is more opaque, with information moving surreptitiously across borders constantly. This data can be used for the improvement of public services or for the surveillance and repression of civilians in equal measure. Civilians need to know that they can trust the deals brokered at an elite level, as well as what to demand from the future iterations of digital infrastructure. [15] Given Kenya’s proven appetite for adapting existing technologies to local needs, there is some feasibility for leveraging community-based networks local and sub-national structures for greater democratic traction. In addition to this, a network of digital rights advocates uniting multilaterals, nation states, and private sector organisations could further support accountable leadership. Kenya’s leadership in the digital governance space needs to ensure that its technological offering is accountable to consumers at every level of society. This will not only tackle emerging domestic issues, but lay the foundations for Africa’s late-adopting digital regions. [16]

Though Kenya’s status as an innovation hub is still in its infancy, it is a country which highlights some of the key digital developments to come. What has been presented here is a timely discussion of trends which will likely develop greater momentum within the next few years. For the moment, digital infrastructure in Africa needs to be examined on a case-by-case basis. However, given the rapidly-changing digital landscape and increasing geopolitical interest in what Africa can offer as a mutual partner, there is scope for the lessons learned from Kenya’s digital leadership to be applied to concurrent developments in the near future.

Sources

[1] Internet World Stats, (2020) [online]. IWS. Available from: https://www.internetworldstats.com/stats1.htm [Accessed 21 Apr 2020].

[2] Ndemo, B. Weiss, T. & SpringerLink (Online service) (2017), Digital Kenya: An Entrepreneurial Revolution in the Making, Palgrave Macmillan UK, London.

[3] Mallonee, L., 2018. The Techies Turning Kenya Into a Silicon Savannah. Wired. Available at: https://www.wired.com/story/kenya-silicon-savannah-photo-gallery/ [Accessed 21 Apr 2020].

[4] Afrobarometer, (2016-18). The Online Data Analysis Tool [online]. Afrobarometer. Available from: https://afrobarometer.org/online-data-analysis/analyse-online [Accessed 21 Apr 2020].

[5] Diepeveen, S. (2019), "The limits of publicity: Facebook and transformations of a public realm in Mombasa, Kenya", Journal of Eastern African Studies, vol. 13, no. 1, pp. 158-174.

[6] Li, S. & SpringerLink (Online service) (2017), Mediatized China-Africa Relations: How Media Discourses Negotiate the Shifting of Global Order, Springer Singapore, Singapore.

[7] ibid.

[8] Afrobarometer, (2016-18). The Online Data Analysis Tool [online]. Afrobarometer. Available from: https://afrobarometer.org/online-data-analysis/analyse-online [Accessed 21 Apr 2020].=

[9] Goldstein, J., Rotich, J., 2008. Digitally Networked Technology In Kenya’s 2007-2008 Post-Election Crisis [online]. Berkman Klein Center. Available from: https://cyber.harvard.edu/publications/2008/Digitally_Networked_Technology_Kenyas_Post-Election_Crisis [Accessed 21 Apr 2020].

[10] Li, A. (2016), "Technology transfer in China-Africa relation: myth or reality", Transnational Corporations Review, vol. 8, no. 3, pp. 183-195.

[11] Tsalikis, C., (2019). Nanjala Nyabola On The “Digital Colonialism” Transforming Kenya’s Political Discourse [online]. Centre For International Governance Innovation. Available from: https://www.cigionline.org/articles/nanjala-nyabola-digital-colonialism-transforming-kenyas-political-discourse [Accessed 16 Apr 2020].

[12] ibid.

[13] Li, S. & SpringerLink (Online service) (2017), Mediatized China-Africa Relations: How Media Discourses Negotiate the Shifting of Global Order, Springer Singapore, Singapore.

[14] Olukotun, A., Omotoso, S.A. & SpringerLink (Online service) (2017), Political Communication in Africa, Springer International Publishing, Cham.

[15] Paradigm Initiative, 2020. Digital Rights In Africa Report 2019 [online]. Paradigm Initiative. Available from: https://paradigmhq.org/dra2019/ [Accessed 12 Apr 2020].

The New Morocco-Nigeria Pipeline: A Highly Risky Tool for the South-South Agenda of the Makhzen

In August 2016, Morocco introduced a new gas pipeline project - one that extends all the way to Nigeria. This project is in line with Morocco’s South-South Agenda; a key focus of Rabat’s foreign policy for greater engagement with Sub-Saharan Africa. The Morocco-Nigeria pipeline, both onshore and offshore, would supply gas to 13 countries in West and North Africa as a continuation of the existing West Africa Gas Pipeline (WAGP) between Nigeria, Benin, Togo and Ghana. With a possible extension to Europe through Spain, the Morocco-Nigeria pipeline would be one of the longest worldwide (5,660 kilometers, or 3,517 miles), and a new opportunity for socio-economic development in Western Africa. Yet, the project faces fundamental obstacles. Indeed, this initiative could become an open door to more corruption and disastrous environmental issues — one of the main reasons behind slow social and economic development in West Africa. Furthermore, the pipeline seems to rekindle cross-border tensions regarding the exploitation of natural resources.

By Sahar Lahdifi

Since Morocco’s King Mohammed VI visited Abuja in December 2016, several meetings have followed to assess the technical and economic viability of the project. Two protocols of the agreement have been signed between Morocco and Nigeria, discussing the construction of a gas pipeline and an LNG terminal, a facility allowing for the regasification of Liquified Natural Gas. The 5,660 km pipeline aims to enhance the quality of life –  by providing full electrification to the 13 countries – and promote economic and social progress. Indeed, resource extraction is the most important sector of the Nigerian economy, as the country is rich in crude oil and natural gas [1]. Further highlighting the importance of this sector in the region is the fact that the Western region of Africa represents around 30% of the continental natural gas reserves [2], Nigeria being a world leader in gas export.

Following the inability of Algeria to meet its 2002 commitment to construct the Trans-Saharan pipeline [3] linking the country to Nigeria through Niger, Morocco has taken advantage of this vacuum to establish a project in line with its agenda to strengthen cooperation with its sub-Saharan counterparts. This South-South Agenda highlights one of Morocco’s main goals of becoming the ‘electricity hub for North and West Africa’ [4] in terms of electricity traded, capacity building and innovation. However, this Agenda also reveals underlying tensions and competition with Morocco’s neighbour Algeria, the second African leader in gas exports behind Nigeria.

These tensions began during the long-lasting Western Sahara conflict, following the Spanish de-colonisation of the territory in 1975. While Morocco claims sovereignty over Western Sahara, Algeria fully supports the Sahrawi secessionist group Front Polisario for independence. More than a question of identity, this conflict became an issue around access and exploitation of the natural resources of the Sahrawi region, namely phosphate and fisheries. [5]

Notably, after leaving the African Union in 1984 due to the Western Sahara conflict, Morocco rejoined the organization in 2017 [6]. In the same year, Rabat also applied for membership to the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) [7], demonstrating its will to tie a solid relationship with Sub-Saharan Africa. In line with this political advance, the Morocco-Nigeria pipeline seems to be a strong tool for the Moroccan government (Makhzen) to fulfil its aspirations in investing in intra-African exchange and cooperative development projects.

Additionally, cooperation with Europe remains present in Morocco’s agenda. The Morocco-Nigeria pipeline aims at supplying gas to Europe through Spain, as the successful Algerian Maghreb-Europe pipeline already does. Furthermore, the new pipeline is of particular interest for European countries, considering their desire to lessen growing dependence on Russia’s Gazprom pipeline. As Russia is currently constructing a new pipeline, Nord Stream II, it is in Europe’s interest to seek additional energy sources, including those from Africa [8].

However, this African project does not come without obstacles. In March 2018, 40 non-governmental organisations (NGOs) signed a joint-declaration [9] raising fundamental environmental, social, and economic concerns. Indeed, the construction of this pipeline would have considerable environmental implications, as the ‘increase of extraction and consumption of fossil resources’ [10] constitutes one of the main causes of climate change. The use of methane remains uncertain and volatile, and could disturb marine fauna. These environmental impacts, in addition to the risk of chemical waste and potential leaks on fisheries, would fundamentally impact millions of people’s livelihoods, as has already happened in Nigeria. The company Shell, active in Nigeria since 1937, has been accused of causing massive environmental degradation, impacting fisheries and farming. Once again, the current project is criticized as being “top-down”, sidelining the actual needs of the populations in the 13 countries, and the environment. It  also goes against Morocco’s main ambition to increase its part of renewable energy sources in the capacity mix, up to 52% by 2030 [11].

When taking a financial stance, the initial US $20bn estimated for the construction of the pipeline would ultimately be more than doubled, constituting ‘an exponential increase of the debt burden’ [12] on highly corrupt countries. The risk is reminiscent of Frank Timis’ bribery scandal in Senegal, where Petro-Tim obtained rights of exploration in 2012, despite their lack of expertise. Evidence has finally been found in 2019 that President of Senegal Macky Sall’s family was granted a significant amount of money from the Timis Corporation, even employing his brother Aliou Sall at $25,000 per month. Oil and gas company British Petroleum is suspected to be complicit in this scandal, as they bought Petro-Tim, and is expected to pay them between $9bn and $12bn in the next year as a royalty rate [13]. Corruption has been one of the main reasons behind slow social and economic development in West Africa, and a new pipeline linking the whole coast would provide more opportunities to potentially aggravate the situation.

Ultimately, the difficulties are not only environmental and socio-economic. Indeed, many armed groups, including Boko Haram, are present in the Delta Region of Nigeria, which could disturb the supply and provision of gas in neighboring countries [14]. In Morocco, the pipeline is supposed to supply the Western Sahara region, despite a frozen conflict that has persisted there. Technical difficulties are also foreseeable, as the 13 countries need to seek governmental approval and legislative concordance for the project, slowing down implementation. Indeed, twelve years were already required for the implementation of the pipeline between Nigeria, Benin, Togo and Ghana (WAGP), and the current multiple geopolitical obstacles facing the project will make it even more difficult for the new project to come to fruition in the near future.

Sources

[1] West Africa Oil & Gas Upstream Market 2019-2024: Increasing Exploration & Production Activities - Nigeria to Dominate the Market, Business Wire, 2019.

