State of Art Computational Propaganda

Disinformation is a rapidly evolving process, and it is becoming more sophisticated with advances in and successful integration of Machine Learning (ML) and Artificial Intelligence (AI) technology. Where AI represents machine intelligence as compared to human intelligence, ML is the subset of AI which represents algorithms that perform specific tasks without explicit instructions, as they rely instead on inference and patterns. This article examines the ways ML/AI have transformed the art of disinformation campaigning, and to what extent this development will effectively shape public opinion and political discourse. ML/AI technologies are increasingly sophisticated in manipulation of both the rate and nature of information production. It is subsequently more crucial than ever to strike a balance between countering disinformation with user freedoms and overall credibility.

By Rana Al-Nusair

People have always used the term “seeing is believing” and technology professionals now speculate whether this term may have become obsolete due to progressively sophisticated iterations of ML/AI technology. Deepfake technology is a current challenge to the aforementioned points in its use of ML.[1] This software alters audio and video, to the extent that an individual with enough skill, understanding, and technological tools can create personally-targeted content which can make the subject appear as if he/she has said or done something which has not been said or done.[2] This software is particularly dangerous in the political sphere and can result in the undermining of leaders. [3]

Disinformation campaigns are currently occurring both at unprecedented quantitative and qualitative rates. It would certainly be difficult to argue that people are not experiencing a never-achieved-before state-of-the-art information war. Can the same tools that are used to create highly sophisticated false content be the same tools used to reliably counter that very content as well? With ML/AI, a rogue actor can create false content that is uniquely and intelligently tailored to the unsuspecting target audience. ML/AI introduces techniques which can easily and cost-effectively penetrate many more layers than ever experienced before in the realm of disinformation campaigns, mainly the cognitive, sociological, and political spheres. With ML, algorithms learn more information at a faster rate about any given individual or a group; this advancement stems from the vast amount of data that is readily available to the algorithms’ training sets.[4] In addition, an actor can acquire tailored information without necessarily having to engage in a physical or any kind of compromising interaction with the targeted person or audience.

OpenAI, a leading AI research company, has created software known as the GPT-2, a disinformation detection tool which spots potential bot accounts on social media based on analysis of linguistic patterns, in addition to evaluation of the spread of bot-generated disinformation content over time. In February 2019, OpenAI’s research lab stated it would not release the full code for the GPT-2, as it might be used by adversaries to generate spam and false content. In November 2019, however, OpenAI decided to release the full GPT-2 software.[5] The GPT-2 had initially trained on eight million web pages, which were not disclosed to the public. After full disclosure of the software, OpenAI revealed that the software now had trained on one and a half billion parameters.[6]  Google has expressed the same concerns over misuse of their software when they released a paper revealing that they had put constraints on research software previously shared.[7] As machines become better at mimicking their training data and thereby generating higher quality content, which could be indistinguishable from reality, malign actors –if equipped with the same level of algorithmic sophistication– could  increase the quality of their fake content in such a way as the GPT-2 by itself might not be able to reveal said content as either fake or real.

Disinformation detection software is also becoming more sophisticated, using tools such as topic detection, viewpoint clustering, narrative identification, and topic/viewpoint/narrative user interface.[8] What makes disinformation detection software, such as the GPT-2 or Grover, so effective at spotting fake content, is that the software itself is also highly adept at creating fake content, using sophisticated techniques such as signal processing analysis, physics-level analysis, semantic and physiological signals.[9] Cybersecurity professionals regularly penetrate their own software to discover their weaknesses in order to improve upon them and decrease the possibility of real adversarial attacks. As Yejin Choi, a researcher at AI2 says, “the best models for detecting disinformation are the best models at generating it”.[10]

