More is Not Always Better: Intelligence Lessons from the Search for Osama bin Laden

‘We’re now in an age in which our primary adversary is easy to kill, he’s just very hard to find’ - Michael V. Hayden, Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (2007)[1]

by Ricardo Ehe

When US President Donald Trump announced on the 27th of October 2019 the death of the leader of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi, one might have been reminded of the search for and killing of another central figure in Islamic terrorism: Al-Qaeda founder and former leader Osama bin Laden (OBL). Similar to Baghdadi today, the bin Laden case had extensive (western) media coverage on the US raid itself but put less emphasis on the preceding intelligence efforts to find him in the first place. While all the details of the Baghdadi case are still to be revealed, the bin Laden case shows in hindsight the centrality of intelligence analysis. Analysing the search for OBL in more detail gives insight into what the intelligence community is generally capable of. This following provides a short overview and analysis of the lesson learned in one of the most central intelligence operations of the 21st century.

 Summary

After the US’ decision to invade Afghanistan in its declared ‘Global War on Terror’, one specific objective was to capture or kill OBL. Three months after 9/11 this objective became achievable when the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) indicated that OBL’s location was likely to be Tora Bora, a cave complex near the Pakistani border in eastern Afghanistan which also served as al-Qaeda’s headquarters.[2] In early December 2001, as the US approached and fought at Tora Bora, OBL was able to escape through the mountains into Pakistan. According to the Abbottabad Commission Report, OBL went to various places across Pakistan before he ultimately moved with some of his wives and children into the ‘custom-built compound’ in Abbottabad in 2005.[3]

In the beginning, analysts were divided on the question of whether he was hiding in a rural, cave-like compound in the mountains or in a safe-house within an urban environment. A game changer in the first phase of the search was to shift the key question from ‘where is bin Laden?’ to ‘how does he communicate?’. Through various sources, the CIA was able to verify that OBL was using a single, trusted, personal courier to communicate with the outside world and did not use any kind of electronic communication device. Ultimately, through an intercepted phone call, the courier was located in north-western Pakistan which later led the CIA to the compound in Abbottabad. From then on, the challenge was to verify whether OBL was actually there or not. Until right before the raid, the presence of OBL at the Abbottabad compound remained an ‘educated guess’ and could not be undoubtedly confirmed.[4] Eventually, Operation Neptune Spear with the aim to capture or kill OBL was successful. Under the direction of the CIA, a Navy Seals Team entered the Abbottabad compound and killed OBL on 2nd May 2011.[5] 

Lesson learned

When Barack Obama became the US President in 2009, he made the bin Laden search the CIA’s number one priority for fighting al-Qaeda. But even before that the US was not hesitant to commit ‘money, technology and ingenuity to the problem’.[6] After OBL’s escape from Tora Bora, CIA’s Counterterrorism Center increased their personnel from 340 to 1,500, utilised various computer systems, and offered a bounty of twenty-five million dollars.[7] With this in mind it becomes clear that the US was not lacking the political will to deploy any resources available and considering that the CIA is one of the world’s most sophisticated intelligence agencies, their assets were extensive. However, as Dahl points out, simply throwing money at a problem does not necessarily lead to success. The fact that the CIA was not able to find OBL for almost a decade shows that even ‘the best technology, the most money, and the most-brilliant thinking is not always enough’.[8]

This lesson can be drawn from two important findings of the bin Laden search. First, it can be deduced from the attempt to ‘flood the zone’ in Operation Cannonball. When in 2006 the CIA was still clueless about the location of OBL, they decided to send a significant amount of personnel into Afghanistan and Pakistan. The underlying notion clearly followed the logic of ‘the more the better’. A logic that originates from traditional Cold War tactics which was, for instance, applied in the Korean War when the CIA sent 200 officers into the country in an attempt to produce high amounts of human intelligence. As most commentators agree, Operation Cannonball provided only very limited clues on OBL’s whereabouts.[9] Instead, ‘the more agents the CIA deployed to Afghanistan and Pakistan, the more leads were generated and the more wild goose chases resulted’.[10] Considering that OBL was CIA’s top priority, every single lead had to be tracked down even though it did not result in any beneficial outcomes.[11]

Second, this lesson can be similarly deduced from the attempt to verify OBL’s presence in the compound after it was located in Abbottabad. US intelligence agencies (most notably the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency) applied all technical means in their arsenal to confirm the target. However, since the compound had no internet connection or telephone line, their success was limited.[12]

The takeaway from this lesson is certainly not to say that the high prioritisation of the bin Laden search and the resources deployed were overvalued, rather, it relates to the intelligence strategy itself. As Deniston suggests, sometimes you have to follow ‘parallel search tracks’ or apply strategies independent of their starting point.[13] In a scenario where traditional tradecraft does not result in the aspired goal, it is the variation that can make a difference. It is important to emphasise, as mentioned before, that more assets can also lead to negative results, as the overload of input can increase noise and is likely to obscure a clear view in a sea of information. 

 Sources

[1] Michael V. Hayden, ‘A Conversation with Michael V. Hayden’ (Council on Foreign Relations, 9 July 2007), https://www.cfr.org/event/conversation-michael-v-hayden-0.

[2] Peter Bergen, ‘The Account of How We Nearly Caught Osama Bin Laden in 2001’, The New Republic, 30 December 2009, https://newrepublic.com/article/72086/the-battle-tora-bora.

[3] Doug Stanglin, ‘Leaked Pakistan Report Details Bin Laden’s Secret Life’, usatoday, 7 August 2013, https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2013/07/08/pakistan-commission-osama-bin-laden-al-jazeera-leaked-report/2498565/.

[4] Erik J. Dahl, ‘Finding Bin Laden: Lessons for a New American Way of Intelligence’, Political Science Quarterly 129, no. 2 (26 June 2014): 179–210, https://doi.org/10.1002/polq.12183, 191.

[5] Schmidle, Nicholas. ‘Getting Bin Laden’, 1 August 2011. https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2011/08/08/getting-bin-laden.

[6] Dahl, ‘Finding Bin Laden’, 183.

[7] Ibid.

[8] Ibid., 205.

[9] Ibid., 185.

[10] Ibid., 201.

[11] Ibid., 183.

[12] ‘Osama Bin Laden Killed: Phonecall by Courier Led US to Their Target’, 3 May 2011, sec. World, https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/pakistan/8489078/Osama-bin-Laden-killed-phonecall-by-courier-led-US-to-their-target.html.

Emergency Management as a Security Discipline

Emergency Management is a sub-discipline of security relying heavily on planning and co-ordination. Effective emergency management leverages resources during natural disasters and other crises to ensure human security both domestically and internationally. Analysing this field at the United States’ municipal and state-levels allows us to examine the varying command structures and assess how the government ensures its citizenry and critical infrastructure during major incidents.

By Caitlyn Roth and Casey Cannon

The Emergency Management field in the United States (US) holds a unique position in its national security apparatus. Emergency Management (EM) is dissimilar from the more prominent security fields in that its agencies do not contain intelligence divisions, enforcement arms, nor do they ensure national defence. However, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) is positioned within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and is responsible for ‘reducing the loss of life and property and protecting American institutions from all hazards by leading and supporting the nation in a comprehensive, risk-based emergency management program of mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery’ (1). Based on this definition, emergency management would fall into the Human Security school of security theory. Like other security fields within the US, Emergency Management agencies vary to some degree in each state and generally feature a FEMA division responsible for their region, a state Emergency Operation Center (EOC) and municipal emergency management agencies that are tasked with coordinating response between agencies during crises. At each level of government, these agencies have different protocols and Incident Command Structures (ICS) that dictate operations in anticipation of, during, and after major incidents (2). This paper will evaluate two cases: the July 2019 New York City (NYC) power outage, and Hurricane Irma, which hit Florida in 2017. The responses to these incidents will be examined to analyse the ways in which emergency management operations differ on opposite corners of the country and through the lens of two different levels of government. The evaluation of the (NYC) power outage will focus on the response by the NYC agencies and how co-ordination played an essential role during the outage. The Hurricane Irma case will assess how the government at the state-level organises and responds to a major hurricane. These instances will provide an overview of the EM field, and how geography and levels of government influence EM coordinated responses.

New York City Blackout 

On July 13th of 2019, a power outage struck New York City, leaving more than 70,000 residents and critical infrastructure, such as traffic lights, without power (3). Significant power outages such as this pose substantial risk to the citizens living in the affected area. Blackouts can present challenges to public health, medical services, transportation, hospitals, emergency services, as well as several other areas. To co-ordinate incidents that require a multi-agency response, NYC relies on a management structure called the City Incident Management System (CIMS), which defines the strategy and agency roles during an emergency from the start of the incident until stability is restored (4). In the case of a significant blackout, NYC’s power utility provider, Con Edison, is responsible for restoring power and identifying the cause of the blackout. In an outage of this scale, however, other agencies would necessarily be involved. The city’s first priority is to ensure the safety of people that might be endangered by a loss of power. In this instance, the New York Fire Department (FDNY) was dispatched to buildings to rescue individuals trapped in elevators; the Metropolitan Transit Authority (MTA) was responsible for assessing the impact on the subways and addressing risk posed to passengers; the New York Police Department (NYPD) was tasked with, among other things, responding to vulnerable populations (defined as adults over 65 and residents who require assistance with daily activities that rely on electrical power) (5)(6). 

CIMS recognises that a multi-agency response of this scope requires significant co-ordination. In such instances, New York City Emergency Management (NYCEM), an agency that is specifically tasked with managing and providing support in anticipation of and during crises, serves as the Co-ordinating Element. NYCEM is responsible for ensuring that the CIMS command structure is in place and facilitating interagency coordination. In an incident like a power outage, NYCEM would be in consistent contact with Con Edison to get updates on the scope of the outage and estimated time to restoration while updating other agencies, including the mayor's office (7). To facilitate seamless connectivity between agencies, NYCEM has liaisons in nearly every NYC agency and direct lines to gather information and update stakeholders. NYCEM also has a substantial cache of resources and teams of emergency responders available for dispatch. During an incident like a blackout, clear and timely communication is essential to preventing panic and the spread of misinformation. Throughout such instances, NYCEM will put out regular communication through its NotifyNYC program and Twitter account. As the incident unfolded, the NYCEM Twitter account tweeted and retweeted several dozens of messages that provided updates on the outage and affected areas. In this instance, there was public concern that the outage might have been caused by a malicious actor as part of a cyber-attack. Consistent messaging, however, confirmed that the blackout was in fact due to a faulted 13,000-volt distribution cable that relay systems failed to isolate. The fault shut down power to a large portion of the Upper-West Side of Manhattan (8). If the incident were to become so large in scope that the city became unable to manage the crisis, the state and federal emergency management structures can step in and provide support. Fortunately, in this instance, the inter-agency co-ordination structure executed its function and power was restored later that evening with no significant injuries reported. The July power outage demonstrated the essential function that CIMS plays in multi-agency co-ordination during major incidents.

Hurricane Irma

On September 10th, 2017, Hurricane Irma was upgraded to a Category Four hurricane just prior to making landfall on Cudjoe Key, 20 miles north of Key West, Florida. The Florida Keys, a 356 kilometer archipelago at the southernmost part of the State of Florida, received approximately 30 centimeters (cm) of rainfall, and experienced a storm surge of over three meters (9). The average elevation of the lower keys, where Cudjoe Key is located, only sits one metre above sea level (10).  With maximum sustained winds in the Atlantic Basin recorded at 298 kilometres per hour (kph) for 37 hours at its peak, Hurricane Irma was named the strongest hurricane ever observed, according to an analysis by the National Weather Service (11). The hurricane also held seven trillion watts of energy, or twice the amount of energy than that of all bombs reportedly used during World War II. The force of this storm was so powerful that earthquake seismometers recorded it (12). The death toll, encompassing the moment Irma first made landfall on the Leeward Islands in the northeast of the Caribbean, to the storm’s end over South Carolina, reached 134, with 94 casualties recorded in the United States (13).

Hurricane Irma posed an immense risk to the critical infrastructure and residents of Monroe County, which is vulnerable to extreme weather events due to its position in the Atlantic Basin, therefore, disaster mitigation plans were crafted to be extensive and highly organised. Florida’s Division of Emergency Management (FDEM), which reports directly to the Executive Office of the Governor of Florida, is tasked with maintaining a comprehensive statewide emergency management program. Within FDEM, the State Emergency Response Team (SERT) co-ordinates the efforts of the federal government with other departments and agencies of the state, county, and municipal governments, as well as school boards and private agencies having a role in emergency management. Under SERT, all state agency personnel are trained and equipped to work in collaboration during an emergency and to combine resources to provide streamlined and effective disaster mitigation to victims in Florida. Just prior to the storm, an executive order (17-235) by Governor Rick Scott, set limitations and rules for disaster mitigation, and provided a comprehensive framework to lead reaction and response efforts (14). Among the most important aspects of Executive Order 17-235 were provisions for directing all state, regional, and local governmental agencies to identify necessary personnel to assist in meeting the needs created by this emergency. It further suspended any statute, rule, or order that would prevent, hinder, or delay any mitigation, response, or recovery action necessary to cope with the disaster. Additionally, the Adjutant General of Florida was ordered to activate the Florida National Guard, and the Florida Department of Transportation (FDOT) was ordered to waive the collection of toll road fees and other charges used for major public highways to assist in efficient evacuation processes. They also reversed the flow of traffic as necessary, closed roads to facilitate gasoline deliveries and emergency response personnel, and waived size and weight restrictions for vehicles transporting other emergency equipment (15). The FDEM director was designated as the State Co-ordinating Officer for the duration of the emergency and was tasked with executing the the state’s comprehensive emergency management plan. 

As in the case of the 2019 New York City blackout, accurate and timely communication was considered paramount in anticipation of Irma. Misinformation and panic can spread quickly, therefore FDEM and SERT set up 24 hour call centers at the Florida Emergency Operations Center in Tallahassee, staffed with volunteers who could assist people affected by the storm. Additionally, SERT maintained a constant presence on social media, primarily through its Twitter account to disseminate accurate information in real time to Floridians. Both Governor Rick Scott and the FDEM director made a point to bolster communications via regular updates on all major news broadcasts. 

A state of emergency was declared four days before the storm made landfall that covered all 67 Florida counties, and Keys residents were placed under a mandatory phased evacuation due to the fact that there is only one road out of the archipelago (16). This was to ensure a safe and speedy exit and prevent major traffic congestion. In total, 6.5 million people within the state evacuated and 77,000 people sought refuge in hurricane shelters (17). When the storm passed, entrance to the Keys was restricted to emergency personnel and equipment only to begin the initial response process. FDOT was tasked with ensuring the entire overseas highway and its 41 bridges were structurally sound and critical infrastructure had not been washed away (18). The Coast Guard assisted in recovery efforts as well as general policing to reduce looting concerns, and a curfew was put into place restricting movement overnight. Residents were permitted to enter on a scheduled basis with vehicle permits once the highway was deemed safe for travel, but only during specific times. Each vehicle had to be cleared at a checkpoint by the Monroe County Sheriff’s office prior to being granted entry. In total, once adjusted for inflation, Hurricane Irma’s path of destruction cost $50 billion, making it the fifth costliest hurricane on record. Presently, Monroe County has the nation’s highest building standards to mitigate effects from these powerful storms, and the damage caused by Irma could have been significantly worse in a low lying coastal area like the Keys, as there is currently no structure in Monroe County built to withstand the 298 kph winds Irma generated in the Atlantic Basin (19).  

Conclusion

The EM field relies on after-action reports to identify lessons learned and apply them to future disasters. The wide range of stakeholders, both public and private, that may be involved in this process underscores the essential role of an EM agency in co-ordinating responses to these crises. The NYC blackout and Hurricane Irma response efforts demonstrated the importance of the EM offices, but also how emergencies are managed at differing levels of government in different parts of the country. Specific EM agencies, however, are not unique to the US, as the European Union offers the Emergency Response Coordination Centre (ERCC) and the United Nations (UN) contains the UN Disaster Assessment and Coordination (UNDAC), to name but two (20). Threats such as climate change will continue to call upon creative and effective institutions and decision-makers prepared to learn and adapt to developments in the threat landscape. This reality will call for continued investment in planning, personnel, and infrastructure to address the breadth of security threats in this emerging field.

Sources:

1. Witt, J ‘Federal Emergency Management Agency Mission Statement’ https://govinfo.library.unt.edu/npr/library/nprrpt/annrpt/vp-rpt96/appendix/fema.html

2. ‘NEW YORK STATE COMPREHENSIVE EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT PLAN: Volume 3’ http://www.dhses.ny.gov/planning/cemp/documents/NYS-CEMP-Vol3.pdf

3. Barron ,J & Zaveri, M ‘Power Restored to Manhattan’s West Side After Major Blackout’ New York Times

4. Citywide Incident Management System (2017)

5. Bauman, Ali ‘NYC Blackout: Cause Of Massive Manhattan Outage Under Investigation’ New York CBS local: https://newyork.cbslocal.com/2019/07/14/new-york-city-power-outage-cause/

6. Hames, E et al, ‘A GIS Approach to Identifying Socially and Medically Vulnerable Older Adult Populations in South Florida’ (2017) Link: https://academic.oup.com/gerontologist/article/57/6/1133/2632031

7. Citywide Incident Management System (2017)

8. Frehse, R & Romine, T ‘Preliminary report shows faulty relay protection system caused NYC power outage’ CNN https://edition.cnn.com/2019/07/15/us/new-york-city-power-outage-con-edison/index.html

9. Amadeo, Kimberly. (2019) ‘Hurricane Irma Facts, Damage, and Costs’ The Balance: https://www.thebalance.com/hurricane-irma-facts-timeline-damage-costs-4150395

10. Gastesi, R. (2019) ‘Green Keys! A Plan to Create a Sustainable Florida Keys’ Sustainable Action Plan: http://greenkeys.info/intro-policy-outreach/

11. National Weather Service. ‘Detailed Meteorological Summary on Hurricane Irma’ Hurricane Irma Synopsis: https://www.weather.gov/tae/Irma_technical_summary

12. Amadeo, Kimberly. (2019) ‘Hurricane Irma Facts, Damage, and Costs’ The Balance: https://www.thebalance.com/hurricane-irma-facts-timeline-damage-costs-4150395

13. Tropical Weather (2019). ‘Hurricane Irma Facts’:https://www.thebalance.com/hurricane-irma-facts-timeline-damage-costs-4150395

14. Executive Office of the Governor (2017). ‘Executive Order Number 17-235: Emergency Management- Hurricane Irma’: https://www.flgov.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/SLG-BIZHUB17090402490.pdf

15. IBID

16. Monroe County Emergency Management (2017). ‘Evacuation Information’:https://www2.monroecounty.gov/oem

17. Amadeo, Kimberly. (2019) ‘Hurricane Irma Facts, Damage, and Costs’ The Balance: https://www.thebalance.com/hurricane-irma-facts-timeline-damage-costs-4150395

18. Goodhue, David (2017). “No automatic re-entry post-irma, county says’ Florida Keys News: https://www.flkeysnews.com/news/local/article172306727.html

19. Amadeo, Kimberly. (2019) ‘Hurricane Irma Facts, Damage, and Costs’ The Balance:https://www.thebalance.com/hurricane-irma-facts-timeline-damage-costs-4150395

20. United Nations Disaster Assessment and Coordination - UNDAC Field Handbook (2018) https://www.unocha.org/sites/unocha/files/1823826E_web_pages.pdf

The Internet as an Extension of Colonialism

Globally digital technologies and the Internet have been increasingly normalised seeing Western states dominate cyberspace and technological developments. As such, questions have arisen regarding the prominence of Western bias at both the developmental and implementational level leading to negative implications for non-Western users. This article draws upon the concept of digital colonialism seeking to address the potential emergence of colonial attitudes towards integration and usage of digital technologies and the Internet. 

by Heather McDonald

The use of technology across the world has increased rapidly in recent decades resulting in a reshaping of how individuals and states interact, function, and develop. As such, our world is now heavily interconnected and sees digital technologies impacting nations’ ability to thrive politically, socially, and economically.1 The spread of digital technologies has been met with the belief that technological innovation could help liberate and progress the countries of the African continent to ‘catch them up’ with the West. However, the Internet and digital technologies, such as mobile phones, and the process of colonialism can be understood as historically intertwined2 as both have been developed and implemented with Western states and organisations as the driving forces at play. Meaning, globally we have seen the integration and dependency of the Internet and digital technologies spread from the West and imposed on other states, the African continent in particular. These technologies spread often through the likes of government sponsored charity initiatives like ‘Computers 4 Africa’, a United Kingdom based charity who provides schools in African nations with computer supplies. Or through the likes of ‘Free Basics’, a mobile app developed by Facebook allowing users to access a small selection of websites that can be viewed without paying for mobile data,3 which was heavily criticised for encouraging users to pay for digital technologies but also due to the fact the websites offered were majority in English rather than the native language of the country. However, it must be acknowledged that colonialism as a term is situational and  often sees blanketed use to describe the experiences of many different individuals and countries4 and so, as with colonialism, each African country will have a different experience with digital technologies.

