Violence in the Democratic Republic of Congo: Twenty Years of Attempted United Nations Peacekeeping

‘The year 2019 sees the UN’s peacekeeping efforts in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) cross the threshold of 20 continuous years. Violence in the country endures despite numerous mandate expansions of the UN peacekeeping mission to a point where it now allows the use of proactive force for mandate implementation. Proactive force stands in opposition to the original concepts of UN peacekeeping, creating conflicting opinions within the authorising United Nations Security Council. The UN’s 20 years in the DRC tells a story of increasingly desperate measures without a mission completion in sight.’ 

By Matthew Wentworth

Origins of the Conflict

The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) has been engulfed in conflict since 1996. The origins of the current violence lie in the massive refugee crisis and spill-over from the 1994 genocide in Rwanda after which Hutus involved in the genocide fled to the east of the DRC and formed armed groups. In response, opposing Tutsi and other opportunistic rebel groups arose. The Congolese government proved unable to control or defeat the various armed groups, some of which directly threatened populations in neighbouring countries and as a result, in 1998, the Second Congolese War broke out. The United Nations’ (UN) presence began just after the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement was negotiated in August 1999 between the DRC, and five other states in the region: Angola, Namibia, Rwanda, Uganda, and Zimbabwe. It was the UN’s assumption that the Lusaka Agreement would mark the end of the Second Congolese War and that peacekeeping efforts would be necessary to manage the transition period. To this end, the UN deployed a small peacekeeping mission to the DRC with a mandate to observe the ceasefire, ensure disengagement of forces, and maintain liaison between all parties. This mission was titled the United Nations Organisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC).

MONUC: 1999 – 2010

What followed the Lusaka process however was not an end to the war but rather ‘the disintegration from a “rational” war’[i]into a number of privatised, socially, and economically motivated sub-conflicts situated in the east, mainly in the North and South Kivu region. This region alone held 132 active non-state armed actors, causing insecurity in the eastern part of the country and necessitating that MONUC remain deployed. The mission failed, however, in protecting civilians during the 2002 Kisangani Massacre leaving at least 160 dead at the hands of a Rwandan-backed rebel group. MONUC forces similarly failed to act in 2003 during violence in the Northeastern Ituri region. They were unable to stop the carnage, being unauthorised to intervene, and instead ‘hid in their well-protected bases as hundreds were slaughtered’[ii]. The UN troops were said to be unable, under-resourced, and poorly-equipped to halt the widespread killing, atrocities, and displacements throughout 2003[iii]. Due to this failure in the protection mandate, then UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan requested an EU Member State to head up a multi-national force to provide security and protection in Ituri. This was a significant move because it amounted to the UN acknowledging the failure of MONUC and requesting that an external body lend assistance. France agreed to be the framework nation and the European Council authorised an Interim Emergency Multinational Force (Operation Artemis). The mission suffered from a restrictive geographic remit of 15km2 (mainly the city of Bunia) which merely resulted in the relocation of the atrocities to the fringes of the towns where killings continued. The Interim European Military Force (IEMF), acting under Operation Artemis, though mandated to operate from June – September 2003, withdrew only three weeks after becoming concerned that the upcoming expiration of their authorised mandate would leave them without legal cover in the case of any incident. Nevertheless, the EU force did make progress with regards to civilian protection and in response, the UN, attributing the success to Operation Artemis’ use of force mandate, authorised in September 2003 an increase of military personnel to MONUC and sanctioned all necessary means to fulfil its mandate in the Ituri district and North and South Kivu. This was both a recognition of the difficulties with peacekeeping in an area where there is no peace and signified a shift towards a robust peacekeeping mandate with a more proactive use of force.

MONUSCO & The Fall of Goma

In 2010, further changes to the mission were made with ‘stabilisation’ being added to the mission’s title meaning it became the United Nations Organisation Stabilisation Mission in the DRC (MONUSCO). The name change was seen by critical commentators to be an attempt at rebranding after criticisms from Human Rights Watch and others over MONUC’s lending of direct operational support to the Congolese Army in spite of their negative human rights record This support weakened MONUC’s legitimacy and tarnished its image in the eyes of the locals. With the updated MONUSCO mandate the UN recognised that the successful protection of civilians necessitated a more proactive use of force nationwide. Yet, in 2012, the ongoing cycle of violence, especially in the eastern provinces, remained. The most humiliating incident for MONUSCO came with the fall of the provincial capital of Goma in November 2012 to forces of the Rwanda-backed M23 rebel group. Goma, the capital of North Kivu, with a population of nearly one million, was overrun in the presence of 1500 UN peacekeepers, highlighting the failure of MONUSCO’s efforts to bring stability to the east. MONUSCO forces were unable to defend the city despite the fact that it had actually begun preparation for the M23 offensive as early as July of the same year, recognising that the fall of Goma would be ‘disastrous’[iv]. This was a massive breakdown of MONUSCO’s mandate implementation, most notably civilian protection and assisting the government in extending and protecting state authority[v].

The Force Intervention Brigade

In direct response to this failure of the UN peacekeeping mission, in February 2013, 11 regional countries agreed on a Peace, Security, and Cooperation Framework for the DRC[vi]. This established a brigade-strength Neutral Intervention Force under the support of the Southern African Development Community (SADC), and was a move to explicitly cut out the UN. However, with the estimated cost being £165 million it proved an unattainable goal. In a bid to salvage the last remnants of its reputation in the DRC after not being able to stop the M23 with the largest and most expensive peacekeeping mission in the world, the UN made a counter-proposal to establish and fund a Force Intervention Brigade (FIB), composed of troops from the SADC countries. The FIB was subsequently authorised in 2013, and the UN simultaneously mandated MONUSCO to ‘take all necessary measures to “neutralise” and “disarm” groups that were posing a threat to state authority and civilian security’[vii]. The UN was careful to explicitly state that the FIB was established on an exceptional basis in order to avoid creating a precedent or prejudice to the agreed principles of peacekeeping which fundamentally prohibits the use of force except in self-defence. Nevertheless, this assertion did not assuage the concerns of Security Council members who had long been opposed to the mandated use of force by UN missions, most notably China and Russia who warned that ‘what was once the exception now threatens to become the unacknowledged standard practice’[viii]. The two key concerns voiced were that peace-enforcement mandates to UN peacekeeping missions may compromise the impartiality of UN peacekeeping operations and jeopardise the safety and security of peacekeepers. It was feared that the use of force could increase the perception that the UN was taking sides and increase the risk of attacks against civilian and humanitarian personnel of the UN. Nevertheless, then UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, labelled MONUSCO’s FIB a ‘milestone that signalled the resolve of the UN Security Council to address the changing nature of conflict and the operating environment of United Nations peacekeeping’[ix].

Despite Ban Ki-moon’s endorsement, concerns continue to grow, including the doctrinal criticism that the mandate to neutralise all armed groups implicitly presumes that all armed groups are hostile to peace processes and cannot or should not be integrated into a political process. Such mandates ignore the fact that there is an interconnected relationship between rebellion, bargaining, and shifting power relations[x], as evidenced by the events in the months following the start of the M23 rebellion. The fall of Goma forced the Congolese government back to the negotiating table in late 2012/early 2013 and resulted in the aforementioned Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework, a peace accord involving national, regional, and international players. The government recognised the dysfunction of the DRC’s state institutions as a root cause of the conflict and committed to substantial reforms to address them, including security sector reform, decentralisation, and democratic reform. 

In 2015, MONUSCO became the largest UN peacekeeping operation in the world, its mandate has seen similarly dramatic expansions, including from 2007 onwards the extension of state authority, the protection of civilians, and use of surveillance drones being included in the mandate. The extension of MONUSCO’s mandate continues to push the boundaries of what can legitimately considered UN peacekeeping, but this has not been accompanied by a similar identifiable success in establishing or keeping peace in the country. The continued expansion of the use of force and acceptance of robust mandates has shown very little success for a mission that this year turns 20 years old and remains deployed with no clear path to successfully conclude the mission.

Sources:

[i]Berdal, M. (2018) ‘The state of UN peacekeeping: Lessons from Congo’. Journal of Strategic Studies, 41(5). Pp.721-750.

[ii]Astill, J. (2003) ‘UN troops wait behind razor wire as Congo’s streets run with blood’. The Guardian. [online] Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2003/may/23/congo.jamesastill [Accessed 6 June 2019].

[iii]Berdal (2018) ‘State of UN Peacekeeping’.

[iv]Tull, D. M. (2018) ‘The limits and unintended consequences of UN peace enforcement: the Force Intervention Brigade in the DR Congo’. International Peacekeeping, 25(2). Pp.167-190.

iv]BBC News (2012) ‘DR Congo M23 rebels 'enter Goma city'’. BBC News. [online] Available at: https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-20405739 [Accessed 1 June 2019].

[vi]Karlsrud, J. (2015) ‘The UN at war: examining the consequences of peace-enforcement mandates for the UN peacekeeping operations in the CAR, the DRC and Mali’. Third World Quarterly, 36(1). Pp.40-54.

[vii]Karlsrud (2015) ‘UN at War’.

[viii]UNSC Verbatim Record (25 April 2013) UN Doc S/PV.6952, 2.

[ix]Ban Ki-moon (2014) ‘Remarks at Security Council Open Debate on Trends in United Nations Peacekeeping’. UN Peacekeeping. [online] Available at: https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/remarks-security-council-open-debate-trends-united-nations-peacekeeping[Accessed on 30 May 2019].

[x]Tull (2018) ‘Limits and unintended consequences’.

The Strategic-Tactical Dichotomy of Drone Warfare

“Drones have arguably revolutionised modern warfare, especially their use in targeted killings. However, over-reliance on this tactic due to its measurable results has come at the expense of long-lasting strategic advances, moving drones away from their original intelligence-focused tasks and stagnating an already exhaustive War On Terror.”

by Javier Martínez Mendoza

The failed assassination attempt of Taliban leader Mullah Omar, on 7th October 2001, marked the first use of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV) or “drones” for a targeted killing in the Global War on Terror [1]. Since then, the involvement of drones in this struggle has shifted from merely surveillance and intelligence-related activities to an additional function: leadership decapitation, arguably revolutionising the way war is waged [2].

Despite their tactical achievements, over-reliance on this tactic has had repercussions on the Global War on Terror’s strategic goals, stagnating any significant advance for the sake of short-term gains that require these operations to be carried out constantly. Ultimately, this strategic-tactical dichotomy has caused a misperception regarding how modern wars should be waged, prolonging an already exhaustive war.

How do drones fit in the War On Terror?

The use of drones is not new for US war efforts and intelligence. For decades, drones have been used just for activities relating to surveillance, training, and information gathering [3]. Originally, American decision-makers’ attitudes towards using drones to carry out strikes were of clear opposition, but the response to 9/11 paved the way for their use in targeted killings of Al Qaeda militants and enablers [4]. From that moment on, the US underwent ‘the most overt, technologically advanced, and prolific assassination programme the world had seen to that point’ [5].

In the broader context of the Global War on Terror, drones have been used or could be used for activities such as persistent surveillance, especially ‘pattern of life’ surveillance (following an individual’s everyday activities for a prolonged time), as well as tasks that involve entering environments that are risky for human health or that are deemed not worth endangering personnel [6]. It is possible to identify two trends: drones have been used mostly for surveillance and air support in Iraq and Afghanistan, whereas they have been extensively involved in targeted killings in Pakistan, Yemen, and Somalia, where the US is not officially engaged in a war and thus has not deployed a significant number of personnel [7].

The strategic-tactical dichotomy

Drones have become essential for the US decapitation strategy against terrorist groups like Al Qaeda, which aim at taking down terrorist organisations by capturing or killing their leadership. However, targeted killings could have a limited impact in reducing the frequency of militant attacks in the regions where they are carried out, providing a short-term solution that must be consistently carried out to maintain its impact, instead of a definite solution to terrorist violence [8].

For instance, even if it is true that the assassination of terrorist leaders decreases the incidence of terrorist attacks by increasing the organisations’ vulnerability by disrupting cohesion and deterring its militants, terrorist groups might remain operational. Due to their decentralized and clandestine nature, communal support and the bureaucracy they create over time, these organisations can develop a resilience that allows them to engage in terrorism even while weakened [9].

Nonetheless, other research suggests that Al Qaeda and the Taliban do suffer the effects of drone attacks, losing bases and militants, and facing operational setbacks [10]. Moreover, these attacks not only take down organisation leadership, but also deter their activities due to fear of imminent strikes. Despite the latter seeming as a long-term strategic advantage, targeted killings would need to take place constantly to keep exerting their deterring effect. 

On the other hand, statistical data on the effect of drone strikes in North-western Pakistan and Eastern Afghanistan shows there could be a negative correlation between terrorist violence and the recurrence of drone attacks in these regions [11]. Notwithstanding the latter, drone warfare as a long-lasting counter-terrorism solution remains a dubious policy, since its deterent effect on terrorism would require strikes to keep taking place indefinitely.

When drone warfare is assessed from a strategic point of view, it can be argued that its groundbreaking character has been exaggerated, both by supporters and detractors, as it has produced an over-reliance on tactics at the detriment of strategy. As targeted killings deliver measurable results, it becomes “addictive” for decision-makers to continue to carry them out even if, ultimately, there is no territorial gain and terrorists maintain activities and control over the territory [12].

Furthermore, over-reliance on killing targets denies the possibility of vital information gathering had the operation been aimed at capturing. Targeted killings are shifting the focus from drones’ initial intelligence-driven role in the Global War On Terror: surveillance [13]. However, it is possible to consider that drones are also changing the dynamics of this armed conflict, causing a shift in the display of police functions instead of waging war against terrorists. Ultimately, it could be argued that carrying out drone strikes is stagnating US-led efforts, as it is driving American forces to maintain police-like surveillance over terrorists that are being deterred but not taken down as an organisation.

Conclusion

The tactical efficiency of drone strikes offers decision-makers much desired results in a seemingly endless War On Terror. However, the tactical advantages of drones have distracted from wider strategic goals, giving decision-makers a false sense of progress. Drone use in war should remain a tactic, but current policy-making has missed the point and favoured tactical gains rather than fulfilling strategic goals [14].

Due to the tangible and measurable results of targeted killings, US-led efforts in the Global War On Terror have run the risk of emphasising immediate achievements at the expense of pursuing long-lasting strategic objectives. This might ultimately contribute to the stagnation of US military efforts by stopping its forces from attaining fatal blows to resilient terrorist structures. In this regard, it could be argued that drone use for targeted killings has become just a tactically efficient way to cut the weed, without addressing the underlying roots.

Drones’ effectiveness is mostly present in their ability to support military operations and gather valuable information. However, as long as the tactical-strategic dichotomy analysed previously, keeps misleading decision-makers from the idea that drones’ true potential will be fulfilled when their use follows strategy instead of setting it, they will fail to truly revolutionise US efforts against terrorism.

Sources:

1- Neal Curtis, “The explication of the social: Algorithms, drones and (counter-)terror,” Journal of Sociology 52, no. 3 (2016).

2- Hugh Gusterson, Drone: remote control warfare (London: The MIT Press, 2016), 6. Christopher J. Coyne, and Abigail R. Hall, “The Drone Paradox: Fighting Terrorism with Mechanized Terror,” The Independent Review 23, no. 1 (2018).

3- Patrick F. Walsh, “Drone paramilitary operations against suspected global terrorists: US and Australian perspectives”, Intelligence and National Security 32, no. 4 (2017). Coyne, and Hall, “The Drone Paradox”.

4- Gusterson, “Drone”.

5- Simon Frankel Pratt, “Crossing off names: the logic of military assassination,” Small Wars & Insurgencies 26, no. 1 (2015): 11.

6- Ann Rogers, and John Hill, Unmanned: Drone Warfare and Global Security (London: Pluto Press, 2014).

7- Walsh, ”Drone paramilitary operations”. Gusterson, ”Drone”.

8- Trevor McCrisken, ”Obama’s Drone War,” Survival 55, no. 2 (2013)

9- Jenna Jordan, ”Attacking the Leader, Missing the Mark: Why Terrorist Groups Survive Decapitation Strikes,” International Security 38, no. 4 (2014).

10- Asfandyar Mir, ”The U.S. Drone War in Pakistan Revisited”, Lawfare, https://www.lawfareblog.com/us-drone-war-pakistan-revisited

11- Patrick B. Johnston, and Anoop K. Sarbahi, ”The Impact of US Drone Strikes on Terrorism in Pakistan,” International Studies Quarterly 60 (2017): 215-216. McCrisken, ”Obama’s Drone War”.

12- Lawrence D. Freedman, ”The drone revolution: less than meets the eye,” Foreign Affairs 95, no. 6 (2016), http://go.galegroup.com.ezproxy.lib.gla.ac.uk/ps/i.do?p=EAIM&u=glasuni&id=GALE%7CA477460848&v=2.1&it=r&sid=summon

13- Tyler Wall, ”Ordinary Emergency: Drones, Police, and Geographies of Legal Terror,” Antipode 48, no. 4 (2016).

14- Johnston, and Sarbahi, ”The Impact of US“.

The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development: A Paradigm Shift in International Development

“With the 2030 Agenda the UN served its purpose as an international multilateral diplomatic forum, building consensus that resulted in a paradigm shift in international development, successfully legitimizing the synergetic relation of sustainability and development. This new framework brands development as sustainable, universal, and interdependent in economic, social and environmental dimensions and will likely spread through all layers of the UN system.”

by Eugenia Isabel Padilla

The official recognition and consolidation of sustainability into international cooperation and development  was unanimously adopted in September 2015 in the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) Resolution 70/1 titled “Transforming Our World: The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development.”  Within the UN system 2019 has been a significant year for the integration of the 2030 Agenda as it approaches its fourth anniversary. UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres announced that as of January 2019 the UN would embark on a set of systemic reforms aiming to position sustainable development “at the heart” of the organization1. During the 74th session of the UNGA in September 2019, the High Level Political Forum on Sustainable Development (HLPF) will celebrate its first high-level summit with Heads of State and Government since 2015 to discuss and negotiate a political declaration highlighting advances and shortcomings in the implementation of the 2030 Agenda2.

