Forcing the Taliban to the negotiation table?

With the latest show of force at Ghazni, the Taliban proved during their Al-Khandaq Spring Offensive of being capable to launch coordinated and major attacks. While the US military underestimates the importance of Taliban’s control over provincial districts, the Taliban is proving the opposite – using provincial areas to retreat and plan assaults on major cities. After the Eid al-Fitr cease-fire, the Taliban gained leverage for future peace negotiations in a time where Western-allied forces are trying to force the Taliban to the negotiation table and end the almost 17-year-war.

By Fabian Herzog

Ghazni, Afghanistan

After heavy fighting in the eastern Afghan city Ghazni, the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) reclaimed control on Saturday, 11th August 2018. The attack on the provincial capital – 2 hours from Kabul – was launched by 1000 Taliban fighters on Thursday, 9th August, as part of a major offensive to take over provincial cities [1] [2]. The battle is against the backdrop of the recently reached Eid al-Fitr ceasefire between the Afghan government and the Taliban. The confrontation takes place in a time where Western-allied forces are trying to force the Taliban to the negotiation table and end the almost 17-year-war [3] [4].

Despite warnings ongoing for months that Ghazni’s outskirts were being taken over by the Taliban, the central government did not respond [5]. The Taliban fighting force included Pakistanis, Chechens, and Al Qaeda affiliates. Police forces had to fall back to protect basic government facilities such as the Police Headquarters, the Intelligence Headquarter, and the prison [6]. The battle lasted two days and the ANSF losses reached up to 200. Ghazi has now become a hotspot with clashes constantly breaking out killing 100 police officers and soldiers so far [7].

Taking matters into his own hands, the Afghan National Army´s (ANA) Chief of Staff, Lieutenant General Mohammad Sharif Yaftali, went to regain control of the city [8]. ANSF were backed by US advisers and Special Forces to coordinate the two dozen air strikes and ground operations that drove the Taliban fighters out of the embattled city of Ghazni [9]. The Afghan government’s reaction was chaotic. As the ANA was reinforcing the Afghan police in Ghazni, it provided American ammunition to the Afghan police who use Russian weapons systems [10]. With the end of the military assault, a humanitarian crisis continues to unravel with families unable to leave their homes, alongside failing water and food supplies [11]. The Ghazni hospital is overburdened with over 250 dead or wounded – and numbers are rising. Due to the damage to the telecommunication systems and electrical support lines, the exact situation on the ground is hard to grasp.

The Taliban’s Spring Offensive Al-Khandaq has seen breakouts in other Afghan districts as well. The four-part, coordinated offensive aimed to take over territory, establish checkpoints, secure the area with IEDs, and collect taxes along both the Kabul-Kandahar Highway as well as the road from Ghazni City to Gardez [12]. In Faryab province in the north-west of Afghanistan, the ANA lost an outpost where up to 50 soldiers were killed. In the northern Baghlan Province attacks led to the loss of another outpost and 7 policemen and 9 soldiers killed and 3 soldiers captured [13]. In the Ajristan district, the Afghan Commandos lost 100 members from a forward operating base. The Taliban destroyed the base with two vehicle-borne IED, killing numerous soldiers. Some of the Afghan soldiers fled into the mountains and walked two days while being ambushed by the Taliban. The wounded 22 soldiers were rescued and transported with donkeys out of the mountains [14]. Overall the Afghan military, supported by US forces, is superior to the Taliban when it comes to decisive battles such as Ghanzi and the battle for Kunduz City in 2015 and 2016 [17]. However, the Afghan internal political disagreements and its inability to outmanoeuvre insurgents are a crucial problem [18]. This is demonstrated by the high losses of the ANSF and the Taliban´s capabilities to mobilise and undertake coordinated offensives. Special units such as the Afghan commandos are a crucial part of the NATO Operation RESOLUTE SUPPORT´s strategy to bolster Afghan forces. The high losses and the lost base is a discouraging hit for the Western allied forces and might indicate a declining effectiveness [15].

Retreived from liveuamap.com (2018)

Military stalemate and peace talks between the Afghan government and the Taliban

The Taliban offensive contributes to the heated atmosphere shortly before the parliamentary elections in October 2018. Another suicidal attack took place close to the independent election commission in Kabul [16].
While the US military underestimates the importance of Taliban’s control over provincial districts, the Taliban is proving the opposite – using provincial areas for retreat and planning assaults on major cities [19]. This was the same case at the 2015 siege of Kunduz when the city was slowly surrounded by insurgents, taking over the city step-by-step, which took the ANSF two weeks to retake [20].

From a broader perspective, the new US war strategy for Afghanistan published in 2017 foresees a retreat of ANSF from provincial outposts back to the major cities resembling the small footprint approach adopted by the Bush and Obama administrations [21]. As the examples of Kunduz in 2015 and now Ghazni show, this provides ground for the Taliban. Leading to sufficient time and resources to gather strength; there is space for poppy cultivation fields, training camps, and recruitment. The Taliban is trying to take over major provincial cities such as Kunduz, Helmand, Farah, and now Ghazni since the US led forces took a supportive role in 2014 [22].

After the Eid al-Fitr cease-fire the Taliban gained leverage for future peace negotiations as they proved capable to launch coordinated and major offensives [23]. The Afghan government is facing difficulty convincing critics of the peace efforts [24]. A US delegation met with the Taliban on 23rd July in Doha, Qatar; bilateral talks with the Americans have been a Taliban demand for years. The lack of time restrictions on US engagement in Afghanistan is an uncertain factor for the Taliban – which might act as an incentive for them to join negotiations [25]. This bilateral meeting certainly indicates that the US wants a solution to the almost 17 years of war. After the offensive in Ghazni it seems like the Taliban has increased their negotiation weight and sent their message of strength [26].

Sources:

[1] The Defense Post (2018): Taliban and the Afghan government both claim

control over Ghazni city,

https://thedefensepost.com/2018/08/11/afghanistan-taliban-government-control-ghazni/

accessed 13th of August 2018.

[2] The New York Times (2018): Why the Taliban’s Assault on Ghazni Matters for

Afghanistan and the U.S., By Mujib Mashal

https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/13/world/asia/why-the-talibans-assault-on-ghazni-matters-for-afghanistan-and-the-us.html?rref=collection%2Fsectioncollection%2Fworld&action=click&contentCollection=world&region=rank&module=package&version=highlights&contentPlacement=2&pgtype=sectionfront

accessed on 14th of August 2018.