[2]  L’Afrique de l’Ouest détient les tiers des réserves de pétrole et de gaz du continent, Jeune Afrique, 2008.

[3] Augé B. Le Trans Saharan Gas Pipeline, Mirage ou Réelle Opportunité ? Ifri, Programme Afrique subsaharienne, 2010.

[4] Office National de l’Electricité et de l’Eau (ONEE) au Maroc et en Afrique, Brochure 2015.

[5] See literature on the Western Sahara conflict (e.g. Sahara Occidental, Conflit oublié, population en mouvement, Collection “Civilisation étrangères”, Presses universitaires François-Rabelais, 2018)

[6] Morocco rejoins the African Union after 33 years, Al Jazeera, 2017. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/01/morocco-rejoins-african-union-33-years-170131084926023.html

[7] ECOWAS agrees to admit Morocco to West African body, BBC News, 2017. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-40158089

[8] See literature about the European dependence on Russia for gas import and its risks since the annexation of Crimea (2014) (E.g. Europe’s energy security - caught between short term needs and long-term goals, The Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, Oxford University, 2014).

[9] “Nigeria-Morocco gas pipeline: Not in our interest”, 2018. https://www.cadtm.org/Nigeria-Morocco-gas-pipeline-Not

[10] Ibid, 2018.

[11] Energy Policies Beyond IEA Countries - Morocco 2019, IEA, Country profile Morocco 2018, RES4Med.

[12] Nigeria-Morocco gas pipeline: Not in our interest”, 2018. https://www.cadtm.org/Nigeria-Morocco-gas-pipeline-Not

[13] See documentary BBC Africa “The $10 billion Energy Scandal”, 2019.

[14] Yata F. Les véritables enjeux du Gazoduc Africain Atlantique, La Nouvelle Tribunes, 2017.

Conversing COVID – Part III, with Belén Rodríguez

An Interview Series on the Political Implications of the Pandemic

By Fabiana Natale and Gilles de Valk

For this interview series, Fabiana Natale and Gilles de Valk speak to experts from different backgrounds on the political implications of the COVID-19 pandemic in their respective fields. From their living rooms in France and The Netherlands, they will explore the (geo)political, security, and societal consequences of this pandemic. This interview series marks the launch of a new type of content for the Security Distillery, one which we hope can provide informative and entertaining analyses of an uncertain and evolving development in global politics.

In this third episode, we are interviewing Belén Rodríguez, Research Associate at the NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence (NATO StratCom COE). Rodríguez mainly focuses on Russian ‘information laundering’, a “process [in which] false or deceitful information is legitimised through a network of intermediaries that apply gradually a set of techniques in order to de-contextualise it and obscure the original source”. In our conversation with Rodríguez, we discussed different information laundering techniques, examples of information laundering during the corona crisis, and the future of the NATO-Russia relations. 

Firstly, could you tell us something about your work at the NATO StratCom COE?

I arrived at the NATO StratCom COE fifteen months ago and started collaborating with the tech branch’s Robotrolling report, which researches online information manipulation. I was then asked to support the Nordic Baltic Project, which analyses Russian information manipulation targeting the Nordic Baltic region. It is a very comprehensive study that involves aspects from narrative research to target audience analysis.

My contribution to the project started with investigating whether disinformation activities follow a specific structure. I tried to see if I could apply a metaphor of the framework developed to investigate money laundering to research disinformation activities, hence the term ‘information laundering’. Indeed, it appeared that we could develop a standardised framework that would allow national institutions to better understand the life cycle of information and influence activities. 

In this regard, the Information Laundering project is not merely a research paper. It is also a tool to inform national governments and European institutions on information laundering activities as part of a larger process that aims at manipulating public opinion. It can help those governments and institutions to research disinformation and understand those supposedly isolated issues as part of a process of manipulation.

In that respect, the NATO StratCom CEO is not there to actively counter information laundering, but rather has a training and advisory role to governments, institutions, policymakers, or journalists.

There are several information laundering techniques. Could you tell us something about the most prevalent ones?

Among the most frequent ones you find disinformation, which is the manipulation of information by creating false news or false components. It is often used in short laundering processes, especially when they target a key event such as the corona crisis, in which it is easy to speculate about the origin of the virus. However, disinformation can also occur outside a laundering process. On the other hand, a laundering process does not necessarily include disinformation. For example, there can simply be a mix of contexts and different stories or the use of unrelated and purely sensational headlines to present an alternative version of the news.

Such processes involve other interesting information laundering techniques that are gaining ground over disinformation, such as ‘misappropriation’ and the ‘woozle effect’.

Misappropriation is a technique which modifies factual data by removing important elements, adding wrong contexts, or emphasising specific content in order to change the angle of understanding for the reader. This technique is frequently used regarding NATO military exercises. For example, Sky News would publish articles about military exercises with purely factual data [1]. Sputnik [a Russian news agency with international coverage] shares the same content and adds a paragraph explaining how Russia is sophisticating its military capabilities in order to counter ‘threats’ coming from NATO and how NATO is operating close to its border. This is not actually false. But for the reader, it creates the impression that NATO is being reckless and could destabilize international relations and bring the world to collapse.

The woozle effect is a technique which uses real quotes from public figures, but within a misleading context in order to support an unrelated argument. For instance, there are quotes from Finnish Prime Minister Sauli Niinistö taken out of their original context to suggest that he was withdrawing support from continuing EU sanctions against Russia. [2]

The combination of misappropriation and the woozle effect is the most effective mix of techniques, because the use of real news and real quotes makes it very difficult to debunk, despite the altered interpretation. 

 You already mentioned several actors that can take part to the information laundering process. Could you expand more on their roles?

Different actors participate in information laundering processes, although it is important to keep in mind that information laundering includes both voluntary and accidental steps; not all actors participate knowingly. 

Regarding information manipulation coordinated by the Kremlin, you would look at the involvement of official Kremlin media. Additionally, most information laundering processes tend to be transnational, therefore involving foreign pro-Kremlin media, which share information and create original content aligned with the Kremlin’s strategic interests.

After that, proxy and accidental actors intervene. The latter are particularly dangerous because they are the most unpredictable users. Accidental actors are individuals that engage with pro-Kremlin content. Such actors amplify information laundering processes, but not necessarily willingly. For example, a person can decide to share information on their blog with a sensational headline just to get visibility. Even though such content was written without the intention of contributing to spreading Moscow’s influence, it can be referenced by a journalist that might have more malicious intentions. This creates a snowball effect. 

 Now that we have a clear overview of the information laundering mechanisms, could you present us an example of information laundering you have observed since the beginning of the corona crisis?

 Although NATO is not yet specifically investigating information laundering regarding the pandemic, we have come across a lot of coronavirus-related cases. At the beginning of the crisis, we observed many blank disinformation and short information laundering processes. For instance, this included discussions on the involvement of Bill Gates in the spreading of the virus, or speculations on the use of biological weapons to control populations. Sometimes, it was older information laundering processes that were brought back while incorporating this new element: the pandemic. In this way, conspiracy theories about 5G technologies have been fueled, the pandemic allegedly being the embodiment of the dangers about which we had been warned a year ago.

Besides, a broad information manipulation campaign occurred in order to discredit the Western system by criticizing its inefficient reaction to the pandemic. However, when Russia started registering an increasing number of COVID-19 infections, it could not promote this argument anymore and went back to a more conventional rhetoric on NATO, recycling traditional security-related topics that have the opportunity to be exploited now.

Let me give a concrete example of this. A new narrative element that has occurred is the reduction of NATO military exercises due to the virus, announced by the German international broadcaster Deutsche Welle. This has been interpreted by Russian media outlet иноTV as NATO losing its combat readiness as opposed to the Russian army which keeps reinforcing its capabilities [3]. Besides, it added that, with decreased capabilities, some regions might be abandoned. Finally, Rubaltic stated that Lithuania panicked about NATO withdrawal, but NATO did not withdraw, and Lithuania did not panic [4].

This is how, through misappropriation and the woozle effect, manipulation coordinated by the Kremlin created the impression that NATO would risk being weakened compared to Russia by the end of the crisis. It was not factually wrong that NATO reduced the personnel involved in the exercises, but it does not mean that Russia will be more powerful than NATO at the end of the pandemic. 

What will be the main consequences of the crisis for information laundering?

While the crisis advanced, we observed a sophistication of the laundering techniques and content. On top of that, the amplification is even more considerable than before, as disinformation is being spread throughout different media and languages. This is concerning, because it becomes complicated for a user to verify information.

After the crisis, information laundering will continue, and its actors will adapt. Domestic, international, and proxy actors will use any kind of event and opportunity to serve their strategic interests. Journalists should be particularly careful in their coverage of news events and try to approach them impartially, so they do not make easier the job of hostile actors by including, for example, sensationalised pieces or inaccurate data.

Over the next couple of years, what could be the impact of the coronavirus on the role of information laundering in the relationship between Russia and NATO?

 Russia is obviously not the only actor performing information manipulation on a large scale. However, it is the most evident one, and they will not stop using those techniques, because to them information laundering and influence operations are a way of maintaining power. In fact, I think they will continue to sophisticate their tactics and strategies. We should realise that Russia is much more experienced than us when it comes to information laundering tactics and strategies and we need to find our way of combating and countering those practices. In that respect, NATO member states’ governments and institutions need to understand that information laundering processes are taking place and are systematic.

However, if the global geopolitical context remains the same and supposing that the western societies will survive as they are, I do not think much will change. Russian disinformation activities targeting the European institutions or the United States will continue. Only the technicality will evolve, with the help of progresses in machine learning and artificial intelligence. In that sense, disinformation will be even more complicated to debunk, but generally, the reciprocal aims of NATO and Russia should stay the same.

Finally, what are the key takeaways of the crisis regarding NATO’s geopolitical position?

One of the biggest geopolitical risks of this crisis is the polarisation of public opinion towards democratic institutions. The western model and its institutions are facing a credibility crisis, and this is being exploited by state actors such as Russia and China but also non-state actors to some extent. As the European Union did not face the crisis most efficiently, initially, the trust of citizens in the domestic institutions has been affected. This opens a window of opportunity for discrediting western liberal democracy. This does not only apply to external rival actors, but also to domestic contexts. Political parties within NATO member states also use the crisis to polarise public opinion and to reach new audiences, which creates instability and goes against good crisis management.

