What Does Iran’s Threatened Withdrawal from the 2015 Nuclear Agreement Mean for US-Iranian Tensions?

What Does Iran’s Threatened Withdrawal from the 2015 Nuclear Agreement Mean for US-Iranian Tensions?

Iranian President Hassan Rouhani announced that Iran will begin to reduce its compliance with the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) if the remaining members observing the deal fail to ease the weight of U.S. sanctions. European efforts to circumvent U.S. sanctions have thus far rendered insufficient results due to the overwhelming economic pressure of the U.S. measures. Europe’s apparent rejection of the withdrawal suggests that the European members are not convinced that Iran will follow-through with its threatened action. Iran’s tensions with the U.S., however, will ostensibly continue to escalate.

The Dormant Stage of the Chechen Insurgency and The Challenges It Poses to the Pro-Russian Chechen Regime

“Following the end of the Russian military operations in 2008, Chechnya has experienced a period of economic recession and consistent low-level political violence perpetrated by Jihadist and separatist insurgent movements. The brutal Counterinsurgency operations carried out by the Chechen security forces inflicted severe casualties on the rebels but antagonised large segments of the local population. A sudden decline in the regime’s capacity to enforce law and order could arouse the dormant Chechen insurgency and drive the little republic towards a new, bloody civil war.

by Roberto Colombo

In February 2008, Russian President Vladimir Putin announced the end of the Russian military operations in the Republic of Chechnya. Promising the return of peace and stability in the troubled region, Putin asserted in front of the Russian State Council that, starting from early 2004, the Russian armed forces operating in conjunction with the Chechen government’s paramilitary units successfully inflicted a ‘decisive and crushing blow’ to the Chechen rebels [1]. Welcomed with enthusiasm by the Russian population, the end of the Russian Counterinsurgency (COIN) operations and the institution of a competent pro-Russian indigenous COIN force were supposed to mark the conclusion of a military engagement that, since August 1999, claimed the lives of more than 10,000 Russian soldiers and 30,000 Chechen civilians (according to Russian official estimates) [2] [3]. Despite Putin’s speech describing the Chechen conflict as resolved, scholars and journalists challenged the Kremlin’s optimistic viewpoint. ‘It is a fairy tale that Chechnya has become a stable region,’ stated the editor of the Caucasian Knot website, Grigory Shvedov, a few days after the declaration, noting that clashes between insurgents and security forces continued to occur on a daily-basis in spite of the Chechen regime’s heightened COIN capabilities [4]. Although the pro-Russian government headed by Ramzan Kadyrov since May 2004 forced the insurgency to assume a ‘dormant’ configuration characterised by a low-level frequency of violent attacks, it only did so by implementing brutal COIN measures that alienated the civilian population and exacerbated the local communities’ hostility towards the official authorities [5]. Notwithstanding the decrease in their operational efficacy, the insurgents have not been dissuaded from attempting to unsettle the status quo through the use of terrorism, political assassinations, and low-level guerrilla warfare [6]. Should the regime’s capability of enforcing law and order be weakened or challenged, the dormant Chechen insurgency could swiftly gain momentum by mobilising the populace against the pro-Russian government and triggering an escalatory cycle of retaliatory violence between civilian population and security forces [7].

Ironically, the paramilitary forces that allowed the pro-Russian regime to quell the insurgency might also be the catalyst for a new wave of violence throughout the region. Realising that the deployment of Chechen natives would have significantly assisted the Russian military forces in isolating and neutralising the insurgents, Moscow in 2000 supported the establishment of the kadyrovtsy, a pro-Russian indigenous paramilitary group named after Chechnya’s ruling family – the Kadyrov clan [8]. Against a backdrop of judicial impunity, the kadyrovtsy resorted to collective punishments against the insurgents’ relatives, including threats, beatings, rapes, torture, and executions, to force the insurgents to lay down their weapons and deter the population from providing assistance to the rebels [9]. Because of their experience as former insurgents, their loyalty to the incumbents, their access to high-quality information, and their inclination to target innocent civilians, the kadyrovtsy proficiently contained the insurgency and effectively coerced the civilian population into submission [10]. Nevertheless, the kadyrovtsy’s draconian techniques exacerbated the society’s polarisation and deeply antagonised the civilian population. Many Chechens are ‘in a state of postponed blood feud toward Kadyrov, his clan, and the kadyrovtsy and are waiting for ‘a propitious time to commence violence’ [11]. As long as Kadyrov is able to control and direct his paramilitary units against the insurgents and their supporters, the kadyrovtsy will continue to constitute a formidable COIN force. But because the Kremlin retains the authority to appoint and dismiss the leaders of any autonomous republic of the North Caucasus Federal District (NCFD), Kadyrov’s supremacy is dependent on Moscow’s volition. If deprived of their leader’s guidance and the government’s patronage, the kadyrovtsy would lose their organizational and operational efficacy, exposing themselves to the populations’ retaliatory strikes [12]. Such a tense and unpredictable socio-political landscape is particularly suited to trigger large-scale collective violent outbreaks. Consequently, the Chechen insurgency could easily capitalise on the population’s grievances and swiftly turn from dormant to rampant. In other words, the repressed Chechen population is likely to retaliate against the security forces and join the insurgency in large numbers as soon as the regime’s capability to subdue the local communities and suppress the insurgents wanes [13].
As mentioned, the dormant Chechen insurgency might also reawaken if the relationship between Grozny, the capital of Chechnya, and Moscow deteriorates to the point of endangering the Chechen political establishment’s survival. Since 2004, Chechnya has been ruled by a leader fully loyal to Putin and anxious to demonstrate his allegiance to the Russian Federation. As a reward for his ability to quell the insurgency, Kadyrov enjoys Putin’s personal support and is afforded the freedom to ‘treat Chechnya as his personal fiefdom’ [14]. However, the Chechen leader’s political hegemony is subject to significant restrictions. Despite Kadyrov behaving like a monarch and his political power steadily growing, his dominion over Chechnya cannot be secured without Moscow’s direct approval. Therefore, Kadyrov’s position might drastically change overnight if Moscow decides to dispossess the Chechen leadership of its official federal endorsement [15]. Currently, the strongest opposition to Kadyrov’s rule is represented by the Russian siloviki – politicians that previously served within Russian military, security, and law enforcement agencies [16]. Many among the siloviki consider the presence of an ambitious warlord dominating a small Russian region and disposing of a large personal elite force as a serious threat to the federal government’s authority [17]. At the moment, Putin’s patronage prevents the siloviki from taking actions against Kadyrov and undermining the Chechen leadership’s legitimacy. Nevertheless, a significant weakening of the Chechen regime’s political power cannot be ruled out from the possible outcomes of an increasingly tense relationship between Grozny and Moscow. Although Chechnya exhibits lower levels of political violence in comparison to other areas of the NCFD, the situation on the ground remains highly volatile [18]. If the regime is deprived of Moscow’s endorsement or loses its ability to confront the insurgents, the Chechen population would be able to massively engage in politically-motivated violence and revitalise an insurgency that, until now, seemed to have been patiently waiting for favourable conditions to arise once again.

Sources:

[1] Putin, V (2008) ‘Speech at Expanded Meeting of the State Council on Russia’s Development Strategy through to 2020.’ [online] available from: http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/24825. Accessed on 12th May 2019.

[2] ‘Chechen Official Puts Death Toll for 2 Wars at Up to 160,000,’ (2005) New York Time, 16th August [online] available from https://www.nytimes.com/2005/08/16/world/europe/chechen-official-puts-death-toll-for-2-wars-at-up-to-160000.html. Accessed on 12th May 2019.

[3] Department of Justice (Russia) ‘Armed Conflict Report: Russia (Chechnya) (1999-First Combat Deaths in Current Phase,’ January 2019 [online] available from: https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/eoir/legacy/2014/02/25/Russia.pdf. Accessed on 12th May 2019.

[4] Schwirtz, M (2009) ‘Russia Ends Operations in Chechnya,’ New York Times, 16th April [online] available from: https://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/17/world/europe/17chechnya.html. Accessed on 12th May 2019.

[5] Halbach, U (2018) ‘Chechnya’s Status Within the Russian Federation,’ German Institute for International and Security Studies, SWP Research Paper, p. 5.

[6] Blank, S & Kim, Y (2016) ‘The North Caucasus: Russia’s Other War,’ The Journal of Slavic Military Studies, Vol. 29, No. 2, p.187.

[7]Souleimanov, E; Abbasov, N; Siroky, D (2019) ‘Frankenstein in Grozny: Vertical and Horizontal Cracks in the Foundation of Kadyrov’s Rule,’ Asia Europe Journal, Vol. 17, p. 87.

[8] Souleimanov, E (2017) ‘A Failed Revolt? Assessing the Viability of the North Caucasus Insurgency,’ The Journal of Slavic Military Studies, Vol. 30, No. 2, p. 219. & Souleimanov, E; Aliyev, H (2017) How Socio-Cultural Codes Shaped Violent Mobilisation, Palgrave, p. 39.

[9] Ratelle, J & Souleimanov, E (2016) ‘A Perfect Counterinsurgency? Making Sense of Moscow’s Policy of Chechenisation,’ Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 68, No. 8, p. 1298.

[10] Souleimanov, E & Aliyev, H (2016) ‘Evaluating the Efficacy of Indigenous Forces in Counterinsurgency: Lessons from Chechnya and Dagestan,’ Small Wars & Insurgencies, Vol. 27, No. 3, p. 394.

[11] Souleimanov; Abbasov; Siroky, p. 95.

[12] Ratelle & Souleimanov, p. 1308.

[13] Souleimanov, p. 222.

[14] Halbach, p. 13.

[15] Ratelle & Souleimanov, p. 1304.

[16] Taylor, B (2017) ‘The Russian Siloviki & Political Change,’ American Academy for Arts & Sciences, Vol. 146, No. 2, p. 53.

[17] Souleimanov, E (2015) ‘An Ethnography of Counterinsurgency: Kadyrovtsy and Russia’s Policy of Chechenisation,’ Post-Soviet Affairs, Vol. 31, No. 2, p. 107.

[18] Dannreuther, R (2014) ‘Shifting Dynamics of the Insurgency and Counter-Insurgency in the North Caucasus,’ Ethnopolitics, Vol. 13, No. 4, p- 378.

The Politics of Food in Venezuela: Maduro, Military, and Malnutrition

‘’The build up of tensions in Venezuela has led the country to a breaking point: self-appointed interim president Guaidó has called for the military to defect and support him to topple the sitting Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro at the end of April. This decision is not free from risk, especially since Guaidó’s diplomatic immunity has been revoked by the Maduro regime. Though the decision and its stakes highlight the key player in Venezuelan society: the military.’’

by Marijn Pronk

Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro has put top military personnel in power positions of nationalized industries, such as oil, in order to secure his power. Hugo Chávez, the president that preceded Maduro, had the same tactic by appointing lawmakers in support of the regime in high political positions in the National Assembly as well as the Supreme Court [1]. It is indeed primarily support of the military, not the citizen’s support, that keeps Maduro in power [2]. Maduro has never been as charismatic and popular as his predecessor Chávez, and after the contested results of the election in January that granted Maduro another term his popularity among the Venezuelan population and other political parties in Venezuela collapsed in favour of President of the National Assembly of Venezuela Juan Guaidó [3].  

These political tactics caused the military to be rooted in politics and economics, thus making  senior military officers key players in Venezuelan society. While in any case this entrenchment is detrimental to democracy, Maduro’s decision in 2016 to make the military in charge of the distribution of food paints an obvious picture of the lengths the regime was having to go to to stay in power. In order to centralize power, food is used as a tool to keep top military personnel on Maduro’s side [4]. With the economy crippled and the enormous inflation, food has become a more powerful tool to

The politicisation of food is noticeable in the distribution of so-called CLAP packages, which are committees that distribute food locally, now under the supervision of the military. However, there is a disparity between the distribution of food; areas which overall support the Maduro regime receive more food packages compared to dissident areas which systematically get less packages [5]. In order to receive CLAP packages, the Maduro regime has installed a system of federally issued cards (Carnet de la Patria) that you need in order to access various social programs, including CLAP benefits [6]. Hence opposing the regime will be made harder, due to the population’s dependency on social programs and basic resources. These methods are typically associated with of autocratic rule in a country, e.g. Mao Zedong’s Great Leap Forward, which includes a strong governmental focus on centralised, industrial, economy. With these tactics, Maduro weaponizes social safety nets to centralise control.

The scarcity of resources in Venezuela has made food trade especially profitable, with corruption by military and non-military personnel in the food business surging. Certain members of so-called Colectivos (paramilitary groups that are supported by the Maduro regime), have already noted that the illegal trafficking of food and medicine have become more profitable than the drug trade, without carrying as much risk as the latter does [7].

Guaidó’s adamant pressure on the military to defect from Maduro’s side is a sign of their importance in the resistance movement, but the slowly growing number of military dissidents also show that the military personnel see that the situation cannot hold any longer. The ‘food business’ is profitable and grants a relatively stable influx of resources to military families. Deserting from this safety net means uncertainty and a possible chance of prosecution by the Maduro regime.

The above underlines the gravity of the decision to leave such a privileged situation. With the country in despair, the military personnel see that there is no ‘good’ option, neither staying on the side of Maduro nor defecting will guarantee long-term stability. Combined with an increasing diplomatic and economic pressure from outside, the world media watching every step, and  growing incidents of national protest, the powerful military leaders are feeling the country reaching a boiling point.

Since Guaidó admits he does not have enough military defectors to topple Maduro’s regime, he might be more inclined to ask for foreign military assistance [8]. If the international community wants to avoid military intervention, pressure points of the Venezuelan military need to be addressed. The majority of CLAP packages are imported from Mexico of which over 80% are being handled by the military. The pressure put on this program through the Mexican export of those packages to the military might be the final push the military needs to defect from Maduro if the guarantee of food is obstructed [6][9]. However, careful deliberation between international actors is necessary to start putting pressure on the CLAP program, which also supports the Venezuelan population.

The aforementioned trade-off, between risking personal security by defecting or remaining loyal in spite of domestic and international pressure, is one domestic actors in the Venezuelan crisis have to make, whether Venezuelan population or the Venezuelan military. Both national and international actors have to choose between actively pursuing Maduro’s toppling with all the risks that choice carries, or accepting the status quo. Venezuela’s situation has rendered the options extremely limited, with some arguing no option is more preferable than the next. The words ‘uncertainty’ and ‘disastrous’ will be attributed to the Venezuelan policy future. The question that remains is: to whom will those criticisms be directed?

Sources:

[1] “Tightening the Grip | Concentration and Abuse of Power in Chávez's Venezuela.” Human Rights Watch, 17 July 2012, www.hrw.org/report/2012/07/17/tightening-grip/concentration-and-abuse-power-chavezs-venezuela.

[2] "Removing Maduro; Venezuela." The Economist, 26 Jan. 2019, p. 10(US). Expanded Academic ASAP, Accessed 8 May 2019. http://link.galegroup.com/apps/doc/A570872240/EAIM?u=glasuni&sid=EAIM&xid=804c08d3.

[3] Corrales, Javier. ‘’How to tackle Venezuela’s military problem’’. The New York Times. 4 March 2019. Accessed May 14, 2019.

[4] AP News Agency. Venezuela military controls food as nation goes hungry.1 January 2017. Accessed April 8, 2019. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/01/venezuela-military-controls-food-nation-hungry-170101195414433.html.

[5] Martínez, Eugenio. The opposition is the next objective of social control of Chavism in Venezuela.21 December 2017. Accessed April 18, 2019.https://www.diariolasamericas.com/america-latina/la-oposicion-es-el-proximo-objetivo-del-control-social-del-chavismo-venezuela-n4139849.

[6] Rendon, Moises. “The Maduro Diet: Food v. Freedom in Venezuela.” CSIS.9 July 2018. Accessed April 7, 2019. https://www.csis.org/analysis/maduro-diet-food-v-freedom-venezuela.

[7] Unidad Investigativa de Venezuela. La delegación del poder estatal: Los “colectivos”.18 May 2018. Accessed April 9, 2019. https://es.insightcrime.org/investigaciones/la-delegacion-del-poder-estatal-los-colectivos.

[8] Berlinger, Joshua. "As Guaido Admits He Needs More Military Support, Trump Warns of Worse to Come in Venezuela." CNN. May 02, 2019. Accessed May 08, 2019. https://edition.cnn.com/2019/05/02/americas/venezuela-maduro-guaido-intl/index.html.

[9] Schemidt, Ronaldo. "A Un Año De Los CLAP Se Entregan Bolsas Incompletas Y Con Menos Kilos." El Interes. March 12, 2017. Accessed May 08, 2019. http://elestimulo.com/elinteres/a-un-ano-de-los-clap-se-entregan-bolsas-incompletas-y-con-menos-kilos/.

An introduction to Men’s Rights Activists (MRAs)

The re-emergence of men’s rights activists (MRAs) in social and political contexts in recent years has posed new threats regarding national and international security. Through the utilisation of the internet to further their ideology, develop a community, and radicalise others these threats are increasing. Therefore, in order to understand the legitimacy of the threat posed by MRAs, it is essential to explore their origins.

by Heather McDonald

Groups associated with the far-right have historically held misogynist, anti-feminist, and sexist views and for contemporary far-right groups, this has been no different. However, for many modern-day far-right groups, these values and opinions are no longer a “result of their wider political outlook but rather a central pillar to their ideology” [1]. Nowadays, certain sections of the far-right are heavily driven by anti-feminist ideologies resulting in the emergence and development of male supremacy groups such as ‘Proud Boys’ and ‘Return of Kings’ as extensions of the far-right ideology.

The existence of men’s rights groups in society is nothing new, however, the aims and methods adopted by these groups have changed and evolved over time. As a reaction to second-wave feminism in the 1970s, the ‘men’s liberation’ movement formed in order to provide a critical understanding of the conventions of masculinity [2]. Similarly to the feminist movement the original men’s liberation movement aimed to address the stereotypes and conditions that affected men and masculinity in the social, cultural, and political context. From here the men’s liberation movement split into two factions: those who were pro- and those who were anti-feminist [3]. With each side of this original ideological movement basing their position mainly on the debate surrounding the concept of male privilege and the ways in which male entitlement adversely impacted women globally. Members of the men’s liberation movement who aligned with feminist principles established themselves around topics ranging from male circumcision to child custody. Similarly, this faction also aimed to debate and question the normalised patriarchal standards throughout society deemed detrimental to all genders. This faction supported the idea that gender stereotypes had created harmful circumstances within society for both men and women. However, those affiliated with the anti-feminist approach went on to re-establish themselves as ‘men’s rights activists’ (MRAs). Operating under the belief that “they are victims of oppressive feminism, an ideology which must be overthrown often through violence” [4]. For these individuals gender stereotypes were a positive thing in society and the reduction of them and breaking down of barriers was detrimental to men and masculinity.