The Digital Divide and Digital Colonialism  

From the normalisation of digital technologies across the globe, has stemmed a ‘digital divide’, understood as “the unequal access to and usage of new technology”5. This has seen those in poverty across Western states disadvantaged, but also throughout the global spectrum, less affluent countries are also struggling. Unlike other forms of technology, the Internet provides African nations the ability to interact on an international platform with the rest of the world,  overcoming the previous barriers that have hindered the continent 6. However,  digital technologies and the realm of cyberspace came late to the African continent, largely due to the aftermath of colonialism and the countries focusing on state-building7. Nevertheless, this  delay in progress has not meant digital technologies and the Internet have not progressed at all within African nations, as highlighted through the use of mobile phones and social media in the Arab Spring or in Nigeria where their Nollywood industry has been exported to large Western media streaming sites.   

However, due to the origins, implementation and development of digital technologies and the Internet, cyberspace and cyberculture have arguably become a product of the West. Cyberculture, the way in which people perform online, can at times be perceived as a reflection of Western morality and perceptions of ‘right and wrong’. This mimics behaviours deemed desirable in Western culture, which historically was carried out on a global scale through the process of colonialism8. The sub-Saharan region of Africa has been described as ‘a technological desert’9 and, similar to previous technological revolutions, this process began in the West and was then imposed upon the less developed regions of the world. 

This digital divide has seen the development of digital colonialism, which addresses the multitude of issues that have come from the Westernisation of the Internet but also the enforcement of digital technologies towards less developed countries across the African region. The digital divide arguably goes further than being about those who simply do not have access to digital technologies and the Internet10, rather the digital divide addresses the lack of access to the international markets, increased security threats, and cultural norms that have been brought by the West to the African continent. Digital technologies and the Internet have been reflective of colonial tendencies through the fact that Western states, in an attempt to ‘help’ countries across Africa, have steered them towards the adoption of digital technologies11 and encouraged a dependency on them despite providing only a small handful of benefits such as access to international markets.  This situation is reminiscent of colonial times when Western states approached African countries in an attempt to ‘fix’ or ‘democratise’ their governments,  we may be seeing a modern day equivalent through the deployment of digital technologies to the continent12. 

Digital Native

From this digital divide and digital colonialism, the concept of ‘digital native’ has evolved into the notion that those who are born with access to the Internet and are, in turn, socialized by it are those most likely to thrive online 13. Often during colonial times, the people across the African continent were seen as subservient individuals 14 who were to follow the rules put out by Colonisers.  Through digital colonialism, individuals across the African continent have been subservient to the colonial nature of cyberspace and the ways digital technologies have been spread. Many issues similar to those present during the colonial peak have re-emerged for individuals across Africa in regards to a lack of agency and individual freedom.  Many African people have gained access to these technologies but not the freedom to develop content such as web pages or social media platforms in their own way15. Digital natives have much more power16 and therefore use this to create their own space with their own norms, shaping their online world according to their own outlook. This power dynamic sees the formation of an ‘othering’ concept,17 deeming digital natives the desirable norm and non-natives as needing to be assimilated. Consequently this dynamic is reflective of the types of power dynamics the African continent saw during the colonial period which does not take into consideration the cultural and spatial differences across the continent18. This ‘othering’ of individuals online based on their technological interaction creates a binary ideology of those who are not ‘native’ to the online world.   

Business in Cyberspace 

Finally, cyberspace and the Internet can be viewed as an extension of colonialism in regards to the business world.  The BBC reports that as the Internet spreads across the African continent, more businesses are moving online and reaching a larger market19. Cyberspace has the ability to deconstruct the pre-existed physical borders that put constraints on businesses or governments to trade in the international market therefore providing economic benefits for countries across Africa. However, the countries of the continent that have really benefited from this movement towards cyber activities are those with stable and strong economies and telecommunication systems already in place20. New digital technologies create an environment where “missionaries declare the scriptures” 21 due to the fact that these digital technologies have been beneficial to the societies and environments they were created in and where the developers and users often assume all experiences will then be the same. Simply because digital technologies have revolutionised the business world of the West by providing platforms for smaller business, encouraging e-commerce, and digital banking, does not mean that this is the same for countries across Africa. 

Conclusion

The role of digital technologies across the African continent have minced and furthered patterns that were prevalent during the colonial period. Digital technologies across the African continent have produced an environment where colonialism is able to occur simply on a new platform and in a new manner. While the African continent are not merely passive bystanders in this situation, the issue does not entirely lie with them. Rather it is the mindset of Western states and companies regarding African countries that has furthered this problematic situation. Until the digital divide is breached allowing the African continent to develop their own responses to digital technologies and operate in cyberspace on their own terms, these patterns reflecting colonial prejudice and technological bias may prevail.

Sources:

1. Igun, S.E. (2011). Bridging of Digital Divide in Africa. International Journal of Information and Communication Technology Education, 7(1), pp.11-20.

2. Jandrić, P. & Kuzmanić, A, 2016, ‘Digital Postcolonialism’, IADIS International Journal on WWW/Internet, available at: http://www.iadisportal.org/ijwi/papers/2015131203.pdf

3. Solon, O. (2017). 'It's digital colonialism': how Facebook's free internet service has failed its users. [online] the Guardian. Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2017/jul/27/facebook-free-basics-developing-markets [Accessed 1 Dec. 2019].

4. Bayart, J. and Ellis, S., 2000, ‘Africa in the world: a history of extraversion’, African Affairs, 99(395), pp.217-267.

5. Fuchs, C. and Horak, E. (2008). Africa and the digital divide. Telematics and Informatics, 25(2), pp.99-116.

6. Hillard, R.L., 2002, Getting Ready for Cyberspace and The Structure of Cyberspace. In Hilliard, R.L. and Robins, M. (Eds), Beyond boundaries (pp1-17) and (pp19-26) Portsmouth (N.H.): Greenwood.

7. Hillard, R.L., 2002, Getting Ready for Cyberspace and The Structure of Cyberspace. In Hilliard, R.L. and Robins, M. (Eds), Beyond boundaries (pp1-17) and (pp19-26) Portsmouth (N.H.): Greenwood.

8. Langmia, K., 2016. Globalization and Cyberculture An Afrocentric Perspective, Springer International Publishing, Cham

9. Mbarika, V., Jensen, M. and Meso, P. (2002). Cyberspace across sub-Saharan Africa. Communications of the ACM, 45(12).

10. Fuchs, C. and Horak, E. (2008). Africa and the digital divide. Telematics and Informatics, 25(2), pp.99-116.

11. Jandrić, P. & Kuzmanić, A, 2016, ‘Digital Postcolonialism’, IADIS International Journal on WWW/Internet, available at: http://www.iadisportal.org/ijwi/papers/2015131203.pdf

12. Langmia, K., 2016. Globalization and Cyberculture An Afrocentric Perspective, Springer International Publishing, Cham

13. Brown, C. and Czerniewicz, L. (2010). Debunking the ‘digital native’: beyond digital apartheid, towards digital democracy. Journal of Computer Assisted Learning, 26(5), pp.357-369.

14. Langmia, K., 2016. Globalization and Cyberculture An Afrocentric Perspective, Springer International Publishing, Cham

15. Igun, S.E. (2011). Bridging of Digital Divide in Africa. International Journal of Information and Communication Technology Education, 7(1), pp.11-20.

16. Jandrić, P. & Kuzmanić, A, 2016, ‘Digital Postcolonialism’, IADIS International Journal on WWW/Internet, available at: http://www.iadisportal.org/ijwi/papers/2015131203.pdf

17. Brown, C. and Czerniewicz, L. (2010). Debunking the ‘digital native’: beyond digital apartheid, towards digital democracy. Journal of Computer Assisted Learning, 26(5), pp.357-369.

18. Tickner, A., 2003, ‘Seeing IR Differently: Notes from the Third World’, Millennium: Journal of International Studies, 32(2), pp.295-324.

19. BBC News. (2015). Cyber-crime: Africa's 'next big threat'. [online] Available at: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-34830724 [Accessed 1 dec. 2019]

20. Hillard, R.L., 2002, Getting Ready for Cyberspace and The Structure of Cyberspace. In Hilliard, R.L. and Robins, M. (Eds), Beyond boundaries (pp1-17) and (pp19-26) Portsmouth (N.H.): Greenwood.

21. Haywood, T. 1998, Global Networks and the Myth of Equality: trickle down or trickle away. In Loader, B.D. (Ed), Cyberspace divide equality, agency, and policy in the information society (pp. 19-35), London ; New York: Routledge.

Violence Against Indigenous Women in Canada: Does it Matter if it is Called Genocide?

Sexist and racist policies and practices in Canada have created an environment inimical to the health, safety, and wellbeing of Indigenous women and girls. In light of the finding of the National Inquiry into Missing and Murdered Indigenous Women and girls that the treatment of Indigenous women in Canada amounts to genocide, this piece examines the importance of labeling this issue ‘genocide’ and why this finding has garnered some resistance in Canada. 

By Leilani Roy-Wright

In June of 2019, Canada’s National Inquiry into Missing and Murdered Indigenous Women and Girls (The Inquiry) published its Final Report. The Inquiry concluded that the violence perpetrated against Indigenous women and girls in Canada amounts to genocide.1 It collaborated with a team of legal experts and lawyers to publish a separate report specifically on their findings related to genocide. The conclusion was detailed and based on a meticulous understanding of relevant law.2 The Inquiry’s mandate was to examine and report on all forms of violence against Indigenous women, girls, and 2SLGBTQQIA (Two-Spirit, lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, queer, questioning, intersex and asexual) people. The Inquiry process included truth gathering through a series of hearings as well as research, collaborations with experts and community knowledge keepers, and forensic investigations into police records.3 The Final Report revealed widespread violence and demonstrated that the factors leading to individual acts of violence are the direct result of colonial policies.4 Examination is required into the idea that Indigenous women in Canada have been the victims of genocide as it is presented in The Inquiry’s reports on Missing and Murdered Indigenous Women and Girls (MMIWG) and the implications of calling, or not calling, this violence a genocide. 

Many Indigenous communities in Canada grieve the murder or disappearance of a community member. In 2014, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) recorded at least 1,181 cases of MMIWG spanning the previous three decades.5 The Inquiry reported that Indigenous women have a greater chance of being killed by strangers or acquaintances, seven times more likely to be targeted by a serial killer, and sixteen times more likely than Caucasian Canadian women to be murdered.6 Additionally, Indigenous women and girls make up the majority of people who are trafficked in Canada.7

Despite pressure from Indigenous families and activists, previous Canadian governments have primarily ignored the issue, insisting that murders and disappearances were simply individual criminal acts.8  They failed to acknowledge that the issue lay not only in the commission of the crimes but also in the failure of government and law enforcement to react effectively to prevent and respond to cases involving Indigenous women.9 An example of such a failure was the murder of Helen Betty Osborne who was physically assaulted and brutally murdered after being forced into a car with four men and driven out of town.10 In the Aboriginal Justice Inquiry of Manitoba which investigated the case, RCMP officers stated that ‘they were aware of white youths cruising the town attempting to pick up Aboriginal girls for drinking parties and for sex. The RCMP told the Inquiry that it was not their practice to stop the cars to discover if the girls were of age or in the car willingly.’11 This statement suggests a decided lack of concern for the safety of Indigenous girls. 

In response to The Inquiry’s findings, Andrew Scheer, leader of the Official Opposition, stated that though it is tragic, he does not see it as genocide.12 Scheer’s statement brings up important questions about why this violence constitutes genocide according to The Inquiry. It would be hard to claim that these events are not tragic, but how they constitute genocide is more complicated because in most cases the crimes were not committed by the Canadian state directly or officially endorsed by it. 

The Inquiry argues that the Canadian government and law enforcement have failed to effectively protect Indigenous women and girls from violence. This was clear in the case of fifteen-year old Tina Fontaine, whose body was found in a river after she was murdered.13 The Canadian government had repeatedly interfered with her family and community’s ability to raise her but had not upheld their responsibility to care for her as a ward of the state.14 Nothing was done when she informed a child-welfare worker that she was spending time with a sixty-two year old methadone drug user, though it should be noted that the same man was later acquitted of her murder.15 Additionally, the Native Women’s Association of Canada found that ‘“only 54% of murder cases involving Aboriginal women and girls ha[d] led to charges of homicide,” compared with the national rate of 84%.’16 

One impediment to investigations and the laying of charges has been the fact indigenous women often face prejudicial assumptions that they are involved in sex-work.17 A minority of MMIWG and two spirit people have actually been demonstrated to be sex workers.18 Even so, ‘[b]oth the denial of sex workers’ worth and human dignity and the assumption of Indigenous women’s sexual availability and engagement in sex work are highly problematic.’19 The framing of Indigenous women as deserving of violence because of their assumed promiscuity ignores perpetrators and instead blames victims.20 Additionally, this narrative attributes Indigenous women’s presence in sex work to the women themselves, ignoring the racism and socio-economic strife that often push Indigenous women into sex work.21 Some Indigenous victims reported having their victim statements discredited by police at the time of recording them due to their race, mental health status, or engagement in substance use or sex work at the time of the crime.22 Law enforcement officers have at times contributed to the problem by themselves physically or sexually assaulting victims. In response, many have faced little or no legal action, and some never investigated.23

Participants in the Inquiry’s Truth Gathering Process indicated that the violence against Indigenous women, girls, and 2SLGBTQQIA people comes as a direct result of colonialism and accompanying government policies in Canada. The Residential School System and the ‘Sixties Scoop’ saw families ripped apart, children being deprived of their culture, and being physically and sexually abused, shamed, and neglected. These policies left trauma and wounds in the form of poverty, substance abuse, and violence.24 Overt racism from settler Canadians, paired with sexism, have created an environment that is often hostile towards Indigenous women, girls, and 2SLGBTQQIA people. They are at the apex of a dangerous intersection of two systems of oppression.25 While the Inquiry is a good first step, much remains to be done if Canada is to effectively remedy the wrongs that are described in The Inquiry’s reports.   It is important to consider the way that this issue is framed. In June, Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau stated that he accepted the findings of The Inquiry (though he prefers the term cultural genocide).26 However, since June, Trudeau’s party has gone from having a majority to a minority government. With Andrew Scheer at the helm of Canada’s Official Opposition, it seems that the Prime Minister may encounter some opposition if he wishes to implement concrete action based on the Inquiry’s findings. If Canada continues in its past habits of seeing the murders and disappearances of Indigenous women through the lens of individual, rather than systematic, events, will it be able to combat the issue effectively? Does looking at this violence  as genocidal action allow for better and more meaningful responses to be crafted and implemented? Could looking at these crimes as a human security issue give the issue more status among Canadian politicians who may care less for gender and race issues than they do for security issues? These questions may prove to be important ones for Canadians and their government to ask in order to assess how to move toward remedying past wrongs and creating meaningful change within Canadian politics and society.

Sources

1. National Inquiry into Missing and Murdered Indigenous Women and Girls (2019) Reclaiming Power and Place: Executive Summary of the Final Report, p. 4.

2. National Inquiry into Missing and Murdered Indigenous Women and Girls (2019) A Legal Analysis of Genocide: Supplementary Report of the Inquiry into Missing and Murdered Indigenous Women and Girls, p. 1-33.

3. National Inquiry into Missing and Murdered Indigenous Women and Girls (2015) ‘Our Mandate, Our Mission, Our Vision,’ [online] available from https://www.mmiwg-ffada.ca/mandate/ , accessed on 7th September 2019.

4. National Inquiry into Missing and Murdered Indigenous Women and Girls (2019) Reclaiming Power and Place: The Final Report of the National Inquiry into Missing and Murdered Indigenous Women and Girls Volume 1a, p. 54.

5. Smiley, C (2016) ‘A Long Road Behind Us, a Long Road Ahead: Towards an Indigenous Feminist National Inquiry,’ Canadian Journal of Women and the Law, Vol. 28, No. 2, pp. 309.

6. Ibid.

7. Ibid.

8. Saramo, S (2016) ‘Unsettling Spaces: Grassroots Responses to Canada’s Missing and Murdered Indigenous Women During the Harper Government Years,’ Comparative American Studies An International Journal, Vol. 14, No. 3-4, pp. 208.

9. National Inquiry into Missing and Murdered Indigenous Women and Girls, ‘Reclaiming Power and Place: Executive Summary of the Final Report,’ p. 39-40.

10. Eberts, M (2014) ‘Knowing and unknowing: Settler reflections on missing and murdered indigenous women,’ Saskatchewan Law Review, Vol. 77, No. 1, pp. 82-83.

11. Ibid.

12. Tasker, J (2019) ‘It is 'its own thing': Andrew Scheer disagrees with Indigenous inquiry's genocide finding,’ CBC News, 10th June.

13. Malone, K (2019) ‘“Nothing has changed:” Tina Fontaine's body pulled from river five years ago,’ CBC News, 16th August.

14. Scribe, M (2017)‘Pedagogy of Indifference: State Responses to Violence Against Indigenous Girls,’ Canadian Woman Studies, Vol. 32, No. 1-2, pp. 47, 55.

15. Malone, 2019.

16. Saramo, p. 208.

17. Ibid., p. 213.

18. Ibid., p. 213-214.

19. Ibid.

20. Smiley, p. 310.

21. Razack, S (2016) ‘Sexualized violence and colonialism: Reflections on the inquiry into missing and murdered indigenous women,’ Canadian Journal of Women and the Law, Vol. 28, No. 2, pp. ii.

22. National Inquiry into Missing and Murdered Indigenous Women and Girls, ‘Reclaiming Power and Place: The Final Report of the National Inquiry into Missing and Murdered Indigenous Women and Girls Volume 1b,’ p. 153.

23. Palmater, P (2016) ‘Shining Light on the Dark Places: Addressing Police Racism and Sexualized Violence against Indigenous Women and Girls in the National Inquiry,’ Canadian Journal of Women and the Law, Vol. 28, No. 2, pp. 276-277.

24. National Inquiry into Missing and Murdered Indigenous Women and Girls, ‘Reclaiming Power and Place: The Final Report of the National Inquiry into Missing and Murdered Indigenous Women and Girls Volume 1a,’ p. 113.

25. Ibid. p.104.

26. Tasker, J (2019) ‘It is 'its own thing': Andrew Scheer disagrees with Indigenous inquiry's genocide finding,’ CBC News, 10th June.

North-Eastern Syria: Lasting Peace Unlikely as Instability and Conflict Is Set to Increase

Russia and Turkey’s deal halted the Turkish-led operation in North-Eastern Syria and avoided direct confrontation between Turkey and Syrian forces. The situation remains tenuous, however, as lasting peace settlements between all sides remains a distant prospect. The continuing presence of Turkish-backed rebels in former SDF areas along with a worsening humanitarian crisis will gradually destabilise the area, making conflict likely to resume.

by Keir Watt

On the 6th of October 2019, U.S. President Donald Trump suddenly announced the withdrawal of U.S. forces from areas held by the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in North-Eastern Syria. The move cleared the way for the Turkish-led OPERATION PEACE SPRING against the SDF, which had served as a key U.S. partner in the coalition against the Islamic State (I.S.). 

Within weeks of the announcement, Russia brokered a deal with Turkey which halted their advance and ended the heavy fighting while leaving the SDF precariously reliant on the Syrian government. The deal brought temporary peace to the region, but the Turkish operation has already sowed the seeds of further violence which will hamper lasting peace in the future.