In the longer term, the crisis will have direct consequences for the next electoral processes and might be harmful to NATO with the increasing popularity of extremist, nationalist parties holding anti-NATO narratives. The current crisis gives room to those domestic actors and to diverging opinions, potentially weakening bodies such as NATO, whose legitimacy and power in the international scene will also be challenged by countries such as Russia or China.

Sources

[1] Haynes, Deborah (2018) ‘NATO prepared for 'growing Russian threat' Sky News
https://news.sky.com/story/nato-ready-to-respond-to-growing-russian-threat-11524827

[2] No Author (2019) ‘Президент Финляндии не поддержал призыв Зеленского сохранять санкции против России’ тасс
https://tass.ru/mezhdunarodnaya-panorama/6882569

No Author (2019) ‘Kommentti: Niinistö muuttui valeuutiseksi’ Ilta-Sanomat
https://www.is.fi/ulkomaat/art-2000006238572.html

[3] No Author (2020) ‘Die Welt: пандемия ослабила боеготовность НАТО, а на Россию не повлияла’
https://russian.rt.com/inotv/2020-04-24/Die-Welt-pandemiya-oslabila-boegotovnost

[4] Носович, Александр (2020) ‘Литва панически испугалась ухода войск НАТО’ https://www.rubaltic.ru/article/politika-i-obshchestvo/27042020-litva-panicheski-ispugalas-ukhoda-voysk-nato/

The views and opinions expressed are solely those of the interviewee and do not reflect those of the Security Distillery, the IMSISS consortium or its partners and affiliates.

Conversing COVID – Part II, with Mikel Irizar

An Interview Series on the Political Implications of the Pandemic

By Fabiana Natale and Gilles de Valk

For this interview series, Fabiana Natale and Gilles de Valk speak to experts from different backgrounds on the political implications of the COVID-19 pandemic in their respective fields. From their living rooms in France and The Netherlands, they will explore the (geo)political, security, and societal consequences of this pandemic. This interview series marks the launch of a new type of content for the Security Distillery, one which we hope can provide informative and entertaining analyses of an uncertain and evolving development in global politics.

For this second episode, we interviewed Mikel Irizar, Operations Specialist at INTERPOL’s Command and Coordination Center in Buenos Aires, Argentina. In our conversation, we discussed the consequences of the pandemic for politics, economics, and organised crime in Latin America, and its impact on the work INTERPOL is doing.

Mikel Irizar’s views do not necessarily reflect those of INTERPOL or any of its member countries.

Can you tell us something about your work? How has your work changed since the start of the pandemic?

INTERPOL brings together police forces for a safer world. We are trying to offer member states the tools and capabilities they need from us, such as expertise, special operational support, or information from databases holding data from 194 countries. We monitor the information that we get from police forces all over the world and redistribute it when necessary.

The pandemic hit us all. Argentina was hit relatively late, but we were sent home at the beginning of March. The type of work has not changed so much, I simply have been working remotely ever since.

Indeed, many professionals have continued working as before, but remotely. While this movement has led to a decrease in crimes, such as murders and thefts, the new working environment has been favourable to an increase in cybercrime. What can you say about these trends? [1]

It is correct that we are seeing less reported crime across Latin America when it comes to murder or armed robberies, for example. In Chile and some other parts of the region, however, people feel like the crime level is staying the same or even rising. Cybercrime, including ransomware, phishing mails, and fraud, on the other hand, has been very present during the pandemic and is increasing since many people are working remotely. In Europe, even hospitals have been targeted.

In order to create cyber awareness globally, INTERPOL is trying to promote their media campaign #WashYourCyberHands. Usual precautions should be taken now more than ever, such as using firewalls, anonymising your online footprint, eliminating potentially harmful cookies, and browsing on secure networks. We should not be afraid to set strong cyber security standards.

The Economist recently published an article titled ‘The pandemic is creating fresh opportunities for organised crime’. Which ‘opportunities’ are the most striking? [2]

The biggest opportunity the pandemic is yielding for organised crime is the fact that criminal organisations are sitting down on billions of economic assets. It is incredible how much money these transnational organisations handle. They are taking this opportunity to see who is in trouble, now that economic turmoil is coming to every household. They have started to buy people, favours, and businesses; it is the perfect moment for such organisations to buy networks that are going to remain loyal in the future. Even though these economic transactions are potentially saving somebody’s problems now, these organisations will come back to haunt them in the near future.

At the same time, in South America, cartels and other large organised crime organisations such as the Cali Cartel in Colombia and Primeiro Comando da Capital and Comando Vermelho in Brazil are reaching out to peripheral areas or densely populated low-income urban centres where they have a strong position, as opposed to the state. In such areas that are populated by millions of people, they are replacing the state by enforcing the quarantine themselves, for example. Theoretically, they are taking care of the people who are in most need, even though it ultimately works against those people. In that sense, the cartels are solidifying their presence in areas where the state already had difficulties reaching out.

It seems organised crime is taking this opportunity to exploit the gap that states had left, helping people with basic needs such as food. This could result in a shift of legitimacy from the state to such organisations. Do you think this trend can be reversed with the end of the pandemic?

I think we have seen this trend for a long time already. It is not a secret that cartels have been considered to be the saviours of communities in Mexico, for example, but also elsewhere. This is a broader trend and, unfortunately, cinema has a lot to do with these false myths. In TV series we can often see how widely admired the figures of the Colombian narco world have been.

However, this trend is being tackled on a daily basis. Although states are currently preoccupied with providing health care for the entirety of their societies, combating organised crime remains a priority.

As the restrictions are easing and we are going back to normality, we can observe a shift back to strong national states. I think we are going to see states regaining the areas that were not well taken care of five years ago, for example, and they will come back and try to reassert themselves over these criminal organisations.

States seem to be increasingly focused on their national interests and state institutions seem to be trying to strengthen through new health and security policies. What does this development mean for INTERPOL and international cooperation in general?

After working here for some time, I believe this is going to make the organisation better. We want states to be strong, because that also means they will cooperate better in this international forum that INTERPOL provides.

However, politically and economically states are also becoming  more inward looking. We will need to readjust to whichever way member states change in the near future. We are going to be there, holding their hands at every step, no matter what. At the end of the day, we are international civil servants and we are at their disposal. Although we follow strict direction from international law and human rights, INTERPOL is an organisation that bases its actions on the member states’ contributions, although we rely on private partners for some projects here and there. We will keep trying to provide the same services, capabilities, and expertise.

Nevertheless, nationalist reflexes from states have arguably caused a crisis in multilateralism. How is this impacting INTERPOL and its cooperation with national governments and law enforcement agencies?

For international cooperation we need shared interests, which have always been difficult to find. At INTERPOL, we only go as far as member states allow us to go. However, the mechanisms for sharing of information at INTERPOL are very particular and are ultimately why INTERPOL has survived for almost 100 years. Our organisation is trying to anticipate the way member states would like us to work for them. Every day, we are making small changes to appease member states. So at the moment, nothing is changing in a substantial fashion, but I could not rule out a more substantial change in the future.

Countries such as Uruguay, Brazil, and Nicaragua have been tackling the pandemic very differently, resulting in large differences in the amount of cases they have. What role have the governments played in (limiting) the spread of the virus? [3]

Each country counts differently and it changes every other week, so it is hard to keep track of the actual amount of cases. Nonetheless, there are also other factors that play a role in the amount of cases.

Uruguay, for example, has a relatively small population of three to four million people and covers a geographically reduced area, which yields some benefits on controlling and eventually eradicating the virus outbreak. The Uruguayan success is also a result of several years of pretty solid public health and social policy.

It is not a secret that cases are skyrocketing in Brazil, which is concerning for all the countries in the region. However, it is such a large country when it comes to population and size, making it more difficult to manage the situation. I believe Brazil is trying to overcome these issues and that Brazilian health authorities will eventually get a more firm hand on the crisis.

Regarding Nicaragua, there are disparate opinions on the way the government is handling the crisis. To a certain degree, they have not considered the virus as grave of a threat as other countries. I think it was during Easter that religious processions in the streets were even promoted, for example. However, it seems that they have been able to put a certain level of control into place. Similarly, we have seen US President Trump clearly advocating for the opening of churches. Religion is part of national identities all over the world. 

Nevertheless, the aforementioned are very different, politically speaking.

Evidently, the crisis also has a huge economic impact. In Argentina, for instance, an increase in prices was registered and an underground economy is developing.

As far as information is available right now, Argentina is going to default and is in fact talking with the lenders in New York to extend the deadlines to pay back their loans. But the informal nature of business networks and the way people transact and transfer money is an intrinsic part of the region. Many of these matters go unregistered, which makes them very difficult to quantify even though we are living in the age of Big Data. Since a lot is happening under the radar, it is difficult to keep track of everything, from the amount of bank accounts, any given country’s precise population, to the amount of COVID cases right now.

However, countries like Spain see a huge potential in Latin America. So, what does this crisis mean strategically for Latin America and their international relations? [4]

The world is going through a time of geopolitical and geo-economic readjustment. We are witnessing an acceleration of global trends that were already going on before the pandemic.

Latin America is an economically emerging region with historical, linguistic, and cultural links to Europe. Geographically, it has an obvious link with the United States because of the continental mass connecting the two regions. In these times, it seems logical to me that the West relies on those who are more logical allies, so there are definitely opportunities for Latin America.

However, the region has a history of reluctance towards the West because of imperialism. Latin America is also a region that wants to break free from traditional structures of global power. Furthermore, this region is very fragmented. Over the years, Latin American countries have attempted to develop a cooperative framework in order to strengthen and promote better regional dynamics, but they have not yet been as effective as the European Union, for example.

At the end of the day, the region will look for external support or external leadership. In that sense, I see an alignment of common interest here; it is an opportunity for the West as well as Latin America.

What do you think are the key takeaways from this crisis?