Men’s Rights Activists reflect an ideology and global movement which set out to to question and stall women’s gains at all levels [5], believing these gains have been awarded at the expense of men. Sub-groups operating under the same beliefs as MRAs perceive the social, cultural, and political opportunities afforded by the feminist movement as threats to their existence which must be revoked. MRAs hold the belief that feminism, and therefore gender equality, has ‘gone too far’ and in turn harmed men deeply [6]. Certain subgroups such as the ‘Involuntary Celibate’ (incels) who believe sexual relationships are a human right they have been deprived of because of the normalisation of gender equality and global feminism, have called for a ‘gender revolt’ in the hopes of reclaiming a type of manhood rich in “male and white superiority” [7].

As a result of social movements on behalf of women’s rights, anti-racism and LGBTQ+ rights, the power and dominance afforded to ‘white men’ in society are increasingly being challenged [8]. The level of powerlessness felt by these men, particularly those operating within the far-right ideology, is now leading to defensive actions. Contemporary MRAs have utilised the internet in order to develop and spread their ideology whilst also recruiting and radicalising new members. This utilisation has occurred through forums, posting videos explaining their own personal grievances on YouTube, and meme making. Essentially the internet has provided MRAs with a place to evolve their ideology and gain a sense of community and normalisation  of their opinions. Yet we are now increasingly witnessing MRAs actions emerging increasingly offline through protests, marches, and extreme acts of violence on areas populated by women. For example the Toronto Van Attack of 2018 when Alek Minassian ploughed a van into crowds of shoppers deliberately targeting women and in turn killing 10 individuals and injuring a further 16.

Fully understanding MRAs and the inclination by some of them to resort to violence in order to achieve their ideological goals is extremely complex. MRAs do not differ from any other extremist groups in that there are specific subgroups and individuals who will feel more inclined than others to turn to violence. To say that all MRAs are inherently violent extremists would simply be wrong, however, as we witness additional attacks inspired by the male supremacy ideology and other non-MRA far-right terrorist attacks referencing male supremacy, the level of threat MRAs and male supremacy pose to national and international security cannot be shied away from by policymakers and law enforcement agencies alike.

Sources:

[1] Murdoch, S. (2018). ‘Societal Misogyny and the Manosphere Understanding the UK Anti-Feminist Movement’ in Lowles, N. (ed), State of Hate 2019: People vs the Elite? (pp. 38-41), London: Hope Not Hate.

[2] Ging, D. (2017). Alphas, Betas, and Incels. Men and Masculinities, pp.1097184X1770640.

[3] Messner, M. A. 2016. “Forks in the Road of Men’s Gender Politics: Men’s Rights vs Feminist Allies.” International Journal for Crime, Justice and Social Democracy 5:6–20

[4] Zimmerman, Shannon, Lusia Ryan, and David Duriesmith “Who are Incels? Recognising the Violent Extremist Ideology”, Women in International Security (2018) : 1-5 Research Gate

[5] Palmer and Subramaniam, 2018

[6] Allan, J. (2016). Phallic Affect, or Why Men's Rights Activists Have Feelings. Men and Masculinities, 19(1), pp.22-41.

[7] Zimmerman, Shannon, Lusia Ryan, and David Duriesmith “Who are Incels? Recognising the Violent Extremist Ideology”, Women in International Security (2018) : 1-5 Research Gate

[8] Marwick, A and Rebecca Lewis. (2017) Media Manipulation and Disinformation Online. New York: Data & Society Research Institute.

Ethics and Hybrid War

Hybrid War is emerging as a new form of warfare which military doctrines are struggling to adjust to. Its combination of conventional and non-conventional threats blur the distinctions between civilian and combatant, and between peace and war. This increasingly complex and ambiguous environment presents operational challenges, but also ethical ones.

by Keir Watt

Since Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014, the term Hybrid War has become the latest buzzword for military experts explaining advancements in warfare. The central idea of Hybrid Warfare is that conflicts are evolving to include a ‘hybrid’ mix of conventional and non-conventional threats which are challenging current preconceptions of war. The inter-state wars of the past century centred around conventional warfare are being replaced by conflicts in which “there is no clear-cut distinction between soldiers and civilians and between organised violence, terror, crime, and war.“[i] This more complex strategic environment poses operational challenges to militaries, but also raises new ethical dilemmas.

According to Just War Theory, war must have a just cause; principally, in self-defence and the defence of innocents [ii]. War must also be carried out with just means; this asserts that there are certain constraints on conduct in war. Primarily, this excludes civilians from being targets of violence, but also advocates proportionality to limit the destructiveness of war. Throughout history these ethical principles have been applied inconsistently, but have to a great extent formed the basis for international norms and laws of war today.

Hybrid War undermines the distinction between combatants and civilians by deliberately placing irregular troops within civilian areas. Any opposing force consequently faces a choice between retreat or targeting enemies with a high chance of killing civilians. During the 2006 Lebanon War, Hezbollah exploited this by stationing rockets within holy sites and schools to ensure Israeli airstrikes would inflict civilian casualties; Hezbollah subsequently used this to “intensify support for its ideology and recruitment” through its strategic use of media.[iii] If states and non-state actors continue to use hybrid warfare, wars will inevitably become less humane as civilians are exploited within the battlespace. Ironically, this tactic only remains effective when the opposing force continues to follow the established ethical norms of warfare. The biggest danger would arise, however, if the imperative of the just cause became so great that it overruled concerns for conducting the war within normal ethical limits at all.

As the concept of Hybrid War expands to include factors like crime, dis-information operations, and cyber hacking, the distinction between combatant and non-combatant could also become blurred in ways not yet encountered. When war becomes more interdisciplinary determining who can be lawfully killed becomes more ambiguous. Cyber-hackers could appear as civilians operating far outside the battlespace, attacking opponents with relative impunity. In this context Hybrid War not only makes it hard to determine an appropriate use of force, but also threatens to expand the battlespace globally.

Perhaps the most concerning aspect of Hybrid War is its ability to blur the boundaries between peace and war itself. Hybrid adversaries can attack in ways which make it hard to respond as we struggle to decide whether a military or non-military measure is required. This aspect remains contested as some hybrid war theorists like Frank Hoffman assert that this style of behaviour is better described as “political warfare” or “active measures” rather than true Hybrid War. Debating if the Hybrid War concept should encompass these measures will become immaterial, however, if politicians and military planners nonetheless continue to consider them to be part of war.

As Hybrid War makes acts of war and peace indistinguishable to decision makers, determining when there is a just cause for war will consequently become either impossible or meaningless. Leaders will be faced with the possibility of escalating a conflict unnecessarily or reacting too late to real dangers; consequently allowing aggressors to gradually increase their position unchecked. U.S. policy during the Cold War faced a similar dilemma.  Because it recognised “few intermediate points between total war and total peace” it struggled to address Soviet belligerency which fell somewhere in-between.[iv] Writing in 1957, Henry Kissinger bemoaned that this over-emphasis on total war failed to address the most likely security problem: “the attempt by the Soviet leaders to upset the strategic balance, not at one blow, but piecemeal.”[v]

Despite its apparent novelty, wars have involved hybrid threats throughout history.  European powers often used irregular troops to exploit civilians in the 17th and 18th centuries[vi]. The use of information, technological sabotage, and psychological operations was also as common during the Cold War as it is today. Addressing the moral conundrums these emerging technologies and tactics present has likewise persisted through history:  U.S. policy in the Cold War illustrates that determining a just cause in an ambiguous strategic environment is not a predicament unique to today’s Hybrid Wars.

In the past, deciding legitimate forms of warfare was settled through international treaties; guided as much by political expediency as moral principles. The 1907 Hague Regulations which criminalised irregular warfare, ostensibly to make war more humane, also did so because it suited the dominant European powers whose armies had suffered brutally against irregular militias in the previous century.[vii] Whilst history does not provide a perfect lesson for the ethical implications of Hybrid War, it does suggest they can be resolved through political agreements. Unfortunately, this means ethical interpretations may remain dependent upon political considerations as much as guiding them. Harmonising military doctrine with ethics has been an enduring quest throughout the history of armed conflict. Hybrid War is not the first challenge overcome, but the new threats and ambiguity it creates may make us assess our moral principles in ways not yet encountered.

Sources:

[i] Hoffman, F.G., 2007. Conflict in the 21st Century: The Rise of Hybrid Wars. Arlington, V.A.: The Potomac Institute for Policy Studies, p.11.

[ii]] Aquinas, T. 1911. The “Summa theologica” of St Thomas Aquinas/ literally translated by Fathers of the English Dominican Province. London: T.Baker, Ps.81:4.

[iii]Kreps, S.E., 2007. The 2006 Lebanon War: Lessons Learned. Parameters, (spring), p.72.

[iv] Kissinger, H., 1957. Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy. New York: Harper & Brothers, p.11.

[v] Kissinger, 1957, p.28.

[vi Bobbitt, P., 2008. Terror and Consent: The Wars for the Twenty-First Century. London: Penguin Books, p.35; See also Scheipers, S., 2014. ‘Unlawful Combatants:’ The West’s Treatment of Irregular Fighters in the ‘War on Terror’. Orbis, 58(4), pp.517-571; Heauser, B., 2010. Small Wars in the Age of Clausewitz: The Watershed Between Partisan War and People’s War. Journal of Strategic Studies, 3391), p.142

[vii] Watkin, K., 2005. Warriors Without Rights? Combatants, Unprivileged Belligerents, and the Struggle Over Legitimacy. Harvard University Program on Humanitarian Policy and Conflict Research Occasional Papers, (Winter), p.20.

The Influence of Big Data in the Intelligence Cycle

Big Data entails innovative technological progress to the intelligence cycle as it strengthens the collection stage, introduces the correlational analysis method, and facilitates the dissemination of data to the final consumers. However, Big Data also presents some challenges and risks as human consciousness and expert participation remains essential to ensure the intelligence cycle’s effectiveness.

by Alejandra Bringas Colmenarejo

The inclusion of Big Data (BD) in the intelligence cycle has entailed a great advance since it introduced objective and quantitative methods in a discipline highly characterised by its subjectivity. In this sense, BD attempts to reduce intelligence uncertainty through the collection of a huge volume of data and the identification of hidden correlations unobservable in smaller samples. However, while BD is a beneficial technological advance of the intelligence cycle, it also leads to deep controversy given that policymakers may be tempted to replace the expert knowledge and the intelligence analysis with raw BD assets and correlations [1].

BD “represents the Information assets characterized by such a High Volume, Velocity and Variety to require specific Technology and Analytical Methods for its transformation into value” [2]. Consequently, BD is defined by the extremely large quantity of information collected in real-time and in continuous flows. Such information includes structured and unstructured data, traditional processed numeric and text databases, as well as unprocessed formats like images, audios, videos, tweets, emails and more [3]. Furthermore, BD also entails the necessary technologies to collect, manipulate, compare and analyse the collected bulk data and transform it into a reasoned intelligence assessment [4].

The inclusion of BD in the intelligence cycle has several challenges since it surpassed information, knowledge, casualty and context to centre the focus of attention on correlations [5]. Once its veracity and validity have been determined, the data collected from different sources is analysed to predict, determine or even prevent future scenarios, actions and behaviours [6]. Consequently, BD intelligence analysis is “the process of examining and interrogating Big Data assets to derive insights of value for decision making in a quasi-immediate response” [7]. However, this intelligence progress entails some risks and challenges since the increasing dependence on gathering technologies, as well as the enormous quantity of data collected, could result in a sense of overconfidence in technologies and a refusal of human capabilities.

Regarding intelligence collection, BD improves the inductive approach that attempts to recognize long-term trends, patterns and anomalies [8]. Different algorithms and informatics tools enable the automatization of collection, storage, management and transmission of data. This automatization decreases the dependence from manual processes and facilitates the continuous flows of data, [9] which strengthens the analysts’ capabilities to discover intelligence gaps or unusual behaviours. However, to avoid a paralysation of the intelligence process it is essential that the algorithms used are effective in selecting valid and useful data from the vast raw data collected [10].

BD also allows intelligence analysts to generate and refute hypotheses. BD analysis appears to be quite inductive since it refers to past events and historical patterns to causally respond to the question of ‘what is happening’. However, the value of BD lies in the correlation and the identification of hidden events and circumstances so that realities which may not be evident or observable become available to the intelligence analyst. Consequently, filtering valid information from the massive quantity of data allows analysts to support their speculations with facts or to deny a previously confirmed hypothesis [11]. The quick and real-time collection, as well as the long-term storage of data, provides analysts with the necessary evidence to develop informed and predictive intelligence hypotheses. In spite of that, the BD correlation process could also result in the identification of patterns and realities that extrapolated from their specific context are completely useless or coincidental. Consequently, intelligence agents should carefully use BD correlations as without the appropriate expertise analysis they could lead to irrelevant events or unconnected behaviours [12].

Despite the massive volume of data gathered by the intelligence actors, some information remains unknown and excluded from the correlation process because of its secrecy or its restricted access. In this context, non-state data collectors, such as social media platforms, marketing agencies or companies collect and store information that can be bought by the intelligence actors to fulfil the information gap. Nevertheless, the veracity and accuracy of this information remains dependent on the initial collectors [13]. As a result, data provided by private actors could involuntarily impact the effectiveness of the intelligence process or maliciously corrupt, manipulate and counterfeit the reality to deliberately influence the final intelligence assessment [14].

In this manner, BD remains dependent on human capabilities because it still lacks creativity, consciousness and judgement to contextualize new correlations within a broader analytical framework [15]. The limitations of BD should be understood completely in order to avoid misinterpretations and misunderstandings of reality. BD needs expert analysts who are able to identify mere coincidences and consider the unpredictable behaviour of human beings.

Concerning the relation between intelligence analysts and consumers, BD could play different roles. It could help disseminate relevant intelligent assessments to their effective consumers facilitating well-informed analysis and decision-making. Despite this progress in the dissemination stage, intelligence consumers may be sceptical about the veracity and validity of BD’s correlations. Consequently, they could ask for in-depth pattern’ explanations or even become reluctant to authorise action or enact policies supported by BD’s analysis [16]. Otherwise, consumers may be tempted to use raw data without the necessary subsequent analysis to support their own interest and purposes, contrary to the effectiveness of the intelligence cycle [17].

The challenges introduced by Big Data in the intelligence cycle are part of the existential debate between humans and technology and a logical consequence of the very speed of technological advances. Nevertheless, an even greater intelligence revolution could result from the next technological progress – the autonomy of artificial intelligence (AI). AI would collect BD in real-time, develop the consequent intelligence analysis and finally disseminate a reasoned assessment. Future BD analysis and AI would be able to reduce uncertainty and solve intelligence puzzles. However, the challenges and risks associated with this kind of technology are also undeniable since the human element in the intelligence cycle is reduced to the mere intelligence consumer. In the present time, BD does not possess human consciousness, however, full autonomy could be a reality in the near future [18].

Sources:

[1] Van Puyvelde, Damien, Stephen Coulthart, and M. Shahriar Hossain. “Beyond the buzzword: big data and national security decision-making.” International Affairs, 2017: 1397-1416.

[2] De Mauro, Andrea, Michele Grimaldi, and Marco Greco. (2014) “What is Big Data? A Consensual Definition and a Review of Key Research Topics.” 4th International Conference on Integrated Information. AIP Proceedings, pp. 1-11.

[3] Normandeau, K. (2013, September 12). Beyond Volume, Variety and Velocity is the Issue of Big Data Veracity. Available at https://insidebigdata.com/2013/09/12/beyond-volume-variety-velocity-issue-big-data-veracity/

[4] Boyd D. & Crawford. K. Critical Questions for Big Data. (Information, Communication and Society, 2012), p. 662-678

[5] Landon-Murray, M. (2016). Big Data and Intelligence: Applications, Human Capital, and Education. Journal of Strategic Security, 9(2), p.92-121.

[6] Lyon, D. (2014, July-December). Surveillance, Snowden, and Big Data: Capacities, consequences, critique. Big Data & Society, p.1-13. doi: 10.1177/2053951714541861

[7] Couch, N., & Robins, B. (2013). Big Data for Defence and Security. Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies, p.6.

[8] Lim, K. (2015). Big Data and Strategic Studies. Intelligence and National Security, p.619-635.

[9] Symon, P. B., & Tarapore, A. (2015). Defense Intelligence Analysis in the Age of Big Data. Joint Force Quarterly 79, p. 4-12

[10] Couch & Robins, p.9

[11] Lim, p. 636

[12] Landon-Murray, p.94

[13] Zwitter, A. (2015) Big Data and International Relations. Ethics & International Affairs, 29, no 4, pp. 377-389.

[14] Symon & Tarapore, p. 9.

[15] Dyndal, G. L., Berntsen, T. A., & Redse-Johansen, S. (2017, 28 July). Autonomous military drones: no longer science fiction. Available at NATO Review Magazine: https://www.nato.int/docu/review/2017/also-in-2017/autonomous-military-drones-no-longer-science-fiction/en/index.htm

[16] Landon-Murray, p.101.

[17] Jani, K. (2016). The Promise and Prejudice of Big Data in Intelligence Community. Sam Nunn School of International Affairs, p.14.

[18] Dyndal; Berntsen & Redse-Johansen.


Disinformation and Cyber-Threats: Vulnerability and Resilience in the 2019 EU Elections

In May 2019, over 350 million European citizens will express their vote for the constituency of the new European Parliament in a moment of significant challenges for the European Union (EU). As these may be the most important elections ever faced by the EU, policy-makers should pay particular attention to disinformation campaigns and cyber-threats to guarantee fair and free elections.

by Stefano de Blasi

In May 2019, over 350 million European citizens across 28 (27, if the United Kingdom exits the EU) countries will elect their representatives for the European Parliament. These elections come at a time of considerable challenges for European institutions. Brexit, immigration, populism, and economic unrest are already threatening the stability of the EU, risking to jeopardise years of cooperation among European member states. Therefore, these elections are of the utmost importance, they will shape the future policies and trajectories of one of the largest democratic bodies in the world.