Regarding the quantitative dimension, a study in 2017 estimated that about 15% of Twitter user accounts are bots, and this grew from approximately 8.5% based on an earlier 2014 study.[11] In 2104, this percentage represented 48 million Twitter bot accounts from the entire demographic  of Twitter users, a conservative percentage at best. Computational propaganda can be produced with  virtually no effort, minimal-to-no cost and is effective and quick. Dissemination of Deepfake videos, for example, is growing exponentially alongside the software’s’ low cost distribution. Arguably, producing these videos is easier than doing something similar on Photoshop, due to the fact that these Deepfake videos rely on machine learning rather than manual design. Deepfake videos are usually produced by combining an already existing video with new audio and image, using a class of machine learning that is called generative adversarial networks (GAN).[12]

ML/AI technology transforms the current cyber races between states, groups and individuals on multiple fronts. ML/AI achieves this change from both its fundamental qualitative and quantitative intrinsic nature. This technology transforms the quantitative aspect of competition as well by advancing autonomous machine-driven propagation, incentivizing, and multiplying adversaries with the democratization of technology in which the costs of acquiring and using the technology rapidly decrease. This ability enables virtually anyone to radicalize or sensationalize an event that could be detrimental, not only to a few targeted individuals but to masses. Additionally, considering the accountability aspect primarily through the notions of plausible deniability, it is an integral part of the transformative aspect to computational propaganda.  Transparency from the most powerful social media companies is likely a step towards countering computational propaganda; however, this step has proven difficult to establish, especially for private companies which strongly oppose criticism and are overly protective of their algorithms.

Sources

[1] Simonite, Tom. “Will ‘Deepfakes’ Disrupt the Midterm Election?” WIRED, 2018. https://www.wired.com/story/will-deepfakes-disrupt-the-midterm-election/

[2] Kertysova, Katerina. “Artificial Intelligence and Disinformation: How AI changes the way disinformation is produced, disseminated, and can be countered”, Security and Human Rights in Monitor. Pp. 11. https://www.shrmonitor.org/assets/uploads/2019/11/SHRM-Kertysova.pdf

[3] BuzzFeedVideo, “You Won’t Believe What Obama Says in This Video!”, April 18, 2017 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cQ54GDm1eL0

[4] Funk, McKenzie. “The Secret Agenda of a Facebook Quiz,” New York Times, 2016, https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/20/opinion/cambridge-analytica-facebook-quiz.html

[5] Simonite, Tom. “To See the Future of Disinformation, You Build Robo-Trolls”. WIRED, 2019. https://www.wired.com/story/to-see-the-future-of-disinformation-you-build-robo-trolls/

[6] See tweet by OpenAI at https://twitter.com/OpenAI/status/1191764001434173440

[7] Simonite, Tom. “The Text-Generator that’s too Dangerous to Make Public.” WIRED, 2019. https://www.wired.com/story/ai-text-generator-too-dangerous-to-make-public/

[8] BUSSINESS WIRE. “Datametrex Introduces World Class Bot Detection and Fake News Filter”. MARTECH SERIES, 2019. https://martechseries.com/technology/datametrex-introduces-world-class-bot-detection-fake-news-filter/

[9] Lorica, Ben. “How AI Can Help to Prevent the Spread of Disinformation”. Information Age, 2019. Accessed December 3rd 2019. https://www.information-age.com/ai-prevent-disinformation-123479466/

[10] Kalim, Faisal. “Turning fake news against itself: AI tool can detect disinformation with 92% accuracy”. WNIP, 2019. https://whatsnewinpublishing.com/turning-fake-news-against-itself-ai-tool-can-detect-disinformation-with-92-accuracy

[11] Onur Varol, et. al. “Human-Bot Interactions: Detection, Estimation, and Characterization.” (2017).

[12] Goodfellow, Ian. et. Al. (2014). “Generative Adversarial Networks”. Proceedings of the International Conference on Neural Information Processing Systems (NIPS 2014). pp. 2672–2680.