Unlike its predecessor, the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), the 2030 Agenda doubles its scope comprising 17 goals that span 169 targets cutting across economic, social and environmental dimensions that include six essential elements: dignity, people, prosperity, our planet, justice, and partnership3. The 2030 Agenda embodies a new paradigm for international development, labelling it as universal and  transversal, recognising the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) as a common but differentiated responsibility of all states. This represents a normative transformation concerning international development; the top layer of this reformulation being the attachment of the concept sustainability. Solely by ascribing this concept, the SDGs integrate the conservation of the environment with the procurement of social and economic capital4. In this regard, the 2030 Agenda is a milestone in developmental progress, specifically dedicating seven goals to environmental degradation concerns, in addition to goals 16 and 17 addressing rule of law and global partnerships.

The 2030 Agenda recognizes that achieving success requires intersectionality: “…eradicating poverty in all its forms and dimensions, combating inequality within and among countries, preserving the planet, creating sustained, inclusive, and sustainable economic growth and fostering social inclusion are linked to each other and are interdependent”5. The term ‘interdependent’ is key since the scope of the SDGs acknowledge in a single, consolidated agenda the unavoidable nexus between peace, gender equality, environmental degradation, social progress, and economic growth. The 2016 UNGA Special Session (UNGASS) on drug policy exemplifies these interlinkages, demonstrating how the SDGs have permeated the global agenda given their inclusive nature. This forum adjusted the international community’s efforts to combat the world drug problem by aligning international drug policy with human rights, public health, and development. Specifically, the International Expert Group on Drug Policy Metrics delineated how integrating the SDGs to drug policy will mutually reinforce results combating nine different Agenda goals, including job creation, sustainable agriculture, management of forests, and reduction of violence and corruption6. Hence, The 2030 Agenda sets a precedent for UN goal-setting initiatives to consider intersectionality between distinct issues7.

From the 1960s to the 1990s the UN envisioned development as economic growth in developing countries supported by the financial aid of donor countries8. This automatically divided member states’ roles, with developing countries given the burden of development while developed countries supplied the financial means to undertake the challenge. The 2030 Agenda is a departure from this division, making the 17 goals universal, which invalidates  the notion of development exclusively centering around poverty reduction in the Global South. Resolution 70/1 specifically states that the SDGs ‘…are universal goals and targets which involve the entire world, developed and developing countries alike.’9

Underpinning the universality of the SDGs is the principle of Common but Differentiated Responsibilities (CBDR), endorsed in the Rio Declaration in 1992. This principle acknowledges that development is a common responsibility of all countries, yet each has a distinct set of capabilities that define the extent of its contribution to international development. Reaffirming diverse national realities can allow for a more balanced approach to development that combines different efforts in different contexts with a potential collateral effect, strengthening other countries’ implementation of the agenda. The CBDR principle goes hand in hand with the global goal-setting approach of the 2030 Agenda. Governance through goals, in this case by equalizing the playing field, allows for the ‘naming and shaming’ strategy to pressure actors that do not comply. Economist Jeffrey Sachs, former special advisor on the MDG’s to the UN Secretary General, claims that goal-setting and common responsibility facilitates the mobilization of support and resources, fosters peer pressure within political spheres, and creates epistemic communities that spread  knowledge and advise on best practices10.

The 2030 Agenda is not without flaws and ambiguities. Even though the SDGs represent a new paradigm for international development, they contain contradictions inherent to their multidimensional and universal character. Scholars regard the complexity of quantifying the SDGs as one of their most critical shortcomings11. Moreover, politicization shines through in the language of the SDGs. For example, African and Arabic countries resisted the integration of LGBT rights, and indigenous peoples are mentioned once throughout the resolution12. Since 2015, the optimism surrounding the SDGs has dwindled. The United States for instance, has withdrawn from the Paris Agreement on Climate Change and is against the inclusion of climate action language in UN documents13. Clashes with the state-centric politics of the UN will continue to deter progress. 

In theory, the SDGs attempt to be as intersectional as possible—but international politics are not static, which calls for their constant evaluation and adaptation. Government regimes constantly change alongside cultural and social movements and the SDGs must do so as well. Nonetheless, with the 2030 Agenda the UN served its purpose as an international multilateral diplomatic forum, building consensus that resulted in a paradigm shift in international development, successfully legitimizing the synergetic relation of sustainability and development. This new framework brands development as sustainable, universal, and interdependent in economic, social and environmental dimensions and will likely spread through all layers of the UN system. Yet, if it will create a lasting impact within the system and beyond remains undetermined.

Sources:

1. Lebada, A. M. (2019). ‘’New Year New United Nations”: Structural Reforms Begin.”’ International Institute for Sustainable Development. Available at: http://sdg.iisd.org/commentary/policy-briefs/new-year-new-united-nations-structural-reforms-begin/

2. United Nations. (2019). “High Level Political Forum” Sustainable Development Goals Knowledge Platform. Available at: https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/hlpf
3. Renwick, D. (2015). “Sustainable Development Goals.” Council on Foreign Relations. Available at: https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/sustainable-development-goals
4. Stafford-Smith, M., Griggs, D., Gaffney, O., Ullah, F., Reyers, B., Kanie, N., Stigson, B., Shrivastaba, P., Leach., M. and O’Connell, D. (2017). “Integration: the Key to Implementating the Sustainable Development Goals.” Sustainability Science, 12, pp. 912.
5. United Nations. (2015). “A/RES/70/1 Transforming Our World: The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development.” Sustainable Development Goals Knowledge Platform. https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/content/documents/21252030%20Agenda%20for%20Sustainable%20Development%20web.pdf
6. International Expert Group on Drug Policy Metrics. (2018). “Aligning Agendas: Drugs, Sustainable Development, and the Drive for Policy Coherence.” New York: International Peace Institute, pp. 8. https://www.ipinst.org/2018/02/drugs-sustainable-development-and-the-drive-for-policy-coherence
7. Donaires Sacilotto, O., Cezarino Oranges, L., Ferreira Caldana, A. C. and Liboni, L. (2019). “Sustainable Development Goals-An Analysis of Outcomes.” Kybernetes, 48(1), pp. 186.
8. Fukuda-Parr, S. (2018). “Sustainable Development Goals.” Oxford Handbook on the United Nations: Oxford University Press, pp. 3.
9. United Nations. (2015). “A/RES/70/1 Transforming Our World: The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development.”
10. Renwick, “Sustainable Development Goals.”
11. Fukuda-Parr, “Sustainable Development Goals,” pp. 10.
12. Fukuda-Parr, S. (2016). “From the Millennium Development Goals to the Sustainable Development Goals: shifts in purpose, concept, and politics of global goal setting for development.” Gender & Development, 24(1), pp. 48.
13. Nakamura, D., and Fears, D. (2018). “Trump Administration Resist Global Climate Efforts at Home and Abroad.” The Guardian. https://www.washingtonpost.com/

The Application of Artificial Intelligence for Peacekeeping

“The increasing amount of available data, mainly due to the proliferation of access to the internet in countries where peacekeeping missions take place, has caused a technology-driven transformation of the operational environment. This comes at a time of significant developments in the fields of artificial intelligence and particularly machine learning, most of whose applications still rely on massive amounts of data. As such these developments have produced some promising individual initiatives to exploit this new and growing potential for United Nations operations.“

by Hendrik A. Pasligh

At least as early as 1996 researchers have used machine learning (ML) to predict conflicts[1]. Today, mainly due to significantly higher amounts of available data[2], advancements in computing power and the progress made in natural language processing, several artificial intelligence (AI) tools have been added to the peacekeeping arsenal. The surge in available data has mainly been caused by the proliferation of mobile phones and access to the internet[3]. The potential for companies such as Facebook to amass profits from their access to and use of people’s data makes it lucrative for them to provide access to the internet for a much lower price[4]. Thus, the equipment is now affordable for people in relatively poorer countries, which is where most peacekeeping operations take place[5]. All of these developments constitute a technology-driven transformation of the environment of peacekeeping operations. This article seeks to explore in which ways this changing environment is characterised by an increased potential for the application of AI tools.

AI tools have the potential to support peacekeeping operations in three areas: general military tasks, conflict prediction, and specific peacekeeping tasks during an operation. Among the general military tasks is the potential for optimisation and automation of administrative processes such as logistics, increasing not the effectiveness but efficiency of military operations[6]. This could lead states to be more willing to participate in peacekeeping missions and if more personnel or equipment is deployed while costs remain constant, reduce the gap between mission goals and available resources. Additionally, AI-based virtual training can be used to enhance soldiers’ tactical abilities, thus contributing to the mission’s success while mitigating casualties[7]. Sharing such programs with less developed countries  – who overwhelmingly are the main troop contributors to United Nations (UN) missions – could compensate for the lack of resources that results in insufficient training[8] for soldiers facing complex situations in peacekeeping operations[9]. Beyond that, this would certainly be in the interest of more developed countries seeking to enable local forces to take over responsibility for the security of their own countries as with the European Union Training Mission Mali (EUTM Mali).

Several studies claim that the application of machine learning tools significantly increases success in predicting conflict[10]. This can enhance the ability to understand conflict dynamics and allow for a design of peacekeeping operations that is more appropriate for preventing re-emerging or new conflicts. For example, using ML techniques such as lasso and random forests, Blair et al. found that – contrary to previous belief – ‘the risk of local violence is higher rather than lower in communities where minority and majority ethnic groups share power’[11]. The knowledge drawn from ML-driven analysis could be used to enhance prevention capabilities[12], thereby avoiding a situation in which a peacekeeping mission has to be established in the first place. It can also be applied on a tactical level, enabling a smarter allocation of resources for day-to-day tasks[13]. An important aspect here is the use of geographic information systems (GIS) which have greatly benefited from the commercialisation and subsequent affordability of satellites and satellite imagery. Machine learning[14] tools have been utilised to analyse these massive amounts of data. Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) can also contribute to this collection of data[15]. Unarmed drones were first deployed by the UN in 2013[16]. The information obtained from the use of GIS can facilitate a broad range of tasks beyond conflict prediction, including the monitoring of borders and sustainable development[17], supporting elections and other governance tasks[18] as well as field logistics[19].

Some of the most ambitious AI tools for specific peacekeeping tasks set the objective of ‘deep conflict resolution’[20], taking into account the needs and perceptions of all participants. Here, AI is used to process knowledge on conflict dynamics[21] and present it in an easily accessible way to the user in the field. This would lead to the decentralisation of knowledge and reduce a mission’s dependence on experts of psychology, conflict resolution and local culture[22]. The software cogSolv claims to provide the user with ‘options leading to truly just results’[23]. This is achieved by simulating a specific situation and, for example, suggesting to base efforts for conflict resolution on ‘Local Dignity’ instead of ‘Human Rights Discourse’.

Significant advancements in natural language processing (NLP) enabled the creation of powerful translation tools, which could enhance interoperability in multinational peacekeeping forces as well as facilitate communication with locals. Arguably even more valuable, the capability of computer programmes to process language and identify objects unlocked tools[24] to analyse open-source information, most importantly gathered from social media. A UN Global Pulse lab has used NLP to analyse radio shows in Uganda, notably including statements of people who called into the radio station, in order to gain insight into social tensions[25]. This access to unprecedented amounts and forms of information can provide peacekeeping missions with better understanding of the environment they are operating in but could also be used for smarter reactions to emergencies based on informed decision-making[26]. However, this – as well as the deployment of UAVs – raises concerns about privacy and who will have access to intelligence gathered by the UN or in the course of a UN operation[27]. Beyond that, the digitisation of UN operations might create additional vulnerabilities and establish an even more complex conflict environment by including cybersecurity risks.

In light of these numerous benefits the application of AI for peacekeeping can yield, it is worthwhile to take a look at the effort the UN is making to make the most of this technology. The UN-issued 2015 Report of the Expert Panel on Technology and Innovation in UN Peacekeeping explicitly mentions AI once – in the annexe[28]. The Secretary General’s Strategy on New Technologies recognises the importance of AI, but speaks of ‘exposure to new technologies’[29]. Nonetheless, several UN departments already make use of AI and machine learning, the Centre for Artificial Intelligence and Robotics is in the process of being established in The Hague[30] and Big Data analysis was among the main topics discussed at the 5th International Partnership for Technology in Peacekeeping Symposium in May 2019[31]. In 2013, John Karlsrud argued that in comparison to other UN activities, the possibilities of Big Data are underutilised for peacekeeping[32]. Clearly, the UN is aware of the possible benefits. However, the shift from “exploring“ and “raising awareness” to “regulating” and “committing resources” on a systemic level has yet to take place.

Sources:

[1] Trappl, R / Fürnkranz, J / Petrak, J (1996) ‘Digging for Peace: Using Machine Learning Methods for Assessing International Conflict Databases,‘ paper presented at the 12th European Conference on Artificial Intelligence, Budapest, Hungary.[2] Horowitz, M C / Allen, G C / Saravalle, E / Cho, A / Frederick, K / Scharre, P (2018) Artificial Intelligence and International Security,: Center for a New American Security, p. 13.

[3] Dorn, A W (2016) Smart Peacekeeping: Toward Tech-Enabled UN Operations,: International Peace Institute, p. 1.

[4] Taylor, L / Broeders, D (2015) ‘In the name of Development: Power, profit and the datafication of the global South,’ Geoforum, Vol. 64, pp. 229-237, p. 233.

[5] World Economic Forum (2018) ‘7 charts that show how peacekeeping is changing,’ [online] available from https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2018/06/how-the-role-of-peacekeeping-is-changing-in-7-charts/ , accessed on 3rd June 2019.

[6] Horowitz et al., p. 10-11.

[7] Cil, I / Mala, M (2010) ‘A multi-agent architecture for modelling and simulation of small military unit combat in asymmetric warfare,’ Expert Systems with Applications, Vol. 37, No. 2, pp. 1331-1343; Dormehl, L (2019) ‘The U.S. Army is building a giant VR battlefield to train soldiers virtually,’ Digital Trends, 20th March, [online] available from https://www.digitaltrends.com/cool-tech/synthetic-training-environment-vr-training/ , accessed on 12th June 2019.

[8] McCauley, A (2014) ‘Soldiers From Poor Countries Have Become the World's Peacekeepers,’ Time, 12th September, [online] available from https://time.com/3272718/un-undof-peacekeeping-golan-heights-terrorism/ , accessed on 12th June 2019.

[9] Cutillo, A (2013) ‘As Peacekeeping Becomes More Complex, Progress Needed on Training,’ IPI Global Observatory, 4th September, [online] available from https://theglobalobservatory.org/2013/09/as-peacekeeping-becomes-more-complex-progress-needed-on-training/ , accessed on 12th June 2019.

[10] Blair, R A / Blattman, C / Hartman, A (2017) ‘Predicting local violence: Evidence from a panel survey in Liberia,’ Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 54, No. 2, pp. 298-312; Perry, C (2013) ‘Machine Learning and Conflict Prediction: A Use Case,’ Stability: International Journal of Security & Development, Vol. 2, No. 3, pp. 1-18.

[11] Blair et al., p. 298.

[12] Perry, p. 2.

[13] Horowitz et al., p. 12.

[14] Naveen, J (2018) ‘4 Ways Global Defense Forces Use AI,’ Forbes, 26th August, [online] available from https://www.forbes.com/sites/cognitiveworld/2018/08/26/4-ways-the-global-defense-forces-are-using-ai , accessed on 11th June 2019.

[15] Portmess, L / Romaya, B (2015) ‘Digital Peacekeepers, Drone Surveillance and Information Fusion: A Philosophical Analysis of New Peacekeeping,’ Theoria, Vol. 62, No. 145, pp. 5-22, p. 9.

[16] Dorn, p. 6.

[17] Chen, J / Li, R / Dong, W / Ge, Y / Liao, H / Cheng, Y (2015) ‘GIS-Based Borderlands Modeling and Understanding: A Perspective,’ ISPRS International Journal of Geo-Information, Vol. 4, pp. 661-676, p. 662.

[18] Convergne, E / Snyder, M R (2015) ‘Making Maps to Make Peace: Geospatial Technology as a Tool for UN Peacekeeping,’ International Peacekeeping, Vol. 22, No. 5, pp. 565-586, p. 565.

[19] Ibid., p. 567.

[20] Olsher, D J (2015) ‘New Artificial Intelligence Tools For Deep Conflict Resolution and Humanitarian Response,’ Procedia Engineering, Vol. 107, pp. 282-292.

[21] https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2017/05/scientist-race-build-peace-machine-170509112307430.html

[22] Olsher, p. 282-283.

[23] Ibid., p. 289.

[24] International Telecommunication Union (2018) United Nations Activities on Artificial Intelligence (AI), p. 32.

[25] Hidalgo-Sanchis, P (2018) ‘USING BIG DATA AND AI TO SUPPORT PEACE AND SECURITY EFFORTS IN AFRICA,’ [online] available from https://www.unglobalpulse.org/news/using-big-data-and-ai-support-peace-and-security-efforts-africa , accessed on 3rd June 2019.

[26] Dorn, p. 12.

[27] Portmess / Romaya, p. 8-9.

[28] Lute, J H / Bager, I J / Dorn, W / Fryer, M / Guha, A (2015) Performance Peacekeeping. Final Report of the Expert Panel on Technology and Innovation.

[29] UN Secretary General’s Strategy on New Technologies (2018), p. 13.

[30] United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute (n.d.) ‘UNICRI Centre for Artificial Intelligence and Robotics,’ [online] available from http://www.unicri.it/in_focus/on/UNICRI_Centre_Artificial_Robotics , accessed on 3rd June 2019.

[31] UN Department of Operational Support (n.d.) ‘5th International Partnership for Technology in Peacekeeping Symposium Topics ,’ [online] available from https://operationalsupport.un.org/en/5th-international-partnership-technology-peacekeeping-symposium-topics , accessed on 7th June 2019.

[32] Karlsrud, J (2013) “Peacekeeping 4.0 Harnessing the Potential of Big Data, Social Media, and Cyber-technology,” in Jan-Frederik Kremer and Benedikt Müller, eds., Cyberspace and international relations: Theory, prospects and challenges, Springer, pp. 141-160, p. 143-144.