In the digital era, elections have increasingly become one of the primary targets of cyber-attacks[i]. The EU elections in May will likely expose several vulnerabilities to malicious state and non-state actors who would benefit from a fragmented Europe. Some of these vulnerabilities are inherently a product of the latest technological developments, whereas others are due to specific circumstances of the European case, where the organisation of elections remains a national prerogative. Considering the political magnitude of May’s elections, EU governments must acknowledge the threat posed by potential hacks and respond with a comprehensive strategy.  

Hacking election infrastructures or manipulating the voting behaviours of citizens constitute the main cyber-areas of vulnerability for democratic elections. Failing to address these issues could have dramatic implications for the future of the Union. When it comes to the hacking of voting technologies, threats are mainly connected to voter registration, vote counting, and communication of the vote outcome[ii]. This constitutes a critical issue as many European states partially (i.e. France, Hungary, Italy and more) or entirely (Estonia) rely on technology to coordinate their elections[iii]. This approach naturally exposes the entire voting process to cyber-attacks against election infrastructures such as voting machines, databases, and member states’ election websites. Given the cross-border nature of these elections, hackers have the opportunity to exploit and attack each country’s vulnerabilities and create security breaches for their own malevolent purposes.

The second area subject to cyber-meddling is the manipulation of the voting behaviour of European citizens. Nowadays, hackers have powerful tools to influence preferences at the ballot-box. First, trolls and computer bots are widely used to spread rumours and fake news on social media in order to divide and sway public opinion. For example, these tactics have been deployed extensively in Italy to foster anti-immigration and anti-Non-Governmental Organisation sentiments across the population[iv]. Secondly, hackers may exploit security breaches in politicians’ e-mails and databases in order to steal sensitive information to release during delicate moments of the elections. Such efforts have already been observed in Europe, notably with the Macron Leaks– the release of more than 20,000 private emails just two days before the French presidential elections[v]. Third, hackers may undermine free and transparent democratic elections using targeted social media posts and advertisements based on the data-mining of internet users’ preferences. In this regard, the most notable case is the Cambridge Analytica scandal, which involved exposing the data of up to 87 million Facebook profiles for political purposes, shedding light on the (mis)use of social media data in political environments[vi]. Finally, the latest developments in Artificial Intelligence and digital technology are paving innovative paths that may be dangerously exploited by hackers for political purposes. The coming years will likely see a widespread use of “deep fakes” – digital manipulations of audio or video resources almost indistinguishable from real ones – that will further challenge the resilience of democracies all over the world[vii]. While it is unlikely that deep fakes will be used for the upcoming elections, European governments should be aware of the direction in which the disinformation war is heading to prepare for the variety of future threats.

While there are several measures that might reduce the aforementioned threats, there is no infallible way to eradicate cyber-threats and information operations[viii]. Therefore, the EU should increase the efforts stated in the 2013 Cyber Security Strategy concerning high-level deterrence and resilience cyber-strategies[ix] to ensure transparent and fair elections in May, which undoubtedly requires a close co-operation among EU governments. The implementation of a permanent mandate for the European Union Agency for Network and Information Security (ENISA)[x] represents a considerable improvement in the common fight against cyber-attacks. Moreover, member states will need to implement a mix of short- and long-term policies to combat the most delicate aspects of these phenomena.

In the short-term, European governments should focus their attention on technological and normative fields, setting up firm codes of conduct for tech companies, as well as coercive measures for all actors involved in disinformation campaigns. Although it failed to live up to its expectations[xi], the ‘Code of Practice’ signed in September 2018 by the European Commission with Google, Facebook, and Twitter to address the spread of disinformation and fake news represented a strong step forward for the development of joint measures to tackle these issues[xii].

In the long-term, European member states will have to direct their efforts towards development in the IT, social, and cultural fields. In fact, if these issues cannot be solved entirely by technological advancements, it means that European citizens will have to learn to operate in an environment characterized by the presence of fake-news. States should, therefore, invest massively in media literacy to assure a wide development of critical and analytical skills among their citizens, reducing, in turn, the impact of disinformation efforts. Additionally, EU governments will have to further cooperate to create a pan-European normative framework that will apply strict regulations against malignant actors in this digital arms race.

A joint European approach to these threats and a common perspective on election security are necessary to ensure the legitimacy of these elections. As previously mentioned, it will be crucial for the future of the EU and its member governments to do everything in their power to ensure a fair, free, and transparent vote during the upcoming elections. Involving technology in the electoral process should not compromise any of these fundamental requirements. Moreover, since the organization of elections is a national responsibility, varying greatly among member states, there is a significant risk that malicious actors will try to exploit vulnerabilities and consequent security breaches in the electoral process, as some countries are more prepared than others to face these threats[xiv]. Ultimately, EU governments must recognise that the future stability of the EU will depend significantly on the outcome of these elections and will require the utmost attention to guarantee that the founding values of the European institutions – freedom of speech and pluralism within the media – are upheld. Guaranteeing these principles while combatting external meddling constitutes the best weapons available to the EU in the current disinformation war.

Sources:

[i] Hansen, I., & Lim, D. J. (2019) ‘Doxing democracy: Influencing elections via cyber voter interference,’ Contemporary Politics, Vol. 25, No. 2, pp. 150-171.

[ii] Cheeseman, N., Lynch, G. & Willis, J. (2019) ‘Digital dilemmas: the united consequences of election technology,’ Democratization, Vol. 25, No.8, pp. 1397-1418.

[iii] Microsoft Corporate Blogs (2018) ‘Elections under threat: Europe's electronic voting landscape,’ [online] available at https://blogs.microsoft.com/eupolicy/2018/11/22/europes-voting-landscape/ accessed on 14th April 2019.

[iv] Alandete, D. & Verdù, D. (2018) ‘How Russian networks worked to boost the far right in Italy’, El Pais [online] available at https://elpais.com/elpais/2018/03/01/inenglish/1519922107_909331.html accessed on 17th January 2019.

[v] Mohan, M., (2017) ‘Macron Leaks: the anatomy of a hack,’ BBC [online] Available at https://www.bbc.com/news/blogs-trending-39845105 accessed on 17th January 2019.

[vi] The Guardian (2018) ‘The Cambridge Analytica Files’, [online] available at https://www.theguardian.com/news/series/cambridge-analytica-files, accessed on 18th January 2019

[vii] Floridi, L. (2018), ‘Artificial intelligence, deepfakes and a future of ectypes,’ Philosophy & Technology, Vol. 31, No. 3, pp. 317-321.

[viii] NIS Cooperation Group (2018) ‘Compendium on Election Technology,’ [online] Available at https://www.ria.ee/public/Cyber_security_of_Election_Technology.pdf accessed on 21st January 2019

[ix] European Commission, (2013) ‘Cybersecurity Strategy of the European Union: An Open, Safe and Secure Cyberspace,’ [online] Available at https://eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/policies/eu-cyber-security/cybsec_comm_en.pdf , accessed on 25th January 2019.

[x] European Parliament, (2018) ‘ENISA and a new cybersecurity act,’ [online] Available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/en/document.html?reference=EPRS_BRI(2017)614643 accessed on 24th January 2019.

[xi] King, Sir J., Mariah G. (2019) ‘Facebook and Twitter told us they would tackle ‘fake news’. They failed’, The Guardian. [online] Available at https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2019/feb/28/facebook-twitter-fake-news-eu-elections accessed on 2nd March 2019.

[xii] European Commission (2018) ‘Code of Practice on Disinformation’ [online] Available at https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/news/code-practice-disinformation accessed on 28th January 2019.

[xiii] King, Sir J. (2018) ‘ Democracy is under threat by the use of technology. The EU is fighting back’, The Guardian. [online] Available at https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2018/jul/28/democracy-threatened-malicious-technology-eu-fighting-back accessed on 28th February 2019.


Highlights from the first Security Distillery event in 2019

On the 20th March the Security Distillery in collaboration with VOX-Pol got together for its first event of 2019, “Extremism: Online Networks, Offline Violence” at Dublin City University. Students from across DCU and the IMSISS programme attended for presentations from Security Distillery members discussing right-wing extremism in the EU, UK and US and an expert panel discussion on “Countering Violent Extremism”.

The event was hosted by Security Distillery member Casey Cannon who also chaired the discussion on right-wing extremism. Our presenters, Javier Martinez Mendoza, Heather McDonald and Felipe Simoni, presented a comprehensive look at the rise of right-wing extremism in the EU, UK and US and engaged our audience in an interactive debate including discussions on the relationship between extremism and right-wing rhetoric in the US particularly from President Donald Trump and whether the rise of the ideology in the EU and UK can be seen as a response to the refugee crisis. The presenters also highlighted the importance of studying this form of political violence by considering the recent attacks in Christchurch where 50 people were killed at two mosques at the hands of an ‘alt-right’ extremist.

The event was co-hosted with VOX-Pol an academic research network at DCU focused on researching violent online political extremism. The discussion was chaired by James Fitzgerald, a lecturer in Terrorism Studies at DCU. Maura Conway is the Coordinator of VOX-Pol and Orla Lehane is the Education Director at Fighting Words and works at the Institute of Education at DCU. The discussion focused on the effectiveness of Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) operations and how this is done online.

The Security Distillery continues to work on creating comprehensive analyses of complex security  issues providing a better understanding of international security and foreign policy trends. We are also aiming to host another event in Prague in December 2019.

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The Demise of the International Commission Against Impunity in Guatemala (CICIG): An experiment in Central American Accountability

Guatemalans have welcomed the anti-impunity commission that works to combat high level corruption and abuses, but after over a decade of prominent arrests and government pushback, Guatemalan President Jimmy Morales threatened a pre-emptive withdrawal from the effort in January 2019. The decision is tied to a pattern of US-led norm breaking, with implications for justice in Guatemala and the region.

by Cassandra Stimpson

The International Commission Against Impunity in Guatemala, or La Comisión Internacional Contra La Impunidad En Guatemala, (CICIG) is a unique initiative described as an ‘independent investigative entity that operates under Guatemalan law’ that acts in conjunction with the Guatemalan justice system in an effort to end impunity and increase local institutional capacity1. The CICIG formed in the wake of longstanding “state capture,” wherein organised crime and businesses control governmental functions with immunity from prosecutorial powers2. Similar to many Latin American states, the Guatemalan criminal infrastructures did not simply disappear once the 36-year civil war ended in 1996, taking 200,000 lives. Old structures and networks remained for conducting business. High level human rights abusers were hired into governmental positions. Thus, corruption and abuse easily found a new home in military and intelligence personnel. The international body, with an independent capacity to influence domestic decisions, hoped to reduce the implications of state capture that trickle down to nearly all facets of society, from murder convictions to local tax systems.

The CICIG exists at Guatemala’s official invitation in response to local and international outcry after the murder of a Salvadoran congressman from the Central American Parliament in 2007, and its mandate must be renewed every two years. It cemented its place in Guatemala City by using its initial momentum to enact an outreach strategy that enlisted local civil society along with national media to engage the public3. Those indicted so far due to CICIG operations include politicians, policemen, business leaders, judges,  and even permeate the upper echelons of the political system concluding in the arrest of a Vice President and two former Presidents4.

The United Nations (UN) and Guatemala agreed to establish the experimental enterprise in 2007, and until 2015, it was hailed as an innovative success. The CICIG’s broad achievements lie in legislative improvements and investigatory and prosecutorial capacity building to convict organised criminals and colluding public officials5.  As a result of the council, Guatemala’s impunity rate fell from 98% in 2006 to 70% in 2015. Whilst still a comparatively high level, this 28% reduction does represent significant progress made by CICIG in improving justice nationwide6. Nevertheless, in 2016, statistically one in four Guatemalans had been solicited for a bribe, and over a third believed that all politicians in the country were corrupt7.

The CICIG remained controversial throughout its tenure and, coinciding with President Trump’s blustery approach to the international liberal order and outspoken concerns for state sovereignty, the Guatemalan administration became emboldened to condemn the international body prosecuting governmental figures. Currently, Guatemalan courts have thwarted its complete closure, but UN personnel have been removed from the country and the Morales administration has all but dismantled what is left of the commission8.

The CICIG still holds higher public trust than Guatemala’s Public Ministry and its Constitutional Court, and there was hope that the CICIG’s high regard would dissuade President Morales from dismantling the commission9. CICIG’s unravelling can be explained by the elite class’ desire to retain and collect further power alongside latent concerns for state sovereignty. There is little doubt that the CICIG’s investigation, in conjunction with the Public Ministry, into Mr. Morales’ 2015 campaign contributions influenced the decision to attempt to shut down the UN body early in 201910.

Beyond Mr. Morales’ reaction to the threat to his presidency, there are larger, normative issues that the CICIG represents. Despite its perceived necessity and popularity with citizens, it has complications. For instance, to adapt to the punitive institutional responses that the CICIG promoted, criminal  groups built further defenses and moved underground, making convictions more difficult11.  Indeed, the CICIG’s prosecutorial power, normally reserved for national bodies, could be seen as a legitimate cause for national security concerns.

The CICIG impacted and formed norms in governments, criminal organisations, businesses and other institutions throughout the region, and its removal will have similar inverse ramifications. The decision to end the CICIG’s initiative comes as the Guatemalan congress debates an amnesty bill that would free over 30 convicted war criminals and over a dozen awaiting trial, as well as stop any potential investigations into war crimes that took place during Guatemala’s brutal, decades-long civil war. The bill, combined with CICIG’s closure, could reignite the pattern of impunity that the military, government, and national elites have enjoyed throughout Guatemalan history12.

Beyond removing the corruption deterrent, ending the CICIG will affect the economy. Guatemala’s credit rating will likely fall because of the move, raising interest rates and reducing overall foreign investment, which is already declining. As confidence shrinks in Guatemala’s regulatory atmosphere, the space left by departing investment creates an opportunity for previously eradicated illicit enterprises to once again flourish. The anti-corruption body helped imprison many local business leaders who now warmly welcome the dismantling of the commission13.

In the past, the US has invested heavily in the fight against military-backed networks of corruption prominent in Latin America. The State Department believes that anti-corruption efforts reduce migration and drug flow to the US, therefore over the past decade the CICIG had received bipartisan support from US administrations and lawmakers, who have appropriated nearly $45 million toward the commission since its inception. Yet, when Mr. Morales announced the closure, it was merely met with a vague anti-corruption statement from the local US Embassy. Guatemala has moved closer to US positions as of late, refusing to affirm China’s claim over Taiwan, recognising Juan Guaidó as the true elected leader in Venezuela, and becoming the first country to back the Trump administration’s decision to move the US embassy to Jerusalem. Perhaps because of these events, there has not only been little pushback to the closure, but former US Ambassador to the UN Nikki Haley advocated defunding the commission. This received opposition from the State Department and anti-narcotics agencies that hoped the CICIG would be a regional model14. For instance, plans have been in motion to form the CICIES (International Commission against Impunity in El Salvador), a copycat in the spirit of the Guatemalan council15.

The purposeful destruction of the CICIG, accompanied by the lack of US attention, signals a normative shift away from concerns for good governance and accountability as part of the international liberal order, and toward a more transactional relationship, harkening back to a Cold War Order wherein human rights, corruption, and other transgressions are ignored in favor of ideological pandering and personal relationships. There may still be time to save the CICIG, whose current mandate is set to expire this year. Whether the experiment’s results will sustain however, and whether other countries can utilise its lessons, remains to be seen.

Sources:

1. Washington Office on Latin America, “The International Commission against Impunity in Guatemala (CICIG): An Innovative Instrument for Fighting Criminal Organizations and Strengthening the Rule of Law” (Washington, DC: Washington Office on Latin America, July 1, 2015), 2, https://www.wola.org/analysis/wola-report-on-the-international-commission-against-impunity-in-guatemala-cicig/.

2. Yulia Krylova, “Outsourcing the Fight against Corruption: Lessons from the International Commission against Impunity in Guatemala,” Global Policy 9, no. 1 (February 2018).

3. Washington Office on Latin America, “The International Commission against Impunity in Guatemala (CICIG): An Innovative Instrument for Fighting Criminal Organizations and Strengthening the Rule of Law.”

4. Krylova, “Outsourcing the Fight against Corruption: Lessons from the International Commission against Impunity in Guatemala.”

5. Washington Office on Latin America, “The International Commission against Impunity in Guatemala (CICIG): An Innovative Instrument for Fighting Criminal Organizations and Strengthening the Rule of Law,” 2.

6. Krylova, “Outsourcing the Fight against Corruption: Lessons from the International Commission against Impunity in Guatemala.”

7. Elizabeth J. Zechmeister and Dinorah Azpuru, “What Does the Public Report on Corruption, the CICIG, the Public Ministry, and the Constitutional Court in Guatemala?,” Topical Brief, Latin American Public Opinion Project (Vanderbilt University, August 31, 2017).

8. Nelson Renteria, “Guatemalan Presidential Candidate Aldana ‘not Scared’ of Arrest Threat,” Reuters, March 21, 2019, sec. World News, https://af.reuters.com/article/worldNews/idAFKCN1R202H.

9. Zechmeister and Azpuru.

10. Ibid.

11. Washington Office on Latin America, “The International Commission against Impunity in Guatemala (CICIG): An Innovative Instrument for Fighting Criminal Organizations and Strengthening the Rule of Law.”

12. Sandra Cuffe, “Guatemala War Crime Survivors Challenge Amnesty Bill,” Al Jazeera, February 14, 2019, sec. News, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/02/guatemala-war-crime-survivors-challenge-amnesty-bill-190213234804759.html.

13. Ximena Enríquez, “Is Kicking Out CICIG Bad for Business in Guatemala?” (Guatemala City: Americas Quarterly, February 9, 2019), https://www.americasquarterly.org/content/kicking-out-cicig-bad-business-guatemala?

14. Colum Lynch, “Corrupt Guatemalans’ GOP Lifeline,” Foreign Policy, February 5, 2019, https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/02/05/trump-republican-lawmakers-weaken-u-n-anti-corruption-commission-guatemala-jimmy-morales-white-house-putin/.

15. Fernando Romero, “La CICIES de Nayib Bukele no es como la pintan,” Factum Magazine, October 9, 2018, http://revistafactum.com/cicies-bukele/.

