Post-Revolution Libya’s Internal State-Building Challenges

The 17 February 2011 Libyan revolution brought a sense of freedom to the Libyan people. Eight years later, the country has erupted into another war, with numerous internal state-building challenges. Many of these challenges are rooted in the Gaddafi regime.

by Shahed Warreth

Libya has become a deeply divided country in the eight years following the fall of the Gaddafi regime in 2011. Facing many challenges, it has yet to stabilise as warring factions, all interested in ruling, have made it difficult for Libya to find peace, thereby plunging the country into a civil war. Libya is split between the United Nations-backed Government of National Accord (GNA) and the Council of Deputies. Libya’s current issues, such as this divide, stem from Gaddafi’s reign. In order to understand the challenges that the country faces, we must first understand the foundations of fear, tyranny, and corruption it was built on prior to the revolution.

Prior to the Gaddafi era, Libya was a federal monarchy with three distinct provinces between 1951-1963: Tripolitania to the northwest; Cyrenaica, also known as Barqa, in the east; and Fezzan in the southwest.[1] The federal form of governance was soon abolished, and with it the three provinces were re-structured into baladiyat. The 1969 coup d’état led by Colonel Muammar Gaddafi brought with it a new way of arranging the country, the latest version being the 22 shabiyat established in 2007.

As a result of Gaddafi’s coup, the once stable and progressive monarchy transformed into a dictatorship distinctly lacking infrastructure and institutions.[2]Under Gaddafi’s oppressive regime, there was a sense of powerlessness felt among the Libyan people. This includes the torture, imprisonment, and murder of anyone who opposed Gaddafi’s regime, including those living abroad.[3] When Gaddafi’s security state finally collapsed in 2011, it left a ‘huge political vacuum’ that multiple forces are competing to fill without any overall sense of direction’.[4]

The 2011 revolution gave the Libyan people a sense of freedom but brought about another set of problems, one of which is ethnic divisions. There was and remains a strong sense of tribalism in Libya compared to its neighbouring countries[5]. During his reign, Gaddafi attempted to diminish tribal importance and influence by pitting tribes against each other and adopting an ideology of pan-Arab Nationalism[6]. Gaddafi then used these tribes to reassert his power. Nepotism was bountiful as loyal tribes were given high ranking government jobs, while others were sidelined.[7] Furthermore, tribal loyalty to the regime was used to undermine the military. In post-revolution Libya where ‘the state is traumatically absent’, tribes offer a form of social protection that the state has failed to provide[8].

After several attempts by the military to overthrow Gaddafi, a new security force was created, the leaders of which were Gaddafi loyalists. They fought for Gaddafi during the revolution, while many generals and soldiers defected.[9]The tribal mindset and way of leading can still be found in post-revolution Libya. This in turn led to the instability and chaos that Libya is facing today. In contrast, neighbouring Tunisia has become relatively stable. This is due to the strong military presence in the country, something which Gaddafi failed to provide in order to strengthen his control. Had there been a strong and unified military after the revolution, Libya may have become a united country without militias and numerous parties vying for power. By segregating the populace, Gaddafi played on his influence so he could remain in power. He exploited tribal differences and pitted them against each other, thereby inadvertently enabling these differences to exist even today.

The rebel forces of the revolution were also divided, and militias were and remain to be plentiful. Instead of establishing an army, the government has instead hired these militias to enforce order.[10] No job prospects or access to training may motivate some to join militias,[11]meaning these militias are a hotbed of the unemployed. Libya has suffered from a high unemployment rate both before and after the revolution, particularly among youths.[12] While different sources give different estimates for the unemployment rate in Libya, the International Labour Organization estimates that the total unemployment rate was 17.6% in 2010, 19.6% in 2011, and 17.3% in 2018.[13] The lack of jobs, and prospects of a bleak future forces youths into a life of militias and violence. In a society where there is low cash flow and no unemployment benefits, some Libyans see this as their only option. There is a societal expectation in Libya for men to be the primary breadwinners, thereby creating a societal pressure to remain employed, even if it means joining a militia. Those who are educated are also unemployed as many graduates lack the necessary skills across different industries and sectors.

Libya’s economy is heavily dependent on public sector employment, and hydrocarbons, with the latter accounting for 95% of exports in 2013. However, oil exports have decreased, and the economy has fluctuated greatly since 2011, some years being the fastest growing economy in the world, while other years being the slowest.[14]Without the revenue it generates, the government cannot provide a sufficient number of jobs in order to steer its citizens away from a life of militias. Ironically, it is these militias, along with the Libyan National Army (LNA), who have largely seized control of the oil production.[15]

Another obstacle that Libya must overcome is the lack of a coherent government. The National Transitional Council (NTC) of the revolution left Libyans unsatisfied, and was ineffective in quashing the militia problem.[16] Their successors, the General National Congress (GNC), also failed to govern effectively yet have refused to step down.[17] Neither have been successful in drawing up a constitution, disarming the militias, and forming a unified army. Moreover, the GNC formed 99 new baladiyat after the revolution, which later grew to 108. However, in 2012, the Cyrenaica Transitional Council (CTC) was formed. Renamed in October 2013 to the Council of Cyrenaica in Libya (CCL), the CCL declared Cyrenaica an autonomous province, bringing the old divisions back to the forefront.[18]

Though the GNA and the Presidential Council (PC) to the west of Libya are recognised internationally as the legitimate government, they have not gained the support of the Council of Deputies and the House of Representatives (HoR) to the east.[19] The Council of Deputies does however back the LNA, headed by General Khalifa Haftar who had previously served in Gaddafi’s army but later tried to overthrow him, and who’s military has now expanded into southern Libya.[20] However, it is clear that both governments ‘may actually be in a worse position than that enjoyed by [Gaddafi, whose] militias and military forces were loyal to him; the militias in Libya today answer to themselves and secondarily to their paymaster government’.[21] Rather than coming together in order to rebuild the country, they have instead chosen to fight for power and control and, in the case of the militias, to push their Islamist agenda.

Eight years after the revolution, Libya remains in conflict, with many of the challenges largely stemming from its past. After 42 years of living under a dictatorship, the Libyan people are once again living in a time of oppression and fear. The mindset of the Gaddafi era is still present throughout Libya; the struggle for dominance and power can still be found between warring factions looking to control the country and its resources. Post-revolution Libya has seen the rise of federalism as the citizens are fearful that if one government rules, the country will revert to old ways.[22] While the country has been liberated from Gaddafi’s authoritarian regime, it has been plunged into a never-ending conflict. It is clear that there is more to do in order to obtain peace and security in such a turbulent nation.

Sources:

[1] Pack, J. and Barfi, B. (2012) In War’s Wake: The Struggle for Post-Qadhafi Libya. Washington, D.C.: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, p. 11;

Pusztai, W. (2016). ‘Does Federalism Have a Future in Libya?’ Atlantic Council, 22 August. Available from: http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/menasource/does-federalism-have-a-future-in-libya.

[2] Fitzgerald, F., and Megerisi, T. (2015) Libya: Whose Land Is It? Property Rights and Transition. London: Legatum Institute. Available at: https://www.li.com/activities/publications/libya-whose-land-is-it;

St. John, R.B. (2012) Libya: From Colony to Revolution. Oxford: One World Publications.

[3] Diana, E. (2014) ‘“Literary Springs” in Libyan Literature: Contributions of Writers to the Country’s Emancipation’, Middle East Critique, 23(4), pp. 444.

[4] Randall, E. (2013) ‘After Qadhafi: Development and Democratization in Libya’, The Middle East Journal, 69(2), p. 210.

[5] Randall, 2013;

Cherstich, I. (2014), ‘When Tribesmen do not act Tribal: Libyan Tribalism as Ideology (not as Schizophrenia)’, Middle East Critique, 23(4), pp. 405-421;

Meijer, R. (2015) Citizenship Rights and the Arab Uprisings: Foundation for a New Political Order in the Middle and North Africa. Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, p. 4.

[6] El-Katiri, M. (2012) State-Building Challenges in a Post-Revolution Libya. Pennsylvania: U.S. Army War College, p. 11.

Fitzgerald and Megerisi, 2015.

[7] St. John, 2012;

Geha, C. (2016). Civil Society and Political Reform in Lebanon and Libya: Transition and Constraint. Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge.

[8] Cherstich, 2014.

[9] St. John, (2012); Gaub, F. (2013) ‘The Libyan Armed Forces between Coup-proofing and Repression’, Journal of Strategic Studies, 36(2), p. 235.

[10] Larémont, R.R. (2013) ‘After the Fall of Qaddafi: Political, Economic, and Security Consequences for Libya, Mali, Niger, and Algeria’, Stability: International Journal of Security and Development, 2(2), http://doi.org/10.5334/sta.bq;

Roumani, J. (2014) ‘Libya on the Brink: Insecurity, Localism, and the State Not Back In’, Middle East Institute, 12 March. Available at: https://www.mei.edu/publications/libya-brink-insecurity-localism-and-state-not-back.

[11] Mezran, K. (2013) ‘A Holistic Approach to Security in Libya’, Atlantic Council, 10 July. Available at: https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/menasource/a-holistic-approach-to-security-in-libya.

[12] El-Katiri, 2012, p.7.

[13] International Labour Organization (2018) ‘Key Indicators of the Labour Market: Unemployment Rate – ILO modelled estimates’, International LAbour Organization, November. Available at: https://www.ilo.org/ilostat/faces/ilostat-home.

[14] Larémont, 2013;

Mattes, H. (2014) ‘Rebuilding the National-Security Forces in Libya’, Middle East Policy, 21(2), p. 97;

Fitzgerald and Megerisi, 2015;

MENA-OECD Economic Resilience Task Force (2018) Country case study: Building economic resilience in Lebanon and Libya, p. 34. Available at: https://www.oecd.org/mena/competitiveness/ERTF-Jeddah-2018-Background-note-Case-studies-Lebanon-and-Libya.pdf;

International Monetary Fund (2018) World Economic Outlook: Real GDP Growth (Libya). Available at: https://www.imf.org/external/datamapper/NGDP_RPCH@WEO/OEMDC/ADVEC/WEOWORLD/LBY.

[15] Chivvis, C.S. and Martini, J. 2014. Libya After Qaddafi: Lessons and Implications for the Future. Santa Monica, California: RAND Corporation;

El Wardany, S. ‘Libya Oil Boss: Biggest Field Won't Restart Until Militia Leaves’, Bloomberg, 25 February. Available at: https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-02-25/libya-oil-boss-biggest-field-won-t-restart-until-militia-leaves;

Assad, A. (2019) ‘From Abu Dhabi, Libyan officials announce lifting force majeure on Sharara oilfield’, The Libya Observer, 26 February. Available at: https://www.libyaobserver.ly/news/abu-dhabi-libyan-officials-announce-lifting-force-majeure-sharara-oilfield;

Lacher, W. (2019) ‘Libya’s Conflicts Enter a Dangerous New Phase’, German Institute for International and Security Affairs, SWP Comment No. 8, February. Available at: https://www.swp-berlin.org/en/publication/libyas-conflicts-enter-a-dangerous-new-phase/.

[16] El-Katiri, 2012; Achcar, G. (2016) Morbid Symptoms: Relapse in the Arab Uprising. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press.

[17] Roumani, 2014.

[18] Kane, S. (2012). ‘Federalism and fragmentation in Libya? Not so fast…’ Foreign Policy, 20 March. Available from: http://foreignpolicy.com/2012/03/20/federalism-and-fragmentation-in-libya-not-so-fast/;

Pack, J. (2012). ‘Federalism in Libya: Tried and failed’, Al Jazeera, 20 April. Available from: https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2012/04/201241871355584880.html.

[19] Fitzgerald, M. (2016) ‘Libya’s Worsening Turmoil – Bad for Everyone’, Global Geneva, 20 October. Available at: https://www.global-geneva.com/libyas-worsening-turmoil-bad-for-everyone/;

Toaldo, M. (2016) ‘A Quick Guide to Libya’s Main Players: Political Actors’, European Council on foreign Relations. Available at: https://www.ecfr.eu/mena/mapping_libya_conflict.

[20] Lacher, 2019.

[21] Larémont, 2013, p.2.

[22] Geha, 2016; Mattes, 2014; Roumani, 2014.

The Influence and Stability of the United Kingdom: The National Security Ramifications of a No Deal Brexit

Brexit presents a scenario in which, all at once, the UK must: maintain its relevance on the world-stage whilst simultaneously reducing its legislative and policy making influence;  satisfy Scotland’s call to remain; and assuage Northern Ireland’s border concerns. At risk is the fragmentation of its union and a shrinking of its international role.

by Matthew Wentworth

The referendum campaign leading up to June 2016, which questioned Britain’s continued membership of the European Union (EU), was based on the argument that the United Kingdom (UK) could be a self-governed, self-sustaining, wholly independent nation, free from the limiting bureaucracies of the EU, and stronger out. After the result these promises waned and now, whatever Brexit brings, Britain’s leaving of the EU could prove to be a rare historical turning point for the UK and a tectonic shift in European Security. If the UK fractures it could lead to diminishing fiscal and political capacity in terms of national security policy making[1]. These concerns are based on the detrimental effect Brexit could have to Britain’s influence both globally and within multilateral institutions, as well as the increased possibility of the break-up of the UK through Scottish independence or the reunification of Ireland.

The placement of UK officials is the first direct global status ramification of the UK becoming a third-state outside of the EU. Absent a deal, the UK Defence Minister will no longer take part in meetings of EU Defence Ministers and will therefore not be involved in decision-making or planning EU defence and security. British personnel currently hold senior positions within major bodies like Europol, the loss of which would significantly affect the British ability to exercise leverage and influence in the development of European security agencies like Europol, which many currently consider a British-friendly institution[2]. Even a soft Brexit will come at a price to overall UK security. Britain will lose both power and influence by no longer having a say in EU legislation addressing terrorism, crime, foreign policy, or security.

Perhaps more concerning, however, is that the UK’s diminished capacity may not be limited to influence within the EU but could extend further to bodies like NATO. Brexit will certainly not change the fact that NATO is Britain’s multilateral defence forum of choice; in fact, the government champions a ‘renewed emphasis in NATO on deterrence and collective defence’ in what it labels a worsened security environment[3]. The assumption that many make with regard to the UK being able to use NATO to rebalance its security role in Europe however is unsound. The UK will undoubtedly lose influence within NATO after the inevitable appointment of a non-British Deputy Supreme Allied Commander to Europe, the first amongst many other likely changes, which will be a blow to the UK’s global standing in symbolic terms at the very least.