Energy (In)Security in Central Asia

“Central Asia, a region with significant strategic importance due to its geographic location and energy resources, is severely affected by the uneven distribution of energy resources, low investment, corruption and gross mismanagement that prevents them from harnessing energy security and from seizing opportunities in the energy market. Most importantly, the Soviet legacy in the five Central Asian republics—Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and Tajikistan—continues to have a negative impact on the region, which is reflected in their energy programs.”

by Andrea Marzeth Padilla

Central Asia is among the most understudied regions of the world, but it represents an important area in terms of energy resources.1 This region, which is composed of a mix of high-, middle- and low-income economies, holds significant strategic importance due to its geographic location and natural resource endowments2, particularly energy sources. However, the uneven distribution of energy resources, low investment, corruption and gross mismanagement, prevent these countries from harnessing energy security and from seizing opportunities in the energy market.3 Most importantly, the Soviet legacy in Central Asia has served as a great benefit as much as a burden, due to the region’s inheritance of major oil and gas pipelines that still centered around Russia.

The energy relations of the now five Central Asian republics—Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and Tajikistan—were first organized by the integrated power system of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), and then by the Unified Energy System of Central Asia (UESCA).4 The former held Russia as its dominating centre and is mainly characterized by a resource-sharing system, where Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan provided water to Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan in summer and received Kazakh, Turkmen and Uzbek coal, gas and electricity in winter.5   In terms of energy production, the latter consisted of 83 power plants located across the republics, with a total capacity of 25 GW, linked by a 220 and 500-kilovolt transmission line.6 But after the dissolution of the USSR (1991) and the disintegration of UESCA (2003), the five Central Asian countries were left deeply interdependent in the energy field, dealing with an energy security issue as a matter of national security. 

For a region that was used to a unified power grid and a resource-sharing system, countries had to adjust their own energy policies and develop autonomous domestic energy systems by identifying and leveraging their own resources to enhance their domestic water, electricity and gas infrastructure. Yet, the dependency on Russia after this period remained evident, although different from country to country. 7 With the exception of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, the Central Asian region became increasingly reliant on access to Russian pipelines in order to export their oil and gas resources to global markets. 8 Such are the cases of Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan, which had abundant fossil fuel reserves, enabling them to meet domestic energy needs and earn money from exports, particularly to Russia, China, Iran and Afghanistan.9 Kazakhstan remains one of the top producers of energy in the European and Eurasian region, behind Russia and Norway and ahead of Azerbaijan10, whilst the gas reserves of Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan are respectively the 5th and 8th highest in the world. 11 

In an attempt to gain full energy independence, Kazakhstan has increased its North-South energy transit capacity and has been betting on conventional renewable energy sources (RES).12 Uzbekistan increased thermal power plants (TPP) production substantially, and Turkmenistan has built several new power plants, including the first-ever combined-cycle gas-steam turbine power plant at the Mary State Power Station.13 On the other side, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan had plenty of hydropower potential but very little oil and gas of their own, preventing them to benefit from hydrocarbon exports and forcing them to rely heavily on energy imports of their neighbours.14 Nonetheless, both countries developed large hydropower plants (HPP) to compensate for the energy that their other power plants could not generate.15 At the moment, Kyrgyzstan uses just 10% of that potential, while Tajikistan uses only 5%; yet both countries already produce over 90% of their electricity from hydropower.16

Despite the fact that this region has great energy potential on the international level, these countries continue to face important challenges that prevent them from benefiting from their sufficient and sustainable energy supplies. Besides the unequal distribution of energy resources and infrastructural dependence on Russia, these countries maintain increasingly obsolescent  energy systems that are severely affected by seasonal variations of power production with water-energy linkages.17  In addition, Central Asia’s oil and natural gas industry faces a great challenge in transporting their products from the landlocked region to global markets, mainly since the majority of the existing pipeline systems still lead to Russia and any new energy infrastructure is still likely to depend on Russia for funding.18In a region where there is no common definition of energy security, cooperating among the states of Central Asia seems to be the right answer. Some experts have recommended that the cooperation among these countries will not only diversify their energy resources but also their export destinations, leading to a decrease in the dependence of Russia for successfully achieving energy security in the region.19 In part due to the lack of regional cooperation among these states, the Central Asian transport route with the rest of the world has remained underdeveloped, intensifying reliance on Russia. Therefore, a joint management of these vital resources is considered crucial not only for the region’s energy security but also for their sustainable development, poverty reduction and climate resilience.20

Sources:

1. Velázquez, S (2017) ‘Gas y petróleo en Asia Central, ¿alternativa para la dependencia energética de la UE?,’ Instituto Español de Estudios Estratégicos, p. 1.2. United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific, ESCAP. (2018) ‘Energy and Development in Central Asia: A statistical overview of energy sectors in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan,’ [online] available from https://www.unescap.org/sites/default/files/Central%20Asia%20Statistical%20Perspective%202018_WEB.pdf , accessed on 12th June 2019, pp 4.
3. Domnin, S (2016) ‘Sergei Domnin: Hydro-energy problems in Central Asia: A View from Kazakhstan,’ Central Asia Bureau for Analytical Reporting [online] available from https://cabar.asia/en/sergei-domnin-hydro-energy-problems-in-central-asia-a-view-from-kazakhstan/ , accessed on 12th June 2019.
4. Ibid.
5. International Crisis Group (2014) ‘Water Pressures in Central Asia,’ [online] available from https://www.refworld.org/pdfid/5412a6444.pdf,, accessed on 12th June 2019.
6. ESCAP, pp 30.
7. Niklasson, C (2008) ‘Russian leverage in Central Asia,’ FOI, [online] available from https://www.foi.se/rest-api/report/FOI-R--2484--SE, accessed on 20th June 2019, pp 32.
8. Hendenskog and Larsson (2007), Russian Leverage on the CIS and the Baltic states, Stockholm: The Swedish Defence Research Agency (FOI), FOI-R--2301-SE, p. 45
9. Russell, M (2018) ‘Water in Central Asia: An increasingly scarce resource,’ European Parliamentary Research Service [online] available from http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2018/625181/EPRS_BRI(2018)625181_EN.pdf , accessed on 13th June 2019.
10. Putz, C (2017) ‘Energy in Central Asia: Who Has What?,’ The Diplomat, [online] available from https://thediplomat.com/2017/06/energy-in-central-asia-who-has-what/ , accessed on 13th June 2019.
11. Ibid.
12. Wheeler, E (2017) ‘Kazakhstan's Renewable Energy Quest,’ The Diplomat, [online] available from https://thediplomat.com/2017/05/kazakhstans-renewable-energy-quest/, accessed on 13th June 2019.
13. Turkmenistan Today (2018) ‘President of Turkmenistan Launches New Power Plant,’ [online] available from http://tdh.gov.tm/news/en/articles.aspx&article14459&cat29 , accessed on 14th June 2019.
14. Russell, p. 9.
15. Smirnov, S (2009) ‘Разорвать нельзя оставить,’ Expert Kazakhstan №46, 237, [online] available from https://expert.ru/kazakhstan/2009/46/elektroenergetika/, accessed on 14th June 2019.
16. Russell, p. 4.
17. Aminjonov, F (2017) ‘Re-thinking Central Asian Energy Security: Pitfalls of Export Diversification Policies,’ Central Asia Institute for Strategic Studies, [online] available from http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/kasachstan/13546.pdf , accessed on 14th June 2019.
18. The Jamestown Foundation (2019) ‘Central Asia’s Biggest Energy Challenge,’ Oil price, [online] available from https://oilprice.com/Energy/Energy-General/Central-Asias-Biggest-Energy-Challenge.html , accessed on 15th June 2019.
19. Bahgat, G (2011) Energy Security: An Interdisciplinary Approach,: Wiley.
20. Shrestha, P (2019) ‘EU and World Bank agree €7m for energy and water security in Central Asia,’ Energy Live News, [online] available from https://www.energylivenews.com/2019/05/24/eu-and-world-bank-agree-e7m-for-energy-and-water-security-in-central-asia/, accessed on 15th June 2019.

Latin America: The World’s Deadliest Region for Environmental Activism

“In commemoration of the World Environment Day, 5th of June 2019”

By Andrea Marzeth Padilla, Louise Vingert & Mariana Garrido

Latin America (LATAM) is the most dangerous region for defenders of the environment and land, comprising six of the ten deadliest countries for environmental defenders: Brazil, Colombia, Mexico, Peru, Honduras and Nicaragua [1]. According to Global Witness’ 2018 Report ‘At What Cost?’, from the 207 environmental defenders killed around the globe in 2017, 116 died in LATAM [2]. Comprising over 50% of the world’s biodiversity [3], the region holds a vast natural wealth, attracting investment for extractivist activities — such as mining, hydroelectric exploitation and agroindustry,— which have been widely guarded by national governments independent of the many pernicious environmental and human costs.

Extractivism and its environmental damages has motivated counter-actions from environmental defenders, who speak out for the protection of their homelands’ natural diversity [4].  The  majority of them identify as indigenous peoples, making them natural protectors of the environment, yet more prone to suffer the impacts of environmental imbalances and ethnic exclusion [5]. Environmental defenders often face persecution and intimidation from corporations or contracted mercenaries, which is aggravated by widespread impunity and a weak rule of law. Three significant case studies in Brazil, Colombia, and Honduras have been chosen to overview the situation and reflect upon the reasons making LATAM an insecure region for environmental defenders.

Brazil

Brazil has been assessed by Global Witness as the most dangerous country for environmental defenders [6]. The country had a record  57 killings in 2017; 43,9% of which happened in the context of massacres in areas of the Amazon [7]. The escalation of threat can be traced back to the beginning of this decade, marked by budgetary cuts in the two most important organisations handling the protection of indigenous populations, and the land redistribution to small farmers and Afro descendants: The National Institute of Colonisation and Agrarian Reform (INCRA) and The National Foundation of Indigenous people (FUNAI). The latter was forced to close offices in remote areas, such as Vale do Javari (Amazonas), an isolated and prevalent indigenous territory. This allowed the unmonitored access of miners in indigenous areas, which allegedly led to the massacre of 10 innocent members of an indigenous group [8]. Furthermore, policy changes have made it easier for corporations to develop projects without the previous consent of local communities, further shifting the power balance in favour of big industries [9].

A notorious example of the resistance against corporate action in the region is the one of Maria do Socorro, an active leader of forest dwellers – indigenous, quilombo and riverine communities in the state of Pará [10]. Since 2009, Maria has denounced the intrusive action and water contamination of one of the world’s biggest Alumina refineries, Norsk Hydro [11]. In exchange, she has suffered threats and intimidations, while being widely ignored by local authorities, who seem to value foreign investment over environmental security. Even though the company has finally been convicted for contamination and flooding, proper justice is yet to be made. Maria continues to lead the demands for land recognition and environmental protection — a personal struggle that is also historically relevant to matters of ‘race, inequality and justice’ [12].  

The backslide on public policies for the environment and the rights of indigenous people remains ongoing in Brazil, including cuts on the National Programme for the Protection of Human Rights Defenders. The new President’s, Jair Bolsonaro, expressions of stigmatization and securitization of environmental defenders do not promise a better future, with the promise of continuing Temer’s policy of ending the ‘industry of demarcation of indigenous lands’ [13]. It bears mentioning that the Brazilian Congress has a significant influence of agribusiness lobby (Bancada Ruralista). In fact, changes in legislation have facilitated the construction work of many companies demonstrating that the law seem to lean towards the politics of big corporations, which are usually under public contract, rendering the environment and its defenders environment particularly vulnerable.

Colombia

Colombia’s record of threats against environmental defenders is part of a bigger picture of stigmatization and aggressions against human rights defenders and leftist groups in the country [14]. According to Global Witness, 24 environmental defenders were killed in 2017 [15], and at least 105 Human Rights defenders were killed in the same year [16]. Although records of threats against environmental activists have been present throughout Colombia’s history, there has been a significant rise in the killings of defenders after the signing of the Colombian Peace Process in 2016. This rampant phenomenon is closely related to land disputes that emerged as a consequence of the power vacuum left by the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) [17].

Environmental activism in Colombia is usually led by indigenous and Afro-Colombian leaders who actively speak out against the environmental impacts of mining, hydroelectric energy, illegal logging and deforestation [18]. One of the most striking examples has been the case of Francia Marquez, winner of the Goldman Environmental Prize [18], who mobilized 80 women from her community of La Toma to march 350 km to Bogotá in  protest against the illegal mining activities taking place in their homeland [20]. As a result of Marquez’s role, all those operations were forced to cease [21]. Francia’s work is nevertheless unfinished as La Toma still faces high levels of water contamination and as the activist continues to suffer life threats that forced her to move to the city of Cali [22].

Subsequent Colombian governments share the weight of responsibility for an incautious promotion of extractivism and for the effects of their inaction in the protection of environmental defenders. Many Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO’s) along with the United Nations have exhorted national authorities to take further action in the investigation of the referred killings, as well as in the development of protection schemes for its victims [23].  At the moment, the state’s protection measures include the provision of disposable cell phones and bulletproof vests, leaving the security concerns of defenders ignored [24]. Simultaneously, while there appears to be an effort by authorities to investigate the material perpetrators of crimes against defenders, intellectual authors of these crimes remain untouched[25]. The apparent systematicity of the killings, a generalized environment of stigmatization of environmental activism — defenders are often accused of narco-trafficking — not only spreads fear and distrust over defenders’ communities but contributes to the relegation of important environmental protection reforms in one of the most biodiverse countries in the world.

Honduras

Honduras has been the most insecure country per capita for environmental defenders in LATAM, with 128 people murdered since 2010 [26]. In 2009, following a coup d’état, Honduras witnessed an explosive growth in environmentally destructive megaprojects that would displace many indigenous communities [27]. Although there has been a significant decrease in the killings of environmental defenders in the last few years, the civil society continues to face waves of repression, stigmatization, criminalisation, death threats, and police brutality [28].

Moreover, the Honduran government has faced serious accusations for taking part in illegitimate agreements, bribes and crimes committed against environmental and land defenders in the country. Such is the 2016 case of Agua Zarca hydroelectric dam on the Gualcarque river, in which Berta Cáceres, a prominent human rights defender, indigenous leader and winner of the Goldman Environmental Prize in 2015, was shot dead, for opposing this project, by gunmen who entered her home in Honduras on the 2nd of March 2016.

Cáceres, had been actively leading the Lenca community’s resistance against Agua Zarca project, which has previously been linked to the killing of another human rights defender, Tomás Garcia, in 2013 [29]. In her effort to stop the Agua Zarca Project dam, Cáceres rallied her community and waged a grassroots campaign that successfully pressured the world’s largest dam developer to pull out” [30]. However, the case of Berta’s murder indicates the high levels of impunity throughout the country. For two and a half years after her assassination, Berta’s case remained unresolved until the Environmental Manager of the Agua Zarca dam project company Desarrollos Energéticos S. A (DESA), Sergio Rodríguez Orellana, alongside six others, were found guilty of her murder.  Meanwhile, powerful elites and politicians that were implicated have yet to be held accountable [31].

Berta’s story is evidence  that Honduras’ justice system, despite receiving large amounts of financial aid from the United States (US) and European Union (EU), continues to operate with negligence, impunity, secrecy and bias. In addition, the strong linkages between rich and powerful elites of the country and the environmental defenders’ assassinations are difficult to ignore in the global context, where Berta Cáceres has become the self-image of international environmental activism.

Conclusion

The daily reports of threats and murders demonstrate the high levels of insecurity encountered daily by the environmental defenders in Latin America. UN’s Former Special Rapporteur on Human Rights and the Environment, John Knox, has highlighted ‘endemic corruption’ as one of the main reasons why the region is especially dangerous for environmental defenders [32].  After a thorough analysis, it is clear that corporate and governmental interest are major factors driving the persecution, stigmatization and criminalization of these activists. Impunity and the lack of political will to resolve this issue are certainly aggravants to the problem. In this conflict between corporations extractivist conception of natural resources as profit versus an indigenous biocultural approach to the preservation of their natural ecosystems, the environment is not only a victim itself, but it is “emerging as a new battleground for human rights” [33].

Sources:

[1] Parker, A (2018) ‘Latin America is the deadliest region for environmental activists’, Open Democracy [online], available from https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/democraciaabierta/latin-america-is-deadliest-region-for-environmental-activists, accessed on 7th June 2019; Rojo, M (2019) ‘Environmental Defenders endangered in Latin America,’ Fair Planet [online], available from https://www.fairplanet.org/editors-pick/environmental-defenders-endangered-in-latin-america/, accessed on 7th June 2019.

[2] Global Witness (2019) ‘At What Cost: Irresponsible business and the murder of land and environmental defenders in’, available from https://www.globalwitness.org/en/campaigns/environmental-activists/at-what-cost/, accessed 6th June 2019.

[3] United Nations Environment Programme (2016) ‘Biodiversity in Latin America and the Caribbean’ (1 March 2016). XX Meeting of the Forum of Ministers of the Environment of Latin America and the Caribbean [online], available from http://www.pnuma.org/forodeministros/20-colombia/documentos/Background_Biodiversity_Document_26_02_16.pdf, accessed 7th June 2016.

[4] Forst, M (2016) ‘A Deadly Shade of Green: Threats to Environmental Human Rights Defenders in Latin America.’ Center for International Environmental Law, Article 19, pp. 4-5, available from www.ciel.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/Deadly_shade_of_green_English_Aug2016.pdf, accessed 6th June 2016.

[5] Mihlar, F (2018) ‘Voices that must be heard: minorities and indigenous people combating climate change’ Minority Rights Group International [online], available from https://www.refworld.org/pdfid/492d18da2.pdf, accessed 7th June 2019.

[6] Global Witness p.8

[7] Global Witness.

[8] Global Witness, Op cit., p. 25

[9] Global Witness 2017; Mitchell, C. (2018) ‘2017 was deadliest year for environmental activism: report’, Al Jazeera [online], available from https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/07/2017-deadliest-year-environmental-activism-report-180722174539780.html, accessed 6th June 2019.

[10] Barbosa, C (2018) ‘Três mulheres de Barcarena: ameaçadas, perseguidas e intimidadas’, Amazonia Real [online], available from http://amazoniareal.com.br/tres-mulheres-de-barcarena-ameacadas-perseguidas-e-intimidadas/, accessed 6th June 2019.

