Discord of War in Yemen: Is Liberating Hodeidah Strategic?

The liberation of Hodeidah will strategically enhance the UN-led peace process and the global humanitarian response to the world’s largest humanitarian crisis in 100 years, unlike what some western practitioners and researchers from the outside contend. To the Houthis, Hodeidah is a supply artery for survival at best and a negotiation stick at worst. Once liberated they are debilitated militarily, financially and politically favouring Yemen Peace Process and millions of Yemenis in dire need of relief aids.

By Ibrahim Jalal

After the Coalition-backed Joint Forces made rapid military advancements and halted the Houthi supply lines in Yemen’s coastal city on the Red Sea, Hodeidah, through a concerted strategy of port’s encirclement within a 4-km diameter in early November, the Houthis defensively reinforced a strategy of terror, from mine-laying on public roads and in humanitarian facilities to arbitrary destruction [1]. Hassan Zaid, a senior Houthi leader, said on a Twitter post: “The Villains’ dream of controlling the port of Hodeidah and if you managed to, would rebuild it from scratch. Trust that! You will not rejoice victory …  Neither the port nor public and private properties be more precious than the blood of martyrs and Mujahdeen. Let it be Aleppo! [2].” Drawing on these developments, the British Foreign Secretary Jeremy Hunt visited Riyadh and Abu Dhabi on 12th November to de-escalate the offensive and advocated the resumption of UN-led political efforts in Sweden [3]. One day later, Lise Grande – the UN humanitarian coordinator for Yemen – and David Beasley – the Executive Director of the World Food Programme – visited Hodeidah and met with Houthi representatives to discuss the prospects of de-escalation and ceasefire [4]. The situation on the ground is now less intense with continued Houthi violence and the Joint Forces on standby, while Griffiths is seemingly crafting a new peace proposal.

It is, however, worth noting that this is a reoccurring international intervention to hinder the military liberation of Hodeidah based on humanitarian justification while turning a blind eye to the Houthi cruel behaviour for the second time within 5 months.

On 1st July 2018, the Coalition-backed forces de-escalated the military offensive aiming at the restoration of Hodeidah from the Houthi insurgency upon the UN Special Envoy Martin Griffiths’ plea [5]. Chief issues to the Envoy’s requests were a global apprehension of aggravating the considerably alarming humanitarian circumstance and the UN intention to reactivate ‘Yemen Peace Process’ nearly two years after Kuwait II Peace Talks collapsed.

This structural pressure, unsurprisingly, failed to convince the Houthis to either withdraw peacefully from Hodeidah as Griffiths suggested or even partake in ‘Geneva Consultations’ leading to the re-escalation of the Hodeida offensive in late October [6]. Although this cycle of peace-conflict dynamics reveals an articulated tension between hard-headed domestic needs and ambiguous global priorities, this piece argues that the liberation of Hodeidah will strategically enhance the UN-led peace process and the global humanitarian response to the world’s largest humanitarian crisis in 100 years, unlike what some international researchers and practitioners in London, Paris, and Washington advocate.

The UN-led Peace Process and Hodeidah Liberation

In the realm of political efforts, liberating Hodeidah province from the Houthi militia, whether peacefully or militarily, is vital to shifting the existing structure of power at the domestic level. Largely because the Houthis tightened power grip in Sana’a and areas of influence after killing their one-time ally Ali Abdullah Saleh – the Chairman of General People’s Congress and Yemen’s ex-President, they impeded the effective reactivation of peace process [7]. In fact, the Houthis abandoned attending ‘Geneva Consultations’ in September 2018 upon the UN-sponsored de-escalation [8]. Built around premises of status quo and by extension bargaining chips, the ex-Envoy Ould Cheikh condemned the Houthis’ irresponsible behaviour throughout four official rounds of UN-led consultations/talks between 2015 and 2016 in Geneva, Biel, and Kuwait at the Security Council [9].

On the other hand, it is no surprise that the delegation of the internationally legitimate government of President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi attended Geneva Consultations. Yemen’s Minister of Foreign Affairs Khaled Al-Yamani reaffirmed to the international community that they are not advocating war like the Houthis, but rather peace advocates – a sign of continuing goodwill and high commitment to the UN-led peace process [10]. Considering the behaviours of warring parties towards Griffiths’ invite in Geneva, it is highly unlikely that the Houthis will ‘engage constructively’ in the UN-led peace consultations in Sweden without being weakened. A critical military defeat in, or a peaceful retreat from, Hodeidah would suffice to incentivise their desire for peace. Only an imbalance in the present distribution of power will yield a rational interest in peace, and thus a propensity to meaningful peace talks designed around the three references: The Gulf Cooperation Council initiative, the conclusions of the National Dialogue Conference, and UNSCR 2216 (2015).

Strategic Viewpoint of Hodeidah’s Liberation

From a strategic viewpoint, Hodeidah’s port is a primary source of Houthi power; ranging from military and financial capabilities to often undelivered and looted international humanitarian aids. Militarily, the Tehran-backed militia has reportedly received Iranian-manufactured smuggled arms through Houthi-controlled ports, Sayyad-2C ground-to-air missiles, Qiam-1 short-range ballistic missiles and ‘Behine Pardazan Rizmojsanat’ (BP-RMS) tracking systems to name a few [11]. Financially, the Houthis have imposed taxes and tariffs on commercial goods entering through Hodeidah port to financially sustain fighting while controlling the flow of humanitarian aids by their rules [12]. According to Lise Grande, 70 % of all national imports and 90% of food and medical supplies enter through the port of Hodeidah [13]. Upon the Joint Forces’ seizure of the Red Sea Mills miles to Hodeidah on 7th November, a social media post revealed a para-military member with a large supply of grain, roughly 45 thousand tons enough to feed 3.5 million citizens for a month. Due to the proximity of the undistributed humanitarian aid to the base of the Houthis and utility of aids for business purposes in markets it suggests complicity [14]. Therefore, as along as Hodeida’s port and stores of external assistance remain under the control of the Houthis, they will be able to finance war, influence the distribution of aids, and compel the international community on grounds of calculated humanitarian consequences. The Houthis are the biggest impediment to safe and effective delivery of humanitarian aids to millions in Yemen.

By extending the above logic, no one could substantially claim that the international organisations operating in Yemen within Houthi-controlled zones have not functioned the Houthi way. This paradox alludes to two interlinked facts: the Houthis have weakened the humanitarian response on the ground and the international community has helped to sustain the insurgent’s power through reinforcing a global humanitarian discourse on the war in Yemen. In this endeavour, the global forces have systematically overlooked the root causes of the humanitarian crisis in Yemen and enabled the Houthi to play the ‘human insecurities card’ shifting the political nature of the conflict at the international stage to humanitarian per se [15].

Restoring Hodeidah, therefore, will bolster humanitarian and relief efforts to the world’s biggest ‘Houthi-caused’ humanitarian crisis. The Coalition-backed regime must strengthen its internal legitimacy through the delivery of basic services, including the facilitation of international and local humanitarian efforts, should Hodeidah be under their control.

Hodeidah Between Hard Choices: The Way Forward

The battle for Hodeidah has three pathways. First, if the coalition-backed forces won decisively and rapidly, the prospects for a political settlement and effective humanitarian response would enhance sharply. British and American pressures on the coalition-backed forces to halt the offensive suggest that this scenario is the least likely. A second possibility is if a protracted destruction-based win occurred (consistent with the Houthi declaration), the humanitarian situation within Hodeidah, and wider Yemen would reach unthinkable figures [16]. The likelihood of this scenario is greater than the first due to the Houthi brutality, should the offensive continue. Up-to-date evidence includes the Houthi militarisation of a health facility – May 22 Hospital – deploying snipers on the roof, breaching International Humanitarian Law and a sign of civilians’ victimisation [17]. These breaches have discouraged the international community due to the knock-on humanitarian consequences if they destroyed the primary source of national imports: Hodeidah port.

The third scenario is the final dance of the Whitehall-backed envoy. If parties responded positively to systemic pushes of de-escalating violence and unconditional ceasefire, it is highly likely that Griffiths would propose an internationally-monitored withdrawal of military forces, including the ‘Houthi mujahedeen.’ Griffiths might also recommend the establishment of an UN-supervised consensus-based structure to neutralise the security circumstance in Hodeidah. Such an arrangement would ensure the humanitarian efforts continue through Hodeidah’s port. This scenario has greater likelihood to transpire after an expected re-escalation of offensive if the Houthis abide by confidence-building measures, potentially before Sweden round kicks off by the end of this year.

Considering how the international community has embraced the Houthi as an actor, the success of this scenario is highly reliant on whether the Houthis act responsibly, an unobserved pattern in the Houthi conduct. Hodeidah is a stringent test to the UN, success there would increase Griffiths’ prospects and by extension the UN-led peace process in Yemen.

As uncertainties continue to unfold, long-term peacebuilding in Yemen requires high-cost sacrifices in the short-term. Today, Hodeidah is caught between the Houthi terrorism and a global humanitarian failure. The present offensive is constrained, and the Houthi defeat delayed. To the Houthis, Hodeidah is a supply artery for survival at best and a negotiation stick at worst.  Once the port is liberated, they are debilitated militarily, financially and politically favouring the UN-led Yemen Peace Process and millions in dire need of relief aids. It is therefore in London’s interest to allow Hodeidah’s liberation to fulfil the UNSCR 2216 (2015) and enhance Griffiths’ chances to succeed as the third UN envoy [18]. For any envoy to succeed in such a complex mission, a lessons-learnt approach is urgently required to develop a sustainable peacebuilding for Yemen and the wider region.

If Riyadh and Abu Dhabi have made a political decision to liberate Hodeida with strategic support as a part and parcel of an overall strategy, the liberation will enhance the prospects of the UN-led peace process and relief efforts. It will also likely strengthen the status quo of the internationally legitimate government, mobilise public support vis-à-vis the Houthis within Houthi-controlled territories and speed up ‘Yemen Peace Process’ more constructively. That unresolved, Hodeidah could likely become another Aden or Aleppo.

Sources:

[1] Ghobari, M. (2018, November 4). Saudi-backed forces advance towards Yemen's Hodeidah as U.N. warns of famine. Retrieved from Reuters: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-yemen-security/saudi-backed-forces-advance-towards-yemens-hodeidah-as-u-n-warns-of-famine-idUSKCN1N90HC

[2] Zaid, H. (2018, November 12). Twitter. Retrieved from Hassan Zaid: https://twitter.com/zeid_200/status/1062094730979356687?s=19

[3] Arab News. (2018, November 12). King Salman meets British Foreign Minister Jeremy Hunt. Retrieved from Arab News: http://www.arabnews.com/node/1403571/saudi-arabia

[4] Xuequan, M. (2018, November 14). Fighting eases in Yemen's Hodeidah amid visits by UN officials. Retrieved form Xinhua Net: www.xinhuanet.com/english/2018-11/14/c_129993334.htm

[5] Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Yemen. (2018, July 4). Special Envoy's Remarks to the Press at the end of a 3-day visit to Sana'a. Retrieved from OSESGY: https://osesgy.unmissions.org/special-envoys-remarks-press-end-3-day-visit-sanaa

[6] Al Jazeera and News Agencies. (2018, November 9). Yemeni forces, Saudi-led coalition launch 'vast' Hodeidah push. Retrieved from Al Jazeera: https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/11/yemeni-forces-saudi-led-coalition-launch-vast-hodeidah-push-181109133507645.html

[7] Wintour, P. (2017, December 4). Yemen Houthi rebels kill former president Ali Abdullah Saleh. Retrieved from The Guardian: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/dec/04/former-yemen-president-saleh-killed-in-fresh-fighting

[8] UN News. (2018, September 11). Yemen: UN envoy asks Security Council for more support ‘to move back’ to the negotiating table. Retrieved from UN News: https://news.un.org/en/story/2018/09/1019062

[9] Security Council Report. (2018, April). Yemen: April 2018 Monthly Forecast. Retrieved from Security Council Report. Retrieved from Security Council Report: https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/monthly-forecast/2018-04/yemen_33.php?print=true

[10] Nebehay, S. (2018, September 8). Yemen peace talks collapse in Geneva after Houthi no-show. Retrieved from Reuters: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-yemen-security-un/yemen-peace-talks-collapse-in-geneva-after-houthi-no-show-idUSKCN1LO08Z

[11] Nadimi, F., & Knights, M. (2018). Iran's Support to Houthi Air Defenses in Yemen. Washington: The Washington Institute.