The (De-)Securitisation of Brazilian Borders: A Descriptive Framework to Draw Normative Conclusions

Brazil is amongst the most unequal countries in the world, as the nation’s social-economic inequality in particular has reached extreme levels.[1] Despite country-wide campaigns to eradicate poverty there are still roughly 24 million Brazilians who live on less than $2 per day, and 56% of the population earns less than the minimum wage.[2] Although inequality is one of Brazil’s most pressing matters, as a source for violence and instability, it has never been truly securitised. In contrast, Brazil did consider the issue of drug trafficking at its borders to be an existential threat that required the mobilisation of scarce resources and extraordinary measures. This security issue recently reached the phase of de-securitisation, not as a result of its success, but because of financial and political pressures. It was simply too costly and not feasible to protect the roughly 17,000 kilometres of remote land, water, and air that separate the country from Bolivia, Peru and Colombia, South America’s coca sources, and Paraguay, the continent’s main producer of marijuana. In this brief article, I will demonstrate that Securitisation Theory, as defined by the Copenhagen School, offers the analytical framework to display the process behind Brazil’s adoption of security threats, and that, in turn, allows us to critically assess these political decisions.

By Maarten Visser

The Theory of Securitisation provides a systematic attempt to answer possibly the most fundamental and contemplated question in the field of Security Studies: What is security? According to its theorists, ‘‘security’ is what actors make it’.[3] Securitisation is about existential threats to security, those whose severity would allow disregard for all ordinary matters and tolerate extreme measures.[4] The aim is to portray the process in which an issue of security evolves out of the realm of normal politics and becomes hierarchised. In a nutshell, the securitisation theory functions as follows: A referent actor designates a security issue as an existential threat, and convinces a relevant audience (through a speech act) of the utter emergency to act and to justify extraordinary measures. Ultimately, the theory is intended to critically assess the outcome of the securitisation process: why do certain issues get securitised, and why other perhaps far more pressing matters are not.

Similar questions could, and perhaps should be asked about security practices in Brazil. In 2016, Caroline Cordeiro Viana e Silva and Alexsandro Eugenio Pereira, scholars connected to the Federal University of Parana (Universidade Federal do Paraná - UFPR), conducted thought-provoking empirical research on the securitisation process of drug trafficking at Brazilian borders.[5] In Brazil, drug trafficking became a politicised matter during the mid-1970s, as the issue entered the political debate in which public policies and the allocation of resources were first discussed. Accordingly, the Brazilian government adopted the 1976 Law n° 6368, which provided the first authorised definition of drug trafficking. Subsequently, in 1990, the act of illicit drug trafficking was placed under Law n° 8072 ― the so-called Heinous Crimes Law. The actual process of securitisation emerged under the presidential administrations of Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva (2003-2010) and Dilma Vana Rousseff (2011-2016), with the adoption of a new range of anti-drug trafficking laws.[6] Moreover, these legal initiatives were substantiated by speech acts from both referent actors, which brought the issue from politicised to securitised. They proclaimed drug trafficking as the utmost threat to the Brazilian people that had to be dealt with urgently. Cordeiro Viana e Silva and Pereira illustrate this with the terminology used during public appearances and speeches of both Lula and Rousseff. The terms ‘drugs’ (drogas), ‘trafficking’ (tráfico) and ‘security’ (segurança), were persistently connected to strong rhetoric such as: ‘this is the most important matter’ (essa e coisa mais importante), ‘especially at our borders’ (especialmente nas fronteiras), ‘we pledge to fight’ (comprometemos a lutar contra) and ‘end the war’ (acabar com a guerra), inter alia.[7]

The securitisation of this issue reached its peak in 2011 with the adoption of the Strategic Border Plan (SBP), a multi-billion dollar project that aimed to intensify border control and improve measures to deter and combat cross-border crime, and resulted in the deployment of many thousands of federal, state and municipal police officers as well as military forces.  The SBP consisted of two separate pillars, ‘Sentinel’ and ‘Ágata’. The former, led by the Ministry of Justice, aimed to gather  permanent intelligence, while the latter was under the control of the Ministry of Defence and had a temporary, impact focused character.[8] Single Ágata operations were region specific and utilised up to 33,000 army, navy and air force personnel, together with 12 ministries and 20 government agencies.[9] Although the drug seizures had significantly increased, the extraordinary measures under the SBP were halted in 2016. After severe criticism from The Federal Court of Audit, especially in relation to issues around corruption and the exorbitant amount of money invested in the plan, the government of Michel Miguel Elias Temer Lulia (2016-2018) was compelled to revoke the SBP. Consequently, the security issue entered the stage of de-securitisation, as the extraordinary measures were replaced by less significant routine border security and the security issue was politically deprived of the emergency label. 