The operation began on October 9th when the Turkish military and their allies the Syrian National Army (SNA) invaded SDF controlled territory along Syria’s north-eastern border with Turkey. Turkey attacked the SDF because the Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG) are the largest of the various groups within the SDF and exert overall control.[i]

The YPG is an affiliate of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), which has been engaged in armed conflict with Turkey since 1984 and is considered a terrorist group by NATO and the European Union. Turkey vowed never to allow the YPG to establish an enclave in Syria which it fears would support the PKK in Turkey. Turkey’s attack has been anticipated since Donald Trump agreed the U.S. would withdraw in December 2018.

On the 17th of October, the U.S. brokered a ceasefire which ended the intense fighting. Shortly after, Presidents Putin and Erdogan agreed to a deal to halt the Turkish advance. It required the SDF to withdraw from a 30km deep ‘safe zone’ along the Syrian-Turkish border whilst Russian and Syrian government forces took over former SDF positions.[ii]

Syrian government forces had already begun to deploy to SDF areas as they quickly agreed to cooperate against the Turkish offensive, but the deal brings Syrian President Bashar al- Assad closer to finally controlling the SDF territories which constitute almost a third of Syria as a whole.

Turning to Assad was simply the best way for the SDF to avoid being defeated by the Turks. The SDF had no effective way of resisting the Turkish offensive without U.S. support, anti-tank and anti-aircraft weapons, and after the U.S. convinced them to dismantle their northern defences to placate Turkish concerns last year. The YPG and SDF have been coordinating with the Assad regime since their substantial victories in 2015.[iii] Moreover, the swift and well-coordinated deployment of regime forces to support SDF positions suggests the two had already planned for a Turkish invasion.

The Turkish operation has brought the Assad regime and the SDF closer together, but the fate of the YPG remains very uncertain. Arab leaders within the SDF such as Sheikh Humaydi Daham al-Hadi, leader of the Shammar tribe, have been discussing peace settlements with Assad for months,[iv] which probably led to the cooperation against the Turkish operation. However, YPG negotiations with the Syrian government have failed whilst their Arab partners’ have progressed; suggesting they could be left isolated as the rest of the SDF join with Assad.

At the same time, the future of the YPG will be impacted by any cooperation between Turkey and Syria. A year ago, Russia suggested the Adana Agreement (1998) could be a path for cooperation between Syria and Turkey. Under the agreement Syria expelled the PKK and ended their presence in Syria until the civil war in 2011. President Erdogan’s recent comments that Turkey will “allow no place for the YPG in Syria’s future” suggests it would still form the basis of cooperation.[v] Such an agreement would suit both parties and be disastrous for the YPG. 

However, the Assad regime remains in talks with the YPG. Unlike the PKK in the 1990s, the YPG’s strong military force means a political settlement is preferable to the Assad regime rather than years of more fighting. Making the expulsion of the YPG an unlikely policy of the Assad regime. 

The Assad regime would also demand Turkey withdraw all its forces from Syria as part of any deal. And while Turkey may be willing to withdraw its military, removing the SNA rebels would be significantly harder.

The SNA is an amalgamation of mostly Turkman and Arab militias which previously formed the Turkish-backed free Syrian Army and the National Liberation Front. These groups were unified under the ‘SNA’ just weeks before OPERATION PEACE SPRING began and frequently clashed in the past. This patchwork of rival groups is likely to destabilize as they establish territory, making it difficult for Ankara to exert the same control as when the operation started.

The SNA groups will also be extremely unwilling to leave now that they control territory and Ankara is unlikely to settle them in Turkey. Ankara would either abandon SNA militias which do not withdraw or incorporate their demands into a deal with Syria; making a final settlement with Assad very difficult.

Meanwhile, the ceasefire brought by Russia’s deal is unlikely to hold before a final peace agreement can be reached. The SNA’s hostility to Kurdish and Christian communities is being condemned as ethnic cleansing as communities are forcibly displaced.[vi] Creating a situation the SDF will struggle to tolerate, as they watch their communities and former territory thrown into chaos. The possibility of SDF retribution also increases as more reports surface of SNA war crimes committed during the Turkish-led offensive in October.[vii] 

Arab contingents within the SDF are also deeply opposed to Wahhabi groups in their territory. Which raises another source of conflict as the SNA have been widely accused of containing Jihadi elements. They were also reported to have recruited former I.S. fighters during the Turkish-led operation in Afrin last year.[viii] If SNA militias begin to assert Wahhabi doctrines upon the local populace hostilities will inevitably erupt. 

At the same time, there is a growing humanitarian crisis in the area caused by the disruption of essential services and the displacement of hundreds of thousands of civilians.[ix]. This crisis will grow in scale and intensity as winter arrives, bringing harsher conditions and reduced food supplies.  

Whilst all sides struggle to agree amongst themselves, they will inevitably fail to manage the humanitarian crisis effectively. Which will further destabilise the area and bring both sides closer to conflict. Russia and Turkey have advertised their deal as a big success, but in reality it has only temporarily halted the conflict. Sources of conflict and instability continue to fester, making a lasting deal more imperative but increasingly hard to achieve.

Sources:

[i] Barfi, B., 2016. Ascent of the PYD and the SDF. The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Research Notes, 32 [online]. Available at: https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/uploads/Documents/pubs/ResearchNote32-Barfi.pdf. [accessed 4 November 2019].p.3.

[ii] Turkey Syria offensive: Erdogan and Putin strike deal over Kurds. 2019. BBC [online]. Available at: https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-50138121.[Accessed 23/10/2019].

[iii] Barfi, B., 2016. Ascent of the PYD and the SDF. The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Research Notes, 32 [online]. Available at: https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/uploads/Documents/pubs/ResearchNote32-Barfi.pdf. [accessed 4 November 2019], pp.5-7.

[iv] Zaman, A., 2019. Syria’s Kurds increasingly isolated as Arab tribes cut deals with regime. Al Monitor [online]. Available at: https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2019/03/syria-kurds-isolated-arab-tribes-deals-damascus.html.

[v] Erdogan quoted in. Zontur, E.C., 2019. Turkey says YPG/PKK has no role in the future of Syria. AA [online]. Available at: https://www.aa.com.tr/en/middle-east/turkey-says-ypg-pkk-has-no-role-in-future-of-syria/1622247. [accessed 4 November 2019].

[vi] OCHA Syria Flash Update #5: Humanitarian impact of the military operation in northeastern Syria 14 October 2019. 2019. OCHA [online]. Available at: https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/ocha_syria_flash_update_5_nes_14_octoberfinal.pdf.[Accessed 21/10/2019].

[vii] Higgins, E., 2019. Video Evidence Sheds Light on Executions Near Turkey-Syria Border. Bellingcat [online]. Available at: https://www.bellingcat.com/news/mena/2019/10/31/video-evidence-sheds-light-on-executions-near-turkey-syria-border/. [accessed 4 November 2019]; Chulov, M., Rasool, M., 2019. Kurdish politician among nine civilians shot dead by pro-Turkey forces in Syria. 2019. Guardian [online]. Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/oct/13/female-kurdish-politician-among-nine-civilians-killed-by-pro-turkey-forces-in-syria-observers-say. [Accessed 21/10/2019]; Seligman, L., 2019. Turkish Proxies Appear to Be Using White Phosphorus in Syria. 2019. Foreign Policy [online]. Available at: https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/10/17/turkish-proxies-chemical-weapons-syria-kurds/. [Accessed 21/10/2019].

[viii] Cockburn, P., 2019. Turkey accused of recruiting ex-Isis fighters in their thousands to attack Kurds in Syria. Independent [online]. Available at: https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/turkey-isis-afrin-syria-kurds-free-syrian-army-jihadi-video-fighters-recruits-a8199166.html. [accessed 4 November 2019].

[ix] UNHCR. Hundreds of thousands in harm’s way in northern Syria. UNHCR [online]. Available at: https://www.unhcr.org/news/press/2019/10/5d9f10eb4/hundreds-thousands-harms-way-northern-syria.html. [accessed 4 November 2019].[x] Photo: Specialist Arnada Jones U.S. Combined Joint Task Force.https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Combined_Joint_U.S.,_Turkey_Patrols.jpg.

Current Challenges to Peacebuilding and Statebuilding in Kosovo

Twenty years after the Kosovo War, which left a scenery of destruction behind, and eleven years after the country’s declaration of independence, the challenges posed to Kosovo are far from solved. The ongoing processes of peacebuilding and statebuilding have had countless positive results for the region, yet have so far been unable to grant Kosovo real legitimacy either internally or externally. Kosovo has reached a deadlock.

by Mariana Garrido

Twenty years ago, Kosovo was victimised by a series of bloody events. First, Former Yugoslavian President Slobodan Milošević’s campaign of stigmatisation and aggression against the Kosovan Albanians culminated in acts of ‘ethnic cleansing and tendencies for genocidal acts’.1 Second, the actions of Kosovo’s Liberation Army (a seperatist militia founded in 1996) which, despite its role in resisting the Serbian aggressions, also committed many atrocities against civilians.2 And third, NATO’s 11-week air intervention against Serbia, which failed to minimize civilian casualties, caused a whole scenery of destruction.3

Today, years after its unilateral proclamation of independence, Kosovo remains a puzzle. Over the past two decades the region has been developing processes of peacebuilding and statebuilding. Though this has mainly been under the supervision of the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo and the parallel European Union mission, EUlex, Kosovo has nevertheless facilitated a growing autonomy.4 Yet, the lack of agreement in regards to what happened during the conflict, the geopolitical interest of certain great powers in the region, the remaining ethnic-religious tensions, and the issues of legitimacy faced by the country at the external and internal levels are putting Kosovo’s peacebuilding and statebuilding processes in a deadlock.

Many of the challenges now encountered by Kosovo mirror the causes of the conflict and/or how it developed. The Kosovo War did not happen solely because of ethnic-religious tensions, but rather as a result of geopolitical and geo-economic interests in place.5 NATO’s intervention occurred without prior authorisation from the UN, making it an illegal aggression against a sovereign state.6 7 Kosovo was the perfect opportunity for NATO, after the fall of the Soviet Union, to reinvent itself from a collective defence alliance to an international security organisation.8 The Kosovo case created the opportunity for NATO to test its capacities of intervention under a high moral legitimisation of stopping the suffering that the people from Kosovo were being subjected to by Milošević’s regime.9 10 After this, Kosovo irremediably became an ally of the United States, forever thankful to the Western world and resentful of those who refused to protect them. In this sense, Kosovo is a crystalised relic of the Cold War confrontation.

Second, and in accordance with  the first point, the peace process taking place in Kosovo is not simply a result of two parties who voluntarily wanted to make peace, but a consequence of a ‘victors’ peace’.11 The Serbian regime, which never wanted to make a truce, was ultimately obliged to due to NATO’s strong military capabilities. The way the war was put to an end naturally created lasting tensions and distrust between the two parties, Kosovo and Serbia. Continuing points of disagreement include the existence of competing narratives about  the conflict,12 lack of agreement in establishing a border between Serbia and Kosovo, mutual impediments to further European integration or to enter other international organisations, ethnic tensions and punctual episodes of violence, and, most notably, other delays in Kosovo’s normalisation and statebuilding.

Third, ethnic tensions and exclusion are still present both between Serbia and Kosovo, as well as in Kosovo at the internal level. Tensions between Albanians and Serbs are often mirrored by incidents of intercommunal hate crime, harassment and obstruction.13 The city of Mitrovica is the mirror of all ethnic divisions, border disagreements, and power-sharing issues.14 Split by the River Ibar, in the South of the city, Kosovar-Albanian people use the Euro and openly exhibit US flags and Albanian symbols. On the Serbian side, the currency is the dinar, the buildings are decorated by Serb and Russian flags, and a mural that states ‘Kosovo is a part of Serbia just as Crimea is a part of Russia’ can also be found. Along with the ethnic polarisation between Albanians and Serbs, the remaining exclusion of other minority communities should equally be mentioned. According to the 2011 census, Kosovo’s minority groups are composed of  1.6% Bosniaks, 1.5% Serbs, 1.1% Turks, 0.9% Ashkali, 0.7% Egyptian, 0.6% Gorani and 0.5% Roma.15 Minority Rights Groups state that since Kosovo’s independence, there has been a lack of attention to protecting Kosovo’s minorities facing social exclusion, discrimination, and lack of political representation.16 Although Kosovo’s political system represents the interests of all ethnic groups, Romans, Ashkali, and Egyptians encounter obstacles when trying to access personal documents, health care, social assistance, and education, which creates polarising effects in the society of this new-born country.17

Legitimacy, both at the external and internal level, seem to be the biggest issues slowing down Kosovo’s progress. Since its independence in 2008, Kosovo has been under a process of statebuilding, focused on creating guarantees of security and stabilisation, the rule of law, and economic and institutional development.18 However, according to experts Oliver Richmond and Gezim Visoka, peacebuilding and statebuilding in Kosovo have been in a permanent struggle between externally set conditions and dynamics of local state formation, and state contestation19. On one hand, it seems that a small political elite aims to maintain domestic stability in exchange for securing external legitimacy at the expense of ignoring other pro-peace social groups’.20 On the other hand, this same domestic stability has revealed itself as quite unstable due to Kosovo’s weak rule of law and judicial system, high levels of corruption, and political stability and credibility being undermined by episodes such as the recent resignation of the Prime Minister Haradinaj as a result of his call to answer for war crimes in The Hague.21 22

At the external level, although 112 states have recognised Kosovo, there is still a significant number of states which refuse such as Spain, Russia, and China. Simultaneously, while Kosovo has become a member of international organisations such as the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and even FIFA, it has not yet become a part of the United Nations, nor the European Union, Interpol, or NATO. Furthermore, even though Kosovo has unilaterally adopted the Euro as its currency and conquered the status of potential candidate for EU integration, such dreams seem more and more unattainable both for internal reasons, such as the lack of agreement with Serbia, and reasons related to the political phase the EU is going through, with enlargements being practically frozen, countries such as Spain opposing any negotiations with Kosovo, and more restrictive immigration policies.23

Kosovo’s deadlock may be explained by matters of internal and external legitimacy. It is clear that geopolitics still get in the way of Kosovo’s recognition and integration into international structures, as well as feed into polarisation, political and ethnic, and contribute to the existence of competing versions of the facts. Simultaneously, internal dynamics of elite-based politics, decision-making impasses, ethnic exclusion, and corruption prevent a widespread internal legitimacy. It is possible that Kosovo would profit more from locally generated peacemaking rather than elite-oriented and externally-influenced liberal peacebuilding and statebuilding. Kosovo’s progress utterly depends on breaking the vicious cycle of external reliance the newborn country has entered. Furthering international recognition strictly depends on internal transformations, such as attaining a border agreement with Serbia, strengthening the rule of law, and political and economic stability. Tackling the issue of internal legitimacy will not be successful if Kosovo remains solely dependant on support from the United Nations, donors, and the European Union, rather than generating and utilising local initiatives.24

Sources:

1. Ristic, M., 2012. Dacic Denies His Party’s Role in Balkan Conflicts. Balkan Insight. Retrieved from: https://balkaninsight.com/2012/09/18/dacic-denies-his-party-s-role-in-war-crimes/ [accessed 11/09/2019].2. Human Rights Watch, 2001. Under orders: War Crimes in Kosovo. Retrived from: https://www.hrw.org/report/2001/10/26/under-orders/war-crimes-kosovo [accessed 14/10/2019].

3. Ibid.

4. De Wet, E., 2009. The Governance of Kosovo: Security Council Resolution 1244 and the Establishment and Functioning of Eulex. The American Journal of International Law, 103(1), 83-96.

5. Yannis, A., 2009. The politics and geopolitics of the status of Kosovo: the circle is never round. Journal of Southeast European and Black Sea Studies, Vol. 9, 2009, Issue 1-2.

6. Rebelo da Cruz, 2014. O Processo de Paz no Kosovo: Percepções dos Militares do Exército Português no Teatro de Operações. Universidade Aberta.

7. Gromes, T. 2019. A Humanitarian Milestone? NATO's 1999 intervention in Kosovo and trends in military responses to mass violence. Peace Research Institute Frankfurt Report 2/2019, p. 1. Retrived from: https://www.hsfk.de/fileadmin/HSFK/hsfk_publikationen/prif0219.pdf [accessed 14/10/2019].

8. Roberts, A., 1999. NATO's ‘Humanitarian War’ over Kosovo. Survival, 41:3, 102-123.

9. Gibbs, D., 2011. Kosovo: a template for disaster. The Guardian. Retrieved from: https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2011/mar/21/kosovo-template-for-disaster-libya [accessed 14/10/2019].

10. Severiano Teixeira, N., 2019. A NATO aos 70. Público. Retrieved from: https://www.publico.pt/2019/03/27/mundo/opiniao/nato-70-1866843 [accessed 14/10/2019].

11. Bono, G., 2010. 'The European Union and ‘Supervised Independence’ of Kosovo: A Strategic Solution to the Kosovo/Serbia Conflict?. European Foreign Affairs Review, Issue 2, pp. 249–264.

12. Ferati-Sachsenmaier, F., 2018. Reconciliation in the Balkans: Twenty Years after the Yugoslav Wars, What Went Wrong?. 21st Century Global Dynamics. Retrived from: https://www.21global.ucsb.edu/global-e/september-2018/reconciliation-balkans-twenty-years-after-yugoslav-wars-what-went-wrong [accessed 14/10/2019].

13. Minority Rights Group. Kosovo: Minorities and Indigenous peoples. Retrived from: https://minorityrights.org/country/kosovo/ [accessed 14/10/2019].

14. Estadão, 2019. Nos 20 anos da Guerra do Kosovo, tensão étnica ameaça paz nos Balcãs. O Estado de S. Paulo. Retrieved from: https://internacional.estadao.com.br/noticias/geral,nos-20-anos-da-guerra-do-kosovo-tensao-etnica-ameaca-paz-nos-balcas,70002864039 [accessed 14/10/2019].

15. Minority Rights Group. Kosovo: Minorities and Indigenous peoples. Retrived from: https://minorityrights.org/country/kosovo/ [accessed 11/10/2019].

16. Ibid.

17. Human Rights Watch (2019) World Report 2019. Serbia/Kosovo: Treatment of Minorities. Retrived from: https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2019/country-chapters/serbia/kosovo [accessed 14/10/2019].

18. Allison, J., 2018. State-building in Kosovo - Challenges of Legitimacy. E-International Relations Students. Retrived from: https://www.e-ir.info/2018/03/09/state-building-in-kosovo-challenges-of-legitimacy/ [10/09/2019].

19. Richmond, O., Visoka, G., 2017. After Liberal Peace? From Failed State-Building to an Emancipatory Peace in Kosovo. International Studies Perspectives, 18, 110-129, p. 111.

20. Idem, p. 113.

21. Transparency International (2014) Kosovo: Overview of Political Corruption. Anti-corruption helpdesk. Providing on-demand research to help fight corruption. European Commission.

22. The Guardian (2019) Kosovo PM resigns before questioning at The Hague. The Guardian. Retrived from: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/jul/19/kosovo-pm-resigns-before-questioning-at-the-hague [accessed 14/10/2019].

23. Allison, J. 2018. State-Building in Kosovo – Challenges of Legitimacy. E-International Relations Students. Retrived from: https://www.e-ir.info/2018/03/09/state-building-in-kosovo-challenges-of-legitimacy/ [accessed 14/10/2019].

24. Richmond, O., Visoka, G., 2017. After Liberal Peace? From Failed State-Building to an Emancipatory Peace in Kosovo. International Studies Perspectives, 18, 110-129, p. 112.

Gender and Terrorism: Women Involved in Terrorism and their Representation in the Media

This piece seeks to analyse the specific intersection of women, terrorism and, media in order to provide an overview of the different ways in which female terrorists are portrayed with relation to their motivations, status, and the societal implication of the representations of their individual and political agency. It focuses on whether the framing of women in politically violent groups (such as ISIS) and who commit acts of political violence challenges gender stereotypes or obscures politically violent women’s participation by portraying them as being victimised or irrational so as to remove their capacity to be active agents and the impact this can have on counter-extremist policies. 