[12] Almeida, M. (2018, May 19). Why Hodeidah is a critical chapter of the Yemen war. Retrieved from Arab News: http://www.arabnews.com/node/1305751

[13] Wintour, P. (2018, June 17). UN in advanced talks to take over besieged Yemen port. Retrieved from The Guardian: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/jun/17/un-in-advanced-talks-to-take-over-yemen-port-hodeidah-under-saudi-led-siege

[14] UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. (2018, September 21). Briefing to the Security Council on the Humanitarian Situation in Yemen by the Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator, Mr. Mark Lowcock, 21 September 2018. Retrieved from ReliefWeb: https://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/briefing-security-council-humanitarian-situation-yemen-under-secretary-general; Alkamaly, H. (2018, November 7). Twitter. Retrieved from Hamzah Alkamaly: https://twitter.com/hamzaalkamaly/status/1060255095311527938

[15] Group of International and Regional Eminent Experts on Yemen. (2018, August 28). Yemen: United Nations Experts point to possible war crimes by parties to the conflict. Retrieved from United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner: https://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=23479

[16] Salisbury, P. (2018, September 20). Yemen’s Hodeida Offensive: Once Avoidable, Now Imminent. Retrieved from Crisis Group International: https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/gulf-and-arabian-peninsula/yemen/yemens-hodeida-offensive-once-avoidable-now-imminent

[17] Sanchez, R. (2018, November 08). Houthi fighters 'take up positions on hospital roof' as battle for Hodeidah intensifies. Retrieved from The Telegraph.: https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2018/11/08/yemen-rebel-chief-vows-fight-battle-intensifies-key-port-hunger/

[18] Security Council. (2015, April 14). Security Council Demands End to Yemen Violence, Adopting Resolution 2216 (2015), with Russian Federation Abstaining. Retrieved from UN: https://www.un.org/press/en/2015/sc11859.doc.htm

What is intelligence oversight, and why does it matter?

By definition, the work of intelligence agencies is covert and secret. Intelligence oversight maintains the integrity of the system and the techniques employed by the secret services protecting citizens’ rights to privacy and confidentiality. Although it may seem to restrict the work of intelligence, a clear legal framework increases both intelligence legitimacy and efficiency.

By Anne Lise Michelot

By definition, the work of intelligence agencies is covert and secret. They collect and process information with the purpose of supporting decision-making. Their methods of data gathering (and the data itself) are usually classified as they are of importance to national security. However, despite this necessary high level of secrecy, this does not exempt them from any type of control; for example, the head of a secret service will control the performance of the agency. In a democratic state, other forms of oversight will also be applied to compel agencies to share information regarding their activity with various institutions.

Democratic nations develop systems of oversight to ensure that the use of intelligence methods by various organisations is always carried out while respecting their citizens’ rights to privacy and confidentiality. The intrusive methods used by intelligence agencies to collect information can be exploited to serve the interests of authoritarian regimes, at the expense of human rights. Intelligence oversight maintains the integrity of the system and the techniques employed by the secret services.

According to the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF)[1], an effective oversight and accountability system in a democratic state should have the following characteristics:

– A clear legal framework defining the mission and mandate of intelligence agencies. As mentioned earlier, this ensures that no unlawful use can be made of their abilities. Such framework should also outline the techniques and methods of intelligence collection that are permitted or prohibited, including the conditions in which they can be used.

– The oversight mechanisms should be multiple and diverse, including controls from the executive, judiciary, legislative powers and independent specialised organisms. In order to be effective, these oversight bodies need to be given the adequate means to fulfil their mission. These include independence from political interest, access to relevant classified information and the authority to conduct their investigations. In addition, oversight systems must guarantee the preservation of secrecy, as is needed in the particular field they are controlling.

– Finally, an effective oversight system will provide the possibility for legal recourse should there be abuses to report.

Oversight may seem to be restrictive to the work of intelligence, but in fact, it may be quite the opposite. When provided with a clear legal framework in which to operate, intelligence agencies increase both their legitimacy and efficiency. On the one hand, the law, by defining their work, protects them from abusive political intervention. On the other hand, the oversight system allows for their performance to be measured and earns them the trust of democratic institutions.

Such an argument was made by Jean-Jacques Urvoas, a French socialist deputy who advocated strongly for reforms of the oversight system. According to him, bringing intelligence further under control is beneficial not only to democracy but also to national security and the agencies themselves [2]. By bringing intelligence out of the darkness, public understanding of its benefits can be increased, as opacity and suspicion over this covert field diminish. Moreover, given a legal framework, intelligence agencies will have a stronger voice within the decision-making process and will be given access to more resources, allowing them to increase their capacities to better respond to new threats [3].

Measuring the effectiveness of oversight in reality, as opposed to theory, is not an easy task. While a key component of oversight is transparency, the work of intelligence requires secrecy. Therefore, the organisms performing controls cannot give detailed overviews of their work and their findings. As a result, a more informal, public form of oversight cannot be achieved. Public opinion, through civil society organisations, can hold elected governments and their agencies accountable for their actions and demand for more transparency. This can only be achieved if the public is made aware of their activities.

The peculiar nature of intelligence makes it a difficult state activity to control and keep under check. Yet, a democratic state if it wants to abide to human right standards cannot conduct intelligence activities without a suitable oversight system.

Sources:

[1] Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, “Intelligence Oversight”, SSR Backgrounder Series (Geneva: DCAF, 2017).

[2] Urvoas, J-J (2014 February 4). “Le contrôle parlementaire des services de renseignement, enfin !”. Fondation Jean-Jaurès.

[3] Urvoas J-J, Pascal Lorot (2013/4). “Les enjeux du contrôle et de l'efficacité du renseignement français”. Géoéconomie 67, p34.

When Smarter Is Not Always Safer: the Cybersecurity of the Electric Grid

An increased reliance on electricity combined with new production methods and structural changes in the grid pose new challenges in guaranteeing stable and affordable access to electricity. These structural changes imply the integration of ‘smart’ control systems, which often rely on internet connections. Yet, considering the rapid development of malicious activities in the cyber domain, a smarter grid is not always safer.

By Dorien Van Dam

In 2015, representatives of 196 state parties negotiated the Paris Agreement, whose focal point was to limit global warming to below 2 °C, but preferably below 1.5 °C. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change published a new report in October 2018. This report calls for urgent action to phase out fossil fuels by outlining the disastrous impacts of global warming that could be avoided by limiting global warming to 1.5 °C compared to 2 °C [1]. The need to phase out fossil fuels is well acknowledged, but this transition opens up a whole new range of hurdles to overcome. An increased reliance on electricity combined with new production methods and structural changes in the grid pose new challenges in guaranteeing stable and affordable access to electricity. These structural changes imply the integration of ‘smart’ control systems, which often rely on internet connections. Yet, considering the rapid development of malicious activities in the cyber domain, a smarter grid is not always safer.

Phasing out the use of fossil fuels requires the intensified use of alternative sources of energy. Among the largest sources of renewable energy are wind and solar-power. This production takes place on both the industrial and household levels, for example on large solar farms as well as individual solar panels on rooftops. This development means that electricity is now ‘injected’ in the grid from multiple entry-points: both in the ‘traditional’ top-down direction, as well as in bottom-up processes. However, in the absence of (economically viable) large-scale electricity storage capacity, the grid has to be perfectly balanced at all times: input and output have to be equal. This balancing act becomes increasingly difficult due to several reasons. One is the aforementioned multidirectional injection of electricity into the grid. Another reason is the intermittent production nature of renewable energy sources; solar and wind energy are only produced when the sun shines and the wind blows, and therefore are difficult to regulate.

Properly regulating and balancing the grid requires the collection of large amounts of data about the production and consumption of energy. This is often done through Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition systems (SCADA systems) – these are control systems installed on remote places in the electricity grid. SCADA systems have a dual function. First, they gather data about energy flows and send this data to a central command centre. Second, they execute control commands that they receive from the centre with the purpose of keeping the grid balanced and thus operational [2] [3]. These SCADA systems sometimes referred to as SMART systems (Self-Managing and Reliable Transmission systems), are credited with increasing efficiency and enabling the integration of ‘irregular’ production methods [4]. However, they are also more vulnerable to hackers.

The exchange of data and commands between a SCADA system and the central command centre frequently takes place through an internet connection. Such connections, especially wireless ones, make a system easier to target. Therefore, the risk that external actors gain access to control systems is larger. Subsequently, if a hacker manages to take control and disconnect the system, it can take longer for the grid regulators to regain control because such SCADA systems are often placed in remote locations. By accessing control systems and using this access for disrupting command structures, hackers can disrupt the balance of the grid and ultimately even cause blackouts. This, for example, happened in 2015, when hackers managed to gain access to a remote substation in Ukraine and rendered it inoperable and again in 2016 when Ukrainian Industrial Control systems were hacked [5] [6].

In the context of an increased reliance on electricity, to enable our shift away from fossil fuels, it is safe to conclude that the stable functioning of the electricity grid is of paramount importance. Additionally, the strategy of the European Energy Union heavily relies on the future development of the electricity sector. Integration and standardization of electricity control systems might streamline cross-country energy flows and stimulate the development of a truly interconnected market, but could also render it more vulnerable. If you figure out how to hack one, you know how to hack all of them. Ultimately, we can conclude that a smarter grid is not always a safer grid.

Sources:

[1] Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (2018). Global Warming of 1.5 °C. Retrieved 8 October 2018 at http://www.ipcc.ch/report/sr15/.

[2] Jarmakiewicz, J., Maslanka, K., & Parobczak K., (2015). Evaluation of the Cyber Security Provision System for Critical Infrastructure. Journal of Telecommunications and Information Technology, no. 75, 22-29.

[3] Jarmakiewicz, J., Parobczak, K., & Maślanka, K. (2017). Cybersecurity protection for power grid control infrastructures. International Journal of Critical Infrastructure Protection, 18, 20-33.

[4] Beaulieu et al. (2016). Smart Grids from a Global Perspective: Bringing Old and New Energy Systems. Springer: Switzerland.