It can be stated that the focus on closing borders does not address the country’s fundamental domestic security issues. Therefore, the following question remains: Why does Brazil prioritise illicit drug trafficking over the threat of ever-growing inequality and corresponding poverty concerns? After all, Brazil has long acknowledged the latter as one of the nation’s most pressing matters.[10] The answer could lie in the fact that any approach to address this matter would inevitably require various unpopular fiscal and economic reform policies. Brazil has experienced a long-lasting public debate on the reform of its highly unequal tax system and intricate network of bureaucracy and regulations, which are, arguably, highly attributable to the country’s inequality levels. Brazil’s indirect taxes (ICMS and IPI) are high and it has a mildly progressive income tax. Moreover, there is virtually no tax levy on wealth, inheritances and dividends. Furthermore, the public sector benefits from extraordinary salaries along with abundant privileges, such as early retirements,[11] and public officials are often appointed for life. According to Carlos Kawall, chief economist at Banco Safra and former Treasury Secretary, pension and tax reforms are essential for the country’s future economy.[12]

As the Copenhagen School asserts, security is all about politics. Brazil’s (de-)securitisation process of illicit drug trafficking clearly evidences this. In terms of Brazilian domestic security, it is unclear what the future will bring. Noteworthy in this context, however, is that current President Jair Messias Bolsonaro seems to have won the administrative and pension-reform battle and has proclaimed to have similar ambitions for the country’s tax and judicial systems.[13] Although partly pressured by the magnitude of the after-effects of the financial crisis that struck Brazil in 2014, Bolsonaro’s reforming politics appear, at least to some extent, to be a welcome turn of events. Nonetheless, Brazil’s future success seems to necessitate a more fundamental transformation of attitude, concentrating on the country’s inequality in the broadest sense of the word together with the structural revision of its institutions and governance.

* I am grateful to Caroline Cordeiro Viana e Silva and her colleagues for their extensive help in the maze of the Brazilian systems and translations of the Portuguese language.

Sources

[1] Pedro Henrique Soares Leivas an Anderson Moreira Aristides dos Santos, “Horizontal Inequality and Ethnic Diversity in Brazil: Patterns, Trends, and their Impacts on Institutions.” Oxford Development Studies 46, no. 3 (2018): 348-362.

[2] OECD Economic Surveys, Brazil 2018 (Paris: OECD Publishers, 2018): 25-26.

[3] Barry G. Buzan, Ole Waever, Regions and powers: the structure of international security (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 48-49.

[4] Barry G. Buzan, Ole Wæver, and Jaap De Wilde. Security: A new framework for analysis. (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998), 21.

[5] Caroline Cordeiro Viana e Silva and Alexsandro Eugenio Pereira, International Security and New Threats: Securitisation and Desecuritisation of Drug Trafficking at the Brazilian Borders. Contexto Internacional, 41, no.1 (2016): 209-234.

[6] The in 2004 adopted Decree n° 5514 (shoot-down law) which allowed Brazil to shoot-down of smuggling-suspected aircraft and the 2006 Law n° 11343 which established new anti-drug legislation are examples hereof.

[7] Cordeiro Viana e Silva and Pereira, International Security and New Threats, 217-219.

[8] Ibid., 224.

[9]  Ibid., 226.

[10] Defense White Paper: Livro Branco de Defesa Nacional 2012, 16.