By Laura Bartley

“The media fetishizes female terrorists. This contributes to the belief that there is something really unique, something just not right about the women who kill. We make assumptions about what these women think, why they do what they do, and what ultimately motivates them. Women involved in terrorist violence are demonized more than male terrorists… The common assumption is that female terrorists must be even more depressed, crazier, more suicidal, or more psychopathic than their male counterparts.”1

The phenomenon of ‘foreign fighters’ travelling to Iraq and Syria was an issue which the Western media took a particular fascination with, partly due to the unprecedented level of Western Muslims voluntarily choosing to join ISIS. In 2015, international strategic consultancy The Soufan Group reported that up to 31,000 recruits from over 86 countries had travelled to join ISIS forces, with 5000 of these coming from Western states2 and 600 of them being women. In fact, in 2016 it was estimated that 40 percent of all French migrants in ISIS-controlled territory were women.3 Moreover, according to a report on the issue of Westerners joining ISIS by the Institute for Strategic Dialogue on the topic “the profile of this cohort differs from the norm; there are a higher proportion of women, they are younger, and they are less likely to be known to the authorities.”4 

Yet despite this great empirical evidence of women’s participation in an armed Islamist struggle, media portrayals of women’s violence is continually treated as unnatural or exceptional. This may arise from the preconceived idea that ‘femininity’ is incompatible with violence as women are traditionally represented in culture as ‘nurturers’, ‘carers’ or ‘peacemakers’, whereas men tend to be viewed as more ‘political’ and ‘violent’. This is a phenomenon that was identified by Elizabeth Gardner who argues:

“journalists thus frame female inclusion in political violence as ‘unnatural’ and worthy of explanation, suggesting that women who relocate from the private sphere to the public sphere of political violence necessitate contextual explanations for their actions.”5

Women, terrorism and the media

In “Mothers, Monsters, Whores: Women’s Violence in Global Politics,” Gentry and Sjoberg argue that there are three different narratives in representations of agency of women participating in political violence – mother, monster, and whore – that ultimately serve to ‘other’ violent women.6 It is significant that they highlight the problematic tendency in both academic and policy-related discussions to explain women’s violence as having different motivations from men’s by arguing that “women who commit violence have been characterized as anything but regular criminals or regular soldiers or regular terrorists; they are captured in storied fantasies which deny women’s agency and reify gender stereotypes and subordination.”7 It is these gender norms, such as masculine traits (bravery and strength) and feminine traits (innocence and fragility) which render women’s violence as being “outside of these ideal-typical understandings of what it means to be a woman.”8 This is potentially due to the perceived anomaly of women taking life as opposed to their traditional role as ‘life-giver’ – indeed the idea of motherhood and politically violent women is discussed in reference to the notion of ‘twisted maternalism’ by Gentry.9 

In her discussion of twisted maternalism, Gentry critiques how politically violent women such as Palestinian suicide bombers continued to be objectified and denied agency because their reasons and motivations for engaging in such violent acts is framed in relation to the individual’s marriage, divorce, children or lack thereof and is thus explained in domestic and maternal language. This echoes the pathologisation of women terrorists – that there must be something wrong with a woman’s femininity in order for her to have the capacity to commit a terrorist/violent act. Sjoberg and Gentry specifically argue that the dominant Orientalist narrative in academia, politics, and the media is that the sexually dysfunctional Western woman is violent because she refuses to conform, to please men or in fact revolts against her role as one who ought to please men. Whereas Islamic women are violent because there is something wrong with them that makes them unable to please men.10  This is an important point as typically a Western woman’s decision to join ISIS is seen as an irrational act and it is often assumed that the muhajirat have little autonomy in their decision-making. As outlined by Loken and Zelenz this classifies women’s motivation into two categories: (1) women are motivated by romance or sex, complementing Gentry and Sjoberg’s “erotomania and erotic dysfunction” classification of female violence; (2) women are naive and easily tricked by recruiters who sell an unrealistic portrayal of life in ISIS-controlled territory.11  However on the contrary, the true motivations of women partaking in political violence have been shown to correspond to men’s motivations.

Nacos’ Frames used in media coverage of female terrorists

Since female terrorism is generally perceived as exceptional or unconventional, the media often exploits this sensationalism. Yet as emphasised by Nacos there is no evidence that male and female terrorists differ fundamentally with regards to their recruitment, motivations for joining, ideological devotion or even cruelty of their violence.12 Nonetheless despite this, the media representation and portrayal of female terrorists is continually framed by existing gender stereotypes and in fact reinforces them. In this manner, newsrooms are not exempt to the “prejudices that play perniciously just beneath the surface of American life.”13 Therefore these explanatory frames frequently employed by the media are incredibly important as they have the power not only to reveal insights into and shape a society’s understanding of events but also the wider implication of shaping society’s gender assumptions. Regarding the relationship between framing and female terrorists, Nacos specifically researches this relationship between the media and terrorism and in doing so has identified similar gender stereotypes/framing in the media’s representation of female politicians and female terrorists. Table One located below outlines the five frames Nacos identifies as being frequently used in media coverage of female terrorists.

Conclusion

It is important to grapple with the issue of politically violent women, in order to appreciate the media’s role in framing pre-existing assumptions of these transgressive individuals. The media, policy makers, and the general public tend to rely on overly simplistic tropes concerning what female political violence is and how it manifests. The five frames Nacos identifies as being frequently used in media coverage of female terrorists show how the media frequently represents women terrorists in a different way to their male counterparts which does not challenge gender stereotypes. Instead the common frames that portray women often relate to their victimisation or lack of rationality, and in doing so remove their capacity to be active agents. This has large implications in terms of female political motivations and subjectivity as it de-emphasises their political motivations. As such it is imperative that the understandings and assumptions of female terrorists that have already been made are challenged both in the media and in broader discussions – for example the belief that terrorism is a hyper-masculine space composed of predominantly men may become more nuanced when we recognise the role women play.

Finally, it is of the utmost importance to take into consideration the role of women (and gender more broadly) in political violence because if we continue to take seriously only male terrorists then we are bound to miss the gendered consequences of both female terrorism and the impact that representation of female terrorism has, while also continuing to relegate the political agency of women to the background. Most significantly, the unfair prejudices associated with terrorist women may obfuscate the underlying dynamics of recruitment motivations and participation that could ultimately prejudice the efficacy or outcomes of counter-extremist policies.

Sources:

1. Bloom, M. (2011). Bombshell: The Many Faces of Women Terrorists. London: Hurst and Company., pp. 33-34.

2. For the purpose of this essay, ‘Western’ states refers to EU countries, the United States, Canada, Australia or New Zealand.

3. Rubin, A. and Breeden, A. (2016). Women’s Emergence as Terrorists in France Points to Shift in ISIS Gender Roles. [online] Nytimes.com. Available at: https://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/02/world/europe/womens-emergence-as-terrorists-in-france-points-to-shift-in-isis-gender-roles.html

4. Briggs, R. and Silverman, T. (2014). Western Foreign Fighters: Innovations in Responding to the Threat. [online] Isdglobal.org. Available at: https://www.isdglobal.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/ISDJ2784_Western_foreign_fighters_V7_WEB.pdf

5. Gardner, E. (2007). Is There Method to the Madness?. Journalism Studies, 8(6), pp.909-929.

6. Sjoberg, L. and Gentry, C. (2007). Mothers, monsters, whores. London: Zed.

7. ibid, pp. 4-5

8. ibid, pp. 2

9. Gentry, C. (2009). Twisted Maternalism. International Feminist Journal of Politics, 11(2), pp.242.

10. Sjoberg, L. and Gentry, C. (2008). Reduced to Bad Sex: Narratives of Violent Women from the Bible to the War on Terror. International Relations, 22(1), pp.17

11. Loken, M. and Zelenz, A. (2017). Explaining extremism: Western women in Daesh. European Journal of International Security, 3(01), pp.50.

12. Nacos, B. (2005). The Portrayal of Female Terrorists in the Media: Similar Framing Patterns in the News Coverage of Women in Politics and in Terrorism. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 28(5), pp.436.

13. ibid pp.437

14. Herlitz, A. (2016). Examining Agency in the News: a content analysis of Swedish media's portrayal of Western women. MA. Utrecht University, the Netherlands., pp.40.

The Tense Relationship Between Social Media Intelligence and Privacy

Social media has transformed social life because of the prominent communicative role that its networks and platforms have achieved in the modern era and the new social environments that they have created. However, SOCMINT entails a great challenge as it requires access by default to the private information of social media users, affecting the legitimacy of the intelligence community as well as the morality and legality of carrying out SOCMINT surveillance.

by Alejandra Bringas Colmenarejo

Social media may be considered the most major source of information about societies, individuals, and communities that has ever existed to such an extent that it could become essential to understand the social dynamics and interactions that affect international security. Social Media Intelligence (SOCMINT) could enable the intelligence community to tackle criminal activities and behaviours by providing warnings about outbreaks of public disorders, providing information about extremist and radicalised groups and individuals, or helping policymakers and state agencies to give a response to any kind of situation [1]. However, this intelligence assumption creates strong debates about the public nature of the information collected, the morality of the methods used for such purpose, and the real efficiency of the process.

SOCMINT is defined as ‘the process of identification, validation, collection and analysis of data and information from social media using intrusive and non-intrusive methods [opened, closed and/or clandestine channels], with the aim of developing a product for national security’ [2]. In this sense, the information accessed, processed and analysed by SOCMINT could be classified into four categories: (1) The information obtained through open and closed sources that neither identify nor could identify a concrete person – e.g. aggregated data about locations or public transport. (2) Information accessed through open channels which either identify or could identify a concrete person – such as name, gender, age, nationality. (3) Information either open or closed which is specifically accessed through covert, misleading, or deceiving tactics – e.g. posting provocative messages to tackle the social responses or entering friends-locked groups using fake, personal, or unofficial profiles. (4) Closed information accessed using clandestine tactics – such as decoding technologies or hacking software [3].

Based on this classification, it might be logical to think that, despite intelligence actions carried out to obtain specific information, SOCMINT is mainly focused on the continuous and uninterrupted access and collection of large open data sets, information for which there is no universal agreement regarding its public accessibility. On the one hand, platform companies generally consider users’ information to be publicly available when it is accessible (1) to any member of the user network within the platform; (2) to any other platform user, even though they do not coincide in any common network, or (3) to any third party external to the social media platform through unrestricted methods. On the other hand, platforms users, law enforcement agencies, and  society usually defend more restrictive definitions of privacy and intimacy so that the access to social media information is limited to specific circumstances [4]. 

The lack of consensus between social media and society about this issue leads to the possible obtention of private, sensitive, and intimate information usually without the consent and the knowledge of the social media user. Consequently, SOCMINT either performed through restricted or unrestricted channels could entail an infringement of the right of privacy and an abuse of the expectations of non-state interference in the private lives of its citizens [5]. Added to this, the novel and constantly changing characteristics of social media is complicating the classification of social media platforms as public or private spaces, provoking a number of legal controversies and loopholes. This problem can be worsened due to the number of social media networks that coexist and have different hierarchical levels of privacy; meaning  some information could be unrestricted for one group of people but could be restricted to outsiders in accordance with the pertinent settings.

The legally admissive access to social media data and its moral and ethical acceptance involve a fragile balance of interests, as the intelligence process could be considered an incisive intrusion into an individuals’ privacy. In fact, this problem also relates to people’s indifference to share their private life online without questioning how their data could be used or which level of protection is granted to it. In this regard, the peculiarities of social media have created a sense of disconnection between the real and the virtual world facilitating the sharing of personal information, political opinions, or religious beliefs, exposing the individual’s life with a lack of restriction and an excessive expectation that the state will respect their privacy [6].

Nevertheless, it may  be argued that a reasonable expectation of privacy exists if the user believes their data remains private because of their explicit efforts to achieve that exclusion from third parties’ access or knowledge; or if the whole society considers that such information belongs to the individual’s private sphere [7]. This divergence of opinions between the users, society, and legal systems could negatively affect a user’s privacy. Whilst society and users’ understandings of privacy could differ it is just as true that societal and individual expectations of privacy could collide with the social media platform’s privacy settings or with enforced legislation so that, contrary to the societal expectation, the information is legally considered public or non-directly defined as private making it accessible for  third parties [8].

To this effect, social media is considered as a privately-owned public sphere:  spaces owned by private companies where people voluntarily join and freely share public, private, or even intimate information [9] due to two main reasons. Firstly, because of the users’ willingness to upload and share their personal and intimate lives on these platforms, and secondly, because of the users’ voluntary consent to the terms and conditions of the platforms which normally state the openness and the public nature of the networks [10]. Consequently, although social media users expect a reasonable level of privacy on social media platforms, this expectation is easily undermined since they have voluntarily joined these platforms, accepting that platforms’ rules even when the settings could threaten their right  to privacy. Furthermore, while users may expect different levels of privacy from each option available to communicate and interact within the networks, from the point of view of the owner companies, social media platforms are public spheres where their users can freely communicate with each other and whose data, information, and shared content can be openly accessed and used. The concerns that arise from this lack of consensus are clear; when and how would it be morally justified for the intelligence community to access, store, and analyse the personal data of social media users? 

Social media has created an online society where people can communicate, interact, and share information even on a broader scale than the real world would ever allow. However, this online society affects their physical reality, threatening the security, defence, and safety of the public and private international actors. Consequently, social media has become an incredibly important issue of concern for the intelligence community and security agencies as it appears to be the most innovative and initially effective tool to understand social interactions and dynamics. However, SOCMINT entails a great challenge as it requires access by default to the private information of social media users, affecting the legitimacy of the intelligence community and the morality and legality of carrying out SOCMINT surveillance. The ambiguous nature of social media platforms as public private-owned spaces affects the consideration of the information shared and accessed as publicly available and its protection by the society and the individuals’ legitimate expectations of privacy. No  legislation has been able to offer an adequate delimitation of social media spaces to restrict the collection, use and exploitation of social media private information by private and public actors. However, what is clear is that SOCMINT is intrinsically connected with a reality, social media, that provokes more challenges than certainties and as a consequence, SOCMINT has to deal with great concerns in relation to the individuals’ rights and the legitimacy of the security interest.

Sources:

[1] Vrist Rønn, K., & Obelitz Søe, S. (2019). Is social media intelligence private? Privacy in public and the nature of social media intelligence. Intelligence and National Security, 34(3), 363-378. doi:10.1080/02684527.2019.1553701[2] Liviu, A., Anamaria, C., Codruta, R., & Nicolae, M. (2015). Social Media Intelligence: Opportunities and Limitations. CES Working Papers, VII(2A), p. 506

[3] Edwards, L., & Urquhart, L. (2016). Privacy in Public Spaces: What Expectations of Privacy do we have in Social Media Intelligence? International Journal of Law and Information Technology, Autumn,p. 279-310

[4] Privacy International. (n.d.). Social Media Intelligence. Retrieved from Privacy International: https://privacyinternational.org/explainer/55/social-media-intelligence

[5] Edwards, L., & Urquhart, L. (2016).

[6] Gibson, S. (2004). Open Source Intelligence. The RUSI Journal, 149(1), p.16-22. doi:10.1080/03071840408522977

[7] Omand, D., Bartlett, J., & Miller, C. (2012). Introducing Social Media Intelligence (SOCMINT). Intelligence and National Security, 27(6), 801-823. doi:10.1080/02684527.2012.716965

[8] Edwards, L., & Urquhart, L. (2016).

[9] Privacy International. (n.d.).

[10] Edwards, L., & Urquhart, L. (2016).

2019 Turkish Local Elections: An Explanation of the Ruling Party’s Failure

The Turkish local elections of 2019 resulted in a failure for President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and his ruling party, which lost votes in the country’s three largest cities: Izmir, Istanbul and the capital, Ankara. This crucial breakdown of the Justice and Development Party is an outcome of enduring political, economic, and social struggles within Turkish society which has expressed its discontent through elections, demonstrating its desire to implement fundamental changes. 

by Badri Belkania

The Turkish local elections of 2019 resulted in a major blow to President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and his ruling party, the Justice and Development Party (AKP), which lost control over the three largest cities of the country (Istanbul, Izmir, and the capital, Ankara) for the first time, after sixteen years in power. The phrase uttered by Erdoğan before the vote highlights the importance of the local elections for the government, especially in Turkey’s largest city: ‘if we lose Istanbul, we lose Turkey’ (Barkey 2019). This article examines the crucial reasons behind the AKP’s undeniably historic defeat.

Firstly, the premises behind the AKP’s setback in the 2019 local elections should be placed into the context of the continuous process of Erdoğan’s rising authoritarianism, which had been gradually reaching its peak subsequent to the 2016 failed coup d’etat attempt. 

Since the AKP took power in 2002, this shift toward autocracy and even dictatorship, as it has been frequently labeled in light of the 2016 events, has become more and more apparent. In the first years of his rule, Erdoğan, arguably, worked towards transforming Turkey into a democratic and free market based country, however, after the triumph in the 2007 presidential elections he substituted the party’s pluralistic ruling system for ‘a majoritarian one’ and ‘liberal sensibilities’ with ‘an authoritarian mind-set’ (Özsel et al., 2013, 552). As the 2019 local elections demonstrated, frustration within the Turkish population regarding Erdoğan’s authoritarian tendencies had accumulated throughout the years, which finally came to a tipping point at the ballot boxes. 

The events following the failed 2016 coup d’etat demonstrated Erdoğan’s intentions of seizing absolute power in Turkey. The thwarted coup d’etat, which was immediately attributed to the former ally of Erdoğan, and exiled Muslim cleric and businessman, Fethullah Gülen, became Erdoğan’s justification for launching an extensive purge against his political opponents and opposing journalists. As a result, by 2018 more than 107,000 people were dismissed from their jobs, approximately 1,000 people allegedly related to the coup were imprisoned, and 2,745 judges lost their seats. This ‘massive liquidation movement’ encompassed almost all professions in the country including soldiers, teachers, academics, and police officers (Azeri 2016; Morris 2018).

Frustration among Turkish citizens has risen in lockstep with autocracy in the country and the results of the 2019 local elections should not be perceived as an unexpected turn of events. For instance, the 2013 Gezi Park protests clearly demonstrated this growing civil discontent in the country. The demonstrations originally opposed the demolition of Gezi Park in Istanbul but expanded into a massive riot of crowds from different backgrounds in opposition to larger issues such as curtailment of civil rights, lack of freedom of speech, media control, corruption, and the turn away from secularism (Demiryol 2018).

Secondly, when analysing Erdoğan’s defeat in the largest cities of the country, the protracted Kurdish issue should not be neglected. There is definite hostility between Erdoğan and the Kurds, and they certainly played a role in the AKP’s defeat in the major cities of the country. There are approximately 20 million Kurds in Turkey (CIA 2018). They make up almost 25% of the country’s entire population, and many of these Kurds live in the largest cities of Turkey where the AKP suffered there most important defeats. We can fairly assume that the majority of this Kurdish population would have voted against the AKP which continues to rigidly pursue improper policies towards minorities.

Considering the minor difference between the final percentages of the competing candidates, it can be concluded that the antipathy of the Kurdish population towards the AKP would have played a fairly significant role in the fall of the ruling party’s contenders. This is supported by the fact that the People’s Democratic Party (HDP), the most popular party among Kurds, refrained from putting forward mayoral candidates in seven major municipalities in order to increase chances of the main opposition nominees (Daily Sabah 2019).

Immigration proved to be one of the most crucial points of contention between the public and the government, and to some extent cost Erdoğan votes. The Syrian civil war and Turkey’s involvement in the conflict contributed to the massive flow of Syrian refugees to the country which became an immense challenge for Turkey. 

According to UNHCR (2019), Turkey shelters 3.6 million registered Syrian refugees, which makes it the largest host-country in the world. However, the public position on the AKP’s foreign policy of accepting high amounts of refugees has been critical since the eruption of the Syrian civil war. Turkey witnessed a number of demonstrations against refugee policy in the major cities of the country, some of them ending in violent clashes with authorities (Middle East Eye 2014). 

Lastly, despite rising authoritarianism, oppression, and a number of domestic and foreign political challenges, Erdoğan and his party had still managed to retain public popularity throughout the previous 16 years. The main explanation for this apparent anomaly is found in the rapid economic development of the country during the early years of Erdoğan’s reign. In this particular period, the economy of Turkey reached its highest numbers in the modern history of the republic. However, this situation has worsened gradually since the economic peak in 2008, culminating in a total breakdown in Turkey’s economy last year. Compared to the 7.4% growth in 2017, last year (2018) reached only 2.6% (Pitel 2019). Erdoğan faces his first recession in a decade, while the country suffers from a 20% inflation, 13.5% unemployment rate, and high levels of corruption. 