[3] The Defense Post (2018): Taliban and the Afghan government both claim

control over Ghazni city,

https://thedefensepost.com/2018/08/11/afghanistan-taliban-government-control-ghazni/

accessed 13th of August 2018.

[4] The Defense Post (2018): Afghan government asserts ‘complete control’ over

Ghazni after Taliban assault,

https://thedefensepost.com/2018/08/11/afghanistan-government-control-ghazni-taliban/

accessed 13th of August 2018.

[5] The New York Times (2018): Why the Taliban’s Assault on Ghazni Matters for

Afghanistan and the U.S., By Mujib Mashal,

https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/13/world/asia/why-the-talibans-assault-on-ghazni-matters-for-afghanistan-and-the-us.html?rref=collection%2Fsectioncollection%2Fworld&action=click&contentCollection=world&region=rank&module=package&version=highlights&contentPlacement=2&pgtype=sectionfront

accessed on 14th of August 2018.

[6] ibid.

[7] The New York Times (2018): Taliban Kill More Than 200 Afghan Defenders on 4

Fronts: ‘a Catastrophe’

https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/12/world/asia/afghanistan-ghazni-taliban.html?action=click&module=In%20Other%20News&pgtype=Homepage&action=click&module=News&pgtype=Homepage

accessed on 13th of August 2018.

[8] FDD´s Long War Journal (2018): Ghazni City remains under assault, despite

RS assurances, By Bill Roggio

https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2018/08/ghazni-city-remains-under-assault-despite-rs-assurances.php

accessed on 13th of August 2018.

[9] Reuter (2018): Afghan special forces sent to bolster threatened city

defenses, by Hamid Shalizi, Rupam Jain

https://www.reuters.com/article/us-afghanistan-attack/afghan-special-forces-sent-to-bolster-threatened-city-defenses-idUSKBN1KY0MY?feedType=RSS&feedName=topNews

accessed on 13th of August 2018.

[10] The New York Times (2018): Taliban Kill More Than 200 Afghan Defenders on

4 Fronts: ‘a Catastrophe’

https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/12/world/asia/afghanistan-ghazni-taliban.html?action=click&module=In%20Other%20News&pgtype=Homepage&action=click&module=News&pgtype=Homepage

accessed on 13th of August 2018.

[11] BBC (2018): Afghanistan: Battle-torn Ghazni residents 'can't find food'

https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-45168890

accessed on 13th of August 2018.

[12] FDD´s Long War Journal (2018): Ghazni City remains under assault,

despite RS assurances, By Bill Roggio,

https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2018/08/ghazni-city-remains-under-assault-despite-rs-assurances.php

accessed on 13th of August 2018.

[13] The New York Times (2018): Taliban Kill More Than 200 Afghan Defenders on

4 Fronts: ‘a Catastrophe’

https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/12/world/asia/afghanistan-ghazni-taliban.html?action=click&module=In%20Other%20News&pgtype=Homepage&action=click&module=News&pgtype=Homepage

accessed on 13th of August 2018.

[14] ibid.

[15] FDD´s Long War Journal (2018): Ghazni City remains under assault,

despite RS assurances, By Bill Roggio

https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2018/08/ghazni-city-remains-under-assault-despite-rs-assurances.php

accessed on 13th of August 2018.

[16] FDD´s Long War Journal (2018): Ghazni City remains under assault,

despite RS assurances, By Bill Roggio

https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2018/08/ghazni-city-remains-under-assault-despite-rs-assurances.php

accessed on 13th of August 2018.

[17] FDD´s Long War Journal (2018): Taliban routs Afghan Commandos while overrunning

remote district in Ghazni, By Bill Roggio

https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2018/08/taliban-routs-afghan-commandos-while-overrunning-remote-district-in-ghazni.php

accessed on 13th of August 2018.

[18] Reuter (2018): Afghan special forces sent to bolster threatened city defenses

by Hamid Shalizi, Rupam Jain

https://www.reuters.com/article/us-afghanistan-attack/afghan-special-forces-sent-to-bolster-threatened-city-defenses-idUSKBN1KY0MY?feedType=RSS&feedName=topNews

accessed on 13th of August 2018.

[19] FDD´s Long War Journal (2018): Ghazni City remains under assault,

despite RS assurances, By Bill Roggio

https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2018/08/ghazni-city-remains-under-assault-despite-rs-assurances.php

accessed on 13th of August 2018.

[20] The New York Times (2018): Why the Taliban’s Assault on Ghazni Matters for

Afghanistan and the U.S., By Mujib Mashal

https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/13/world/asia/why-the-talibans-assault-on-ghazni-matters-for-afghanistan-and-the-us.html?rref=collection%2Fsectioncollection%2Fworld&action=click&contentCollection=world&region=rank&module=package&version=highlights&contentPlacement=2&pgtype=sectionfront

accessed on 14th of August 2018.

[21] The New York Times(2018): Newest U.S. Strategy in Afghanistan Mirrors Past

Plans for Retreat, By Thomas Gibbons-Neff and Helene Cooper,

https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/28/world/asia/trump-afghanistan-strategy-retreat.html

accessed on 14th of August 2018.

[22] The Diplomat (2018):The Trump Administration's Terrible Idea for Afghanistan's Security Forces

https://thediplomat.com/2018/08/the-trump-administrations-terrible-idea-for-afghanistans-security-forces/

By Ghulam Farooq Mujaddidi, accessed on 14th of August 2018.

[23] The Washington Post (2018): Taliban blindsides U.S. forces with surprise Afghan offensive

By Carlo Muñoz

https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2018/aug/13/taliban-surprise-offensive-afghanistan-catches-us-/

accessed on 14th of August 2018.

[24] The New York Times (2018): Why the Taliban’s Assault on Ghazni Matters for Afghanistan

and the U.S., By Mujib Mashal

https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/13/world/asia/why-the-talibans-assault-on-ghazni-matters-for-afghanistan-and-the-us.html?rref=collection%2Fsectioncollection%2Fworld&action=click&contentCollection=world&region=rank&module=package&version=highlights&contentPlacement=2&pgtype=sectionfront

accessed on 14th of August 2018.