What ISIS’ Defeat in the Middle East Means for Europe: Counter-Radicalisation in the EU

Radicalisation has emerged as a sincere issue in Europe in the last five years. Since ISIS started to lose territory, foreign fighters have begun to return to Europe, while ISIS’ web presence has strengthened and increased. In response, the European Union has created some of the most successful anti-radicalisation programmes to tackle those threats. However, these measures have failed to prevent some of the worst terrorist attacks that have ever occurred on European soil. This is due to a lack of true coordination and cooperation between member states’ approaches and at the broader EU level.

by Sabbir Jubaer & Valerio Viscardi

Propaganda & Returning Fighters

As ISIS has finally been defeated on the ground, losing its entire territorial control in the Middle East [i], some observers may underestimate ISIS as a continuing and viable adversary in the future for Western countries, especially for Europe given its proximity to the Middle East. Careful observation, however, suggests that ISIS is adapting to the new circumstances through maintaining a robust presence online and by posing new security challenges. In order to address these challenges, the European Union formulated a number of policies and discussed their efficiency in addressing extremism on European soil.

Since 2013, extremist propaganda has undergone a transformation. ISIS has started to produce ‘top notch’ quality propaganda videos, with graphic details and narratives directed towards radicalisation: considered here as intolerance and a possible use of violence against democratic values.[ii] The rise of social media has further bolstered the effectiveness of ISIS’ communications, a stark contrast to al-Qaida’s communications during the previous decades.[iii] The slow destruction of ISIS’ territory and its retreat underground has ultimately been downplayed by ISIS propaganda. This has encouraged homegrown terrorist fighters to act, causing devastating harm. Recent findings suggest the increased use of encrypted communications apps (Telegram & WhatsApp) have been essential mediums for the successful distribution of ISIS propaganda.[iv]

The issue of how to deal with the returning fighters and their families has been a serious concern for European countries. Some states for instance (France and the United Kingdom), before the decision was made to withdraw American troops from Iraq, were not interested in taking back their citizens who had left to fight alongside the so-called Islamic State, fearing a further spread of militancy. In fact, different European cities had already been attacked by militants alleged to be linked with ISIS. France had argued in favour of conducting the prosecutions of the fighters in the countries where their actions took place, i.e. Iraq. However, some European countries, including France, have now agreed to take back the fighters after the United States (U.S.) announced the withdrawal of its troops, fearing the militants may otherwise escape due to the absence of U.S. forces.[v]

Another major concern is the rehabilitation of the detainees. Instead of functioning as rehabilitation centres, prisons in many European countries have emerged as new ground for radicalisation. Prisons provide a space where militants of various degrees of radicalisation can come in touch with, and influence, non-radicalised prisoners. Thus, a prisoner or a person with a lower level of radicalisation can become fully radicalised. This was suspected to be the case for the convicted burglar and prison inmate, Benjamin Herman, a white suburban teen and nominal Catholic when he was first arrested. During his detention, he came in contact with an Islamist recruiter. Whilst allowed out into the community as part of a ‘two-day home leave’ in May 2018, he murdered three people. During the investigation, the authorities found a Quran and a prayer rug in his cell. This, coupled with his link to the radicalist preacher in custody, led Europol to classify the incident as a jihadist terror attack. [vi]

Responses & Rehabilitation

To respond to these threats, the European Union created a centralised strategy for Combating Radicalisation and Recruitment to Terrorism. This strategy, revised in 2014, aims primarily at ‘combating radicalisation and recruitment while taking into account evolving trends, such as lone-actor terrorism, foreign fighters, and the use of social media by terrorists’.[vii] To this purpose, the strategy focuses on four main pillars: prevention, protection, pursuit, and response. Specifically, the prevention pillar tries to ‘prevent people from becoming radicalised  … being recruited to terrorism and prevent a new generation of terrorists from emerging’ [viii]. Some examples of ongoing work in countering Islamic radicalisation are the Europol Internet Referral Unit (IRU) to combat terrorism and violent extremist propaganda, and the Radicalisation Awareness Network.

Regarding the former, on 12 March 2015, the Justice and Home Affairs Council of the European Union authorised Europol to create a special unit ‘aimed at reducing the level and impact of terrorist and violent extremist propaganda on the internet’. [ix] The IRU provides operational support to member states by identifying and referring relevant online content towards responsible internet service providers, which remove illegal content from their domain.[x] The European Union’s Radicalisation Awareness Network Internet and Social Media Working Group (RAN@) was created in 2011 by the European Council. Existing as Europe’s largest and highest funded counter-narrative campaign, it is a ‘network of frontline practitioners from across Europe who work on a daily basis with people who have already been radicalised or who are vulnerable to radicalisation’.[xi] This campaign is designed to support objectives such as implementing de-radicalisation and rehabilitation programmes, developing approaches for handling returning foreign terrorist fighters, equipping teachers and youth workers in addressing the root causes of radicalisation, and strengthening resilience, in particular among young people. Moreover, it creates synergies between different actions and policy areas of member states, enhancing the cooperation between them and the European Union.[xii]

Finally, these tools allow counter-narrative campaigns to inspire change in social structures inside each member state in order to increase integration and discourage individuals to radicalise. Each of the different thematic approaches addresses terrorist propaganda from a different angle, and none of them are comprehensive in themselves. Instead, each of these approaches have merit and, collectively, they create a stronger response to terrorist propaganda.

Counter-Radicalisation in Prison & European Countries

In order to tackle radicalisation in prison, each European country has implemented different measures. Some of the most illustrative are those of Belgium and Germany. Belgium, in 2018, developed a program known as ‘Deradex’. According to this program, radicalised inmates were kept isolated and were allowed only limited contact with other prisoners considered radicalised at the same level. The opposite approach was taken in Germany where the idea of isolating radicalised inmates was rejected favouring instead the implementation an intense monitoring and intervention program to prevent further radicalisation from occurring. [xiii] These are only two examples of the different approaches European member states have chosen. These differences are preventing the European Union, and its law-enforcement agencies, from implementing a more effective and unified action. European policy makers need to pay equal attention to homegrown extremists. The detainment and prosecution of returning fighters may give comfort for some time, however, new homegrown fighters will rise unless the root causes of extremism are addressed. Undetected radicalized European citizens can exploit their anonymity to cause more havoc and may emerge as fighters if a new front is opened.

ISIS’ future strategies

Losing territorial control in the Middle East could push ISIS to try to establish strongholds in new theatres. It has previously been successful capturing an area in a non-Muslim majority country far from its traditional area: Marawi city in the Philippines in 2017.[xiii] The group now has a  presence in Libya and has declared “wilayats” (provinces/branches) in many regions around Europe. Therefore, ISIS may try to find another front near or even within European soil.

Even with an absolute lack of control over land, ISIS will continue to exist and even may thrive as long as its ideological foundation appeals to individuals. ISIS’ future strategy will likely involve attempts to evolve as a fully-fledged virtual caliphate. The cyber caliphate will engage in asymmetric warfare and provide a platform to direct its followers to organise, propagate extremist narratives, recruit new militants, and incite attacks on European soil.

In conclusion, the national approaches to tackle radicalisation in Europe have proven to be effective on a national level. However, more cooperation at a European level could empower national approach and extend their effectiveness to the whole union. The recent wave of attacks have strengthened the current European transnational cooperation and proven its necessity. At the same time, the European counter-messaging campaigns and programme provide effective support to member states, not limited to national territories, in the battle against radicalisation. However, the lack of coordination and the differences in the national commitment of addressing radicalisation undermine the general effectiveness of anti-radicalisation in Europe. Therefore, there should be more cooperation with the European law enforcement institutions in order to allow them to work as bridges between different law enforcement agencies around Europe, significantly increasing the general operational effectiveness.

Sources:

[i] The Soufan Center. 2019. “IntelBrief: A State Without Territory”. Accessed on February 12, 2019. https://thesoufancenter.org/intelbrief-a-state-without-territory/

[ii] European Commission.“Radicalization”. Immigration and Home Affair Accessed February 15, 2019. https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/content/radicalisation-0_en

[iii] Gambhir, Harleen K. 2014. “Dabiq: The Strategic Messaging of the Islamic State”. Institute for the Study of War.

[iv] “Counter-terrorism strategy”. European Union. 2017. Accessed February 08, 2019. https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ALL/?uri=LEGISSUM:l33275.

[v] McAuley, J. & Birnbaum, M. 2019. “France to take back ISIS fighters, reversing policy in wake of U.S. withdrawal from Syria”. Washington Post. Accessed February 12, 2019. https://wapo.st/2BxJP6K

[vi] Erickson, A. 2018. “Europe’s prisons breed terrorism. Can anything be done?”. Washington Post. Accessed March 19, 2019. https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2018/07/26/europes-prisons-breed-terrorism-can-anything-be-done/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.51905d015a4c

[vii] “Counter-terrorism strategy”. European Union. 2017. Accessed February 08, 2019. https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ALL/?uri=LEGISSUM:l33275.

[viii] Meleagrou-Hitchens, Alexander. 2017. “The Challenges and Limitations of Online Counter-Narratives in the Fight against ISIS Recruitment in Europe and North America.” 18 (3): 95–104. doi:10.1353/gia.2017.0041.

[ix] “Europol’s Internet Referral Unit to combat terrorist and violent extremist propaganda.” 2015. News release. July 1. Accessed February 08, 2019. https://www.europol.europa.eu/newsroom/news/europol%E2%80%99s-internet-referral-unit-to-combat-terrorist-and-violent-extremist-propaganda.

[x] Dr Alastair Reed,Dr Haroro J. Ingram, Joe Whittaker. 2017. “Countering Terrorist Narratives.

[xi] European Commission. 2019. “Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN)”. Accessed January 27, 2019. https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-do/networks/radicalisation_awareness_network_en.

[xii] Idem

[xiii]Betteridge-Moes, M. 2017. “What happened in Marawi?”. Aljazeera. Accessed February 12, 2019. https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2017/10/happened-marawi-171029085314348.html


The Security Implications of The Far-Right’s Rise in Europe

The far-right’s most recent electoral emergence in Europe raises concerns about the possible securitization of multiculturalism, the inspiration of radical right terrorism and the destabilization of liberal democracies. Understanding its rise and tactics can help liberalism address the far-right’s challenge.

by Javier Martínez Mendoza

In the last five years, instability in the Middle East and Islamist terrorism have been perceived as two of the main threats to Western societies’ everyday life. However, an inward look at the structure of these societies begins to indicate a new perspective of an ever-present but exacerbated threat. The phantom of the radical right is becoming an increased security challenge for many western societies and consequently, mainstream policy-making is dangerously overlooking the threats posed by far-right movements.

In 2016, the electoral emergence of far-right politics was made evident by Brexit and Donald Trump’s victory. Both cases illustrate the influence of heightened Euroscepticism and an anti-immigration agenda, respectively, in order to achieve ground-breaking electoral gains. In the following years, radical right parties would start disrupting the political landscape of other Western countries.

In  Europe, Alternative for Germany’s (AfD) success in federal and state elections precipitated a break-up of the country’s twelve-year-long period of political stability under Angela Merkel. This led her to step down as leader of the centre-right [1]. In Southern Europe, the Italian right-wing political party Lega Nord have managed to take control of the public agenda through the Ministry of Interior and its recent immigration policy.  This left the majority coalition partner Five Star Movement without political initiative. Similarly, Vox’s victory in Andalucia has put an end to Spain’s exceptional status as the single major European country without a significant far-right party [2].

Regardless of the far-right’s latest boom after the 2015 refugee crisis, its current emergence in Western liberal democracies can be traced back to the 2008 financial crisis. Consequently, the economic and social struggles exacerbated by the crisis amongst European and North American societies,  raised the appeal of the radical right. Arguably, the political platform with which the far-right has addressed people’s grievances can be viewed as an antagonistic response to the cultural, social and political changes caused by globalization in the last 40 years and accelerated in the last decade.

Securitizing immigration and beyond

The radical right has built and benefited from a narrative that warns societies of the perils of immigration and multiculturalism. Following their logic, prominent features of globalization threaten the cohesion of national identities and traditional values they view as essential. Thus,  nativism, a radical and exclusionary form of nationalism, has risen as a challenge for the liberal democratic order and domestic security due to processes of politicization and securitization that lead to extraordinary policies and the normalisation of antagonistic attitudes against “securitized” groups or institutions within societies [3].

In the last four decades, economic integration, a push towards progressive social rights and immigration have transformed Western societies, therefore, changing the social and demographic landscape and gradually expanding into multiculturalism. Reactions to these social transformations have been mixed. However, animosity towards cultural diversity and migration fluxes increased after the 2008 financial crisis and, most recently, by the 2015 refugee crisis [4].

Consequently the far-right have often argued that across Europe the waves of refugees entering the continent are terrorist cells planning to carry out attacks there. Despite the ambiguity of their argument, this narrative has gained momentum, especially after terror attacks such as the attack in Paris on November 13th, 2015 [5].

Recently, this rhetoric has earned far-right parties electoral successes, granting them access to an increased presence in national parliaments, and consequently the political weight to form coalitions in some governments. But most importantly, they seem to have seized control of the political discourse in Western societies by making immigration policy a key electoral issue. Mainstream parties now feel inclined to embrace an essence of the far-right’s proposals to avoid losing voters to the far-right, or compelling majority coalition partners to implement tougher immigration controls [6, 7].

Even if these measures have allowed centre-right parties to hinder the electoral advance of far-right formations they are consequently practising the normalisation of ultra-nationalist discourse. This creates a dangerous environment for minorities in Europe through the politicization of cultural diversity and immigration  [8, 9].

Furthermore, far-right parties and leaders are often characterised as authoritarian and in contrast with liberal democracy and progressive social values. Once in power, far-right governments –like Viktor Orbán’s in Hungary and Law and Justice majority regime in Poland, have expressed this perceived authoritarianism targeting and hampering free media, autonomous judiciary systems and liberal democratic institutions. Despite seeking political representation through democratic means and claiming to defend Western liberal values from terrorism and crime through their migration policies–they refer to the incompatibility of Muslim immigrants with liberal democratic values [10, 11, 12].

Far-right violence and terrorism

The terror attacks carried out in recent years by Al Qaeda and the Islamic State have instigated Western governments to pay close attention and employ concerted efforts to tackle Islamist terrorism. However, far-right terrorism has been present in the West for decades and remains worryingly overlooked by decision-makers and security forces [13].

Radical right terrorism refers to the instances when far-right extremists answer violently to contemporary social changes, such as their countries’ openness to different cultures or social progressive values. Their disenchantment with liberal democracy and their personal and social grievances could lead radicalized groups or individuals to take matters into their own hands rather than relying on mainstream politics. Hence, there is a risk members of far-right groups might address their perceived security threat through vigilantism and attacks carried out by clandestine cells, challenging the state’s monopoly on the use of force and threatening the lives of minorities and other groups in Western societies. Radicalized individuals may also be inspired by far-right politicians rhetoric against immigration and multiculturalism [14, 15, 16].

Right-wing extremism, similar to its Islamist counterpart, has benefited from social media and internet communications. Extremists have utilised technology to establish networks that cross borders and build connections with like-minded groups and political formations. Furthermore, social media has allowed them to improve their training, recruitment, fundraising methods, while spreading propaganda and radical content in such a way that they reach a broader audience while remaining clandestine. Thus, violent far-right cells and individuals have become an internationalised phenomenon that has increased violent attacks in the last four years and should not be overlooked by government authorities [17, 18, 19].

Instability and inattention to other issues

Western allies consider themselves threatened by Russian hostilities and therefore political instability in the West represents a strategic gain for Russia. As previously mentioned, far-right parties have aimed to disrupt liberal democracies’ political stability profiting from an increasing social polarization and breaking the traditional left-right political divide in favour of identity politics. They have also questioned economic cooperation, such as the European integration project. Even if far-right political parties are not directly influenced by Russia, the turmoil caused by their disruption in European liberal democracies undoubtedly profits Russia’s foreign policy  [20].

On the other hand, the securitization of immigration and multiculturalism arguably aims to divert policy-makers from comprehensively addressing actual security issues. For instance, terrorism will continue to fester if the targeting of Muslim minorities by the far-right contributes to Islamist radicalization within the West. Likewise, climate change, economic turmoil and social justice vindications cannot be addressed if the far-right shifts attention to immigration and promotes an environment of political instability that hinders the process of policy-making [21].

Conclusion

Western liberal democracies need to acknowledge the security risks posed by the far-right. It is a threat to their democratic processes and has arguably shifted the political and electoral discussions towards the far-right’s agenda. Radical right politics have emerged from within liberal democratic societies and have already crossed borders by establishing networks of like-minded groups; consequently becoming an international security concern.

Mainstream parties embracing policies from the far-right hoping to halt far-right parties from attaining further electoral success are helping them galvanize political momentum. Even without winning a majority in parliaments, the politicization and eventual securitization of immigration and multiculturalism have helped far-right groups advance their goals and get closer to broader parliamentary representation or even governmental positions.

In order to address the far-right’s challenge, it is necessary to understand the root causes of their emergence, the issues that have contributed to increasing their public appeal and learn from their rhetoric and networks. This is not to adopt the far-right’s ideas rather to learn from their communication methods in order to promote liberal values in a compelling way for disenfranchised and grieving populations.

Understanding the risks to security and liberal democracy posed by the far-right –namely, the securitization of immigration and multiculturalism, the inspiration of far-right violence and the overlooking of other security threats and their relation with the far-right– will allow mainstream policy-makers to renovate liberal democratic processes in order to alleviate people’s grievances without them needing to resort to far-right stances. The far-right will remain as a key and challenging feature in liberal democracies for the upcoming years, but its footprint in democratic institutions and social cohesion is still in the making; liberal elites and individuals can still make a difference.

Sources:

[1]Katrin Bennhold & Melissa Eddy (2018). Germany Without Angela Merkel: Unthinkable? Think Again, She Says. The New York Times.

[2]Christoph Hasselbach (2018). Opinion: Right-wing populism is EU’s elephant in the room. Deutsche Welle.

[3]Martin A. Schain (2018). Shifting Tides: Radical-Right Populism and Immigration Policy in Europe and the United States. Migration Policy Institute.

[4]Pankaj Mishra (2016). The Globalization of Rage: Why Today’s Extremism Looks Familiar. Foreign Affairs.

[5]Martin A. Schain (2018). Op. Cit.