The AKP’s failure in the 2019 Turkish elections was a complex outcome, one which cannot be explained through consideration of present processes alone and calls for a deeper examination of the party’s political narrative. However, though the existing economic problems cannot solely explain the AKP’s slump in the last vote, it can clarify why this happened this year and not in previous elections. The reason behind this development is that the recent economic crisis became the final piece in the puzzle of the public discontent with the AKP’s rule. Erdoğan’s party managed to retain the necessary popularity throughout previous elections, predominantly due to Turkey’s economic welfare and growth, but last year deprived many supporters of the AKP of their last remaining argument.

Sources:

Azeri, S., 2016. The July 15 Coup Attempt in Turkey: The Erdoğan–Gulen Confrontation and the Fall of ‘Moderate’ Political Islam. Critique: Journal of Socialist Theory, 44(4), pp. 465-478.

Barkey, H., 2019. 'If we lose Istanbul, we lose Turkey': why the mayoral election is so critical to Erdoğan's hold on power. The National. [Online] Available at: https://www.thenational.ae/opinion/comment/if-we-lose-istanbul-we-lose-turkey-why-the-mayoral-election-is-so-critical-to-erdogan-s-hold-on-power-1.876754

CIA, 2018. The World Factbook: Turkey. [Online] Available at: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/tu.html [Accessed 17 April 2019].

Daily Sabah, 2019. HDP says it won’t run candidates for Istanbul, Ankara, 5 other municipalities. [Online] Available at: https://www.dailysabah.com/elections/2019/01/28/hdp-says-it-wont-run-candidates-for-istanbul-ankara-5-other-municipalities [Accessed 18 June 2019].

Demiryol, G. İ., 2018. Turkey’s Arendtian Moment: Gezi Park Protests. Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies, 20(6), pp. 531-546. Middle East Eye, 2014. Istanbul residents in violent protest over Syrian refugees. [Online] Available at: https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/istanbul-residents-violent-protest-over-syrian-refugees [Accessed 19 June 2019].

Morris, C., 2018. Reality Check: The numbers behind the crackdown in Turkey. [Online] Available at: https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-44519112 [Accessed 14 April 2019].

Özsel, D., Öztürk, A. & Ince, H. O., 2013. A Decade of Erdoğan's JDP: Ruptures and. Critique: Journal of Socialist Theory, 41(4), pp. 551-570.

Pitel, L., 2019. Turkey falls into recession as lira crisis takes long-lasting toll. [Online] Available at: https://www.ft.com/content/92818e7c-43c6-11e9-b168-96a37d002cd3 [Accessed 21 April 2019].

Cybercrime in Ecuador: An Asymmetrical Threat

In the digital era we live in, cybercrime represents a direct threat not only for nations but also for corporations and individuals. Nations that lack development in technology and cybersecurity strategies are especially vulnerable to this type of threat. The recent data leak in Ecuador has highlighted the substantial threat of cybercrime to less technologically developed nations and the enormous impact it can have on their populations’ data protection.  

By Fidel Velásquez

In the 21st century, Cybercrime is one of the most relevant and pressing issues in the digital world. The impact and the influence that it can have over individuals, companies, corporations, and States is alarming. There are more than two billion people with access to cyberspace, all potential victims of cybercrime. Since software products required for hacking can be readily and cheaply obtained online, anyone with a computer and a relative amount of knowledge can become a cybercriminal and affect millions of individuals at once. According to the United Nations, more than “431 million people [were victims] of cybercrime in 2013”[i]. The consequences and costs of this contemporary issue are truly enormous, and growing rapidly as computers, smartphones, tablets, and other electronic devices attempt to produce ever-evolving methods to prevent cybercriminals from their aggressive and increasingly sophisticated attacks[ii]. 

The effect of cybercrime in the public and private sector is enormous. It is estimated that “by 2016, the average loss annually by a company due to cybercrime was between $2 million and $5 million”[iii]. Further, according to the “Commissioner of the City of London Police, ‘cyber’ fraud costs the United Kingdom £27 billion per year while ‘cyber breaches’ were recorded by 93% of small and medium businesses in the United Kingdom in 2013”[iv]. As a result, cybercrime generates negative impacts on employment as the monetary loss “has the effect of shifting personnel away from the highest value jobs in developed nations”[v]. Whilst the impact of cybercrime is more evident within the European Union and developed countries such as the United States, the United Kingdom, and Japan, countries that are less technologically developed in matters of cybersecurity are also highly exposed to suffer from cybercrime. Digitalisation is often considered as key to economic development, therefore countries striving for this goal may experience resulting vulnerabilities, or simply may not have the necessary resources to deal with cybercrime effectively such as The Republic of Ecuador.

Ecuador has been a victim of cybercrime for a considerable period of time and it is becoming increasingly apparent that this threat exceeds the country’s capabilities. Cybercrime in Ecuador started to be treated as a serious threat in the year 2009, 3,143 cases were registered in the following five years; however, it is estimated that 80% of cybercrimes are not reported[vi]. Furthermore, as Ecuador decided after seven years to withdraw diplomatic asylum from WikiLeaks founder Julian Assange in April 2019 it received more than 40 million cyberattacks from international activist hacker group Anonymous in one day. The attacks affected entities such as Chancellery, the Presidency, the Central Bank of Ecuador, and multiple other ministries[vii]. 

The problems seem to continue, as on Tuesday 17thof September 2019, the Government of Ecuador announced that it had been a victim of cybercrime as the data of six public entities were leaked through a security breach. According to the BBC, a team of researchers in vpnMentor, a firm specialised in information regarding Virtual Pirate Networks and internet privacy, discovered that the information of about twenty million Ecuadorians had been leaked. This figure exceeds the total population of Ecuador by four million, meaning information of deceased people was also leaked. The data was disclosed from a non-secured server in Miami owned by Novaestrat Company; an Ecuadorian company focused on providing services such as data analysis and strategic marketing. The information contained sensitive data regarding personal, familial, employment, and vehicle-related data which could be used by cybercriminals to commit a diverse range of crimes. Names of relatives, ID numbers, place and date of births, telephone numbers, email addresses, academic histories, professions, job salaries, job positions, civil status’, loan and credit information, credit, were some of the fifty types of data leaked. The data has two origins, public and private. However, most of the stolen information was acquired from the Ecuadorian Institute of Social Security and the Civil Registry of Ecuador[viii]. 

The content stolen from the Civil Registry, the Internal Tax Office, the Higher Education Secretary, the Ecuadorian Institute of Social Security, the Bank of the Ecuadorian Institute of Social Security, and the National Traffic Agency leave Ecuadorians exposed to a diverse set of crimes such as fraud, phishing, identity theft, financial fraud, theft of goods, extortion, and business espionage. The investigators believe that the databases were stolen or illegally bought from ex-public civil servants that used to work in some of the aforementioned six public entities. It is not yet clear for what purpose the data was stolen whether it be for political, commercial, or criminal objectives. However, what is clear is that Ecuador is not technologically nor legally ready to face the challenge of cybercrime. 74% of Ecuadorian public entities still do not have the security apparatus deemed necessary by the International Organisation for Standardisation to avoid cyberattacks[ix]. Also, according to the Global Cybersecurity Index 2018, Ecuador occupies position 98 out of 175 nations showing a lower position than Ghana, Botswana, or Cameroon and a similar position to Venezuela, Samoa, and Gabon. This demonstrates that Ecuador has a medium level of commitment towards engaging in cybersecurity programs and initiatives to face cyber threats[x]. Ecuador is one of the few countries in the region that have not develop a data protection bill yet, therefore, Ecuadorians have stipulated rights regarding the protection of their data but no laws to regulate it. Furthermore, cyberspace and ICT is continuously changing and being developed, therefore, the necessity for a suitably evolving legal framework that will keep up with cybercriminals is imperative for Ecuador, and the world, to prosecute cybercriminals and address their apparent impunity.    

The Ecuadorian Minister of Telecommunications Andrés Michelena has argued that the data of Ecuadorians is ‘well-protected’, but the truth is that in 2019 Ecuador suffered the biggest information leak in its history. Furthermore, as a response to both cybercrime and as a response to the most recent data leak, the Ecuadorian Government announced that a bill regarding data protection has been sent to the National Assembly aiming to support the Integral Criminal Code of Ecuador regarding cybercrimes and that $11 million had been allocated for Ecuador’s data protection[xi]. 

Despite the efforts of the Ecuadorian government, it seems unprepared to deal with the continuing threat of cybercrime, partly due to the issue simply being neglected. Furthermore, the characteristics of the modern technological era means that cybercrime is considered an asymmetrical threat, especially for countries that are underdeveloped in technical matters such as Ecuador. Different from traditional warfare, where attackers and defenders are on equal ground when confronting one another, in cybercrime such equality between parties does not exist; the cybercriminal has the palpable advantage with regard to both attack and defence[xii]. Hence, the tools that Ecuador has are not enough to defend itself, when information is leaked it is unlikely to be recovered, and for investigators it is almost impossible to determine the perpetrators of cybercrimes. The continuing threat of cybercrime calls for the Ecuadorian government to implement an adaptable response to protect the information of its population. 

Sources:

[i]United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), (2013), “Comprehensive Study on Cybercrime”, New York.

[ii]Moskowitz, S (2017) “The Global Cyber Crime Industry”, Butterworth-Heinemann.

 [iii]Ahkgar, et al (2014). “Cyber Crime and Cyber Terrorism Investigator’s Handbook”, Waltham: Elsevier. 

[iv]Ibid

[v]Ibid

[vi] Zambrano, E, (2016), “Computer Crime. Criminal Procedure in Ecuador”.

[vii] El Universo, (2019), retrieved from: https://www.eluniverso.com/noticias/2019/04/15/nota/7287215/ecuador-ha-recibido-40-millones-ataques-ciberneticos-revela

[viii]BBC News, (2019), “Data on almost every Ecuadorian Citizen leaked, retrieved from:https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-49715478

[ix] Diario El Comercio (2019), retrieved from: https://www.elcomercio.com/actualidad/ecuador-ciberseguridad-region-informe-delitos.html

 [x] Global Cybersecurity Index 2018 (GCI), (2019), ITU Publications, retrieved from: https://www.itu.int/dms_pub/itu-d/opb/str/D-STR-GCI.01-2018-PDF-E.pdf

[xi]Diario El Comercio (2019), retrieved from: https://www.elcomercio.com/actualidad/gobierno-ecuatoriano-proteccion-datos-ataque.html

[xii]. Moskowitz, S (2017) “The Global Cyber Crime Industry”, Butterworth-Heinemann.

Don’t depend on Drones in intelligence

Drones have advanced warfare and counterinsurgency operations carried out in the War on Terror, their positive effect on intelligence is less significant however. Whilst drone technology has facilitated better observational intelligence, lethal capacity, and new forms of counterinsurgency strategy, they are limited in their application and not as infallible as policy-makers often believe. It also remains uncertain if drones will remain as applicable to future intelligence operations as they are today. 

By Keir Watt

Drones are commonly considered to be revolutionising warfare. According to P.W. Singer, expert on 21st Century warfare, their impact can even be compared to ‘the introduction of gunpowder, the printing press or the airplane.’[1] Yet, as revolutionary as drones seem, their impact on intelligence is not as dramatic.

Weaponising drones has certainly advanced counterinsurgency operations. When the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) located al-Qaeda founder Osama Bin Laden in Afghanistan in 1998 they had to predict where he would be four to six hours later, accounting for the flight time for cruise missiles.[2] Now drones can observe for days and launch strikes instantly, speeding up the ‘find-fix-finish’ loop so much that counterinsurgency strategy has become shaped around their use. [3]

Drones have not made intelligence gatherers as all-knowing as some officials would like to believe, however. Whilst drones can provide excellent surveillance, this does not remove the need for other sources of corroborating intelligence. Strikes like the “Roboski Massacre” in 2011 emphasise this necessity, as thirty-eight adult smugglers and their children were killed merely for looking suspicious, the drone could not even tell whether or not they were armed.[4]

Signature strikes are, controversially, almost entirely reliant on drones and have become a cornerstone of U.S. strategy against al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and similar enemies. These target individuals solely on patterns of their behaviour, if they ‘bear the characteristics of al-Qaeda and Taliban leaders on the run.’[5] As a senior U.S. military official described, ‘using the all-seeing eye, you will find out who is important in a network, where they live, where they get their support from, where their friends are . . . wait till these people have gone down a lonely stretch of road and take them out with a Hell-fire missile.’[6]

These operations are a significant development in counterinsurgency strategy. Yet what distinguishes them most is not so much drone technology, but their reliance on behavioural analysis. One of its biggest weaknesses is not using a big enough quantity and variety of information to form conclusions. Current operations which use primarily or exclusively drone footage remain crude in their analysis. Developing big data processes which use huge quantities of information could transform these operations into a more accurate and complete model.[7] However, this advancement has not come to fruition and signature strikes remain a flawed strategy.

There also remains a lot more to intelligence than drone missions and behavioural analysis. The main function of agencies like the CIA is developing human intelligence and keeping policy makers informed. Drones may offer an “antiseptic solution” for terrorism in places where we don’t want to send troops, however, seeking a technological “fix” to all problems distracts from investing in less flashy but more important areas. In the United States of America, the transfer of control of drone programmes from the CIA to the Pentagon is a positive sign that things are getting back on track.  

More generally, it’s not clear drones will remain relevant for future conflicts. Drone technology evolved to meet the challenges of the War on Terror War and has been very effective, but  may struggle to address different challenges. Conflict with major powers such as China or Russia, for example, would require different capabilities than counterinsurgency operations in Afghanistan. As the threat environment changes, intelligence will have to develop new responses and drones may not be a part of that.

Drones were first used to provide surveillance during the Vietnam War. They were so successful that the Chief of Staff, General William C. Westermoreland was convinced they were leading a ‘quiet revolution’ in warfare.[8] Once the war was over, however, the drone programmes were scrapped as budgets faced new priorities. Like Vietnam, U.S. commander’s demand for ‘situational awareness 24/7/365’ in Afghanistan made them an integral part of the War on Terror.[9] As new threats emerge, however, it’s possible current drone programmes may be relegated like those of the 1970s. 

This is not to say that drones will become redundant altogether; contemporary drones are increasingly advanced and have more applications than those of the past. But assuming that what makes drones useful for today’s conflicts can be applied to those of the future would ignore the basic lesson of both Vietnam and Afghanistan: that changing contexts and challenges require new responses.

Sources:

[1] Spiegel Online, 2010. Interview with Defence Expert P.W. Singer: ‘The Soldiers Call It War Porn.’ SPIEGEL ONLINE.  Available at: www.spiegel.de/international/world/interview-with-defense-expert-p-w-singer-the-soldiers-call-it-war-porn-a-682852.html. [Accessed 10 July 2019]. 

[2] Logan, L., 2012. Hank Crumpton: Life as a spy. CBS News. Available at: : https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Kdkoqem9s1Y. [Accessed 10 July 2019].

[3] CIA Director Leon Panetta quoted in CNN editor, 2009., Airstrikes in Pakistan called ‘very effective.’CNN. Available at:  edition.cnn.com/2009/POLITICS/05/18/cia.pakistan.airstrikes/. [Accessed 10 July 2019].

[4] Eralp, D.U., 2015. The Role of U.S. Drones in the Roboski Massacre. Peace Review, 27(4), pp. 448-452.

[5] Zenko, M., 2013. Reforming US Drone Strike Policies. Council on Foreign Relations, Special Report 65, p. 14. 

[6] Quoted in Barnes, J.E., 2009. Military Refines ‘A Constant Stare Against Our Enemy.’ Los Angeles Times, November 2nd, 2009.

[7] Atwood, C.P., 2015. Activity-based intelligence: revolutionizing military intelligence analysis. Joint Force Quarterly 77, 2nd Quarterly, p. 29.

[8] William C. Westermoreland quoted in Dickson, P., 1996. The Electronic Battlefield. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, pp. 220-221.

[9] Air Force Secretary Michael Donley quoted in Lubold, G., 2010. As drones multiply in Iraq and Afghanistan, so do their uses.The Christian Science Monitor. Available at: https://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Military/2010/0302/As-drones-multiply-in-Iraq-and-Afghanistan-so-do-their-uses. [Accessed 10 July 2019].

[10] Photo: Sergeant Ross Tilly (RAF)/MOD: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Reaper_Remotely_Piloted_Air_System_MOD_45156829.jpg#filelinks

Violence in the Democratic Republic of Congo: Twenty Years of Attempted United Nations Peacekeeping

‘The year 2019 sees the UN’s peacekeeping efforts in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) cross the threshold of 20 continuous years. Violence in the country endures despite numerous mandate expansions of the UN peacekeeping mission to a point where it now allows the use of proactive force for mandate implementation. Proactive force stands in opposition to the original concepts of UN peacekeeping, creating conflicting opinions within the authorising United Nations Security Council. The UN’s 20 years in the DRC tells a story of increasingly desperate measures without a mission completion in sight.’ 

By Matthew Wentworth

Origins of the Conflict

The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) has been engulfed in conflict since 1996. The origins of the current violence lie in the massive refugee crisis and spill-over from the 1994 genocide in Rwanda after which Hutus involved in the genocide fled to the east of the DRC and formed armed groups. In response, opposing Tutsi and other opportunistic rebel groups arose. The Congolese government proved unable to control or defeat the various armed groups, some of which directly threatened populations in neighbouring countries and as a result, in 1998, the Second Congolese War broke out. The United Nations’ (UN) presence began just after the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement was negotiated in August 1999 between the DRC, and five other states in the region: Angola, Namibia, Rwanda, Uganda, and Zimbabwe. It was the UN’s assumption that the Lusaka Agreement would mark the end of the Second Congolese War and that peacekeeping efforts would be necessary to manage the transition period. To this end, the UN deployed a small peacekeeping mission to the DRC with a mandate to observe the ceasefire, ensure disengagement of forces, and maintain liaison between all parties. This mission was titled the United Nations Organisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC).

MONUC: 1999 – 2010

What followed the Lusaka process however was not an end to the war but rather ‘the disintegration from a “rational” war’[i]into a number of privatised, socially, and economically motivated sub-conflicts situated in the east, mainly in the North and South Kivu region. This region alone held 132 active non-state armed actors, causing insecurity in the eastern part of the country and necessitating that MONUC remain deployed. The mission failed, however, in protecting civilians during the 2002 Kisangani Massacre leaving at least 160 dead at the hands of a Rwandan-backed rebel group. MONUC forces similarly failed to act in 2003 during violence in the Northeastern Ituri region. They were unable to stop the carnage, being unauthorised to intervene, and instead ‘hid in their well-protected bases as hundreds were slaughtered’[ii]. The UN troops were said to be unable, under-resourced, and poorly-equipped to halt the widespread killing, atrocities, and displacements throughout 2003[iii]. Due to this failure in the protection mandate, then UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan requested an EU Member State to head up a multi-national force to provide security and protection in Ituri. This was a significant move because it amounted to the UN acknowledging the failure of MONUC and requesting that an external body lend assistance. France agreed to be the framework nation and the European Council authorised an Interim Emergency Multinational Force (Operation Artemis). The mission suffered from a restrictive geographic remit of 15km2 (mainly the city of Bunia) which merely resulted in the relocation of the atrocities to the fringes of the towns where killings continued. The Interim European Military Force (IEMF), acting under Operation Artemis, though mandated to operate from June – September 2003, withdrew only three weeks after becoming concerned that the upcoming expiration of their authorised mandate would leave them without legal cover in the case of any incident. Nevertheless, the EU force did make progress with regards to civilian protection and in response, the UN, attributing the success to Operation Artemis’ use of force mandate, authorised in September 2003 an increase of military personnel to MONUC and sanctioned all necessary means to fulfil its mandate in the Ituri district and North and South Kivu. This was both a recognition of the difficulties with peacekeeping in an area where there is no peace and signified a shift towards a robust peacekeeping mandate with a more proactive use of force.

MONUSCO & The Fall of Goma

In 2010, further changes to the mission were made with ‘stabilisation’ being added to the mission’s title meaning it became the United Nations Organisation Stabilisation Mission in the DRC (MONUSCO). The name change was seen by critical commentators to be an attempt at rebranding after criticisms from Human Rights Watch and others over MONUC’s lending of direct operational support to the Congolese Army in spite of their negative human rights record This support weakened MONUC’s legitimacy and tarnished its image in the eyes of the locals. With the updated MONUSCO mandate the UN recognised that the successful protection of civilians necessitated a more proactive use of force nationwide. Yet, in 2012, the ongoing cycle of violence, especially in the eastern provinces, remained. The most humiliating incident for MONUSCO came with the fall of the provincial capital of Goma in November 2012 to forces of the Rwanda-backed M23 rebel group. Goma, the capital of North Kivu, with a population of nearly one million, was overrun in the presence of 1500 UN peacekeepers, highlighting the failure of MONUSCO’s efforts to bring stability to the east. MONUSCO forces were unable to defend the city despite the fact that it had actually begun preparation for the M23 offensive as early as July of the same year, recognising that the fall of Goma would be ‘disastrous’[iv]. This was a massive breakdown of MONUSCO’s mandate implementation, most notably civilian protection and assisting the government in extending and protecting state authority[v].