We need wider international cooperation; this virus has proven no country is safe on its own. I think denying that does not make sense. Furthermore, we have been overlooking our healthcare systems for far too long. Specialists in global risks, big insurance companies, or international organisations were aware that national healthcare systems were underdeveloped. For years we have been debating how we would do if a pandemic like COVID-19 would strike the world, yet we did not do anything to strengthen our medical capabilities. Each time, we need to do a great exercise of internal deliberation, because if we let dormant vulnerabilities intact, we will suffer the consequences at some point. In this case, it means better equipping medical facilities and healthcare systems, making sure they are ready for the next pandemic. But that’s also applicable for a number of other vulnerabilities out there.

 What can INTERPOL learn from this crisis?  

I think that INTERPOL needs to continue developing its capabilities to work better for the global community, needs to establish better and more fluid channels of communication, and needs to continue enhancing what is eventually a large network of expertise across the world, in order to remain a reference point in international security.

Sources

[1] No Author (2020). ‘The pandemic is creating fresh opportunities for organised crime’. The Economist.
https://www.economist.com/international/2020/05/16/the-pandemic-is-creating-fresh-opportunities-for-organised-crime

[2] Ibid.

[3] Ríos, Ana Maria (2020). ‘Number of confirmed cases of novel coronavirus (COVID-19) in Latin America and the Caribbean as of June 15, 2020, by country.’ Statista. https://www.statista.com/statistics/1101643/latin-america-caribbean-coronavirus-cases/

[4] Fariza, Ignacio (2020). ‘España reafirma su apuesta por América Latina en el momento mas critico de la pandemia en la region’. El Pais.
https://elpais.com/economia/2020-05-25/espana-reafirma-su-apuesta-por-america-latina-en-el-momento-mas-critico-de-la-pandemia-en-la-region.html

More figures : https://public.flourish.studio/visualisation/2562261/

The views and opinions expressed are solely those of the interviewee and do not reflect those of the Security Distillery, the IMSISS consortium or its partners and affiliates.

Why Europe Would Benefit from Repatriating its Foreign Fighters from Syria and Iraq - Part II

Impact of Non-Repatriation on Europe’s Security Environment

Part one of this article analysed the security implications for Europe of foreign fighter repatriation from Syria and Iraq. It concluded that fears of a drastic deterioration of Europe’s security environment are overstated, and the risk emanating from returnees manageable. Part two discusses the impact of non-repatriation, showing that policy alternatives outsourcing the problem increase the terrorist threat for Europe.

By Livia Margna

If not repatriated, European foreign fighters remain either incarcerated in camps or prisons in the conflict zone where they could eventually stand trial, or on the run. Those on the run have the possibility to continue fighting in Syria, hide on site, try to sneak back home, find refuge elsewhere, or move to another conflict. Whatever situation non-repatriated foreign fighters find themselves in or choose for themselves bears significant consequences for European states’ and other countries’ security.

The most fierce foreign fighters remaining in the conflict area are likely to regroup when the opportunity arises, rejoin the residual Islamic State troops or allied terrorist groups, and re-engage in the materialisation of an ideology which is far from being defeated. Insights from the Afghan war inform us that foreign fighters inhibited from returning home are likely to continue their engagement for jihad. [1] Others could try to sneak back to Europe. Chances are that they remain undetected and can thus neither be brought to justice nor be rehabilitated. [2] Moreover, when unmonitored they pose an increased threat, not only to the security of their home countries, but also to the states through which they transit.

Some of those who leave the conflict theatre do so to relocate to third countries, either to seek refuge there or fight in other conflicts. A relocation to third countries, however, shifts the insecurity associated with foreign fighters to states that are not at fault for their radicalisation and often have less resources to mitigate threats than their European counterparts. It also creates new hazards for Europe. First of all, it negatively affects geopolitical stability. [3] Relocatees can incite new or exacerbate existing conflicts in their new homes by spreading extremist ideology, fostering radicalisation and recruitment for jihadi causes, and importing military skills. Secondly, the retreat to so-called safe havens neither threatening prosecution nor surveillance allows indoctrinated foreign fighters to regain strength and reorganise, and potentially even establish sleeper cells which could eventually be activated to attack Europe. [4] Thirdly, even if foreign fighters genuinely relocate to third countries to find refuge and rebuild peaceful lives, their illegal status could force them into an underground existence, rendering them susceptible for the recruitment efforts of globally acting crime networks. [5]

A significant number of European foreign fighters remaining in the conflict zone are currently incarcerated. In February 2019, the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) claimed to hold 800 male European Islamic State fighters in prisons, as well as 700 women and some 1500 children in camps. [6] Further Europeans are in the hands of other paramilitary groups in Iraq and Turkey. The past, however, has repeatedly shown that incarceration of foreign fighters in the conflict region does not take them out of the threat equation as they are often unexpectedly freed or released. Turkey, for example, has already unilaterally released some of its European Islamic State prisoners because of their home country’s reluctance to take them back. [7] The Islamic State, on the other hand, has a long history of liberating its incarcerated members by staging prison attacks. Furthermore, many foreign fighters, predominantly women and children who never assumed violent roles in the war and might not have gone to Syria voluntarily, are detained in overcrowded camps known for their ‘appalling and sometimes deadly conditions’ [8] or are, due to a lack of alternatives, hiding. With their husbands and fathers dead or imprisoned and with nowhere else to turn, individuals are pushed ‘to seek assistance elsewhere, which often leads them right back into extremist circles’. [9] Hence, depriving them of assistance is not just a humanitarian offence, but might promote the alienation, radicalisation, and manipulation of hundreds of low-risk individuals, thus turning them into a potential future security threat.

Moreover, policy alternatives to repatriation nurture the terror threat from Islamists in the long-term by fostering anti-Western narratives. Denying support to European foreign fighters and their families in destitution, non-intervention in cases where they face torture or the death penalty, implementing discriminatory citizenship revocation practices disproportionately affecting individuals with an immigration background, [10] and tolerance or even execution of extrajudicial killings – as in the case of France and the United Kingdom [11] -- nourish the narrative depicting Muslims in the West as second-class citizens to whom the principles of human rights and international law are only selectively applied. Thus, by signalling ‘that an individual is no longer seen as part of the society’ [12] states arguably increase the animosity towards Western societies that motivated many Muslims to travel to Syria and join the Islamic State which had successfully co-opted this narrative into their recruitment propaganda. Moreover, it could further radicalise those foreign fighters who are not terrorists but see themselves treated as such, as ‘labelling them [terrorists] may irritate rather than dissuade the fence-sitters’. [13] Refusing assistance and repatriation thus ‘add[s] fuel to fire’ [14] and could even ‘incite possible acts of retribution’. [15]

Denying European nationals in Syria and Iraq the possibility to return thus not only shifts the problem to other countries. It also creates new threats for Europe which are much harder to pre-empt, as not only controlling and monitoring but also prosecuting, deradicalising, and rehabilitating alleged terrorists is virtually impossible from afar.

In liberal societies, terrorism cannot not be fully eradicated. We have to live with the fact that attacks have become part of our everyday lives. Yet, this does not mean that threats cannot be mitigated and extremists be deradicalised. Politicians denying their citizens who participated in the Syrian war to return, however, do the exact opposite. Instead of containing extremism by repatriating and consequently monitoring foreign fighters, they allow it to spread uncontrolled and thus create more threats. Hence, European states would benefit from bringing back their nationals as soon as possible.

 

Sources

[1] Pokalova, E. (2020). Returning Islamist Foreign Fighters – Threats and Challenges to the West. Washington DC: Palgrave Macmillan.

[2] Jenkins, B. (2019, June 6). Options for Dealing with Islamic State Foreign Fighters Currently Detained in Syria. CTC Sentinel, 11-23. Retrieved from International Institute for Counter-Terrorism Herzliya: https://www.ict.org.il/Article/2403/Dealing_with_IS_Foreign_Fighters_Detained_in_ Syria#gsc.tab=0

[3] Reed, A., de Roy van Zuijdewijn, J., & Bakker, E. (2015). Pathways of Foreign Fighters: Policy Options and Their (Un)Intended Consequences. The Hague: International Centre for Counter-Terrorism – The Hague.

[4] Ibid.

[5] Ibid.

[6] Kiley, S. (2019, October 13). Europe Never Really Dealt with its ISIS Fighters. A Reckoning is Coming. Retrieved from CNN: https://edition.cnn.com/2019/10/30/opinions/trump- europe-isis-threat-intl/index.html

[7] Sariyuce, I., & Mackintosh, E. (2019, November 14). Turkey Begins Deporting Suspected ISIS Fighters to US, UK, Germany. Retrieved from CNN: https://edition.cnn.com/2019/11/14/europe/turkey-deports-isis-fighters-us-uk- germany-gbr-intl/index.html

[8] Human Rights Watch. (2019, July 23). Syria: Dire Conditions for ISIS Suspects’ Families. Retrieved from Human Rights Watch: https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/07/23/syria- dire-conditions-isis-suspects-families, p. 1.

[9] Pokalova, p. 135.

[10] Pokalova.

[11] Ibid.

[12] Reed, p. 13.

[13] Hegghammer, T. (2013). Should I Stay or Should I Go? Explaining Variation in Western Jihadists' Choice between Domestic and Foreign Fighting. The American Political Science Review, p. 13.

[14] Hussin, S. (2019, April 8). Deradicalisation and Rehabilitation: Way Forward for Returnees. Retrieved from RSIS Commentary: https://dr.ntu.edu.sg/bitstream/10356/82781/1/CO19065.pdf

[15] Reed, p. 13.

Why Europe Would Benefit from Repatriating its Foreign Fighters from Syria and Iraq - Part I

Impacts of Repatriation on Europe’s Security Environment

In many European societies, the Islamic State’s loss of its last stronghold, Baghuz Fawqani, on 23 March 2019 reignited the fierce debate on whether states should repatriate their foreign fighters from Syria and Iraq. While Europe has faced the challenges associated with returnees from the Levant since the early years of the Syrian war, both politicians and citizens worry that high-risk individuals could now come back en masse. Nevertheless, these societies were deeply shocked by recent terror incidents involving returnees in Manchester, Paris, and Brussels. They fear that the surviving Islamic State fighters would travel home to continue jihad there, bringing an explosive mix of extensive terrorist training, traumatic war experiences, and deep-rooted hatred against the West in their backpacks. Therefore, most decision-makers have shown reluctance to support repatriation and have instead implemented policy alternatives outsourcing the problem. This Security Distillery article critically examines and dismantles their main arguments, while shedding light on the self-harming implications proffered by them. In order to do so, the first part of this article discusses the impacts of repatriation on Europe’s security environment while the second part, published in a week’s time, analyses the impacts of non-repatriation. Having rebutted the constituting rationales of the repatriation opponents, it concludes that allowing foreign fighters to return is most in line with European states’ security interests.

