Despite North Korea's constant threat, South Korea's prudent adherence to international law and alliance with the United States have restrained its nuclear ambitions. Given its impressive economic growth and cultural influence, recent discourse suggests that the country demonstrates its ambition by adopting more pervasive nuclear strategies.
BY Nyein Nyein Thant Aung
Thirty-two years after the United States withdrew its nuclear weapons from South Korea, President Yoon Suk-Yeol made the unprecedented statement that his government would consider developing nuclear weapons or asking the United States to redeploy them on the Korean Peninsula if the nuclear threat from North Korea continues to escalate [1]. Although being a signatory of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), South Korea has not yet formed an official strategy for acquiring nuclear power. As a result, Suk-Yeol's comments on a possible future nuclearisation of the country have provoked a heated public debate.
A Soft Power Success Story
Joseph Nye, the author of Soft Power, views Korea as one of the world's great success stories of soft power—the capacity to influence others via attraction rather than coercion or inducement [2]. In terms of hard power, South Korea is content to see itself as a middle power. However, South Korea has become an economic, technological, and cultural superpower on a global scale.
K-pop and Korean popular culture are excellent examples of how South Korea has enthralled audiences around the world when it comes to culture. The nation's soft power, though, goes beyond its popular culture. The Pyeongchang 2018 Winter Olympics opened the door for more South Korean influence in sports [3]. Some soft power analysts have denoted the rise of the South Korean National Team and Korean corporations' support during the 2022 FIFA World Cup as “inspirational.” In addition to culture and sports, one important aspect of South Korea's soft power is its appeal to international students, which has a big impact on how other countries view the nation.
A further aspect of South Korea's soft power is its capacity to combine economic prosperity with a democratic culture, thereby enhancing the country's credibility and legitimacy, particularly on the global stage. Attesting that soft power is a trait of nations and not just governments, successive Korean administrations have also attempted to extend the role of the Korea International Cooperation Agency (KOICA), particularly in developing countries in Asia and Africa.
However, while soft power can be an effective tool, the Korean government is aware of its limitations and recognises that maintaining its reputation as a leader in soft power requires ongoing effort and innovation. South Korea has always sought to become a smart power by maximising its soft power while coexisting with economic and military hard power. Over time, Seoul has become a major arms dealer, maintaining a strong defence industrial base with robust production lines of U.S.-compatible, high-end equipment and research and development [4]. In 2022, amidst an uncertain global security situation exacerbated by the Russian invasion of Ukraine, Korean armaments reached both old and new markets [5]. As part of its plan to become a pivotal power, South Korea dreams of possessing nuclear weapons for deterrence.
South Korea's Nuclear Ambition
On July 27, 2023, the seventieth anniversary of the end of the Korean War will be observed. The war resulted in the creation of the demilitarised zone (DMZ), which approximately divides the Korean peninsula in half. Yet, Seoul has always been concerned about North Korean infiltration. In 1972, after North Korea launched its nuclear program with the help of China in the early 1970s, Seoul attempted to construct a nuclear reactor under the 'Project 890' initiative [6]. But U.S. intelligence agencies discovered the project in 1974 and predicted that South Korea would obtain strategic nuclear capability by the 1980s. The United States, France, and Canada were successful in convincing South Korea to renounce its nuclear ambitions in 1976 [7].
When the North tested its missiles, the South was always reminded of nuclearisation, which is a taboo to be discussed at the policy level. The absence of support from the United States, their strategic ally, is a deciding factor since denuclearization of the Korean peninsula is one of the United States' top policy priorities in the East Asia Region [8]. Although the South insists on nuclearisation for deterrence purpose, in the worst-case scenario, this could provoke the North. Furthermore, analysts contend that the South's nuclear ambitions would cause instability beyond the peninsula because deterrence plans would irritate China and Russia, in addition to North Korea [9].
Seoul's interest in nuclearisation stems from the security dilemma in alliance politics [10]. Despite the United States' assurance of protection enshrined in the Mutual Defense Treaty, South Korea remains sceptical of its ally's long-term reliability. With the United States' numerous commitments around the world, there is concern that there will be insufficient support in a critical situation. While some analysts suggest that Seoul should rely on its conventional forces [11] with U.S. support, there is a considerable likelihood that Yoon’s administration may consider a nuclear strategy to eliminate the uncertainty and dilemma.