The Force Intervention Brigade

In direct response to this failure of the UN peacekeeping mission, in February 2013, 11 regional countries agreed on a Peace, Security, and Cooperation Framework for the DRC[vi]. This established a brigade-strength Neutral Intervention Force under the support of the Southern African Development Community (SADC), and was a move to explicitly cut out the UN. However, with the estimated cost being £165 million it proved an unattainable goal. In a bid to salvage the last remnants of its reputation in the DRC after not being able to stop the M23 with the largest and most expensive peacekeeping mission in the world, the UN made a counter-proposal to establish and fund a Force Intervention Brigade (FIB), composed of troops from the SADC countries. The FIB was subsequently authorised in 2013, and the UN simultaneously mandated MONUSCO to ‘take all necessary measures to “neutralise” and “disarm” groups that were posing a threat to state authority and civilian security’[vii]. The UN was careful to explicitly state that the FIB was established on an exceptional basis in order to avoid creating a precedent or prejudice to the agreed principles of peacekeeping which fundamentally prohibits the use of force except in self-defence. Nevertheless, this assertion did not assuage the concerns of Security Council members who had long been opposed to the mandated use of force by UN missions, most notably China and Russia who warned that ‘what was once the exception now threatens to become the unacknowledged standard practice’[viii]. The two key concerns voiced were that peace-enforcement mandates to UN peacekeeping missions may compromise the impartiality of UN peacekeeping operations and jeopardise the safety and security of peacekeepers. It was feared that the use of force could increase the perception that the UN was taking sides and increase the risk of attacks against civilian and humanitarian personnel of the UN. Nevertheless, then UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, labelled MONUSCO’s FIB a ‘milestone that signalled the resolve of the UN Security Council to address the changing nature of conflict and the operating environment of United Nations peacekeeping’[ix].

Despite Ban Ki-moon’s endorsement, concerns continue to grow, including the doctrinal criticism that the mandate to neutralise all armed groups implicitly presumes that all armed groups are hostile to peace processes and cannot or should not be integrated into a political process. Such mandates ignore the fact that there is an interconnected relationship between rebellion, bargaining, and shifting power relations[x], as evidenced by the events in the months following the start of the M23 rebellion. The fall of Goma forced the Congolese government back to the negotiating table in late 2012/early 2013 and resulted in the aforementioned Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework, a peace accord involving national, regional, and international players. The government recognised the dysfunction of the DRC’s state institutions as a root cause of the conflict and committed to substantial reforms to address them, including security sector reform, decentralisation, and democratic reform. 

In 2015, MONUSCO became the largest UN peacekeeping operation in the world, its mandate has seen similarly dramatic expansions, including from 2007 onwards the extension of state authority, the protection of civilians, and use of surveillance drones being included in the mandate. The extension of MONUSCO’s mandate continues to push the boundaries of what can legitimately considered UN peacekeeping, but this has not been accompanied by a similar identifiable success in establishing or keeping peace in the country. The continued expansion of the use of force and acceptance of robust mandates has shown very little success for a mission that this year turns 20 years old and remains deployed with no clear path to successfully conclude the mission.

Sources:

[i]Berdal, M. (2018) ‘The state of UN peacekeeping: Lessons from Congo’. Journal of Strategic Studies, 41(5). Pp.721-750.

[ii]Astill, J. (2003) ‘UN troops wait behind razor wire as Congo’s streets run with blood’. The Guardian. [online] Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2003/may/23/congo.jamesastill [Accessed 6 June 2019].

[iii]Berdal (2018) ‘State of UN Peacekeeping’.

[iv]Tull, D. M. (2018) ‘The limits and unintended consequences of UN peace enforcement: the Force Intervention Brigade in the DR Congo’. International Peacekeeping, 25(2). Pp.167-190.

iv]BBC News (2012) ‘DR Congo M23 rebels 'enter Goma city'’. BBC News. [online] Available at: https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-20405739 [Accessed 1 June 2019].

[vi]Karlsrud, J. (2015) ‘The UN at war: examining the consequences of peace-enforcement mandates for the UN peacekeeping operations in the CAR, the DRC and Mali’. Third World Quarterly, 36(1). Pp.40-54.

[vii]Karlsrud (2015) ‘UN at War’.

[viii]UNSC Verbatim Record (25 April 2013) UN Doc S/PV.6952, 2.

[ix]Ban Ki-moon (2014) ‘Remarks at Security Council Open Debate on Trends in United Nations Peacekeeping’. UN Peacekeeping. [online] Available at: https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/remarks-security-council-open-debate-trends-united-nations-peacekeeping[Accessed on 30 May 2019].

[x]Tull (2018) ‘Limits and unintended consequences’.

The Strategic-Tactical Dichotomy of Drone Warfare

“Drones have arguably revolutionised modern warfare, especially their use in targeted killings. However, over-reliance on this tactic due to its measurable results has come at the expense of long-lasting strategic advances, moving drones away from their original intelligence-focused tasks and stagnating an already exhaustive War On Terror.”

by Javier Martínez Mendoza

The failed assassination attempt of Taliban leader Mullah Omar, on 7th October 2001, marked the first use of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV) or “drones” for a targeted killing in the Global War on Terror [1]. Since then, the involvement of drones in this struggle has shifted from merely surveillance and intelligence-related activities to an additional function: leadership decapitation, arguably revolutionising the way war is waged [2].

Despite their tactical achievements, over-reliance on this tactic has had repercussions on the Global War on Terror’s strategic goals, stagnating any significant advance for the sake of short-term gains that require these operations to be carried out constantly. Ultimately, this strategic-tactical dichotomy has caused a misperception regarding how modern wars should be waged, prolonging an already exhaustive war.

How do drones fit in the War On Terror?

The use of drones is not new for US war efforts and intelligence. For decades, drones have been used just for activities relating to surveillance, training, and information gathering [3]. Originally, American decision-makers’ attitudes towards using drones to carry out strikes were of clear opposition, but the response to 9/11 paved the way for their use in targeted killings of Al Qaeda militants and enablers [4]. From that moment on, the US underwent ‘the most overt, technologically advanced, and prolific assassination programme the world had seen to that point’ [5].

In the broader context of the Global War on Terror, drones have been used or could be used for activities such as persistent surveillance, especially ‘pattern of life’ surveillance (following an individual’s everyday activities for a prolonged time), as well as tasks that involve entering environments that are risky for human health or that are deemed not worth endangering personnel [6]. It is possible to identify two trends: drones have been used mostly for surveillance and air support in Iraq and Afghanistan, whereas they have been extensively involved in targeted killings in Pakistan, Yemen, and Somalia, where the US is not officially engaged in a war and thus has not deployed a significant number of personnel [7].

The strategic-tactical dichotomy

Drones have become essential for the US decapitation strategy against terrorist groups like Al Qaeda, which aim at taking down terrorist organisations by capturing or killing their leadership. However, targeted killings could have a limited impact in reducing the frequency of militant attacks in the regions where they are carried out, providing a short-term solution that must be consistently carried out to maintain its impact, instead of a definite solution to terrorist violence [8].

For instance, even if it is true that the assassination of terrorist leaders decreases the incidence of terrorist attacks by increasing the organisations’ vulnerability by disrupting cohesion and deterring its militants, terrorist groups might remain operational. Due to their decentralized and clandestine nature, communal support and the bureaucracy they create over time, these organisations can develop a resilience that allows them to engage in terrorism even while weakened [9].

Nonetheless, other research suggests that Al Qaeda and the Taliban do suffer the effects of drone attacks, losing bases and militants, and facing operational setbacks [10]. Moreover, these attacks not only take down organisation leadership, but also deter their activities due to fear of imminent strikes. Despite the latter seeming as a long-term strategic advantage, targeted killings would need to take place constantly to keep exerting their deterring effect. 

On the other hand, statistical data on the effect of drone strikes in North-western Pakistan and Eastern Afghanistan shows there could be a negative correlation between terrorist violence and the recurrence of drone attacks in these regions [11]. Notwithstanding the latter, drone warfare as a long-lasting counter-terrorism solution remains a dubious policy, since its deterent effect on terrorism would require strikes to keep taking place indefinitely.

When drone warfare is assessed from a strategic point of view, it can be argued that its groundbreaking character has been exaggerated, both by supporters and detractors, as it has produced an over-reliance on tactics at the detriment of strategy. As targeted killings deliver measurable results, it becomes “addictive” for decision-makers to continue to carry them out even if, ultimately, there is no territorial gain and terrorists maintain activities and control over the territory [12].

Furthermore, over-reliance on killing targets denies the possibility of vital information gathering had the operation been aimed at capturing. Targeted killings are shifting the focus from drones’ initial intelligence-driven role in the Global War On Terror: surveillance [13]. However, it is possible to consider that drones are also changing the dynamics of this armed conflict, causing a shift in the display of police functions instead of waging war against terrorists. Ultimately, it could be argued that carrying out drone strikes is stagnating US-led efforts, as it is driving American forces to maintain police-like surveillance over terrorists that are being deterred but not taken down as an organisation.

Conclusion

The tactical efficiency of drone strikes offers decision-makers much desired results in a seemingly endless War On Terror. However, the tactical advantages of drones have distracted from wider strategic goals, giving decision-makers a false sense of progress. Drone use in war should remain a tactic, but current policy-making has missed the point and favoured tactical gains rather than fulfilling strategic goals [14].

Due to the tangible and measurable results of targeted killings, US-led efforts in the Global War On Terror have run the risk of emphasising immediate achievements at the expense of pursuing long-lasting strategic objectives. This might ultimately contribute to the stagnation of US military efforts by stopping its forces from attaining fatal blows to resilient terrorist structures. In this regard, it could be argued that drone use for targeted killings has become just a tactically efficient way to cut the weed, without addressing the underlying roots.

Drones’ effectiveness is mostly present in their ability to support military operations and gather valuable information. However, as long as the tactical-strategic dichotomy analysed previously, keeps misleading decision-makers from the idea that drones’ true potential will be fulfilled when their use follows strategy instead of setting it, they will fail to truly revolutionise US efforts against terrorism.

Sources:

1- Neal Curtis, “The explication of the social: Algorithms, drones and (counter-)terror,” Journal of Sociology 52, no. 3 (2016).

2- Hugh Gusterson, Drone: remote control warfare (London: The MIT Press, 2016), 6. Christopher J. Coyne, and Abigail R. Hall, “The Drone Paradox: Fighting Terrorism with Mechanized Terror,” The Independent Review 23, no. 1 (2018).

3- Patrick F. Walsh, “Drone paramilitary operations against suspected global terrorists: US and Australian perspectives”, Intelligence and National Security 32, no. 4 (2017). Coyne, and Hall, “The Drone Paradox”.

4- Gusterson, “Drone”.

5- Simon Frankel Pratt, “Crossing off names: the logic of military assassination,” Small Wars & Insurgencies 26, no. 1 (2015): 11.

6- Ann Rogers, and John Hill, Unmanned: Drone Warfare and Global Security (London: Pluto Press, 2014).

7- Walsh, ”Drone paramilitary operations”. Gusterson, ”Drone”.

8- Trevor McCrisken, ”Obama’s Drone War,” Survival 55, no. 2 (2013)

9- Jenna Jordan, ”Attacking the Leader, Missing the Mark: Why Terrorist Groups Survive Decapitation Strikes,” International Security 38, no. 4 (2014).

10- Asfandyar Mir, ”The U.S. Drone War in Pakistan Revisited”, Lawfare, https://www.lawfareblog.com/us-drone-war-pakistan-revisited

11- Patrick B. Johnston, and Anoop K. Sarbahi, ”The Impact of US Drone Strikes on Terrorism in Pakistan,” International Studies Quarterly 60 (2017): 215-216. McCrisken, ”Obama’s Drone War”.

12- Lawrence D. Freedman, ”The drone revolution: less than meets the eye,” Foreign Affairs 95, no. 6 (2016), http://go.galegroup.com.ezproxy.lib.gla.ac.uk/ps/i.do?p=EAIM&u=glasuni&id=GALE%7CA477460848&v=2.1&it=r&sid=summon

13- Tyler Wall, ”Ordinary Emergency: Drones, Police, and Geographies of Legal Terror,” Antipode 48, no. 4 (2016).

14- Johnston, and Sarbahi, ”The Impact of US“.

The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development: A Paradigm Shift in International Development

“With the 2030 Agenda the UN served its purpose as an international multilateral diplomatic forum, building consensus that resulted in a paradigm shift in international development, successfully legitimizing the synergetic relation of sustainability and development. This new framework brands development as sustainable, universal, and interdependent in economic, social and environmental dimensions and will likely spread through all layers of the UN system.”

by Eugenia Isabel Padilla

The official recognition and consolidation of sustainability into international cooperation and development  was unanimously adopted in September 2015 in the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) Resolution 70/1 titled “Transforming Our World: The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development.”  Within the UN system 2019 has been a significant year for the integration of the 2030 Agenda as it approaches its fourth anniversary. UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres announced that as of January 2019 the UN would embark on a set of systemic reforms aiming to position sustainable development “at the heart” of the organization1. During the 74th session of the UNGA in September 2019, the High Level Political Forum on Sustainable Development (HLPF) will celebrate its first high-level summit with Heads of State and Government since 2015 to discuss and negotiate a political declaration highlighting advances and shortcomings in the implementation of the 2030 Agenda2.

Unlike its predecessor, the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), the 2030 Agenda doubles its scope comprising 17 goals that span 169 targets cutting across economic, social and environmental dimensions that include six essential elements: dignity, people, prosperity, our planet, justice, and partnership3. The 2030 Agenda embodies a new paradigm for international development, labelling it as universal and  transversal, recognising the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) as a common but differentiated responsibility of all states. This represents a normative transformation concerning international development; the top layer of this reformulation being the attachment of the concept sustainability. Solely by ascribing this concept, the SDGs integrate the conservation of the environment with the procurement of social and economic capital4. In this regard, the 2030 Agenda is a milestone in developmental progress, specifically dedicating seven goals to environmental degradation concerns, in addition to goals 16 and 17 addressing rule of law and global partnerships.

The 2030 Agenda recognizes that achieving success requires intersectionality: “…eradicating poverty in all its forms and dimensions, combating inequality within and among countries, preserving the planet, creating sustained, inclusive, and sustainable economic growth and fostering social inclusion are linked to each other and are interdependent”5. The term ‘interdependent’ is key since the scope of the SDGs acknowledge in a single, consolidated agenda the unavoidable nexus between peace, gender equality, environmental degradation, social progress, and economic growth. The 2016 UNGA Special Session (UNGASS) on drug policy exemplifies these interlinkages, demonstrating how the SDGs have permeated the global agenda given their inclusive nature. This forum adjusted the international community’s efforts to combat the world drug problem by aligning international drug policy with human rights, public health, and development. Specifically, the International Expert Group on Drug Policy Metrics delineated how integrating the SDGs to drug policy will mutually reinforce results combating nine different Agenda goals, including job creation, sustainable agriculture, management of forests, and reduction of violence and corruption6. Hence, The 2030 Agenda sets a precedent for UN goal-setting initiatives to consider intersectionality between distinct issues7.

From the 1960s to the 1990s the UN envisioned development as economic growth in developing countries supported by the financial aid of donor countries8. This automatically divided member states’ roles, with developing countries given the burden of development while developed countries supplied the financial means to undertake the challenge. The 2030 Agenda is a departure from this division, making the 17 goals universal, which invalidates  the notion of development exclusively centering around poverty reduction in the Global South. Resolution 70/1 specifically states that the SDGs ‘…are universal goals and targets which involve the entire world, developed and developing countries alike.’9

Underpinning the universality of the SDGs is the principle of Common but Differentiated Responsibilities (CBDR), endorsed in the Rio Declaration in 1992. This principle acknowledges that development is a common responsibility of all countries, yet each has a distinct set of capabilities that define the extent of its contribution to international development. Reaffirming diverse national realities can allow for a more balanced approach to development that combines different efforts in different contexts with a potential collateral effect, strengthening other countries’ implementation of the agenda. The CBDR principle goes hand in hand with the global goal-setting approach of the 2030 Agenda. Governance through goals, in this case by equalizing the playing field, allows for the ‘naming and shaming’ strategy to pressure actors that do not comply. Economist Jeffrey Sachs, former special advisor on the MDG’s to the UN Secretary General, claims that goal-setting and common responsibility facilitates the mobilization of support and resources, fosters peer pressure within political spheres, and creates epistemic communities that spread  knowledge and advise on best practices10.

The 2030 Agenda is not without flaws and ambiguities. Even though the SDGs represent a new paradigm for international development, they contain contradictions inherent to their multidimensional and universal character. Scholars regard the complexity of quantifying the SDGs as one of their most critical shortcomings11. Moreover, politicization shines through in the language of the SDGs. For example, African and Arabic countries resisted the integration of LGBT rights, and indigenous peoples are mentioned once throughout the resolution12. Since 2015, the optimism surrounding the SDGs has dwindled. The United States for instance, has withdrawn from the Paris Agreement on Climate Change and is against the inclusion of climate action language in UN documents13. Clashes with the state-centric politics of the UN will continue to deter progress. 

In theory, the SDGs attempt to be as intersectional as possible—but international politics are not static, which calls for their constant evaluation and adaptation. Government regimes constantly change alongside cultural and social movements and the SDGs must do so as well. Nonetheless, with the 2030 Agenda the UN served its purpose as an international multilateral diplomatic forum, building consensus that resulted in a paradigm shift in international development, successfully legitimizing the synergetic relation of sustainability and development. This new framework brands development as sustainable, universal, and interdependent in economic, social and environmental dimensions and will likely spread through all layers of the UN system. Yet, if it will create a lasting impact within the system and beyond remains undetermined.

Sources:

1. Lebada, A. M. (2019). ‘’New Year New United Nations”: Structural Reforms Begin.”’ International Institute for Sustainable Development. Available at: http://sdg.iisd.org/commentary/policy-briefs/new-year-new-united-nations-structural-reforms-begin/

2. United Nations. (2019). “High Level Political Forum” Sustainable Development Goals Knowledge Platform. Available at: https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/hlpf
3. Renwick, D. (2015). “Sustainable Development Goals.” Council on Foreign Relations. Available at: https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/sustainable-development-goals
4. Stafford-Smith, M., Griggs, D., Gaffney, O., Ullah, F., Reyers, B., Kanie, N., Stigson, B., Shrivastaba, P., Leach., M. and O’Connell, D. (2017). “Integration: the Key to Implementating the Sustainable Development Goals.” Sustainability Science, 12, pp. 912.
5. United Nations. (2015). “A/RES/70/1 Transforming Our World: The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development.” Sustainable Development Goals Knowledge Platform. https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/content/documents/21252030%20Agenda%20for%20Sustainable%20Development%20web.pdf
6. International Expert Group on Drug Policy Metrics. (2018). “Aligning Agendas: Drugs, Sustainable Development, and the Drive for Policy Coherence.” New York: International Peace Institute, pp. 8. https://www.ipinst.org/2018/02/drugs-sustainable-development-and-the-drive-for-policy-coherence
7. Donaires Sacilotto, O., Cezarino Oranges, L., Ferreira Caldana, A. C. and Liboni, L. (2019). “Sustainable Development Goals-An Analysis of Outcomes.” Kybernetes, 48(1), pp. 186.
8. Fukuda-Parr, S. (2018). “Sustainable Development Goals.” Oxford Handbook on the United Nations: Oxford University Press, pp. 3.
9. United Nations. (2015). “A/RES/70/1 Transforming Our World: The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development.”
10. Renwick, “Sustainable Development Goals.”
11. Fukuda-Parr, “Sustainable Development Goals,” pp. 10.
12. Fukuda-Parr, S. (2016). “From the Millennium Development Goals to the Sustainable Development Goals: shifts in purpose, concept, and politics of global goal setting for development.” Gender & Development, 24(1), pp. 48.
13. Nakamura, D., and Fears, D. (2018). “Trump Administration Resist Global Climate Efforts at Home and Abroad.” The Guardian. https://www.washingtonpost.com/

The Application of Artificial Intelligence for Peacekeeping

“The increasing amount of available data, mainly due to the proliferation of access to the internet in countries where peacekeeping missions take place, has caused a technology-driven transformation of the operational environment. This comes at a time of significant developments in the fields of artificial intelligence and particularly machine learning, most of whose applications still rely on massive amounts of data. As such these developments have produced some promising individual initiatives to exploit this new and growing potential for United Nations operations.“

by Hendrik A. Pasligh

At least as early as 1996 researchers have used machine learning (ML) to predict conflicts[1]. Today, mainly due to significantly higher amounts of available data[2], advancements in computing power and the progress made in natural language processing, several artificial intelligence (AI) tools have been added to the peacekeeping arsenal. The surge in available data has mainly been caused by the proliferation of mobile phones and access to the internet[3]. The potential for companies such as Facebook to amass profits from their access to and use of people’s data makes it lucrative for them to provide access to the internet for a much lower price[4]. Thus, the equipment is now affordable for people in relatively poorer countries, which is where most peacekeeping operations take place[5]. All of these developments constitute a technology-driven transformation of the environment of peacekeeping operations. This article seeks to explore in which ways this changing environment is characterised by an increased potential for the application of AI tools.