[11] Watts, J (2018) ‘They should be put in prison’: battling Brazil’s huge alumina plant’, The Guardian [online], available from: https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2018/jul/21/land-grab-corruption-pollution-amazon-rainforest-brazil-maria-do-soccoro-silva, accessed 8th June 2019.

[12] Watts, Op Cit..

[13] Folha de S. Paulo (2018) ‘Bolsonaro diz que pretende acabar com 'ativismo ambiental xiita' se for presidente’, Uol [online], available from https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2018/10/bolsonaro-diz-que-pretende-acabar-com-ativismo-ambiental-xiita-se-for-presidente.shtml, accessed 8th June 2019.

[14] Forst, M. (2018) ‘United Nations Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights defenders. Visit to Colombia, 20 November to 3 December 2018 End of mission statement’, United Nations Human Rights Special Procedures [online], available from https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Defenders/StatementVisitColombia3Dec2018_EN.pdf, accessed 7th June 2019; Fundación Ideas para la Paz (2016) 'Human Rights and Business Country Guide - Colombia', Fundación Ideas para la Paz and The Danish Institute for Human Rights [online], available from: http://www.ideaspaz.org/especiales/guia-empresas/colombia_country_guide_(english).pdf, accessed 17th June 2019; Galanova, M (2018) 'In Colombia, it's dangerous to be left wing', Deutsche Welle [online], available from: https://www.dw.com/en/in-colombia-its-dangerous-to-be-left-wing/a-44131086, accessed 17th June 2019.

[15] Global Witness, Op Cit.

[16] Amnesty International (2018) ‘Amnesty International Report 2017/18 - Colombia’, Amnesty International [online], available from https://www.refworld.org/docid/5a993925a.html, accessed 7th June 2019.

[17] Forst, M. (2018).

[18] Global Witness, Op cit, p. 28.

[19] The Goldman Environmental Prize (2018) ‘Francia Márquez. 2018 Goldman Prize Recipient South and Central America’, Goldman Prize [online], available from https://www.goldmanprize.org/recipient/francia-marquez/, accessed 7th June 2019.

[20] Rojas, C, Mosquera, M, Botero, P, Escobar, A (2015) ‘Fights of "good living" by black women from Alto Cauca’, Nómadas 43. Universidad Central, pp. 167-183.

[21] The Goldman Environmental Prize (2018).

[22] The Goldman Environmental Prize (2018).

[23] United Nations Security Council (2018) Resolution SC/13307. Despite Recent Challenges, Colombia Represents Pinnacle of Success in Fostering Peace, Security Council Hears at Briefing on New Developments (19 April 2018) [online], available from https://www.un.org/press/en/2018/sc13307.doc.htm, accessed 7th June 2019.

[24] Global Witness, Op cit, p. 28.

[25] El Espectador (2019) Académicos piden acciones de fondo en defensa de líderes y excombatientes (21 May 2019) [online], available from https://www.elespectador.com/noticias/politica/academicos-piden-acciones-de-fondo-en-defensa-de-lideres-y-excombatientes-articulo-861841, accessed 7th June 2019.

[26] Global Witness, Op. cit., p.21.

[27] The Goldman Environmental Prize ‘Berta Caceres’, [online] available from https://www.goldmanprize.org/recipient/berta-caceres/, accessed 5th of June 2019.

[28] Global Witness, Op. cit. p.25.

[29] Business & Human Rights Resource Centre ‘Honduras: Agua Zarca Dam impacts indigenous people by Gualcarque River,’ [online] available from https://www.business-humanrights.org/en/honduras-agua-zarca-dam-impacts-indigenous-people-by-gualcarque-river, accessed 5th June 2019.

[30] The Goldman Environmental Prize ‘Berta Caceres,’ Goldman Prize [online], available from https://www.goldmanprize.org/recipient/berta-caceres, accessed 5th June 2019.

[31] Lakhani, N (2017) ‘Honduras elites blamed for violence against environmental activists,’ The Guardian [online], available from https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/jan/31/honduras-environmental-activists-global-witness-violence-berta-caceres, accessed 5th June 2019.

[32] Schweimler, D (2018) ‘Intimidation and murder: Brazilians fight unequal land ownership’, Al Jazeera [online], available from https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/07/intimidation-murder-brazilians-fight-unequal-land-ownership-180725032455226.html, accessed 4th June 2019.

[33] Global Witness, Op cit.

The struggle for ethnic identities in Morocco and Algeria: A colonial legacy of inequalities

“The sentences of Hirak protestors were recently confirmed in appeal by the Casablanca court, reaching up to 20 years of prison on the ground of ‘conspiracy against State’s Security’. The Hirak movement occurred in the Rif, claiming the end of an economic blockade and social discrimination affecting the Amazigh regions. Five years after the Arab Spring, known as the ‘20th February movement’ in Morocco, the (under)development of the Amazigh regions remains a big issue. The popular mass protest spread in Algeria, where similar conditions are experienced by the Kabyles. These events underline the inherent connection between recognition of identity on the one hand and socio-economic inequalities on the other. Properly named Amazigh, Berber is the dominant ethnic group in Morocco and an important one in Algeria, despite the countries’ identification as “Arab”. Ultimately, questions of identity and process of Arabization in both Morocco and Algeria could be hardly understood without acknowledging their colonial past [1].”

by Sahar Lahdifi

Similarly to Algeria, Morocco’s notion of national identity is the result of a long process of colonial and post-colonial legitimisation of power. Contemporary national identity is, in reality, the legacy of a social division imposed by the French colonial state, between Arabs and Amazighs on the one hand, and Muslims and non-Muslims on the other[2]. Despite two different types of colonial rules enforced by the French colonisers – assimilationist vs associationist[3] - both Algeria and Morocco suffered from an arbitrary division on the ground of ethnicity, created to establish a policy of divide-and-rule.

Following a long struggle for independence, the two states had the important task of preserving the integrity of their respective territories. As colonial rule did little to create a shared identity, Algeria and Morocco’s first objective was to gain legitimacy through the shaping of national identity[4]. Both former Moroccan Sultan King Mohammed V and Algerian President Ahmed Ben Bella imposed a collective identity enshrined in Islamic and Arabic roots, disregarding the Amazigh population, the first inhabitants of Morocco before the arrival of Arabs and Islam in the 7th Century.

In fact, the Arabic and Islamic roots were the two main features of political and social distinction between the colonists and the natives. In the Algerian colony, Muslims had to give up Islam to become first-class citizens, emphasising Islam as a symbol of resistance during post-colonial time. For their parts, Amazighs were deemed to be favoured and associated to the colonial state regarding their more secular customs, sometimes detached from Islam. Following the independence, their distinct legal customs were suppressed under Islamic laws and unification against the colonial state resulted in Islamisation and Arabisation of the national identity, reaching the demands of the Arab nationalists.

Yet, this post-colonial unification contributed to large inequalities between ethnicities, as it had an impact on the economic and social development of the Berber regions and their inhabitants. Significant claims were made to decrease Arabisation in order to include the Berbers and Kabyles as part of the collective identity, especially concerning their language and culture in the educational system.

On March 1980, strikes occurred in Tizi Ouzou and the Kabyle districts of Algiers, known as the “Berber Spring” [5]. Thousands of young Berbers in Algeria, joined demonstrations for the official recognition of their language, as part of the Algerian national history and identity. It was not until the end of the violent Kabyle protests, called “Black Spring” in 2001, that former President of Algeria Abdelaziz Bouteflika officially recognised the Tamazight as a national language through a constitutional amendment. In Morocco, the process has taken longer due to the complicated composition of the population, as the Berbers are divided into 4 major groups (Rif, Braber, Shluh and Soussi) and those groups are further divided into tribes.

On August 20th, 1994, King Hassan II of Morocco announced the teaching of Tamazight in middle-school following international pressure by the Human Rights Commission of Vienna[6]. The rise of the Arab Spring in February 2011 incited a movement in Morocco. Their revindications concerned a larger recognition of Amazigh culture and language, alongside wider political rights. This movement was judged too significant to ignore considering the geopolitical context, and King Mohammed VI of Morocco was constrained to answer to the political demands. A new Constitution was enacted on the 30th July 2011, recognising the “Berber components” of the country[7].

The claim for identity recognition reveals a deeper struggle for economic, social, and political rights. In 2016, the death of a Berber fish vendor, Mohsen Fikri, who saw his merchandise confiscated by a policeman, unleashed the anger of thousands of Berbers in the Rif region of Morocco. The Hirak movement was born and spread throughout the whole country as well as in Algeria, claiming the end of an economic blockade affecting Amazigh regions[8]. Protestors also called for equality and the end of social discrimination, particularly in regard to employment and education. For example, illiteracy and unemployment rates in the Rif region of Morocco are higher than the national average, affecting almost half of the population. Despite infrastructure projects led by the state, the number of health facilities in the region remain fundamentally low. Access to water and electricity is disparate, as 13.3% of the population have access to clean water in rural areas compared to 91.4% in urban areas[9]. Berbers protest the discrimination experienced at the hands of the elite governing class, who are out of touch with the reality, especially following the sentencing of protestors.

Despite new participatory mechanisms enshrined in the new Constitution, civil rights and freedoms remain controversial in Morocco and impact the whole population regardless of their ethnicities. Yet, the Amazigh population has a long history of inequalities behind, that it aims to engage in despite a complex domestic context.

From colonisation to post-colonialism, collective identity in Morocco and Algeria has always been dynamically negotiated and reimagined in interaction with political, social, and economic dynamics. Indeed, questions of identity are often indicative of profound political, social and economic (in)stabilities and (in)securities.

Sources:

[1]Jonathan Wyrtzen, Colonial Legitimization-Legibility Linkages and the Politics of Identity in Algeria and Morocco, Yale University, European Journal of Sociology, Vol. 58, N°2, 2017, pp. 205-235

[2]Ibid

[3]Ibid

[4]Jonathan N.C. Hill, Identity and instability in Postcolonial Algeria, The Journal of North African Studies, Vol.11, N°1, March 2006

[5]Jonathan N.C. Hill, Identity and instability in Postcolonial Algeria, The Journal of North African Studies, Vol.11, N°1, March 2006

[6]Perspective monde, Reconnaissance des revendications berbères au Maroc,Faculté des lettres et sciences humaines, Université de Sherbrooke, Québec, 20 août 1994

[7]Preamble of the Moroccan Constitution of 201

[8]Reda Zaireg, Rif Crisis Reveals Failure of Development in Morocco, 2 January 2018, Orient XXI, https://orientxxi.info/magazine/rif-crisis-reveals-failure-of-development-in-morocco,2197

[9]Nadia Lamlili, Tensions à Al Hoceima : les chiffres des inégalités sociales qui expliquent la grogne marocaine, 25 mai 2017, Jeune Afrique, https://www.jeuneafrique.com/441734/politique/tensions-a-al-hoceima-chiffres-inegalites-sociales-expliquent-grogne-marocaine/

The Dormant Stage of the Chechen Insurgency and The Challenges It Poses to the Pro-Russian Chechen Regime

“Following the end of the Russian military operations in 2008, Chechnya has experienced a period of economic recession and consistent low-level political violence perpetrated by Jihadist and separatist insurgent movements. The brutal Counterinsurgency operations carried out by the Chechen security forces inflicted severe casualties on the rebels but antagonised large segments of the local population. A sudden decline in the regime’s capacity to enforce law and order could arouse the dormant Chechen insurgency and drive the little republic towards a new, bloody civil war.“

by Roberto Colombo

In February 2008, Russian President Vladimir Putin announced the end of the Russian military operations in the Republic of Chechnya. Promising the return of peace and stability in the troubled region, Putin asserted in front of the Russian State Council that, starting from early 2004, the Russian armed forces operating in conjunction with the Chechen government’s paramilitary units successfully inflicted a ‘decisive and crushing blow’ to the Chechen rebels [1]. Welcomed with enthusiasm by the Russian population, the end of the Russian Counterinsurgency (COIN) operations and the institution of a competent pro-Russian indigenous COIN force were supposed to mark the conclusion of a military engagement that, since August 1999, claimed the lives of more than 10,000 Russian soldiers and 30,000 Chechen civilians (according to Russian official estimates) [2] [3]. Despite Putin’s speech describing the Chechen conflict as resolved, scholars and journalists challenged the Kremlin’s optimistic viewpoint. ‘It is a fairy tale that Chechnya has become a stable region,’ stated the editor of the Caucasian Knot website, Grigory Shvedov, a few days after the declaration, noting that clashes between insurgents and security forces continued to occur on a daily-basis in spite of the Chechen regime’s heightened COIN capabilities [4]. Although the pro-Russian government headed by Ramzan Kadyrov since May 2004 forced the insurgency to assume a ‘dormant’ configuration characterised by a low-level frequency of violent attacks, it only did so by implementing brutal COIN measures that alienated the civilian population and exacerbated the local communities’ hostility towards the official authorities [5]. Notwithstanding the decrease in their operational efficacy, the insurgents have not been dissuaded from attempting to unsettle the status quo through the use of terrorism, political assassinations, and low-level guerrilla warfare [6]. Should the regime’s capability of enforcing law and order be weakened or challenged, the dormant Chechen insurgency could swiftly gain momentum by mobilising the populace against the pro-Russian government and triggering an escalatory cycle of retaliatory violence between civilian population and security forces [7].

Ironically, the paramilitary forces that allowed the pro-Russian regime to quell the insurgency might also be the catalyst for a new wave of violence throughout the region. Realising that the deployment of Chechen natives would have significantly assisted the Russian military forces in isolating and neutralising the insurgents, Moscow in 2000 supported the establishment of the kadyrovtsy, a pro-Russian indigenous paramilitary group named after Chechnya’s ruling family – the Kadyrov clan [8]. Against a backdrop of judicial impunity, the kadyrovtsy resorted to collective punishments against the insurgents’ relatives, including threats, beatings, rapes, torture, and executions, to force the insurgents to lay down their weapons and deter the population from providing assistance to the rebels [9]. Because of their experience as former insurgents, their loyalty to the incumbents, their access to high-quality information, and their inclination to target innocent civilians, the kadyrovtsy proficiently contained the insurgency and effectively coerced the civilian population into submission [10]. Nevertheless, the kadyrovtsy’s draconian techniques exacerbated the society’s polarisation and deeply antagonised the civilian population. Many Chechens are ‘in a state of postponed blood feud toward Kadyrov, his clan, and the kadyrovtsy and are waiting for ‘a propitious time to commence violence’ [11]. As long as Kadyrov is able to control and direct his paramilitary units against the insurgents and their supporters, the kadyrovtsy will continue to constitute a formidable COIN force. But because the Kremlin retains the authority to appoint and dismiss the leaders of any autonomous republic of the North Caucasus Federal District (NCFD), Kadyrov’s supremacy is dependent on Moscow’s volition. If deprived of their leader’s guidance and the government’s patronage, the kadyrovtsy would lose their organizational and operational efficacy, exposing themselves to the populations’ retaliatory strikes [12]. Such a tense and unpredictable socio-political landscape is particularly suited to trigger large-scale collective violent outbreaks. Consequently, the Chechen insurgency could easily capitalise on the population’s grievances and swiftly turn from dormant to rampant. In other words, the repressed Chechen population is likely to retaliate against the security forces and join the insurgency in large numbers as soon as the regime’s capability to subdue the local communities and suppress the insurgents wanes [13].
As mentioned, the dormant Chechen insurgency might also reawaken if the relationship between Grozny, the capital of Chechnya, and Moscow deteriorates to the point of endangering the Chechen political establishment’s survival. Since 2004, Chechnya has been ruled by a leader fully loyal to Putin and anxious to demonstrate his allegiance to the Russian Federation. As a reward for his ability to quell the insurgency, Kadyrov enjoys Putin’s personal support and is afforded the freedom to ‘treat Chechnya as his personal fiefdom’ [14]. However, the Chechen leader’s political hegemony is subject to significant restrictions. Despite Kadyrov behaving like a monarch and his political power steadily growing, his dominion over Chechnya cannot be secured without Moscow’s direct approval. Therefore, Kadyrov’s position might drastically change overnight if Moscow decides to dispossess the Chechen leadership of its official federal endorsement [15]. Currently, the strongest opposition to Kadyrov’s rule is represented by the Russian siloviki – politicians that previously served within Russian military, security, and law enforcement agencies [16]. Many among the siloviki consider the presence of an ambitious warlord dominating a small Russian region and disposing of a large personal elite force as a serious threat to the federal government’s authority [17]. At the moment, Putin’s patronage prevents the siloviki from taking actions against Kadyrov and undermining the Chechen leadership’s legitimacy. Nevertheless, a significant weakening of the Chechen regime’s political power cannot be ruled out from the possible outcomes of an increasingly tense relationship between Grozny and Moscow. Although Chechnya exhibits lower levels of political violence in comparison to other areas of the NCFD, the situation on the ground remains highly volatile [18]. If the regime is deprived of Moscow’s endorsement or loses its ability to confront the insurgents, the Chechen population would be able to massively engage in politically-motivated violence and revitalise an insurgency that, until now, seemed to have been patiently waiting for favourable conditions to arise once again.

Sources:

[1] Putin, V (2008) ‘Speech at Expanded Meeting of the State Council on Russia’s Development Strategy through to 2020.’ [online] available from: http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/24825. Accessed on 12th May 2019.

[2] ‘Chechen Official Puts Death Toll for 2 Wars at Up to 160,000,’ (2005) New York Time, 16th August [online] available from https://www.nytimes.com/2005/08/16/world/europe/chechen-official-puts-death-toll-for-2-wars-at-up-to-160000.html. Accessed on 12th May 2019.

[3] Department of Justice (Russia) ‘Armed Conflict Report: Russia (Chechnya) (1999-First Combat Deaths in Current Phase,’ January 2019 [online] available from: https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/eoir/legacy/2014/02/25/Russia.pdf. Accessed on 12th May 2019.

[4] Schwirtz, M (2009) ‘Russia Ends Operations in Chechnya,’ New York Times, 16th April [online] available from: https://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/17/world/europe/17chechnya.html. Accessed on 12th May 2019.

[5] Halbach, U (2018) ‘Chechnya’s Status Within the Russian Federation,’ German Institute for International and Security Studies, SWP Research Paper, p. 5.