[5] Cox, J. (2016). The Malware That Led to the Ukrainian Blackout. Vice Motherboard. Retrieved 8 October 2018 from https://motherboard.vice.com/en_us/article/wnx5yz/the-malware-that-led-to-the-ukrainian-blackout

[6] Imeson, M. (2017). Electricity industry on alert for ‘cyber sabotage’. Financial Times. Retrieved 8 October 2018 from https://www.ft.com/content/1fc89bd8-996c-11e7-8c5c-c8d8fa6961bb.

Nordstream II: it’s business, not personal

“Resistance to Nordstream II comes from all sides. European leaders criticise the increased dependency on Russian gas and internally, the Green Party and other interest groups attempted to block the project for environmental reasons. Poland fears that Northstream II will slowly erode the security dividend of its position as a transit country. German dependency on Polish imports guarantees their support if tensions between Russia and Poland increase.”

By Dorien Van Dam

A potential pipeline between Germany and Russia is causing a European political headache. The construction of the +/- 1,200 km pipeline is a complex international process, requiring cooperation between Russia, Finland, Sweden, Denmark, and Germany. The authority to start construction rests with these countries. At the time of writing, the pipeline has not received Danish formal approval [1]. Poland and Trump are outspoken opponents of the pipeline, citing an increased reliance on Russian imports as a threat [2]. Germany appears to be walking a thin line, so why does Berlin insist on the project?

Pipeline
Nordstream II is a planned gas connector between Germany and Russia via the Baltic Sea. An existing connector, Nordstream I, was finished in 2011, but cannot be used at full capacity. This is due to the Third EU Energy Package, aimed at promoting competition and increasing energy diversification. It intends to prevent overreliance on a single source of gas by limiting imports [3]. Currently, Germany imports a large share of its gas from Russia through third countries such as Poland and Ukraine. Considering the relationship between Poland and Russia, the Gas Wars in Ukraine (2005–06, 2009 and 2014–15), and the annexation of Crimea; Germany, understandably, prefers a direct connection to its source. By securing Germany’s gas supply the country will not become collateral damage or invested in someone else’s conflict. Berlin does not directly perceive import dependency on Russia as a risk, but rather as a part of their aim to become a central energy hub based on exchange and interdependence [4]. In short: this is business, not politics.

… or pipedream?
Resistance to Nordstream II comes from all sides. European leaders criticise the increased dependency on Russian gas and internally, the Green Party and other interest groups attempted to block the project for environmental reasons [5]. Poland fears that Northstream II will slowly erode the security dividend of its position as a transit country. German dependency on Polish imports guarantees their support if tensions between Russia and Poland increase. Without this ‘leverage’ over the Germans, the Polish feel their bargaining position is weakened vis-à-vis Russia. Economically, Poland is concerned about the loss in transit fees and the fear that the construction of Nordstream II will block the harbour entrance in Świnoujście for larger vessels. This would in turn hamper Poland’s diversification of energy supplies through the import of liquefied natural gas [6]. Internally, the project is facing resistance from environmental actors because Nordstream II will affect biodiversity in the Baltic Sea. The pipeline’s opponents have also pointed out that the bottom of the Baltic Sea houses historic ordnance, which are remnants of the Second World War. Old and potentially unstable weaponry combined with the transportation of highly flammable gas is an understandable concern.

No(rd)stream II
Currently, all eyes are on Denmark, who holds the key to the construction of Nordstream II. The European Union is paying very close attention to the project’s development in the light of the European Energy Union objectives. Germany, eager to move forward with the project, will have to convince them that Russian gas is good business and not a geopolitical move away from the Eastern European states.

Sources:

[1] Nordstream 2 (2018). Project Rationale. Accessed 12 July 2018 at

[https://www.nord-stream2.com/project/rationale/].

[2] Georgi Gotev, (2018). “Trump begins NATO summit with Nord Stream 2 attack.”

Euractiv. Accessed 12 July 2018 at

[https://www.euractiv.com/section/energy/news/trump-begins-nato-summit-with-nord-stream-2-attack/].

[3] Tareq Baconi (2017). “Pipelines and Pipedreams: How the EU can support a regional

gas hub in the Eastern Mediterranean.” European Council on Foreign Relations. Accessed

12 July 2018 at

[http://www.ecfr.eu/publications/summary/pipelines_and_pipedreams_how_the_eu_can_support_a_regional_gas_hub_in_7276].

[4] Kacper Szulecki (eds.) (2018). Energy Security in Europe: Divergent Perceptions

and Policy Challenges. Cham, Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan.

[5] Henry Foy et al., (2017). “Gazprom to receive funding for Nord Stream 2 pipeline.”

Financial Times. Accessed 12 July 2018 at

[https://www.ft.com/content/32898bae-28f3-11e7-9ec8-168383da43b7]

[6] Kacper Szulecki (eds.) (2018). Energy Security in Europe: Divergent Perceptions

and Policy Challenges. Cham, Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan.

EU’s role in shaping cyber legislation – Part Two of Three

The European Union´s role as a global cyber power mainly relies on its ability to shape cyber-related legislation and standards of state behavior. This might prove challenging due to its institutional structure and civilian power characteristics. Still, the cyber diplomacy directive adopted by the European Council in December 2015 marks the EU’s more proactive role in international cyberspace policy development.

By Rusudan Zabakhidze

While the European Union (EU) has established itself as a regional cyber security player, it is far from being a global cyber power. With the EU’s defense and security policy still under construction, the EU remains a civilian power that lacks hard power capabilities – both in the “analog” and the “digital” realm.

The EU’s aspiration to become a cyber power has been the result of two developments. The first is the increasing development of EU competences and the second is the blurred distinction between domestic and international agendas. In order to demonstrate unity, the European Council has called for the development and implementation of a common and comprehensive approach to global cyber diplomacy. The Council of the EU [1] also encourages the Union and its Member States ‘to prepare cyber dialogues, avoiding duplication of efforts and taking into account the broader EU political and economic interests, collectively promoted by all EU actors’.

The EU’s role as a global cyber power mainly relies on its ability to shape cyber-related legislation as well as norms and standards of state behavior. This might prove challenging due to its institutional structure and civilian power characteristics. Still, the cyber diplomacy directive adopted by the European Council in December 2015 marks the EU’s more proactive role in international cyberspace policy development [2].

Even though the type of cyber security threats and their sources are more diversified than ever, liberal democracies are failing to respond to them with active measures. Regulating cyberspace is obviously a challenging task, as it requires to bring together diverse actors with various interests. This is where the window of opportunity opens up for the EU. The EU has been relatively successful in bringing together civilian and military stakeholders, as well as centers of excellence, industry, and academia [3]. (More on this in Part 1 of the series: EU Cyber Security Capabilities).

One of the main goals of the EU’s cyber diplomacy is to find international consensus on how to apply existing international law to cyberspace and to develop norms for responsible state behavior. The United Nations Charter does not refer to cybersecurity as by the time it was created, the Internet simply did not exist. The EU supports the idea that the UN Charter should apply to the cyber realm as well. The September 2017 Joint Communication on ‘Resilience, Deterrence and Defense: Building strong cybersecurity for the EU’ endorses the non-binding norms, rules, and principles of responsible state behavior in the field of Information and Telecommunications that have been articulated by the UN Group of Governmental Experts [4].

One of the notable examples that can be analysed to further understand the EU’s ability to influence international norm setting is the General Data Protection Regulation, which gives European citizens more control over the use of their private data. In a United States Senate hearing, Facebook CEO Mark Zuckerberg noted that the European legislation seems fair and suitable to prevent unwelcome interferences and misuse of customer data in the future [5]. Even though the regulation has not become an international standard yet, international discourse commends the EU’s progressive vision regarding data protection. Decreasing the vulnerability of European citizens and companies, in addition to building secured information and communication systems, creates a strong foundation for cyber security deterrence.

The real challenge to develop an effective legislation lies in overcoming the EU bureaucracy against a fast-developing and ever-changing cyber environment. Even though the European Union is yet to become a powerful cyber security actor, its diplomatic efforts to support the application of the international law to cybercrimes have the potential to set international norms and principles of responsible state behavior. Amongst others, the EU has started to influence the global discourse through cooperation with third countries and other regional organisations. The scale, achievements and challenges of this type of cooperation will further be discussed in the final part of the series on the EU Cyber Security Capabilities.

Sources:

[1] Reform of the Cyber Security in Europe. 2017. Council of the European Union. Retrieved on July 27, 2018 from: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/cyber-security/ [2] European Commission. (2017. Digital Single Market. Cybersecurity. Retrieved on July 27, 2018 from: https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/cyber-security [3] European Commission and High Representative of the EU for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. (2013). Cyber Security Strategy of the EU: An Open, Safe and Secure Cyberspace. Retrieved on July 27, 2018 from: https://eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/policies/eu-cyber-security/cybsec_comm_en.pdf [4] Jaku Bund, Pawlak Patryk. (2017) Minilateralism and norms in . cyberspace. EU Institute for Security Studies. Retrived on Sep 15, 2018 from https://www.iss.europa.eu/sites/default/files/EUISSFiles/Alert%2025%20Cyber%20norms_0.pdf [5] The Washington Post. (2018). Mark Zuckerberg testifies on Capitol Hill (full Senate hearing). Retrieved on July 27, 2018 from: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6ValJMOpt7s

Online Political Microtargeting in the United States

Online political microtargeting is personalised advertising targeting the voters who are on the fence in a campaign, and are thus most susceptible to personalised political advertisements. In the US, microtargeting allows political campaigns to target swing states, which fluctuate between supporting Democrats and Republicans and possess considerable weight in the outcome of an election.

By Agniete Pocyte

‘Political elites do not employ new communication channels with the aim of citizen empowerment, greater democratic deliberation, or any other normative goals’ [1]. The goal of investing in new media communication tools is to win elections.’

Online political microtargeting is personalised advertising which targets voters based on the predictions of an algorithmic model, manipulated from publicly available data and private data [2]. Facebook is the most popular advertising platform as nearly three-quarters of American adults use Facebook, and 44% of the adult population cite it as a part of their news sources [3]. Although Facebook is not the only social media site that functions as a news source, it is by far the largest [4].

Despite the focus on President Trump’s 2016 campaign, George W. Bush made use of similar, albeit less complicated, microtargeting. In 2004, Bush’s presidential campaign bought data on 5.7 million Michigan consumers from Acxiom, one of the world’s largest data brokers, and merged it with their own polling information to categorise Michigan voters into 34 ‘microtargeting segments’ [5]. With this information, the campaign created advertisements and scripted messages targeted at the narrow categories of voters through telephone and direct-mail messages. Mitt Romney’s 2012 US presidential campaign used micro-categories to target undecided voters with advertisements that emphasised different aspects of his campaign. Zac Moffet, the digital director of Mitt Romney’s 2012 presidential campaign stated: ‘two people in the same house could get different messages. Not only will the message change, the type of content will change’ [6].