[6]Aristotle Kallis, Sara Zeiger & Bilgehan Öztürk (2018). Introduction. In Kallis, Zeiger &Öztürk (eds.), Violent Radicalisation & Far-Right Extremism in Europe. SETA Publications.

[7]James F. Downes, Matthew Loveless & Andrew Lam (2018). Opening up Pandora’s box? How centre-right parties can outperform the radical right on immigration. LSE.

[8]Aristotle Kallis, Sara Zeiger & Bilgehan Öztürk (2018). Op. Cit.

[9]Tamáz Berecz & Kristóf Domina (2012). Domestic Extremism in Europe: Threat Landscape. Athena Institute.

[10]Ben Margulies (2018). Nativists are Populists, Not Liberals. Journal of Democracy, 29:1.

[11]Zsolt Eyedi, Chantal Mouffe, Yannis Stavrakakis, Ruth Wodak & John Fitzgibbon (2017). Five views: is populism really a threat to democracy? LSE.

[12]Max Bergmann, Carolyn Kenney & Trevor Sutton (2018). The Rise of Far-Right Populism Threatens Global Security and Democracy. Center for American Progress.

[13]In the US, extreme right violent incidents rose from five or less per year between 2007 to 2011, to 31 in 2017. Similarly, in Europe these attacks rose from 0 in 2012 to 30 in 2017. Seth G. Jones (2018). The Rise of Far-Right Extremism in the United States. CSIS.

[14]Idem.

[15]Daniel Koehler (2016). Right-Wing Extremism and Terrorism in Europe Current Developments and Issues for the Future. PRISM, 6:2.

[16]Aristotle Kallis, Sara Zeiger & Bilgehan Öztürk (2018). Op. Cit.

[17]Seth G. Jones (2018). Op. Cit.

[18]Idem.

[19]Daniel Koehler (2016). Op. Cit.

[20]Alina Polyakova (2016). Why Europe Is Right to Fear Putin’s Useful Idiots. Foreign Policy.

[21]Sean Illing (2018). Reciprocal rage: Why islamist extremists and the far right need each other. Vox.

Assessing the Implications of the US-Syria Withdrawal on the Kurdish Democratic Union

The U.S.’ proposed withdrawal of the majority of its military presence from Syria leaves the Kurdish Democratic Union (PYD) in a challenging position. Now lacking clear U.S. protection and in the midst of preparing its final assault on ISIS-held positions, the PYD is now forced to weigh the decision of aligning with Russia and the Syrian government to hedge against the threat of a Turkish assault from the north.

The PYD

On December 19th of 2018, in a surprise move following a call with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, United States (U.S.) President Donald Trump announced that the U.S.’ roughly 2,000 military personnel would be withdrawing from Syria within 30 days. The reason stated was that the so called Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) had been defeated and the U.S. could continue to carry out support operations in the form of airstrikes[1]. Trump’s decision signalled a likely end to any aspirations of fostering a legitimate alternative to Syrian President Bashar Al Assad’s government, which has caused the deaths of hundreds of thousands of its own citizens and has been found to have deployed chemical weapons against them [2]. Beyond the implications of the withdrawal on the U.S.’ geopolitical aims, Washington’s decision leaves the U.S.-allied People’s Protection Units (YPG), with little leverage and minimal options in its fight for greater legitimacy in its controlled territory along Syria’s northern border. This is significant because the YPG represents the Kurdish component of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) that has been engaged in most of the combat on the ground against ISIS. Trump’s National Security Advisor, John Bolton, has stated that ‘the U.S.’ withdrawal is contingent upon ISIS’ continued defeat and Turkey’s commitment to not attacking the YPG’, but prospects of enforcing these conditions would be hampered by a diminished U.S. military presence along its border[3]. At present, it appears that the U.S. will leave 200 troops after the completion of the withdrawal to serve in a peacekeeping capacity.

The YPG represents the militarised branch of the Syrian Kurdish Democratic Union (PYD). The PYD was originally marginalised and closely monitored by the Assad government, but the outbreak of the Syrian Civil War allowed the group to operate largely independently, drive ISIS back thousands of kilometres with U.S. support, and establish a semi-autonomous enclave in Syria’s northern region along its Turkish border. The  proximity of the PYD-claimed territory to Turkey represents the most imminent threat to the Kurdish enclave as Turkey views the YPG as an extension of the Turkey-based Kurdish Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), which Ankara views as a terrorist organisation [4]. Turkey typically maintains a more measured foreign policy approach and avoids third-party conflicts but it entered northern Syria in August 2016 to support an offensive against ISIS and block the SDF from seizing territory that would have connected the sizable Kurdish northern territory to Afrin in the west [5]. This would have yielded the SDF a near complete control over Syria’s northern border. Turkey views the YPG’s gains as a direct cross-border threat to link up with the PKK and now that the U.S. presence is decreasing drastically, it stands to reason that the Turks may seek to attack the Kurdish gains. Turkey’s Defence Minister, Hulusi Akar, was quoted saying that after Turkish military intervention, Kurdish fighters would be ‘buried in their ditches’[6].

U.S. Policy Pivot

In concert with Bolton’s stated commitment to a conditional withdrawal, Trump has stated that there will be an established 32-kilometer safe zone between the YPG and Turkey and threatened economic sanctions against Turkey if it were to violate it. The Trump administration has imposed sanctions on Turkey already as a result of its detainment of an American pastor in August of 2018[7]. Turkey, for its part, dismissed Trump’s warning of sanctions with its foreign Minister, Mevlut Cavusoglu stating ‘we have said multiple times that we will not fear or be deterred by any threat. You can get nowhere by threatening Turkey economically’[8]. The question facing both the PYD and the U.S. is: will a 200-person peacekeeping force be able to enforce a safe zone against an emboldened Turkey, or is there potential that the U.S. forces may become caught in a crossfire between the PYD and Turkish forces and spark a larger conflict?

Despite President Trump’s stated commitment to a safe-zone, the PYD has begun pursuing alternative partners to guarantee its survival. The Kurds initially protested the U.S.’ decision  when thousands gathered near the U.S. coalition headquarters in Syria but has since acquiesced and begun engaging with potential partners[9]. Faced with a Turkish government with a stated pledge to destroying its territory and an uncertain U.S. military commitment, the PYD is left with few other state partners to align with. The PYD has decided that the only way to hedge against the Turkish threat is to align with allied Syrian and Russian governments. This alliance makes further strategic sense considering that Moscow has been pushing for an alternative to a Turkish presence on Syrian soil. Therefore, a Russian supported YPG could both aim to secure the northern border for the Assad government and provide the PYD the security assurances it seeks[10]. Considering these factors, the SDF has asked Moscow for protection and the PYD expects negotiations with the Assad government to begin soon.

Conclusion

The U.S. withdrawal demonstrates yet another example of the Trump administration’s commitment to recusing U.S. forces from participating in conflicts beyond its borders. The Syrian Civil War has been a devastating conflict, featuring many stakeholders, and few appealing options for coalition forces to align with. The YPG-led SDF has been the U.S.’ most reliable partner in this conflict up to this point but is now likely to turn to Washington’s adversaries to counter what the PYD surely views as an existential threat. The major questions remaining are: how will a PYD pivot to Moscow impact the remaining U.S. peacekeeping force’s ability to enforce strategic objectives and will Moscow and Damascus be reliable partners for the PYD going forward? The situation in which the PYD finds itself represents another chapter in the Kurdish pursuit of statehood in a region offering complex challenges and limited supporters of its aims of state legitimacy.

Post-Revolution Libya’s Internal State-Building Challenges

The 17 February 2011 Libyan revolution brought a sense of freedom to the Libyan people. Eight years later, the country has erupted into another war, with numerous internal state-building challenges. Many of these challenges are rooted in the Gaddafi regime.

by Shahed Warreth

Libya has become a deeply divided country in the eight years following the fall of the Gaddafi regime in 2011. Facing many challenges, it has yet to stabilise as warring factions, all interested in ruling, have made it difficult for Libya to find peace, thereby plunging the country into a civil war. Libya is split between the United Nations-backed Government of National Accord (GNA) and the Council of Deputies. Libya’s current issues, such as this divide, stem from Gaddafi’s reign. In order to understand the challenges that the country faces, we must first understand the foundations of fear, tyranny, and corruption it was built on prior to the revolution.

Prior to the Gaddafi era, Libya was a federal monarchy with three distinct provinces between 1951-1963: Tripolitania to the northwest; Cyrenaica, also known as Barqa, in the east; and Fezzan in the southwest.[1] The federal form of governance was soon abolished, and with it the three provinces were re-structured into baladiyat. The 1969 coup d’état led by Colonel Muammar Gaddafi brought with it a new way of arranging the country, the latest version being the 22 shabiyat established in 2007.

As a result of Gaddafi’s coup, the once stable and progressive monarchy transformed into a dictatorship distinctly lacking infrastructure and institutions.[2]Under Gaddafi’s oppressive regime, there was a sense of powerlessness felt among the Libyan people. This includes the torture, imprisonment, and murder of anyone who opposed Gaddafi’s regime, including those living abroad.[3] When Gaddafi’s security state finally collapsed in 2011, it left a ‘huge political vacuum’ that multiple forces are competing to fill without any overall sense of direction’.[4]

The 2011 revolution gave the Libyan people a sense of freedom but brought about another set of problems, one of which is ethnic divisions. There was and remains a strong sense of tribalism in Libya compared to its neighbouring countries[5]. During his reign, Gaddafi attempted to diminish tribal importance and influence by pitting tribes against each other and adopting an ideology of pan-Arab Nationalism[6]. Gaddafi then used these tribes to reassert his power. Nepotism was bountiful as loyal tribes were given high ranking government jobs, while others were sidelined.[7] Furthermore, tribal loyalty to the regime was used to undermine the military. In post-revolution Libya where ‘the state is traumatically absent’, tribes offer a form of social protection that the state has failed to provide[8].

After several attempts by the military to overthrow Gaddafi, a new security force was created, the leaders of which were Gaddafi loyalists. They fought for Gaddafi during the revolution, while many generals and soldiers defected.[9]The tribal mindset and way of leading can still be found in post-revolution Libya. This in turn led to the instability and chaos that Libya is facing today. In contrast, neighbouring Tunisia has become relatively stable. This is due to the strong military presence in the country, something which Gaddafi failed to provide in order to strengthen his control. Had there been a strong and unified military after the revolution, Libya may have become a united country without militias and numerous parties vying for power. By segregating the populace, Gaddafi played on his influence so he could remain in power. He exploited tribal differences and pitted them against each other, thereby inadvertently enabling these differences to exist even today.

The rebel forces of the revolution were also divided, and militias were and remain to be plentiful. Instead of establishing an army, the government has instead hired these militias to enforce order.[10] No job prospects or access to training may motivate some to join militias,[11]meaning these militias are a hotbed of the unemployed. Libya has suffered from a high unemployment rate both before and after the revolution, particularly among youths.[12] While different sources give different estimates for the unemployment rate in Libya, the International Labour Organization estimates that the total unemployment rate was 17.6% in 2010, 19.6% in 2011, and 17.3% in 2018.[13] The lack of jobs, and prospects of a bleak future forces youths into a life of militias and violence. In a society where there is low cash flow and no unemployment benefits, some Libyans see this as their only option. There is a societal expectation in Libya for men to be the primary breadwinners, thereby creating a societal pressure to remain employed, even if it means joining a militia. Those who are educated are also unemployed as many graduates lack the necessary skills across different industries and sectors.

Libya’s economy is heavily dependent on public sector employment, and hydrocarbons, with the latter accounting for 95% of exports in 2013. However, oil exports have decreased, and the economy has fluctuated greatly since 2011, some years being the fastest growing economy in the world, while other years being the slowest.[14]Without the revenue it generates, the government cannot provide a sufficient number of jobs in order to steer its citizens away from a life of militias. Ironically, it is these militias, along with the Libyan National Army (LNA), who have largely seized control of the oil production.[15]

Another obstacle that Libya must overcome is the lack of a coherent government. The National Transitional Council (NTC) of the revolution left Libyans unsatisfied, and was ineffective in quashing the militia problem.[16] Their successors, the General National Congress (GNC), also failed to govern effectively yet have refused to step down.[17] Neither have been successful in drawing up a constitution, disarming the militias, and forming a unified army. Moreover, the GNC formed 99 new baladiyat after the revolution, which later grew to 108. However, in 2012, the Cyrenaica Transitional Council (CTC) was formed. Renamed in October 2013 to the Council of Cyrenaica in Libya (CCL), the CCL declared Cyrenaica an autonomous province, bringing the old divisions back to the forefront.[18]

Though the GNA and the Presidential Council (PC) to the west of Libya are recognised internationally as the legitimate government, they have not gained the support of the Council of Deputies and the House of Representatives (HoR) to the east.[19] The Council of Deputies does however back the LNA, headed by General Khalifa Haftar who had previously served in Gaddafi’s army but later tried to overthrow him, and who’s military has now expanded into southern Libya.[20] However, it is clear that both governments ‘may actually be in a worse position than that enjoyed by [Gaddafi, whose] militias and military forces were loyal to him; the militias in Libya today answer to themselves and secondarily to their paymaster government’.[21] Rather than coming together in order to rebuild the country, they have instead chosen to fight for power and control and, in the case of the militias, to push their Islamist agenda.

Eight years after the revolution, Libya remains in conflict, with many of the challenges largely stemming from its past. After 42 years of living under a dictatorship, the Libyan people are once again living in a time of oppression and fear. The mindset of the Gaddafi era is still present throughout Libya; the struggle for dominance and power can still be found between warring factions looking to control the country and its resources. Post-revolution Libya has seen the rise of federalism as the citizens are fearful that if one government rules, the country will revert to old ways.[22] While the country has been liberated from Gaddafi’s authoritarian regime, it has been plunged into a never-ending conflict. It is clear that there is more to do in order to obtain peace and security in such a turbulent nation.

Sources:

[1] Pack, J. and Barfi, B. (2012) In War’s Wake: The Struggle for Post-Qadhafi Libya. Washington, D.C.: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, p. 11;

Pusztai, W. (2016). ‘Does Federalism Have a Future in Libya?’ Atlantic Council, 22 August. Available from: http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/menasource/does-federalism-have-a-future-in-libya.

[2] Fitzgerald, F., and Megerisi, T. (2015) Libya: Whose Land Is It? Property Rights and Transition. London: Legatum Institute. Available at: https://www.li.com/activities/publications/libya-whose-land-is-it;

St. John, R.B. (2012) Libya: From Colony to Revolution. Oxford: One World Publications.

[3] Diana, E. (2014) ‘“Literary Springs” in Libyan Literature: Contributions of Writers to the Country’s Emancipation’, Middle East Critique, 23(4), pp. 444.

[4] Randall, E. (2013) ‘After Qadhafi: Development and Democratization in Libya’, The Middle East Journal, 69(2), p. 210.

[5] Randall, 2013;

Cherstich, I. (2014), ‘When Tribesmen do not act Tribal: Libyan Tribalism as Ideology (not as Schizophrenia)’, Middle East Critique, 23(4), pp. 405-421;

Meijer, R. (2015) Citizenship Rights and the Arab Uprisings: Foundation for a New Political Order in the Middle and North Africa. Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, p. 4.

[6] El-Katiri, M. (2012) State-Building Challenges in a Post-Revolution Libya. Pennsylvania: U.S. Army War College, p. 11.

Fitzgerald and Megerisi, 2015.

[7] St. John, 2012;

Geha, C. (2016). Civil Society and Political Reform in Lebanon and Libya: Transition and Constraint. Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge.

[8] Cherstich, 2014.

[9] St. John, (2012); Gaub, F. (2013) ‘The Libyan Armed Forces between Coup-proofing and Repression’, Journal of Strategic Studies, 36(2), p. 235.

[10] Larémont, R.R. (2013) ‘After the Fall of Qaddafi: Political, Economic, and Security Consequences for Libya, Mali, Niger, and Algeria’, Stability: International Journal of Security and Development, 2(2), http://doi.org/10.5334/sta.bq;

Roumani, J. (2014) ‘Libya on the Brink: Insecurity, Localism, and the State Not Back In’, Middle East Institute, 12 March. Available at: https://www.mei.edu/publications/libya-brink-insecurity-localism-and-state-not-back.

[11] Mezran, K. (2013) ‘A Holistic Approach to Security in Libya’, Atlantic Council, 10 July. Available at: https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/menasource/a-holistic-approach-to-security-in-libya.

[12] El-Katiri, 2012, p.7.

[13] International Labour Organization (2018) ‘Key Indicators of the Labour Market: Unemployment Rate – ILO modelled estimates’, International LAbour Organization, November. Available at: https://www.ilo.org/ilostat/faces/ilostat-home.

[14] Larémont, 2013;

Mattes, H. (2014) ‘Rebuilding the National-Security Forces in Libya’, Middle East Policy, 21(2), p. 97;

Fitzgerald and Megerisi, 2015;

MENA-OECD Economic Resilience Task Force (2018) Country case study: Building economic resilience in Lebanon and Libya, p. 34. Available at: https://www.oecd.org/mena/competitiveness/ERTF-Jeddah-2018-Background-note-Case-studies-Lebanon-and-Libya.pdf;

International Monetary Fund (2018) World Economic Outlook: Real GDP Growth (Libya). Available at: https://www.imf.org/external/datamapper/NGDP_RPCH@WEO/OEMDC/ADVEC/WEOWORLD/LBY.

[15] Chivvis, C.S. and Martini, J. 2014. Libya After Qaddafi: Lessons and Implications for the Future. Santa Monica, California: RAND Corporation;

El Wardany, S. ‘Libya Oil Boss: Biggest Field Won't Restart Until Militia Leaves’, Bloomberg, 25 February. Available at: https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-02-25/libya-oil-boss-biggest-field-won-t-restart-until-militia-leaves;

Assad, A. (2019) ‘From Abu Dhabi, Libyan officials announce lifting force majeure on Sharara oilfield’, The Libya Observer, 26 February. Available at: https://www.libyaobserver.ly/news/abu-dhabi-libyan-officials-announce-lifting-force-majeure-sharara-oilfield;

Lacher, W. (2019) ‘Libya’s Conflicts Enter a Dangerous New Phase’, German Institute for International and Security Affairs, SWP Comment No. 8, February. Available at: https://www.swp-berlin.org/en/publication/libyas-conflicts-enter-a-dangerous-new-phase/.

[16] El-Katiri, 2012; Achcar, G. (2016) Morbid Symptoms: Relapse in the Arab Uprising. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press.