[6] Blank, S & Kim, Y (2016) ‘The North Caucasus: Russia’s Other War,’ The Journal of Slavic Military Studies, Vol. 29, No. 2, p.187.

[7]Souleimanov, E; Abbasov, N; Siroky, D (2019) ‘Frankenstein in Grozny: Vertical and Horizontal Cracks in the Foundation of Kadyrov’s Rule,’ Asia Europe Journal, Vol. 17, p. 87.

[8] Souleimanov, E (2017) ‘A Failed Revolt? Assessing the Viability of the North Caucasus Insurgency,’ The Journal of Slavic Military Studies, Vol. 30, No. 2, p. 219. & Souleimanov, E; Aliyev, H (2017) How Socio-Cultural Codes Shaped Violent Mobilisation, Palgrave, p. 39.

[9] Ratelle, J & Souleimanov, E (2016) ‘A Perfect Counterinsurgency? Making Sense of Moscow’s Policy of Chechenisation,’ Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 68, No. 8, p. 1298.

[10] Souleimanov, E & Aliyev, H (2016) ‘Evaluating the Efficacy of Indigenous Forces in Counterinsurgency: Lessons from Chechnya and Dagestan,’ Small Wars & Insurgencies, Vol. 27, No. 3, p. 394.

[11] Souleimanov; Abbasov; Siroky, p. 95.

[12] Ratelle & Souleimanov, p. 1308.

[13] Souleimanov, p. 222.

[14] Halbach, p. 13.

[15] Ratelle & Souleimanov, p. 1304.

[16] Taylor, B (2017) ‘The Russian Siloviki & Political Change,’ American Academy for Arts & Sciences, Vol. 146, No. 2, p. 53.

[17] Souleimanov, E (2015) ‘An Ethnography of Counterinsurgency: Kadyrovtsy and Russia’s Policy of Chechenisation,’ Post-Soviet Affairs, Vol. 31, No. 2, p. 107.

[18] Dannreuther, R (2014) ‘Shifting Dynamics of the Insurgency and Counter-Insurgency in the North Caucasus,’ Ethnopolitics, Vol. 13, No. 4, p- 378.

The Politics of Food in Venezuela: Maduro, Military, and Malnutrition

‘’The build up of tensions in Venezuela has led the country to a breaking point: self-appointed interim president Guaidó has called for the military to defect and support him to topple the sitting Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro at the end of April. This decision is not free from risk, especially since Guaidó’s diplomatic immunity has been revoked by the Maduro regime. Though the decision and its stakes highlight the key player in Venezuelan society: the military.’’

by Marijn Pronk

Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro has put top military personnel in power positions of nationalized industries, such as oil, in order to secure his power. Hugo Chávez, the president that preceded Maduro, had the same tactic by appointing lawmakers in support of the regime in high political positions in the National Assembly as well as the Supreme Court [1]. It is indeed primarily support of the military, not the citizen’s support, that keeps Maduro in power [2]. Maduro has never been as charismatic and popular as his predecessor Chávez, and after the contested results of the election in January that granted Maduro another term his popularity among the Venezuelan population and other political parties in Venezuela collapsed in favour of President of the National Assembly of Venezuela Juan Guaidó [3].  

These political tactics caused the military to be rooted in politics and economics, thus making  senior military officers key players in Venezuelan society. While in any case this entrenchment is detrimental to democracy, Maduro’s decision in 2016 to make the military in charge of the distribution of food paints an obvious picture of the lengths the regime was having to go to to stay in power. In order to centralize power, food is used as a tool to keep top military personnel on Maduro’s side [4]. With the economy crippled and the enormous inflation, food has become a more powerful tool to

The politicisation of food is noticeable in the distribution of so-called CLAP packages, which are committees that distribute food locally, now under the supervision of the military. However, there is a disparity between the distribution of food; areas which overall support the Maduro regime receive more food packages compared to dissident areas which systematically get less packages [5]. In order to receive CLAP packages, the Maduro regime has installed a system of federally issued cards (Carnet de la Patria) that you need in order to access various social programs, including CLAP benefits [6]. Hence opposing the regime will be made harder, due to the population’s dependency on social programs and basic resources. These methods are typically associated with of autocratic rule in a country, e.g. Mao Zedong’s Great Leap Forward, which includes a strong governmental focus on centralised, industrial, economy. With these tactics, Maduro weaponizes social safety nets to centralise control.

The scarcity of resources in Venezuela has made food trade especially profitable, with corruption by military and non-military personnel in the food business surging. Certain members of so-called Colectivos (paramilitary groups that are supported by the Maduro regime), have already noted that the illegal trafficking of food and medicine have become more profitable than the drug trade, without carrying as much risk as the latter does [7].

Guaidó’s adamant pressure on the military to defect from Maduro’s side is a sign of their importance in the resistance movement, but the slowly growing number of military dissidents also show that the military personnel see that the situation cannot hold any longer. The ‘food business’ is profitable and grants a relatively stable influx of resources to military families. Deserting from this safety net means uncertainty and a possible chance of prosecution by the Maduro regime.

The above underlines the gravity of the decision to leave such a privileged situation. With the country in despair, the military personnel see that there is no ‘good’ option, neither staying on the side of Maduro nor defecting will guarantee long-term stability. Combined with an increasing diplomatic and economic pressure from outside, the world media watching every step, and  growing incidents of national protest, the powerful military leaders are feeling the country reaching a boiling point.

Since Guaidó admits he does not have enough military defectors to topple Maduro’s regime, he might be more inclined to ask for foreign military assistance [8]. If the international community wants to avoid military intervention, pressure points of the Venezuelan military need to be addressed. The majority of CLAP packages are imported from Mexico of which over 80% are being handled by the military. The pressure put on this program through the Mexican export of those packages to the military might be the final push the military needs to defect from Maduro if the guarantee of food is obstructed [6][9]. However, careful deliberation between international actors is necessary to start putting pressure on the CLAP program, which also supports the Venezuelan population.

The aforementioned trade-off, between risking personal security by defecting or remaining loyal in spite of domestic and international pressure, is one domestic actors in the Venezuelan crisis have to make, whether Venezuelan population or the Venezuelan military. Both national and international actors have to choose between actively pursuing Maduro’s toppling with all the risks that choice carries, or accepting the status quo. Venezuela’s situation has rendered the options extremely limited, with some arguing no option is more preferable than the next. The words ‘uncertainty’ and ‘disastrous’ will be attributed to the Venezuelan policy future. The question that remains is: to whom will those criticisms be directed?

Sources:

[1] “Tightening the Grip | Concentration and Abuse of Power in Chávez's Venezuela.” Human Rights Watch, 17 July 2012, www.hrw.org/report/2012/07/17/tightening-grip/concentration-and-abuse-power-chavezs-venezuela.

[2] "Removing Maduro; Venezuela." The Economist, 26 Jan. 2019, p. 10(US). Expanded Academic ASAP, Accessed 8 May 2019. http://link.galegroup.com/apps/doc/A570872240/EAIM?u=glasuni&sid=EAIM&xid=804c08d3.

[3] Corrales, Javier. ‘’How to tackle Venezuela’s military problem’’. The New York Times. 4 March 2019. Accessed May 14, 2019.

[4] AP News Agency. Venezuela military controls food as nation goes hungry.1 January 2017. Accessed April 8, 2019. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/01/venezuela-military-controls-food-nation-hungry-170101195414433.html.

[5] Martínez, Eugenio. The opposition is the next objective of social control of Chavism in Venezuela.21 December 2017. Accessed April 18, 2019.https://www.diariolasamericas.com/america-latina/la-oposicion-es-el-proximo-objetivo-del-control-social-del-chavismo-venezuela-n4139849.

[6] Rendon, Moises. “The Maduro Diet: Food v. Freedom in Venezuela.” CSIS.9 July 2018. Accessed April 7, 2019. https://www.csis.org/analysis/maduro-diet-food-v-freedom-venezuela.

[7] Unidad Investigativa de Venezuela. La delegación del poder estatal: Los “colectivos”.18 May 2018. Accessed April 9, 2019. https://es.insightcrime.org/investigaciones/la-delegacion-del-poder-estatal-los-colectivos.

[8] Berlinger, Joshua. "As Guaido Admits He Needs More Military Support, Trump Warns of Worse to Come in Venezuela." CNN. May 02, 2019. Accessed May 08, 2019. https://edition.cnn.com/2019/05/02/americas/venezuela-maduro-guaido-intl/index.html.

[9] Schemidt, Ronaldo. "A Un Año De Los CLAP Se Entregan Bolsas Incompletas Y Con Menos Kilos." El Interes. March 12, 2017. Accessed May 08, 2019. http://elestimulo.com/elinteres/a-un-ano-de-los-clap-se-entregan-bolsas-incompletas-y-con-menos-kilos/.

An introduction to Men’s Rights Activists (MRAs)

The re-emergence of men’s rights activists (MRAs) in social and political contexts in recent years has posed new threats regarding national and international security. Through the utilisation of the internet to further their ideology, develop a community, and radicalise others these threats are increasing. Therefore, in order to understand the legitimacy of the threat posed by MRAs, it is essential to explore their origins.

by Heather McDonald

Groups associated with the far-right have historically held misogynist, anti-feminist, and sexist views and for contemporary far-right groups, this has been no different. However, for many modern-day far-right groups, these values and opinions are no longer a “result of their wider political outlook but rather a central pillar to their ideology” [1]. Nowadays, certain sections of the far-right are heavily driven by anti-feminist ideologies resulting in the emergence and development of male supremacy groups such as ‘Proud Boys’ and ‘Return of Kings’ as extensions of the far-right ideology.

The existence of men’s rights groups in society is nothing new, however, the aims and methods adopted by these groups have changed and evolved over time. As a reaction to second-wave feminism in the 1970s, the ‘men’s liberation’ movement formed in order to provide a critical understanding of the conventions of masculinity [2]. Similarly to the feminist movement the original men’s liberation movement aimed to address the stereotypes and conditions that affected men and masculinity in the social, cultural, and political context. From here the men’s liberation movement split into two factions: those who were pro- and those who were anti-feminist [3]. With each side of this original ideological movement basing their position mainly on the debate surrounding the concept of male privilege and the ways in which male entitlement adversely impacted women globally. Members of the men’s liberation movement who aligned with feminist principles established themselves around topics ranging from male circumcision to child custody. Similarly, this faction also aimed to debate and question the normalised patriarchal standards throughout society deemed detrimental to all genders. This faction supported the idea that gender stereotypes had created harmful circumstances within society for both men and women. However, those affiliated with the anti-feminist approach went on to re-establish themselves as ‘men’s rights activists’ (MRAs). Operating under the belief that “they are victims of oppressive feminism, an ideology which must be overthrown often through violence” [4]. For these individuals gender stereotypes were a positive thing in society and the reduction of them and breaking down of barriers was detrimental to men and masculinity.

Men’s Rights Activists reflect an ideology and global movement which set out to to question and stall women’s gains at all levels [5], believing these gains have been awarded at the expense of men. Sub-groups operating under the same beliefs as MRAs perceive the social, cultural, and political opportunities afforded by the feminist movement as threats to their existence which must be revoked. MRAs hold the belief that feminism, and therefore gender equality, has ‘gone too far’ and in turn harmed men deeply [6]. Certain subgroups such as the ‘Involuntary Celibate’ (incels) who believe sexual relationships are a human right they have been deprived of because of the normalisation of gender equality and global feminism, have called for a ‘gender revolt’ in the hopes of reclaiming a type of manhood rich in “male and white superiority” [7].

As a result of social movements on behalf of women’s rights, anti-racism and LGBTQ+ rights, the power and dominance afforded to ‘white men’ in society are increasingly being challenged [8]. The level of powerlessness felt by these men, particularly those operating within the far-right ideology, is now leading to defensive actions. Contemporary MRAs have utilised the internet in order to develop and spread their ideology whilst also recruiting and radicalising new members. This utilisation has occurred through forums, posting videos explaining their own personal grievances on YouTube, and meme making. Essentially the internet has provided MRAs with a place to evolve their ideology and gain a sense of community and normalisation  of their opinions. Yet we are now increasingly witnessing MRAs actions emerging increasingly offline through protests, marches, and extreme acts of violence on areas populated by women. For example the Toronto Van Attack of 2018 when Alek Minassian ploughed a van into crowds of shoppers deliberately targeting women and in turn killing 10 individuals and injuring a further 16.

Fully understanding MRAs and the inclination by some of them to resort to violence in order to achieve their ideological goals is extremely complex. MRAs do not differ from any other extremist groups in that there are specific subgroups and individuals who will feel more inclined than others to turn to violence. To say that all MRAs are inherently violent extremists would simply be wrong, however, as we witness additional attacks inspired by the male supremacy ideology and other non-MRA far-right terrorist attacks referencing male supremacy, the level of threat MRAs and male supremacy pose to national and international security cannot be shied away from by policymakers and law enforcement agencies alike.

Sources:

[1] Murdoch, S. (2018). ‘Societal Misogyny and the Manosphere Understanding the UK Anti-Feminist Movement’ in Lowles, N. (ed), State of Hate 2019: People vs the Elite? (pp. 38-41), London: Hope Not Hate.

[2] Ging, D. (2017). Alphas, Betas, and Incels. Men and Masculinities, pp.1097184X1770640.

[3] Messner, M. A. 2016. “Forks in the Road of Men’s Gender Politics: Men’s Rights vs Feminist Allies.” International Journal for Crime, Justice and Social Democracy 5:6–20

[4] Zimmerman, Shannon, Lusia Ryan, and David Duriesmith “Who are Incels? Recognising the Violent Extremist Ideology”, Women in International Security (2018) : 1-5 Research Gate

[5] Palmer and Subramaniam, 2018

[6] Allan, J. (2016). Phallic Affect, or Why Men's Rights Activists Have Feelings. Men and Masculinities, 19(1), pp.22-41.

[7] Zimmerman, Shannon, Lusia Ryan, and David Duriesmith “Who are Incels? Recognising the Violent Extremist Ideology”, Women in International Security (2018) : 1-5 Research Gate

[8] Marwick, A and Rebecca Lewis. (2017) Media Manipulation and Disinformation Online. New York: Data & Society Research Institute.

Ethics and Hybrid War

Hybrid War is emerging as a new form of warfare which military doctrines are struggling to adjust to. Its combination of conventional and non-conventional threats blur the distinctions between civilian and combatant, and between peace and war. This increasingly complex and ambiguous environment presents operational challenges, but also ethical ones.

by Keir Watt

Since Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014, the term Hybrid War has become the latest buzzword for military experts explaining advancements in warfare. The central idea of Hybrid Warfare is that conflicts are evolving to include a ‘hybrid’ mix of conventional and non-conventional threats which are challenging current preconceptions of war. The inter-state wars of the past century centred around conventional warfare are being replaced by conflicts in which “there is no clear-cut distinction between soldiers and civilians and between organised violence, terror, crime, and war.“[i] This more complex strategic environment poses operational challenges to militaries, but also raises new ethical dilemmas.

According to Just War Theory, war must have a just cause; principally, in self-defence and the defence of innocents [ii]. War must also be carried out with just means; this asserts that there are certain constraints on conduct in war. Primarily, this excludes civilians from being targets of violence, but also advocates proportionality to limit the destructiveness of war. Throughout history these ethical principles have been applied inconsistently, but have to a great extent formed the basis for international norms and laws of war today.

Hybrid War undermines the distinction between combatants and civilians by deliberately placing irregular troops within civilian areas. Any opposing force consequently faces a choice between retreat or targeting enemies with a high chance of killing civilians. During the 2006 Lebanon War, Hezbollah exploited this by stationing rockets within holy sites and schools to ensure Israeli airstrikes would inflict civilian casualties; Hezbollah subsequently used this to “intensify support for its ideology and recruitment” through its strategic use of media.[iii] If states and non-state actors continue to use hybrid warfare, wars will inevitably become less humane as civilians are exploited within the battlespace. Ironically, this tactic only remains effective when the opposing force continues to follow the established ethical norms of warfare. The biggest danger would arise, however, if the imperative of the just cause became so great that it overruled concerns for conducting the war within normal ethical limits at all.

As the concept of Hybrid War expands to include factors like crime, dis-information operations, and cyber hacking, the distinction between combatant and non-combatant could also become blurred in ways not yet encountered. When war becomes more interdisciplinary determining who can be lawfully killed becomes more ambiguous. Cyber-hackers could appear as civilians operating far outside the battlespace, attacking opponents with relative impunity. In this context Hybrid War not only makes it hard to determine an appropriate use of force, but also threatens to expand the battlespace globally.

Perhaps the most concerning aspect of Hybrid War is its ability to blur the boundaries between peace and war itself. Hybrid adversaries can attack in ways which make it hard to respond as we struggle to decide whether a military or non-military measure is required. This aspect remains contested as some hybrid war theorists like Frank Hoffman assert that this style of behaviour is better described as “political warfare” or “active measures” rather than true Hybrid War. Debating if the Hybrid War concept should encompass these measures will become immaterial, however, if politicians and military planners nonetheless continue to consider them to be part of war.

As Hybrid War makes acts of war and peace indistinguishable to decision makers, determining when there is a just cause for war will consequently become either impossible or meaningless. Leaders will be faced with the possibility of escalating a conflict unnecessarily or reacting too late to real dangers; consequently allowing aggressors to gradually increase their position unchecked. U.S. policy during the Cold War faced a similar dilemma.  Because it recognised “few intermediate points between total war and total peace” it struggled to address Soviet belligerency which fell somewhere in-between.[iv] Writing in 1957, Henry Kissinger bemoaned that this over-emphasis on total war failed to address the most likely security problem: “the attempt by the Soviet leaders to upset the strategic balance, not at one blow, but piecemeal.”[v]

Despite its apparent novelty, wars have involved hybrid threats throughout history.  European powers often used irregular troops to exploit civilians in the 17th and 18th centuries[vi]. The use of information, technological sabotage, and psychological operations was also as common during the Cold War as it is today. Addressing the moral conundrums these emerging technologies and tactics present has likewise persisted through history:  U.S. policy in the Cold War illustrates that determining a just cause in an ambiguous strategic environment is not a predicament unique to today’s Hybrid Wars.