A microtargeting strategy will rarely target more than a small portion of the voting population. That is because most of the population is either set on voting for a particular candidate or is extremely unlikely to vote. By targeting the voters who are on the fence in a campaign, and are thus most susceptible to personalised political advertisements, microtargeting becomes a cost-effective strategy. Most importantly in the US, microtargeting allows political campaigns to target swing states, which fluctuate between supporting Democrats and Republicans and possess considerable weight in the outcome of an election. Since 1980, the number of contested swing states has dwindled [7]. In 1976, 20 states were won by a margin of less than 5%. This number dropped to 11 states in 2004 and to just 7 states (Florida, Ohio, Virginia, New Hampshire, Wisconsin, Iowa, and Colorado) in 2008. The fact that US presidential elections are fought over ‘relatively small margins in a handful of states sets up conditions for continued importance of fine-grained tactical efforts’ to persuade a select group of voters [8]. That being said, ‘political elites do not employ new communication channels with the aim of citizen empowerment, greater democratic deliberation, or any other normative goals’ [9]. The goal of investing in new media communication tools is to win elections.

Although political microtargeting purports to engage with voters in a more relevant fashion, the threats to individual privacy, the electorate, and democracy outweigh the benefits. American voters do not have adequate control of their data and cannot dictate who uses it. Many organisations, including political campaigns, are under no obligation to protect user’s information privacy and political privacy. Moreover, microtargeting practices suppress certain voter populations and exacerbate the effects of the ‘filter bubble’ by channeling voters into informational silos. Due to the highly personalised nature of the messages in political ads, thousands of variations of the same ad exist to maximise voter receptiveness. Political campaigns do not publish a database of all the ad variations which makes it difficult for journalists and the general public to investigate the honesty of a particular campaign. Third parties including social media companies, data brokers, and data analytic firms, are unregulated and possess a questionable amount of political power if the effects of microtargeting are as extreme as purported by campaign managers. Regulations are difficult to implement due to alleged conflicts with freedoms of speech and expression and the lack of empirical evidence surrounding the effects of microtargeting. Technology has outgrown regulation and it is vital to keep the possible threats of microtargeting in mind not only for policymakers, but the voters as well.

N.B. ‘the ‘filter bubble’ is the intellectual isolation that can occur when websites make use of algorithms to selectively assume the information a user would want to see, and then give information to the user according to this assumption’ [10].

Sources:

[1] Bimber, B. (2014). Digital media in the Obama campaigns of 2008 and 2012: Adaptation to the personalized political communication environment. Journal of Information Technology & Politics, 11(2), p.146.

[2] Gorton, W. A. (2016). Manipulating Citizens: How Political Campaigns’ Use of Behavioral Social Science Harms Democracy. New Political Science, 38(1), 61-80.

[3] Gottfried, J., & Shearer, E. (2016). News Use Across Social Media Platforms 2016. Pew Research Center’s Journalism Project. Retrieved 2 May 2018, from http://www.journalism.org/2016/05/26/news-use-across-social-media-platforms-2016/
[4] Ibid.

[5] Gorton, W. A. (2016). Manipulating Citizens: How Political Campaigns’ Use of Behavioral Social Science Harms Democracy. New Political Science, 38(1), 61-80

[6] Ibid.

[7] Bimber, B. (2014). Digital media in the Obama campaigns of 2008 and 2012: Adaptation to the personalized political communication environment. Journal of Information Technology & Politics, 11(2), p.146.

[8] Ibid, p. 144

[9] Ibid, p146

[10] Techopedia. (2018). What is a Filter Bubble? – Definition from Techopedia. [online]. Available at: https://www.techopedia.com/definition/28556/filter-bubble [Accessed 30 Aug. 2018]

Author’s further reading:

[1] Borgesius, F. J., Moller, J., Kruikemeier, S., Fathaigh, R. Ó., Irion, K., Dobber, T., … & de Vreese, C. (2018). Online Political Microtargeting: Promises and Threats for Democracy. Utrecht L. Rev., 14, 82.

[2] Ienca, M. (2017). Do We Have a Right to Mental Privacy and Cognitive Liberty?. Scientific American Blog Network. Retrieved 2 May 2018, from https://blogs.scientificamerican.com/observations/do-we-have-a-right-to-mental-privacy-and-cognitive-liberty/

[3] Tenove, C., Buffie, J., McKay, S., & Moscrop, D. (2018). How Foreign Actors Use Digital Techniques to Undermine Democracy. Centre for the Study of Democratic Institutions, UBC.

Women’s reproductive health rights and the economic crisis in Venezuela

Venezuela is stuck in a severe economic crisis. Inflation rates are reaching 1,000,000 per cent while GDP is falling by 18 per cent. But the crisis is not simply economic: it has also become a severe health crisis by which women are disproportionately affected. Their fundamental rights to sexual and reproductive health are infringed. As a result, Venezuelan women are forced to take extraordinary measures if they wish to exceed their right to sexual freedom.

By Britta Moormann

The Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela is stuck in a severe economic crisis. The country is experiencing inflation at a rate of 1,000,000 per cent and a falling gross domestic product (GDP) of 18 per cent as determined by the International Monetary Fund (IMF); [1] but the crisis is not simply economic. It has become a severe humanitarian and health crisis by which women are disproportionately affected. Fundamental women’s rights are infringed, primarily their right to sexual and reproductive health and sexual freedom. As a result, Venezuelan women are forced to take extraordinary measures if they wish to exceed their right to sexual freedom.

Sexual and reproductive health is recognized as a decisive pillar of gender equality and empowerment. In 1995, the Beijing Conference established a comprehensive approach to women’s rights. The International Conference on Population and Development (ICPD) is considered a consensus document by over 179 states. The ICPD’s document, just like the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, defines equality of men and women with regards to reproductive rights (in its Article 16(1)(e) as ‘the same rights to decide freely and responsibly on the number and spacing of their children and to have access to the information, education and means to enable them to exercise these rights(.)’[2].

Living a life of sexual freedom includes the positive right to produce new live as well as the negative right not to produce new life to which the accessibility of contraceptives is conditional. In light of the present crisis in Venezuela however, women, as the traditional primary caregivers to their families [3], lack these rights. As a Venezuelan woman very drastically attests in ‘Women of the Venezuelan Chaos’*: ‘Us women always suffer, and for everything. To give birth and to stop giving birth! To stop giving birth! To stop giving birth. My God. Like if we were cows or something.’ [4].

Contemporarily, deciding to give birth as a Venezuelan women means facing potentially life-threatening conditions. Deciding to live out sexual freedom means facing extraordinary economic challenges and health risks. 87 per cent of the Venezuelan households attest to living under conditions of food insecurity, following a mono diet within which man consume 15 different types of food and women consume only 12 different types of food [5]. The extreme food insecurity is exemplified by the fact that 9 out of 10 Venezuelans is unable to pay for its daily nutrients and 6 out of 10 Venezuelans lost around 11 kg during the last year due to the continuous situation of hunger [6].

The majority of families adopted a diet consisting of less diverse food products and a lesser amount of food in general. One family requires at least 51 average salaries to cover basic costs of alimentation [7]. Additionally, the access to and level of medical treatment has worsened strongly. Doctors and medical staff are working under war-like conditions, with 76 percent of hospitals experiencing shortages of medical supplies, of those hospitals among 81 percent lack surgical materials and 70 percent complain of intermittent water supply [8]. Many pregnant women cross the border to Colombia to reach the city of Cucuta to receive medical treatment, as pre-natal check-ups become a rarity in Venezuelan hospitals.

Since 2015, 14,000 Venezuelan patients have received medical treatment in the main hospital of Cucuta. Among the most vulnerable patients are children (suffering from skin diseases, diarrhoea or respiratory problems) and women (mainly due to malnutrition and with only few pre-natal check-ups). The Colombian hospital gives an aspiration of survival to Venezuelan women; a hope of not succumbing to the high maternal mortality rate of 65 per cent [9].

The reality of food shortages persists after child birth. Prices for dairy milk have risen 266,7 percent and the prices of diapers 71,4 percent in 2016 alone [10]. According to UNHCR around 2,3 million Venezuelans have migrated to neighbouring South American countries since 2015, the majority of which are living in irregular situations of non-documentation. Among the main reasons why Venezuelans continue to leave the Republic is the continuing economic and food insecurity, access to medical treatment or essential social services, and physical integrity [11]. Whilst a group of Latin American nations agrees on giving assistance particularly to Venezuelan migrants, Venezuelan President Maduro dismisses migration related figures as incorrect and fights grounds for pre-emptive justification of potential foreign intervention in Venezuelan affairs [12].

By means to secure contraceptives, Venezuelan women face disproportionate economic challenges. The price of condoms escalated to around $169 USD for three condoms on the black market, which equals a five-day salary. Safe sex has become a luxury only a minority of the Venezuelan population is able to afford. Subsequently, a higher number of patients suffer sexually transmitted diseases [14]. Moreover, the fear of getting pregnant is the main reason why more women see an obligation to medical sterilisation or clandestine abortions. In some hospitals, 30 sterilizations a week have been practiced during the course of 2017 to extraordinary cost. Irrespective of the continuing health deterioration, the Venezuelan government perceives its health systems as one of the world’s best. Official health statistics remain unpublished nonetheless [15].

President Maduro denies the reality of a humanitarian crisis politically and continues to follow an antagonistic position towards reproductive health care. Stipends are offered to pregnant women for new born children where maternity culturally is a considerable fate. Contrarily, free sterilization days are offered in public hospitals with rising tendency of patients [16]. Non-governmental organizations criticise the disproportionate risks women take in order to live out their rights to sexual and reproductive health. If both carrying a child and taking measures not to get pregnant is directly linked to taking either disproportionate economic or physical risks, women are exposed to unequal conditions of exercising fundamental human rights.

* A movie portraying the life of five women under the extremity of the Venezuelan crisis, made by filmmaker Margarita Cardenas and presented at the Human Rights Watch’s Film Festival in New York.

Sources:

[1] Friesen, Garth. 2018. “The Path To Hyperinflation: What Happened To Venezuela?”. Forbes. https://www.forbes.com/sites/garthfriesen/2018/08/07/the-path-to-hyperinflation-what-happened-to-venezuela/#7bc8884a15e4.

[2] UN. 1998. Rights to Sexual and Reproductive Health – the ICPD Convention and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women. [ONLINE] http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/csw/shalev.htm.

[3] Taraciuk Broner, Tamara. 2018. “Mujeres del caos venezolano”. La Vanguardia. https://www.lavanguardia.com/internacional/20180529/443912937067/mujeres-caos-venezolano-venezuela.html.

[4] Marillier, Lou. 2018. “Lacking Birth Control Options, Desperate Venezuelan Women Turn To Sterilization And Illegal Abortion”. The Intercept. https://theintercept.com/2018/06/10/venezuela-crisis-sterilization-women-abortion/.

[5] AVESA, CEPAZ, FREYA, Mujeres en Línea. 2017. Mujeres Al Límite. El peso de la emergencia humanitarian: vulneración de derechos humanos de las mujeres en Venezuela. [ONLINE] https://avesawordpress.files.wordpress.com/2017/11/mujeres-al-limite.pdf, p. 14.

[6] ENCOVI. 2017. Encuesta Nacional de Condiciones de Vida. Venezuela 2017. Alimentactión I. [ONLINE] https://www.ucab.edu.ve/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/2018/02/ENCOVI-Alimentación-2017.pdf.

[7] Caritas Venezuela. 2018. Monitorio de la Situación Nutricional en Niños menores de 5 años. [ONLINE] http://caritasvenezuela.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/6to-Boletin-SAMAN-Enero-Marzo-2018.pdf.