[17] Roumani, 2014.

[18] Kane, S. (2012). ‘Federalism and fragmentation in Libya? Not so fast…’ Foreign Policy, 20 March. Available from: http://foreignpolicy.com/2012/03/20/federalism-and-fragmentation-in-libya-not-so-fast/;

Pack, J. (2012). ‘Federalism in Libya: Tried and failed’, Al Jazeera, 20 April. Available from: https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2012/04/201241871355584880.html.

[19] Fitzgerald, M. (2016) ‘Libya’s Worsening Turmoil – Bad for Everyone’, Global Geneva, 20 October. Available at: https://www.global-geneva.com/libyas-worsening-turmoil-bad-for-everyone/;

Toaldo, M. (2016) ‘A Quick Guide to Libya’s Main Players: Political Actors’, European Council on foreign Relations. Available at: https://www.ecfr.eu/mena/mapping_libya_conflict.

[20] Lacher, 2019.

[21] Larémont, 2013, p.2.

[22] Geha, 2016; Mattes, 2014; Roumani, 2014.

The Influence and Stability of the United Kingdom: The National Security Ramifications of a No Deal Brexit

Brexit presents a scenario in which, all at once, the UK must: maintain its relevance on the world-stage whilst simultaneously reducing its legislative and policy making influence;  satisfy Scotland’s call to remain; and assuage Northern Ireland’s border concerns. At risk is the fragmentation of its union and a shrinking of its international role.

by Matthew Wentworth

The referendum campaign leading up to June 2016, which questioned Britain’s continued membership of the European Union (EU), was based on the argument that the United Kingdom (UK) could be a self-governed, self-sustaining, wholly independent nation, free from the limiting bureaucracies of the EU, and stronger out. After the result these promises waned and now, whatever Brexit brings, Britain’s leaving of the EU could prove to be a rare historical turning point for the UK and a tectonic shift in European Security. If the UK fractures it could lead to diminishing fiscal and political capacity in terms of national security policy making[1]. These concerns are based on the detrimental effect Brexit could have to Britain’s influence both globally and within multilateral institutions, as well as the increased possibility of the break-up of the UK through Scottish independence or the reunification of Ireland.

The placement of UK officials is the first direct global status ramification of the UK becoming a third-state outside of the EU. Absent a deal, the UK Defence Minister will no longer take part in meetings of EU Defence Ministers and will therefore not be involved in decision-making or planning EU defence and security. British personnel currently hold senior positions within major bodies like Europol, the loss of which would significantly affect the British ability to exercise leverage and influence in the development of European security agencies like Europol, which many currently consider a British-friendly institution[2]. Even a soft Brexit will come at a price to overall UK security. Britain will lose both power and influence by no longer having a say in EU legislation addressing terrorism, crime, foreign policy, or security.

Perhaps more concerning, however, is that the UK’s diminished capacity may not be limited to influence within the EU but could extend further to bodies like NATO. Brexit will certainly not change the fact that NATO is Britain’s multilateral defence forum of choice; in fact, the government champions a ‘renewed emphasis in NATO on deterrence and collective defence’ in what it labels a worsened security environment[3]. The assumption that many make with regard to the UK being able to use NATO to rebalance its security role in Europe however is unsound. The UK will undoubtedly lose influence within NATO after the inevitable appointment of a non-British Deputy Supreme Allied Commander to Europe, the first amongst many other likely changes, which will be a blow to the UK’s global standing in symbolic terms at the very least.

If British global influence is eroded, then current arrangements with allies like the US are also likely to suffer. Britain is considered an intelligence superpower due to UK intelligence-sharing arrangements with the US and membership in the Five Eyes Network[4]. Historically however, the security role of the UK in the EU was favoured greatly by Washington who saw the value of the UK as deriving at least in part from its EU membership. This influence cannot be replicated via NATO – meaning the UK cannot necessarily count on being ‘America’s closest partner’ indefinitely as British Prime Minister Theresa May has maintained[5]. The US intelligence community might begin to see the UK as a diminishing asset and opt to reach for another, more stable, ally for fear that the UK might disintegrate or lose access to EU intelligence[6].

This idea of political instability within the UK is recognised by many, both domestically and internationally, with the ostensible exception of the UK government itself. The months immediately following the referendum in the UK saw a Cabinet reshuffle, leadership contests and, eventually, a general election. This election cost the Conservative Party their majority at the expense of sizeable Labour gains and forced them to turn to Northern Ireland’s Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) to maintain their ruling position. Since this general election, the Cabinet alone has suffered no less than 23 resignations over the Brexit issue, including two Brexit Secretaries and the Foreign Secretary. We have also seen two narrowly won votes of no confidence based purely on the Brexit negotiations: one in Mrs May, as the leader of the Conservative Party; and one in the Government itself. Political instability of this kind does not a secure nation make.

The disjointed strategies, lack of consensus, and infighting displayed are not restricted simply to Westminster, but stretch to the Union at large. The different referendum results witnessed in Scotland and Northern Ireland (NI) compared to England and Wales increase the danger to the currently delicate fabric of the UK[7]. Firstly, the Scottish issue forces one to consider whether the Scottish people will stand for being removed from the EU by Westminster against their expressed will. If Scottish voters assert that they stand to gain more from the EU than the British Union, then the UK could become still less united. Whilst this issue was muted in recent months, the growing prospect of a no deal exit has driven Scottish First Minister Nicola Sturgeon to confirm that she will reveal plans for a second Scottish independence referendum after this phase of the Brexit negotiations has ended[8]. In discussing these plans, Mrs Sturgeon recently confirmed her vision for an independent Scotland that would apply for EU membership within the next five years[9]. The success of Scotland’s application to rejoin the EU would be dependent on both economic and political variables, but the point remains that Westminster’s wilful ignorance of Scotland’s resolve to remain is fuelling stronger calls for self-governance.

Scottish independence would bring more than just concerns regarding the break-up of the Union, it will also bring with it practical security implications. Scotland and Scottish bases form a crucial part of the UK’s air defence perimeter and maritime zone[10]. Multiple major platforms for building and storing warships, munitions, and naval heavy weapons would be at risk. Independence could also mean losing facilities such as Britain’s Trident Force, directly affecting the UK’s nuclear deterrent capabilities. The political and fiscal costs of moving this base elsewhere in the UK or to an overseas territory make it potentially infeasible. Though 55.3% of Scots voted to remain as part of the UK in the 2014 referendum, attitudes amongst the Scottish people might be swayed back to independence as a result of Westminster’s continued disregard for the Scottish stance on Brexit, and the probable recession resulting from leaving the EU. Further fuelling this call is the potential for a violent reopening of the Irish Question, which is a distinct possibility in the ever-increasing likelihood of a botched Brexit[11].

The troubled violent history in NI coupled with the fact that the government still considers there to be a present threat of NI related terrorism create a fragile environment in which to negotiate change. This fragility is compounded by the fact that the current Conservative government is propped up by ten pro-Brexit DUP members insistent on NI leaving the EU on the same terms as the rest of the UK, scuppering the previously proposed backstop arrangements. Failure to satisfy the DUP concerns would likely result in their withdrawal from the confidence and supply arrangement they hold with Mrs May’s government, leaving a ruling party with no majority.

In the event of a no deal scenario, it is difficult to envisage anything but the recreation of a real, as opposed to virtual, border between the Republic of Ireland and NI which defies the terms of the Good Friday Agreement. The type of border that emerges is extremely important for the UK’s national security, as undermining of the rules in place governing the border amounts to an undermining of the agreement itself[12]. There is a consensus that anything which upsets the delicate status-quo of NI’s political environment could cue a resurgence of dissident paramilitary activity and further national security concerns for the UK[13]. The vote for remain in NI signifies that opinion there might be disjointed with that of England and Wales, potentially giving greater priority to links with the Republic whilst simultaneously breeding a new polarisation along sectarian lines: another example of how Brexit has made the Union more fragile[14].

The extent of the UK’s post-Brexit strategic vision amounts to a determination for a ‘Global Britain’. The plan however has no more structure than that empty phrase; it is a goal unlikely to be attained by seceding from the EU[15]. Far from elevating the UK to new heights, the Brexit process has thus far suggested the UK’s retreat from world affairs and a shrinking of Britain’s international role through diminished capacity in NATO, no say in EU policy, and a potentially weakened intelligence relationship with the US. The turmoil surrounding the political management of Brexit could also have dire consequences for the stability of the UK itself. Mrs May’s precarious majority looks to be in constant jeopardy, and Westminster’s alienation of the Scottish people, coupled with the impossibility of delivering a hard Brexit which is compatible with the Good Friday Agreement, might prove as deciding factors in the weakening of the stability of the UK through either Scottish Independence, a unified Ireland, or both.

Sources:

1. Blagden, D. (2017) Britain and the world after Brexit. International Politics. 54(1), pp.1–25.

2. Dawson, J. (2017) Brexit: implications for national security. London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office.

3. Cabinet Office (2018) National Security Capability Review. London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office.

4. Inkster, N. (2016) Brexit, Intelligence and Terrorism. Survival. 58(3), pp.23-30.

5. May, T. (2018) PM Speech at Munich Security Conference 17 February 2018. Munich Security Conference, Munich.

6. Konstantopoulosa, I.L., and J.N. Nomikos (2017) Brexit and intelligence: connecting the dots. Journal of Intelligence History.16(2), pp. 100-107.

7. Macpherson, N. (2016) The case for Scottish independence looks stronger post-Brexit. Financial Times. [online] Available at: https://www.ft.com/content/1219f41c-4456-11e6-9b66-0712b3873ae1 [Accessed 6 Jan. 2019].

8. Nutt, K. (2019) Nicola Sturgeon set to unveil indyref2 plans soon. The National. [online] Available at: https://www.thenational.scot/news/17341120.nicola-sturgeon-set-to-unveil-indyref2-plans-soon/?ref=mr&lp=4 [Accessed 9 Jan. 2019].

9. McLaughlin, M. (2019). Scotland will be independent in five years, declares Sturgeon. The Times. [online] Available at: https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/scotland-will-be-independent-in-five-years-declares-sturgeon-8r7nc62zj [Accessed 13 Feb. 2019].

10. Blagden, “Britain and the world after Brexit,” 11.

11. Heisbourg, F. (2016) Brexit and European Security. Survival. 58(3), pp.13-22.

12. Duke, S. (2018) Will Brexit Damage our Security and Defence?: The Impact on the UK and EU. Cham: Springer Nature.

13. Morrow, D., and J. Byrne. (2016) Playing Jenga? Northern Ireland after Brexit. Political Insight. 7(2), pp.30-31.

14. Gamble, A. (2018) Taking back control: the political implications of Brexit. Journal of European Public Policy. 25(8), pp.1215-1232.

15. Duke, “Will Brexit Damage our Security and Defence?,” 92

Choosing the Right Strategy: (Counter)Insurgency and (Counter)Terrorism as Competing Paradigms

Distinguishing between terrorism and insurgency is becoming increasingly challenging for policy-makers and military planners. Terrorist organisations cannot be disrupted through counter-insurgency techniques and insurgencies are extremely resilient to counter-terrorism strategies. Counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency, although similar in certain respects, identify divergent assumptions and modalities for dealing with terrorism and insurgency.

by Roberto Colombo

Distinguishing between terrorism and insurgency presents significant challenges that policy-makers and military officials need to face. Often, these threats are so interwoven that policy-makers, unable to separate the two, confront them by implementing similar strategies. However, confusion leads to counterproductive outcomes and, instead of containing and reducing threats, misguided measures have the potential to exacerbate the impact of political violence. Terrorism and insurgency are two distinct models of violent conflict. Therefore, they must not be confronted with one-size-fits-all approaches[1]. Consequently, understanding the difference between counter-terrorism (CT) and counter-insurgency (COIN) is a precondition for effectively engaging and disrupting terrorist organisations and insurgency movements, and this understanding is underpinned by the idea that ‘counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency are [neither] mutually exclusive’ nor interchangeable[2].

The United States Department of Defence (DoD) in 2014 defined terrorism as ‘the unlawful use of violence or threat of violence, often motivated by religious, political, or other ideological beliefs, to instil fear and coerce governments or societies in pursuit of goals that are usually political’[3]. Although terrorism is a long-lasting feature of political violence, counter-terrorism as a stand-alone strategy was developed during the 1970s and gained substantial importance in the post-9/11 era[4][5]. Before the 1970s, the majority of Western military analysts considered the phenomenon of terrorism mainly as one of the many tactics deployed by insurgency movements, therefore, countermeasures against terrorism were incorporated in COIN strategies. Military planners started to consider terrorism and insurgency as two separate threats when terrorist groups throughout the 70s composed of alienated individuals, such as the Italian Red Brigades and the German Red Army Faction, engaged in a season of attacks without achievable aims or trying to obtain popular support[6]. Hence, CT emerged as a strategy specifically designed to isolate and disrupt terrorist organisations that, deprived of the population’s support, could be promptly detected and neutralised. The DoD defines CT as ‘activities and operations taken to neutralize terrorists, their organizations, and networks in order to render them incapable of using violence to instil fear and coerce governments or societies to achieve their goals’[7].

Unlike the majority of terrorist organisations, insurgent groups consider it paramount to gain legitimacy from the greater population by championing deeper issues and grievances within society. Insurgencies, as defined by COIN scholar David Kilcullen, are ‘organised, protracted politico-military struggles designed to weaken the control and legitimacy of an established government, occupying power, or other political authority while increasing insurgent control’[8]. In other words, insurgencies are long-term conflicts that the insurgent party wages with the intention of overthrowing the government to take its place. The Vietcong’s uprising in South Vietnam against the central government in Saigon (1954-1976) and the Taliban’s attempts to overthrow the Afghan Government and obtain its power throughout the last 18 years are famous examples of protracted insurgencies. Because insurgents rely on their links with the local population for securing their survival and advancing their cause, governments that implement counter-terrorism strategies to engage insurgency movements are unlikely to emerge victorious. Consequently, strategies that rely on military operations designed to capture and kill insurgents without addressing the root causes of the insurgency are often counterproductive. This is because insurgents benefit from being deeply interconnected with local communities and, when the government launches large-scale operations, they can rely on the protection from the local population to melt away and ‘go quiet’[9]. It is thus not rare for governments to implement countermeasures that, without causing significant damages to the insurgents, generate civilian casualties, alienate local communities, and indirectly legitimise the insurgents in the eyes of the population. A clear example is given by Russia’s framing of the nationalist rebellion in Chechnya during the 1990s as a terrorist uprising. Moscow’s failure to understand that insurgency, and not terrorism, was the defining character of the two Chechen Wars led to the implementation of counter-terrorism strategies that turned a contained rebellion into a widespread jihadi insurgency. Russia’s brutal hunt for the alleged “terrorists” in Chechnya caused the death of innocent civilians, alienated local communities and created the perfect breeding ground for radicalisation and protracted violence in the region[10]. Therefore, successful COIN efforts, instead of only seeking to kill insurgents and disrupt their networks, are mainly directed at severing the link between insurgents and local communities (population-centric approaches). This is defined by Kilcullen as ‘a competition with the insurgent for the right and ability to win hearts, minds, and acquiescence of the population’[11].

CT and COIN are neither mutually exclusive nor interchangeable. The two are not mutually exclusive because if properly implemented their joint action can turn out to be highly successful in tackling terrorism and insurgency. Nevertheless, the marriage between CT and COIN is profitable only when the government is facing insurgents that adopt terrorism as one of their strategies. Firstly, population-centric COIN approaches sever the link between insurgents and population. Secondly, once insurgents are alienated from the local communities and lack the protection of the greater population, they become highly vulnerable to CT strategies. This was the case in Iraq during the “Surge” of U.S. troops in 2007. The strategic approach adopted by the U.S. in Iraq can be divided into two phases. Firstly, the massive deployment of U.S. and Iraqi soldiers provided security and support to the local communities. The long-term presence of security forces at the local level prevented the insurgents from controlling key areas and shifted the population’s allegiance from the insurgents to the security forces. Once these COIN techniques were proven successful in isolating the insurgents, U.S. forces launched the second phase of the “Surge”. Special Operations Forces (SOFs) efficiently combined counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency tactics, engaging insurgents and neutralising their networks without inflicting large numbers of civilian casualties[12]. Hence, before implementing CT strategies, the government must first win the population’s support. As previously mentioned, adapting the wrong strategies in such contexts not only inhibits the government’s success, but may also spawn backlashes, inadvertently strengthen the insurgents’ grip over local communities, and protract the conflict.

CT and COIN are not interchangeable either. Terrorist organisations cannot be disrupted through COIN techniques and insurgencies are extremely resilient to CT strategies. Consequently, adopting the wrong strategy often strengthens the hostile movement. COIN strategies are mainly directed at reinforcing the government’s legitimacy and addressing the root causes of the population’s grievances while granting secondary emphasis to capturing and killing insurgents. But when it comes to confronting alienated individuals determined to spread fear among the population, COIN efforts are generally ineffective. In these circumstances governments should implement CT strategies that emphasise military and law enforcement techniques. Conversely, CT strategies adopted in insurgency scenarios alienate the population, creating the perfect breeding ground for radicalisation and political violence, indirectly strengthening the insurgency.

Policy-makers and military officials often confuse insurgency for terrorism and vice versa because the two phenomena share many commonalities. As Kilcullen states, ‘terrorism is a component in almost all insurgencies, and insurgent objectives lie behind almost all non state terrorism’[13]. Although CT and COIN are not interchangeable, in certain contexts their joint action significantly improves the government’s ability to confront insurgents that implement terrorism as a tactic. The main difference between CT and COIN is that, while the former focuses on neutralising terrorists and disrupting their networks, the latter is an approach aimed at first marginalising, rather than destroying, the insurgent movement[14].

Sources:

[1] Younyoo K., Stephen B. (2013) “Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Russia: Contending Paradigms and Current Perspectives,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, Vol 36, No. 11, p. 918.

[2] Ibid., p. 920.

[3] United States Department of Defense (2014) Joint Publication 3-26: Counterterrorism, U.S. Government Printing Office, p. I-5.

[4] Boyle, M. (2010) “Do Counterterrorism and Counterinsurgency Go Together?,” International Affairs, Vol. 36, No. 2, p. 342. & Merari, A. (1993) “Terrorism as a Strategy of Insurgency,” Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol. 5, No. 4, p. 224-238.