[11] Indiana Tomazelli, “55% dos militares se aposentam com menos de 50 anos.” economia.estadao.com.br. https://economia.estadao.com.br/noticias/geral,55-dos-militares-se-aposentam-com-menos-de-50-anos,70001827530(accessed June 6, 2017)

[12] Rachel Gamarski, “Brazil’s Lost Fiscal Decade Is Timebomb Awaiting Next President.” bnnbloomberg.ca https://www.bnnbloomberg.ca/brazil-s-lost-fiscal-decade-is-timebomb-awaiting-next-president-1.1068867 (accessed April 30, 2018) 

[13] Globo, “Reforma administrativa: Bolsonaro diz que ainda precisa dar 'polimento' à proposta.” g1.globo.com https://g1.globo.com/politica/noticia/2020/01/03/reforma-administrativa-bolsonaro-diz-que-ainda-precisa-dar-polimento-na-proposta.ghtml (accessed January 3, 2020)

Kenya and the Securitization of Refugees

By Emma Hurlbert

I. The current situation: Influx of refugees, violence, and terrorism

The circumstances of refugees in Kenya are defined by the protracted crises in neighboring countries. The ongoing Somali Civil War, conflict in South Sudan, the Rwandan Genocide, the Congo Wars, and violence in eastern part of the Democratic Republic of Congo have caused hundreds of thousands of people to flee to Kenya.[1] As of May 2019, the refugee population in Kenya is estimated at 476,695 people, the majority of whom are housed in Dadaab Refugee Complex close to the border with Somalia, and Kakuma Refugee Settlement close to South Sudan.[2]

Violence in and around the camps is a significant threat to the refugees themselves and the local populations in proximity.[3] Tension and aggression exist between the refugees and local populations adjacent to the camps.[4] Near Kakuma, the indigenous Turkana people live in tension with the refugees, especially as the camp expands into Turkana grazing areas.[5] Furthermore, violence is common among refugee identity populations. Violent or traditional justice is also common within refugee communities, as consequences according to indigenous justice systems.[6]

Armed robbery is a notable problem near Dadaab, which targets refugees, aid agencies and staff, traveling vehicles, and drug traders at night. They steal cash and low-value items that can be sold.[7] Lastly, sexual abuse and violence is an immediate and acute threat to many women and children in the camps. Rape is commonplace in deserted areas around the camps.[8]  Female Genital Mutilation is also common within the Somali communities in Dadaab.[9] The amount of violence in and around Dadaab and Kakuma is a major security concern for the refugees, aid workers, and the local populations, which the government should address.

Furthermore, as refugee flows increased into Kenya due to neighboring conflicts, so too did violence and terrorism, especially attacks orchestrated by al-Shabaab and al-Qaeda. Attacks in the last few decades have included the 1998 US Embassy bombing in Nairobi and mass shootings in 2013 at Westgate Mall and in 2015 at Garissa University, both conducted by al-Shabaab.[10] Following terrorist attacks, there have been backlashes and increasing xenophobia within local Kenyan populations against refugee populations, particularly Somalis.[11]

II. Securitization: Linking the refugees with terrorism

The Kenyan government has experienced domestic pressure to protect the country against terrorism, and xenophobia has grown against refugees.[12] Therefore they use securitizing rhetoric to link the refugee populations with terrorism and al-Shabaab, making them into an existential threat to Kenyan society, the audience of the securitizing rhetoric.[13] Therefore, the refugees themselves, rather than the violence affecting both them and local populations, become the threat perceived by the audience. This action justifies extraordinary measures, which would otherwise be unacceptable, in order to exert control over refugee populations and satisfy the concerns of the local population.[14]

Since 2012, the Encampment Policy has required refugees to live exclusively within their assigned camps and they can only travel with a Movement Pass.[15] The Policy remains strictly enforced; refugees may receive six months of jail time for leaving the camp without a permit.[16] Furthermore, refugees require a work permit obtained in Nairobi,[17] in order to legally join the labour market because they are treated as foreigners.[18] It is documented that Kenya has only granted work permits in a few isolated cases since 2004.[19] These institutional limitations make it unrealistic for refugees to obtain legal working status.

Furthermore, it is almost impossible for refugees to attain naturalized citizenship. According to the Constitution, refugees are eligible for citizenship, if they ‘have entered Kenya legally’, which has been used to deny citizenship to refugees. In practice, ‘Kenya does not appear to grant citizenship to refugees’. [20] Through these policies, refugees remain aid reliant because they cannot legally provide for themselves.