AI tools have the potential to support peacekeeping operations in three areas: general military tasks, conflict prediction, and specific peacekeeping tasks during an operation. Among the general military tasks is the potential for optimisation and automation of administrative processes such as logistics, increasing not the effectiveness but efficiency of military operations[6]. This could lead states to be more willing to participate in peacekeeping missions and if more personnel or equipment is deployed while costs remain constant, reduce the gap between mission goals and available resources. Additionally, AI-based virtual training can be used to enhance soldiers’ tactical abilities, thus contributing to the mission’s success while mitigating casualties[7]. Sharing such programs with less developed countries  – who overwhelmingly are the main troop contributors to United Nations (UN) missions – could compensate for the lack of resources that results in insufficient training[8] for soldiers facing complex situations in peacekeeping operations[9]. Beyond that, this would certainly be in the interest of more developed countries seeking to enable local forces to take over responsibility for the security of their own countries as with the European Union Training Mission Mali (EUTM Mali).

Several studies claim that the application of machine learning tools significantly increases success in predicting conflict[10]. This can enhance the ability to understand conflict dynamics and allow for a design of peacekeeping operations that is more appropriate for preventing re-emerging or new conflicts. For example, using ML techniques such as lasso and random forests, Blair et al. found that – contrary to previous belief – ‘the risk of local violence is higher rather than lower in communities where minority and majority ethnic groups share power’[11]. The knowledge drawn from ML-driven analysis could be used to enhance prevention capabilities[12], thereby avoiding a situation in which a peacekeeping mission has to be established in the first place. It can also be applied on a tactical level, enabling a smarter allocation of resources for day-to-day tasks[13]. An important aspect here is the use of geographic information systems (GIS) which have greatly benefited from the commercialisation and subsequent affordability of satellites and satellite imagery. Machine learning[14] tools have been utilised to analyse these massive amounts of data. Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) can also contribute to this collection of data[15]. Unarmed drones were first deployed by the UN in 2013[16]. The information obtained from the use of GIS can facilitate a broad range of tasks beyond conflict prediction, including the monitoring of borders and sustainable development[17], supporting elections and other governance tasks[18] as well as field logistics[19].

Some of the most ambitious AI tools for specific peacekeeping tasks set the objective of ‘deep conflict resolution’[20], taking into account the needs and perceptions of all participants. Here, AI is used to process knowledge on conflict dynamics[21] and present it in an easily accessible way to the user in the field. This would lead to the decentralisation of knowledge and reduce a mission’s dependence on experts of psychology, conflict resolution and local culture[22]. The software cogSolv claims to provide the user with ‘options leading to truly just results’[23]. This is achieved by simulating a specific situation and, for example, suggesting to base efforts for conflict resolution on ‘Local Dignity’ instead of ‘Human Rights Discourse’.

Significant advancements in natural language processing (NLP) enabled the creation of powerful translation tools, which could enhance interoperability in multinational peacekeeping forces as well as facilitate communication with locals. Arguably even more valuable, the capability of computer programmes to process language and identify objects unlocked tools[24] to analyse open-source information, most importantly gathered from social media. A UN Global Pulse lab has used NLP to analyse radio shows in Uganda, notably including statements of people who called into the radio station, in order to gain insight into social tensions[25]. This access to unprecedented amounts and forms of information can provide peacekeeping missions with better understanding of the environment they are operating in but could also be used for smarter reactions to emergencies based on informed decision-making[26]. However, this – as well as the deployment of UAVs – raises concerns about privacy and who will have access to intelligence gathered by the UN or in the course of a UN operation[27]. Beyond that, the digitisation of UN operations might create additional vulnerabilities and establish an even more complex conflict environment by including cybersecurity risks.

In light of these numerous benefits the application of AI for peacekeeping can yield, it is worthwhile to take a look at the effort the UN is making to make the most of this technology. The UN-issued 2015 Report of the Expert Panel on Technology and Innovation in UN Peacekeeping explicitly mentions AI once – in the annexe[28]. The Secretary General’s Strategy on New Technologies recognises the importance of AI, but speaks of ‘exposure to new technologies’[29]. Nonetheless, several UN departments already make use of AI and machine learning, the Centre for Artificial Intelligence and Robotics is in the process of being established in The Hague[30] and Big Data analysis was among the main topics discussed at the 5th International Partnership for Technology in Peacekeeping Symposium in May 2019[31]. In 2013, John Karlsrud argued that in comparison to other UN activities, the possibilities of Big Data are underutilised for peacekeeping[32]. Clearly, the UN is aware of the possible benefits. However, the shift from “exploring“ and “raising awareness” to “regulating” and “committing resources” on a systemic level has yet to take place.

Sources:

[1] Trappl, R / Fürnkranz, J / Petrak, J (1996) ‘Digging for Peace: Using Machine Learning Methods for Assessing International Conflict Databases,‘ paper presented at the 12th European Conference on Artificial Intelligence, Budapest, Hungary.[2] Horowitz, M C / Allen, G C / Saravalle, E / Cho, A / Frederick, K / Scharre, P (2018) Artificial Intelligence and International Security,: Center for a New American Security, p. 13.

[3] Dorn, A W (2016) Smart Peacekeeping: Toward Tech-Enabled UN Operations,: International Peace Institute, p. 1.

[4] Taylor, L / Broeders, D (2015) ‘In the name of Development: Power, profit and the datafication of the global South,’ Geoforum, Vol. 64, pp. 229-237, p. 233.

[5] World Economic Forum (2018) ‘7 charts that show how peacekeeping is changing,’ [online] available from https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2018/06/how-the-role-of-peacekeeping-is-changing-in-7-charts/ , accessed on 3rd June 2019.

[6] Horowitz et al., p. 10-11.

[7] Cil, I / Mala, M (2010) ‘A multi-agent architecture for modelling and simulation of small military unit combat in asymmetric warfare,’ Expert Systems with Applications, Vol. 37, No. 2, pp. 1331-1343; Dormehl, L (2019) ‘The U.S. Army is building a giant VR battlefield to train soldiers virtually,’ Digital Trends, 20th March, [online] available from https://www.digitaltrends.com/cool-tech/synthetic-training-environment-vr-training/ , accessed on 12th June 2019.

[8] McCauley, A (2014) ‘Soldiers From Poor Countries Have Become the World's Peacekeepers,’ Time, 12th September, [online] available from https://time.com/3272718/un-undof-peacekeeping-golan-heights-terrorism/ , accessed on 12th June 2019.

[9] Cutillo, A (2013) ‘As Peacekeeping Becomes More Complex, Progress Needed on Training,’ IPI Global Observatory, 4th September, [online] available from https://theglobalobservatory.org/2013/09/as-peacekeeping-becomes-more-complex-progress-needed-on-training/ , accessed on 12th June 2019.

[10] Blair, R A / Blattman, C / Hartman, A (2017) ‘Predicting local violence: Evidence from a panel survey in Liberia,’ Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 54, No. 2, pp. 298-312; Perry, C (2013) ‘Machine Learning and Conflict Prediction: A Use Case,’ Stability: International Journal of Security & Development, Vol. 2, No. 3, pp. 1-18.

[11] Blair et al., p. 298.

[12] Perry, p. 2.

[13] Horowitz et al., p. 12.

[14] Naveen, J (2018) ‘4 Ways Global Defense Forces Use AI,’ Forbes, 26th August, [online] available from https://www.forbes.com/sites/cognitiveworld/2018/08/26/4-ways-the-global-defense-forces-are-using-ai , accessed on 11th June 2019.

[15] Portmess, L / Romaya, B (2015) ‘Digital Peacekeepers, Drone Surveillance and Information Fusion: A Philosophical Analysis of New Peacekeeping,’ Theoria, Vol. 62, No. 145, pp. 5-22, p. 9.

[16] Dorn, p. 6.

[17] Chen, J / Li, R / Dong, W / Ge, Y / Liao, H / Cheng, Y (2015) ‘GIS-Based Borderlands Modeling and Understanding: A Perspective,’ ISPRS International Journal of Geo-Information, Vol. 4, pp. 661-676, p. 662.

[18] Convergne, E / Snyder, M R (2015) ‘Making Maps to Make Peace: Geospatial Technology as a Tool for UN Peacekeeping,’ International Peacekeeping, Vol. 22, No. 5, pp. 565-586, p. 565.

[19] Ibid., p. 567.

[20] Olsher, D J (2015) ‘New Artificial Intelligence Tools For Deep Conflict Resolution and Humanitarian Response,’ Procedia Engineering, Vol. 107, pp. 282-292.

[21] https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2017/05/scientist-race-build-peace-machine-170509112307430.html

[22] Olsher, p. 282-283.

[23] Ibid., p. 289.

[24] International Telecommunication Union (2018) United Nations Activities on Artificial Intelligence (AI), p. 32.

[25] Hidalgo-Sanchis, P (2018) ‘USING BIG DATA AND AI TO SUPPORT PEACE AND SECURITY EFFORTS IN AFRICA,’ [online] available from https://www.unglobalpulse.org/news/using-big-data-and-ai-support-peace-and-security-efforts-africa , accessed on 3rd June 2019.

[26] Dorn, p. 12.

[27] Portmess / Romaya, p. 8-9.

[28] Lute, J H / Bager, I J / Dorn, W / Fryer, M / Guha, A (2015) Performance Peacekeeping. Final Report of the Expert Panel on Technology and Innovation.

[29] UN Secretary General’s Strategy on New Technologies (2018), p. 13.

[30] United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute (n.d.) ‘UNICRI Centre for Artificial Intelligence and Robotics,’ [online] available from http://www.unicri.it/in_focus/on/UNICRI_Centre_Artificial_Robotics , accessed on 3rd June 2019.

[31] UN Department of Operational Support (n.d.) ‘5th International Partnership for Technology in Peacekeeping Symposium Topics ,’ [online] available from https://operationalsupport.un.org/en/5th-international-partnership-technology-peacekeeping-symposium-topics , accessed on 7th June 2019.

[32] Karlsrud, J (2013) “Peacekeeping 4.0 Harnessing the Potential of Big Data, Social Media, and Cyber-technology,” in Jan-Frederik Kremer and Benedikt Müller, eds., Cyberspace and international relations: Theory, prospects and challenges, Springer, pp. 141-160, p. 143-144.

Energy (In)Security in Central Asia

“Central Asia, a region with significant strategic importance due to its geographic location and energy resources, is severely affected by the uneven distribution of energy resources, low investment, corruption and gross mismanagement that prevents them from harnessing energy security and from seizing opportunities in the energy market. Most importantly, the Soviet legacy in the five Central Asian republics—Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and Tajikistan—continues to have a negative impact on the region, which is reflected in their energy programs.”

by Andrea Marzeth Padilla

Central Asia is among the most understudied regions of the world, but it represents an important area in terms of energy resources.1 This region, which is composed of a mix of high-, middle- and low-income economies, holds significant strategic importance due to its geographic location and natural resource endowments2, particularly energy sources. However, the uneven distribution of energy resources, low investment, corruption and gross mismanagement, prevent these countries from harnessing energy security and from seizing opportunities in the energy market.3 Most importantly, the Soviet legacy in Central Asia has served as a great benefit as much as a burden, due to the region’s inheritance of major oil and gas pipelines that still centered around Russia.

The energy relations of the now five Central Asian republics—Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and Tajikistan—were first organized by the integrated power system of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), and then by the Unified Energy System of Central Asia (UESCA).4 The former held Russia as its dominating centre and is mainly characterized by a resource-sharing system, where Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan provided water to Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan in summer and received Kazakh, Turkmen and Uzbek coal, gas and electricity in winter.5   In terms of energy production, the latter consisted of 83 power plants located across the republics, with a total capacity of 25 GW, linked by a 220 and 500-kilovolt transmission line.6 But after the dissolution of the USSR (1991) and the disintegration of UESCA (2003), the five Central Asian countries were left deeply interdependent in the energy field, dealing with an energy security issue as a matter of national security. 

For a region that was used to a unified power grid and a resource-sharing system, countries had to adjust their own energy policies and develop autonomous domestic energy systems by identifying and leveraging their own resources to enhance their domestic water, electricity and gas infrastructure. Yet, the dependency on Russia after this period remained evident, although different from country to country. 7 With the exception of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, the Central Asian region became increasingly reliant on access to Russian pipelines in order to export their oil and gas resources to global markets. 8 Such are the cases of Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan, which had abundant fossil fuel reserves, enabling them to meet domestic energy needs and earn money from exports, particularly to Russia, China, Iran and Afghanistan.9 Kazakhstan remains one of the top producers of energy in the European and Eurasian region, behind Russia and Norway and ahead of Azerbaijan10, whilst the gas reserves of Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan are respectively the 5th and 8th highest in the world. 11 

In an attempt to gain full energy independence, Kazakhstan has increased its North-South energy transit capacity and has been betting on conventional renewable energy sources (RES).12 Uzbekistan increased thermal power plants (TPP) production substantially, and Turkmenistan has built several new power plants, including the first-ever combined-cycle gas-steam turbine power plant at the Mary State Power Station.13 On the other side, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan had plenty of hydropower potential but very little oil and gas of their own, preventing them to benefit from hydrocarbon exports and forcing them to rely heavily on energy imports of their neighbours.14 Nonetheless, both countries developed large hydropower plants (HPP) to compensate for the energy that their other power plants could not generate.15 At the moment, Kyrgyzstan uses just 10% of that potential, while Tajikistan uses only 5%; yet both countries already produce over 90% of their electricity from hydropower.16

Despite the fact that this region has great energy potential on the international level, these countries continue to face important challenges that prevent them from benefiting from their sufficient and sustainable energy supplies. Besides the unequal distribution of energy resources and infrastructural dependence on Russia, these countries maintain increasingly obsolescent  energy systems that are severely affected by seasonal variations of power production with water-energy linkages.17  In addition, Central Asia’s oil and natural gas industry faces a great challenge in transporting their products from the landlocked region to global markets, mainly since the majority of the existing pipeline systems still lead to Russia and any new energy infrastructure is still likely to depend on Russia for funding.18In a region where there is no common definition of energy security, cooperating among the states of Central Asia seems to be the right answer. Some experts have recommended that the cooperation among these countries will not only diversify their energy resources but also their export destinations, leading to a decrease in the dependence of Russia for successfully achieving energy security in the region.19 In part due to the lack of regional cooperation among these states, the Central Asian transport route with the rest of the world has remained underdeveloped, intensifying reliance on Russia. Therefore, a joint management of these vital resources is considered crucial not only for the region’s energy security but also for their sustainable development, poverty reduction and climate resilience.20

Sources:

1. Velázquez, S (2017) ‘Gas y petróleo en Asia Central, ¿alternativa para la dependencia energética de la UE?,’ Instituto Español de Estudios Estratégicos, p. 1.2. United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific, ESCAP. (2018) ‘Energy and Development in Central Asia: A statistical overview of energy sectors in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan,’ [online] available from https://www.unescap.org/sites/default/files/Central%20Asia%20Statistical%20Perspective%202018_WEB.pdf , accessed on 12th June 2019, pp 4.
3. Domnin, S (2016) ‘Sergei Domnin: Hydro-energy problems in Central Asia: A View from Kazakhstan,’ Central Asia Bureau for Analytical Reporting [online] available from https://cabar.asia/en/sergei-domnin-hydro-energy-problems-in-central-asia-a-view-from-kazakhstan/ , accessed on 12th June 2019.
4. Ibid.
5. International Crisis Group (2014) ‘Water Pressures in Central Asia,’ [online] available from https://www.refworld.org/pdfid/5412a6444.pdf,, accessed on 12th June 2019.
6. ESCAP, pp 30.
7. Niklasson, C (2008) ‘Russian leverage in Central Asia,’ FOI, [online] available from https://www.foi.se/rest-api/report/FOI-R--2484--SE, accessed on 20th June 2019, pp 32.
8. Hendenskog and Larsson (2007), Russian Leverage on the CIS and the Baltic states, Stockholm: The Swedish Defence Research Agency (FOI), FOI-R--2301-SE, p. 45
9. Russell, M (2018) ‘Water in Central Asia: An increasingly scarce resource,’ European Parliamentary Research Service [online] available from http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2018/625181/EPRS_BRI(2018)625181_EN.pdf , accessed on 13th June 2019.
10. Putz, C (2017) ‘Energy in Central Asia: Who Has What?,’ The Diplomat, [online] available from https://thediplomat.com/2017/06/energy-in-central-asia-who-has-what/ , accessed on 13th June 2019.
11. Ibid.
12. Wheeler, E (2017) ‘Kazakhstan's Renewable Energy Quest,’ The Diplomat, [online] available from https://thediplomat.com/2017/05/kazakhstans-renewable-energy-quest/, accessed on 13th June 2019.
13. Turkmenistan Today (2018) ‘President of Turkmenistan Launches New Power Plant,’ [online] available from http://tdh.gov.tm/news/en/articles.aspx&article14459&cat29 , accessed on 14th June 2019.
14. Russell, p. 9.
15. Smirnov, S (2009) ‘Разорвать нельзя оставить,’ Expert Kazakhstan №46, 237, [online] available from https://expert.ru/kazakhstan/2009/46/elektroenergetika/, accessed on 14th June 2019.
16. Russell, p. 4.
17. Aminjonov, F (2017) ‘Re-thinking Central Asian Energy Security: Pitfalls of Export Diversification Policies,’ Central Asia Institute for Strategic Studies, [online] available from http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/kasachstan/13546.pdf , accessed on 14th June 2019.
18. The Jamestown Foundation (2019) ‘Central Asia’s Biggest Energy Challenge,’ Oil price, [online] available from https://oilprice.com/Energy/Energy-General/Central-Asias-Biggest-Energy-Challenge.html , accessed on 15th June 2019.
19. Bahgat, G (2011) Energy Security: An Interdisciplinary Approach,: Wiley.
20. Shrestha, P (2019) ‘EU and World Bank agree €7m for energy and water security in Central Asia,’ Energy Live News, [online] available from https://www.energylivenews.com/2019/05/24/eu-and-world-bank-agree-e7m-for-energy-and-water-security-in-central-asia/, accessed on 15th June 2019.

Latin America: The World’s Deadliest Region for Environmental Activism

“In commemoration of the World Environment Day, 5th of June 2019”

By Andrea Marzeth Padilla, Louise Vingert & Mariana Garrido

Latin America (LATAM) is the most dangerous region for defenders of the environment and land, comprising six of the ten deadliest countries for environmental defenders: Brazil, Colombia, Mexico, Peru, Honduras and Nicaragua [1]. According to Global Witness’ 2018 Report ‘At What Cost?’, from the 207 environmental defenders killed around the globe in 2017, 116 died in LATAM [2]. Comprising over 50% of the world’s biodiversity [3], the region holds a vast natural wealth, attracting investment for extractivist activities — such as mining, hydroelectric exploitation and agroindustry,— which have been widely guarded by national governments independent of the many pernicious environmental and human costs.