[8] Watts, Jonathan. 2016. “’Like doctors in a war’: inside Venezuela’s healthcare crisis”. The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/oct/19/venezuela-crisis-hospitals-shortages-barcelona-caracas.

[9] Moloney, Anastasia. 2018. “As Venezuela’s health system crumbles, pregnant women flee to Colombia”. Reuters. https://uk.reuters.com/article/colombia-migrants-health/feature-as-venezuelas-health-system-crumbles-pregnant-women-flee-to-colombia-idUKL5N1T34JJ.

[10] AVESA et al., p. 11.

[11] UNHCR. 2018. Venezuela Situation. Fact Sheet. [ONLINE] https://data2.unhcr.org/en/documents/download/64428, p. 3.

[12] Valencia, Alexandra. 2018. “Venezuela’s neighbours seek aid to grapple with migration crisis”. Reuters. https://af.reuters.com/article/worldNews/idAFKCN1LK2T0.

[13] UNFPA, The Danish Institute for Human Rights, The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights. 2014. Reproductive Rights are Human Rights. A Handbook for National Human Rights Institutions. [ONLINE] p. 18. https://www.unfpa.org/publications/reproductive-rights-are-human-rights.

[14] Wright, Emily. 2016. “Safe Sex Is a Luxury in Venezuela, Where a Pack of Condoms Costs Nearly $200.” Broadly. https://broadly.vice.com/en_us/article/bmwqy4/safe-sex-is-a-luxury-in-venezuela-where-a-pack-of-condoms-costs-nearly-200.

[15] Ulmer, Alexandra. 2016. “In crisis-hit Venezuela young women seek sterilisation”. Reuters The Wider Image. https://widerimage.reuters.com/story/in-crisis-hit-venezuela-young-women-seek-sterilization.

[16] See Reference 4.

The Chinese Swarming Programme – Part Three of Three

The People Liberation Army has recognised the potential of swarm technology to disrupt the current order; the low cost of swarming technology means that it could be used for saturation assaults on a high-value target by simply overwhelming the current defensive systems.

By Caitlin Irvine

When discussing the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) developments in swarm technology it is first important to lay out their strategy. The PLA has recognised the potential of swarm technology to disrupt the current order; the low cost of swarming technology means that it could be used for saturation assaults on a high-value target by simply overwhelming the current defensive systems [1]. The Chinese military, therefore, intends to use this technological advancement as a force multiplier. According to the PLA, unmanned weapons systems are central to future operations in all domains of warfare [2]. Political commentators have speculated that swarming technology could be deployed by China in contentious areas such as the South China Sea [3]. The unmanned nature leaves the party coming into contact with the swarm having to decide whether or not a flyover is an act of aggression, simply reconnaissance, or human error. The secrecy surrounding Chinese military operations resulted in only two clear examples of swarming being discovered; the demonstration at Guangzhou Air Show in 2017 and a simulated reconnaissance mission.

The simulated reconnaissance mission tested an entire group of drones – incorporated with swarming technology – carrying out a variety of missions [4]. Unspecified portions of the flight were performed autonomously whilst still acting as a swarm. Feng and Clover highlight that Beijing therefore thinks ‘swarms of drones will become a weapon of the future’ [5]. It is clear that this technology – and autonomous weapons systems more generally – are an area of debate with severe implications for future warfare.

The PLA aims to harness ‘military-civil fusion to enable future military applications’ by integrating military and civilian developments [6]. A success in the civilian arena rapidly transfers over to the military dimension [7]. In 2017, at the Guangzhou Air Show, a swarm of 1,108 quadcopters displayed the results of Chinese civil-military cooperation [8]. Not only did these drones illustrate synchronised flight but they also showed ‘independent thought’ [9]. During the performance at least three drones fell out of the swarm for an unpublished technical reason. However, when they failed to complete their delegated tasks each drone executed their  individual landings. Drone swarms have previously been compared to an American football team – the swarm runs set plays and the operator oversees the network [10]. But in this demonstration the drones have also shown independent self-repair capabilities; the communication connection from the drones to the hive-like mind was re-established during flight [11]. This self-repairing function therefore demonstrates the potential for these systems to have decision-making capabilities outside of the operator’s direct control. This is a developing technology, still in the early stages, but the PLA is committed to investing in drone swarms for the long-term future.

Drone swarms represent a disruption in the strategic status quo of warfare. In this three-part mini-series, three main points about the consequences of swarming technology have been made. The low entry cost relative to conventional munitions could make these systems commonplace. As a weapon, drone swarms place the onus of differentiation on those being attacked. The advantages for unconventional theatres, such as urban terrain, make these systems attractive to militaries around the world. In both the American and Chinese examples, investment in swarming technology has been seen from both civil and military entities. Within the narrative surrounding drone swarms, it appears that the main use of such systems will be reconnaissance. But, it is their ability to also host attack capabilities is what makes them particularly terrifying. It appears that drone swarms have less political opposition in comparison to Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems, or ‘Killer Robots’ as they are more popularly known, yet mark a clear point in the path towards such autonomous technologies [12]. 

Sources:

[1] Kania, E (2017) ‘Swarms at war: Chinese advances in Swarm Intelligence’, The Jamestown Foundation: China Brief, Vol 17, Issue 9, p 13

[2] Ibid.

[3] Wise, D (2017) ‘Chinese Drone Swarms Could Overwhelm US at Sea’, The Cipher Brief [online] available at: https://www.thecipherbrief.com/chinese-drone-swarms-overwhelm-u-s-sea accessed on 16th April 2017

[4] Trevthick, J (2018) ‘China Is Hard At Work Developing Swarms Of Small Drones With Big Military Applications’, The Warzone [online] available at: http://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/17698/chinas-is-hard-at-work-developing-swarms-of-small-drones-on-multiple-levels accessed on 19th April 2018

[5] Feng, E and Clover, C (2017) ‘Drone swarms vs conventional arms: China’s military debate’, The Financial Times [online] available at: https://www.ft.com/content/302fc14a-66ef-11e7-8526-7b38dcaef614 accessed on 16th April 2017

[6] Kania, E (2017) ‘Swarms at war: Chinese advances in Swarm Intelligence’, The Jamestown Foundation: China Brief, Vol 17, Issue 9, p15

[7] Laskai, L (2018) ‘Civil-Military Fusion and the PLA’s Pursuit of Dominance in Emerging Technologies’ [online], The Jamestown Foundation: The China Brief, Vol 18, Issue 6, availible at: https://jamestown.org/program/civil-military-fusion-and-the-plas-pursuit-of-dominance-in-emerging-technologies/

[8] Romaniuk, SN and Burgers, T (2018) ‘China’s Swarms of Smart Drones Have Enormous Military Potential’, The Diplomat [online] available at: https://thediplomat.com/2018/02/chinas-swarms-of-smart-drones-have-enormous-military-potential/ Accessed on 16th April 2018

[9] Ibid.

[10] Department of Defence (2017) ‘Department of Defence Announces Successful Micro-Drone Demonstration’, Department of Defence, Press release number NR-008-17, 9th January [online] available at: https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Releases/News-Release-View/Article/1044811/department-of-defense-announces-successful-micro-drone-demonstration/ accessed on 19th April 2018

[11] Romaniuk, SN and Burgers, T (2018) ‘China’s Swarms of Smart Drones Have Enormous Military Potential’, The Diplomat [online] available at: https://thediplomat.com/2018/02/chinas-swarms-of-smart-drones-have-enormous-military-potential/ Accessed on 16th April 2018

[12] Docherty, B (2012) ‘Losing Humanity: The Case against Killer Robots’, Human Rights Watch Report

Forcing the Taliban to the negotiation table?

With the latest show of force at Ghazni, the Taliban proved during their Al-Khandaq Spring Offensive of being capable to launch coordinated and major attacks. While the US military underestimates the importance of Taliban’s control over provincial districts, the Taliban is proving the opposite – using provincial areas to retreat and plan assaults on major cities. After the Eid al-Fitr cease-fire, the Taliban gained leverage for future peace negotiations in a time where Western-allied forces are trying to force the Taliban to the negotiation table and end the almost 17-year-war.

By Fabian Herzog

Ghazni, Afghanistan

After heavy fighting in the eastern Afghan city Ghazni, the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) reclaimed control on Saturday, 11th August 2018. The attack on the provincial capital – 2 hours from Kabul – was launched by 1000 Taliban fighters on Thursday, 9th August, as part of a major offensive to take over provincial cities [1] [2]. The battle is against the backdrop of the recently reached Eid al-Fitr ceasefire between the Afghan government and the Taliban. The confrontation takes place in a time where Western-allied forces are trying to force the Taliban to the negotiation table and end the almost 17-year-war [3] [4].

Despite warnings ongoing for months that Ghazni’s outskirts were being taken over by the Taliban, the central government did not respond [5]. The Taliban fighting force included Pakistanis, Chechens, and Al Qaeda affiliates. Police forces had to fall back to protect basic government facilities such as the Police Headquarters, the Intelligence Headquarter, and the prison [6]. The battle lasted two days and the ANSF losses reached up to 200. Ghazi has now become a hotspot with clashes constantly breaking out killing 100 police officers and soldiers so far [7].

Taking matters into his own hands, the Afghan National Army´s (ANA) Chief of Staff, Lieutenant General Mohammad Sharif Yaftali, went to regain control of the city [8]. ANSF were backed by US advisers and Special Forces to coordinate the two dozen air strikes and ground operations that drove the Taliban fighters out of the embattled city of Ghazni [9]. The Afghan government’s reaction was chaotic. As the ANA was reinforcing the Afghan police in Ghazni, it provided American ammunition to the Afghan police who use Russian weapons systems [10]. With the end of the military assault, a humanitarian crisis continues to unravel with families unable to leave their homes, alongside failing water and food supplies [11]. The Ghazni hospital is overburdened with over 250 dead or wounded – and numbers are rising. Due to the damage to the telecommunication systems and electrical support lines, the exact situation on the ground is hard to grasp.

The Taliban’s Spring Offensive Al-Khandaq has seen breakouts in other Afghan districts as well. The four-part, coordinated offensive aimed to take over territory, establish checkpoints, secure the area with IEDs, and collect taxes along both the Kabul-Kandahar Highway as well as the road from Ghazni City to Gardez [12]. In Faryab province in the north-west of Afghanistan, the ANA lost an outpost where up to 50 soldiers were killed. In the northern Baghlan Province attacks led to the loss of another outpost and 7 policemen and 9 soldiers killed and 3 soldiers captured [13]. In the Ajristan district, the Afghan Commandos lost 100 members from a forward operating base. The Taliban destroyed the base with two vehicle-borne IED, killing numerous soldiers. Some of the Afghan soldiers fled into the mountains and walked two days while being ambushed by the Taliban. The wounded 22 soldiers were rescued and transported with donkeys out of the mountains [14]. Overall the Afghan military, supported by US forces, is superior to the Taliban when it comes to decisive battles such as Ghanzi and the battle for Kunduz City in 2015 and 2016 [17]. However, the Afghan internal political disagreements and its inability to outmanoeuvre insurgents are a crucial problem [18]. This is demonstrated by the high losses of the ANSF and the Taliban´s capabilities to mobilise and undertake coordinated offensives. Special units such as the Afghan commandos are a crucial part of the NATO Operation RESOLUTE SUPPORT´s strategy to bolster Afghan forces. The high losses and the lost base is a discouraging hit for the Western allied forces and might indicate a declining effectiveness [15].