Moreover, the government has attempted to limit the refugee population to 150,000 or close the camps altogether, which would require refugees to return to a dangerous home country. These threats mark a departure from the 1951 UN Convention on Refugees principle of non-refoulement, or not returning refugees their country of origin if it remains unsafe.[21] However, national courts have blocked these attempts to limit the refugee population.

Kenya has also engaged in both explicit and encouraged refoulement of refugees.[22] In 2007 the government forcibly refouled about 400 refugees from Somalia.[23] Furthermore, there have been extensive attempts to refoule refugees using softer language, so as to mask the extraordinary measures taken. In 2013 Kenya, Somalia, and the UNHCR agreed to facilitate ‘the voluntary repatriation of Somali refugees’ over three years. [24] Though this policy hides behind the language of freedom and voluntary choice, it is a continuation of previous refoulement operations, which break the international law and norm of non-refoulement.

Notably, none of these policies directly address the violence facing the refugees, neighboring Kenyan populations, nor the workers that serve them in the camps. This absence of action demonstrates that the government does not consider the refugees as part of the population which they are responsible to protect, echoing the idea that the refugees themselves are the threat.

III. Limitations: Consequences of this approach

The policies which the Kenyan government has created through the securitization of refugees are limiting and problematic. They violate the rights of refugees, forcing them to remain aid-dependent, negate their potential to contribute to Kenyan society, break the international law and norm of non-refoulement, and foster animosity and radicalization. Additionally, the policies do not address the security threats facing the refugees themselves. The human rights of refugees are abused by their captivity within the camps and their inability to work legally, although they legally reside within the country. The refugees are therefore forced to remain aid-dependent, and they remain a drain on UNHCR resources, as well as the Kenyan economy. These effects directly undermine the goals of the UNHCR for the self-reliance of refugees.[25]

Furthermore, through the process of securitization, the government invokes extraordinary measures, which would otherwise be considered unacceptable in the international community. All of the policies outlined in the previous section break international norms, many of which have been codified into law. Perhaps most notably, refoulement is a glaring exploitation of refugee rights, breaks the agreement of the 1951 UN Convention on Refugees, and should not be acceptable.

In conclusion, these measures negatively impact Kenya’s goal of increased security. By labeling the refugees as an existential threat, the government fosters further tension and animosity between the local population and the refugees. Moreover, perhaps through their dire and unfair conditions, the camps could actually become the havens for radicalization which the government seeks to protect against. Kenyan policies pursued through the securitization of refugees are, in fact, counterproductive and harmful to both refugee and local communities.

Sources

[1] “Somali Civil War.” In New World Encyclopedia, 2015. https://www.newworldencyclopedia.org/entry/Somali_Civil_War.

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees “Somalia.” January 2018. https://www.unhcr.org/somalia.html.

“South Sudan Profile - Timeline.” British Broadcasting Corporation, August 6, 2018. https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-14019202.

“Q&A: DR Congo Conflict.” British Broadcasting Corporation, November 20, 2012. https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-11108589.

[2] United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees: Kenya. “Figures at a Glance.”, n.d. https://www.unhcr.org/ke/figures-at-a-glance.

[3] Jeff Crisp. "A State of Insecurity: The Political Economy of Violence in Kenya's Refugee Camps." African Affairs 99, no. 397 (2000): 601-632.

[4] Ibid., 610-611.

[5] Ibid., 610-611.

[6] Ibid., 603-604.

[7] Ibid., 607.

[8] Ibid., 604-607.

[9] Ibid., 604.

[10] Federation of American Scientists. “Report of the Accountability Review Boards Bombing of the US Embassies in Nairobi, Kenya and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania on August 7, 1998: Nairobi: Discussion and Findings.” January 1999. https://fas.org/irp/threat/arb/board_nairobi.html

“Foreign travel advice: Kenya: Terrorism.” UK Government. https://www.gov.uk/foreign-travel-advice/kenya/terrorism

[11] “New Encampment Policy Fuels Xenophobia in Kenya.” Human Rights First, February 8, 2013. https://www.humanrightsfirst.org/2013/02/08/new-encampment-policy-fuels-xenophobia-in-kenya.