[25] The Washington Post (2018): Taliban blindsides U.S. forces with surprise Afghan offensive, By Carlo Muñoz

https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2018/aug/13/taliban-surprise-offensive-afghanistan-catches-us-/

accessed on 14th of August 2018.

[26] The Guardian (2018): Taliban hails 'helpful' US talks as boost to Afghan peace process

Memphis Barker and Sami Yousafzai in Islamabad

https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/aug/13/taliban-hails-helpful-us-talks-as-boost-to-afghan-peace-process

accessed on 14th of August 2018.

The American Swarming Programme – Part Two of Three

In an attempt to stay ahead of the curve, the US has been heavily investing in the research and development of drone swarms. Three developments in the US swarming programme are particularly interesting: the Perdix drone swarm, the Low-Cost UAV Swarming Technology (LOCUST) and the Control Architecture for Robotic Agent Command and Sensing, or CARACaS systems.

By Caitlin Irvine

In an attempt to stay ahead of the curve, the US has been heavily investing in the research and development of drone swarms. A swarm consists of multiple unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) with a certain amount of autonomy to navigate and sense the surrounding area [1]. In comparison to Predators or Reapers they ‘are smarter and more autonomous, designed to take off and land on their own, fly mission sets on their own, refuel in the air on their own, and penetrate enemy air defences on their own’ [2].

Three developments in the US swarming programme are particularly interesting. Both the Perdix drone swarm and the Low-Cost UAV Swarming Technology (LOCUST) programmes demonstrate the future trend towards more autonomous warfare. Finally, the Control Architecture for Robotic Agent Command and Sensing, or CARACaS system, demonstrates that swarm technology can be applied to multiple theatres of operation.

In October 2016, the US military ‘released a 103-strong swarm of Perdix drones’ in California [3]. The Perdix drone is a micro-UAV as its wingspan is less than 30 centimetres – making it ideal for operating in urban environments. The swarm demonstrated advanced behaviours ‘such as collective decision-making, adaptive formation flying, and self-healing’ [4]. The UAVs were launched from three F/A-18 Super Hornet fighter jets showing the ability of the US Air Force to use the developments in swarm technology in combination with their advanced air superiority. The Department of Defence’s press release stated that ‘Perdix is a collective organism, sharing one distributed brain for decision-making and adapting to each other like swarms in nature’ [5]. The DoD’s optimism concerning swarm technology, might indicate  that it will play a role in future conflicts.

Whereas the Perdix drones indicate a move towards autonomously functioning hardware, the LOCUST programme refers to the software used. LOCUST is currently being used in Coyote UAVs that are tube-launched from a platform – not dissimilar from the anti-ship missile launchers currently on board US naval vessels. Seen as a cheaper way of gaining attack capabilities the LOCUST programme could potentially substitute for a single, expensive, anti-ship missile [6]. LOCUST systems fire a minimum of 30 Coyote UAVs in 40 seconds and they are then synchronised mid-flight to create the swarm [7]. At around $500,000 for a 30-drone swarm and just $15,000 for a single unit, the cost of LOCUST is less than half the price of the currently deployed million-dollar Harpoon anti-ship missile [8]. The LOCUST is specifically intended to take advantage of the low-cost UAVs such as the Coyote – the drones are expendable so that if one is destroyed ‘the others autonomously change their behaviour to complete the mission’ –  into an offensive dimension [9].

Finally, the third development in the US swarming programme can be found in the CARACaS programme. CARACaS developed both software and hardware that can be fitted in any vessel in the US Navy illustrating that the move towards autonomous systems is happening across multiple theatres. CARACaS is currently used in small, unmanned boats – but can be used in any vessel – and operates using swarm technology that allows the boats to communicate with one another [10]. The idea behind this project is that expensive but important routine tasks such as harbour patrols could be delegated to an unmanned supervised system. The Navy’s CARACaS system is removing the ‘dull, dirty, and dangerous tasks from sailors lives’ [11]. But the phrase ‘dull, dirty, and dangerous’ covers almost every duty and responsibility given to a standing military.

The majority of swarming software is being designed by civilian firms, for both offensive and defensive uses. Defensive systems have been relatively untouched by the current debate on lethal autonomous weapons systems. This is simply because it is difficult to campaign against a system with defensive purposes. By creating a system that has offensive capabilities – but is primarily used defensively – the issue of whether or not such a system is acceptable becomes blurred. Within the narrative surrounding drone swarms, it appears that the main use of such systems will be reconnaissance. However, their ability to also host attack capabilities is what makes them particularly terrifying.  

Sources:

[1] Bürkle, A, Segor, F, and Kollman, M (2011) ‘Towards Autonomous Micro UAV

Swarms’, Journal of Intelligent And Robotic Systems, Vol 61(1-4), p342

[2] Singer, PW (2013) ‘The Global Swarm’, Foreign Policy [online] available at:

http://foreignpolicy.com/2013/03/11/the-global-swarm/

accessed on 18th April 2018

[3] Feng, E and Clover, C (2017) ‘Drone swarms vs conventional arms: China’s

military debate’, The Financial Times [online] available at:

https://www.ft.com/content/302fc14a-66ef-11e7-8526-7b38dcaef614

accessed on 16th April 2017

[4] Adhikari, R (2017) ‘Pentagon Battle-Tests Micro Drone Swarm’,

TechNewsWorld [online] available at:

https://www.technewsworld.com/story/84217.html

accessed on 18th April 2018

[5] Department of Defence (2017) ‘Department of Defence Announces Successful

Micro-Drone Demonstration’, Department of Defence, Press release number

NR-008-17, 9th January [online] available at:

https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Releases/News-Release-View/Article/1044811/department-of-defense-announces-successful-micro-drone-demonstration/

accessed on 19th April 2018

[6] Richardson, J (2017) ‘Swarming UAVs demonstrate enormous attack potential’,

Defence Procurement International [online] available at:

https://www.defenceprocurementinternational.com/features/air/drone-swarms

accessed on 19th April 2018

[7] Hambling, D (2016) ‘Drone Swarms will change the face of modern warfare’,

Wired [online] available at:

http://www.wired.co.uk/article/drone-swarms-change-warfare

accessed 10th April 2018

[8] Lachow, I (2017) ‘The upside and downside of swarming drones’,

Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol 73:2, p97

[9] Hambling, D (2016) ‘Drone Swarms will change the face of modern warfare’,

Wired [online] available at:

http://www.wired.co.uk/article/drone-swarms-change-warfare

accessed 10th April 2018

[10] WarLeaks (2017) ‘US Navy Drone Swarm Boats: Autonomous Boats Short

Documentary’, WarLeaks - Daily Military Defence Videos and Combat Footage [online] available at:

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NN3A7z9diT4

accessed on 16th April 2018

[11] Ibid.