Retreived from liveuamap.com (2018)

Military stalemate and peace talks between the Afghan government and the Taliban

The Taliban offensive contributes to the heated atmosphere shortly before the parliamentary elections in October 2018. Another suicidal attack took place close to the independent election commission in Kabul [16].
While the US military underestimates the importance of Taliban’s control over provincial districts, the Taliban is proving the opposite – using provincial areas for retreat and planning assaults on major cities [19]. This was the same case at the 2015 siege of Kunduz when the city was slowly surrounded by insurgents, taking over the city step-by-step, which took the ANSF two weeks to retake [20].

From a broader perspective, the new US war strategy for Afghanistan published in 2017 foresees a retreat of ANSF from provincial outposts back to the major cities resembling the small footprint approach adopted by the Bush and Obama administrations [21]. As the examples of Kunduz in 2015 and now Ghazni show, this provides ground for the Taliban. Leading to sufficient time and resources to gather strength; there is space for poppy cultivation fields, training camps, and recruitment. The Taliban is trying to take over major provincial cities such as Kunduz, Helmand, Farah, and now Ghazni since the US led forces took a supportive role in 2014 [22].

After the Eid al-Fitr cease-fire the Taliban gained leverage for future peace negotiations as they proved capable to launch coordinated and major offensives [23]. The Afghan government is facing difficulty convincing critics of the peace efforts [24]. A US delegation met with the Taliban on 23rd July in Doha, Qatar; bilateral talks with the Americans have been a Taliban demand for years. The lack of time restrictions on US engagement in Afghanistan is an uncertain factor for the Taliban – which might act as an incentive for them to join negotiations [25]. This bilateral meeting certainly indicates that the US wants a solution to the almost 17 years of war. After the offensive in Ghazni it seems like the Taliban has increased their negotiation weight and sent their message of strength [26].

Sources:

[1] The Defense Post (2018): Taliban and the Afghan government both claim

control over Ghazni city,

https://thedefensepost.com/2018/08/11/afghanistan-taliban-government-control-ghazni/

accessed 13th of August 2018.

[2] The New York Times (2018): Why the Taliban’s Assault on Ghazni Matters for

Afghanistan and the U.S., By Mujib Mashal

https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/13/world/asia/why-the-talibans-assault-on-ghazni-matters-for-afghanistan-and-the-us.html?rref=collection%2Fsectioncollection%2Fworld&action=click&contentCollection=world&region=rank&module=package&version=highlights&contentPlacement=2&pgtype=sectionfront

accessed on 14th of August 2018.

[3] The Defense Post (2018): Taliban and the Afghan government both claim

control over Ghazni city,

https://thedefensepost.com/2018/08/11/afghanistan-taliban-government-control-ghazni/

accessed 13th of August 2018.

[4] The Defense Post (2018): Afghan government asserts ‘complete control’ over

Ghazni after Taliban assault,

https://thedefensepost.com/2018/08/11/afghanistan-government-control-ghazni-taliban/

accessed 13th of August 2018.

[5] The New York Times (2018): Why the Taliban’s Assault on Ghazni Matters for

Afghanistan and the U.S., By Mujib Mashal,

https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/13/world/asia/why-the-talibans-assault-on-ghazni-matters-for-afghanistan-and-the-us.html?rref=collection%2Fsectioncollection%2Fworld&action=click&contentCollection=world&region=rank&module=package&version=highlights&contentPlacement=2&pgtype=sectionfront

accessed on 14th of August 2018.

[6] ibid.

[7] The New York Times (2018): Taliban Kill More Than 200 Afghan Defenders on 4

Fronts: ‘a Catastrophe’

https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/12/world/asia/afghanistan-ghazni-taliban.html?action=click&module=In%20Other%20News&pgtype=Homepage&action=click&module=News&pgtype=Homepage

accessed on 13th of August 2018.

[8] FDD´s Long War Journal (2018): Ghazni City remains under assault, despite

RS assurances, By Bill Roggio

https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2018/08/ghazni-city-remains-under-assault-despite-rs-assurances.php

accessed on 13th of August 2018.

[9] Reuter (2018): Afghan special forces sent to bolster threatened city

defenses, by Hamid Shalizi, Rupam Jain

https://www.reuters.com/article/us-afghanistan-attack/afghan-special-forces-sent-to-bolster-threatened-city-defenses-idUSKBN1KY0MY?feedType=RSS&feedName=topNews

accessed on 13th of August 2018.

[10] The New York Times (2018): Taliban Kill More Than 200 Afghan Defenders on

4 Fronts: ‘a Catastrophe’

https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/12/world/asia/afghanistan-ghazni-taliban.html?action=click&module=In%20Other%20News&pgtype=Homepage&action=click&module=News&pgtype=Homepage

accessed on 13th of August 2018.

[11] BBC (2018): Afghanistan: Battle-torn Ghazni residents 'can't find food'

https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-45168890

accessed on 13th of August 2018.

[12] FDD´s Long War Journal (2018): Ghazni City remains under assault,

despite RS assurances, By Bill Roggio,

https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2018/08/ghazni-city-remains-under-assault-despite-rs-assurances.php

accessed on 13th of August 2018.

[13] The New York Times (2018): Taliban Kill More Than 200 Afghan Defenders on

4 Fronts: ‘a Catastrophe’

https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/12/world/asia/afghanistan-ghazni-taliban.html?action=click&module=In%20Other%20News&pgtype=Homepage&action=click&module=News&pgtype=Homepage

accessed on 13th of August 2018.

[14] ibid.

[15] FDD´s Long War Journal (2018): Ghazni City remains under assault,

despite RS assurances, By Bill Roggio

https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2018/08/ghazni-city-remains-under-assault-despite-rs-assurances.php

accessed on 13th of August 2018.

[16] FDD´s Long War Journal (2018): Ghazni City remains under assault,

despite RS assurances, By Bill Roggio

https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2018/08/ghazni-city-remains-under-assault-despite-rs-assurances.php

accessed on 13th of August 2018.

[17] FDD´s Long War Journal (2018): Taliban routs Afghan Commandos while overrunning

remote district in Ghazni, By Bill Roggio

https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2018/08/taliban-routs-afghan-commandos-while-overrunning-remote-district-in-ghazni.php

accessed on 13th of August 2018.

[18] Reuter (2018): Afghan special forces sent to bolster threatened city defenses

by Hamid Shalizi, Rupam Jain

https://www.reuters.com/article/us-afghanistan-attack/afghan-special-forces-sent-to-bolster-threatened-city-defenses-idUSKBN1KY0MY?feedType=RSS&feedName=topNews

accessed on 13th of August 2018.

[19] FDD´s Long War Journal (2018): Ghazni City remains under assault,

despite RS assurances, By Bill Roggio

https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2018/08/ghazni-city-remains-under-assault-despite-rs-assurances.php

accessed on 13th of August 2018.

[20] The New York Times (2018): Why the Taliban’s Assault on Ghazni Matters for

Afghanistan and the U.S., By Mujib Mashal

https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/13/world/asia/why-the-talibans-assault-on-ghazni-matters-for-afghanistan-and-the-us.html?rref=collection%2Fsectioncollection%2Fworld&action=click&contentCollection=world&region=rank&module=package&version=highlights&contentPlacement=2&pgtype=sectionfront

accessed on 14th of August 2018.

[21] The New York Times(2018): Newest U.S. Strategy in Afghanistan Mirrors Past

Plans for Retreat, By Thomas Gibbons-Neff and Helene Cooper,

https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/28/world/asia/trump-afghanistan-strategy-retreat.html

accessed on 14th of August 2018.

[22] The Diplomat (2018):The Trump Administration's Terrible Idea for Afghanistan's Security Forces

https://thediplomat.com/2018/08/the-trump-administrations-terrible-idea-for-afghanistans-security-forces/

By Ghulam Farooq Mujaddidi, accessed on 14th of August 2018.

[23] The Washington Post (2018): Taliban blindsides U.S. forces with surprise Afghan offensive

By Carlo Muñoz

https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2018/aug/13/taliban-surprise-offensive-afghanistan-catches-us-/

accessed on 14th of August 2018.

[24] The New York Times (2018): Why the Taliban’s Assault on Ghazni Matters for Afghanistan

and the U.S., By Mujib Mashal

https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/13/world/asia/why-the-talibans-assault-on-ghazni-matters-for-afghanistan-and-the-us.html?rref=collection%2Fsectioncollection%2Fworld&action=click&contentCollection=world&region=rank&module=package&version=highlights&contentPlacement=2&pgtype=sectionfront

accessed on 14th of August 2018.

[25] The Washington Post (2018): Taliban blindsides U.S. forces with surprise Afghan offensive, By Carlo Muñoz

https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2018/aug/13/taliban-surprise-offensive-afghanistan-catches-us-/

accessed on 14th of August 2018.

[26] The Guardian (2018): Taliban hails 'helpful' US talks as boost to Afghan peace process

Memphis Barker and Sami Yousafzai in Islamabad

https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/aug/13/taliban-hails-helpful-us-talks-as-boost-to-afghan-peace-process

accessed on 14th of August 2018.

The American Swarming Programme – Part Two of Three

In an attempt to stay ahead of the curve, the US has been heavily investing in the research and development of drone swarms. Three developments in the US swarming programme are particularly interesting: the Perdix drone swarm, the Low-Cost UAV Swarming Technology (LOCUST) and the Control Architecture for Robotic Agent Command and Sensing, or CARACaS systems.

By Caitlin Irvine

In an attempt to stay ahead of the curve, the US has been heavily investing in the research and development of drone swarms. A swarm consists of multiple unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) with a certain amount of autonomy to navigate and sense the surrounding area [1]. In comparison to Predators or Reapers they ‘are smarter and more autonomous, designed to take off and land on their own, fly mission sets on their own, refuel in the air on their own, and penetrate enemy air defences on their own’ [2].

Three developments in the US swarming programme are particularly interesting. Both the Perdix drone swarm and the Low-Cost UAV Swarming Technology (LOCUST) programmes demonstrate the future trend towards more autonomous warfare. Finally, the Control Architecture for Robotic Agent Command and Sensing, or CARACaS system, demonstrates that swarm technology can be applied to multiple theatres of operation.

In October 2016, the US military ‘released a 103-strong swarm of Perdix drones’ in California [3]. The Perdix drone is a micro-UAV as its wingspan is less than 30 centimetres – making it ideal for operating in urban environments. The swarm demonstrated advanced behaviours ‘such as collective decision-making, adaptive formation flying, and self-healing’ [4]. The UAVs were launched from three F/A-18 Super Hornet fighter jets showing the ability of the US Air Force to use the developments in swarm technology in combination with their advanced air superiority. The Department of Defence’s press release stated that ‘Perdix is a collective organism, sharing one distributed brain for decision-making and adapting to each other like swarms in nature’ [5]. The DoD’s optimism concerning swarm technology, might indicate  that it will play a role in future conflicts.