If British global influence is eroded, then current arrangements with allies like the US are also likely to suffer. Britain is considered an intelligence superpower due to UK intelligence-sharing arrangements with the US and membership in the Five Eyes Network[4]. Historically however, the security role of the UK in the EU was favoured greatly by Washington who saw the value of the UK as deriving at least in part from its EU membership. This influence cannot be replicated via NATO – meaning the UK cannot necessarily count on being ‘America’s closest partner’ indefinitely as British Prime Minister Theresa May has maintained[5]. The US intelligence community might begin to see the UK as a diminishing asset and opt to reach for another, more stable, ally for fear that the UK might disintegrate or lose access to EU intelligence[6].

This idea of political instability within the UK is recognised by many, both domestically and internationally, with the ostensible exception of the UK government itself. The months immediately following the referendum in the UK saw a Cabinet reshuffle, leadership contests and, eventually, a general election. This election cost the Conservative Party their majority at the expense of sizeable Labour gains and forced them to turn to Northern Ireland’s Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) to maintain their ruling position. Since this general election, the Cabinet alone has suffered no less than 23 resignations over the Brexit issue, including two Brexit Secretaries and the Foreign Secretary. We have also seen two narrowly won votes of no confidence based purely on the Brexit negotiations: one in Mrs May, as the leader of the Conservative Party; and one in the Government itself. Political instability of this kind does not a secure nation make.

The disjointed strategies, lack of consensus, and infighting displayed are not restricted simply to Westminster, but stretch to the Union at large. The different referendum results witnessed in Scotland and Northern Ireland (NI) compared to England and Wales increase the danger to the currently delicate fabric of the UK[7]. Firstly, the Scottish issue forces one to consider whether the Scottish people will stand for being removed from the EU by Westminster against their expressed will. If Scottish voters assert that they stand to gain more from the EU than the British Union, then the UK could become still less united. Whilst this issue was muted in recent months, the growing prospect of a no deal exit has driven Scottish First Minister Nicola Sturgeon to confirm that she will reveal plans for a second Scottish independence referendum after this phase of the Brexit negotiations has ended[8]. In discussing these plans, Mrs Sturgeon recently confirmed her vision for an independent Scotland that would apply for EU membership within the next five years[9]. The success of Scotland’s application to rejoin the EU would be dependent on both economic and political variables, but the point remains that Westminster’s wilful ignorance of Scotland’s resolve to remain is fuelling stronger calls for self-governance.

Scottish independence would bring more than just concerns regarding the break-up of the Union, it will also bring with it practical security implications. Scotland and Scottish bases form a crucial part of the UK’s air defence perimeter and maritime zone[10]. Multiple major platforms for building and storing warships, munitions, and naval heavy weapons would be at risk. Independence could also mean losing facilities such as Britain’s Trident Force, directly affecting the UK’s nuclear deterrent capabilities. The political and fiscal costs of moving this base elsewhere in the UK or to an overseas territory make it potentially infeasible. Though 55.3% of Scots voted to remain as part of the UK in the 2014 referendum, attitudes amongst the Scottish people might be swayed back to independence as a result of Westminster’s continued disregard for the Scottish stance on Brexit, and the probable recession resulting from leaving the EU. Further fuelling this call is the potential for a violent reopening of the Irish Question, which is a distinct possibility in the ever-increasing likelihood of a botched Brexit[11].

The troubled violent history in NI coupled with the fact that the government still considers there to be a present threat of NI related terrorism create a fragile environment in which to negotiate change. This fragility is compounded by the fact that the current Conservative government is propped up by ten pro-Brexit DUP members insistent on NI leaving the EU on the same terms as the rest of the UK, scuppering the previously proposed backstop arrangements. Failure to satisfy the DUP concerns would likely result in their withdrawal from the confidence and supply arrangement they hold with Mrs May’s government, leaving a ruling party with no majority.

In the event of a no deal scenario, it is difficult to envisage anything but the recreation of a real, as opposed to virtual, border between the Republic of Ireland and NI which defies the terms of the Good Friday Agreement. The type of border that emerges is extremely important for the UK’s national security, as undermining of the rules in place governing the border amounts to an undermining of the agreement itself[12]. There is a consensus that anything which upsets the delicate status-quo of NI’s political environment could cue a resurgence of dissident paramilitary activity and further national security concerns for the UK[13]. The vote for remain in NI signifies that opinion there might be disjointed with that of England and Wales, potentially giving greater priority to links with the Republic whilst simultaneously breeding a new polarisation along sectarian lines: another example of how Brexit has made the Union more fragile[14].

The extent of the UK’s post-Brexit strategic vision amounts to a determination for a ‘Global Britain’. The plan however has no more structure than that empty phrase; it is a goal unlikely to be attained by seceding from the EU[15]. Far from elevating the UK to new heights, the Brexit process has thus far suggested the UK’s retreat from world affairs and a shrinking of Britain’s international role through diminished capacity in NATO, no say in EU policy, and a potentially weakened intelligence relationship with the US. The turmoil surrounding the political management of Brexit could also have dire consequences for the stability of the UK itself. Mrs May’s precarious majority looks to be in constant jeopardy, and Westminster’s alienation of the Scottish people, coupled with the impossibility of delivering a hard Brexit which is compatible with the Good Friday Agreement, might prove as deciding factors in the weakening of the stability of the UK through either Scottish Independence, a unified Ireland, or both.

Sources:

1. Blagden, D. (2017) Britain and the world after Brexit. International Politics. 54(1), pp.1–25.

2. Dawson, J. (2017) Brexit: implications for national security. London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office.

3. Cabinet Office (2018) National Security Capability Review. London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office.

4. Inkster, N. (2016) Brexit, Intelligence and Terrorism. Survival. 58(3), pp.23-30.

5. May, T. (2018) PM Speech at Munich Security Conference 17 February 2018. Munich Security Conference, Munich.

6. Konstantopoulosa, I.L., and J.N. Nomikos (2017) Brexit and intelligence: connecting the dots. Journal of Intelligence History.16(2), pp. 100-107.

7. Macpherson, N. (2016) The case for Scottish independence looks stronger post-Brexit. Financial Times. [online] Available at: https://www.ft.com/content/1219f41c-4456-11e6-9b66-0712b3873ae1 [Accessed 6 Jan. 2019].

8. Nutt, K. (2019) Nicola Sturgeon set to unveil indyref2 plans soon. The National. [online] Available at: https://www.thenational.scot/news/17341120.nicola-sturgeon-set-to-unveil-indyref2-plans-soon/?ref=mr&lp=4 [Accessed 9 Jan. 2019].

9. McLaughlin, M. (2019). Scotland will be independent in five years, declares Sturgeon. The Times. [online] Available at: https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/scotland-will-be-independent-in-five-years-declares-sturgeon-8r7nc62zj [Accessed 13 Feb. 2019].

10. Blagden, “Britain and the world after Brexit,” 11.

11. Heisbourg, F. (2016) Brexit and European Security. Survival. 58(3), pp.13-22.

12. Duke, S. (2018) Will Brexit Damage our Security and Defence?: The Impact on the UK and EU. Cham: Springer Nature.

13. Morrow, D., and J. Byrne. (2016) Playing Jenga? Northern Ireland after Brexit. Political Insight. 7(2), pp.30-31.

14. Gamble, A. (2018) Taking back control: the political implications of Brexit. Journal of European Public Policy. 25(8), pp.1215-1232.

15. Duke, “Will Brexit Damage our Security and Defence?,” 92

Choosing the Right Strategy: (Counter)Insurgency and (Counter)Terrorism as Competing Paradigms

Distinguishing between terrorism and insurgency is becoming increasingly challenging for policy-makers and military planners. Terrorist organisations cannot be disrupted through counter-insurgency techniques and insurgencies are extremely resilient to counter-terrorism strategies. Counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency, although similar in certain respects, identify divergent assumptions and modalities for dealing with terrorism and insurgency.

by Roberto Colombo

Distinguishing between terrorism and insurgency presents significant challenges that policy-makers and military officials need to face. Often, these threats are so interwoven that policy-makers, unable to separate the two, confront them by implementing similar strategies. However, confusion leads to counterproductive outcomes and, instead of containing and reducing threats, misguided measures have the potential to exacerbate the impact of political violence. Terrorism and insurgency are two distinct models of violent conflict. Therefore, they must not be confronted with one-size-fits-all approaches[1]. Consequently, understanding the difference between counter-terrorism (CT) and counter-insurgency (COIN) is a precondition for effectively engaging and disrupting terrorist organisations and insurgency movements, and this understanding is underpinned by the idea that ‘counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency are [neither] mutually exclusive’ nor interchangeable[2].

The United States Department of Defence (DoD) in 2014 defined terrorism as ‘the unlawful use of violence or threat of violence, often motivated by religious, political, or other ideological beliefs, to instil fear and coerce governments or societies in pursuit of goals that are usually political’[3]. Although terrorism is a long-lasting feature of political violence, counter-terrorism as a stand-alone strategy was developed during the 1970s and gained substantial importance in the post-9/11 era[4][5]. Before the 1970s, the majority of Western military analysts considered the phenomenon of terrorism mainly as one of the many tactics deployed by insurgency movements, therefore, countermeasures against terrorism were incorporated in COIN strategies. Military planners started to consider terrorism and insurgency as two separate threats when terrorist groups throughout the 70s composed of alienated individuals, such as the Italian Red Brigades and the German Red Army Faction, engaged in a season of attacks without achievable aims or trying to obtain popular support[6]. Hence, CT emerged as a strategy specifically designed to isolate and disrupt terrorist organisations that, deprived of the population’s support, could be promptly detected and neutralised. The DoD defines CT as ‘activities and operations taken to neutralize terrorists, their organizations, and networks in order to render them incapable of using violence to instil fear and coerce governments or societies to achieve their goals’[7].

Unlike the majority of terrorist organisations, insurgent groups consider it paramount to gain legitimacy from the greater population by championing deeper issues and grievances within society. Insurgencies, as defined by COIN scholar David Kilcullen, are ‘organised, protracted politico-military struggles designed to weaken the control and legitimacy of an established government, occupying power, or other political authority while increasing insurgent control’[8]. In other words, insurgencies are long-term conflicts that the insurgent party wages with the intention of overthrowing the government to take its place. The Vietcong’s uprising in South Vietnam against the central government in Saigon (1954-1976) and the Taliban’s attempts to overthrow the Afghan Government and obtain its power throughout the last 18 years are famous examples of protracted insurgencies. Because insurgents rely on their links with the local population for securing their survival and advancing their cause, governments that implement counter-terrorism strategies to engage insurgency movements are unlikely to emerge victorious. Consequently, strategies that rely on military operations designed to capture and kill insurgents without addressing the root causes of the insurgency are often counterproductive. This is because insurgents benefit from being deeply interconnected with local communities and, when the government launches large-scale operations, they can rely on the protection from the local population to melt away and ‘go quiet’[9]. It is thus not rare for governments to implement countermeasures that, without causing significant damages to the insurgents, generate civilian casualties, alienate local communities, and indirectly legitimise the insurgents in the eyes of the population. A clear example is given by Russia’s framing of the nationalist rebellion in Chechnya during the 1990s as a terrorist uprising. Moscow’s failure to understand that insurgency, and not terrorism, was the defining character of the two Chechen Wars led to the implementation of counter-terrorism strategies that turned a contained rebellion into a widespread jihadi insurgency. Russia’s brutal hunt for the alleged “terrorists” in Chechnya caused the death of innocent civilians, alienated local communities and created the perfect breeding ground for radicalisation and protracted violence in the region[10]. Therefore, successful COIN efforts, instead of only seeking to kill insurgents and disrupt their networks, are mainly directed at severing the link between insurgents and local communities (population-centric approaches). This is defined by Kilcullen as ‘a competition with the insurgent for the right and ability to win hearts, minds, and acquiescence of the population’[11].

CT and COIN are neither mutually exclusive nor interchangeable. The two are not mutually exclusive because if properly implemented their joint action can turn out to be highly successful in tackling terrorism and insurgency. Nevertheless, the marriage between CT and COIN is profitable only when the government is facing insurgents that adopt terrorism as one of their strategies. Firstly, population-centric COIN approaches sever the link between insurgents and population. Secondly, once insurgents are alienated from the local communities and lack the protection of the greater population, they become highly vulnerable to CT strategies. This was the case in Iraq during the “Surge” of U.S. troops in 2007. The strategic approach adopted by the U.S. in Iraq can be divided into two phases. Firstly, the massive deployment of U.S. and Iraqi soldiers provided security and support to the local communities. The long-term presence of security forces at the local level prevented the insurgents from controlling key areas and shifted the population’s allegiance from the insurgents to the security forces. Once these COIN techniques were proven successful in isolating the insurgents, U.S. forces launched the second phase of the “Surge”. Special Operations Forces (SOFs) efficiently combined counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency tactics, engaging insurgents and neutralising their networks without inflicting large numbers of civilian casualties[12]. Hence, before implementing CT strategies, the government must first win the population’s support. As previously mentioned, adapting the wrong strategies in such contexts not only inhibits the government’s success, but may also spawn backlashes, inadvertently strengthen the insurgents’ grip over local communities, and protract the conflict.

CT and COIN are not interchangeable either. Terrorist organisations cannot be disrupted through COIN techniques and insurgencies are extremely resilient to CT strategies. Consequently, adopting the wrong strategy often strengthens the hostile movement. COIN strategies are mainly directed at reinforcing the government’s legitimacy and addressing the root causes of the population’s grievances while granting secondary emphasis to capturing and killing insurgents. But when it comes to confronting alienated individuals determined to spread fear among the population, COIN efforts are generally ineffective. In these circumstances governments should implement CT strategies that emphasise military and law enforcement techniques. Conversely, CT strategies adopted in insurgency scenarios alienate the population, creating the perfect breeding ground for radicalisation and political violence, indirectly strengthening the insurgency.

Policy-makers and military officials often confuse insurgency for terrorism and vice versa because the two phenomena share many commonalities. As Kilcullen states, ‘terrorism is a component in almost all insurgencies, and insurgent objectives lie behind almost all non state terrorism’[13]. Although CT and COIN are not interchangeable, in certain contexts their joint action significantly improves the government’s ability to confront insurgents that implement terrorism as a tactic. The main difference between CT and COIN is that, while the former focuses on neutralising terrorists and disrupting their networks, the latter is an approach aimed at first marginalising, rather than destroying, the insurgent movement[14].

Sources:

[1] Younyoo K., Stephen B. (2013) “Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Russia: Contending Paradigms and Current Perspectives,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, Vol 36, No. 11, p. 918.

[2] Ibid., p. 920.

[3] United States Department of Defense (2014) Joint Publication 3-26: Counterterrorism, U.S. Government Printing Office, p. I-5.

[4] Boyle, M. (2010) “Do Counterterrorism and Counterinsurgency Go Together?,” International Affairs, Vol. 36, No. 2, p. 342. & Merari, A. (1993) “Terrorism as a Strategy of Insurgency,” Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol. 5, No. 4, p. 224-238.

[5] See Rinehart, J. (2010) “Counterterrorism and Counterinsurgency,” Perspectives on Terrorism, Vol. 4, No. 5, p. 34-37. for a cohesive summary of the origins and evolution of counterterrorism.