By Livia Margna

Between 2011 and 2016, more than 5,000 adults from the European Union (EU) travelled to Syria to fight with opposition forces against the regime of Bashar al-Assad. [1] Most joined the ranks of jihadist organisations, first and foremost those of the so-called Islamic State. [2] Around 1,800 European foreign fighters are believed to be dead, and up to 1,700 have already returned home. [3] Until now, around 2,000 adult EU citizens and an unknown number of their children are estimated to have neither died nor returned. [4] From a legal point of view, most states have no obligation to facilitate their return. [5] While some states such as Germany, France, and Belgium have repatriated young children, only a few instances of European states repatriating adults exist. [6] The majority of states have instead implemented a mixture of policies outsourcing the problem.

Wreaking havoc in several European cities, – including the November 2015 attacks in Paris claiming 130 lives – earlier returnees had demonstrated their hazardous potential. Compared to the previous waves of returnees, the individuals still remaining in Syria and Iraq are believed to be even more prone to follow the Islamic State’s call to continue jihad on European soil. The network they established, the training, and status they acquired in conflict, so the argument goes, are likely to be misused at home for radicalising others, inspiring lone wolves, and potentially establishing sleeper cells, providing logistic support for attacks or even plotting attacks themselves. Given the high number of European foreign fighters remaining in the conflict zone, most states thus argue that the aggregated threat constituted by them renders repatriation unacceptable. A closer examination of the issue, however, reveals that the overall situation is less alarming. While the attacks perpetrated by returnees prove that their threat is real, repatriation opponent’s threat assessment is in many regards overstated, overgeneralised, and undifferentiated, and thus prone to misrepresent the actual risk.

Firstly, it is unlikely that the returns would be as numerous as expected, even if repatriation was arranged. Lessons learnt from previous conflicts involving foreign fighters, [7] the considerable discrepancies between estimates and actual returnees in the early years of the Syrian war, and the imagery of European nationals burning their passports show that a significant number have no intention to return, and instead would continue to fight or settle down in the Levant or elsewhere.

Furthermore, repatriation opponents do not take into account that returnees are a heterogeneous mass consisting of individuals of different ages, genders, and backgrounds who differ from each other in their motives for departing and returning, as well as in different degrees of radicalisation and combat experience. European citizens remaining in the conflict zone range from fighters to defectors, from indoctrinated youth to new-born babies, and from female enslavers of the Yazidis to teenage housewives. [8] Highly indoctrinated and potentially dangerous individuals are likely to be among them, but so are many who never assumed violent roles. Other prospective returnees were never fully committed to the cause or lacked the determination to defect, [9] while some are disillusioned, disappointed, or even traumatised and ready to leave the war experiences behind. Even those who assumed violent roles are not a homogeneous group. The willingness to fight abroad does not necessarily translate into the willingness to conduct attacks at home, even if returnees continue to glorify jihad when back: ‘Most Islamists consider confined insurgency more legitimate than international terrorism’. [10] Thus, it can be concluded that only a few might hold intentions to engage in terrorist activities at home, while the vast majority is unlikely to do so. [11]

This assumption is consistent with the current understanding of foreign fighter recidivism rates. While the counts should be used with caution, they nonetheless allow us to identify trends in foreign fighter’s aggregated attitudes. Hegghammer’s seminal study on recidivism rates of Western foreign fighter returnees between 1990 and 2010 estimates that at most one in nine return to attack, while admitting that the real figure may be closer to one in 20. [12] An analysis of Islamic State-attributed attacks in Europe shows that most were not committed by returnees, but individuals inspired by the terror group’s propaganda. [13] Moreover, the few individuals who plan an attack at home are rather unsuccessful. As of March 2015, 10 of 11 attacks plotted in the West and involving returnees were thwarted. [14] This is surprising, given that due to their combat experience foreign fighters are usually portrayed as highly capable of staging attacks. According to Byman, however, battle experiences gained in a civil war does not translate into the skills necessary to execute sophisticated terror attacks. [15]

Repatriation opponents often argue that they would be unable to deal with returnees due to a lack of capacities and resources. It holds true that past terror incidents on European soil involved returnees who were well-known to intelligence agencies but fell off their radar due to insufficient means and poor cooperation between security services. [16] Learning from these failures, however, European states have increased both their soft and hard power capacities. Thus, they augmented their counterterrorism budgets and improved inter-agency and inter-state information sharing, [17] homogenised EU policies towards adult returnees, strengthened the prosecution, [18] and accumulated experience in deradicalisation and rehabilitation of extremists. Hence, instead of leaving foreign fighters in an environment prone to alienate them further, repatriation allows European states to turn them away from violence.

Repatriation also offers opportunities that can be utilised to enhance domestic security. Disengaged foreign fighter returnees could become highly influential in discouraging others from following their path. [19] In the past, disillusioned returnees often showed a willingness to cooperate with security services for counter-terrorism purposes. [20] Moreover, disengaged returnees are valuable sources of information, both as witnesses in lawsuits against their former fellow fighters and as informants helping intelligence agencies to improve their understanding of terrorist groups. [21] In turn, such insight – for example on recruitment processes – can render counter-terrorism efforts more effective.

In summary, fears of a drastic deterioration of the security environment caused by an influx of returnees ‘are not so much wrong as they are overstated’. [22] A residual risk can indeed not be fully eliminated; however, given its limited extent and the substantial capacities of European states to mitigate it, it is manageable. Furthermore, it is partly offset by the positive influences disengaged returnees can have on the security environment. Moreover, if not repatriated, the threat posed by foreign fighters remaining in the conflict theatre or in third countries for European societies is arguably higher and more long-term, and in any case harder to mitigate. This is shown in the second part of this article which will be published in a week’s time.

Sources

[1] Barret, R. (2017). Beyond the Caliphate: Foreign Fighters and the Threat of Returnees. New York: The Soufan Center.

[2] Coolsaet, R., & Renard, T. (2019). New Figures on European Nationals Detained in Syria and Iraq. Brussels: Egmont Royal Institute for International Relations.

[3] Jenkins, B. (2019, June 6). Options for Dealing with Islamic State Foreign Fighters Currently Detained in Syria. CTC Sentinel, 11-23. Retrieved from International Institute for Counter-Terrorism Herzliya: https://www.ict.org.il/Article/2403/Dealing_with_IS_Foreign_Fighters_Detained_in_ Syria#gsc.tab=0

[4] Ibid.

[5] Pokalova, E. (2020). Returning Islamist Foreign Fighters – Threats and Challenges to the West. Washington DC: Palgrave Macmillan.

[6] Agence France-Presse. (2019, June 11). Repatriate or Reject: What Countries Are Doing With IS Group Families. Retrieved from France24: https://www.france24.com/en/20190611-repatriation-families-islamic-state-group- jihadists-children.

[7] Reed, A., de Roy van Zuijdewijn, J., & Bakker, E. (2015). Pathways of Foreign Fighters: Policy Options and Their (Un)Intended Consequences. The Hague: International Centre for Counter-Terrorism – The Hague.

[8] Jenkins.

[9] Ragazzi, F., & Walmsley, J. (2018). The Return of Foreign Fighters to EU Soil – Ex-post Evaluation. Brussels: European Parliamentary Research Service.

[10] Hegghammer, T. (2013). Should I Stay or Should I Go? Explaining Variation in Western Jihadists' Choice between Domestic and Foreign Fighting. The American Political Science Review, p.13.

[11] Reed.

[12] Hegghammer, pp. 1-15.

[13] Pokalova.

[14] Byman, D. (2016). The Jihadist Returnee Threat: Just How Dangerous? Political Science Quarterly, 69-99.

[15] Ibid.

[16] Ibid.

[17] Dworkin, A. (2019). Beyond Good and Evil: Why Europe Should Bring ISIS Foreign Fighters Home. Berlin: European Council on Foreign Relations.

[18] Ragazzi.

[19] Reed.

[20] Pokalova.

[21] Jenkins.

[22] Byman, p. 71.

Black Lives Matter

Dear Security Distillery Readers,

We would like to pause from publishing our usual content for a day in order to discuss the brutal white supremacy that has been plaguing our communities, and the actions we can take to be active change-makers.

Last week on May 25, 2020 George Floyd was murdered by police officers in Minneapolis, Minnesota, USA. After the handcuffed Floyd fell to the ground, a police officer named Derek Chauvin placed his knee on Floyd’s neck for 8 minutes and 46 seconds. Three other officers (Thomas Lane, J. Alexander Kueng and Tou Thao) watched as Floyd gasped for breath, eventually saying “I can’t breathe” and “They’re going to kill me”. [1] In the video, witnesses can be heard crying and begging the policemen to stop, to do something. [2] As the three policemen stood by, Floyd died under Chauvin’s knee. [3] His murder has served as yet another reminder that the legacy of systemic and personal racism against Black Americans lives on, and that police brutality continues to be a particularly heinous expression of that legacy.

Floyd’s murder has proven to be a breaking point for communities already mourning the losses of other innocent Black lives, such as Breonna Taylor and Ahmaud Arbury. [6] In the last week, protests have erupted across the US and the world, demanding the fundamental restructuring of a system that relies on white supremacy and enables police brutality. [4] Ironically, the response to these protests has often been increased state violence, including the use of tear gas and rubber bullets, the violent arresting of protestors, the deployment of the United States National Guard, and the imposition of strict curfews. [5]

While the history and conditions of the US lend themselves to exceptional violence and lethality, the spectre of white supremacy and systemic racism looms internationally. The battle for racial equity and social justice is a global one. While the rage you may feel against the American system is certainly justified, it is likely that echoes and reflections of the same core issues exist in your community as well. In the UK, 51% of young people in jail are people of colour (POC), despite only making up 14% of the overall population. [6] In France, police have been repeatedly caught using racial slurs against North Africans, and in 2016, they stangled a young man named Adama Touaré to death. [7] In country after country, we see state-sanctioned violence disproportionately targeting Black citizens and POC.