Whereas the Perdix drones indicate a move towards autonomously functioning hardware, the LOCUST programme refers to the software used. LOCUST is currently being used in Coyote UAVs that are tube-launched from a platform – not dissimilar from the anti-ship missile launchers currently on board US naval vessels. Seen as a cheaper way of gaining attack capabilities the LOCUST programme could potentially substitute for a single, expensive, anti-ship missile [6]. LOCUST systems fire a minimum of 30 Coyote UAVs in 40 seconds and they are then synchronised mid-flight to create the swarm [7]. At around $500,000 for a 30-drone swarm and just $15,000 for a single unit, the cost of LOCUST is less than half the price of the currently deployed million-dollar Harpoon anti-ship missile [8]. The LOCUST is specifically intended to take advantage of the low-cost UAVs such as the Coyote – the drones are expendable so that if one is destroyed ‘the others autonomously change their behaviour to complete the mission’ –  into an offensive dimension [9].

Finally, the third development in the US swarming programme can be found in the CARACaS programme. CARACaS developed both software and hardware that can be fitted in any vessel in the US Navy illustrating that the move towards autonomous systems is happening across multiple theatres. CARACaS is currently used in small, unmanned boats – but can be used in any vessel – and operates using swarm technology that allows the boats to communicate with one another [10]. The idea behind this project is that expensive but important routine tasks such as harbour patrols could be delegated to an unmanned supervised system. The Navy’s CARACaS system is removing the ‘dull, dirty, and dangerous tasks from sailors lives’ [11]. But the phrase ‘dull, dirty, and dangerous’ covers almost every duty and responsibility given to a standing military.

The majority of swarming software is being designed by civilian firms, for both offensive and defensive uses. Defensive systems have been relatively untouched by the current debate on lethal autonomous weapons systems. This is simply because it is difficult to campaign against a system with defensive purposes. By creating a system that has offensive capabilities – but is primarily used defensively – the issue of whether or not such a system is acceptable becomes blurred. Within the narrative surrounding drone swarms, it appears that the main use of such systems will be reconnaissance. However, their ability to also host attack capabilities is what makes them particularly terrifying.  

Sources:

[1] Bürkle, A, Segor, F, and Kollman, M (2011) ‘Towards Autonomous Micro UAV

Swarms’, Journal of Intelligent And Robotic Systems, Vol 61(1-4), p342

[2] Singer, PW (2013) ‘The Global Swarm’, Foreign Policy [online] available at:

http://foreignpolicy.com/2013/03/11/the-global-swarm/

accessed on 18th April 2018

[3] Feng, E and Clover, C (2017) ‘Drone swarms vs conventional arms: China’s

military debate’, The Financial Times [online] available at:

https://www.ft.com/content/302fc14a-66ef-11e7-8526-7b38dcaef614

accessed on 16th April 2017

[4] Adhikari, R (2017) ‘Pentagon Battle-Tests Micro Drone Swarm’,

TechNewsWorld [online] available at:

https://www.technewsworld.com/story/84217.html

accessed on 18th April 2018

[5] Department of Defence (2017) ‘Department of Defence Announces Successful

Micro-Drone Demonstration’, Department of Defence, Press release number

NR-008-17, 9th January [online] available at:

https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Releases/News-Release-View/Article/1044811/department-of-defense-announces-successful-micro-drone-demonstration/

accessed on 19th April 2018

[6] Richardson, J (2017) ‘Swarming UAVs demonstrate enormous attack potential’,

Defence Procurement International [online] available at:

https://www.defenceprocurementinternational.com/features/air/drone-swarms

accessed on 19th April 2018

[7] Hambling, D (2016) ‘Drone Swarms will change the face of modern warfare’,

Wired [online] available at:

http://www.wired.co.uk/article/drone-swarms-change-warfare

accessed 10th April 2018

[8] Lachow, I (2017) ‘The upside and downside of swarming drones’,

Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol 73:2, p97

[9] Hambling, D (2016) ‘Drone Swarms will change the face of modern warfare’,

Wired [online] available at:

http://www.wired.co.uk/article/drone-swarms-change-warfare

accessed 10th April 2018

[10] WarLeaks (2017) ‘US Navy Drone Swarm Boats: Autonomous Boats Short

Documentary’, WarLeaks - Daily Military Defence Videos and Combat Footage [online] available at:

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NN3A7z9diT4

accessed on 16th April 2018

[11] Ibid.

Win-win for China? Using Development aid to project strategic interests

China’s ‘tied aid’ strategy particularly benefits Chinese state-owned enterprises with their loans being backed by African natural resources. As a result, China is not only promoting its state-owned business interests but also deepening their footprint in the region.

By Fabian Herzog

During the Cold War, Russia and the United States (US) used development aid as a politicised measurement of diplomatic relations, especially in Africa to counter each other’s influence.

While the US seems to be retreating from their international engagement by reducing foreign aid globally – and on the African continent- China is pushing its framework consisting of international agreements, loans and development aid to another level. Mixing tools of foreign investment and development China’s programme is incomparable to the projects of other traditional donors.

Traditional Western donors are beginning to recognise the opportunities for business exports to Africa. This is exemplified by Africa’s economic outlook of a middle class of nearly 350 million people, emerging markets and a population in working age bigger than in India and China combined [1].

But China has been stepping up their game. The situation has become a competition for the market opportunities in Africa. If China can establish hegemony as the large investor in Africa, it will be the favourite partner for customized solutions in the next decade [2]. The difference between China’s investment projects and traditional donors becomes clear in the following graph. While the American foreign investment consists mostly of Official Development Assistance (ODA), China’s major share of foreign investment is Other Official Flows (OOF) and mainly commercially oriented.

Unlike the democracy promoting approach most Western countries have taken towards Africa, China advocates economic growth through direct investments aiming to provide the country with much needed infrastructural support [3]. The Chinese strategy intends to provide development finance by encouraging Chinese companies and agencies to mix their direct investment, trade, and export. This results in adjusted and customer oriented projects attractive for recipients in Africa but also barely identifiable as aid.

China’s “tied aid” strategy particularly benefits Chinese state-owned enterprises with their loans being backed by African natural resources. As a result, China is financing infrastructure projects in Africa while simultaneously promoting the expansion of its own businesses [4].

Djibouti – The “One Belt, One Road” Initiative – Projecting Strategic Interest

In Djibouti -China’s strategic partner- heavy investment is creating one of the largest free trade zones in Africa, to be used as a gateway into the continent. The military base and port denote a visible Chinese presence. Moreover, China is financing infrastructure projects that will connect Djibouti and Ethiopia through amenities such as gas and water pipelines as well as interconnected transportation via an electrified train line. Consequently, China is not only promoting its state-owned business interests but also deepening their footprint in the region [5].

While investment in Djibouti seems to be unattractive as it is one of Africa’s smallest countries with few natural resources, the country is of strategic important because of the maritime route; trading ships head to the Red Sea, the Suez Canal, and Europe [6]. Djibouti therefore lies on the Chinese New Silk Road’s maritime route. China uses development aid to construct schools, hospitals and sports facilities without any loans, and at the same time the military footprint grows. Djibouti now hosts the first Chinese military station outside of Asia and officially provides support for the Chinese fleet [7]. By providing stability for the country and region, China simultaneously supports its economic interest and creates a military ‘base camp’ for activities in East-Africa.

Beijing appears to be the number one partner for Africa; it avoids influencing domestic politics in Africa whilst gaining access to Africa’s resources, markets, and political support for China’s agenda at multilateral forums [8].

Djibouti is a hub for international actors from both Europe and Asia because it connects the Arab and African spheres. With several troops stationed on its soil (French, American, Chinese, German and Spanish), Djibouti will be given closer examination in following articles.

Sources:

[1] African Development Bank, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development,

United Nations Development Programme [ADB; OECD; UNDP] (2017): African Economic Outlook,

https://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Publications/AEO_2017_Report_Full_English.pdf,

in:

CSIS (2018): Is the United States Prepared for China to be Africa’s Main Business Partner?,

https://www.csis.org/analysis/united-states-prepared-china-be-africas-main-business-partner.

[2] Center for Strategic & International Studies (CSIS) 2018: Is the United States Prepared

for China to be Africa’s Main Business Partner?,

https://www.csis.org/analysis/united-states-prepared-china-be-africas-main-business-partner.

[3] International Center for Trade and Development [ICTSD] (2017): China’s Infrastructure

Development Strategy in Africa: Mutual Gain?, Yabin Wu, Xiao Bai,

Short URL: https://goo.gl/D6b4uS

[4] Brookings (2014): China’s Aid to Africa: Monster or Messiah?, by Yun Sun,

https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/chinas-aid-to-africa-monster-or-messiah/,

retreived 12.02.2018.

[5] Spiegel (2018): Geopolitical Laboratory, How Djibouti Became China's Gateway To Africa,

http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/djibouti-is-becoming-gateway-to-africa-for-china-a-1191441.html.

[6] ibid.

[7] ibid.

[8] Brookings (2014): China’s Aid to Africa: Monster or Messiah?, by Yun Sun,

https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/chinas-aid-to-africa-monster-or-messiah/,

retreived 12.02.2018.

Graphs:

AidData. 2017. Global Chinese Official Finance Dataset, Version 1.0. Retrieved from

http://aiddata.org/data/chinese-global-official-finance-dataset.

EU and Cyber Security: New Player against Emerging Threats in Cyberspace – Part One of Three

Transport, energy, health, and finance are the most vulnerable sectors exposed to cyber-threats. Issuing the EU Cybersecurity Strategy in 2013 was an important step forward in developing a common framework; however, the strategy lacked the practical initiatives that would deliver tangible outcomes.

By Rusudan Zabakhidze

In the past decade, cyber warfare has become an exceptional phenomenon that has increased the vulnerability of individuals, non-state actors, and state actors to unprecedented levels. Businesses and governments rely on networks to provide their services across the EU. However, the cyber threat vulnerability of the world’s second-largest economy remains unclear. This article provides an introduction to the EU’s strategic cyber security vision by critically analysing internal and external challenges in the implementation of the recently published cyber security strategy: “Resilience, Deterrence, and Defense: Building strong cybersecurity for the EU.”

In the case of a cyber offense, the victimised country is often hampered to find a proper response because of the ambiguity surrounding the nature and origin of the attack. Since the cyber-attacks against Estonia in 2007, there have been growing concerns over the possibility of election hacking by foreign states, ransomware attacks, and other cybercrime. According to the statistics provided by the European Commission, 80% of European companies experienced at least one cybersecurity incident in 2017 [1]. Correspondingly, 86% of Europeans believe that the cybercrime risks are increasing [2].

The European Union is working on completing the Digital Single Market which will further extend the “four freedoms” (movement, capital, goods, and labour) by providing the rules of fair competition for the individuals and businesses of the Member States to engage in online activities [3]. Therefore, the costs related to cyber attacks are only expected to increase, creating a need for the development of effective preventive mechanisms. Some Member States have already included Cybersecurity in their National Security Strategies. Yet, the ambition of creating the Digital Single Market coupled with the highly interdependent nature of the EU economy indicates a need for action on the collective European level, rather than the individual national levels.