In the past, deciding legitimate forms of warfare was settled through international treaties; guided as much by political expediency as moral principles. The 1907 Hague Regulations which criminalised irregular warfare, ostensibly to make war more humane, also did so because it suited the dominant European powers whose armies had suffered brutally against irregular militias in the previous century.[vii] Whilst history does not provide a perfect lesson for the ethical implications of Hybrid War, it does suggest they can be resolved through political agreements. Unfortunately, this means ethical interpretations may remain dependent upon political considerations as much as guiding them. Harmonising military doctrine with ethics has been an enduring quest throughout the history of armed conflict. Hybrid War is not the first challenge overcome, but the new threats and ambiguity it creates may make us assess our moral principles in ways not yet encountered.

Sources:

[i] Hoffman, F.G., 2007. Conflict in the 21st Century: The Rise of Hybrid Wars. Arlington, V.A.: The Potomac Institute for Policy Studies, p.11.

[ii]] Aquinas, T. 1911. The “Summa theologica” of St Thomas Aquinas/ literally translated by Fathers of the English Dominican Province. London: T.Baker, Ps.81:4.

[iii]Kreps, S.E., 2007. The 2006 Lebanon War: Lessons Learned. Parameters, (spring), p.72.

[iv] Kissinger, H., 1957. Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy. New York: Harper & Brothers, p.11.

[v] Kissinger, 1957, p.28.

[vi Bobbitt, P., 2008. Terror and Consent: The Wars for the Twenty-First Century. London: Penguin Books, p.35; See also Scheipers, S., 2014. ‘Unlawful Combatants:’ The West’s Treatment of Irregular Fighters in the ‘War on Terror’. Orbis, 58(4), pp.517-571; Heauser, B., 2010. Small Wars in the Age of Clausewitz: The Watershed Between Partisan War and People’s War. Journal of Strategic Studies, 3391), p.142

[vii] Watkin, K., 2005. Warriors Without Rights? Combatants, Unprivileged Belligerents, and the Struggle Over Legitimacy. Harvard University Program on Humanitarian Policy and Conflict Research Occasional Papers, (Winter), p.20.

The Influence of Big Data in the Intelligence Cycle

Big Data entails innovative technological progress to the intelligence cycle as it strengthens the collection stage, introduces the correlational analysis method, and facilitates the dissemination of data to the final consumers. However, Big Data also presents some challenges and risks as human consciousness and expert participation remains essential to ensure the intelligence cycle’s effectiveness.

by Alejandra Bringas Colmenarejo

The inclusion of Big Data (BD) in the intelligence cycle has entailed a great advance since it introduced objective and quantitative methods in a discipline highly characterised by its subjectivity. In this sense, BD attempts to reduce intelligence uncertainty through the collection of a huge volume of data and the identification of hidden correlations unobservable in smaller samples. However, while BD is a beneficial technological advance of the intelligence cycle, it also leads to deep controversy given that policymakers may be tempted to replace the expert knowledge and the intelligence analysis with raw BD assets and correlations [1].

BD “represents the Information assets characterized by such a High Volume, Velocity and Variety to require specific Technology and Analytical Methods for its transformation into value” [2]. Consequently, BD is defined by the extremely large quantity of information collected in real-time and in continuous flows. Such information includes structured and unstructured data, traditional processed numeric and text databases, as well as unprocessed formats like images, audios, videos, tweets, emails and more [3]. Furthermore, BD also entails the necessary technologies to collect, manipulate, compare and analyse the collected bulk data and transform it into a reasoned intelligence assessment [4].

The inclusion of BD in the intelligence cycle has several challenges since it surpassed information, knowledge, casualty and context to centre the focus of attention on correlations [5]. Once its veracity and validity have been determined, the data collected from different sources is analysed to predict, determine or even prevent future scenarios, actions and behaviours [6]. Consequently, BD intelligence analysis is “the process of examining and interrogating Big Data assets to derive insights of value for decision making in a quasi-immediate response” [7]. However, this intelligence progress entails some risks and challenges since the increasing dependence on gathering technologies, as well as the enormous quantity of data collected, could result in a sense of overconfidence in technologies and a refusal of human capabilities.

Regarding intelligence collection, BD improves the inductive approach that attempts to recognize long-term trends, patterns and anomalies [8]. Different algorithms and informatics tools enable the automatization of collection, storage, management and transmission of data. This automatization decreases the dependence from manual processes and facilitates the continuous flows of data, [9] which strengthens the analysts’ capabilities to discover intelligence gaps or unusual behaviours. However, to avoid a paralysation of the intelligence process it is essential that the algorithms used are effective in selecting valid and useful data from the vast raw data collected [10].

BD also allows intelligence analysts to generate and refute hypotheses. BD analysis appears to be quite inductive since it refers to past events and historical patterns to causally respond to the question of ‘what is happening’. However, the value of BD lies in the correlation and the identification of hidden events and circumstances so that realities which may not be evident or observable become available to the intelligence analyst. Consequently, filtering valid information from the massive quantity of data allows analysts to support their speculations with facts or to deny a previously confirmed hypothesis [11]. The quick and real-time collection, as well as the long-term storage of data, provides analysts with the necessary evidence to develop informed and predictive intelligence hypotheses. In spite of that, the BD correlation process could also result in the identification of patterns and realities that extrapolated from their specific context are completely useless or coincidental. Consequently, intelligence agents should carefully use BD correlations as without the appropriate expertise analysis they could lead to irrelevant events or unconnected behaviours [12].

Despite the massive volume of data gathered by the intelligence actors, some information remains unknown and excluded from the correlation process because of its secrecy or its restricted access. In this context, non-state data collectors, such as social media platforms, marketing agencies or companies collect and store information that can be bought by the intelligence actors to fulfil the information gap. Nevertheless, the veracity and accuracy of this information remains dependent on the initial collectors [13]. As a result, data provided by private actors could involuntarily impact the effectiveness of the intelligence process or maliciously corrupt, manipulate and counterfeit the reality to deliberately influence the final intelligence assessment [14].

In this manner, BD remains dependent on human capabilities because it still lacks creativity, consciousness and judgement to contextualize new correlations within a broader analytical framework [15]. The limitations of BD should be understood completely in order to avoid misinterpretations and misunderstandings of reality. BD needs expert analysts who are able to identify mere coincidences and consider the unpredictable behaviour of human beings.

Concerning the relation between intelligence analysts and consumers, BD could play different roles. It could help disseminate relevant intelligent assessments to their effective consumers facilitating well-informed analysis and decision-making. Despite this progress in the dissemination stage, intelligence consumers may be sceptical about the veracity and validity of BD’s correlations. Consequently, they could ask for in-depth pattern’ explanations or even become reluctant to authorise action or enact policies supported by BD’s analysis [16]. Otherwise, consumers may be tempted to use raw data without the necessary subsequent analysis to support their own interest and purposes, contrary to the effectiveness of the intelligence cycle [17].

The challenges introduced by Big Data in the intelligence cycle are part of the existential debate between humans and technology and a logical consequence of the very speed of technological advances. Nevertheless, an even greater intelligence revolution could result from the next technological progress – the autonomy of artificial intelligence (AI). AI would collect BD in real-time, develop the consequent intelligence analysis and finally disseminate a reasoned assessment. Future BD analysis and AI would be able to reduce uncertainty and solve intelligence puzzles. However, the challenges and risks associated with this kind of technology are also undeniable since the human element in the intelligence cycle is reduced to the mere intelligence consumer. In the present time, BD does not possess human consciousness, however, full autonomy could be a reality in the near future [18].

Sources:

[1] Van Puyvelde, Damien, Stephen Coulthart, and M. Shahriar Hossain. “Beyond the buzzword: big data and national security decision-making.” International Affairs, 2017: 1397-1416.

[2] De Mauro, Andrea, Michele Grimaldi, and Marco Greco. (2014) “What is Big Data? A Consensual Definition and a Review of Key Research Topics.” 4th International Conference on Integrated Information. AIP Proceedings, pp. 1-11.

[3] Normandeau, K. (2013, September 12). Beyond Volume, Variety and Velocity is the Issue of Big Data Veracity. Available at https://insidebigdata.com/2013/09/12/beyond-volume-variety-velocity-issue-big-data-veracity/

[4] Boyd D. & Crawford. K. Critical Questions for Big Data. (Information, Communication and Society, 2012), p. 662-678

[5] Landon-Murray, M. (2016). Big Data and Intelligence: Applications, Human Capital, and Education. Journal of Strategic Security, 9(2), p.92-121.

[6] Lyon, D. (2014, July-December). Surveillance, Snowden, and Big Data: Capacities, consequences, critique. Big Data & Society, p.1-13. doi: 10.1177/2053951714541861

[7] Couch, N., & Robins, B. (2013). Big Data for Defence and Security. Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies, p.6.

[8] Lim, K. (2015). Big Data and Strategic Studies. Intelligence and National Security, p.619-635.

[9] Symon, P. B., & Tarapore, A. (2015). Defense Intelligence Analysis in the Age of Big Data. Joint Force Quarterly 79, p. 4-12

[10] Couch & Robins, p.9

[11] Lim, p. 636

[12] Landon-Murray, p.94

[13] Zwitter, A. (2015) Big Data and International Relations. Ethics & International Affairs, 29, no 4, pp. 377-389.

[14] Symon & Tarapore, p. 9.

[15] Dyndal, G. L., Berntsen, T. A., & Redse-Johansen, S. (2017, 28 July). Autonomous military drones: no longer science fiction. Available at NATO Review Magazine: https://www.nato.int/docu/review/2017/also-in-2017/autonomous-military-drones-no-longer-science-fiction/en/index.htm

[16] Landon-Murray, p.101.

[17] Jani, K. (2016). The Promise and Prejudice of Big Data in Intelligence Community. Sam Nunn School of International Affairs, p.14.

[18] Dyndal; Berntsen & Redse-Johansen.

Disinformation and Cyber-Threats: Vulnerability and Resilience in the 2019 EU Elections

In May 2019, over 350 million European citizens will express their vote for the constituency of the new European Parliament in a moment of significant challenges for the European Union (EU). As these may be the most important elections ever faced by the EU, policy-makers should pay particular attention to disinformation campaigns and cyber-threats to guarantee fair and free elections.

by Stefano de Blasi

In May 2019, over 350 million European citizens across 28 (27, if the United Kingdom exits the EU) countries will elect their representatives for the European Parliament. These elections come at a time of considerable challenges for European institutions. Brexit, immigration, populism, and economic unrest are already threatening the stability of the EU, risking to jeopardise years of cooperation among European member states. Therefore, these elections are of the utmost importance, they will shape the future policies and trajectories of one of the largest democratic bodies in the world.

In the digital era, elections have increasingly become one of the primary targets of cyber-attacks[i]. The EU elections in May will likely expose several vulnerabilities to malicious state and non-state actors who would benefit from a fragmented Europe. Some of these vulnerabilities are inherently a product of the latest technological developments, whereas others are due to specific circumstances of the European case, where the organisation of elections remains a national prerogative. Considering the political magnitude of May’s elections, EU governments must acknowledge the threat posed by potential hacks and respond with a comprehensive strategy.  

Hacking election infrastructures or manipulating the voting behaviours of citizens constitute the main cyber-areas of vulnerability for democratic elections. Failing to address these issues could have dramatic implications for the future of the Union. When it comes to the hacking of voting technologies, threats are mainly connected to voter registration, vote counting, and communication of the vote outcome[ii]. This constitutes a critical issue as many European states partially (i.e. France, Hungary, Italy and more) or entirely (Estonia) rely on technology to coordinate their elections[iii]. This approach naturally exposes the entire voting process to cyber-attacks against election infrastructures such as voting machines, databases, and member states’ election websites. Given the cross-border nature of these elections, hackers have the opportunity to exploit and attack each country’s vulnerabilities and create security breaches for their own malevolent purposes.

The second area subject to cyber-meddling is the manipulation of the voting behaviour of European citizens. Nowadays, hackers have powerful tools to influence preferences at the ballot-box. First, trolls and computer bots are widely used to spread rumours and fake news on social media in order to divide and sway public opinion. For example, these tactics have been deployed extensively in Italy to foster anti-immigration and anti-Non-Governmental Organisation sentiments across the population[iv]. Secondly, hackers may exploit security breaches in politicians’ e-mails and databases in order to steal sensitive information to release during delicate moments of the elections. Such efforts have already been observed in Europe, notably with the Macron Leaks– the release of more than 20,000 private emails just two days before the French presidential elections[v]. Third, hackers may undermine free and transparent democratic elections using targeted social media posts and advertisements based on the data-mining of internet users’ preferences. In this regard, the most notable case is the Cambridge Analytica scandal, which involved exposing the data of up to 87 million Facebook profiles for political purposes, shedding light on the (mis)use of social media data in political environments[vi]. Finally, the latest developments in Artificial Intelligence and digital technology are paving innovative paths that may be dangerously exploited by hackers for political purposes. The coming years will likely see a widespread use of “deep fakes” – digital manipulations of audio or video resources almost indistinguishable from real ones – that will further challenge the resilience of democracies all over the world[vii]. While it is unlikely that deep fakes will be used for the upcoming elections, European governments should be aware of the direction in which the disinformation war is heading to prepare for the variety of future threats.

While there are several measures that might reduce the aforementioned threats, there is no infallible way to eradicate cyber-threats and information operations[viii]. Therefore, the EU should increase the efforts stated in the 2013 Cyber Security Strategy concerning high-level deterrence and resilience cyber-strategies[ix] to ensure transparent and fair elections in May, which undoubtedly requires a close co-operation among EU governments. The implementation of a permanent mandate for the European Union Agency for Network and Information Security (ENISA)[x] represents a considerable improvement in the common fight against cyber-attacks. Moreover, member states will need to implement a mix of short- and long-term policies to combat the most delicate aspects of these phenomena.

In the short-term, European governments should focus their attention on technological and normative fields, setting up firm codes of conduct for tech companies, as well as coercive measures for all actors involved in disinformation campaigns. Although it failed to live up to its expectations[xi], the ‘Code of Practice’ signed in September 2018 by the European Commission with Google, Facebook, and Twitter to address the spread of disinformation and fake news represented a strong step forward for the development of joint measures to tackle these issues[xii].

In the long-term, European member states will have to direct their efforts towards development in the IT, social, and cultural fields. In fact, if these issues cannot be solved entirely by technological advancements, it means that European citizens will have to learn to operate in an environment characterized by the presence of fake-news. States should, therefore, invest massively in media literacy to assure a wide development of critical and analytical skills among their citizens, reducing, in turn, the impact of disinformation efforts. Additionally, EU governments will have to further cooperate to create a pan-European normative framework that will apply strict regulations against malignant actors in this digital arms race.

A joint European approach to these threats and a common perspective on election security are necessary to ensure the legitimacy of these elections. As previously mentioned, it will be crucial for the future of the EU and its member governments to do everything in their power to ensure a fair, free, and transparent vote during the upcoming elections. Involving technology in the electoral process should not compromise any of these fundamental requirements. Moreover, since the organization of elections is a national responsibility, varying greatly among member states, there is a significant risk that malicious actors will try to exploit vulnerabilities and consequent security breaches in the electoral process, as some countries are more prepared than others to face these threats[xiv]. Ultimately, EU governments must recognise that the future stability of the EU will depend significantly on the outcome of these elections and will require the utmost attention to guarantee that the founding values of the European institutions – freedom of speech and pluralism within the media – are upheld. Guaranteeing these principles while combatting external meddling constitutes the best weapons available to the EU in the current disinformation war.

Sources:

[i] Hansen, I., & Lim, D. J. (2019) ‘Doxing democracy: Influencing elections via cyber voter interference,’ Contemporary Politics, Vol. 25, No. 2, pp. 150-171.

[ii] Cheeseman, N., Lynch, G. & Willis, J. (2019) ‘Digital dilemmas: the united consequences of election technology,’ Democratization, Vol. 25, No.8, pp. 1397-1418.

[iii] Microsoft Corporate Blogs (2018) ‘Elections under threat: Europe's electronic voting landscape,’ [online] available at https://blogs.microsoft.com/eupolicy/2018/11/22/europes-voting-landscape/ accessed on 14th April 2019.

[iv] Alandete, D. & Verdù, D. (2018) ‘How Russian networks worked to boost the far right in Italy’, El Pais [online] available at https://elpais.com/elpais/2018/03/01/inenglish/1519922107_909331.html accessed on 17th January 2019.

[v] Mohan, M., (2017) ‘Macron Leaks: the anatomy of a hack,’ BBC [online] Available at https://www.bbc.com/news/blogs-trending-39845105 accessed on 17th January 2019.

[vi] The Guardian (2018) ‘The Cambridge Analytica Files’, [online] available at https://www.theguardian.com/news/series/cambridge-analytica-files, accessed on 18th January 2019

[vii] Floridi, L. (2018), ‘Artificial intelligence, deepfakes and a future of ectypes,’ Philosophy & Technology, Vol. 31, No. 3, pp. 317-321.

[viii] NIS Cooperation Group (2018) ‘Compendium on Election Technology,’ [online] Available at https://www.ria.ee/public/Cyber_security_of_Election_Technology.pdf accessed on 21st January 2019

[ix] European Commission, (2013) ‘Cybersecurity Strategy of the European Union: An Open, Safe and Secure Cyberspace,’ [online] Available at https://eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/policies/eu-cyber-security/cybsec_comm_en.pdf , accessed on 25th January 2019.

[x] European Parliament, (2018) ‘ENISA and a new cybersecurity act,’ [online] Available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/en/document.html?reference=EPRS_BRI(2017)614643 accessed on 24th January 2019.

[xi] King, Sir J., Mariah G. (2019) ‘Facebook and Twitter told us they would tackle ‘fake news’. They failed’, The Guardian. [online] Available at https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2019/feb/28/facebook-twitter-fake-news-eu-elections accessed on 2nd March 2019.

[xii] European Commission (2018) ‘Code of Practice on Disinformation’ [online] Available at https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/news/code-practice-disinformation accessed on 28th January 2019.