[6] Kilcullen, D. (2010) Counterinsurgency: Oxford University Press, p. 186

[7] United States Department of Defense (2014) Joint Publication 3-26: Counterterrorism, U.S. Government Printing Office, p. I-5.

[8] Kilcullen, Counterinsurgency, p. 1.

[9] Kilcullen, D (2009) The Accidental Guerrilla: Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One: Oxford University Press, p. 32.

[10] Younyoo, Blank, p. 919.

[11] Kilcullen, Counterinsurgency, p. 8.

[12] Kilcullen, The Accidental Guerrilla, p. 115-185.

[13] Kilcullen, Counterinsurgency, p. 184.

[14] Pratt, S. (2010, December 21). What is the difference between counterinsurgency and counter-terrorism?. Retrieved from E-International Relations: https://www.e-ir.info/2010/12/21/what-is-the-difference-between-counter-insurgency-and-counter-terrorism/, p. 4.

UK Access to EU Databases: The National Security Ramifications of a No Deal Brexit

The UK’s ability to prevent, prepare for, and respond to risks is enhanced by its ability to share data and expertise, exchange information, and collaborate closely with its nearest neighbours. Brexit presents a significant threat to both that information exchange and continued collaboration.

by Matthew Wentworth

At present standing, with one deal presented by British Prime Minister Theresa May having already failed to pass through the Commons, the consequences of a no deal Brexit are looming. It is a scenario which many Members of Parliament expressly wish to avoid as leaving the European Union (EU) without a deal would have ramifications for the United Kingdom’s (UK) transnational policing, counter-terror operations, national border control, and forensic investigative capabilities. Each of these areas will be directly and immediately affected in the event of a no deal Brexit due to the specific instruments that the UK stands to lose access to and the effect this will have on its ability to ensure national security.

Without an agreement the UK would leave Europol and UK police forces would lose use of the European Arrest Warrant (EAW), access to Europol’s Information System, and the EU Internet Referral Unit[1]. Not only this but the National Crime Agency would lose access to the EU’s network of Financial Intelligence Units (based at Europol) and the Bomb Data System[2]. Back in 2016 Mrs May cited the EAW when she stated that ‘there are definitely things we can do as members of the European Union that I think keep us more safe’[3]. Informing her view was the fact that in the period 2004–2016 the EAW enabled the UK to extradite 7000 individuals accused or convicted of criminal offences in other EU countries[4]. In the past five years alone, 5000 people have been extradited to EU member states using the EAW[5] highlighting its increasing importance. The prospect of the UK losing rights to the use of EAWs after withdrawing from the EU, and by extension Europol, would mean reverting to more costly and time-consuming measures due to the sudden absence of provisions for mutual recognition of judicial orders[6].

It is well understood that the UK’s lack of access to these instruments would serve neither the UK nor their European partners and whilst examples do exist of bespoke arrangements with third-states, leaving Europol would mean that at best Britain would have to settle for non-voting observer status, forfeiting the right of British officers to lead Europol teams[7]. The argument often presented by leave supporters from all parties that post-Brexit access to the EAW will be straightforward discounts the question of legal oversight of the European Court of Justice (ECJ)[8]. Mrs May has already conceded that any prospect of the UK’s participation in EU agencies such as Europol would mean respecting the remit of the ECJ[9]. This point is entirely at odds with what backbench Commons Members, specifically those of the European Research Group, will accept.

Instead, pro-Brexit Members of Parliament claim that the UK’s contribution to Europol databases as well as the expertise they provide in operations is a big enough bargaining chip to secure the UK access to instruments post-Brexit. Denmark, for example, is able to exchange data with Europol as a third-state, but this is only facilitated through the time-consuming process of Danish officers contacting Danish-speaking Europol staff and being granted the requested information on a case-by-case basis. Denmark does not have right of access to Europol data. The applicability of this arrangement to the UK is extremely doubtful, the EU-Danish agreement depends upon Denmark’s continued membership of the Schengen area, domestic legislative implementation of EU data protection laws, and acceptance of the jurisdiction of the ECJ. These conditions are unworkable for the UK since they undermine many facets of the decision to leave the EU[10].

National border control and customs security will be similarly affected with the updated Schengen Information System (SIS II) and the European Criminal Records Information System (ECRIS) being two further tools that the UK will lose in a no deal Brexit scenario[11]. The SIS II supports external border control and law enforcement cooperation across 22 participating EU countries (plus four associated countries). The staggering extent of its use amounts to it having been consulted 2.9 billion times in 2015[12]. In 2017 Britain alone checked the system over 500 million times in relation to searches for people and objects wanted for law enforcement purposes[13].

ECRIS is a decentralised system utilised by the majority of EU members and provides judges with the information on criminal records of persons which transcends state borders[14]. The government has proposed continued participation in this system, recognising that the UK relies on it for the effective management of violent and sexual offenders. This reliance is reflected in the fact that the UK sent and received over 163,000 requests and notifications for criminal records just in 2017, amounting to over 3,000 a week or 600 requests and notifications to and from the EU per working day[15]. Continued access to both SIS II and ECRIS is of the utmost importance for continued effective law enforcement yet it would require a unique agreement as, to date, there are no examples of access by non-EU or non-Schengen countries in either case[16]. Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, and Switzerland have access to SIS II but all are members of the Schengen area[17]. Politicians and academics alike have pointed to these countries as evidence that the UK will be able to access similar databases after it leaves the EU without recognition of the criteria it will have to fulfil as a third-state to do so. It currently takes six days to determine the domestic criminal convictions of EU nationals visiting the UK, post-Brexit the process could take up to ten times longer[18].

Similar time-delay concerns abound when considering the forensic investigative capabilities of the UK and the removal of access to both the European Asylum Dactyloscopy Database (Eurodac), and the Prüm Framework. In 2016 then Home Secretary Mrs May described the Prüm Framework (a cross European agreement to search DNA and fingerprint databases) as ‘a tool which hugely increases the reach of UK law enforcement’[19]. To have the same accessibility to both Prüm and Eurodac (a mechanism for sharing fingerprint data for asylum and law-enforcement purposes[20]) following a no deal Brexit, the UK would need to negotiate individual agreements with each EU government. The importance of continued access to the Prüm Framework has been challenged due to the fact that equivalent manual requests can be made through Interpol. The reality is that UK police forces sent 69 DNA profiles abroad in 2014-15 using Interpol, whereas 9,931 profiles were sent in less than six months during a pilot of the Prüm system[21] demonstrating that requests through Interpol are not an equitable comparison to the capability facilitated by Prüm.

All these platforms and information sharing systems are mutually beneficial to participating countries and many Brexit fears are exacerbated by the fact that the UK is both a large contributor and consumer of the information held and shared. What is often not considered however is that some mentioned above largely contain information on only convicted criminals rather than terrorist suspects. Classified or secret information on terror subjects, or information on counter-terror operations, are not shared on some databases because they are not sufficiently advanced to host intelligence above a classification level of “confidential”[22]. Intelligence relating to terror suspects and operations is contained on national security databases and are therefore shared between individual countries on a “need to know” basis, something that is not currently set to change after the UK leaves the EU. In the absence of a deal however it is possible that EU countries will demand proof of the UK’s willingness to recognise the rulings of the ECJ if it wishes to maintain current levels of counter-terrorism co-operation. Failure to offer this assurance could lead to renewed concerns amongst Member States about mass surveillance by the UK government and a decrease in the aforementioned co-operation.

The government has in-part identified non-EU mechanisms that exist to replace a proportion of the apparatus identified above but none would provide the same level of capability as those available in either a deal or remain scenario[23] meaning they would increase pressure on UK security, law enforcement, and judicial authorities. The fall-backs are slower, more bureaucratic, and ultimately less effective. The importance of introducing measures to combat these national security concerns is recognised by the government as evidenced by their assertion of the need to maintain, deepen, and strengthen operational and practical cooperation with the EU through an adequacy agreement. Given that over three-quarters of the UK’s data flows are with EU countries[24] it is certainly true that the absence of a deal will inevitably mean that the exchange of personal data for law enforcement and criminal justice purposes would be impacted[25]. UK capabilities in cross-border policing, counter-terror operations, national border control, and forensic investigative capabilities stand to be severely disadvantaged.  The uncertainty and instability that Brexit is causing in the information sharing and transnational policing realms stand to be exploited by terrorists and organised crime cells. Both the EU and the UK would be negatively affected by the immediate operational disruption and security implications[26] potentially affecting the political stability of all concerned.

Sources:

1. de Vries, G. (2018) A hard Brexit will see criminals taking back control. LSE Brexit Blog. Available at: http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/brexit/2018/03/12/a-hard-brexit-will-see-criminals-taking-back-control/ [Accessed 4 Dec. 2018].

2. ibid.

3. Mason, R. (2016) Leaked recording shows Theresa May is 'ignoring her own warnings' on Brexit. The Guardian. [online] Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2016/oct/26/leaked-recording-shows-theresa-may-is-ignoring-her-own-warnings-on-brexit [Accessed 6 Jan. 2019].

4. House of Lords (2016) Leaving the European Union: Foreign and Security Policy Cooperation. London: Her Majesty's Stationary Office.

5. May, T. (2016) The UK, EU and our place in the world. Institute of Mechanical Engineers, London.

6. Cabinet Office (2018) National Security Capability Review. London: Her Majesty's Stationary Office.

7. de Vries, “A hard Brexit”.

8. Duke, S. (2018) Will Brexit Damage our Security and Defence?: The Impact on the UK and EU. Cham: Springer Nature.

9. de Vries, “A hard Brexit”.

10. House of Commons European Scrutiny Committee (2017) Third-Second Report of Session 2016–17. London: House of Commons.

11. Inkster, N. (2016) Brexit, Intelligence and Terrorism. Survival. 58(3), pp.23-30.

12. House of Lords, Leaving the European Union, p.17.

13. European Agency for the Operational Management of Large-Scale IT Systems in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (2018) SIS II – 2017 Statistics. Tallinn: eu-LISA.

14. Duke, Will Brexit Damage our Security and Defence?, p.62.

15. National Crime Agency (2017) Historical European Arrest Warrants statistics: Calendar and Financial year totals 2004 - May 2016. London: National Crime Agency.

16. Duke, Will Brexit Damage our Security and Defence?, p.68.

17. Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS) (2018) Criminal Justice and Police Cooperation between the EU and the UK after Brexit: Towards a principled and trust-based partnership. [online] Brussels: CEPS. Available at: https://www.ceps.eu/system/files/TFR_EU-UK_Cooperation_Brexit_0.pdf [Accessed 6 Dec. 2018].

18. Inkster, “Brexit, Intelligence and Terrorism”, p.31.

19. House of Lords (2015) Hansard. col. 1637. Available at: https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld201516/ldhansrd/text/151209-0002.htm [Accessed 10 Dec. 2018].

20. Duke, Will Brexit Damage our Security and Defence?, p.66.

21. Cabinet Office, National Security Capability Review, p.6.

22. House of Lords, Leaving the European Union, p.8.

23. Doffman, Z. (2018) Brexit Chaos: Why It Is A Major Terrorism And Security Risk. Forbes. [online] Available at: https://www.forbes.com/sites/zakdoffman/2018/11/15/brexit-chaos-why-it-is-a-major-terrorism-and-security-risk/# [Accessed 5 Jan. 2019].

24. Duke, Will Brexit Damage our Security and Defence?, p.69.

25. Cabinet Office, National Security Capability Review, p.18

26. Duke, Will Brexit Damage our Security and Defence?, p.69.

Environmental Migration and Conflict in West Africa

In the coming decades, climate change will push an astounding number of people to flee their homes in West Africa to search for new places where food, health, and environmental security will be more accessible. Addressing this issue in the earliest phases will play a fundamental role in the coming decades’ policy outcome.

by Stefano de Blasi

Climate change represents one of the principal long-term challenges to international security, which is increasingly recognised as a threat multiplier within the current security landscape. Although there is no mono-causal correlation between climate change, migration, and conflicts, it would be dangerous to underestimate the impact of environmental changes on population displacement and regional conflicts. The effects of climate change are expected to pose a significant threat to West African developing countries due to their lack of wealth, strong institutions, and reliable infrastructures[i]. The absence of these assets, and the high-dependency of their population to natural resources, renders several Western African countries particularly vulnerable to the effects of climate change.

West Africa has already been one of the most affected regions by climate change due to the aggravation of chronic problems such as water scarcity, and the increasing likelihood of rainfall shortage, desertification, and land degradation. The absence of solid infrastructures and technologies to adapt to the hostile effects of climate change may produce severe consequences for the regional socio-economic sphere causing insufficient food security, drastic water shortages, health-related risks, and eventually social unrest[ii]. Moreover, climate change has altered the frequency, intensity and duration of such threats[iii], producing further challenges to the resilience of West African countries.

The data collected by researchers in the field of environmental security offers a worrying picture of the consequences that climate change may produce in the region. According to the 2007 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), average temperatures in West Africa are expected to rise as much as 3°C by 2050, potentially causing devasting effects to the security of the region. The resilience of this ecosystem will also be challenged by an estimated 10 percent reduction in annual rainfall by the same year[iv]. Given the region’s dependency on rainfed agriculture (it is estimated that this covers approximately 96 percent of total crop production[v]), the consequences of such an environmental shift may prove to be fatal in terms of food security and demographic growth. The combination of these environmental issues with one of the highest population growth rates in the world could in turn lead West Africa to food shortages, famines in drought years, and massive human displacements[vi].

Migration has always represented an important adaptive mechanism for people facing environmental changes. Internal urban and coastal migration remains the most common response to climate-driven issues. However, in West Africa these migrations constitute a serious challenge to large cities that aim to absorb and integrate large groups of people who were forced to flee their homes due to sudden natural disasters or long-term effects of climate change[vii]. The discourse is different when it comes to external migrations – i.e. migration flows directed to different countries. One of the major problems in this field concerns acquiring the refugee status for those forced to migrate due to unusual environmental shifts. Currently, no official international convention or definition concerning environmental refugees has been produced. Therefore, these refugees live in a normative limbo, incapable of obtaining recognition or protection abroad. Considering the growing threat the environment is posing to this region, this aspect represents a significant issue in the international normative framework.

Climate-induced migrations in West Africa could also damage the stability of hosting societies, particularly in the case of underdeveloped economies with scarce resources and political instability[viii]. Climate change in this case might exacerbate pre-existing socio-economic and ethnic tensions within the receiving area and it might trigger internal competitions over natural resources and workable lands. This is what is happening right now in the Lake Chad region for example. In the past 50 years this lake has shrunk by 90 percent due to changing environmental conditions, misuse and overuse, and massive population growth. These changes have exasperated disputes for resources and land in this region, which hosts more than 300 local ethnic groups as well as migrant workers[ix]. Thus far, these tensions have concerned mainly rural populations, but it will be fundamental to observe closely how this scenario develops in urban regions in order to prevent any major violent escalation.