Transport, energy, health, and finance are the most vulnerable sectors exposed to cyber-threats [4]. Issuing the EU Cybersecurity Strategy in 2013 was an important step forward in developing a common framework; however, the strategy lacked the practical initiatives that would deliver tangible outcomes [5]. Necessary resources, for example, are still up to each Member State to acquire. In September 2017, the European Commission proposed a wide range of concrete measures that aim to further strengthen the EU’s cyber defense structures and capabilities, entailing more cooperation between the Member States. The updated strategy, “Resilience, Deterrence, and Defense: Building strong cybersecurity for the EU,” revolves around three principles: building resilience, developing legislative responses, and strengthening international cooperation [6].

While the implementation of the proposed initiatives is a long-term process, the EU has already taken its first steps regarding the security of its own institutions. An inter-institutional arrangement established a permanent Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT-EU) covering all EU institutions, bodies, and agencies.

The European Commission has created the EU Cybersecurity Agency for Network and Information Security (ENISA). This agency coordinates cooperation among member states against cyberattacks. The EU has created a blueprint that guides incident responses for large-scale cyberattacks. An EU-wide certification scheme is also in consideration to increase the quality and security of digital products and services. The EU plans to support Research and Competence Centers and to set up a cyber defense training and education platform. The EU also aims to develop a framework for a Joint EU Diplomatic Response to Malicious Cyber Activities and to deepen cooperation with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) [7].

Even though the proposed initiatives cover a wide range of responses, there are a number of practical challenges that will significantly affect the speed, as well as the outcomes, of the mentioned initiatives. The EU has neither properly defined resilience or deterrence nor made sufficiently clear how it intends to overcome institutional fragmentation and lack of legal authority in cybersecurity issues [8]. Other tasks that lie ahead include finding consensus on what constitutes a cybercrime and building the capacities to trace the sources of attacks.

While updating the original cyber security strategy can be considered a positive step towards the EU’s increased resilience, the challenges posed by institutional fragmentation of the Union may hinder the implementation process. Ultimately, as the frequency and scale of cyberattacks increase, effective mechanisms are essential. Failure to implement the proposed initiatives will automatically result in the failure of the establishment of the Digital Single Market. Failure to adapt to the risks and realities of the 21st century could harm the EU’s credibility, and ultimately its viability, not only with its citizens, but worldwide.

Sources:

[1] European Commission. 2017. State of the Union. Cyber Security Factsheet. [online]

Available at: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/21480/cybersecurityfactsheet.pdf

[2] ibid

[3] European Commission. 2015. Shaping the Digital Single Market. [online]

Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/policies/shaping-digital-single-market

[4] Council of the European Union. 2017. Reform of the Cyber Security in Europe. [online]

Available at: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/cyber-security/

[5] European Commission and High Representative of the EU for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy.

2013. Cyber Security Strategy of the EU: An Open, Safe and Secure Cyberspace. [online]

Available at: https://eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/policies/eu-cyber-security/cybsec_comm_en.pdf

[6] European Commission. 2017.

State of the Union - Cybersecurity: Commission scales up EU's response to cyber-attacks.

[online] Available at: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-17-3193_en.htm

[7] European Commission. 2017. State of the Union. Cyber Security Factsheet. [online]

Available at: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/21480/cybersecurityfactsheet.pdf

[8] Bendiek, A, Bossong, R & Matthias Schulze. 2017. The EU’s Revised Cybersecurity Strategy.

German Institute for International and Security Affairs. [online]

Available at: https://www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/comments/2017C47_bdk_etal.pdf

Why the Department of Homeland Security has not been able to succeed in unifying the U.S. intelligence community

“The intelligence community within the United States is a chaotic, massive, bureaucratic nightmare. After the 9/11-attacks, the whole community IC was under the microscope and public dissatisfaction forced Congress to address the failure and shortcomings of the American intelligence. The Department of Homeland Security is the newest player, among seventeen intelligence agencies, whose intention was to unify the IC and foster cooperation.”

By Ashley Rebecca Donald-Tebbutt

Despite only opening its doors on March 1st, 2003 [1], Secretary Janet Napolitano admitted in 2010 that the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) was not functioning optimally and that there was great room for improvement [2]. Even in the DHS’s short-lived lifespan the hindrances of political ambition have become undeniable to those connected to the agency.

The intelligence community (IC) within the United States is a chaotic, massive, bureaucratic nightmare. After the 9/11-attacks, the whole IC was under the microscope and public dissatisfaction forced Congress to address the failure and shortcomings of the American IC. The DHS is the newest player, among seventeen intelligence agencies, whose intention was to unify the IC and foster cooperation [3]. The intentions behind the DHS were idealistic; its mission threefold: secure the homeland from the evolving threat of terrorism, bring common agencies into one organization to foster cooperation, and to have a primary agency that could promote communication and the sharing of resources within the IC and independent agencies [4].

The DHS upon creation amalgamated twenty-two existing agencies and became a bureaucratic giant [5]. The head of the new organization was supposed to be able to “access, receive, and analyze law enforcement information, intelligence information, and other information from the Federal government…”[6]. These resources were central to allow the DHS to function as intended. However, the political ambitions hindered the reforms that delivered the DHS and its continued functioning. During the reform and development of the DHS, fundamental agencies of the IC, such as the CIA and FBI, viewed the agency as a rival and did not support the centralization of the community fearing power loss and budget cutbacks [7]. As such, the CIA and FBI used their influence to prevent the DHS from having the ability to compel information from other agencies. Without the power to compel, the rivalry between agencies endured manifesting in a bureaucratic ‘turf war’ and ultimately restricting the effectiveness of the DHS [8].

It seems that the DHS has only added to the problem by adding another bureaucracy bidding for political influence and consumption of intelligence budget. With the political reforms that brought the DHS into reality, the inability to compel other intelligence agencies has resulted in a large number of redundancies across the IC. Despite the intentions of the DHS, the institution has been hampered in its inability to unite and foster a cohesive community. The blame for the DHS’s failure should not rest on the department but on the members of Congress that only provided the department with half the power it required to meet its full responsibilities. For the DHS to be able to achieve its primary intentions another series of political reforms are required; tragically those seem unlikely to occur until the U.S is faced with another attack on its national security.

Sources:

[1] “Creation of the Department of Homeland Security” Homeland Security. Last modified 09/24/2015. https://www.dhs.gov/creation-department-homeland-security

[2] “Quadrennial Homeland Security Review Report: A Strategic Framework for a Secure Homeland.”Department of Homeland Security. February 2010. pg. iv

[3] Thessin, Jonathan. “Department of Homeland Security Recent Developments.” Harvard Journal on Legislation 40, 2 (2003): pg 529

[4] “Homeland Security Act of 2002” Public Law 107-296 107th Congress.(November 25th, 2002)
[5] Cuellar, Mariano-florentino. Governing Security: The Hidden Origins of American Security Agencies. Stanford University Press: Stanford, (2013). pg. 126

[6] “Homeland Security Act of 2002” Public Law 107-296 107th Congress.(November 25th, 2002) pg. 12

[7] Thessin, Jonathan. “Department of Homeland Security Recent Developments.”

Harvard Journal on Legislation 40, 2 (2003). pg. 528

[8] Durbin, Brent.The CIA and the Politics of US Intelligence Reform.

Cambridge University Press: New York, (2017). Pg 38

The State of the European Energy Union

In an increasingly open and interconnected market, one of the most vital elements of the European Union (EU) common market project is lagging behind: energy. The European Energy Union is an ongoing project of the EU to create an open and interconnected energy market throughout the EU providing secure, affordable and climate-friendly energy.

By Dorien van Dam

In an increasingly open and interconnected market, one of the most vital elements of the European Union (EU) common market project is lagging behind: energy. The European Energy Union is an ongoing project of the EU to create an open and interconnected energy market throughout the EU providing secure, affordable and climate-friendly energy. The initiative was launched in 2014 and published its last progress report in November 2017 [1]. These reports monitor the advancement of the EU towards its 2020 and 2030 energy and climate targets. The reports repeatedly draw the same unsatisfactory conclusion: more work will be needed. So, what exactly is going wrong?

The road towards this Energy Union is outlined in a framework, and can be roughly divided into four pillars: (1) more interconnection, (2) higher energy efficiency, (3) higher share of renewable energy and (4) cuts in greenhouse gas emissions. Some countries, however, are struggling more with their targets than others.

As per the 2014 numbers of Eurostat, nine member states have already met their national renewable energy targets for 2020. The states that are the furthest away from reaching their targets are France, the Netherlands and Ireland [2]. Ironically, these are countries with relatively high GDP per capita within the EU. Irish officials argue that their progress towards the targets were hampered by slow recovery following the financial crisis. Ireland was however not disproportionately affected by the financial crisis;  it was a truly global crisis [3].

A possible explanation is that the four countries were not politically equipped to surpass the tragedy-of-the-commons problem. Renewable energy is a typical good that everyone wants but nobody wants to pay for. In the Netherlands, even after a sharp increase in ‘green’ voters during the 2017 election, the new government coalition agreement was exceptionally weak from an environmental perspective. The French system, on the other hand, is infamous for its layered bureaucracy with high amounts of red-tape. This system, in addition to a well-organized fossil fuel lobby are severely hindering the development of a green energy sector [4].

On a more positive note, the EU is expected to surpass their goals in cutting greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions by 1%. Even though this goal does not include ‘embedded emissions’: GHG emissions involved in the production of imported goods [5], it is still a hard-needed win for the EU in the realisation of their 2020 goals.

Another area where progress is being steadily observed is that of energy efficiency. Per capita energy consumption in the EU has decreased from 2007 to 2014. Yet, 2015 and 2016 witnessed small increases, likely due to cooler winters. This resulted in the repetition of the EU Energy mantra: “additional efforts may be needed.” Despite these cooler winters, the EU is the first economic bloc to decouple economic growth from energy consumption.

Finally, the EU has a range of projects on their way to increase energy interconnection. These projects, however, are facing their own geopolitical issues. To conclude, the EU has set out a structured path towards the creation of its Energy Union, but along the way it has had to face multiple political—and meteorological—realities. Most of the 2020 goals are legally binding targets, resulting in possibly hefty fines for the countries that fail to meet their targets. Yet it is doubtful that the European Court of Justice will accept a cold winter as a justification for a breach, but imposing fines when the EU is suffering from low levels of support might prove a politically risky move. All in all, 2020 will prove to be an interesting year, not just for the Energy Union, but for the wider European Union as well.

Sources:

[1] European Commission. 2018. Energy Union and Climate. [ONLINE]

Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/priorities/energy-union-and-climate_en.

[Accessed 3 March 2018].

[2] TheJournal.ie. 2017.

Ireland is expected to miss its EU renewables target - and cop a multimillion-euro bill.

[ONLINE]

Available at: http://www.thejournal.ie/ireland-eu-2020-energy-fines-2-3231942-Feb2017/. [Accessed 3 March 2018].

[3] Ibid.

[4] ICIS. 2017. ICIS Power Perspective: France likely to miss 2020 renewables target. [ONLINE]

Available at: https://www.icis.com/resources/news/2017/10/06/10149918/icis-power-perspective-france-likely-to-miss-2020-renewables-target/?redirect=english. [Accessed 3 March 2018].

[5] European Commission. 2018. Energy Union and Climate. [ONLINE]

Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/priorities/energy-union-and-climate_en. [Accessed 3 March 2018].