[5] See Rinehart, J. (2010) “Counterterrorism and Counterinsurgency,” Perspectives on Terrorism, Vol. 4, No. 5, p. 34-37. for a cohesive summary of the origins and evolution of counterterrorism.

[6] Kilcullen, D. (2010) Counterinsurgency: Oxford University Press, p. 186

[7] United States Department of Defense (2014) Joint Publication 3-26: Counterterrorism, U.S. Government Printing Office, p. I-5.

[8] Kilcullen, Counterinsurgency, p. 1.

[9] Kilcullen, D (2009) The Accidental Guerrilla: Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One: Oxford University Press, p. 32.

[10] Younyoo, Blank, p. 919.

[11] Kilcullen, Counterinsurgency, p. 8.

[12] Kilcullen, The Accidental Guerrilla, p. 115-185.

[13] Kilcullen, Counterinsurgency, p. 184.

[14] Pratt, S. (2010, December 21). What is the difference between counterinsurgency and counter-terrorism?. Retrieved from E-International Relations: https://www.e-ir.info/2010/12/21/what-is-the-difference-between-counter-insurgency-and-counter-terrorism/, p. 4.

UK Access to EU Databases: The National Security Ramifications of a No Deal Brexit

The UK’s ability to prevent, prepare for, and respond to risks is enhanced by its ability to share data and expertise, exchange information, and collaborate closely with its nearest neighbours. Brexit presents a significant threat to both that information exchange and continued collaboration.

by Matthew Wentworth

At present standing, with one deal presented by British Prime Minister Theresa May having already failed to pass through the Commons, the consequences of a no deal Brexit are looming. It is a scenario which many Members of Parliament expressly wish to avoid as leaving the European Union (EU) without a deal would have ramifications for the United Kingdom’s (UK) transnational policing, counter-terror operations, national border control, and forensic investigative capabilities. Each of these areas will be directly and immediately affected in the event of a no deal Brexit due to the specific instruments that the UK stands to lose access to and the effect this will have on its ability to ensure national security.

Without an agreement the UK would leave Europol and UK police forces would lose use of the European Arrest Warrant (EAW), access to Europol’s Information System, and the EU Internet Referral Unit[1]. Not only this but the National Crime Agency would lose access to the EU’s network of Financial Intelligence Units (based at Europol) and the Bomb Data System[2]. Back in 2016 Mrs May cited the EAW when she stated that ‘there are definitely things we can do as members of the European Union that I think keep us more safe’[3]. Informing her view was the fact that in the period 2004–2016 the EAW enabled the UK to extradite 7000 individuals accused or convicted of criminal offences in other EU countries[4]. In the past five years alone, 5000 people have been extradited to EU member states using the EAW[5] highlighting its increasing importance. The prospect of the UK losing rights to the use of EAWs after withdrawing from the EU, and by extension Europol, would mean reverting to more costly and time-consuming measures due to the sudden absence of provisions for mutual recognition of judicial orders[6].

It is well understood that the UK’s lack of access to these instruments would serve neither the UK nor their European partners and whilst examples do exist of bespoke arrangements with third-states, leaving Europol would mean that at best Britain would have to settle for non-voting observer status, forfeiting the right of British officers to lead Europol teams[7]. The argument often presented by leave supporters from all parties that post-Brexit access to the EAW will be straightforward discounts the question of legal oversight of the European Court of Justice (ECJ)[8]. Mrs May has already conceded that any prospect of the UK’s participation in EU agencies such as Europol would mean respecting the remit of the ECJ[9]. This point is entirely at odds with what backbench Commons Members, specifically those of the European Research Group, will accept.

Instead, pro-Brexit Members of Parliament claim that the UK’s contribution to Europol databases as well as the expertise they provide in operations is a big enough bargaining chip to secure the UK access to instruments post-Brexit. Denmark, for example, is able to exchange data with Europol as a third-state, but this is only facilitated through the time-consuming process of Danish officers contacting Danish-speaking Europol staff and being granted the requested information on a case-by-case basis. Denmark does not have right of access to Europol data. The applicability of this arrangement to the UK is extremely doubtful, the EU-Danish agreement depends upon Denmark’s continued membership of the Schengen area, domestic legislative implementation of EU data protection laws, and acceptance of the jurisdiction of the ECJ. These conditions are unworkable for the UK since they undermine many facets of the decision to leave the EU[10].

National border control and customs security will be similarly affected with the updated Schengen Information System (SIS II) and the European Criminal Records Information System (ECRIS) being two further tools that the UK will lose in a no deal Brexit scenario[11]. The SIS II supports external border control and law enforcement cooperation across 22 participating EU countries (plus four associated countries). The staggering extent of its use amounts to it having been consulted 2.9 billion times in 2015[12]. In 2017 Britain alone checked the system over 500 million times in relation to searches for people and objects wanted for law enforcement purposes[13].

ECRIS is a decentralised system utilised by the majority of EU members and provides judges with the information on criminal records of persons which transcends state borders[14]. The government has proposed continued participation in this system, recognising that the UK relies on it for the effective management of violent and sexual offenders. This reliance is reflected in the fact that the UK sent and received over 163,000 requests and notifications for criminal records just in 2017, amounting to over 3,000 a week or 600 requests and notifications to and from the EU per working day[15]. Continued access to both SIS II and ECRIS is of the utmost importance for continued effective law enforcement yet it would require a unique agreement as, to date, there are no examples of access by non-EU or non-Schengen countries in either case[16]. Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, and Switzerland have access to SIS II but all are members of the Schengen area[17]. Politicians and academics alike have pointed to these countries as evidence that the UK will be able to access similar databases after it leaves the EU without recognition of the criteria it will have to fulfil as a third-state to do so. It currently takes six days to determine the domestic criminal convictions of EU nationals visiting the UK, post-Brexit the process could take up to ten times longer[18].

Similar time-delay concerns abound when considering the forensic investigative capabilities of the UK and the removal of access to both the European Asylum Dactyloscopy Database (Eurodac), and the Prüm Framework. In 2016 then Home Secretary Mrs May described the Prüm Framework (a cross European agreement to search DNA and fingerprint databases) as ‘a tool which hugely increases the reach of UK law enforcement’[19]. To have the same accessibility to both Prüm and Eurodac (a mechanism for sharing fingerprint data for asylum and law-enforcement purposes[20]) following a no deal Brexit, the UK would need to negotiate individual agreements with each EU government. The importance of continued access to the Prüm Framework has been challenged due to the fact that equivalent manual requests can be made through Interpol. The reality is that UK police forces sent 69 DNA profiles abroad in 2014-15 using Interpol, whereas 9,931 profiles were sent in less than six months during a pilot of the Prüm system[21] demonstrating that requests through Interpol are not an equitable comparison to the capability facilitated by Prüm.

All these platforms and information sharing systems are mutually beneficial to participating countries and many Brexit fears are exacerbated by the fact that the UK is both a large contributor and consumer of the information held and shared. What is often not considered however is that some mentioned above largely contain information on only convicted criminals rather than terrorist suspects. Classified or secret information on terror subjects, or information on counter-terror operations, are not shared on some databases because they are not sufficiently advanced to host intelligence above a classification level of “confidential”[22]. Intelligence relating to terror suspects and operations is contained on national security databases and are therefore shared between individual countries on a “need to know” basis, something that is not currently set to change after the UK leaves the EU. In the absence of a deal however it is possible that EU countries will demand proof of the UK’s willingness to recognise the rulings of the ECJ if it wishes to maintain current levels of counter-terrorism co-operation. Failure to offer this assurance could lead to renewed concerns amongst Member States about mass surveillance by the UK government and a decrease in the aforementioned co-operation.

The government has in-part identified non-EU mechanisms that exist to replace a proportion of the apparatus identified above but none would provide the same level of capability as those available in either a deal or remain scenario[23] meaning they would increase pressure on UK security, law enforcement, and judicial authorities. The fall-backs are slower, more bureaucratic, and ultimately less effective. The importance of introducing measures to combat these national security concerns is recognised by the government as evidenced by their assertion of the need to maintain, deepen, and strengthen operational and practical cooperation with the EU through an adequacy agreement. Given that over three-quarters of the UK’s data flows are with EU countries[24] it is certainly true that the absence of a deal will inevitably mean that the exchange of personal data for law enforcement and criminal justice purposes would be impacted[25]. UK capabilities in cross-border policing, counter-terror operations, national border control, and forensic investigative capabilities stand to be severely disadvantaged.  The uncertainty and instability that Brexit is causing in the information sharing and transnational policing realms stand to be exploited by terrorists and organised crime cells. Both the EU and the UK would be negatively affected by the immediate operational disruption and security implications[26] potentially affecting the political stability of all concerned.

Sources:

1. de Vries, G. (2018) A hard Brexit will see criminals taking back control. LSE Brexit Blog. Available at: http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/brexit/2018/03/12/a-hard-brexit-will-see-criminals-taking-back-control/ [Accessed 4 Dec. 2018].

2. ibid.

3. Mason, R. (2016) Leaked recording shows Theresa May is 'ignoring her own warnings' on Brexit. The Guardian. [online] Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2016/oct/26/leaked-recording-shows-theresa-may-is-ignoring-her-own-warnings-on-brexit [Accessed 6 Jan. 2019].

4. House of Lords (2016) Leaving the European Union: Foreign and Security Policy Cooperation. London: Her Majesty's Stationary Office.

5. May, T. (2016) The UK, EU and our place in the world. Institute of Mechanical Engineers, London.

6. Cabinet Office (2018) National Security Capability Review. London: Her Majesty's Stationary Office.

7. de Vries, “A hard Brexit”.

8. Duke, S. (2018) Will Brexit Damage our Security and Defence?: The Impact on the UK and EU. Cham: Springer Nature.

9. de Vries, “A hard Brexit”.

10. House of Commons European Scrutiny Committee (2017) Third-Second Report of Session 2016–17. London: House of Commons.

11. Inkster, N. (2016) Brexit, Intelligence and Terrorism. Survival. 58(3), pp.23-30.

12. House of Lords, Leaving the European Union, p.17.

13. European Agency for the Operational Management of Large-Scale IT Systems in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (2018) SIS II – 2017 Statistics. Tallinn: eu-LISA.

14. Duke, Will Brexit Damage our Security and Defence?, p.62.

15. National Crime Agency (2017) Historical European Arrest Warrants statistics: Calendar and Financial year totals 2004 - May 2016. London: National Crime Agency.

16. Duke, Will Brexit Damage our Security and Defence?, p.68.

17. Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS) (2018) Criminal Justice and Police Cooperation between the EU and the UK after Brexit: Towards a principled and trust-based partnership. [online] Brussels: CEPS. Available at: https://www.ceps.eu/system/files/TFR_EU-UK_Cooperation_Brexit_0.pdf [Accessed 6 Dec. 2018].

18. Inkster, “Brexit, Intelligence and Terrorism”, p.31.

19. House of Lords (2015) Hansard. col. 1637. Available at: https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld201516/ldhansrd/text/151209-0002.htm [Accessed 10 Dec. 2018].

20. Duke, Will Brexit Damage our Security and Defence?, p.66.

21. Cabinet Office, National Security Capability Review, p.6.

22. House of Lords, Leaving the European Union, p.8.

23. Doffman, Z. (2018) Brexit Chaos: Why It Is A Major Terrorism And Security Risk. Forbes. [online] Available at: https://www.forbes.com/sites/zakdoffman/2018/11/15/brexit-chaos-why-it-is-a-major-terrorism-and-security-risk/# [Accessed 5 Jan. 2019].

24. Duke, Will Brexit Damage our Security and Defence?, p.69.

25. Cabinet Office, National Security Capability Review, p.18

26. Duke, Will Brexit Damage our Security and Defence?, p.69.

Environmental Migration and Conflict in West Africa

In the coming decades, climate change will push an astounding number of people to flee their homes in West Africa to search for new places where food, health, and environmental security will be more accessible. Addressing this issue in the earliest phases will play a fundamental role in the coming decades’ policy outcome.

by Stefano de Blasi

Climate change represents one of the principal long-term challenges to international security, which is increasingly recognised as a threat multiplier within the current security landscape. Although there is no mono-causal correlation between climate change, migration, and conflicts, it would be dangerous to underestimate the impact of environmental changes on population displacement and regional conflicts. The effects of climate change are expected to pose a significant threat to West African developing countries due to their lack of wealth, strong institutions, and reliable infrastructures[i]. The absence of these assets, and the high-dependency of their population to natural resources, renders several Western African countries particularly vulnerable to the effects of climate change.

West Africa has already been one of the most affected regions by climate change due to the aggravation of chronic problems such as water scarcity, and the increasing likelihood of rainfall shortage, desertification, and land degradation. The absence of solid infrastructures and technologies to adapt to the hostile effects of climate change may produce severe consequences for the regional socio-economic sphere causing insufficient food security, drastic water shortages, health-related risks, and eventually social unrest[ii]. Moreover, climate change has altered the frequency, intensity and duration of such threats[iii], producing further challenges to the resilience of West African countries.

The data collected by researchers in the field of environmental security offers a worrying picture of the consequences that climate change may produce in the region. According to the 2007 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), average temperatures in West Africa are expected to rise as much as 3°C by 2050, potentially causing devasting effects to the security of the region. The resilience of this ecosystem will also be challenged by an estimated 10 percent reduction in annual rainfall by the same year[iv]. Given the region’s dependency on rainfed agriculture (it is estimated that this covers approximately 96 percent of total crop production[v]), the consequences of such an environmental shift may prove to be fatal in terms of food security and demographic growth. The combination of these environmental issues with one of the highest population growth rates in the world could in turn lead West Africa to food shortages, famines in drought years, and massive human displacements[vi].

Migration has always represented an important adaptive mechanism for people facing environmental changes. Internal urban and coastal migration remains the most common response to climate-driven issues. However, in West Africa these migrations constitute a serious challenge to large cities that aim to absorb and integrate large groups of people who were forced to flee their homes due to sudden natural disasters or long-term effects of climate change[vii]. The discourse is different when it comes to external migrations – i.e. migration flows directed to different countries. One of the major problems in this field concerns acquiring the refugee status for those forced to migrate due to unusual environmental shifts. Currently, no official international convention or definition concerning environmental refugees has been produced. Therefore, these refugees live in a normative limbo, incapable of obtaining recognition or protection abroad. Considering the growing threat the environment is posing to this region, this aspect represents a significant issue in the international normative framework.

Climate-induced migrations in West Africa could also damage the stability of hosting societies, particularly in the case of underdeveloped economies with scarce resources and political instability[viii]. Climate change in this case might exacerbate pre-existing socio-economic and ethnic tensions within the receiving area and it might trigger internal competitions over natural resources and workable lands. This is what is happening right now in the Lake Chad region for example. In the past 50 years this lake has shrunk by 90 percent due to changing environmental conditions, misuse and overuse, and massive population growth. These changes have exasperated disputes for resources and land in this region, which hosts more than 300 local ethnic groups as well as migrant workers[ix]. Thus far, these tensions have concerned mainly rural populations, but it will be fundamental to observe closely how this scenario develops in urban regions in order to prevent any major violent escalation.

In the coming decades, climate change will push an astounding number of people to flee their homes in West Africa to search for new places where food, health, and environmental security will be more accessible. Although offering an accurate estimate of the magnitude of the potential implications of this scenario is beyond our capacities at this moment, addressing this issue in the earliest phases will play a fundamental role in the coming decades’ policy outcome. Enhancing the adaptation and the resilience of West African countries to the adverse effects of climate change is fundamental to preventing forced massive displacement across, and even beyond, this region. The consequences of such a scenario could prove to be dramatic in terms of destabilising mass migrations and potential socio-economic conflicts.

Sources:

[i] Reuveny Rafael, 2007. Climate change-induced migration and violent conflict. Political Geography 26, pp. 656-673.

[ii] Brown Oli et al., 2007. Climate Change as the ‘New Security Threat: Implications for Africa. International Affairs, 83:6. Available at: https://www.jstor.org/stable/4541915

[iii] Stapleton Opitz Sara et al., 2017. Climate change, Migration and Displacement. [online] Available at: https://www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/resource-documents/11874.pdf

[iv] Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. 2007. Impact, adaptation, and Vulnerability.

[v] Serdeczny Olivia et al., 2016. Climate change impacts in Sub-Saharan Africa: from physical changes to their social ripercussions. Regional Environmental Change.

[vi] Warner Koko et al., 2009. In Search of a Shelter – Mapping the Effects of Climate Change on Human Migration and Displacement. [online] Available at: https://www.ciesin.columbia.edu/documents/clim-migr-report-june09_final.pdf

[vii] United Nations Environment Programme. 2011. Livelihood Security - Climate Change, Conflict and Migration in the Sahel. [online] Available at: https://postconflict.unep.ch/publications/UNEP_Sahel_EN.pdf

[viii] Raleigh Clionadh et al., 2008. Assessing the Impact of Climate Change on Migration and Conflict.[online] Available at: https://environmentalmigration.iom.int/assessing-impact-climate-change-migration-and-conflict

[ix] UNEP, 2001. Livelihood Security.

Strategic Turnaround? Russia’s Support to the Afghan Taliban and its Strategic Implications

We know that the Russians are involved, stated U.S. Army General John Nicholson during an interview with the BBC, publicly accusing Russia of smuggling loads of weapons to the Taliban. Russia’s logistical and financial support to the Afghan Taliban is a short-term security insurance, and a profitable long-term investment, for the Kremlin’s future geopolitical manoeuvres.

By Roberto Colombo

During 2018, United States (U.S.) military commanders in Afghanistan repeatedly reported that the Taliban received material, financial and logistical support from Russian representatives.[1] “We know that the Russians are involved,” stated U.S. Army General John Nicholson during an interview with the BBC, publicly accusing Russia of smuggling loads of weapons to the Taliban.[2] These allegations were backed up by testimonies of Afghan police and military officials, which reported to Western media that recently-produced Russian military equipment, including night-vision goggles, heavy machine guns and small arms, is now part of the Taliban’s arsenal.[3] Russia denied any involvement in the alleged shipment of Russian weapons to the Afghan Taliban, declaring that these weapons could have been smuggled by several transnational non-state actors.[4] This escalation of suspicions and accusations demonstrates that Russia’s increasing influence in Afghanistan is causing significant problems for the U.S. and the Afghan Government. Russia’s decision to embrace the Taliban stands in clear contrast with the previous history of logistical help that Moscow guaranteed to the U.S.-led forces fighting the Taliban.[5] Why is Moscow reversing its political stance regarding Afghanistan? This article will analyse Russia’s strategic turnaround from three perspectives: geopolitical considerations, national security and long-term interests.