In the coming decades, climate change will push an astounding number of people to flee their homes in West Africa to search for new places where food, health, and environmental security will be more accessible. Although offering an accurate estimate of the magnitude of the potential implications of this scenario is beyond our capacities at this moment, addressing this issue in the earliest phases will play a fundamental role in the coming decades’ policy outcome. Enhancing the adaptation and the resilience of West African countries to the adverse effects of climate change is fundamental to preventing forced massive displacement across, and even beyond, this region. The consequences of such a scenario could prove to be dramatic in terms of destabilising mass migrations and potential socio-economic conflicts.

Sources:

[i] Reuveny Rafael, 2007. Climate change-induced migration and violent conflict. Political Geography 26, pp. 656-673.

[ii] Brown Oli et al., 2007. Climate Change as the ‘New Security Threat: Implications for Africa. International Affairs, 83:6. Available at: https://www.jstor.org/stable/4541915

[iii] Stapleton Opitz Sara et al., 2017. Climate change, Migration and Displacement. [online] Available at: https://www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/resource-documents/11874.pdf

[iv] Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. 2007. Impact, adaptation, and Vulnerability.

[v] Serdeczny Olivia et al., 2016. Climate change impacts in Sub-Saharan Africa: from physical changes to their social ripercussions. Regional Environmental Change.

[vi] Warner Koko et al., 2009. In Search of a Shelter – Mapping the Effects of Climate Change on Human Migration and Displacement. [online] Available at: https://www.ciesin.columbia.edu/documents/clim-migr-report-june09_final.pdf

[vii] United Nations Environment Programme. 2011. Livelihood Security - Climate Change, Conflict and Migration in the Sahel. [online] Available at: https://postconflict.unep.ch/publications/UNEP_Sahel_EN.pdf

[viii] Raleigh Clionadh et al., 2008. Assessing the Impact of Climate Change on Migration and Conflict.[online] Available at: https://environmentalmigration.iom.int/assessing-impact-climate-change-migration-and-conflict

[ix] UNEP, 2001. Livelihood Security.

Strategic Turnaround? Russia’s Support to the Afghan Taliban and its Strategic Implications

We know that the Russians are involved, stated U.S. Army General John Nicholson during an interview with the BBC, publicly accusing Russia of smuggling loads of weapons to the Taliban. Russia’s logistical and financial support to the Afghan Taliban is a short-term security insurance, and a profitable long-term investment, for the Kremlin’s future geopolitical manoeuvres.

By Roberto Colombo

During 2018, United States (U.S.) military commanders in Afghanistan repeatedly reported that the Taliban received material, financial and logistical support from Russian representatives.[1] “We know that the Russians are involved,” stated U.S. Army General John Nicholson during an interview with the BBC, publicly accusing Russia of smuggling loads of weapons to the Taliban.[2] These allegations were backed up by testimonies of Afghan police and military officials, which reported to Western media that recently-produced Russian military equipment, including night-vision goggles, heavy machine guns and small arms, is now part of the Taliban’s arsenal.[3] Russia denied any involvement in the alleged shipment of Russian weapons to the Afghan Taliban, declaring that these weapons could have been smuggled by several transnational non-state actors.[4] This escalation of suspicions and accusations demonstrates that Russia’s increasing influence in Afghanistan is causing significant problems for the U.S. and the Afghan Government. Russia’s decision to embrace the Taliban stands in clear contrast with the previous history of logistical help that Moscow guaranteed to the U.S.-led forces fighting the Taliban.[5] Why is Moscow reversing its political stance regarding Afghanistan? This article will analyse Russia’s strategic turnaround from three perspectives: geopolitical considerations, national security and long-term interests.

Geopolitical considerations are an evident catalyst of Russia’s strategic turnaround. In the wake of Russia’s revisionism, Moscow is unlikely to discard the occasion that the Afghan quagmire offers to its regional aspirations. Russia’s support to the Taliban poses significant extra costs on the U.S. because a stronger insurgency in Afghanistan jeopardises the progress that counterinsurgency (COIN) operations achieved during years of protracted political and military engagement. Consequently, the Taliban resurgence in Afghanistan forces the U.S. to strengthen its presence in the country. Without the United States’ support, the Afghan Government is unlikely to regain control of the provinces overrun by the enemy. The increasing amounts of resources and personnel diverted to Afghanistan limits the United States’ capability of projecting its hard and soft power in other regions. Therefore, while the U.S. tries to prevent the Taliban from seizing power in Kabul, Moscow is incentivised to expand its influence in North Africa, the Middle East and in the Euro-Atlantic area.[6]

Nevertheless, Russia’s primary interest regarding Afghanistan is directly linked to the security and protection of its external borders.[7] Moscow, by providing support to the Taliban, is aiming at disrupting the presence of the Islamic State (IS) in Afghanistan. The IS is considered by the Taliban a hostile entity that challenges their monopoly on insurgency. Therefore, the Taliban are determined to force the IS out of Afghanistan through the use of force. Similarly, Russia regards the Islamic State as a threat because it poses several challenges to its security. Among these difficulties, the return of foreign fighters to Russia, the connections between the IS in Afghanistan and segments of the underground North Caucasian insurgency and the influence of the IS propaganda on Russia’s population are the most concerning.[8] Russia and the Taliban are partnering because they share a common enemy and their interests are mutually compatible. While the Taliban are focused exclusively on dominating Afghanistan and do not have any interest in expanding their presence outside the country’s borders, the IS strives for enlarging its network both in Russia and Afghanistan.[9] The imperative of preventing the spread of takfiri ideology (radical Islam) and the radicalisation of segments of the Russian society would explain the alleged smuggling of Russian weapons to the Taliban. These weapons do not provide the Taliban with enough firepower to challenge the U.S. forces supremacy, but they can make a difference in the fight against the IS. Furthermore, Russia’s top-priority of disrupting the Islamic State’s cells in Afghanistan also explains why the Russian foreign ministry shared intelligence with the Taliban regarding the movements of the Islamic State’s fighters in Afghanistan.[10]

Lastly, long-term interests of Russia’s support to the Taliban must be considered. The Kremlin is aware that the Taliban are a reality in Afghanistan that cannot be ignored.[11] When Russian officials, interviewed by press representatives, give statements such as “defeating the Taliban by military means is no longer an option,”[12] they are embracing the fact that peaceful settlements of the Afghan situation are meaningless without the Taliban’s consensus. Consequently, having a leverage on the largest non-state actor in Afghanistan enables Russia to seize a favourable position from which to influence the peace talks that could eventually take place between the Taliban and the Afghan Government.

For the U.S., Russia’s support to the Taliban represents a serious problem that could jeopardise years of progress towards a peaceful resolution of the conflict, favourable to the U.S. backed Afghan Government. The Taliban, counting on the assistance of a great power, are likely to increase their efforts to overthrow the central government and refuse to be party to U.S. sponsored peace talks. In contrast, insurgents would be inclined to cooperate during meetings sanctioned by Russia specifically designed to advance Moscow’s projects for the region.

A reconciliation between the Taliban and the Afghan Government that would not deliver the control of the country to the insurgents has always been a difficult objective to achieve. Currently, Russia’s increasing interference and the Taliban’s growing capabilities suggest that a conflict resolution beneficial to the United States’ strategic interests is, for the moment, out of reach.[13] Therefore, there are no short-term solutions at the United States’ disposal. Furthermore, Trump’s plans to withdraw a significant number of troops from Afghanistan in 2019 indicate that forcing the Taliban to the negotiation table is no longer considered a viable option by U.S. policy-makers. At this point, predicting how the Afghan dilemma will evolve in the coming months is not possible. What is certain is that Russia’s support to the Taliban is adding uncertainty to an already strategically complex situation.

Russia, from its relationship with the Taliban, gains geopolitical advantages, national security guarantees and long-term interests at a relatively low political, financial and logistical cost. For all the reasons addressed in this article, Russia’s support to the Taliban is a short-term security insurance, and a profitable long-term investment, for the Kremlin’s future geopolitical manoeuvres.[14]

Sources:

[1] Groll, E. (2018, April 2). Security Brief: Russia Providing Arms to Taliban; China’s Global Kidnapping Campaign. Retrieved from Foreign Policy: https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/04/02/security-brief-russia-providing-arms-to-taliban-chinas-global-kidnapping-campaign/.

[2] Azami, D. (2018, April 2). Is Russia Arming the Afghan Taliban?. Retrieved from BBC World Service: https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-41842285.

[3] Ibid.

[4] Rasmussen, S. (2017, October 22). Russia Accused of Supplying Taliban as Power Shifts Create Strange Bedfellows. Retrieved from The Guardian: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/oct/22/russia-supplying-taliban-afghanistan.

[5] Chellaney, B. (2017, March 8). Putin’s Dance with the Taliban. Retrieved from The Japan Times: https://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2017/03/08/commentary/world-commentary/putins-dance-taliban/#.XA-C6y2cat8.

[6] Sazonov, V. (2017, June 16). Afghanistan as an Example of the Kremlin’s Hybrid Warfare-Why Russia is Arming the Taliban. Retrieved from International Centre for Defence and Security: https://icds.ee/afghanistan-as-an-example-of-the-kremlins-hybrid-warfare-why-russia-is-arming-the-taliban/, p. 7.

[7] Kaura, V. (2018) “Russia’s Changing Relations with Pakistan and Taliban: Implications for India,” Jadvpur Journal of International Relations, Vol. 22, No. 1, p. 73.

[8] Stepanova, E. (2018) “Russia’s Afghan Policy in the Regional and Russia-West Contexts,” Russie.NEI.Reports, No. 23, p. 22.

[9] Rayan, M. (2018, October 12). The Kremlin’s Comeback. Retrieved from The Washington Post: https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/world/wp/2018/10/12/feature/behind-the-scenes-russia-regains-a-complicated-status-afghanistan-power-broker/?utm_term=.072b3271945b.

[10] Rasmussen, Russia Accused of Supplying Taliban as Power Shifts Create Strange Bedfellows.

[11] Azami, D. (2018, April 2). Is Russia Arming the Afghan Taliban?. Retrieved from BBC World Service: https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-41842285.

[12] Stepanova, p.28.

[13] Chellaney, B. Putin’s Dance with the Taliban. [14] Rayan, The Kremlin’s Comeback.

Colombia’s Tenuous Peace

Colombia’s 2016 Peace Deal with the FARC helped to lessen violence. However, without increased development efforts in rural areas, the toll of past conflict on society may prevent long-term sustainability, justice, and recovery. The new administration of Colombian President Iván Duque Márquez is projected to subvert major post-conflict initiatives and risks reigniting paramilitary conflict.

By Cassandra Stimpson

The Peace Deal signed between the Colombian government and the paramilitary Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) in 2016 brought “closure” to nearly sixty years of conflict. Yet, rampant threats remain after the deal was signed including poverty, inequality, illicit economies, corruption, and non-state actor violence.

Since 2002, conflict with the FARC has declined and ultimately ceased through negotiations and increased state control of rural areas. Differences in the three administrations of Álvaro Uribe (2002-2010), Juan Manuel Santos (2010-2018) and recently elected President Iván Duque (August 2018-present) lie in strategic approaches. Uribe’s militarism emphasized counterterrorism and combating the drug trade. Santos relied heavily on rural development and peace process negotiations with rebel groups. Duque, who recently took office, is closely tied with past President Uribe. Duque was able to secure the party’s nomination through Uribe’s endorsement, and both were strong critics of Santos and the peace deal throughout the campaign. It appears that Duque will take Uribe’s hardline no-negotiation approach, which may revive conflict with the FARC and potentially influence other non-state armed groups [i].

The removal of the FARC’s paramilitary presence after sixty years of intra-state conflict has highlighted chronic issues such as high rates of internal displacement, a lack of government presence in rural areas, ubiquitous organized crime, and unequal access to and ownership of resources. This leaves the “peace” in Colombia tenuous. Although Duque is obligated to fulfill certain peace treaty pledges, the funding of said activities is reliant on an economically stressed local tax base for politically unpopular, long term solutions. They key issues outlined below will determine if this “post-conflict” era can endure[ii].

A major challenge is the FARC’s reintegration into society after their demobilisation and subsequent transformation into a political party. After the peace deal was signed, about 2,800 former FARC members have joined or formed insurgencies to fight other criminal groups and the government to illegally obtain natural resources[iii]. A key factor to the sustainability of the government deal is employment and literacy training, as well as psycho-social support, given to ex-combatants in zonas verdales (green zones, which are essentially transition camps) for reintegration purposes. However the zonas have already been implemented improperly due to lack of financing and administrative attention, and Duque will likely further subvert activities and defund many aspects of the plan[iv].

Part of the new president’s popularity was due to his campaign rhetoric that disapproved of Santos’ peace deal, especially its leniency towards past FARC combatants, many of whom have terrorised ordinary Colombians for decades. The FARC not only evaded punishment in the deal, but were also guaranteed seats in Congress. Political posts will go to prior FARC military officials. Ex-FARC members were promised support in the peace deal, though this has not thus far been actualised, leaving the ex-combatants with little government assistance. This carries high risk of recidivism to illegal activities. Though some former fighters receive short-term monthly stipends, lack of access to land or jobs will inhibit societal engagement. Most ex-FARC have already left the zonas with no functional oversight mechanisms to  account for their whereabouts[v].

In absence of the FARC, the Ejército de Liberación Nacional (ELN) remain the largest leftist paramilitary group after decades of conflict, and remain an active threat, having committed large-scale violence within 2018[vi]. After government negotiations stalled under Santos, the group took control of remote areas along the Venezuelan border, displacing people and disrupting local economies[vii]. The Duque administration’s hardline stance on pre-emptive conditions for negotiations may stall them for the foreseeable future, leaving the ELN to destabilize areas that already have decreased government presence. The ELN also participate heavily in Venezuelan illicit economies and are entrenched with Venezuelan politics, which complicates the Colombo-Venezuelan relationship[viii]. With Venezuela’s porous border and current migration crisis, the ELN will likely remain on the strategic backburner for Colombia. Duque’s harsh conditions for negotiations, combined with the ELN’s decentralized nature will likely allow this issue to fester.

Concerns remain that ex-combatants and other opportunists will fill the FARC power vacuum due to lingering societal inequities. While Colombia has scattered major non-state groups, new and smaller criminal gangs perpetuate the same type of violence and crime, mainly in remote, jungle, or otherwise inaccessible terrain[ix]. The peace deal ostensibly addresses this by increasing oversight in rural areas, but this is politically unpopular and expensive.