Extractivism and its environmental damages has motivated counter-actions from environmental defenders, who speak out for the protection of their homelands’ natural diversity [4].  The  majority of them identify as indigenous peoples, making them natural protectors of the environment, yet more prone to suffer the impacts of environmental imbalances and ethnic exclusion [5]. Environmental defenders often face persecution and intimidation from corporations or contracted mercenaries, which is aggravated by widespread impunity and a weak rule of law. Three significant case studies in Brazil, Colombia, and Honduras have been chosen to overview the situation and reflect upon the reasons making LATAM an insecure region for environmental defenders.

Brazil

Brazil has been assessed by Global Witness as the most dangerous country for environmental defenders [6]. The country had a record  57 killings in 2017; 43,9% of which happened in the context of massacres in areas of the Amazon [7]. The escalation of threat can be traced back to the beginning of this decade, marked by budgetary cuts in the two most important organisations handling the protection of indigenous populations, and the land redistribution to small farmers and Afro descendants: The National Institute of Colonisation and Agrarian Reform (INCRA) and The National Foundation of Indigenous people (FUNAI). The latter was forced to close offices in remote areas, such as Vale do Javari (Amazonas), an isolated and prevalent indigenous territory. This allowed the unmonitored access of miners in indigenous areas, which allegedly led to the massacre of 10 innocent members of an indigenous group [8]. Furthermore, policy changes have made it easier for corporations to develop projects without the previous consent of local communities, further shifting the power balance in favour of big industries [9].

A notorious example of the resistance against corporate action in the region is the one of Maria do Socorro, an active leader of forest dwellers – indigenous, quilombo and riverine communities in the state of Pará [10]. Since 2009, Maria has denounced the intrusive action and water contamination of one of the world’s biggest Alumina refineries, Norsk Hydro [11]. In exchange, she has suffered threats and intimidations, while being widely ignored by local authorities, who seem to value foreign investment over environmental security. Even though the company has finally been convicted for contamination and flooding, proper justice is yet to be made. Maria continues to lead the demands for land recognition and environmental protection — a personal struggle that is also historically relevant to matters of ‘race, inequality and justice’ [12].  

The backslide on public policies for the environment and the rights of indigenous people remains ongoing in Brazil, including cuts on the National Programme for the Protection of Human Rights Defenders. The new President’s, Jair Bolsonaro, expressions of stigmatization and securitization of environmental defenders do not promise a better future, with the promise of continuing Temer’s policy of ending the ‘industry of demarcation of indigenous lands’ [13]. It bears mentioning that the Brazilian Congress has a significant influence of agribusiness lobby (Bancada Ruralista). In fact, changes in legislation have facilitated the construction work of many companies demonstrating that the law seem to lean towards the politics of big corporations, which are usually under public contract, rendering the environment and its defenders environment particularly vulnerable.

Colombia

Colombia’s record of threats against environmental defenders is part of a bigger picture of stigmatization and aggressions against human rights defenders and leftist groups in the country [14]. According to Global Witness, 24 environmental defenders were killed in 2017 [15], and at least 105 Human Rights defenders were killed in the same year [16]. Although records of threats against environmental activists have been present throughout Colombia’s history, there has been a significant rise in the killings of defenders after the signing of the Colombian Peace Process in 2016. This rampant phenomenon is closely related to land disputes that emerged as a consequence of the power vacuum left by the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) [17].

Environmental activism in Colombia is usually led by indigenous and Afro-Colombian leaders who actively speak out against the environmental impacts of mining, hydroelectric energy, illegal logging and deforestation [18]. One of the most striking examples has been the case of Francia Marquez, winner of the Goldman Environmental Prize [18], who mobilized 80 women from her community of La Toma to march 350 km to Bogotá in  protest against the illegal mining activities taking place in their homeland [20]. As a result of Marquez’s role, all those operations were forced to cease [21]. Francia’s work is nevertheless unfinished as La Toma still faces high levels of water contamination and as the activist continues to suffer life threats that forced her to move to the city of Cali [22].

Subsequent Colombian governments share the weight of responsibility for an incautious promotion of extractivism and for the effects of their inaction in the protection of environmental defenders. Many Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO’s) along with the United Nations have exhorted national authorities to take further action in the investigation of the referred killings, as well as in the development of protection schemes for its victims [23].  At the moment, the state’s protection measures include the provision of disposable cell phones and bulletproof vests, leaving the security concerns of defenders ignored [24]. Simultaneously, while there appears to be an effort by authorities to investigate the material perpetrators of crimes against defenders, intellectual authors of these crimes remain untouched[25]. The apparent systematicity of the killings, a generalized environment of stigmatization of environmental activism — defenders are often accused of narco-trafficking — not only spreads fear and distrust over defenders’ communities but contributes to the relegation of important environmental protection reforms in one of the most biodiverse countries in the world.

Honduras

Honduras has been the most insecure country per capita for environmental defenders in LATAM, with 128 people murdered since 2010 [26]. In 2009, following a coup d’état, Honduras witnessed an explosive growth in environmentally destructive megaprojects that would displace many indigenous communities [27]. Although there has been a significant decrease in the killings of environmental defenders in the last few years, the civil society continues to face waves of repression, stigmatization, criminalisation, death threats, and police brutality [28].

Moreover, the Honduran government has faced serious accusations for taking part in illegitimate agreements, bribes and crimes committed against environmental and land defenders in the country. Such is the 2016 case of Agua Zarca hydroelectric dam on the Gualcarque river, in which Berta Cáceres, a prominent human rights defender, indigenous leader and winner of the Goldman Environmental Prize in 2015, was shot dead, for opposing this project, by gunmen who entered her home in Honduras on the 2nd of March 2016.

Cáceres, had been actively leading the Lenca community’s resistance against Agua Zarca project, which has previously been linked to the killing of another human rights defender, Tomás Garcia, in 2013 [29]. In her effort to stop the Agua Zarca Project dam, Cáceres rallied her community and waged a grassroots campaign that successfully pressured the world’s largest dam developer to pull out” [30]. However, the case of Berta’s murder indicates the high levels of impunity throughout the country. For two and a half years after her assassination, Berta’s case remained unresolved until the Environmental Manager of the Agua Zarca dam project company Desarrollos Energéticos S. A (DESA), Sergio Rodríguez Orellana, alongside six others, were found guilty of her murder.  Meanwhile, powerful elites and politicians that were implicated have yet to be held accountable [31].

Berta’s story is evidence  that Honduras’ justice system, despite receiving large amounts of financial aid from the United States (US) and European Union (EU), continues to operate with negligence, impunity, secrecy and bias. In addition, the strong linkages between rich and powerful elites of the country and the environmental defenders’ assassinations are difficult to ignore in the global context, where Berta Cáceres has become the self-image of international environmental activism.

Conclusion

The daily reports of threats and murders demonstrate the high levels of insecurity encountered daily by the environmental defenders in Latin America. UN’s Former Special Rapporteur on Human Rights and the Environment, John Knox, has highlighted ‘endemic corruption’ as one of the main reasons why the region is especially dangerous for environmental defenders [32].  After a thorough analysis, it is clear that corporate and governmental interest are major factors driving the persecution, stigmatization and criminalization of these activists. Impunity and the lack of political will to resolve this issue are certainly aggravants to the problem. In this conflict between corporations extractivist conception of natural resources as profit versus an indigenous biocultural approach to the preservation of their natural ecosystems, the environment is not only a victim itself, but it is “emerging as a new battleground for human rights” [33].

Sources:

[1] Parker, A (2018) ‘Latin America is the deadliest region for environmental activists’, Open Democracy [online], available from https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/democraciaabierta/latin-america-is-deadliest-region-for-environmental-activists, accessed on 7th June 2019; Rojo, M (2019) ‘Environmental Defenders endangered in Latin America,’ Fair Planet [online], available from https://www.fairplanet.org/editors-pick/environmental-defenders-endangered-in-latin-america/, accessed on 7th June 2019.

[2] Global Witness (2019) ‘At What Cost: Irresponsible business and the murder of land and environmental defenders in’, available from https://www.globalwitness.org/en/campaigns/environmental-activists/at-what-cost/, accessed 6th June 2019.

[3] United Nations Environment Programme (2016) ‘Biodiversity in Latin America and the Caribbean’ (1 March 2016). XX Meeting of the Forum of Ministers of the Environment of Latin America and the Caribbean [online], available from http://www.pnuma.org/forodeministros/20-colombia/documentos/Background_Biodiversity_Document_26_02_16.pdf, accessed 7th June 2016.

[4] Forst, M (2016) ‘A Deadly Shade of Green: Threats to Environmental Human Rights Defenders in Latin America.’ Center for International Environmental Law, Article 19, pp. 4-5, available from www.ciel.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/Deadly_shade_of_green_English_Aug2016.pdf, accessed 6th June 2016.

[5] Mihlar, F (2018) ‘Voices that must be heard: minorities and indigenous people combating climate change’ Minority Rights Group International [online], available from https://www.refworld.org/pdfid/492d18da2.pdf, accessed 7th June 2019.

[6] Global Witness p.8

[7] Global Witness.

[8] Global Witness, Op cit., p. 25

[9] Global Witness 2017; Mitchell, C. (2018) ‘2017 was deadliest year for environmental activism: report’, Al Jazeera [online], available from https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/07/2017-deadliest-year-environmental-activism-report-180722174539780.html, accessed 6th June 2019.

[10] Barbosa, C (2018) ‘Três mulheres de Barcarena: ameaçadas, perseguidas e intimidadas’, Amazonia Real [online], available from http://amazoniareal.com.br/tres-mulheres-de-barcarena-ameacadas-perseguidas-e-intimidadas/, accessed 6th June 2019.

[11] Watts, J (2018) ‘They should be put in prison’: battling Brazil’s huge alumina plant’, The Guardian [online], available from: https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2018/jul/21/land-grab-corruption-pollution-amazon-rainforest-brazil-maria-do-soccoro-silva, accessed 8th June 2019.

[12] Watts, Op Cit..

[13] Folha de S. Paulo (2018) ‘Bolsonaro diz que pretende acabar com 'ativismo ambiental xiita' se for presidente’, Uol [online], available from https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/poder/2018/10/bolsonaro-diz-que-pretende-acabar-com-ativismo-ambiental-xiita-se-for-presidente.shtml, accessed 8th June 2019.

[14] Forst, M. (2018) ‘United Nations Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights defenders. Visit to Colombia, 20 November to 3 December 2018 End of mission statement’, United Nations Human Rights Special Procedures [online], available from https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Defenders/StatementVisitColombia3Dec2018_EN.pdf, accessed 7th June 2019; Fundación Ideas para la Paz (2016) 'Human Rights and Business Country Guide - Colombia', Fundación Ideas para la Paz and The Danish Institute for Human Rights [online], available from: http://www.ideaspaz.org/especiales/guia-empresas/colombia_country_guide_(english).pdf, accessed 17th June 2019; Galanova, M (2018) 'In Colombia, it's dangerous to be left wing', Deutsche Welle [online], available from: https://www.dw.com/en/in-colombia-its-dangerous-to-be-left-wing/a-44131086, accessed 17th June 2019.

[15] Global Witness, Op Cit.

[16] Amnesty International (2018) ‘Amnesty International Report 2017/18 - Colombia’, Amnesty International [online], available from https://www.refworld.org/docid/5a993925a.html, accessed 7th June 2019.

[17] Forst, M. (2018).

[18] Global Witness, Op cit, p. 28.

[19] The Goldman Environmental Prize (2018) ‘Francia Márquez. 2018 Goldman Prize Recipient South and Central America’, Goldman Prize [online], available from https://www.goldmanprize.org/recipient/francia-marquez/, accessed 7th June 2019.

[20] Rojas, C, Mosquera, M, Botero, P, Escobar, A (2015) ‘Fights of "good living" by black women from Alto Cauca’, Nómadas 43. Universidad Central, pp. 167-183.

[21] The Goldman Environmental Prize (2018).

[22] The Goldman Environmental Prize (2018).

[23] United Nations Security Council (2018) Resolution SC/13307. Despite Recent Challenges, Colombia Represents Pinnacle of Success in Fostering Peace, Security Council Hears at Briefing on New Developments (19 April 2018) [online], available from https://www.un.org/press/en/2018/sc13307.doc.htm, accessed 7th June 2019.

[24] Global Witness, Op cit, p. 28.

[25] El Espectador (2019) Académicos piden acciones de fondo en defensa de líderes y excombatientes (21 May 2019) [online], available from https://www.elespectador.com/noticias/politica/academicos-piden-acciones-de-fondo-en-defensa-de-lideres-y-excombatientes-articulo-861841, accessed 7th June 2019.

[26] Global Witness, Op. cit., p.21.

[27] The Goldman Environmental Prize ‘Berta Caceres’, [online] available from https://www.goldmanprize.org/recipient/berta-caceres/, accessed 5th of June 2019.

[28] Global Witness, Op. cit. p.25.

[29] Business & Human Rights Resource Centre ‘Honduras: Agua Zarca Dam impacts indigenous people by Gualcarque River,’ [online] available from https://www.business-humanrights.org/en/honduras-agua-zarca-dam-impacts-indigenous-people-by-gualcarque-river, accessed 5th June 2019.

[30] The Goldman Environmental Prize ‘Berta Caceres,’ Goldman Prize [online], available from https://www.goldmanprize.org/recipient/berta-caceres, accessed 5th June 2019.

[31] Lakhani, N (2017) ‘Honduras elites blamed for violence against environmental activists,’ The Guardian [online], available from https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/jan/31/honduras-environmental-activists-global-witness-violence-berta-caceres, accessed 5th June 2019.

[32] Schweimler, D (2018) ‘Intimidation and murder: Brazilians fight unequal land ownership’, Al Jazeera [online], available from https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/07/intimidation-murder-brazilians-fight-unequal-land-ownership-180725032455226.html, accessed 4th June 2019.

[33] Global Witness, Op cit.

The struggle for ethnic identities in Morocco and Algeria: A colonial legacy of inequalities

“The sentences of Hirak protestors were recently confirmed in appeal by the Casablanca court, reaching up to 20 years of prison on the ground of ‘conspiracy against State’s Security’. The Hirak movement occurred in the Rif, claiming the end of an economic blockade and social discrimination affecting the Amazigh regions. Five years after the Arab Spring, known as the ‘20th February movement’ in Morocco, the (under)development of the Amazigh regions remains a big issue. The popular mass protest spread in Algeria, where similar conditions are experienced by the Kabyles. These events underline the inherent connection between recognition of identity on the one hand and socio-economic inequalities on the other. Properly named Amazigh, Berber is the dominant ethnic group in Morocco and an important one in Algeria, despite the countries’ identification as “Arab”. Ultimately, questions of identity and process of Arabization in both Morocco and Algeria could be hardly understood without acknowledging their colonial past [1].”

by Sahar Lahdifi

Similarly to Algeria, Morocco’s notion of national identity is the result of a long process of colonial and post-colonial legitimisation of power. Contemporary national identity is, in reality, the legacy of a social division imposed by the French colonial state, between Arabs and Amazighs on the one hand, and Muslims and non-Muslims on the other[2]. Despite two different types of colonial rules enforced by the French colonisers – assimilationist vs associationist[3] - both Algeria and Morocco suffered from an arbitrary division on the ground of ethnicity, created to establish a policy of divide-and-rule.

Following a long struggle for independence, the two states had the important task of preserving the integrity of their respective territories. As colonial rule did little to create a shared identity, Algeria and Morocco’s first objective was to gain legitimacy through the shaping of national identity[4]. Both former Moroccan Sultan King Mohammed V and Algerian President Ahmed Ben Bella imposed a collective identity enshrined in Islamic and Arabic roots, disregarding the Amazigh population, the first inhabitants of Morocco before the arrival of Arabs and Islam in the 7th Century.

In fact, the Arabic and Islamic roots were the two main features of political and social distinction between the colonists and the natives. In the Algerian colony, Muslims had to give up Islam to become first-class citizens, emphasising Islam as a symbol of resistance during post-colonial time. For their parts, Amazighs were deemed to be favoured and associated to the colonial state regarding their more secular customs, sometimes detached from Islam. Following the independence, their distinct legal customs were suppressed under Islamic laws and unification against the colonial state resulted in Islamisation and Arabisation of the national identity, reaching the demands of the Arab nationalists.

Yet, this post-colonial unification contributed to large inequalities between ethnicities, as it had an impact on the economic and social development of the Berber regions and their inhabitants. Significant claims were made to decrease Arabisation in order to include the Berbers and Kabyles as part of the collective identity, especially concerning their language and culture in the educational system.

On March 1980, strikes occurred in Tizi Ouzou and the Kabyle districts of Algiers, known as the “Berber Spring” [5]. Thousands of young Berbers in Algeria, joined demonstrations for the official recognition of their language, as part of the Algerian national history and identity. It was not until the end of the violent Kabyle protests, called “Black Spring” in 2001, that former President of Algeria Abdelaziz Bouteflika officially recognised the Tamazight as a national language through a constitutional amendment. In Morocco, the process has taken longer due to the complicated composition of the population, as the Berbers are divided into 4 major groups (Rif, Braber, Shluh and Soussi) and those groups are further divided into tribes.

On August 20th, 1994, King Hassan II of Morocco announced the teaching of Tamazight in middle-school following international pressure by the Human Rights Commission of Vienna[6]. The rise of the Arab Spring in February 2011 incited a movement in Morocco. Their revindications concerned a larger recognition of Amazigh culture and language, alongside wider political rights. This movement was judged too significant to ignore considering the geopolitical context, and King Mohammed VI of Morocco was constrained to answer to the political demands. A new Constitution was enacted on the 30th July 2011, recognising the “Berber components” of the country[7].

The claim for identity recognition reveals a deeper struggle for economic, social, and political rights. In 2016, the death of a Berber fish vendor, Mohsen Fikri, who saw his merchandise confiscated by a policeman, unleashed the anger of thousands of Berbers in the Rif region of Morocco. The Hirak movement was born and spread throughout the whole country as well as in Algeria, claiming the end of an economic blockade affecting Amazigh regions[8]. Protestors also called for equality and the end of social discrimination, particularly in regard to employment and education. For example, illiteracy and unemployment rates in the Rif region of Morocco are higher than the national average, affecting almost half of the population. Despite infrastructure projects led by the state, the number of health facilities in the region remain fundamentally low. Access to water and electricity is disparate, as 13.3% of the population have access to clean water in rural areas compared to 91.4% in urban areas[9]. Berbers protest the discrimination experienced at the hands of the elite governing class, who are out of touch with the reality, especially following the sentencing of protestors.

Despite new participatory mechanisms enshrined in the new Constitution, civil rights and freedoms remain controversial in Morocco and impact the whole population regardless of their ethnicities. Yet, the Amazigh population has a long history of inequalities behind, that it aims to engage in despite a complex domestic context.

From colonisation to post-colonialism, collective identity in Morocco and Algeria has always been dynamically negotiated and reimagined in interaction with political, social, and economic dynamics. Indeed, questions of identity are often indicative of profound political, social and economic (in)stabilities and (in)securities.

Sources:

[1]Jonathan Wyrtzen, Colonial Legitimization-Legibility Linkages and the Politics of Identity in Algeria and Morocco, Yale University, European Journal of Sociology, Vol. 58, N°2, 2017, pp. 205-235

[2]Ibid

[3]Ibid

[4]Jonathan N.C. Hill, Identity and instability in Postcolonial Algeria, The Journal of North African Studies, Vol.11, N°1, March 2006

[5]Jonathan N.C. Hill, Identity and instability in Postcolonial Algeria, The Journal of North African Studies, Vol.11, N°1, March 2006

[6]Perspective monde, Reconnaissance des revendications berbères au Maroc,Faculté des lettres et sciences humaines, Université de Sherbrooke, Québec, 20 août 1994

[7]Preamble of the Moroccan Constitution of 201

[8]Reda Zaireg, Rif Crisis Reveals Failure of Development in Morocco, 2 January 2018, Orient XXI, https://orientxxi.info/magazine/rif-crisis-reveals-failure-of-development-in-morocco,2197

[9]Nadia Lamlili, Tensions à Al Hoceima : les chiffres des inégalités sociales qui expliquent la grogne marocaine, 25 mai 2017, Jeune Afrique, https://www.jeuneafrique.com/441734/politique/tensions-a-al-hoceima-chiffres-inegalites-sociales-expliquent-grogne-marocaine/