Dominant narratives across Asia, Africa, South America, and Oceania reveal how Western standards of mannerism, beauty, and cultural practice have moulded how individuals come to view themselves. From India and Nigeria to South Korea, much of the post-colonial world has been sold the lie that fair skin is key to professional success [8], marriageability [9] and improved social status. White supremacy has fueled a lucrative global industry of fairness products and services, and its profit depends on anti-Blackness. The European colonial project dehumanised indigenous populations as “savages” and weaponized racial politics to justify their oppression. The wounds of that narrative continue to fester long after independence.

Racism is not a relic of the past: the systemic inequities that plague the world are a result of historical and contemporary laws and actions around the world. This is why the protests demanding an end to racial violence in the US have resonated in so many other countries. Individuals, regardless of status or nationality, must reflect on their actions and acknowledge how they profit off black and indigenous  [10] whilst retaining racist beliefs. Uprooting injustice necessitates the participation of every member of society, regardless of age, gender, race or nationality as the threat of inequality is pervasive, vicious, and homicidal to current and future generations. International support of the Black Lives Matter movement is imperative: the condemnation of white supremacy in the US may act as a proxy and a spark for the global fight against racism and the industries that profit from its continuation.

For those seeking to get involved, we have put together a condensed list of resources, including places to donate, sign petitions, and accessible educational tools. A few resources are linked below, and the full list can be found as a downloadable PDF by clicking here.

●      Freedom is a Constant Struggle by Angela Davis

●      To help bail out protestors in cities across the US

●      To provide food/medical supplies/general aid to the protestors via local mutual aid funds (Thanks to @thegirlwithfood on Twitter for the links)

●      To support BLM by raising ad revenue through this video if physically joining a protest or donating money is not possible

●      Master Resources (including gofundmes, petitions, fundraisers, and more) (thanks to @AM1R4HSCAVE on Twitter for these links):

○      https://blacklivesmatters.carrd.co/

○      https://blackliveswillalwaysmatter.carrd.co/#

Sincerely,

Emma Lin Hurlbert, Margaret Born, and Smera Jayadeva

Sources

[1] McLaughlin, Eliott C. “Three Videos Show the Final Moments of George Floyd’s Life.” CNN, June 1, 2020. https://www.cnn.com/2020/06/01/us/george-floyd-three-videos-minneapolis/index.html.

[2] Ibid.

[3] Ibid.

[4] Michaels, Samantha. “Breonna Taylor Is One of a Shocking Number of Black People to See Armed Police Barge into Their Homes.” Mother Jones (blog). Accessed June 2, 2020. https://www.motherjones.com/crime-justice/2020/05/breonna-taylor-is-one-of-a-shocking-number-of-black-people-to-see-armed-police-barge-into-their-homes/.

[5] McCarthy, Tom. “Police Criticized over Heavy-Handed Response to Peaceful Protests across US.” The Guardian, June 2, 2020, sec. US news. https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2020/jun/02/police-criticized-heavy-handed-response-peaceful-protests-across-us.

Seligman, Lara. “In Crisis Mode, Trump Again Leans on the Military.” POLITICO. Accessed June 2, 2020. https://www.politico.com/news/2020/06/01/trump-deploy-federal-assets-protests-294298.

[6] Cockburn, Harry. “Over Half of Male Young Offenders Are from Black or Minority Ethnic Backgrounds for First Time, Report Reveals.” The Independent, January 19, 2019. https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/crime-records-young-offenders-bme-record-level-uk-prisons-children-jail-stc-yoi-a8750611.html.

Maxwell, Kevin. “Sorry Cressida Dick, but as a Black Former Detective I Know Just How Racist the Met Still Is.” The Independent, July 11, 2019, sec. Voices. https://www.independent.co.uk/voices/met-police-cressida-dick-no-longer-institutionally-racist-racism-black-officer-a9001176.html.

Novara Media. “The UK Is Not Innocent – Police Racism Has a Long and Violent History Here Too.” Accessed June 2, 2020. https://novaramedia.com/2020/06/01/the-uk-is-not-innocent-police-brutality-has-a-long-and-violent-history-here/.

“Population of England and Wales.” Accessed June 2, 2020. https://www.ethnicity-facts-figures.service.gov.uk/uk-population-by-ethnicity/national-and-regional-populations/population-of-england-and-wales/latest.

[7] Amrani, Iman, and Angelique Chrisafis. “Adama Traoré’s Death in Police Custody Casts Long Shadow over French Society.” The Guardian, February 17, 2017, sec. World news. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/feb/17/adama-traore-death-in-police-custody-casts-long-shadow-over-french-society.

Diallo, Rokhaya. “When Will France Admit That Police Racism Is Systemic? | Rokhaya Diallo.” The Guardian, March 2, 2017, sec. Opinion. https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2017/mar/02/france-police-racism-hashtag-activism.

[8] Parameswaran, R., & Cardoza, K. (2009) ‘Melanin on the Margins: Advertising and the Cultural Politics of Fair/Light/White Beauty in India,’ Journalism & Communication Monographs, Vol. 11, No. 3, pp. 213–274.

[9] Nagar, I. (2018) ‘The Unfair Selection: A Study on Skin-Color Bias in Arranged Indian Marriages’, SAGE Open, Vol. 8, No. 2

Thapar, R (1996) ‘The Theory of Aryan Race and India: History and Politics,’ Social Scientist, Vol. 24, No. 1/3., pp. 3-29.

Holmlund, C. A,  (1991) ‘Displacing limits of difference: Gender, Race, and Colonialism in Edward Said and Homi Bhabha's theoretical models and Marguerite Duras's experimental films’, Quarterly Review of Film and Video, Vol.13, No. 1-3, pp. 1-22

[10] Rogers, R. A., (2006) ‘From Cultural Exchange to Transculturation: A Review and Reconceptualization of Cultural Appropriation,’ Communication Theory, Vol. 16, No. 4, pp. 474-503

The mysteries of Pyongyang and a forgotten enemy: Kim Jong Un's biological arsenal

Recent allegations of Kim Jong Un’s death have triggered old questions regarding succession within the Kim dynasty and sparked new controversies regarding North Korea’s approach to nuclear weapons. However, these issues have been raised in the middle of a global crisis, namely the COVID-19 pandemic. This article will move the focus from North Korean nuclear weapons to biological weapons capabilities, after introducing the present situation of the country, and will assess its potential for production and use of those weapons.

By Chiara Artico

Over the last month, the news of Kim Jong Un’s alleged death has been bouncing back and forth in the media all over the world. In fact, North Korea’s Supreme Leader had very suspiciously missed a key anniversary on 15 April 2020 [1]. Eventually, the Supreme Leader’s appearance in public on 1 May 2020 silenced the speculation. Nevertheless, some reasonable doubts remain since the credibility of the released footage showing him inaugurating a fertiliser factory cannot be verified [2].

The alleged death of North Korea’s leader sparked a long-standing debate on who his successor would be if he died soon. His health conditions (obesity, smoking, alcohol use, family history of heart diseases) will, sooner or later, represent an issue for his succession [3]. In fact, the dynasty lacks an heir. Kim Jong Un is supposed to have three children, the eldest of whom should be 10 years old, not old enough to take over power [4]. The alternative scenarios range from his younger sister, Kim Yo Jong, to Vice Marshal Choe Ryong Hae. However, it is almost certain that, regardless of the person in power, North Korea would maintain the existing status quo in regards to weapons of mass destruction (WMD) [5]. Nevertheless, despite the sanctions imposed by the United States (US) and the United Nations (UN) on the country’s nuclear policy [6], these are not the only type of WMD.

In the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic, it seems extremely important to analyse another, often overlooked category of WMD: biological weapons. As reported by the World Health Organization (WHO), ‘biological weapons are microorganisms like virus, bacteria, fungi, or other toxins that are produced and released deliberately to cause disease and death in humans, animals or plants’ [7]. It is undeniable that the voluntary employment of a weaponised biological agent by any actor in the international arena would cause inconceivable harm. As stated by William C. Patrick III, an expert on germ warfare in service for the US, ‘a single gallon of anthrax, if suitably distributed, could end human life on Earth’ [8].

In a report published by the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs in 2017, it was stated that North Korea not only has an interest in sustaining a biological weapons program, but also the capability. Taken into account the difficulties in gaining credible information on the totalitarian regime, there are several elements that confirm the concerns of North Korea being a potential producer of biological weapons. It is believed that Kim Il Sung started the program in the early 1960s, after falsely attributing outbreaks of cholera, typhus, and smallpox in the country to biological attacks by the US during the Korean War (1950-1953) [9]. More recently, Kim Jong Un repeatedly denied the existence of such a program, even claiming that it is the US that wants to engage in biological warfare using anthrax against his country [10]. Despite these statements, indicators suggest that North Korea has at least 13 different pathogens at its disposal [11].

Furthermore, North Korea is assumed to have several institutes adequate to produce dual use equipment, that is equipment to be used for both civilian and military purposes. For example, in 2015, official state media released images that showed the Pyongyang Biotechnical Institute, whose structures raised concern among experts precisely as regards dual use. Moreover, it appears that non-compliance to the security standards of these structures should not be considered as an indicator of the non-existence of weapons production. In fact, it was claimed that North Korea has been using human subjects in testing this technology, as further proof of the impossibility to adhere to human rights standards when evaluating the danger that North Korea might pose [12].

Even more important than the availability of the pathogens and the capabilities of producing them in large scale, is the capability of weaponising them. Here is where evaluation difficulties show up. So far, we have outlined some issues that, even with a shadow of a doubt, are reasonably true and known about North Korea. Less certain is the extent to which the country possesses the ability to weaponise the biological agents. Weaponisation demands the capacity to stabilise the agents to make them suitable for dissemination [13]. At first glance, this might seem complex. However, it is assumed that ‘any country having pharmaceutical, cosmetic, or advanced food storage industries will have stabilization facilities similar to those that could be used for biological weapons’ [14]. It remains unclear whether the country would be able to weaponise all 13 different agents since these need different processes and quantities for large-scale production. As stated in the Belfer Center report, some experts assert that North Korea is not yet ready for mass production of biological weapons, but the possibility cannot be ruled out completely [15]. Once the biological agents are weaponised, they would need to be delivered.