Regional relations have a large impact on Colombia’s internal conflict. Venezuela and Ecuador harbour paramilitary units and criminal gangs, and deal in illicit economies. Additionally, instability in Venezuela has led to a mass migration, which Colombia may not have the capacity to handle alongside implementation of key peace accord developments. Colombia cannot afford to ignore these relationships if it truly wants to fight illicit trades and transnational crime. Yet, Duque and his ill will toward Caracas may re-suspend Venezuelan relations, complicating cross-border co-operation to dismantle paramilitary groups[x]. 

Internal development hinges on implementation of the post-conflict FARC deal in many ways. The new Duque administration puts the deal at risk, though institutional and state backing of the accord (from regional partners, the EU, the UN Security Council, and more) may keep key actions from subversion. Either way, state consolidation is vital. Through different administrations, the goal has been essentially the same: to have presence in, and the ability to secure, regulate, and tax, all corners of Colombia. Duque’s security strategy is due for release in 2019, and may bridge Santos’ peace deal approaches on development with Uribe’s militaristic expansion. In the meantime however, risks run high of a resurgence of non-state control of the economy, security, and overall control of Colombia.

Sources:

[i] “Risky Business: The Duque Government’s Approach to Peace in Colombia” (Bogotá/Brussels: International Crisis Group, 2018), https://www.crisisgroup.org/latin-america-caribbean/andes/colombia/67-risky-business-duque-governments-approach-peace-colombia.

[ii] “Risky Business: The Duque Government’s Approach to Peace in Colombia.”

[iii] Nicholas Casey and Federico Rios Escobar, “Colombia Struck a Peace Deal With Guerrillas, but Many Return to Arms,” The New York Times, November 1, 2018, sec. World, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/18/world/americas/colombia-farc-peace.html.

[iv] Vanda Felbab-Brown, “Death by Bad Implementation? The Duque Administration and Colombia’s Peace Deal(S),” Brookings Institution, July 24, 2018, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2018/07/24/death-by-bad-implementation-the-duque-administration-and-colombias-peace-deals/.

[v] Vanda Felbab-Brown.

[vi] Shannon Kirby, “FARC Dissidents and the ELN Turn Venezuela Into Criminal Enclave,” InSight Crime (blog), December 10, 2018, https://www.insightcrime.org/news/analysis/farc-dissidents-eln-turn-venezuela-criminal-enclave/.

[vii] June S. Beittel, “Colombia: Background and U.S. Relations” (Congressional Research Service, November 14, 2017), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R43813.pdf.

[viii] Beittel.

[ix] Kelly Grant, “EPL,” InSight Crime (blog), March 9, 2018, https://www.insightcrime.org/colombia-organized-crime-news/epl/.

[x] Kirby, “FARC Dissidents and the ELN Turn Venezuela Into Criminal Enclave.”

America, Cassandra Stimpson, Other

Reform of the French Intelligence Oversight System

French intelligence remains a very secretive world from the public view, and the little presence it occupies in the press or public debate is more often than not one of scandal, abuse or failure. Nevertheless, a wave of reforms is attempting to perfect this system, and in some cases, to create effective intelligence oversight mechanisms.

By Anne Lise Michelot

French intelligence remains a very secretive world from the public view, and the little presence it occupies in the press or public debate is more often than not one of scandal, abuse or failure. In 2008, the government initiated a reform process of the intelligence organisation, and continued in 2015, following the numerous terrorist attacks on the national territory. The result of this long process of reshaping the intelligence community has included attempts at perfecting, and in some cases creating, oversight mechanisms. [1]

These reforms have been the subject of public and parliamentary debates for the past decade, as many politicians, scholars and journalists pointed out the lack of supervision and the relative freedom intelligence agencies enjoyed in performing their activities. Today, the French oversight system comprises a specific institution for each type of control. This diversified/plural system was completed with the creation of a new institution, the Commission Nationale de Contrôle des Techniques de Renseignement, CNCTR (national commission for the control of intelligence techniques) in 2015.

The CNCTR is an independent administrative body in charge of controlling the legality and proportionality of the techniques implemented by intelligence agencies. Its creation was intended to counterbalance the use of modern data collection techniques introduced by the 2015 law, which many critics deemed too intrusive and disrespectful of civil liberties. [2]

Intelligence agencies are required to make requests to be examined by the CNCTR before putting in place a new surveillance technique against a target. The inspection includes the respect of procedures, the technique being justified by the threat and the proportionality of the invasion of privacy. The CNCTR then makes a non-binding recommendation to the Prime Minister, who is in charge of the approval.

Reviews can also be carried out after implementation of the technique, in particular, to ensure that it is not continued without justified motives. This can be done as well upon request of individuals who feel they are the victim of illegal techniques. If the control proves that the use of the technique is unlawful, the Commission can recommend that it be discontinued and the information destroyed. If the recommendation is not followed, it can refer the case to the Conseil d’Etat, who has the power to make these recommendations compulsory.

According to the first report it produced after a year of existence, the Commission can deliver a recommendation within a few hours, or even minutes in case of emergency. From October 2015 to October 2016, it replied to 66 584 requests, of which 1 263 resulted in negative recommendations. All these were followed by the Prime Minister and the techniques were not implemented.

Despite what seem like promising results for a young institution, the effectiveness of the CNTCR can be questioned and certainly leaves room for improvement.

Most of the flaws stem from the access the CNCTR has to the information it needs. The data collected through other techniques than phone tapping is not centralised, forcing the agency’s investigators to travel to local branches across the national territory in order to carry out inspections [3]. With no direct access to the intelligence gathered through modern techniques, the CNTCR is limited to the information intelligence agencies are willing to provide.

With only fifteen agents, the CNCTR is not equipped to undertake such a time-consuming quest. In fact, it might not be sufficiently equipped to process the tremendous amount of requests (66 584 in a year) given all the information it is supposed to look upon each time. When its first annual report declares that some recommendations were delivered within minutes, one might question whether all the facts were properly taken into consideration before it was issued and the quality of such recommendations. [4]

The creation of the CNCTR in 2015 to oversee the usage of intelligence techniques has attempted to bring France up to high democratic standards in terms of intelligence oversight. However, the commission’s limited means hinder its ability to perform fully its duties. And let’s not forget that its recommendations are not binding! These considerations require particular attention now that France has entered the age of mass data collection, with the first IMSI-catchers set up in November 2017 and no additional workforce for the CNCTR in sight. [5] There is still some way to go before fully democratic intelligence oversight is achieved.

Structure of the French oversight system

Sources:

[1] Vadillo F. (2016 January), “Les modalités du contrôle démocratique des services de renseignement : scruter l’état secret”. Après-demain 37, 40-42.

[2] Guiliano C. (2015 March 31). “Jean-Marie Delarue (CNCIS) : "Le projet de loi renseignement n’est pas adapté aux libertés publiques"”. AEF Info.

[3] Chataignier L., Geraud A., Gauthier T. (2017 February 17), “L’Etat de droit à l’épreuve du renseignement : Bilan du premier rapport d’activité de la CNCTR”. La Revue des droits de l’homme, p3.

[4] Rees, M. (2016 December 14). “Renseignement : ce que nous apprend le premier rapport de la CNCTR”. Next Inpact.

[5] Alonso P., Guiton A. (2016 December 13). “Les services qui nous surveillent sont-ils mieux contrôlés ?”. Libération.

Discord of War in Yemen: Is Liberating Hodeidah Strategic?

The liberation of Hodeidah will strategically enhance the UN-led peace process and the global humanitarian response to the world’s largest humanitarian crisis in 100 years, unlike what some western practitioners and researchers from the outside contend. To the Houthis, Hodeidah is a supply artery for survival at best and a negotiation stick at worst. Once liberated they are debilitated militarily, financially and politically favouring Yemen Peace Process and millions of Yemenis in dire need of relief aids.

By Ibrahim Jalal

After the Coalition-backed Joint Forces made rapid military advancements and halted the Houthi supply lines in Yemen’s coastal city on the Red Sea, Hodeidah, through a concerted strategy of port’s encirclement within a 4-km diameter in early November, the Houthis defensively reinforced a strategy of terror, from mine-laying on public roads and in humanitarian facilities to arbitrary destruction [1]. Hassan Zaid, a senior Houthi leader, said on a Twitter post: “The Villains’ dream of controlling the port of Hodeidah and if you managed to, would rebuild it from scratch. Trust that! You will not rejoice victory …  Neither the port nor public and private properties be more precious than the blood of martyrs and Mujahdeen. Let it be Aleppo! [2].” Drawing on these developments, the British Foreign Secretary Jeremy Hunt visited Riyadh and Abu Dhabi on 12th November to de-escalate the offensive and advocated the resumption of UN-led political efforts in Sweden [3]. One day later, Lise Grande – the UN humanitarian coordinator for Yemen – and David Beasley – the Executive Director of the World Food Programme – visited Hodeidah and met with Houthi representatives to discuss the prospects of de-escalation and ceasefire [4]. The situation on the ground is now less intense with continued Houthi violence and the Joint Forces on standby, while Griffiths is seemingly crafting a new peace proposal.

It is, however, worth noting that this is a reoccurring international intervention to hinder the military liberation of Hodeidah based on humanitarian justification while turning a blind eye to the Houthi cruel behaviour for the second time within 5 months.

On 1st July 2018, the Coalition-backed forces de-escalated the military offensive aiming at the restoration of Hodeidah from the Houthi insurgency upon the UN Special Envoy Martin Griffiths’ plea [5]. Chief issues to the Envoy’s requests were a global apprehension of aggravating the considerably alarming humanitarian circumstance and the UN intention to reactivate ‘Yemen Peace Process’ nearly two years after Kuwait II Peace Talks collapsed.

This structural pressure, unsurprisingly, failed to convince the Houthis to either withdraw peacefully from Hodeidah as Griffiths suggested or even partake in ‘Geneva Consultations’ leading to the re-escalation of the Hodeida offensive in late October [6]. Although this cycle of peace-conflict dynamics reveals an articulated tension between hard-headed domestic needs and ambiguous global priorities, this piece argues that the liberation of Hodeidah will strategically enhance the UN-led peace process and the global humanitarian response to the world’s largest humanitarian crisis in 100 years, unlike what some international researchers and practitioners in London, Paris, and Washington advocate.

The UN-led Peace Process and Hodeidah Liberation

In the realm of political efforts, liberating Hodeidah province from the Houthi militia, whether peacefully or militarily, is vital to shifting the existing structure of power at the domestic level. Largely because the Houthis tightened power grip in Sana’a and areas of influence after killing their one-time ally Ali Abdullah Saleh – the Chairman of General People’s Congress and Yemen’s ex-President, they impeded the effective reactivation of peace process [7]. In fact, the Houthis abandoned attending ‘Geneva Consultations’ in September 2018 upon the UN-sponsored de-escalation [8]. Built around premises of status quo and by extension bargaining chips, the ex-Envoy Ould Cheikh condemned the Houthis’ irresponsible behaviour throughout four official rounds of UN-led consultations/talks between 2015 and 2016 in Geneva, Biel, and Kuwait at the Security Council [9].

On the other hand, it is no surprise that the delegation of the internationally legitimate government of President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi attended Geneva Consultations. Yemen’s Minister of Foreign Affairs Khaled Al-Yamani reaffirmed to the international community that they are not advocating war like the Houthis, but rather peace advocates – a sign of continuing goodwill and high commitment to the UN-led peace process [10]. Considering the behaviours of warring parties towards Griffiths’ invite in Geneva, it is highly unlikely that the Houthis will ‘engage constructively’ in the UN-led peace consultations in Sweden without being weakened. A critical military defeat in, or a peaceful retreat from, Hodeidah would suffice to incentivise their desire for peace. Only an imbalance in the present distribution of power will yield a rational interest in peace, and thus a propensity to meaningful peace talks designed around the three references: The Gulf Cooperation Council initiative, the conclusions of the National Dialogue Conference, and UNSCR 2216 (2015).

Strategic Viewpoint of Hodeidah’s Liberation

From a strategic viewpoint, Hodeidah’s port is a primary source of Houthi power; ranging from military and financial capabilities to often undelivered and looted international humanitarian aids. Militarily, the Tehran-backed militia has reportedly received Iranian-manufactured smuggled arms through Houthi-controlled ports, Sayyad-2C ground-to-air missiles, Qiam-1 short-range ballistic missiles and ‘Behine Pardazan Rizmojsanat’ (BP-RMS) tracking systems to name a few [11]. Financially, the Houthis have imposed taxes and tariffs on commercial goods entering through Hodeidah port to financially sustain fighting while controlling the flow of humanitarian aids by their rules [12]. According to Lise Grande, 70 % of all national imports and 90% of food and medical supplies enter through the port of Hodeidah [13]. Upon the Joint Forces’ seizure of the Red Sea Mills miles to Hodeidah on 7th November, a social media post revealed a para-military member with a large supply of grain, roughly 45 thousand tons enough to feed 3.5 million citizens for a month. Due to the proximity of the undistributed humanitarian aid to the base of the Houthis and utility of aids for business purposes in markets it suggests complicity [14]. Therefore, as along as Hodeida’s port and stores of external assistance remain under the control of the Houthis, they will be able to finance war, influence the distribution of aids, and compel the international community on grounds of calculated humanitarian consequences. The Houthis are the biggest impediment to safe and effective delivery of humanitarian aids to millions in Yemen.

By extending the above logic, no one could substantially claim that the international organisations operating in Yemen within Houthi-controlled zones have not functioned the Houthi way. This paradox alludes to two interlinked facts: the Houthis have weakened the humanitarian response on the ground and the international community has helped to sustain the insurgent’s power through reinforcing a global humanitarian discourse on the war in Yemen. In this endeavour, the global forces have systematically overlooked the root causes of the humanitarian crisis in Yemen and enabled the Houthi to play the ‘human insecurities card’ shifting the political nature of the conflict at the international stage to humanitarian per se [15].

Restoring Hodeidah, therefore, will bolster humanitarian and relief efforts to the world’s biggest ‘Houthi-caused’ humanitarian crisis. The Coalition-backed regime must strengthen its internal legitimacy through the delivery of basic services, including the facilitation of international and local humanitarian efforts, should Hodeidah be under their control.

Hodeidah Between Hard Choices: The Way Forward

The battle for Hodeidah has three pathways. First, if the coalition-backed forces won decisively and rapidly, the prospects for a political settlement and effective humanitarian response would enhance sharply. British and American pressures on the coalition-backed forces to halt the offensive suggest that this scenario is the least likely. A second possibility is if a protracted destruction-based win occurred (consistent with the Houthi declaration), the humanitarian situation within Hodeidah, and wider Yemen would reach unthinkable figures [16]. The likelihood of this scenario is greater than the first due to the Houthi brutality, should the offensive continue. Up-to-date evidence includes the Houthi militarisation of a health facility – May 22 Hospital – deploying snipers on the roof, breaching International Humanitarian Law and a sign of civilians’ victimisation [17]. These breaches have discouraged the international community due to the knock-on humanitarian consequences if they destroyed the primary source of national imports: Hodeidah port.