Win-win for China? Using Development aid to project strategic interests

China’s ‘tied aid’ strategy particularly benefits Chinese state-owned enterprises with their loans being backed by African natural resources. As a result, China is not only promoting its state-owned business interests but also deepening their footprint in the region.

By Fabian Herzog

During the Cold War, Russia and the United States (US) used development aid as a politicised measurement of diplomatic relations, especially in Africa to counter each other’s influence.

While the US seems to be retreating from their international engagement by reducing foreign aid globally – and on the African continent- China is pushing its framework consisting of international agreements, loans and development aid to another level. Mixing tools of foreign investment and development China’s programme is incomparable to the projects of other traditional donors.

Traditional Western donors are beginning to recognise the opportunities for business exports to Africa. This is exemplified by Africa’s economic outlook of a middle class of nearly 350 million people, emerging markets and a population in working age bigger than in India and China combined [1].

But China has been stepping up their game. The situation has become a competition for the market opportunities in Africa. If China can establish hegemony as the large investor in Africa, it will be the favourite partner for customized solutions in the next decade [2]. The difference between China’s investment projects and traditional donors becomes clear in the following graph. While the American foreign investment consists mostly of Official Development Assistance (ODA), China’s major share of foreign investment is Other Official Flows (OOF) and mainly commercially oriented.

Unlike the democracy promoting approach most Western countries have taken towards Africa, China advocates economic growth through direct investments aiming to provide the country with much needed infrastructural support [3]. The Chinese strategy intends to provide development finance by encouraging Chinese companies and agencies to mix their direct investment, trade, and export. This results in adjusted and customer oriented projects attractive for recipients in Africa but also barely identifiable as aid.

China’s “tied aid” strategy particularly benefits Chinese state-owned enterprises with their loans being backed by African natural resources. As a result, China is financing infrastructure projects in Africa while simultaneously promoting the expansion of its own businesses [4].

Djibouti – The “One Belt, One Road” Initiative – Projecting Strategic Interest

In Djibouti -China’s strategic partner- heavy investment is creating one of the largest free trade zones in Africa, to be used as a gateway into the continent. The military base and port denote a visible Chinese presence. Moreover, China is financing infrastructure projects that will connect Djibouti and Ethiopia through amenities such as gas and water pipelines as well as interconnected transportation via an electrified train line. Consequently, China is not only promoting its state-owned business interests but also deepening their footprint in the region [5].

While investment in Djibouti seems to be unattractive as it is one of Africa’s smallest countries with few natural resources, the country is of strategic important because of the maritime route; trading ships head to the Red Sea, the Suez Canal, and Europe [6]. Djibouti therefore lies on the Chinese New Silk Road’s maritime route. China uses development aid to construct schools, hospitals and sports facilities without any loans, and at the same time the military footprint grows. Djibouti now hosts the first Chinese military station outside of Asia and officially provides support for the Chinese fleet [7]. By providing stability for the country and region, China simultaneously supports its economic interest and creates a military ‘base camp’ for activities in East-Africa.

Beijing appears to be the number one partner for Africa; it avoids influencing domestic politics in Africa whilst gaining access to Africa’s resources, markets, and political support for China’s agenda at multilateral forums [8].

Djibouti is a hub for international actors from both Europe and Asia because it connects the Arab and African spheres. With several troops stationed on its soil (French, American, Chinese, German and Spanish), Djibouti will be given closer examination in following articles.

Sources:

[1] African Development Bank, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development,

United Nations Development Programme [ADB; OECD; UNDP] (2017): African Economic Outlook,

https://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Publications/AEO_2017_Report_Full_English.pdf,

in:

CSIS (2018): Is the United States Prepared for China to be Africa’s Main Business Partner?,

https://www.csis.org/analysis/united-states-prepared-china-be-africas-main-business-partner.

[2] Center for Strategic & International Studies (CSIS) 2018: Is the United States Prepared

for China to be Africa’s Main Business Partner?,

https://www.csis.org/analysis/united-states-prepared-china-be-africas-main-business-partner.

[3] International Center for Trade and Development [ICTSD] (2017): China’s Infrastructure

Development Strategy in Africa: Mutual Gain?, Yabin Wu, Xiao Bai,

Short URL: https://goo.gl/D6b4uS

[4] Brookings (2014): China’s Aid to Africa: Monster or Messiah?, by Yun Sun,

https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/chinas-aid-to-africa-monster-or-messiah/,

retreived 12.02.2018.

[5] Spiegel (2018): Geopolitical Laboratory, How Djibouti Became China's Gateway To Africa,

http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/djibouti-is-becoming-gateway-to-africa-for-china-a-1191441.html.

[6] ibid.

[7] ibid.

[8] Brookings (2014): China’s Aid to Africa: Monster or Messiah?, by Yun Sun,

https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/chinas-aid-to-africa-monster-or-messiah/,

retreived 12.02.2018.

Graphs:

AidData. 2017. Global Chinese Official Finance Dataset, Version 1.0. Retrieved from

http://aiddata.org/data/chinese-global-official-finance-dataset.

EU and Cyber Security: New Player against Emerging Threats in Cyberspace – Part One of Three

Transport, energy, health, and finance are the most vulnerable sectors exposed to cyber-threats. Issuing the EU Cybersecurity Strategy in 2013 was an important step forward in developing a common framework; however, the strategy lacked the practical initiatives that would deliver tangible outcomes.

By Rusudan Zabakhidze

In the past decade, cyber warfare has become an exceptional phenomenon that has increased the vulnerability of individuals, non-state actors, and state actors to unprecedented levels. Businesses and governments rely on networks to provide their services across the EU. However, the cyber threat vulnerability of the world’s second-largest economy remains unclear. This article provides an introduction to the EU’s strategic cyber security vision by critically analysing internal and external challenges in the implementation of the recently published cyber security strategy: “Resilience, Deterrence, and Defense: Building strong cybersecurity for the EU.”