[xiii] King, Sir J. (2018) ‘ Democracy is under threat by the use of technology. The EU is fighting back’, The Guardian. [online] Available at https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2018/jul/28/democracy-threatened-malicious-technology-eu-fighting-back accessed on 28th February 2019.

Highlights from the first Security Distillery event in 2019

On the 20th March the Security Distillery in collaboration with VOX-Pol got together for its first event of 2019, “Extremism: Online Networks, Offline Violence” at Dublin City University. Students from across DCU and the IMSISS programme attended for presentations from Security Distillery members discussing right-wing extremism in the EU, UK and US and an expert panel discussion on “Countering Violent Extremism”.

The event was hosted by Security Distillery member Casey Cannon who also chaired the discussion on right-wing extremism. Our presenters, Javier Martinez Mendoza, Heather McDonald and Felipe Simoni, presented a comprehensive look at the rise of right-wing extremism in the EU, UK and US and engaged our audience in an interactive debate including discussions on the relationship between extremism and right-wing rhetoric in the US particularly from President Donald Trump and whether the rise of the ideology in the EU and UK can be seen as a response to the refugee crisis. The presenters also highlighted the importance of studying this form of political violence by considering the recent attacks in Christchurch where 50 people were killed at two mosques at the hands of an ‘alt-right’ extremist.

The event was co-hosted with VOX-Pol an academic research network at DCU focused on researching violent online political extremism. The discussion was chaired by James Fitzgerald, a lecturer in Terrorism Studies at DCU. Maura Conway is the Coordinator of VOX-Pol and Orla Lehane is the Education Director at Fighting Words and works at the Institute of Education at DCU. The discussion focused on the effectiveness of Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) operations and how this is done online.

The Security Distillery continues to work on creating comprehensive analyses of complex security  issues providing a better understanding of international security and foreign policy trends. We are also aiming to host another event in Prague in December 2019.

The Demise of the International Commission Against Impunity in Guatemala (CICIG): An experiment in Central American Accountability

Guatemalans have welcomed the anti-impunity commission that works to combat high level corruption and abuses, but after over a decade of prominent arrests and government pushback, Guatemalan President Jimmy Morales threatened a pre-emptive withdrawal from the effort in January 2019. The decision is tied to a pattern of US-led norm breaking, with implications for justice in Guatemala and the region.

by Cassandra Stimpson

The International Commission Against Impunity in Guatemala, or La Comisión Internacional Contra La Impunidad En Guatemala, (CICIG) is a unique initiative described as an ‘independent investigative entity that operates under Guatemalan law’ that acts in conjunction with the Guatemalan justice system in an effort to end impunity and increase local institutional capacity1. The CICIG formed in the wake of longstanding “state capture,” wherein organised crime and businesses control governmental functions with immunity from prosecutorial powers2. Similar to many Latin American states, the Guatemalan criminal infrastructures did not simply disappear once the 36-year civil war ended in 1996, taking 200,000 lives. Old structures and networks remained for conducting business. High level human rights abusers were hired into governmental positions. Thus, corruption and abuse easily found a new home in military and intelligence personnel. The international body, with an independent capacity to influence domestic decisions, hoped to reduce the implications of state capture that trickle down to nearly all facets of society, from murder convictions to local tax systems.

The CICIG exists at Guatemala’s official invitation in response to local and international outcry after the murder of a Salvadoran congressman from the Central American Parliament in 2007, and its mandate must be renewed every two years. It cemented its place in Guatemala City by using its initial momentum to enact an outreach strategy that enlisted local civil society along with national media to engage the public3. Those indicted so far due to CICIG operations include politicians, policemen, business leaders, judges,  and even permeate the upper echelons of the political system concluding in the arrest of a Vice President and two former Presidents4.

The United Nations (UN) and Guatemala agreed to establish the experimental enterprise in 2007, and until 2015, it was hailed as an innovative success. The CICIG’s broad achievements lie in legislative improvements and investigatory and prosecutorial capacity building to convict organised criminals and colluding public officials5.  As a result of the council, Guatemala’s impunity rate fell from 98% in 2006 to 70% in 2015. Whilst still a comparatively high level, this 28% reduction does represent significant progress made by CICIG in improving justice nationwide6. Nevertheless, in 2016, statistically one in four Guatemalans had been solicited for a bribe, and over a third believed that all politicians in the country were corrupt7.

The CICIG remained controversial throughout its tenure and, coinciding with President Trump’s blustery approach to the international liberal order and outspoken concerns for state sovereignty, the Guatemalan administration became emboldened to condemn the international body prosecuting governmental figures. Currently, Guatemalan courts have thwarted its complete closure, but UN personnel have been removed from the country and the Morales administration has all but dismantled what is left of the commission8.

The CICIG still holds higher public trust than Guatemala’s Public Ministry and its Constitutional Court, and there was hope that the CICIG’s high regard would dissuade President Morales from dismantling the commission9. CICIG’s unravelling can be explained by the elite class’ desire to retain and collect further power alongside latent concerns for state sovereignty. There is little doubt that the CICIG’s investigation, in conjunction with the Public Ministry, into Mr. Morales’ 2015 campaign contributions influenced the decision to attempt to shut down the UN body early in 201910.

Beyond Mr. Morales’ reaction to the threat to his presidency, there are larger, normative issues that the CICIG represents. Despite its perceived necessity and popularity with citizens, it has complications. For instance, to adapt to the punitive institutional responses that the CICIG promoted, criminal  groups built further defenses and moved underground, making convictions more difficult11.  Indeed, the CICIG’s prosecutorial power, normally reserved for national bodies, could be seen as a legitimate cause for national security concerns.

The CICIG impacted and formed norms in governments, criminal organisations, businesses and other institutions throughout the region, and its removal will have similar inverse ramifications. The decision to end the CICIG’s initiative comes as the Guatemalan congress debates an amnesty bill that would free over 30 convicted war criminals and over a dozen awaiting trial, as well as stop any potential investigations into war crimes that took place during Guatemala’s brutal, decades-long civil war. The bill, combined with CICIG’s closure, could reignite the pattern of impunity that the military, government, and national elites have enjoyed throughout Guatemalan history12.

Beyond removing the corruption deterrent, ending the CICIG will affect the economy. Guatemala’s credit rating will likely fall because of the move, raising interest rates and reducing overall foreign investment, which is already declining. As confidence shrinks in Guatemala’s regulatory atmosphere, the space left by departing investment creates an opportunity for previously eradicated illicit enterprises to once again flourish. The anti-corruption body helped imprison many local business leaders who now warmly welcome the dismantling of the commission13.

In the past, the US has invested heavily in the fight against military-backed networks of corruption prominent in Latin America. The State Department believes that anti-corruption efforts reduce migration and drug flow to the US, therefore over the past decade the CICIG had received bipartisan support from US administrations and lawmakers, who have appropriated nearly $45 million toward the commission since its inception. Yet, when Mr. Morales announced the closure, it was merely met with a vague anti-corruption statement from the local US Embassy. Guatemala has moved closer to US positions as of late, refusing to affirm China’s claim over Taiwan, recognising Juan Guaidó as the true elected leader in Venezuela, and becoming the first country to back the Trump administration’s decision to move the US embassy to Jerusalem. Perhaps because of these events, there has not only been little pushback to the closure, but former US Ambassador to the UN Nikki Haley advocated defunding the commission. This received opposition from the State Department and anti-narcotics agencies that hoped the CICIG would be a regional model14. For instance, plans have been in motion to form the CICIES (International Commission against Impunity in El Salvador), a copycat in the spirit of the Guatemalan council15.

The purposeful destruction of the CICIG, accompanied by the lack of US attention, signals a normative shift away from concerns for good governance and accountability as part of the international liberal order, and toward a more transactional relationship, harkening back to a Cold War Order wherein human rights, corruption, and other transgressions are ignored in favor of ideological pandering and personal relationships. There may still be time to save the CICIG, whose current mandate is set to expire this year. Whether the experiment’s results will sustain however, and whether other countries can utilise its lessons, remains to be seen.

Sources:

1. Washington Office on Latin America, “The International Commission against Impunity in Guatemala (CICIG): An Innovative Instrument for Fighting Criminal Organizations and Strengthening the Rule of Law” (Washington, DC: Washington Office on Latin America, July 1, 2015), 2, https://www.wola.org/analysis/wola-report-on-the-international-commission-against-impunity-in-guatemala-cicig/.

2. Yulia Krylova, “Outsourcing the Fight against Corruption: Lessons from the International Commission against Impunity in Guatemala,” Global Policy 9, no. 1 (February 2018).

3. Washington Office on Latin America, “The International Commission against Impunity in Guatemala (CICIG): An Innovative Instrument for Fighting Criminal Organizations and Strengthening the Rule of Law.”

4. Krylova, “Outsourcing the Fight against Corruption: Lessons from the International Commission against Impunity in Guatemala.”

5. Washington Office on Latin America, “The International Commission against Impunity in Guatemala (CICIG): An Innovative Instrument for Fighting Criminal Organizations and Strengthening the Rule of Law,” 2.

6. Krylova, “Outsourcing the Fight against Corruption: Lessons from the International Commission against Impunity in Guatemala.”

7. Elizabeth J. Zechmeister and Dinorah Azpuru, “What Does the Public Report on Corruption, the CICIG, the Public Ministry, and the Constitutional Court in Guatemala?,” Topical Brief, Latin American Public Opinion Project (Vanderbilt University, August 31, 2017).

8. Nelson Renteria, “Guatemalan Presidential Candidate Aldana ‘not Scared’ of Arrest Threat,” Reuters, March 21, 2019, sec. World News, https://af.reuters.com/article/worldNews/idAFKCN1R202H.

9. Zechmeister and Azpuru.

10. Ibid.

11. Washington Office on Latin America, “The International Commission against Impunity in Guatemala (CICIG): An Innovative Instrument for Fighting Criminal Organizations and Strengthening the Rule of Law.”

12. Sandra Cuffe, “Guatemala War Crime Survivors Challenge Amnesty Bill,” Al Jazeera, February 14, 2019, sec. News, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/02/guatemala-war-crime-survivors-challenge-amnesty-bill-190213234804759.html.

13. Ximena Enríquez, “Is Kicking Out CICIG Bad for Business in Guatemala?” (Guatemala City: Americas Quarterly, February 9, 2019), https://www.americasquarterly.org/content/kicking-out-cicig-bad-business-guatemala?

14. Colum Lynch, “Corrupt Guatemalans’ GOP Lifeline,” Foreign Policy, February 5, 2019, https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/02/05/trump-republican-lawmakers-weaken-u-n-anti-corruption-commission-guatemala-jimmy-morales-white-house-putin/.

15. Fernando Romero, “La CICIES de Nayib Bukele no es como la pintan,” Factum Magazine, October 9, 2018, http://revistafactum.com/cicies-bukele/.

What ISIS’ Defeat in the Middle East Means for Europe: Counter-Radicalisation in the EU

Radicalisation has emerged as a sincere issue in Europe in the last five years. Since ISIS started to lose territory, foreign fighters have begun to return to Europe, while ISIS’ web presence has strengthened and increased. In response, the European Union has created some of the most successful anti-radicalisation programmes to tackle those threats. However, these measures have failed to prevent some of the worst terrorist attacks that have ever occurred on European soil. This is due to a lack of true coordination and cooperation between member states’ approaches and at the broader EU level.

by Sabbir Jubaer & Valerio Viscardi

Propaganda & Returning Fighters

As ISIS has finally been defeated on the ground, losing its entire territorial control in the Middle East [i], some observers may underestimate ISIS as a continuing and viable adversary in the future for Western countries, especially for Europe given its proximity to the Middle East. Careful observation, however, suggests that ISIS is adapting to the new circumstances through maintaining a robust presence online and by posing new security challenges. In order to address these challenges, the European Union formulated a number of policies and discussed their efficiency in addressing extremism on European soil.

Since 2013, extremist propaganda has undergone a transformation. ISIS has started to produce ‘top notch’ quality propaganda videos, with graphic details and narratives directed towards radicalisation: considered here as intolerance and a possible use of violence against democratic values.[ii] The rise of social media has further bolstered the effectiveness of ISIS’ communications, a stark contrast to al-Qaida’s communications during the previous decades.[iii] The slow destruction of ISIS’ territory and its retreat underground has ultimately been downplayed by ISIS propaganda. This has encouraged homegrown terrorist fighters to act, causing devastating harm. Recent findings suggest the increased use of encrypted communications apps (Telegram & WhatsApp) have been essential mediums for the successful distribution of ISIS propaganda.[iv]

The issue of how to deal with the returning fighters and their families has been a serious concern for European countries. Some states for instance (France and the United Kingdom), before the decision was made to withdraw American troops from Iraq, were not interested in taking back their citizens who had left to fight alongside the so-called Islamic State, fearing a further spread of militancy. In fact, different European cities had already been attacked by militants alleged to be linked with ISIS. France had argued in favour of conducting the prosecutions of the fighters in the countries where their actions took place, i.e. Iraq. However, some European countries, including France, have now agreed to take back the fighters after the United States (U.S.) announced the withdrawal of its troops, fearing the militants may otherwise escape due to the absence of U.S. forces.[v]

Another major concern is the rehabilitation of the detainees. Instead of functioning as rehabilitation centres, prisons in many European countries have emerged as new ground for radicalisation. Prisons provide a space where militants of various degrees of radicalisation can come in touch with, and influence, non-radicalised prisoners. Thus, a prisoner or a person with a lower level of radicalisation can become fully radicalised. This was suspected to be the case for the convicted burglar and prison inmate, Benjamin Herman, a white suburban teen and nominal Catholic when he was first arrested. During his detention, he came in contact with an Islamist recruiter. Whilst allowed out into the community as part of a ‘two-day home leave’ in May 2018, he murdered three people. During the investigation, the authorities found a Quran and a prayer rug in his cell. This, coupled with his link to the radicalist preacher in custody, led Europol to classify the incident as a jihadist terror attack. [vi]

Responses & Rehabilitation

To respond to these threats, the European Union created a centralised strategy for Combating Radicalisation and Recruitment to Terrorism. This strategy, revised in 2014, aims primarily at ‘combating radicalisation and recruitment while taking into account evolving trends, such as lone-actor terrorism, foreign fighters, and the use of social media by terrorists’.[vii] To this purpose, the strategy focuses on four main pillars: prevention, protection, pursuit, and response. Specifically, the prevention pillar tries to ‘prevent people from becoming radicalised  … being recruited to terrorism and prevent a new generation of terrorists from emerging’ [viii]. Some examples of ongoing work in countering Islamic radicalisation are the Europol Internet Referral Unit (IRU) to combat terrorism and violent extremist propaganda, and the Radicalisation Awareness Network.

Regarding the former, on 12 March 2015, the Justice and Home Affairs Council of the European Union authorised Europol to create a special unit ‘aimed at reducing the level and impact of terrorist and violent extremist propaganda on the internet’. [ix] The IRU provides operational support to member states by identifying and referring relevant online content towards responsible internet service providers, which remove illegal content from their domain.[x] The European Union’s Radicalisation Awareness Network Internet and Social Media Working Group (RAN@) was created in 2011 by the European Council. Existing as Europe’s largest and highest funded counter-narrative campaign, it is a ‘network of frontline practitioners from across Europe who work on a daily basis with people who have already been radicalised or who are vulnerable to radicalisation’.[xi] This campaign is designed to support objectives such as implementing de-radicalisation and rehabilitation programmes, developing approaches for handling returning foreign terrorist fighters, equipping teachers and youth workers in addressing the root causes of radicalisation, and strengthening resilience, in particular among young people. Moreover, it creates synergies between different actions and policy areas of member states, enhancing the cooperation between them and the European Union.[xii]

Finally, these tools allow counter-narrative campaigns to inspire change in social structures inside each member state in order to increase integration and discourage individuals to radicalise. Each of the different thematic approaches addresses terrorist propaganda from a different angle, and none of them are comprehensive in themselves. Instead, each of these approaches have merit and, collectively, they create a stronger response to terrorist propaganda.

Counter-Radicalisation in Prison & European Countries

In order to tackle radicalisation in prison, each European country has implemented different measures. Some of the most illustrative are those of Belgium and Germany. Belgium, in 2018, developed a program known as ‘Deradex’. According to this program, radicalised inmates were kept isolated and were allowed only limited contact with other prisoners considered radicalised at the same level. The opposite approach was taken in Germany where the idea of isolating radicalised inmates was rejected favouring instead the implementation an intense monitoring and intervention program to prevent further radicalisation from occurring. [xiii] These are only two examples of the different approaches European member states have chosen. These differences are preventing the European Union, and its law-enforcement agencies, from implementing a more effective and unified action. European policy makers need to pay equal attention to homegrown extremists. The detainment and prosecution of returning fighters may give comfort for some time, however, new homegrown fighters will rise unless the root causes of extremism are addressed. Undetected radicalized European citizens can exploit their anonymity to cause more havoc and may emerge as fighters if a new front is opened.

ISIS’ future strategies

Losing territorial control in the Middle East could push ISIS to try to establish strongholds in new theatres. It has previously been successful capturing an area in a non-Muslim majority country far from its traditional area: Marawi city in the Philippines in 2017.[xiii] The group now has a  presence in Libya and has declared “wilayats” (provinces/branches) in many regions around Europe. Therefore, ISIS may try to find another front near or even within European soil.

Even with an absolute lack of control over land, ISIS will continue to exist and even may thrive as long as its ideological foundation appeals to individuals. ISIS’ future strategy will likely involve attempts to evolve as a fully-fledged virtual caliphate. The cyber caliphate will engage in asymmetric warfare and provide a platform to direct its followers to organise, propagate extremist narratives, recruit new militants, and incite attacks on European soil.

In conclusion, the national approaches to tackle radicalisation in Europe have proven to be effective on a national level. However, more cooperation at a European level could empower national approach and extend their effectiveness to the whole union. The recent wave of attacks have strengthened the current European transnational cooperation and proven its necessity. At the same time, the European counter-messaging campaigns and programme provide effective support to member states, not limited to national territories, in the battle against radicalisation. However, the lack of coordination and the differences in the national commitment of addressing radicalisation undermine the general effectiveness of anti-radicalisation in Europe. Therefore, there should be more cooperation with the European law enforcement institutions in order to allow them to work as bridges between different law enforcement agencies around Europe, significantly increasing the general operational effectiveness.