The third scenario is the final dance of the Whitehall-backed envoy. If parties responded positively to systemic pushes of de-escalating violence and unconditional ceasefire, it is highly likely that Griffiths would propose an internationally-monitored withdrawal of military forces, including the ‘Houthi mujahedeen.’ Griffiths might also recommend the establishment of an UN-supervised consensus-based structure to neutralise the security circumstance in Hodeidah. Such an arrangement would ensure the humanitarian efforts continue through Hodeidah’s port. This scenario has greater likelihood to transpire after an expected re-escalation of offensive if the Houthis abide by confidence-building measures, potentially before Sweden round kicks off by the end of this year.

Considering how the international community has embraced the Houthi as an actor, the success of this scenario is highly reliant on whether the Houthis act responsibly, an unobserved pattern in the Houthi conduct. Hodeidah is a stringent test to the UN, success there would increase Griffiths’ prospects and by extension the UN-led peace process in Yemen.

As uncertainties continue to unfold, long-term peacebuilding in Yemen requires high-cost sacrifices in the short-term. Today, Hodeidah is caught between the Houthi terrorism and a global humanitarian failure. The present offensive is constrained, and the Houthi defeat delayed. To the Houthis, Hodeidah is a supply artery for survival at best and a negotiation stick at worst.  Once the port is liberated, they are debilitated militarily, financially and politically favouring the UN-led Yemen Peace Process and millions in dire need of relief aids. It is therefore in London’s interest to allow Hodeidah’s liberation to fulfil the UNSCR 2216 (2015) and enhance Griffiths’ chances to succeed as the third UN envoy [18]. For any envoy to succeed in such a complex mission, a lessons-learnt approach is urgently required to develop a sustainable peacebuilding for Yemen and the wider region.

If Riyadh and Abu Dhabi have made a political decision to liberate Hodeida with strategic support as a part and parcel of an overall strategy, the liberation will enhance the prospects of the UN-led peace process and relief efforts. It will also likely strengthen the status quo of the internationally legitimate government, mobilise public support vis-à-vis the Houthis within Houthi-controlled territories and speed up ‘Yemen Peace Process’ more constructively. That unresolved, Hodeidah could likely become another Aden or Aleppo.

Sources:

[1] Ghobari, M. (2018, November 4). Saudi-backed forces advance towards Yemen's Hodeidah as U.N. warns of famine. Retrieved from Reuters: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-yemen-security/saudi-backed-forces-advance-towards-yemens-hodeidah-as-u-n-warns-of-famine-idUSKCN1N90HC

[2] Zaid, H. (2018, November 12). Twitter. Retrieved from Hassan Zaid: https://twitter.com/zeid_200/status/1062094730979356687?s=19

[3] Arab News. (2018, November 12). King Salman meets British Foreign Minister Jeremy Hunt. Retrieved from Arab News: http://www.arabnews.com/node/1403571/saudi-arabia

[4] Xuequan, M. (2018, November 14). Fighting eases in Yemen's Hodeidah amid visits by UN officials. Retrieved form Xinhua Net: www.xinhuanet.com/english/2018-11/14/c_129993334.htm

[5] Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Yemen. (2018, July 4). Special Envoy's Remarks to the Press at the end of a 3-day visit to Sana'a. Retrieved from OSESGY: https://osesgy.unmissions.org/special-envoys-remarks-press-end-3-day-visit-sanaa

[6] Al Jazeera and News Agencies. (2018, November 9). Yemeni forces, Saudi-led coalition launch 'vast' Hodeidah push. Retrieved from Al Jazeera: https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/11/yemeni-forces-saudi-led-coalition-launch-vast-hodeidah-push-181109133507645.html

[7] Wintour, P. (2017, December 4). Yemen Houthi rebels kill former president Ali Abdullah Saleh. Retrieved from The Guardian: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/dec/04/former-yemen-president-saleh-killed-in-fresh-fighting

[8] UN News. (2018, September 11). Yemen: UN envoy asks Security Council for more support ‘to move back’ to the negotiating table. Retrieved from UN News: https://news.un.org/en/story/2018/09/1019062

[9] Security Council Report. (2018, April). Yemen: April 2018 Monthly Forecast. Retrieved from Security Council Report. Retrieved from Security Council Report: https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/monthly-forecast/2018-04/yemen_33.php?print=true

[10] Nebehay, S. (2018, September 8). Yemen peace talks collapse in Geneva after Houthi no-show. Retrieved from Reuters: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-yemen-security-un/yemen-peace-talks-collapse-in-geneva-after-houthi-no-show-idUSKCN1LO08Z

[11] Nadimi, F., & Knights, M. (2018). Iran's Support to Houthi Air Defenses in Yemen. Washington: The Washington Institute.

[12] Almeida, M. (2018, May 19). Why Hodeidah is a critical chapter of the Yemen war. Retrieved from Arab News: http://www.arabnews.com/node/1305751

[13] Wintour, P. (2018, June 17). UN in advanced talks to take over besieged Yemen port. Retrieved from The Guardian: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/jun/17/un-in-advanced-talks-to-take-over-yemen-port-hodeidah-under-saudi-led-siege

[14] UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. (2018, September 21). Briefing to the Security Council on the Humanitarian Situation in Yemen by the Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator, Mr. Mark Lowcock, 21 September 2018. Retrieved from ReliefWeb: https://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/briefing-security-council-humanitarian-situation-yemen-under-secretary-general; Alkamaly, H. (2018, November 7). Twitter. Retrieved from Hamzah Alkamaly: https://twitter.com/hamzaalkamaly/status/1060255095311527938

[15] Group of International and Regional Eminent Experts on Yemen. (2018, August 28). Yemen: United Nations Experts point to possible war crimes by parties to the conflict. Retrieved from United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner: https://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=23479

[16] Salisbury, P. (2018, September 20). Yemen’s Hodeida Offensive: Once Avoidable, Now Imminent. Retrieved from Crisis Group International: https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/gulf-and-arabian-peninsula/yemen/yemens-hodeida-offensive-once-avoidable-now-imminent

[17] Sanchez, R. (2018, November 08). Houthi fighters 'take up positions on hospital roof' as battle for Hodeidah intensifies. Retrieved from The Telegraph.: https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2018/11/08/yemen-rebel-chief-vows-fight-battle-intensifies-key-port-hunger/

[18] Security Council. (2015, April 14). Security Council Demands End to Yemen Violence, Adopting Resolution 2216 (2015), with Russian Federation Abstaining. Retrieved from UN: https://www.un.org/press/en/2015/sc11859.doc.htm

What is intelligence oversight, and why does it matter?

By definition, the work of intelligence agencies is covert and secret. Intelligence oversight maintains the integrity of the system and the techniques employed by the secret services protecting citizens’ rights to privacy and confidentiality. Although it may seem to restrict the work of intelligence, a clear legal framework increases both intelligence legitimacy and efficiency.

By Anne Lise Michelot

By definition, the work of intelligence agencies is covert and secret. They collect and process information with the purpose of supporting decision-making. Their methods of data gathering (and the data itself) are usually classified as they are of importance to national security. However, despite this necessary high level of secrecy, this does not exempt them from any type of control; for example, the head of a secret service will control the performance of the agency. In a democratic state, other forms of oversight will also be applied to compel agencies to share information regarding their activity with various institutions.

Democratic nations develop systems of oversight to ensure that the use of intelligence methods by various organisations is always carried out while respecting their citizens’ rights to privacy and confidentiality. The intrusive methods used by intelligence agencies to collect information can be exploited to serve the interests of authoritarian regimes, at the expense of human rights. Intelligence oversight maintains the integrity of the system and the techniques employed by the secret services.

According to the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF)[1], an effective oversight and accountability system in a democratic state should have the following characteristics:

– A clear legal framework defining the mission and mandate of intelligence agencies. As mentioned earlier, this ensures that no unlawful use can be made of their abilities. Such framework should also outline the techniques and methods of intelligence collection that are permitted or prohibited, including the conditions in which they can be used.

– The oversight mechanisms should be multiple and diverse, including controls from the executive, judiciary, legislative powers and independent specialised organisms. In order to be effective, these oversight bodies need to be given the adequate means to fulfil their mission. These include independence from political interest, access to relevant classified information and the authority to conduct their investigations. In addition, oversight systems must guarantee the preservation of secrecy, as is needed in the particular field they are controlling.

– Finally, an effective oversight system will provide the possibility for legal recourse should there be abuses to report.

Oversight may seem to be restrictive to the work of intelligence, but in fact, it may be quite the opposite. When provided with a clear legal framework in which to operate, intelligence agencies increase both their legitimacy and efficiency. On the one hand, the law, by defining their work, protects them from abusive political intervention. On the other hand, the oversight system allows for their performance to be measured and earns them the trust of democratic institutions.

Such an argument was made by Jean-Jacques Urvoas, a French socialist deputy who advocated strongly for reforms of the oversight system. According to him, bringing intelligence further under control is beneficial not only to democracy but also to national security and the agencies themselves [2]. By bringing intelligence out of the darkness, public understanding of its benefits can be increased, as opacity and suspicion over this covert field diminish. Moreover, given a legal framework, intelligence agencies will have a stronger voice within the decision-making process and will be given access to more resources, allowing them to increase their capacities to better respond to new threats [3].

Measuring the effectiveness of oversight in reality, as opposed to theory, is not an easy task. While a key component of oversight is transparency, the work of intelligence requires secrecy. Therefore, the organisms performing controls cannot give detailed overviews of their work and their findings. As a result, a more informal, public form of oversight cannot be achieved. Public opinion, through civil society organisations, can hold elected governments and their agencies accountable for their actions and demand for more transparency. This can only be achieved if the public is made aware of their activities.

The peculiar nature of intelligence makes it a difficult state activity to control and keep under check. Yet, a democratic state if it wants to abide to human right standards cannot conduct intelligence activities without a suitable oversight system.

Sources:

[1] Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, “Intelligence Oversight”, SSR Backgrounder Series (Geneva: DCAF, 2017).

[2] Urvoas, J-J (2014 February 4). “Le contrôle parlementaire des services de renseignement, enfin !”. Fondation Jean-Jaurès.

[3] Urvoas J-J, Pascal Lorot (2013/4). “Les enjeux du contrôle et de l'efficacité du renseignement français”. Géoéconomie 67, p34.

When Smarter Is Not Always Safer: the Cybersecurity of the Electric Grid

An increased reliance on electricity combined with new production methods and structural changes in the grid pose new challenges in guaranteeing stable and affordable access to electricity. These structural changes imply the integration of ‘smart’ control systems, which often rely on internet connections. Yet, considering the rapid development of malicious activities in the cyber domain, a smarter grid is not always safer.

By Dorien Van Dam

In 2015, representatives of 196 state parties negotiated the Paris Agreement, whose focal point was to limit global warming to below 2 °C, but preferably below 1.5 °C. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change published a new report in October 2018. This report calls for urgent action to phase out fossil fuels by outlining the disastrous impacts of global warming that could be avoided by limiting global warming to 1.5 °C compared to 2 °C [1]. The need to phase out fossil fuels is well acknowledged, but this transition opens up a whole new range of hurdles to overcome. An increased reliance on electricity combined with new production methods and structural changes in the grid pose new challenges in guaranteeing stable and affordable access to electricity. These structural changes imply the integration of ‘smart’ control systems, which often rely on internet connections. Yet, considering the rapid development of malicious activities in the cyber domain, a smarter grid is not always safer.

Phasing out the use of fossil fuels requires the intensified use of alternative sources of energy. Among the largest sources of renewable energy are wind and solar-power. This production takes place on both the industrial and household levels, for example on large solar farms as well as individual solar panels on rooftops. This development means that electricity is now ‘injected’ in the grid from multiple entry-points: both in the ‘traditional’ top-down direction, as well as in bottom-up processes. However, in the absence of (economically viable) large-scale electricity storage capacity, the grid has to be perfectly balanced at all times: input and output have to be equal. This balancing act becomes increasingly difficult due to several reasons. One is the aforementioned multidirectional injection of electricity into the grid. Another reason is the intermittent production nature of renewable energy sources; solar and wind energy are only produced when the sun shines and the wind blows, and therefore are difficult to regulate.

Properly regulating and balancing the grid requires the collection of large amounts of data about the production and consumption of energy. This is often done through Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition systems (SCADA systems) – these are control systems installed on remote places in the electricity grid. SCADA systems have a dual function. First, they gather data about energy flows and send this data to a central command centre. Second, they execute control commands that they receive from the centre with the purpose of keeping the grid balanced and thus operational [2] [3]. These SCADA systems sometimes referred to as SMART systems (Self-Managing and Reliable Transmission systems), are credited with increasing efficiency and enabling the integration of ‘irregular’ production methods [4]. However, they are also more vulnerable to hackers.

The exchange of data and commands between a SCADA system and the central command centre frequently takes place through an internet connection. Such connections, especially wireless ones, make a system easier to target. Therefore, the risk that external actors gain access to control systems is larger. Subsequently, if a hacker manages to take control and disconnect the system, it can take longer for the grid regulators to regain control because such SCADA systems are often placed in remote locations. By accessing control systems and using this access for disrupting command structures, hackers can disrupt the balance of the grid and ultimately even cause blackouts. This, for example, happened in 2015, when hackers managed to gain access to a remote substation in Ukraine and rendered it inoperable and again in 2016 when Ukrainian Industrial Control systems were hacked [5] [6].

In the context of an increased reliance on electricity, to enable our shift away from fossil fuels, it is safe to conclude that the stable functioning of the electricity grid is of paramount importance. Additionally, the strategy of the European Energy Union heavily relies on the future development of the electricity sector. Integration and standardization of electricity control systems might streamline cross-country energy flows and stimulate the development of a truly interconnected market, but could also render it more vulnerable. If you figure out how to hack one, you know how to hack all of them. Ultimately, we can conclude that a smarter grid is not always a safer grid.

Sources:

[1] Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (2018). Global Warming of 1.5 °C. Retrieved 8 October 2018 at http://www.ipcc.ch/report/sr15/.

[2] Jarmakiewicz, J., Maslanka, K., & Parobczak K., (2015). Evaluation of the Cyber Security Provision System for Critical Infrastructure. Journal of Telecommunications and Information Technology, no. 75, 22-29.

[3] Jarmakiewicz, J., Parobczak, K., & Maślanka, K. (2017). Cybersecurity protection for power grid control infrastructures. International Journal of Critical Infrastructure Protection, 18, 20-33.

[4] Beaulieu et al. (2016). Smart Grids from a Global Perspective: Bringing Old and New Energy Systems. Springer: Switzerland.

[5] Cox, J. (2016). The Malware That Led to the Ukrainian Blackout. Vice Motherboard. Retrieved 8 October 2018 from https://motherboard.vice.com/en_us/article/wnx5yz/the-malware-that-led-to-the-ukrainian-blackout

[6] Imeson, M. (2017). Electricity industry on alert for ‘cyber sabotage’. Financial Times. Retrieved 8 October 2018 from https://www.ft.com/content/1fc89bd8-996c-11e7-8c5c-c8d8fa6961bb.