In the case of a cyber offense, the victimised country is often hampered to find a proper response because of the ambiguity surrounding the nature and origin of the attack. Since the cyber-attacks against Estonia in 2007, there have been growing concerns over the possibility of election hacking by foreign states, ransomware attacks, and other cybercrime. According to the statistics provided by the European Commission, 80% of European companies experienced at least one cybersecurity incident in 2017 [1]. Correspondingly, 86% of Europeans believe that the cybercrime risks are increasing [2].

The European Union is working on completing the Digital Single Market which will further extend the “four freedoms” (movement, capital, goods, and labour) by providing the rules of fair competition for the individuals and businesses of the Member States to engage in online activities [3]. Therefore, the costs related to cyber attacks are only expected to increase, creating a need for the development of effective preventive mechanisms. Some Member States have already included Cybersecurity in their National Security Strategies. Yet, the ambition of creating the Digital Single Market coupled with the highly interdependent nature of the EU economy indicates a need for action on the collective European level, rather than the individual national levels.

Transport, energy, health, and finance are the most vulnerable sectors exposed to cyber-threats [4]. Issuing the EU Cybersecurity Strategy in 2013 was an important step forward in developing a common framework; however, the strategy lacked the practical initiatives that would deliver tangible outcomes [5]. Necessary resources, for example, are still up to each Member State to acquire. In September 2017, the European Commission proposed a wide range of concrete measures that aim to further strengthen the EU’s cyber defense structures and capabilities, entailing more cooperation between the Member States. The updated strategy, “Resilience, Deterrence, and Defense: Building strong cybersecurity for the EU,” revolves around three principles: building resilience, developing legislative responses, and strengthening international cooperation [6].

While the implementation of the proposed initiatives is a long-term process, the EU has already taken its first steps regarding the security of its own institutions. An inter-institutional arrangement established a permanent Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT-EU) covering all EU institutions, bodies, and agencies.

The European Commission has created the EU Cybersecurity Agency for Network and Information Security (ENISA). This agency coordinates cooperation among member states against cyberattacks. The EU has created a blueprint that guides incident responses for large-scale cyberattacks. An EU-wide certification scheme is also in consideration to increase the quality and security of digital products and services. The EU plans to support Research and Competence Centers and to set up a cyber defense training and education platform. The EU also aims to develop a framework for a Joint EU Diplomatic Response to Malicious Cyber Activities and to deepen cooperation with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) [7].

Even though the proposed initiatives cover a wide range of responses, there are a number of practical challenges that will significantly affect the speed, as well as the outcomes, of the mentioned initiatives. The EU has neither properly defined resilience or deterrence nor made sufficiently clear how it intends to overcome institutional fragmentation and lack of legal authority in cybersecurity issues [8]. Other tasks that lie ahead include finding consensus on what constitutes a cybercrime and building the capacities to trace the sources of attacks.

While updating the original cyber security strategy can be considered a positive step towards the EU’s increased resilience, the challenges posed by institutional fragmentation of the Union may hinder the implementation process. Ultimately, as the frequency and scale of cyberattacks increase, effective mechanisms are essential. Failure to implement the proposed initiatives will automatically result in the failure of the establishment of the Digital Single Market. Failure to adapt to the risks and realities of the 21st century could harm the EU’s credibility, and ultimately its viability, not only with its citizens, but worldwide.

Sources:

[1] European Commission. 2017. State of the Union. Cyber Security Factsheet. [online]

Available at: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/21480/cybersecurityfactsheet.pdf

[2] ibid

[3] European Commission. 2015. Shaping the Digital Single Market. [online]

Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/policies/shaping-digital-single-market

[4] Council of the European Union. 2017. Reform of the Cyber Security in Europe. [online]

Available at: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/cyber-security/

[5] European Commission and High Representative of the EU for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy.

2013. Cyber Security Strategy of the EU: An Open, Safe and Secure Cyberspace. [online]

Available at: https://eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/policies/eu-cyber-security/cybsec_comm_en.pdf

[6] European Commission. 2017.

State of the Union - Cybersecurity: Commission scales up EU's response to cyber-attacks.

[online] Available at: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-17-3193_en.htm

[7] European Commission. 2017. State of the Union. Cyber Security Factsheet. [online]

Available at: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/21480/cybersecurityfactsheet.pdf

[8] Bendiek, A, Bossong, R & Matthias Schulze. 2017. The EU’s Revised Cybersecurity Strategy.

German Institute for International and Security Affairs. [online]

Available at: https://www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/comments/2017C47_bdk_etal.pdf

Why the Department of Homeland Security has not been able to succeed in unifying the U.S. intelligence community

“The intelligence community within the United States is a chaotic, massive, bureaucratic nightmare. After the 9/11-attacks, the whole community IC was under the microscope and public dissatisfaction forced Congress to address the failure and shortcomings of the American intelligence. The Department of Homeland Security is the newest player, among seventeen intelligence agencies, whose intention was to unify the IC and foster cooperation.”

By Ashley Rebecca Donald-Tebbutt

Despite only opening its doors on March 1st, 2003 [1], Secretary Janet Napolitano admitted in 2010 that the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) was not functioning optimally and that there was great room for improvement [2]. Even in the DHS’s short-lived lifespan the hindrances of political ambition have become undeniable to those connected to the agency.

The intelligence community (IC) within the United States is a chaotic, massive, bureaucratic nightmare. After the 9/11-attacks, the whole IC was under the microscope and public dissatisfaction forced Congress to address the failure and shortcomings of the American IC. The DHS is the newest player, among seventeen intelligence agencies, whose intention was to unify the IC and foster cooperation [3]. The intentions behind the DHS were idealistic; its mission threefold: secure the homeland from the evolving threat of terrorism, bring common agencies into one organization to foster cooperation, and to have a primary agency that could promote communication and the sharing of resources within the IC and independent agencies [4].

The DHS upon creation amalgamated twenty-two existing agencies and became a bureaucratic giant [5]. The head of the new organization was supposed to be able to “access, receive, and analyze law enforcement information, intelligence information, and other information from the Federal government…”[6]. These resources were central to allow the DHS to function as intended. However, the political ambitions hindered the reforms that delivered the DHS and its continued functioning. During the reform and development of the DHS, fundamental agencies of the IC, such as the CIA and FBI, viewed the agency as a rival and did not support the centralization of the community fearing power loss and budget cutbacks [7]. As such, the CIA and FBI used their influence to prevent the DHS from having the ability to compel information from other agencies. Without the power to compel, the rivalry between agencies endured manifesting in a bureaucratic ‘turf war’ and ultimately restricting the effectiveness of the DHS [8].