Different means of delivery are suitable to different biological agents, depending on several structural factors. The potential categories include missiles, drones, sprayers, and even human vectors [16]. In recent years, Pyongyang has invested in the development of long-range ballistic missiles. In July 2017, the regime first tested the Hwasong-14, an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), followed a couple of months later by its bigger brother, the Hwasong-15. The Center for Strategic and International Studies’ (CSIS) Missile Defense Project elaborated the following two infographics, which perfectly convey the scope of North Korea’s delivery capabilities [17].

The last factor to consider is the potential motivations for North Korea to actually use biological weapons. According to the security experts interviewed by the Belfer Center, North Korea would prefer to use them for tactical purposes, for instance at the beginning of a conflict to seriously damage the enemy’s society and army, sparing its own soldiers [18]. This might also explain why the North Korean army is vaccinated against smallpox [19], a disease which was declared eradicated from our society in 1980 [20] Moreover, Kim, Philipp, and Chung argue it is alarming that ‘North Korea’s broad objective is to “drive out the aggressive forces of the U.S., terminate the dominance and interference of foreign forces… and fight for the unification of the motherland through the unite [sic] of our nation [the Korean peninsula].”’ [21]

For all these reasons, it is evident that the North Korean biological programme might represent a huge threat to international security. Warnings came not only from the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) since 2003 [22], but also from the international security experts of the last three US Presidents, who even described North Korea’s biological weapons program as ‘a global threat’ [23]. Given the power and influence that this might confer to North Korea, it is likely that, as explained regarding its nuclear program, a change of top authority would not entail a change in the approach to such a topic either. After all, Depetris leaves it clear: “balance-of-power dynamics, regional politics, diplomatic relationships, and core security interests are more important than individuals” [24].

 

Sources

[1] Madden, Michael (May 2, 2020) ‘Kim Jong-un and the brutal North Korea rumour mill’. [Online] Available from: https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-52511812. [Accessed 27 May 2020]

[2] BBC NEWS (May 2, 2020) ‘Kim Jong-un appears in public, North Korean state media report’. [Online] Available from: https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-52508437. [Accessed 27 May 2020]

[3] Terry, Sue Mi (April 26, 2020) ‘What happens if Kim Jong Un dies? No one knows’. [Online] Available from: https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2020/04/26/what-happens-if-kim-jong-un-dies-no-one-knows/. [Accessed 27 May 2020]

[4] ISPI Online Publications (April 27, 2020) ‘Mistero a Pyongyang. La scomparsa di Kim Jong Un’. [Online] Available from: https://www.ispionline.it/it/pubblicazione/mistero-pyongyang-25907?fbclid=IwAR2BB0cMB3a9eUXOABhqpHoZnx37JluGCPA5c6sC-5Z6xwvH5Egg7It7eso. [Accessed 27 May 2020]

[5] Terry (2020) ‘What happens if Kim Jong Un dies? No one knows’.

[6] Depetris, Daniel (April 25, 2020) ‘What If Kim Jong Un Dies?’ [Online] Available from: https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2020/04/what-if-kim-dies/164910/. [Accessed 27 May 2020]

[7] World Health Organization (n.d.) ‘Biological weapons’ [Online] Available from: https://www.who.int/health-topics/biological-weapons#tab=tab_1. [Accessed 27 May 2020]

[8] Baumgaertner, Emily and Broad, William J. (January 15, 2019) ‘North Korea’s Less-Known Military Threat: Biological Weapons’ [Online] Available from: https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/15/science/north-korea-biological-weapons.html. [Accessed 27 May 2020]

[9] Kim, Hyun-Kyung; Philipp, Elizabeth and Chung, Hattie (2017) The Known and Unknown - North Korea’s Biological Weapons Program. Available from: https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/north-koreas-biological-weapons-program-known-and-unknown. [Accessed 27 May 2020]

[10] The Guardian (June 12, 2015) ‘North Korea accuses US of targeting it with anthrax and asks UN for help’ [Online] Available from: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jun/12/north-korea-anthrax-united-states. [Accessed 27 May 2020]

[11] Kim, Philipp and Chung (2017) The Known and Unknown - North Korea’s Biological Weapons Program.

[12] Ibid.

[13] Ibid.

[14] GlobalSecurity.org (n.d.) ‘Biological Warfare Agent Delivery’ [Online] Available from: https://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/intro/bio_delivery.htm. [Accessed 27 May 2020]

[15] Kim, Philipp and Chung (2017) The Known and Unknown - North Korea’s Biological Weapons Program.

[16] Ibid.

[17] Missile Defense Project (June 14, 2018), ‘Missiles of North Korea’, Missile Threat, Center for Strategic and International Studies. [Online] Available from: https://missilethreat.csis.org/country/dprk/. Last modified March 4, 2020. [Accessed 27 May 2020]

[18] Kim, Philipp and Chung (2017) The Known and Unknown - North Korea’s Biological Weapons Program.

[19] Ibid.

[20] World Health Organization (2001) ‘Smallpox’ [Online] Available from: https://web.archive.org/web/20121023143819/http://www.who.int/mediacentre/factsheets/smallpox/en/index.html. [Accessed 27 May 2020]

[21] Kim, Philipp and Chung (2017) The Known and Unknown - North Korea’s Biological Weapons Program, p. 13.

[22] CIA (2003) Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions. Available from: https://www.cia.gov/library/reports/archived-reports-1/july_dec2003.htm#5. [Accessed 27 May 2020]

[23] Baumgaertner and Broad (2019) ‘North Korea’s Less-Known Military Threat: Biological Weapons’.

[24] Depetris (2020) ‘What If Kim Jong Un Dies?’.

Conversing COVID - Part I, with Matthijs Lok

An Interview Series on the Political Implications of the Pandemic

By Fabiana Natale and Gilles de Valk

For this interview series, Fabiana Natale and Gilles de Valk speak to experts from different backgrounds on the political implications of the COVID-19 pandemic in their respective fields. From their living rooms in France and The Netherlands, they will explore the (geo)political, security, and societal consequences of this pandemic. This interview series marks the launch of a new type of content for the Security Distillery, one which we hope can provide informative and entertaining analyses of an uncertain and evolving development in global politics.

In this first episode, we are interviewing Matthijs Lok, Senior Lecturer in Modern European History at the European Studies Department of the University of Amsterdam. He recently wrote a piece in which he examined the coronavirus from a historical perspective [1]. As this is the first interview of a larger series, we think it is important to first look at the pandemic from a historical point of view, but also to bridge the gap between social sciences and humanities.

On 6 May 2020, the historian and political writer Timothy Garton Ash asked in the Guardian: ‘What kind of historical moment will this turn out to be, for Europe and the world?’ [2] What do you think, Matthijs?

     It seems like a lot of people around me are optimistic about the future, although these people tend to have a background in social sciences. As a historian, you tend to be a little more suspicious of how large historical events turn out, so I’m a bit more sceptical. I think the “corona crisis” is a reinforcement of existing trends, rather than a rupture with the past. Authoritarianism, nationalism, and other undemocratic developments that were already taking place seem to be enhanced. Even though some people think of it as a time of solidarity, we have seen friction within the EU between the Netherlands and Italy, for example [the Dutch were initially  hesitant about proposed financial aid to southern European countries, which sparked criticism]. Regarding nationalist developments, it seems like there is an emphasis on national self-sufficiency, rather than international cooperation or cosmopolitanism. This trend had already emerged before the crisis if you look at United States President Donald Trump’s policies or the trade war with China, but now we have witnessed nationalist reflexes in countries like Spain, Italy, the Netherlands, and Germany. This reinforcement of national self-sufficiency has not led to the exclusion of specific groups, but it can become that way.     

You mentioned that you are  not as optimistic, being a historian. Do you see similarities between the corona crisis and any historical event in particular?

     We have seen moves towards nationalism and self-sufficiency after big crises before. The eighteenth  century, for instance, was very much a time of commerce and free trade. After the French Revolution, which turned out very different from how the participants expected, you see a surge in nationalism and a focus on economic self-sufficiency, while the belief in international trade experienced a setback. Another period it makes me think of is the end of the nineteenth  century, which was a period of globalisation. However, World War One caused another move towards national self-sufficiency. I would not compare the corona crisis to World War One, but generally speaking, you can see that crises can result in a more inward focus.

On the other hand, the corona crisis shows that some problems that seemed to be unsolvable can be solved. I’m thinking of “overtourism” in European cities such as Venice, Paris, and Amsterdam. At the same time, it seems like we are rushing less in our daily lives  and the fact that we are travelling less can have a positive impact on the environment. Besides, it seems to have caused a revaluation of the public sector, especially the health, education, and law enforcement sectors.     

You said that problems that were deemed to be unsolvable are being solved. But one could argue that they were solved and replaced by new problems and maybe even new threats. How has our perception of security threats changed since the start of the crisis?

     I find it interesting to look at how people experience this crisis. When people look at the news they might think, ‘This situation is radical and unique.’ This is what you think when you are the midst of a crisis, while later on, historians will say that it was not that special after all and that there was actually a lot of continuity. Old problems and threats will reappear, but in a new form. We will just look at them from another perspective.

On the other hand, we are currently not talking about threats such as terrorism. There was a knife attack in south-eastern France on 4 April 2020, supposedly with a terrorist motive [3]. It hardly made it to the headlines, in the Netherlands at least, while it usually would have.

What worries me a little bit is that we are currently only looking at  one single threat – this one giant enemy – and forgetting to look at other problems. Even though this reflex is understandable, there are other medical, but also societal problems. The crisis has a huge economic impact – think about the high unemployment rate in the United States. But there are also mental health issues and it can have a large impact on children. Besides, it might not be good that a very small group of medics seem to be running the country. But this is where historians come in: they can show us that we should not focus on one threat and that there are more problems, by putting it in a historical perspective.     

Earlier we talked about the tension between northern and southern European states over solidarity and financial aid. In 2013, you wrote an article for the Dutch newspaper NRC Handelsblad in which you discussed how the euro crisis had caused the East-West divide in Europe to be replaced by the North-South divide [4]. What are your observations on this divide during the corona crisis?