Inadequacy in Advocacy for Nuclear Strategy
According to a public survey published by a think tank in the U.S. regarding South Koreans' views on nuclear weapons [12], 71% of respondents supported the development of their own strategic nuclear weapons, demonstrating a decline in confidence in the United States' 'extended deterrence’—its commitment to protecting its allies. The survey was released a month before the presidential election in 2022, during which the candidates made no nuclear-related promises during their campaigns.
When the topic of nuclear armament resurfaced in the country, both domestic and international analysts cautioned against repeating the errors of the past, particularly the high costs of covert nuclearization in the 1970s. The pro-nuclear strategy was reintroduced to the public shortly after the inauguration of the newly elected president. Mr Yoon's administration, which is affiliated with the conservative People Power Party (PPP), prefers a deterrence policy towards North Korea. Since Yoon's inauguration, his party members, including metropolitan mayors and governors, have advocated for the populist notion of "a nuke for a nuke." There are also domestic organisations involved in the lobbying process, including think tanks. However, the ongoing nuclear debate does not necessarily correlate with Seoul's new policy towards Pyongyang.
As potential costs of South Korea's nuclearization, analysts have highlighted the structural constraints of the NPT and the US's allied politics. In addition, there are disadvantages to the current pro-nuclear strategy, such as the fact that public opinion polls do not necessarily represent the entire population. In addition, there is considerable uncertainty and confusion because public statements may not reflect true intentions. Politicians' calls for nuclear weapons acquisition may be driven more by populist agendas than by sound doctrine that may not be in the country's best interests.
Conclusion
To conclude, South Korea's soft power success is admirable, but its potential pursuit of nuclear weapons poses risks and challenges, and policymakers must be cautious about every action, including the figure's nuclear strategy comment.
References
[1] Sang-Hun, Choe. “In a First, South Korea Declares Nuclear Weapons a Policy Option.” The Japan Times, January 13, 2023. https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2023/01/13/asia-pacific/south-korea-nuclear-weapons-policy/
[2] Shin Ji-hye, ‘What Is behind South Korea’s Growth in Soft Power?’, The Korea Herald, 11 August 2022, https://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20220811000854.
[3] David Rowe, ‘The Worlds That Are Watching: Media, Politics, Diplomacy, and the 2018 PyeongChang Winter Olympics’, Communication & Sport 7, no. 1 (1 February 2019): 3–22, https://doi.org/10.1177/2167479518804483.
[4] Jun Gon Lee and Min Jae Park, ‘Evaluation of Technological Competence and Operations Efficiency in the Defense Industry: The Strategic Planning of South Korea’, Evaluation and Program Planning 79 (1 April 2020): 101775, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.evalprogplan.2019.101775.
[5] Andy Hong, ‘2022 in Review: South Korean Arms Exports’, Korea Economic Institute of America (blog), 22 December 2022, https://keia.org/the-peninsula/2022-in-review-south-korean-arms-exports.
[6] Seung‐Young Kim, ‘Security, Nationalism and the Pursuit of Nuclear Weapons and Missiles: The South Korean Case, 1970–82’, Diplomacy & Statecraft 12, no. 4 (1 December 2001): 53–80, https://doi.org/10.1080/09592290108406226.
[7] Jang Se Young, ‘Excavating South Korea’s Nuclear History | Wilson Center’, History and Public Policy Program, Wilson Center, 10 April 2017, https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/excavating-south-koreas-nuclear-history
[8] Michael J. Siler, ‘U.S. Nuclear Nonproliferation Policy in the Northeast Asian Region during the Cold War: The South Korean Case’, East Asia 16, no. 3 (1 September 1998): 41–86, https://doi.org/10.1007/s12140-998-0003-7.
[9] Mun Suk Ahn and Young Chul Cho, ‘A Nuclear South Korea?’, International Journal 69, no. 1 (1 March 2014): 26–34, https://doi.org/10.1177/0020702013518495.
[10] Glenn H. Snyder, ‘The Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics’, World Politics 36, no. 4 (1984): 461–95, https://doi.org/10.2307/2010183.
[11] Bernal Gabriela, ‘South Korea’s First Attempt at Going Nuclear’, The Diplomat, 15 February 2023, https://thediplomat.com/2023/02/south-koreas-first-attempt-at-going-nuclear/.
[12] Toby Dalton, Karl Friedhoff, and Lami Kim, ‘Thinking Nuclear: South Korean Attitudes on Nuclear Weapons’, Research (The Chicago Council on Global Affairs, 21 February 2022), https://globalaffairs.org/research/public-opinion-survey/thinking-nuclear-south-korean-attitudes-nuclear-weapons.