It seems that the DHS has only added to the problem by adding another bureaucracy bidding for political influence and consumption of intelligence budget. With the political reforms that brought the DHS into reality, the inability to compel other intelligence agencies has resulted in a large number of redundancies across the IC. Despite the intentions of the DHS, the institution has been hampered in its inability to unite and foster a cohesive community. The blame for the DHS’s failure should not rest on the department but on the members of Congress that only provided the department with half the power it required to meet its full responsibilities. For the DHS to be able to achieve its primary intentions another series of political reforms are required; tragically those seem unlikely to occur until the U.S is faced with another attack on its national security.

Sources:

[1] “Creation of the Department of Homeland Security” Homeland Security. Last modified 09/24/2015. https://www.dhs.gov/creation-department-homeland-security

[2] “Quadrennial Homeland Security Review Report: A Strategic Framework for a Secure Homeland.”Department of Homeland Security. February 2010. pg. iv

[3] Thessin, Jonathan. “Department of Homeland Security Recent Developments.” Harvard Journal on Legislation 40, 2 (2003): pg 529

[4] “Homeland Security Act of 2002” Public Law 107-296 107th Congress.(November 25th, 2002)
[5] Cuellar, Mariano-florentino. Governing Security: The Hidden Origins of American Security Agencies. Stanford University Press: Stanford, (2013). pg. 126

[6] “Homeland Security Act of 2002” Public Law 107-296 107th Congress.(November 25th, 2002) pg. 12

[7] Thessin, Jonathan. “Department of Homeland Security Recent Developments.”

Harvard Journal on Legislation 40, 2 (2003). pg. 528

[8] Durbin, Brent.The CIA and the Politics of US Intelligence Reform.

Cambridge University Press: New York, (2017). Pg 38

The State of the European Energy Union

In an increasingly open and interconnected market, one of the most vital elements of the European Union (EU) common market project is lagging behind: energy. The European Energy Union is an ongoing project of the EU to create an open and interconnected energy market throughout the EU providing secure, affordable and climate-friendly energy.

By Dorien van Dam

In an increasingly open and interconnected market, one of the most vital elements of the European Union (EU) common market project is lagging behind: energy. The European Energy Union is an ongoing project of the EU to create an open and interconnected energy market throughout the EU providing secure, affordable and climate-friendly energy. The initiative was launched in 2014 and published its last progress report in November 2017 [1]. These reports monitor the advancement of the EU towards its 2020 and 2030 energy and climate targets. The reports repeatedly draw the same unsatisfactory conclusion: more work will be needed. So, what exactly is going wrong?

The road towards this Energy Union is outlined in a framework, and can be roughly divided into four pillars: (1) more interconnection, (2) higher energy efficiency, (3) higher share of renewable energy and (4) cuts in greenhouse gas emissions. Some countries, however, are struggling more with their targets than others.

As per the 2014 numbers of Eurostat, nine member states have already met their national renewable energy targets for 2020. The states that are the furthest away from reaching their targets are France, the Netherlands and Ireland [2]. Ironically, these are countries with relatively high GDP per capita within the EU. Irish officials argue that their progress towards the targets were hampered by slow recovery following the financial crisis. Ireland was however not disproportionately affected by the financial crisis;  it was a truly global crisis [3].

A possible explanation is that the four countries were not politically equipped to surpass the tragedy-of-the-commons problem. Renewable energy is a typical good that everyone wants but nobody wants to pay for. In the Netherlands, even after a sharp increase in ‘green’ voters during the 2017 election, the new government coalition agreement was exceptionally weak from an environmental perspective. The French system, on the other hand, is infamous for its layered bureaucracy with high amounts of red-tape. This system, in addition to a well-organized fossil fuel lobby are severely hindering the development of a green energy sector [4].

On a more positive note, the EU is expected to surpass their goals in cutting greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions by 1%. Even though this goal does not include ‘embedded emissions’: GHG emissions involved in the production of imported goods [5], it is still a hard-needed win for the EU in the realisation of their 2020 goals.

Another area where progress is being steadily observed is that of energy efficiency. Per capita energy consumption in the EU has decreased from 2007 to 2014. Yet, 2015 and 2016 witnessed small increases, likely due to cooler winters. This resulted in the repetition of the EU Energy mantra: “additional efforts may be needed.” Despite these cooler winters, the EU is the first economic bloc to decouple economic growth from energy consumption.

Finally, the EU has a range of projects on their way to increase energy interconnection. These projects, however, are facing their own geopolitical issues. To conclude, the EU has set out a structured path towards the creation of its Energy Union, but along the way it has had to face multiple political—and meteorological—realities. Most of the 2020 goals are legally binding targets, resulting in possibly hefty fines for the countries that fail to meet their targets. Yet it is doubtful that the European Court of Justice will accept a cold winter as a justification for a breach, but imposing fines when the EU is suffering from low levels of support might prove a politically risky move. All in all, 2020 will prove to be an interesting year, not just for the Energy Union, but for the wider European Union as well.

Sources:

[1] European Commission. 2018. Energy Union and Climate. [ONLINE]

Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/priorities/energy-union-and-climate_en.

[Accessed 3 March 2018].

[2] TheJournal.ie. 2017.

Ireland is expected to miss its EU renewables target - and cop a multimillion-euro bill.

[ONLINE]

Available at: http://www.thejournal.ie/ireland-eu-2020-energy-fines-2-3231942-Feb2017/. [Accessed 3 March 2018].

[3] Ibid.

[4] ICIS. 2017. ICIS Power Perspective: France likely to miss 2020 renewables target. [ONLINE]

Available at: https://www.icis.com/resources/news/2017/10/06/10149918/icis-power-perspective-france-likely-to-miss-2020-renewables-target/?redirect=english. [Accessed 3 March 2018].

[5] European Commission. 2018. Energy Union and Climate. [ONLINE]

Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/priorities/energy-union-and-climate_en. [Accessed 3 March 2018].