Nordstream II: it’s business, not personal

“Resistance to Nordstream II comes from all sides. European leaders criticise the increased dependency on Russian gas and internally, the Green Party and other interest groups attempted to block the project for environmental reasons. Poland fears that Northstream II will slowly erode the security dividend of its position as a transit country. German dependency on Polish imports guarantees their support if tensions between Russia and Poland increase.”

By Dorien Van Dam

A potential pipeline between Germany and Russia is causing a European political headache. The construction of the +/- 1,200 km pipeline is a complex international process, requiring cooperation between Russia, Finland, Sweden, Denmark, and Germany. The authority to start construction rests with these countries. At the time of writing, the pipeline has not received Danish formal approval [1]. Poland and Trump are outspoken opponents of the pipeline, citing an increased reliance on Russian imports as a threat [2]. Germany appears to be walking a thin line, so why does Berlin insist on the project?

Pipeline
Nordstream II is a planned gas connector between Germany and Russia via the Baltic Sea. An existing connector, Nordstream I, was finished in 2011, but cannot be used at full capacity. This is due to the Third EU Energy Package, aimed at promoting competition and increasing energy diversification. It intends to prevent overreliance on a single source of gas by limiting imports [3]. Currently, Germany imports a large share of its gas from Russia through third countries such as Poland and Ukraine. Considering the relationship between Poland and Russia, the Gas Wars in Ukraine (2005–06, 2009 and 2014–15), and the annexation of Crimea; Germany, understandably, prefers a direct connection to its source. By securing Germany’s gas supply the country will not become collateral damage or invested in someone else’s conflict. Berlin does not directly perceive import dependency on Russia as a risk, but rather as a part of their aim to become a central energy hub based on exchange and interdependence [4]. In short: this is business, not politics.

… or pipedream?
Resistance to Nordstream II comes from all sides. European leaders criticise the increased dependency on Russian gas and internally, the Green Party and other interest groups attempted to block the project for environmental reasons [5]. Poland fears that Northstream II will slowly erode the security dividend of its position as a transit country. German dependency on Polish imports guarantees their support if tensions between Russia and Poland increase. Without this ‘leverage’ over the Germans, the Polish feel their bargaining position is weakened vis-à-vis Russia. Economically, Poland is concerned about the loss in transit fees and the fear that the construction of Nordstream II will block the harbour entrance in Świnoujście for larger vessels. This would in turn hamper Poland’s diversification of energy supplies through the import of liquefied natural gas [6]. Internally, the project is facing resistance from environmental actors because Nordstream II will affect biodiversity in the Baltic Sea. The pipeline’s opponents have also pointed out that the bottom of the Baltic Sea houses historic ordnance, which are remnants of the Second World War. Old and potentially unstable weaponry combined with the transportation of highly flammable gas is an understandable concern.

No(rd)stream II
Currently, all eyes are on Denmark, who holds the key to the construction of Nordstream II. The European Union is paying very close attention to the project’s development in the light of the European Energy Union objectives. Germany, eager to move forward with the project, will have to convince them that Russian gas is good business and not a geopolitical move away from the Eastern European states.

Sources:

[1] Nordstream 2 (2018). Project Rationale. Accessed 12 July 2018 at

[https://www.nord-stream2.com/project/rationale/].

[2] Georgi Gotev, (2018). “Trump begins NATO summit with Nord Stream 2 attack.”

Euractiv. Accessed 12 July 2018 at

[https://www.euractiv.com/section/energy/news/trump-begins-nato-summit-with-nord-stream-2-attack/].

[3] Tareq Baconi (2017). “Pipelines and Pipedreams: How the EU can support a regional

gas hub in the Eastern Mediterranean.” European Council on Foreign Relations. Accessed

12 July 2018 at

[http://www.ecfr.eu/publications/summary/pipelines_and_pipedreams_how_the_eu_can_support_a_regional_gas_hub_in_7276].

[4] Kacper Szulecki (eds.) (2018). Energy Security in Europe: Divergent Perceptions

and Policy Challenges. Cham, Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan.

[5] Henry Foy et al., (2017). “Gazprom to receive funding for Nord Stream 2 pipeline.”

Financial Times. Accessed 12 July 2018 at

[https://www.ft.com/content/32898bae-28f3-11e7-9ec8-168383da43b7]

[6] Kacper Szulecki (eds.) (2018). Energy Security in Europe: Divergent Perceptions

and Policy Challenges. Cham, Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan.

EU’s role in shaping cyber legislation – Part Two of Three

The European Union´s role as a global cyber power mainly relies on its ability to shape cyber-related legislation and standards of state behavior. This might prove challenging due to its institutional structure and civilian power characteristics. Still, the cyber diplomacy directive adopted by the European Council in December 2015 marks the EU’s more proactive role in international cyberspace policy development.

By Rusudan Zabakhidze

While the European Union (EU) has established itself as a regional cyber security player, it is far from being a global cyber power. With the EU’s defense and security policy still under construction, the EU remains a civilian power that lacks hard power capabilities – both in the “analog” and the “digital” realm.

The EU’s aspiration to become a cyber power has been the result of two developments. The first is the increasing development of EU competences and the second is the blurred distinction between domestic and international agendas. In order to demonstrate unity, the European Council has called for the development and implementation of a common and comprehensive approach to global cyber diplomacy. The Council of the EU [1] also encourages the Union and its Member States ‘to prepare cyber dialogues, avoiding duplication of efforts and taking into account the broader EU political and economic interests, collectively promoted by all EU actors’.

The EU’s role as a global cyber power mainly relies on its ability to shape cyber-related legislation as well as norms and standards of state behavior. This might prove challenging due to its institutional structure and civilian power characteristics. Still, the cyber diplomacy directive adopted by the European Council in December 2015 marks the EU’s more proactive role in international cyberspace policy development [2].

Even though the type of cyber security threats and their sources are more diversified than ever, liberal democracies are failing to respond to them with active measures. Regulating cyberspace is obviously a challenging task, as it requires to bring together diverse actors with various interests. This is where the window of opportunity opens up for the EU. The EU has been relatively successful in bringing together civilian and military stakeholders, as well as centers of excellence, industry, and academia [3]. (More on this in Part 1 of the series: EU Cyber Security Capabilities).

One of the main goals of the EU’s cyber diplomacy is to find international consensus on how to apply existing international law to cyberspace and to develop norms for responsible state behavior. The United Nations Charter does not refer to cybersecurity as by the time it was created, the Internet simply did not exist. The EU supports the idea that the UN Charter should apply to the cyber realm as well. The September 2017 Joint Communication on ‘Resilience, Deterrence and Defense: Building strong cybersecurity for the EU’ endorses the non-binding norms, rules, and principles of responsible state behavior in the field of Information and Telecommunications that have been articulated by the UN Group of Governmental Experts [4].

One of the notable examples that can be analysed to further understand the EU’s ability to influence international norm setting is the General Data Protection Regulation, which gives European citizens more control over the use of their private data. In a United States Senate hearing, Facebook CEO Mark Zuckerberg noted that the European legislation seems fair and suitable to prevent unwelcome interferences and misuse of customer data in the future [5]. Even though the regulation has not become an international standard yet, international discourse commends the EU’s progressive vision regarding data protection. Decreasing the vulnerability of European citizens and companies, in addition to building secured information and communication systems, creates a strong foundation for cyber security deterrence.

The real challenge to develop an effective legislation lies in overcoming the EU bureaucracy against a fast-developing and ever-changing cyber environment. Even though the European Union is yet to become a powerful cyber security actor, its diplomatic efforts to support the application of the international law to cybercrimes have the potential to set international norms and principles of responsible state behavior. Amongst others, the EU has started to influence the global discourse through cooperation with third countries and other regional organisations. The scale, achievements and challenges of this type of cooperation will further be discussed in the final part of the series on the EU Cyber Security Capabilities.

Sources:

[1] Reform of the Cyber Security in Europe. 2017. Council of the European Union. Retrieved on July 27, 2018 from: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/cyber-security/ [2] European Commission. (2017. Digital Single Market. Cybersecurity. Retrieved on July 27, 2018 from: https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/cyber-security [3] European Commission and High Representative of the EU for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. (2013). Cyber Security Strategy of the EU: An Open, Safe and Secure Cyberspace. Retrieved on July 27, 2018 from: https://eeas.europa.eu/archives/docs/policies/eu-cyber-security/cybsec_comm_en.pdf [4] Jaku Bund, Pawlak Patryk. (2017) Minilateralism and norms in . cyberspace. EU Institute for Security Studies. Retrived on Sep 15, 2018 from https://www.iss.europa.eu/sites/default/files/EUISSFiles/Alert%2025%20Cyber%20norms_0.pdf [5] The Washington Post. (2018). Mark Zuckerberg testifies on Capitol Hill (full Senate hearing). Retrieved on July 27, 2018 from: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6ValJMOpt7s

Online Political Microtargeting in the United States

Online political microtargeting is personalised advertising targeting the voters who are on the fence in a campaign, and are thus most susceptible to personalised political advertisements. In the US, microtargeting allows political campaigns to target swing states, which fluctuate between supporting Democrats and Republicans and possess considerable weight in the outcome of an election.

By Agniete Pocyte

‘Political elites do not employ new communication channels with the aim of citizen empowerment, greater democratic deliberation, or any other normative goals’ [1]. The goal of investing in new media communication tools is to win elections.’

Online political microtargeting is personalised advertising which targets voters based on the predictions of an algorithmic model, manipulated from publicly available data and private data [2]. Facebook is the most popular advertising platform as nearly three-quarters of American adults use Facebook, and 44% of the adult population cite it as a part of their news sources [3]. Although Facebook is not the only social media site that functions as a news source, it is by far the largest [4].

Despite the focus on President Trump’s 2016 campaign, George W. Bush made use of similar, albeit less complicated, microtargeting. In 2004, Bush’s presidential campaign bought data on 5.7 million Michigan consumers from Acxiom, one of the world’s largest data brokers, and merged it with their own polling information to categorise Michigan voters into 34 ‘microtargeting segments’ [5]. With this information, the campaign created advertisements and scripted messages targeted at the narrow categories of voters through telephone and direct-mail messages. Mitt Romney’s 2012 US presidential campaign used micro-categories to target undecided voters with advertisements that emphasised different aspects of his campaign. Zac Moffet, the digital director of Mitt Romney’s 2012 presidential campaign stated: ‘two people in the same house could get different messages. Not only will the message change, the type of content will change’ [6].

A microtargeting strategy will rarely target more than a small portion of the voting population. That is because most of the population is either set on voting for a particular candidate or is extremely unlikely to vote. By targeting the voters who are on the fence in a campaign, and are thus most susceptible to personalised political advertisements, microtargeting becomes a cost-effective strategy. Most importantly in the US, microtargeting allows political campaigns to target swing states, which fluctuate between supporting Democrats and Republicans and possess considerable weight in the outcome of an election. Since 1980, the number of contested swing states has dwindled [7]. In 1976, 20 states were won by a margin of less than 5%. This number dropped to 11 states in 2004 and to just 7 states (Florida, Ohio, Virginia, New Hampshire, Wisconsin, Iowa, and Colorado) in 2008. The fact that US presidential elections are fought over ‘relatively small margins in a handful of states sets up conditions for continued importance of fine-grained tactical efforts’ to persuade a select group of voters [8]. That being said, ‘political elites do not employ new communication channels with the aim of citizen empowerment, greater democratic deliberation, or any other normative goals’ [9]. The goal of investing in new media communication tools is to win elections.

Although political microtargeting purports to engage with voters in a more relevant fashion, the threats to individual privacy, the electorate, and democracy outweigh the benefits. American voters do not have adequate control of their data and cannot dictate who uses it. Many organisations, including political campaigns, are under no obligation to protect user’s information privacy and political privacy. Moreover, microtargeting practices suppress certain voter populations and exacerbate the effects of the ‘filter bubble’ by channeling voters into informational silos. Due to the highly personalised nature of the messages in political ads, thousands of variations of the same ad exist to maximise voter receptiveness. Political campaigns do not publish a database of all the ad variations which makes it difficult for journalists and the general public to investigate the honesty of a particular campaign. Third parties including social media companies, data brokers, and data analytic firms, are unregulated and possess a questionable amount of political power if the effects of microtargeting are as extreme as purported by campaign managers. Regulations are difficult to implement due to alleged conflicts with freedoms of speech and expression and the lack of empirical evidence surrounding the effects of microtargeting. Technology has outgrown regulation and it is vital to keep the possible threats of microtargeting in mind not only for policymakers, but the voters as well.

N.B. ‘the ‘filter bubble’ is the intellectual isolation that can occur when websites make use of algorithms to selectively assume the information a user would want to see, and then give information to the user according to this assumption’ [10].

Sources:

[1] Bimber, B. (2014). Digital media in the Obama campaigns of 2008 and 2012: Adaptation to the personalized political communication environment. Journal of Information Technology & Politics, 11(2), p.146.

[2] Gorton, W. A. (2016). Manipulating Citizens: How Political Campaigns’ Use of Behavioral Social Science Harms Democracy. New Political Science, 38(1), 61-80.

[3] Gottfried, J., & Shearer, E. (2016). News Use Across Social Media Platforms 2016. Pew Research Center’s Journalism Project. Retrieved 2 May 2018, from http://www.journalism.org/2016/05/26/news-use-across-social-media-platforms-2016/
[4] Ibid.

[5] Gorton, W. A. (2016). Manipulating Citizens: How Political Campaigns’ Use of Behavioral Social Science Harms Democracy. New Political Science, 38(1), 61-80

[6] Ibid.

[7] Bimber, B. (2014). Digital media in the Obama campaigns of 2008 and 2012: Adaptation to the personalized political communication environment. Journal of Information Technology & Politics, 11(2), p.146.

[8] Ibid, p. 144

[9] Ibid, p146

[10] Techopedia. (2018). What is a Filter Bubble? – Definition from Techopedia. [online]. Available at: https://www.techopedia.com/definition/28556/filter-bubble [Accessed 30 Aug. 2018]

Author’s further reading:

[1] Borgesius, F. J., Moller, J., Kruikemeier, S., Fathaigh, R. Ó., Irion, K., Dobber, T., … & de Vreese, C. (2018). Online Political Microtargeting: Promises and Threats for Democracy. Utrecht L. Rev., 14, 82.

[2] Ienca, M. (2017). Do We Have a Right to Mental Privacy and Cognitive Liberty?. Scientific American Blog Network. Retrieved 2 May 2018, from https://blogs.scientificamerican.com/observations/do-we-have-a-right-to-mental-privacy-and-cognitive-liberty/

[3] Tenove, C., Buffie, J., McKay, S., & Moscrop, D. (2018). How Foreign Actors Use Digital Techniques to Undermine Democracy. Centre for the Study of Democratic Institutions, UBC.