Sources:

[i] The Soufan Center. 2019. “IntelBrief: A State Without Territory”. Accessed on February 12, 2019. https://thesoufancenter.org/intelbrief-a-state-without-territory/

[ii] European Commission.“Radicalization”. Immigration and Home Affair Accessed February 15, 2019. https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/content/radicalisation-0_en

[iii] Gambhir, Harleen K. 2014. “Dabiq: The Strategic Messaging of the Islamic State”. Institute for the Study of War.

[iv] “Counter-terrorism strategy”. European Union. 2017. Accessed February 08, 2019. https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ALL/?uri=LEGISSUM:l33275.

[v] McAuley, J. & Birnbaum, M. 2019. “France to take back ISIS fighters, reversing policy in wake of U.S. withdrawal from Syria”. Washington Post. Accessed February 12, 2019. https://wapo.st/2BxJP6K

[vi] Erickson, A. 2018. “Europe’s prisons breed terrorism. Can anything be done?”. Washington Post. Accessed March 19, 2019. https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2018/07/26/europes-prisons-breed-terrorism-can-anything-be-done/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.51905d015a4c

[vii] “Counter-terrorism strategy”. European Union. 2017. Accessed February 08, 2019. https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ALL/?uri=LEGISSUM:l33275.

[viii] Meleagrou-Hitchens, Alexander. 2017. “The Challenges and Limitations of Online Counter-Narratives in the Fight against ISIS Recruitment in Europe and North America.” 18 (3): 95–104. doi:10.1353/gia.2017.0041.

[ix] “Europol’s Internet Referral Unit to combat terrorist and violent extremist propaganda.” 2015. News release. July 1. Accessed February 08, 2019. https://www.europol.europa.eu/newsroom/news/europol%E2%80%99s-internet-referral-unit-to-combat-terrorist-and-violent-extremist-propaganda.

[x] Dr Alastair Reed,Dr Haroro J. Ingram, Joe Whittaker. 2017. “Countering Terrorist Narratives.

[xi] European Commission. 2019. “Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN)”. Accessed January 27, 2019. https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-do/networks/radicalisation_awareness_network_en.

[xii] Idem

[xiii]Betteridge-Moes, M. 2017. “What happened in Marawi?”. Aljazeera. Accessed February 12, 2019. https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2017/10/happened-marawi-171029085314348.html

The Security Implications of The Far-Right’s Rise in Europe

The far-right’s most recent electoral emergence in Europe raises concerns about the possible securitization of multiculturalism, the inspiration of radical right terrorism and the destabilization of liberal democracies. Understanding its rise and tactics can help liberalism address the far-right’s challenge.

by Javier Martínez Mendoza

In the last five years, instability in the Middle East and Islamist terrorism have been perceived as two of the main threats to Western societies’ everyday life. However, an inward look at the structure of these societies begins to indicate a new perspective of an ever-present but exacerbated threat. The phantom of the radical right is becoming an increased security challenge for many western societies and consequently, mainstream policy-making is dangerously overlooking the threats posed by far-right movements.

In 2016, the electoral emergence of far-right politics was made evident by Brexit and Donald Trump’s victory. Both cases illustrate the influence of heightened Euroscepticism and an anti-immigration agenda, respectively, in order to achieve ground-breaking electoral gains. In the following years, radical right parties would start disrupting the political landscape of other Western countries.

In  Europe, Alternative for Germany’s (AfD) success in federal and state elections precipitated a break-up of the country’s twelve-year-long period of political stability under Angela Merkel. This led her to step down as leader of the centre-right [1]. In Southern Europe, the Italian right-wing political party Lega Nord have managed to take control of the public agenda through the Ministry of Interior and its recent immigration policy.  This left the majority coalition partner Five Star Movement without political initiative. Similarly, Vox’s victory in Andalucia has put an end to Spain’s exceptional status as the single major European country without a significant far-right party [2].

Regardless of the far-right’s latest boom after the 2015 refugee crisis, its current emergence in Western liberal democracies can be traced back to the 2008 financial crisis. Consequently, the economic and social struggles exacerbated by the crisis amongst European and North American societies,  raised the appeal of the radical right. Arguably, the political platform with which the far-right has addressed people’s grievances can be viewed as an antagonistic response to the cultural, social and political changes caused by globalization in the last 40 years and accelerated in the last decade.

Securitizing immigration and beyond

The radical right has built and benefited from a narrative that warns societies of the perils of immigration and multiculturalism. Following their logic, prominent features of globalization threaten the cohesion of national identities and traditional values they view as essential. Thus,  nativism, a radical and exclusionary form of nationalism, has risen as a challenge for the liberal democratic order and domestic security due to processes of politicization and securitization that lead to extraordinary policies and the normalisation of antagonistic attitudes against “securitized” groups or institutions within societies [3].

In the last four decades, economic integration, a push towards progressive social rights and immigration have transformed Western societies, therefore, changing the social and demographic landscape and gradually expanding into multiculturalism. Reactions to these social transformations have been mixed. However, animosity towards cultural diversity and migration fluxes increased after the 2008 financial crisis and, most recently, by the 2015 refugee crisis [4].

Consequently the far-right have often argued that across Europe the waves of refugees entering the continent are terrorist cells planning to carry out attacks there. Despite the ambiguity of their argument, this narrative has gained momentum, especially after terror attacks such as the attack in Paris on November 13th, 2015 [5].

Recently, this rhetoric has earned far-right parties electoral successes, granting them access to an increased presence in national parliaments, and consequently the political weight to form coalitions in some governments. But most importantly, they seem to have seized control of the political discourse in Western societies by making immigration policy a key electoral issue. Mainstream parties now feel inclined to embrace an essence of the far-right’s proposals to avoid losing voters to the far-right, or compelling majority coalition partners to implement tougher immigration controls [6, 7].

Even if these measures have allowed centre-right parties to hinder the electoral advance of far-right formations they are consequently practising the normalisation of ultra-nationalist discourse. This creates a dangerous environment for minorities in Europe through the politicization of cultural diversity and immigration  [8, 9].

Furthermore, far-right parties and leaders are often characterised as authoritarian and in contrast with liberal democracy and progressive social values. Once in power, far-right governments –like Viktor Orbán’s in Hungary and Law and Justice majority regime in Poland, have expressed this perceived authoritarianism targeting and hampering free media, autonomous judiciary systems and liberal democratic institutions. Despite seeking political representation through democratic means and claiming to defend Western liberal values from terrorism and crime through their migration policies–they refer to the incompatibility of Muslim immigrants with liberal democratic values [10, 11, 12].

Far-right violence and terrorism

The terror attacks carried out in recent years by Al Qaeda and the Islamic State have instigated Western governments to pay close attention and employ concerted efforts to tackle Islamist terrorism. However, far-right terrorism has been present in the West for decades and remains worryingly overlooked by decision-makers and security forces [13].

Radical right terrorism refers to the instances when far-right extremists answer violently to contemporary social changes, such as their countries’ openness to different cultures or social progressive values. Their disenchantment with liberal democracy and their personal and social grievances could lead radicalized groups or individuals to take matters into their own hands rather than relying on mainstream politics. Hence, there is a risk members of far-right groups might address their perceived security threat through vigilantism and attacks carried out by clandestine cells, challenging the state’s monopoly on the use of force and threatening the lives of minorities and other groups in Western societies. Radicalized individuals may also be inspired by far-right politicians rhetoric against immigration and multiculturalism [14, 15, 16].

Right-wing extremism, similar to its Islamist counterpart, has benefited from social media and internet communications. Extremists have utilised technology to establish networks that cross borders and build connections with like-minded groups and political formations. Furthermore, social media has allowed them to improve their training, recruitment, fundraising methods, while spreading propaganda and radical content in such a way that they reach a broader audience while remaining clandestine. Thus, violent far-right cells and individuals have become an internationalised phenomenon that has increased violent attacks in the last four years and should not be overlooked by government authorities [17, 18, 19].

Instability and inattention to other issues

Western allies consider themselves threatened by Russian hostilities and therefore political instability in the West represents a strategic gain for Russia. As previously mentioned, far-right parties have aimed to disrupt liberal democracies’ political stability profiting from an increasing social polarization and breaking the traditional left-right political divide in favour of identity politics. They have also questioned economic cooperation, such as the European integration project. Even if far-right political parties are not directly influenced by Russia, the turmoil caused by their disruption in European liberal democracies undoubtedly profits Russia’s foreign policy  [20].

On the other hand, the securitization of immigration and multiculturalism arguably aims to divert policy-makers from comprehensively addressing actual security issues. For instance, terrorism will continue to fester if the targeting of Muslim minorities by the far-right contributes to Islamist radicalization within the West. Likewise, climate change, economic turmoil and social justice vindications cannot be addressed if the far-right shifts attention to immigration and promotes an environment of political instability that hinders the process of policy-making [21].

Conclusion

Western liberal democracies need to acknowledge the security risks posed by the far-right. It is a threat to their democratic processes and has arguably shifted the political and electoral discussions towards the far-right’s agenda. Radical right politics have emerged from within liberal democratic societies and have already crossed borders by establishing networks of like-minded groups; consequently becoming an international security concern.

Mainstream parties embracing policies from the far-right hoping to halt far-right parties from attaining further electoral success are helping them galvanize political momentum. Even without winning a majority in parliaments, the politicization and eventual securitization of immigration and multiculturalism have helped far-right groups advance their goals and get closer to broader parliamentary representation or even governmental positions.

In order to address the far-right’s challenge, it is necessary to understand the root causes of their emergence, the issues that have contributed to increasing their public appeal and learn from their rhetoric and networks. This is not to adopt the far-right’s ideas rather to learn from their communication methods in order to promote liberal values in a compelling way for disenfranchised and grieving populations.

Understanding the risks to security and liberal democracy posed by the far-right –namely, the securitization of immigration and multiculturalism, the inspiration of far-right violence and the overlooking of other security threats and their relation with the far-right– will allow mainstream policy-makers to renovate liberal democratic processes in order to alleviate people’s grievances without them needing to resort to far-right stances. The far-right will remain as a key and challenging feature in liberal democracies for the upcoming years, but its footprint in democratic institutions and social cohesion is still in the making; liberal elites and individuals can still make a difference.

Sources:

[1]Katrin Bennhold & Melissa Eddy (2018). Germany Without Angela Merkel: Unthinkable? Think Again, She Says. The New York Times.

[2]Christoph Hasselbach (2018). Opinion: Right-wing populism is EU’s elephant in the room. Deutsche Welle.

[3]Martin A. Schain (2018). Shifting Tides: Radical-Right Populism and Immigration Policy in Europe and the United States. Migration Policy Institute.

[4]Pankaj Mishra (2016). The Globalization of Rage: Why Today’s Extremism Looks Familiar. Foreign Affairs.

[5]Martin A. Schain (2018). Op. Cit.

[6]Aristotle Kallis, Sara Zeiger & Bilgehan Öztürk (2018). Introduction. In Kallis, Zeiger &Öztürk (eds.), Violent Radicalisation & Far-Right Extremism in Europe. SETA Publications.

[7]James F. Downes, Matthew Loveless & Andrew Lam (2018). Opening up Pandora’s box? How centre-right parties can outperform the radical right on immigration. LSE.

[8]Aristotle Kallis, Sara Zeiger & Bilgehan Öztürk (2018). Op. Cit.

[9]Tamáz Berecz & Kristóf Domina (2012). Domestic Extremism in Europe: Threat Landscape. Athena Institute.

[10]Ben Margulies (2018). Nativists are Populists, Not Liberals. Journal of Democracy, 29:1.

[11]Zsolt Eyedi, Chantal Mouffe, Yannis Stavrakakis, Ruth Wodak & John Fitzgibbon (2017). Five views: is populism really a threat to democracy? LSE.

[12]Max Bergmann, Carolyn Kenney & Trevor Sutton (2018). The Rise of Far-Right Populism Threatens Global Security and Democracy. Center for American Progress.

[13]In the US, extreme right violent incidents rose from five or less per year between 2007 to 2011, to 31 in 2017. Similarly, in Europe these attacks rose from 0 in 2012 to 30 in 2017. Seth G. Jones (2018). The Rise of Far-Right Extremism in the United States. CSIS.

[14]Idem.

[15]Daniel Koehler (2016). Right-Wing Extremism and Terrorism in Europe Current Developments and Issues for the Future. PRISM, 6:2.

[16]Aristotle Kallis, Sara Zeiger & Bilgehan Öztürk (2018). Op. Cit.

[17]Seth G. Jones (2018). Op. Cit.

[18]Idem.

[19]Daniel Koehler (2016). Op. Cit.

[20]Alina Polyakova (2016). Why Europe Is Right to Fear Putin’s Useful Idiots. Foreign Policy.

[21]Sean Illing (2018). Reciprocal rage: Why islamist extremists and the far right need each other. Vox.

Assessing the Implications of the US-Syria Withdrawal on the Kurdish Democratic Union

The U.S.’ proposed withdrawal of the majority of its military presence from Syria leaves the Kurdish Democratic Union (PYD) in a challenging position. Now lacking clear U.S. protection and in the midst of preparing its final assault on ISIS-held positions, the PYD is now forced to weigh the decision of aligning with Russia and the Syrian government to hedge against the threat of a Turkish assault from the north.

The PYD

On December 19th of 2018, in a surprise move following a call with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, United States (U.S.) President Donald Trump announced that the U.S.’ roughly 2,000 military personnel would be withdrawing from Syria within 30 days. The reason stated was that the so called Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) had been defeated and the U.S. could continue to carry out support operations in the form of airstrikes[1]. Trump’s decision signalled a likely end to any aspirations of fostering a legitimate alternative to Syrian President Bashar Al Assad’s government, which has caused the deaths of hundreds of thousands of its own citizens and has been found to have deployed chemical weapons against them [2]. Beyond the implications of the withdrawal on the U.S.’ geopolitical aims, Washington’s decision leaves the U.S.-allied People’s Protection Units (YPG), with little leverage and minimal options in its fight for greater legitimacy in its controlled territory along Syria’s northern border. This is significant because the YPG represents the Kurdish component of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) that has been engaged in most of the combat on the ground against ISIS. Trump’s National Security Advisor, John Bolton, has stated that ‘the U.S.’ withdrawal is contingent upon ISIS’ continued defeat and Turkey’s commitment to not attacking the YPG’, but prospects of enforcing these conditions would be hampered by a diminished U.S. military presence along its border[3]. At present, it appears that the U.S. will leave 200 troops after the completion of the withdrawal to serve in a peacekeeping capacity.

The YPG represents the militarised branch of the Syrian Kurdish Democratic Union (PYD). The PYD was originally marginalised and closely monitored by the Assad government, but the outbreak of the Syrian Civil War allowed the group to operate largely independently, drive ISIS back thousands of kilometres with U.S. support, and establish a semi-autonomous enclave in Syria’s northern region along its Turkish border. The  proximity of the PYD-claimed territory to Turkey represents the most imminent threat to the Kurdish enclave as Turkey views the YPG as an extension of the Turkey-based Kurdish Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), which Ankara views as a terrorist organisation [4]. Turkey typically maintains a more measured foreign policy approach and avoids third-party conflicts but it entered northern Syria in August 2016 to support an offensive against ISIS and block the SDF from seizing territory that would have connected the sizable Kurdish northern territory to Afrin in the west [5]. This would have yielded the SDF a near complete control over Syria’s northern border. Turkey views the YPG’s gains as a direct cross-border threat to link up with the PKK and now that the U.S. presence is decreasing drastically, it stands to reason that the Turks may seek to attack the Kurdish gains. Turkey’s Defence Minister, Hulusi Akar, was quoted saying that after Turkish military intervention, Kurdish fighters would be ‘buried in their ditches’[6].

U.S. Policy Pivot

In concert with Bolton’s stated commitment to a conditional withdrawal, Trump has stated that there will be an established 32-kilometer safe zone between the YPG and Turkey and threatened economic sanctions against Turkey if it were to violate it. The Trump administration has imposed sanctions on Turkey already as a result of its detainment of an American pastor in August of 2018[7]. Turkey, for its part, dismissed Trump’s warning of sanctions with its foreign Minister, Mevlut Cavusoglu stating ‘we have said multiple times that we will not fear or be deterred by any threat. You can get nowhere by threatening Turkey economically’[8]. The question facing both the PYD and the U.S. is: will a 200-person peacekeeping force be able to enforce a safe zone against an emboldened Turkey, or is there potential that the U.S. forces may become caught in a crossfire between the PYD and Turkish forces and spark a larger conflict?

Despite President Trump’s stated commitment to a safe-zone, the PYD has begun pursuing alternative partners to guarantee its survival. The Kurds initially protested the U.S.’ decision  when thousands gathered near the U.S. coalition headquarters in Syria but has since acquiesced and begun engaging with potential partners[9]. Faced with a Turkish government with a stated pledge to destroying its territory and an uncertain U.S. military commitment, the PYD is left with few other state partners to align with. The PYD has decided that the only way to hedge against the Turkish threat is to align with allied Syrian and Russian governments. This alliance makes further strategic sense considering that Moscow has been pushing for an alternative to a Turkish presence on Syrian soil. Therefore, a Russian supported YPG could both aim to secure the northern border for the Assad government and provide the PYD the security assurances it seeks[10]. Considering these factors, the SDF has asked Moscow for protection and the PYD expects negotiations with the Assad government to begin soon.

Conclusion

The U.S. withdrawal demonstrates yet another example of the Trump administration’s commitment to recusing U.S. forces from participating in conflicts beyond its borders. The Syrian Civil War has been a devastating conflict, featuring many stakeholders, and few appealing options for coalition forces to align with. The YPG-led SDF has been the U.S.’ most reliable partner in this conflict up to this point but is now likely to turn to Washington’s adversaries to counter what the PYD surely views as an existential threat. The major questions remaining are: how will a PYD pivot to Moscow impact the remaining U.S. peacekeeping force’s ability to enforce strategic objectives and will Moscow and Damascus be reliable partners for the PYD going forward? The situation in which the PYD finds itself represents another chapter in the Kurdish pursuit of statehood in a region offering complex challenges and limited supporters of its aims of state legitimacy.