Swarming Technology is Changing Drone Warfare – Part One of Three

Swarming technology, therefore, represents a disruption in terms of the strategic status quo of warfare due to the low entry cost, the general trend towards more autonomous systems, and the onus of differentiation being placed on those being attacked.

By Caitlin Irvine

‘Swarm technology is nascent, and some have pegged it as the next significant drone innovation’ [1]. It allows a group of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) to complete an objective whilst coordinating with one another [2]. It is not pragmatic to ask one individual to monitor up to 250 UAVs so the operator delegates a task to the swarm and monitors the network that senses, communicates, and computes the surrounding environment [3]. Investment in this subset of independently operating systems has made the use of swarming technology in operational theatres a topical matter.

 The economic case for this new technology is clearly attractive as shown by the two major players investment in the field. The US Army’s funding for robotics for 2017-2021 has tripled to $900 million whilst China currently holds the world record for the largest swarm of drones collectively controlled at the Guangzhou Air show in 2017 [4]. The cost of a swarm relative to a harpoon missile (around $1.2 million) highlights that creating an entire swarm may be cheaper than building conventional defence systems [5]. Swarm technology has been developed primarily in small quadcopters because they are cheaper, easier to transport, and can be deployed in a shorter time than larger hardware such as the Predator B or MQ9-Reaper [6].

 Militarily, these small drone swarms provide several advantages in a built-up operational theatre where bottlenecks are common and buildings or trees can reduce the signal range. Quadcopters are adaptable simply because of their size – they are able to navigate through narrow urban terrain [7]. A swarm can also project further than an individual quadcopter; by placing members of the swarm at different points along the approach to an operational area they can act as relay stations back to the base station where the operator is [8].

 The issue surrounding swarms is how to defend against them. Their innovation causes a paradigm shift. Due to their ability to overwhelm and confuse traditional radar detection-based missile shields mass again becomes a decisive factor on the battlefield [9]. ‘A manned or unmanned aircraft can be brought down by a single missile, but a swarm can take multiple hits’; this places a military with a dilemma of how to respond to a swarm without looking like the aggressor [10]. Simply put, ‘there is lower costs for offense relative to the difficulty of defending against a swarm’ [11].

 Swarming technology therefore represents a disruption in terms of the strategic status quo of warfare due to the low entry cost, the general trend towards more autonomous systems, and the onus of differentiation being placed on those being attacked. Militaries are interested in developing and deploying swarm technology because of the cost-effective advantages it presents in urban environments and the difficulties of defending against such a system. Their use in contested areas could lead to a perpetual cycle of warfare given that the best way to respond to a swarm of UAVs is to deploy your own. The investment drone swarms have received from both civil and military entities shows that they are an important developmental step for the future conduct of warfare. However, the growing trend towards autonomous weapons is concerning primarily because of the lack of thought given to the knock-on effects of such weaponry. 

Sources:

[1] Sims, A (2018) ‘How do we thwart the latest terrorist threat: swarms of weaponised drones?’The Guardian

[online]

available at: https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2018/jan/19/terrorists-threat-weaponised-drones-swarm-civilian-military-syria accessed on 11th April 2018

[2] Hambling, D (2016) ‘Drone Swarms will change the face of modern warfare’, Wired

[online] available at: http://www.wired.co.uk/article/drone-swarms-change-warfare

Accessed 10th April 2018

[3] Lachow, I (2017) ‘The upside and downside of swarming drones’,

Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol 73:2, p96

[4] Ibid.

[5] Hambling, D (2016) ‘Drone Swarms will change the face of modern warfare’, Wired

[online] available at: http://www.wired.co.uk/article/drone-swarms-change-warfare

Accessed 10th April 2018

[6] Bürkle, A, Segor, F, and Kollman, M (2011) ‘Towards Autonomous Micro UAV Swarms’

Journal of Intelligent And Robotic Systems, Vol 61(1-4), p340

[7] Ibid.

[8] Hambling, D (2016) ‘Drone Swarms will change the face of modern warfare’, Wired

[online] available at: http://www.wired.co.uk/article/drone-swarms-change-warfare

Accessed 10th April 2018

[9] Feng, E and Clover, C (2017) ‘Drone swarms vs conventional arms: China’s military debate’,

The Financial Times [online] available at: https://www.ft.com/content/302fc14a-66ef-11e7-8526-7b38dcaef614

Accessed on 16th April 2017

[10] Hambling, D (2016) ‘Drone Swarms will change the face of modern warfare’, Wired

[online] available at: http://www.wired.co.uk/article/drone-swarms-change-warfare

Accessed 10th April 2018

[11] Kania, E (2017) ‘Swarms at war: Chinese advances in Swarm Intelligence’

The Jamestown Foundation: China Brief, Vol 17, Issue 9, p14

Author’s Further Reading

[1] Kumar, V (2015) ‘The Future of Flying Robots’, Ted Talks [online]

Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ge3--1hOm1s A

ccessed on 9th April 2018

[2] Boyle, MJ (2013) ‘The Costs and Consequences of Drone Warfare’

International Affairs, Vol 89: 1 (2013) pp1–29

[3] Nurkin, T (2016) ‘Unmanned ground vehicles: technology and market trends’

Jane’s Review [online]

available at: http://www.janes.com/article/61176/security-unmanned-ground-vehicles-technology-and-market-trends-es2016d1

Accessed on 10th April 2018

BIG WORLD, BIG DATA

The number of potential applications for the use of big data is immense. Initially intended as a private sector tool, big data is now finding its place within the realm of politics. Cambridge Analytica’s involvement in the Trump and Brexit campaigns has demonstrated the onset of a new era where big data may be used not only for population analysis, but also to influence the political views and preferences of the population as well.

By Yuliia Kondrushenko

The evolution of technology and the use of big data has forcefully shifted the balance of power relations within society. It is no longer the person who watches the algorithm, but rather the algorithm watching the person [2]. The main features of big data – volume, velocity, and variety – create a very appealing tool as it allows for the discernment of patterns and relationships that are not readily evident from the input data itself.

Big data is increasing “situational awareness” by recording trends that are taking place. This is often used by major supermarket chains such as Wal-Mart, which handles more than a million customer transactions every hour [4]. For example, customer buying behaviour records can demonstrate if the person is conservative, or if they are prone to shifting preferences based on prices, branding, and other factors. Nevertheless, one must be aware that big data can only show event correlation and cannot concretely explain causation.