Women’s reproductive health rights and the economic crisis in Venezuela

Venezuela is stuck in a severe economic crisis. Inflation rates are reaching 1,000,000 per cent while GDP is falling by 18 per cent. But the crisis is not simply economic: it has also become a severe health crisis by which women are disproportionately affected. Their fundamental rights to sexual and reproductive health are infringed. As a result, Venezuelan women are forced to take extraordinary measures if they wish to exceed their right to sexual freedom.

By Britta Moormann

The Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela is stuck in a severe economic crisis. The country is experiencing inflation at a rate of 1,000,000 per cent and a falling gross domestic product (GDP) of 18 per cent as determined by the International Monetary Fund (IMF); [1] but the crisis is not simply economic. It has become a severe humanitarian and health crisis by which women are disproportionately affected. Fundamental women’s rights are infringed, primarily their right to sexual and reproductive health and sexual freedom. As a result, Venezuelan women are forced to take extraordinary measures if they wish to exceed their right to sexual freedom.

Sexual and reproductive health is recognized as a decisive pillar of gender equality and empowerment. In 1995, the Beijing Conference established a comprehensive approach to women’s rights. The International Conference on Population and Development (ICPD) is considered a consensus document by over 179 states. The ICPD’s document, just like the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, defines equality of men and women with regards to reproductive rights (in its Article 16(1)(e) as ‘the same rights to decide freely and responsibly on the number and spacing of their children and to have access to the information, education and means to enable them to exercise these rights(.)’[2].

Living a life of sexual freedom includes the positive right to produce new live as well as the negative right not to produce new life to which the accessibility of contraceptives is conditional. In light of the present crisis in Venezuela however, women, as the traditional primary caregivers to their families [3], lack these rights. As a Venezuelan woman very drastically attests in ‘Women of the Venezuelan Chaos’*: ‘Us women always suffer, and for everything. To give birth and to stop giving birth! To stop giving birth! To stop giving birth. My God. Like if we were cows or something.’ [4].

Contemporarily, deciding to give birth as a Venezuelan women means facing potentially life-threatening conditions. Deciding to live out sexual freedom means facing extraordinary economic challenges and health risks. 87 per cent of the Venezuelan households attest to living under conditions of food insecurity, following a mono diet within which man consume 15 different types of food and women consume only 12 different types of food [5]. The extreme food insecurity is exemplified by the fact that 9 out of 10 Venezuelans is unable to pay for its daily nutrients and 6 out of 10 Venezuelans lost around 11 kg during the last year due to the continuous situation of hunger [6].

The majority of families adopted a diet consisting of less diverse food products and a lesser amount of food in general. One family requires at least 51 average salaries to cover basic costs of alimentation [7]. Additionally, the access to and level of medical treatment has worsened strongly. Doctors and medical staff are working under war-like conditions, with 76 percent of hospitals experiencing shortages of medical supplies, of those hospitals among 81 percent lack surgical materials and 70 percent complain of intermittent water supply [8]. Many pregnant women cross the border to Colombia to reach the city of Cucuta to receive medical treatment, as pre-natal check-ups become a rarity in Venezuelan hospitals.

Since 2015, 14,000 Venezuelan patients have received medical treatment in the main hospital of Cucuta. Among the most vulnerable patients are children (suffering from skin diseases, diarrhoea or respiratory problems) and women (mainly due to malnutrition and with only few pre-natal check-ups). The Colombian hospital gives an aspiration of survival to Venezuelan women; a hope of not succumbing to the high maternal mortality rate of 65 per cent [9].

The reality of food shortages persists after child birth. Prices for dairy milk have risen 266,7 percent and the prices of diapers 71,4 percent in 2016 alone [10]. According to UNHCR around 2,3 million Venezuelans have migrated to neighbouring South American countries since 2015, the majority of which are living in irregular situations of non-documentation. Among the main reasons why Venezuelans continue to leave the Republic is the continuing economic and food insecurity, access to medical treatment or essential social services, and physical integrity [11]. Whilst a group of Latin American nations agrees on giving assistance particularly to Venezuelan migrants, Venezuelan President Maduro dismisses migration related figures as incorrect and fights grounds for pre-emptive justification of potential foreign intervention in Venezuelan affairs [12].

By means to secure contraceptives, Venezuelan women face disproportionate economic challenges. The price of condoms escalated to around $169 USD for three condoms on the black market, which equals a five-day salary. Safe sex has become a luxury only a minority of the Venezuelan population is able to afford. Subsequently, a higher number of patients suffer sexually transmitted diseases [14]. Moreover, the fear of getting pregnant is the main reason why more women see an obligation to medical sterilisation or clandestine abortions. In some hospitals, 30 sterilizations a week have been practiced during the course of 2017 to extraordinary cost. Irrespective of the continuing health deterioration, the Venezuelan government perceives its health systems as one of the world’s best. Official health statistics remain unpublished nonetheless [15].

President Maduro denies the reality of a humanitarian crisis politically and continues to follow an antagonistic position towards reproductive health care. Stipends are offered to pregnant women for new born children where maternity culturally is a considerable fate. Contrarily, free sterilization days are offered in public hospitals with rising tendency of patients [16]. Non-governmental organizations criticise the disproportionate risks women take in order to live out their rights to sexual and reproductive health. If both carrying a child and taking measures not to get pregnant is directly linked to taking either disproportionate economic or physical risks, women are exposed to unequal conditions of exercising fundamental human rights.

* A movie portraying the life of five women under the extremity of the Venezuelan crisis, made by filmmaker Margarita Cardenas and presented at the Human Rights Watch’s Film Festival in New York.

Sources:

[1] Friesen, Garth. 2018. “The Path To Hyperinflation: What Happened To Venezuela?”. Forbes. https://www.forbes.com/sites/garthfriesen/2018/08/07/the-path-to-hyperinflation-what-happened-to-venezuela/#7bc8884a15e4.

[2] UN. 1998. Rights to Sexual and Reproductive Health – the ICPD Convention and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women. [ONLINE] http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/csw/shalev.htm.

[3] Taraciuk Broner, Tamara. 2018. “Mujeres del caos venezolano”. La Vanguardia. https://www.lavanguardia.com/internacional/20180529/443912937067/mujeres-caos-venezolano-venezuela.html.

[4] Marillier, Lou. 2018. “Lacking Birth Control Options, Desperate Venezuelan Women Turn To Sterilization And Illegal Abortion”. The Intercept. https://theintercept.com/2018/06/10/venezuela-crisis-sterilization-women-abortion/.

[5] AVESA, CEPAZ, FREYA, Mujeres en Línea. 2017. Mujeres Al Límite. El peso de la emergencia humanitarian: vulneración de derechos humanos de las mujeres en Venezuela. [ONLINE] https://avesawordpress.files.wordpress.com/2017/11/mujeres-al-limite.pdf, p. 14.

[6] ENCOVI. 2017. Encuesta Nacional de Condiciones de Vida. Venezuela 2017. Alimentactión I. [ONLINE] https://www.ucab.edu.ve/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/2018/02/ENCOVI-Alimentación-2017.pdf.

[7] Caritas Venezuela. 2018. Monitorio de la Situación Nutricional en Niños menores de 5 años. [ONLINE] http://caritasvenezuela.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/6to-Boletin-SAMAN-Enero-Marzo-2018.pdf.

[8] Watts, Jonathan. 2016. “’Like doctors in a war’: inside Venezuela’s healthcare crisis”. The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/oct/19/venezuela-crisis-hospitals-shortages-barcelona-caracas.

[9] Moloney, Anastasia. 2018. “As Venezuela’s health system crumbles, pregnant women flee to Colombia”. Reuters. https://uk.reuters.com/article/colombia-migrants-health/feature-as-venezuelas-health-system-crumbles-pregnant-women-flee-to-colombia-idUKL5N1T34JJ.

[10] AVESA et al., p. 11.

[11] UNHCR. 2018. Venezuela Situation. Fact Sheet. [ONLINE] https://data2.unhcr.org/en/documents/download/64428, p. 3.

[12] Valencia, Alexandra. 2018. “Venezuela’s neighbours seek aid to grapple with migration crisis”. Reuters. https://af.reuters.com/article/worldNews/idAFKCN1LK2T0.

[13] UNFPA, The Danish Institute for Human Rights, The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights. 2014. Reproductive Rights are Human Rights. A Handbook for National Human Rights Institutions. [ONLINE] p. 18. https://www.unfpa.org/publications/reproductive-rights-are-human-rights.

[14] Wright, Emily. 2016. “Safe Sex Is a Luxury in Venezuela, Where a Pack of Condoms Costs Nearly $200.” Broadly. https://broadly.vice.com/en_us/article/bmwqy4/safe-sex-is-a-luxury-in-venezuela-where-a-pack-of-condoms-costs-nearly-200.

[15] Ulmer, Alexandra. 2016. “In crisis-hit Venezuela young women seek sterilisation”. Reuters The Wider Image. https://widerimage.reuters.com/story/in-crisis-hit-venezuela-young-women-seek-sterilization.

[16] See Reference 4.

The Chinese Swarming Programme – Part Three of Three

The People Liberation Army has recognised the potential of swarm technology to disrupt the current order; the low cost of swarming technology means that it could be used for saturation assaults on a high-value target by simply overwhelming the current defensive systems.

By Caitlin Irvine

When discussing the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) developments in swarm technology it is first important to lay out their strategy. The PLA has recognised the potential of swarm technology to disrupt the current order; the low cost of swarming technology means that it could be used for saturation assaults on a high-value target by simply overwhelming the current defensive systems [1]. The Chinese military, therefore, intends to use this technological advancement as a force multiplier. According to the PLA, unmanned weapons systems are central to future operations in all domains of warfare [2]. Political commentators have speculated that swarming technology could be deployed by China in contentious areas such as the South China Sea [3]. The unmanned nature leaves the party coming into contact with the swarm having to decide whether or not a flyover is an act of aggression, simply reconnaissance, or human error. The secrecy surrounding Chinese military operations resulted in only two clear examples of swarming being discovered; the demonstration at Guangzhou Air Show in 2017 and a simulated reconnaissance mission.

The simulated reconnaissance mission tested an entire group of drones – incorporated with swarming technology – carrying out a variety of missions [4]. Unspecified portions of the flight were performed autonomously whilst still acting as a swarm. Feng and Clover highlight that Beijing therefore thinks ‘swarms of drones will become a weapon of the future’ [5]. It is clear that this technology – and autonomous weapons systems more generally – are an area of debate with severe implications for future warfare.

The PLA aims to harness ‘military-civil fusion to enable future military applications’ by integrating military and civilian developments [6]. A success in the civilian arena rapidly transfers over to the military dimension [7]. In 2017, at the Guangzhou Air Show, a swarm of 1,108 quadcopters displayed the results of Chinese civil-military cooperation [8]. Not only did these drones illustrate synchronised flight but they also showed ‘independent thought’ [9]. During the performance at least three drones fell out of the swarm for an unpublished technical reason. However, when they failed to complete their delegated tasks each drone executed their  individual landings. Drone swarms have previously been compared to an American football team – the swarm runs set plays and the operator oversees the network [10]. But in this demonstration the drones have also shown independent self-repair capabilities; the communication connection from the drones to the hive-like mind was re-established during flight [11]. This self-repairing function therefore demonstrates the potential for these systems to have decision-making capabilities outside of the operator’s direct control. This is a developing technology, still in the early stages, but the PLA is committed to investing in drone swarms for the long-term future.

Drone swarms represent a disruption in the strategic status quo of warfare. In this three-part mini-series, three main points about the consequences of swarming technology have been made. The low entry cost relative to conventional munitions could make these systems commonplace. As a weapon, drone swarms place the onus of differentiation on those being attacked. The advantages for unconventional theatres, such as urban terrain, make these systems attractive to militaries around the world. In both the American and Chinese examples, investment in swarming technology has been seen from both civil and military entities. Within the narrative surrounding drone swarms, it appears that the main use of such systems will be reconnaissance. But, it is their ability to also host attack capabilities is what makes them particularly terrifying. It appears that drone swarms have less political opposition in comparison to Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems, or ‘Killer Robots’ as they are more popularly known, yet mark a clear point in the path towards such autonomous technologies [12]. 

Sources:

[1] Kania, E (2017) ‘Swarms at war: Chinese advances in Swarm Intelligence’, The Jamestown Foundation: China Brief, Vol 17, Issue 9, p 13

[2] Ibid.

[3] Wise, D (2017) ‘Chinese Drone Swarms Could Overwhelm US at Sea’, The Cipher Brief [online] available at: https://www.thecipherbrief.com/chinese-drone-swarms-overwhelm-u-s-sea accessed on 16th April 2017

[4] Trevthick, J (2018) ‘China Is Hard At Work Developing Swarms Of Small Drones With Big Military Applications’, The Warzone [online] available at: http://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/17698/chinas-is-hard-at-work-developing-swarms-of-small-drones-on-multiple-levels accessed on 19th April 2018

[5] Feng, E and Clover, C (2017) ‘Drone swarms vs conventional arms: China’s military debate’, The Financial Times [online] available at: https://www.ft.com/content/302fc14a-66ef-11e7-8526-7b38dcaef614 accessed on 16th April 2017

[6] Kania, E (2017) ‘Swarms at war: Chinese advances in Swarm Intelligence’, The Jamestown Foundation: China Brief, Vol 17, Issue 9, p15

[7] Laskai, L (2018) ‘Civil-Military Fusion and the PLA’s Pursuit of Dominance in Emerging Technologies’ [online], The Jamestown Foundation: The China Brief, Vol 18, Issue 6, availible at: https://jamestown.org/program/civil-military-fusion-and-the-plas-pursuit-of-dominance-in-emerging-technologies/

[8] Romaniuk, SN and Burgers, T (2018) ‘China’s Swarms of Smart Drones Have Enormous Military Potential’, The Diplomat [online] available at: https://thediplomat.com/2018/02/chinas-swarms-of-smart-drones-have-enormous-military-potential/ Accessed on 16th April 2018

[9] Ibid.

[10] Department of Defence (2017) ‘Department of Defence Announces Successful Micro-Drone Demonstration’, Department of Defence, Press release number NR-008-17, 9th January [online] available at: https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Releases/News-Release-View/Article/1044811/department-of-defense-announces-successful-micro-drone-demonstration/ accessed on 19th April 2018

[11] Romaniuk, SN and Burgers, T (2018) ‘China’s Swarms of Smart Drones Have Enormous Military Potential’, The Diplomat [online] available at: https://thediplomat.com/2018/02/chinas-swarms-of-smart-drones-have-enormous-military-potential/ Accessed on 16th April 2018

[12] Docherty, B (2012) ‘Losing Humanity: The Case against Killer Robots’, Human Rights Watch Report