     Firstly, I think the East-West divide is still there as well, as we can see for example with Hungarian Prime Minister, Viktor Orbán, and generally the self-proclaimed “anti-liberal” regimes. The strengthening of authoritarian rule in this context of emergency is not a surprise though. This is what this kind of crisis does: it reinforces the state’s power.

However, the North-South divide is also becoming deeper. My observation is that things have changed, especially since Brexit, and ‘the South’, with its now relatively larger population, has gained political weight and become more powerful.

Furthermore, countries like the Netherlands, Belgium, and France have been regarding themselves as the heart of the European development for a long time, but today they might even become the periphery of this project. And I think we can place the blame in part on those countries themselves, because often      they have not understood the other member states’ perspectives, considering the position they were defending as the right one, until it turned out to be a minority.

The French government, for example, seems aware of the risk of becoming the odd one out and of the need to build alternatives to the French-German driving force. It is, therefore, assigning a growing importance to the development of new allegiances, such as with the Netherlands, in order to keep its position.     

How will we look back at this event in fifty years?

     Some people have almost become apocalyptic or religious about the perception of time, thinking that it will be either heaven or hell. But I think this sense of uniqueness will disappear in the coming months or years. It will find a place in our memories, people will talk about it to younger people who didn’t live through it, students will write their theses on it. I think it will be seen as less of a watershed than we do now.

We have talked about the past and future, let us go back to the present. On 1 May 2020, several humanities scientists wrote an article in NRC Handelsblad arguing that we need to involve historians more with policy responses to the crisis [5]. What lessons can we learn from historians and history?

     Historians can put the crisis in perspective. People tend to focus on one problem, forgetting about other problems, which is of course understandable when people lose their loved ones. However, historians can help to remind us of the other aspects of society. At the same time, historians are very well aware that things are not self-evident and can change radically. Hence, they can show us that this is an extraordinary, but not necessarily a unique situation. From historical events, we can hopefully learn that we do not need the national reflexes of self-sufficiency.     

What are your key observations in this pandemic? 

     The corona crisis is bringing both new issues and opportunities. On one side, besides the health crisis, trends such as nationalism and authoritarianism are being reinforced, which threatens the European project while emphasizing the shift of influence from the West towards Asia. However, societies are resilient and can take advantage of this situation to create new possibilities, like we are doing with IT. Those opportunities can also stem from the emergence of a suitable intellectual context, especially for academics, for new reflections on our societies.

Notes

[1] Lok, Matthijs (2020). ‘A Sublime Historical Event: The Corona Pandemic is also a Crisis in Our Perception of Time’. Netherlands Institute of Advanced Study. https://nias.knaw.nl/food-for-thought/food-for-thought-a-sublime-historical-event/.

[2] Garton Ash, Timothy (2020). ‘A better world can emerge after coronavirus. Or a much worse one’. The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/world/commentisfree/2020/may/06/better-world-coronavirus-young-europeans-democracy-universal-basic-income.

[3] No Author (2020). ‘Romans-sur-Isère: France launches terror probe after knife attack’. BBC. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-52165522.

[4] Lok, Matthijs (2013). ‘Zuid-Europa is nieuw Oost-Europa’. NRC Handelsblad. https://www.nrc.nl/nieuws/2013/09/14/zuid-europa-is-nieuw-oost-europa-1293034-a724362.

[5]  De Graaf, Beatrice, Lotte Jensen, Rina Knoeff, and Catrien Santing (2020). ‘Historici moeten ook meedenken, juist nu’. NRC Handelsblad. https://www.nrc.nl/nieuws/2020/05/01/historici-moeten-ook-meedenken-juist-nu-a3998484.

The views and opinions expressed are solely those of the interviewee and do not reflect those of the Security Distillery, the IMSISS consortium or its partners and affiliates.

Proliferation and Protracted Conflict in South Asia: How has the Nuclearisation of South Asia impacted the conflict and regional stability?

The testing of India and Pakistan’s nuclear capabilities in May 1998 marked the beginning of a period of nuclearisation and proliferation in South Asia. This is an ongoing process as seen with India’s completion of the Nuclear Triad in 2018, allowing for nuclear deterrence by land, air and sea,[1] as well as Pakistan’s growing development of tactical nuclear weapons which can be deployed on the battlefield. [2] The consolidation of the two states’ nuclear arsenals is significant due to the addition of nuclear capabilities in states which are currently involved in a protracted conflict, having engaged in four large scale military conflicts since partition and independence in 1947. The consolidation of nuclear weapons and continued hostilities in the region presents two key questions that must be considered. How has nuclearisation been used in relation to the protracted conflict and more importantly, has nuclearisation in India and Pakistan effectively created regional stability or further injected instability to the regional conflict?

By Steven Mulholland

Protracted conflict is by definition a conflict which ‘resists the most serious attempts at resolution because of the deep-rooted issues over critical resources, meaning, justice and power.’ [3] The lack of reference to proliferation as a basic feature of protracted conflict in the definition is significant because it assumes that protracted conflicts are already inherently difficult to resolve prior to nuclearisation. This assumption is quite clearly supported in the context of India and Pakistan. Three major conflicts in 1947, 1965, and 1971 occurred between the two states prior to nuclearisation, with no solution being achieved over the major issue of the Kashmir State, perpetuating tensions and instability. The nuclearisation of India and Pakistan and its continued proliferation of weapons has naturally created a division of opinion as to how proliferation impacts the protracted conflict and the region’s stability as a whole. I argue that proliferation has increased instability in the region and further entrenched the protracted conflict.

It should be noted that advocates for nuclear deterrence have argued that India and Pakistan’s nuclearisation would have a positive impact on the protracted conflict, citing the argument that nuclear deterrence would effectively prevent the large-scale conflicts seen in the region, by making ‘war terribly expensive and creating a source of constancy amongst nuclear opponents.’ [4] This argument has been supported to an extent by the nature of India and Pakistan’s operation under a more restrained nuclear policy than the Cold War dynamic between the USSR and US. This dynamic is a result of developing a minimal deterrence system [5] that allows for second strike capabilities, further increasing the costs of conflict in the region.

But of course, the Kargil War in 1999 that occured one year after nuclearisation, refuted the deterrence argument in terms of preventing large-scale conflict. Supporters of deterrence argue that India and Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal would not have been consolidated enough to provide a substantial deterrence at the time. However, the conflict did prove that known nuclear capabilities did not make the prospect of conflict too costly, and that the two states were willing to deploy military forces in the Kargil region regardless of the nuclear threat. The conflict more accurately showed how nuclearisation contributed towards the escalation, because of ‘both sides possessing a different understanding of nuclear deterrence theory.’ [6] In the case of Pakistan, nuclearisation is perceived as a means of finally being able to respond to Indian military might in conflict. In contrast, India perceives proliferation as a means of deterring conflict and preserving the balance of power with both Pakistan and China, a key military ally of Pakistan.

Supporters of deterrence have also neglected the fact that the conflict in the region is not limited to large-scale outbreaks. The vast majority of disputes in the region have been on a much smaller scale, as seen with the border mobilisation in 2002, India’s use of ‘surgical strikes in Azad Kashmir in 2016’, [7] and the most recent dispute in 2019 over an Indian Air Force pilot taken into Pakistani custody after being shot down in Pakistani controlled Kashmir. It also neglects the fact that small scale attacks, especially the ‘Pakistani-sponsored attacks on the Indian Parliament in 2001 and Mumbai in 2008’, [8] have been made possible by nuclearisation providing a form of protection against a more aggressive military response or retribution by India. This argument is particularly salient when examining Pakistan’s nuclear doctrine, which refuses to commit to a no first use policy. Their policy assumes that a low threshold for a nuclear response creates an umbrella of protection that can be used to carry out ‘sub-conventional attacks’ [9] on India. The doctrine is significant in suggesting that proliferation in the region has become a justification and allowance for conducting small-scale action in the region as opposed to serving as a successful deterrent.

Overall, it is impossible to make the claim that the proliferation of nuclear weapons by both India and Pakistan has not had an impact on the protracted conflict in the region. However, it can be asserted that the nuclearisation of South Asia has become a significant detriment to the conflict. Instead of providing regional stability through effective deterrence on both sides of the conflict it has failed to prevent large-scale conflict and has served as a means of carrying out and perpetuating small-scale conflict. The presence of nuclear capabilities has only entrenched the protracted conflict and created further instability in the region.

Sources

1.  Narang, V (2018) ‘India’s nuclear strategy twenty years later: From reluctance to maturation. India Review,’ Vol. 17 No.1. pp. 159-179.

2.  Gul, Ayaz (2019) ‘Pakistan Equips Military with Tactical Nuke-Capable Missiles,’ Voa news.https://www.voanews.com/south-central-asia/pakistan-equips-military-tactical-nuke-capable-missile

3.  Coleman, Peter (2003) ‘Characteristics of Protracted, Intractable Conflict: Toward the Development,’ Peace and Conflict, Vol.9. Pp. 1-37.

4.  Noreen.S &  Khan T.M (2016) ‘An Analysis of Indo-Pakistan Nuclear Doctrines,’ Al-Idah, Vol. 33. pp. 50-68.

5.  Basrur. R (2013) ‘China, India and Pakistan: models for an intermediate stage towards disarmament?’ Australian journal of international affairs, Vol. 67 No.2. pp.179-189.

6.  Leghari, Farooque & Moorthy Ravichandaran (2015) ‘Nuclear Deterrence: A complete failure at Kargil,’ Research on Humanities and Social Sciences. Vol. 5. No. 15. Pp. 105-108.

7.  Hindustan Times Correspondent (2016) ‘India’s surgical strikes across LoC,’ Hindustan Times. https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/india-s-surgical-strikes-across-loc-full-statement-by-dgmo-lt-gen-ranbir-singh/story-Q5yrp0gjvxKPGazDzAnVsM.html

8.  Brewster, D (2015)  ‘Murky waters, dangerous currents: India, Pakistan, China and the coming nuclearisation of the Indian Ocean,’ Journal of the Indian Ocean Region, Vol.11 No.2. pp. 1-5.

9.  Brewster, (2015) ‘Murky waters, dangerous currents: India, Pakistan, China and the coming nuclearisation of the Indian Ocean,’ pp. 3.