Due to the corporate-centric nature of big data collection, this sector is where it will be deployed. Big data is an essential tool for detecting bank fraud; should a transaction deviate from the customer’s normal buying patterns, the bank is able to block the activity immediately [5]. But contrary to commercial application, deployment of big data analysis “for the public good” has not been widespread. One place big data could have been useful was the 2007 mortgage crisis in the United States, which began the world financial crisis of 2008. Had big data analysis been performed in relation to debt securities, the bubble may have been halted at its inception.

This is where the limitations of big data analysis become obvious though. The first issue is the amount of data available for algorithmic consumption. The predictive power of big data can only be strengthened by a “significant number of known instances of a particular behaviour” [6]. This means that while bank fraud is a common and well-researched problem with a distinguished pattern, unprecedented crises like the mortgage bubble are not easily predictable.

Another limitation comes from the creation of the algorithm itself. Consumption of an “example data” set creates the operation with the task of finding correlations in the data [7]. Data, which is separate from the example set, is then used to test the effectiveness of the resulting algorithm. This can sometimes create an algorithm that is efficient at forecasting based on the sample used to create it, but is still inadequate for classification of new test data.

While there is a significant risk of result politicization – where the data expert will find scenarios they were initially hoping to find – the fast expansion of available data sets and their dynamic nature makes big data analysis a very powerful tool for business and research.

Sources:

[1]Cárdenas, A., Manadhata, P. and Rajan, S. (2013). Big Data Analytics for Security Intelligence.

[ebook] Cloud Security Alliance, pp.1-22. Available at: https://cloudsecurityalliance.org/download/big-data-analytics-for-security-intelligence/

[2]Jani, K. (2016). The Promise and Prejudice of Big Data in Intelligence Community.

[ebook] Ithaca: The Computing Research Repository Journal, pp.1-19.

https://arxiv.org/abs/1610.08629

[3]Seifert, J. (2007). Data Mining and Homeland Security: An Overview.

Washington D.C.: Congressional Research Service, pp.1-29.

[4]Troester, M. (2012). Big Data Meets Big Data Analytics. [ebook] SAS Institute Inc., pp.1-11.

https://www.sas.com/content/dam/SAS/en_us/doc/whitepaper1/big-data-meets-big-data-analytics-105777.pdf

[5]Cárdenas, A., Manadhata, P. and Rajan, S. (2013). Big Data Analytics for Security Intelligence.

[ebook] Cloud Security Alliance, pp.1-22.

https://cloudsecurityalliance.org/download/big-data-analytics-for-security-intelligence/

[6]Seifert, J. (2007). Data Mining and Homeland Security: An Overview.

Washington D.C.: Congressional Research Service, pp.1-29.

[7]Jani, K. (2016). The Promise and Prejudice of Big Data in Intelligence Community.

[ebook] Ithaca: The Computing Research Repository Journal, pp.1-19. Available at: https://arxiv.org/abs/1610.08629

3D PRINTING AND NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION

The combination of innovation and digitalisation poses a threat to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) as the current institutional framework is targeted at objects, not information. The spread of technology does not fall under the jurisdiction of the NPT and is, due to its digital nature, hard to regulate.

By Caitlin Irvine

The political implications of the recent technological tsunami have yet to be fully explored. Additive Manufacturing (AM), the broader term for 3D printing is one such area as it is displaying the potential to alter the global nuclear balance. Although AM technology has been in use since the 1980s, investment in 3D printing has increased in the 21st century as the initial intellectual property rights expired [1].

After a non-profit organisation called Defence Distributed produced the Computer Aided Design files for a 3D printed handgun, the plans were downloaded over 100,000 times around the world before the cease and desist order came into effect [2]. Although currently it is not possible to use this technology to manufacture nuclear weapons due to the export controls on the maraging steel required for use in centrifuges, 3D printing represents a potential proliferation pathway [3]. The combination of innovation and digitalisation poses a threat to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) as the current institutional framework is targeted at objects, not information. The spread of technology does not fall under the jurisdiction of the NPT and is, due to its digital nature, hard to regulate.

The need for a regulatory framework, however, is urgent. In 2015, General Electric used a AM process called Direct Metal Laser Melting to produce a jet engine capable of 33,000 rotations per minute, similar to the requirements of a uranium-enriching centrifuge [4]. As 3D printing technology, expands in the aerospace industry it will develop a reputation for quality manufacturing; an example of this emerging trend is Raytheon, the U.S. defence contractor, who is attempting to use 3D printing technology to create components of a guided missile system that can be used for a nuclear warhead [5].

Policy must keep comfortable pace with technological advances. Even though AM is still an evolving technology, policy is seriously lagging behind. With no export controls or centralised manufacturing base for the AM industry, the technology is decentralised and open source – to such a degree that my flatmate built two 3D printers in his bedroom for his undergraduate dissertation. Presently, it is possible to almost completely build handguns, grenade launchers, drones, and even guided missiles [6]. Developments in AM technology are therefore likely to impact the system of global governance and non-proliferation because of the variety of products that can be produced. Especially since there is no way of knowing in what hands this knowledge will end up.

Sources:

[1] Kruth, JP, Leu, MC, and Nakagawa, T (1998) ‘Progress in Additive Manufacturing and Rapid Prototyping’,

CIRP Annals, Vol 47: 2, pp 52. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0007-8506(07)63240-5

[2] Morelle, R (2013) ‘US government orders removal of Defcad 3D-gun designs’ [online] BBC News

http://www.bbc.com/news/technology-22478310

[3] Christopher, G 2015, '3D Printing: A Challenge to Nuclear Export Controls'

Strategic Trade Review, vol 1, no. 1, 2, pp. 22.http://www.str.ulg.ac/3D_Printing_A_Challenge

[4] GEreports (2015) ‘The 3D Printed Jet Engine’, YouTube

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=W6A4-AKICQU

[5] Raytheon (2017) ‘To Print a Missile: Raytheon research points to 3-D printing for tomorrow's technology’

[online] https://www.raytheon.com/news/feature/print-missile

[6] Fey, M (2017) ‘The Increasing Salience of 3D Printing for Nuclear Non-Proliferation’ [online],

Peace Research Institute Frankfurt Blog, https://blog.prif.org/