Geopolitical considerations are an evident catalyst of Russia’s strategic turnaround. In the wake of Russia’s revisionism, Moscow is unlikely to discard the occasion that the Afghan quagmire offers to its regional aspirations. Russia’s support to the Taliban poses significant extra costs on the U.S. because a stronger insurgency in Afghanistan jeopardises the progress that counterinsurgency (COIN) operations achieved during years of protracted political and military engagement. Consequently, the Taliban resurgence in Afghanistan forces the U.S. to strengthen its presence in the country. Without the United States’ support, the Afghan Government is unlikely to regain control of the provinces overrun by the enemy. The increasing amounts of resources and personnel diverted to Afghanistan limits the United States’ capability of projecting its hard and soft power in other regions. Therefore, while the U.S. tries to prevent the Taliban from seizing power in Kabul, Moscow is incentivised to expand its influence in North Africa, the Middle East and in the Euro-Atlantic area.[6]

Nevertheless, Russia’s primary interest regarding Afghanistan is directly linked to the security and protection of its external borders.[7] Moscow, by providing support to the Taliban, is aiming at disrupting the presence of the Islamic State (IS) in Afghanistan. The IS is considered by the Taliban a hostile entity that challenges their monopoly on insurgency. Therefore, the Taliban are determined to force the IS out of Afghanistan through the use of force. Similarly, Russia regards the Islamic State as a threat because it poses several challenges to its security. Among these difficulties, the return of foreign fighters to Russia, the connections between the IS in Afghanistan and segments of the underground North Caucasian insurgency and the influence of the IS propaganda on Russia’s population are the most concerning.[8] Russia and the Taliban are partnering because they share a common enemy and their interests are mutually compatible. While the Taliban are focused exclusively on dominating Afghanistan and do not have any interest in expanding their presence outside the country’s borders, the IS strives for enlarging its network both in Russia and Afghanistan.[9] The imperative of preventing the spread of takfiri ideology (radical Islam) and the radicalisation of segments of the Russian society would explain the alleged smuggling of Russian weapons to the Taliban. These weapons do not provide the Taliban with enough firepower to challenge the U.S. forces supremacy, but they can make a difference in the fight against the IS. Furthermore, Russia’s top-priority of disrupting the Islamic State’s cells in Afghanistan also explains why the Russian foreign ministry shared intelligence with the Taliban regarding the movements of the Islamic State’s fighters in Afghanistan.[10]

Lastly, long-term interests of Russia’s support to the Taliban must be considered. The Kremlin is aware that the Taliban are a reality in Afghanistan that cannot be ignored.[11] When Russian officials, interviewed by press representatives, give statements such as “defeating the Taliban by military means is no longer an option,”[12] they are embracing the fact that peaceful settlements of the Afghan situation are meaningless without the Taliban’s consensus. Consequently, having a leverage on the largest non-state actor in Afghanistan enables Russia to seize a favourable position from which to influence the peace talks that could eventually take place between the Taliban and the Afghan Government.

For the U.S., Russia’s support to the Taliban represents a serious problem that could jeopardise years of progress towards a peaceful resolution of the conflict, favourable to the U.S. backed Afghan Government. The Taliban, counting on the assistance of a great power, are likely to increase their efforts to overthrow the central government and refuse to be party to U.S. sponsored peace talks. In contrast, insurgents would be inclined to cooperate during meetings sanctioned by Russia specifically designed to advance Moscow’s projects for the region.

A reconciliation between the Taliban and the Afghan Government that would not deliver the control of the country to the insurgents has always been a difficult objective to achieve. Currently, Russia’s increasing interference and the Taliban’s growing capabilities suggest that a conflict resolution beneficial to the United States’ strategic interests is, for the moment, out of reach.[13] Therefore, there are no short-term solutions at the United States’ disposal. Furthermore, Trump’s plans to withdraw a significant number of troops from Afghanistan in 2019 indicate that forcing the Taliban to the negotiation table is no longer considered a viable option by U.S. policy-makers. At this point, predicting how the Afghan dilemma will evolve in the coming months is not possible. What is certain is that Russia’s support to the Taliban is adding uncertainty to an already strategically complex situation.

Russia, from its relationship with the Taliban, gains geopolitical advantages, national security guarantees and long-term interests at a relatively low political, financial and logistical cost. For all the reasons addressed in this article, Russia’s support to the Taliban is a short-term security insurance, and a profitable long-term investment, for the Kremlin’s future geopolitical manoeuvres.[14]

Sources:

[1] Groll, E. (2018, April 2). Security Brief: Russia Providing Arms to Taliban; China’s Global Kidnapping Campaign. Retrieved from Foreign Policy: https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/04/02/security-brief-russia-providing-arms-to-taliban-chinas-global-kidnapping-campaign/.

[2] Azami, D. (2018, April 2). Is Russia Arming the Afghan Taliban?. Retrieved from BBC World Service: https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-41842285.

[3] Ibid.

[4] Rasmussen, S. (2017, October 22). Russia Accused of Supplying Taliban as Power Shifts Create Strange Bedfellows. Retrieved from The Guardian: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/oct/22/russia-supplying-taliban-afghanistan.

[5] Chellaney, B. (2017, March 8). Putin’s Dance with the Taliban. Retrieved from The Japan Times: https://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2017/03/08/commentary/world-commentary/putins-dance-taliban/#.XA-C6y2cat8.

[6] Sazonov, V. (2017, June 16). Afghanistan as an Example of the Kremlin’s Hybrid Warfare-Why Russia is Arming the Taliban. Retrieved from International Centre for Defence and Security: https://icds.ee/afghanistan-as-an-example-of-the-kremlins-hybrid-warfare-why-russia-is-arming-the-taliban/, p. 7.

[7] Kaura, V. (2018) “Russia’s Changing Relations with Pakistan and Taliban: Implications for India,” Jadvpur Journal of International Relations, Vol. 22, No. 1, p. 73.

[8] Stepanova, E. (2018) “Russia’s Afghan Policy in the Regional and Russia-West Contexts,” Russie.NEI.Reports, No. 23, p. 22.

[9] Rayan, M. (2018, October 12). The Kremlin’s Comeback. Retrieved from The Washington Post: https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/world/wp/2018/10/12/feature/behind-the-scenes-russia-regains-a-complicated-status-afghanistan-power-broker/?utm_term=.072b3271945b.

[10] Rasmussen, Russia Accused of Supplying Taliban as Power Shifts Create Strange Bedfellows.

[11] Azami, D. (2018, April 2). Is Russia Arming the Afghan Taliban?. Retrieved from BBC World Service: https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-41842285.

[12] Stepanova, p.28.

[13] Chellaney, B. Putin’s Dance with the Taliban. [14] Rayan, The Kremlin’s Comeback.

Colombia’s Tenuous Peace

Colombia’s 2016 Peace Deal with the FARC helped to lessen violence. However, without increased development efforts in rural areas, the toll of past conflict on society may prevent long-term sustainability, justice, and recovery. The new administration of Colombian President Iván Duque Márquez is projected to subvert major post-conflict initiatives and risks reigniting paramilitary conflict.

By Cassandra Stimpson

The Peace Deal signed between the Colombian government and the paramilitary Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) in 2016 brought “closure” to nearly sixty years of conflict. Yet, rampant threats remain after the deal was signed including poverty, inequality, illicit economies, corruption, and non-state actor violence.

Since 2002, conflict with the FARC has declined and ultimately ceased through negotiations and increased state control of rural areas. Differences in the three administrations of Álvaro Uribe (2002-2010), Juan Manuel Santos (2010-2018) and recently elected President Iván Duque (August 2018-present) lie in strategic approaches. Uribe’s militarism emphasized counterterrorism and combating the drug trade. Santos relied heavily on rural development and peace process negotiations with rebel groups. Duque, who recently took office, is closely tied with past President Uribe. Duque was able to secure the party’s nomination through Uribe’s endorsement, and both were strong critics of Santos and the peace deal throughout the campaign. It appears that Duque will take Uribe’s hardline no-negotiation approach, which may revive conflict with the FARC and potentially influence other non-state armed groups [i].

The removal of the FARC’s paramilitary presence after sixty years of intra-state conflict has highlighted chronic issues such as high rates of internal displacement, a lack of government presence in rural areas, ubiquitous organized crime, and unequal access to and ownership of resources. This leaves the “peace” in Colombia tenuous. Although Duque is obligated to fulfill certain peace treaty pledges, the funding of said activities is reliant on an economically stressed local tax base for politically unpopular, long term solutions. They key issues outlined below will determine if this “post-conflict” era can endure[ii].

A major challenge is the FARC’s reintegration into society after their demobilisation and subsequent transformation into a political party. After the peace deal was signed, about 2,800 former FARC members have joined or formed insurgencies to fight other criminal groups and the government to illegally obtain natural resources[iii]. A key factor to the sustainability of the government deal is employment and literacy training, as well as psycho-social support, given to ex-combatants in zonas verdales (green zones, which are essentially transition camps) for reintegration purposes. However the zonas have already been implemented improperly due to lack of financing and administrative attention, and Duque will likely further subvert activities and defund many aspects of the plan[iv].

Part of the new president’s popularity was due to his campaign rhetoric that disapproved of Santos’ peace deal, especially its leniency towards past FARC combatants, many of whom have terrorised ordinary Colombians for decades. The FARC not only evaded punishment in the deal, but were also guaranteed seats in Congress. Political posts will go to prior FARC military officials. Ex-FARC members were promised support in the peace deal, though this has not thus far been actualised, leaving the ex-combatants with little government assistance. This carries high risk of recidivism to illegal activities. Though some former fighters receive short-term monthly stipends, lack of access to land or jobs will inhibit societal engagement. Most ex-FARC have already left the zonas with no functional oversight mechanisms to  account for their whereabouts[v].

In absence of the FARC, the Ejército de Liberación Nacional (ELN) remain the largest leftist paramilitary group after decades of conflict, and remain an active threat, having committed large-scale violence within 2018[vi]. After government negotiations stalled under Santos, the group took control of remote areas along the Venezuelan border, displacing people and disrupting local economies[vii]. The Duque administration’s hardline stance on pre-emptive conditions for negotiations may stall them for the foreseeable future, leaving the ELN to destabilize areas that already have decreased government presence. The ELN also participate heavily in Venezuelan illicit economies and are entrenched with Venezuelan politics, which complicates the Colombo-Venezuelan relationship[viii]. With Venezuela’s porous border and current migration crisis, the ELN will likely remain on the strategic backburner for Colombia. Duque’s harsh conditions for negotiations, combined with the ELN’s decentralized nature will likely allow this issue to fester.

Concerns remain that ex-combatants and other opportunists will fill the FARC power vacuum due to lingering societal inequities. While Colombia has scattered major non-state groups, new and smaller criminal gangs perpetuate the same type of violence and crime, mainly in remote, jungle, or otherwise inaccessible terrain[ix]. The peace deal ostensibly addresses this by increasing oversight in rural areas, but this is politically unpopular and expensive.

Regional relations have a large impact on Colombia’s internal conflict. Venezuela and Ecuador harbour paramilitary units and criminal gangs, and deal in illicit economies. Additionally, instability in Venezuela has led to a mass migration, which Colombia may not have the capacity to handle alongside implementation of key peace accord developments. Colombia cannot afford to ignore these relationships if it truly wants to fight illicit trades and transnational crime. Yet, Duque and his ill will toward Caracas may re-suspend Venezuelan relations, complicating cross-border co-operation to dismantle paramilitary groups[x]. 

Internal development hinges on implementation of the post-conflict FARC deal in many ways. The new Duque administration puts the deal at risk, though institutional and state backing of the accord (from regional partners, the EU, the UN Security Council, and more) may keep key actions from subversion. Either way, state consolidation is vital. Through different administrations, the goal has been essentially the same: to have presence in, and the ability to secure, regulate, and tax, all corners of Colombia. Duque’s security strategy is due for release in 2019, and may bridge Santos’ peace deal approaches on development with Uribe’s militaristic expansion. In the meantime however, risks run high of a resurgence of non-state control of the economy, security, and overall control of Colombia.

Sources:

[i] “Risky Business: The Duque Government’s Approach to Peace in Colombia” (Bogotá/Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2018), https://www.crisisgroup.org/latin-america-caribbean/andes/colombia/67-risky-business-duque-governments-approach-peace-colombia.

[ii] “Risky Business: The Duque Government’s Approach to Peace in Colombia.”

[iii] Nicholas Casey and Federico Rios Escobar, “Colombia Struck a Peace Deal With Guerrillas, but Many Return to Arms,” The New York Times, November 1, 2018, sec. World, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/18/world/americas/colombia-farc-peace.html.

[iv] Vanda Felbab-Brown, “Death by Bad Implementation? The Duque Administration and Colombia’s Peace Deal(S),” Brookings Institution, July 24, 2018, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2018/07/24/death-by-bad-implementation-the-duque-administration-and-colombias-peace-deals/.

[v] Vanda Felbab-Brown.

[vi] Shannon Kirby, “FARC Dissidents and the ELN Turn Venezuela Into Criminal Enclave,” InSight Crime (blog), December 10, 2018, https://www.insightcrime.org/news/analysis/farc-dissidents-eln-turn-venezuela-criminal-enclave/.

[vii] June S. Beittel, “Colombia: Background and U.S. Relations” (Congressional Research Service, November 14, 2017), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R43813.pdf.

[viii] Beittel.

[ix] Kelly Grant, “EPL,” InSight Crime (blog), March 9, 2018, https://www.insightcrime.org/colombia-organized-crime-news/epl/.

[x] Kirby, “FARC Dissidents and the ELN Turn Venezuela Into Criminal Enclave.”

America, Cassandra Stimpson, Other

Reform of the French Intelligence Oversight System

French intelligence remains a very secretive world from the public view, and the little presence it occupies in the press or public debate is more often than not one of scandal, abuse or failure. Nevertheless, a wave of reforms is attempting to perfect this system, and in some cases, to create effective intelligence oversight mechanisms.

By Anne Lise Michelot

French intelligence remains a very secretive world from the public view, and the little presence it occupies in the press or public debate is more often than not one of scandal, abuse or failure. In 2008, the government initiated a reform process of the intelligence organisation, and continued in 2015, following the numerous terrorist attacks on the national territory. The result of this long process of reshaping the intelligence community has included attempts at perfecting, and in some cases creating, oversight mechanisms. [1]

These reforms have been the subject of public and parliamentary debates for the past decade, as many politicians, scholars and journalists pointed out the lack of supervision and the relative freedom intelligence agencies enjoyed in performing their activities. Today, the French oversight system comprises a specific institution for each type of control. This diversified/plural system was completed with the creation of a new institution, the Commission Nationale de Contrôle des Techniques de Renseignement, CNCTR (national commission for the control of intelligence techniques) in 2015.

The CNCTR is an independent administrative body in charge of controlling the legality and proportionality of the techniques implemented by intelligence agencies. Its creation was intended to counterbalance the use of modern data collection techniques introduced by the 2015 law, which many critics deemed too intrusive and disrespectful of civil liberties. [2]

Intelligence agencies are required to make requests to be examined by the CNCTR before putting in place a new surveillance technique against a target. The inspection includes the respect of procedures, the technique being justified by the threat and the proportionality of the invasion of privacy. The CNCTR then makes a non-binding recommendation to the Prime Minister, who is in charge of the approval.

Reviews can also be carried out after implementation of the technique, in particular, to ensure that it is not continued without justified motives. This can be done as well upon request of individuals who feel they are the victim of illegal techniques. If the control proves that the use of the technique is unlawful, the Commission can recommend that it be discontinued and the information destroyed. If the recommendation is not followed, it can refer the case to the Conseil d’Etat, who has the power to make these recommendations compulsory.

According to the first report it produced after a year of existence, the Commission can deliver a recommendation within a few hours, or even minutes in case of emergency. From October 2015 to October 2016, it replied to 66 584 requests, of which 1 263 resulted in negative recommendations. All these were followed by the Prime Minister and the techniques were not implemented.

Despite what seem like promising results for a young institution, the effectiveness of the CNTCR can be questioned and certainly leaves room for improvement.

Most of the flaws stem from the access the CNCTR has to the information it needs. The data collected through other techniques than phone tapping is not centralised, forcing the agency’s investigators to travel to local branches across the national territory in order to carry out inspections [3]. With no direct access to the intelligence gathered through modern techniques, the CNTCR is limited to the information intelligence agencies are willing to provide.

With only fifteen agents, the CNCTR is not equipped to undertake such a time-consuming quest. In fact, it might not be sufficiently equipped to process the tremendous amount of requests (66 584 in a year) given all the information it is supposed to look upon each time. When its first annual report declares that some recommendations were delivered within minutes, one might question whether all the facts were properly taken into consideration before it was issued and the quality of such recommendations. [4]

The creation of the CNCTR in 2015 to oversee the usage of intelligence techniques has attempted to bring France up to high democratic standards in terms of intelligence oversight. However, the commission’s limited means hinder its ability to perform fully its duties. And let’s not forget that its recommendations are not binding! These considerations require particular attention now that France has entered the age of mass data collection, with the first IMSI-catchers set up in November 2017 and no additional workforce for the CNCTR in sight. [5] There is still some way to go before fully democratic intelligence oversight is achieved.

 

Structure of the French oversight system

Sources:

[1] Vadillo F. (2016 January), “Les modalités du contrôle démocratique des services de renseignement : scruter l’état secret”. Après-demain 37, 40-42.

[2] Guiliano C. (2015 March 31). “Jean-Marie Delarue (CNCIS) : "Le projet de loi renseignement n’est pas adapté aux libertés publiques"”. AEF Info.

[3] Chataignier L., Geraud A., Gauthier T. (2017 February 17), “L’Etat de droit à l’épreuve du renseignement : Bilan du premier rapport d’activité de la CNCTR”. La Revue des droits de l’homme, p3.

[4] Rees, M. (2016 December 14). “Renseignement : ce que nous apprend le premier rapport de la CNCTR”. Next Inpact.

[5] Alonso P., Guiton A. (2016 December 13). “Les services qui nous surveillent sont-ils mieux contrôlés ?”. Libération.