[12] Oscar Gakuo Mwangi. "Securitisation, Non-Refoulement and the Rule of Law in Kenya: The Case of Somali Refugees." The International Journal of Human Rights 22, no. 10 (2018): 1321.

[13] Nienke Voppen "The securitization of Somali refugees in Kenya: The plan to close Dadaab refugee camp,” Utrecht University. 2017: 18-19.

[14] Columba Peoples, Nick Vaughan-Williams, and Askews & Holts Library Services. Critical Security Studies: An Introduction. Second ed. London: Routledge, Taylor and Francis, 2015: 92-106.

[15] Goitom, Refugee Law and Policy.

[16] Andrew Maina. “Development of Refugee Law in Kenya.” World Policy, March 29, 2016. https://worldpolicy.org/2016/03/29/development-of-refugee-law-in-kenya/.

[17] Maina,“Development of Refugee Law in Kenya.”

[18] Republic of Kenya Laws of Kenya, Refugees Act No. 12 of 2006. National Council for Law Reporting. http://kenyalaw.org/kl/fileadmin/pdfdownloads/Acts/RefugeeAct_No13of2006.pdf:12.

[19] Refugee Consortium of Kenya. “Asylum Under Threat.” June 2012. https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Asylum_Under_Threat.pdf

[20] Ibid.

Anna Lindley. "Between a Protracted and a Crisis Situation: Policy Responses to Somali Refugees in Kenya." Refugee Survey Quarterly 30, no. 4 (2011): 36.

Goitom, Refugee Law and Policy: Kenya.

[21] Ibid.

[22] United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. “Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees.” 1951. https://www.unhcr.org/uk/3b66c2aa10.

[23] Mwangi, "Securitisation, Non-Refoulement and the Rule of Law”, 1320-1321.

[24] Ibid., 1321.

[25] United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. “Promoting Livelihoods and Self Reliance.” 2011. https://www.unhcr.org/uk/publications/operations/4eeb19f49/promoting-livelihoods-self-reliance-operational-guidance-refugee-protection.html

Achieving 100% Renewable Energy: Political Challenges, Strategic Independence, and the Armed Forces

Achieving 100% renewable energy can not only reduce the effects of climate change, but also increase states’ strategic independence and their armed forces’ effectiveness. How can a society feasibly achieve 100% renewable energy, why are these ambitions important, and what impact would this have on armed forces?

By Marijn Pronk, Hendrik A. Pasligh & Javier Martínez Mendoza

Achieving 100% renewable energy

From a technological perspective, previous research has predominantly focused on the electricity sector. But in order to achieve the goal of complete energy renewability, a more holistic and cross-sectoral approach is necessary[1]. Technologies and industries from the supply side, i.e. energy storage and system efficiency, need to be connected to the demand side, i.e. reducing the need for energy supply through energy efficient technologies. These approaches are vital for transitioning into a 100% renewable energy system, whilst remaining in the limits that sustainable resources could offer[2,3]. Other contingencies that need to be considered are the different energy dependencies and demographics of particular countries. Brazil, with its massive Amazonian rainforest, will need different policies with regards to energy autonomy compared to Norway, which can derive almost all its electricity from hydro-power. All countries will need to forge a uniquely tailored path to deal with the effects of climate change. 

Political concerns are the main culprits preventing renewable energy policies from being implemented. Key barriers include climate science denial, the power of fossil fuel lobbies, political paralysis, outdated infrastructures, and financial and governmental constraints[4]. It is critical to overcome these obstacles in order to create a feasible plan to achieve a state in which society can depend on 100% renewable energy. Transparency, accountability, and close co-operation with public and private spheres will be paramount[5}. Country-specific action plans are necessary to equally divide the resource burdens. 

Strategic independence through renewables?

The interactions between producers, transit, and consumer countries condition the balance of power between states. Moreover, the availability of energy resources has been associated with a state’s capacity not only to increase its security and prosperity, but also to exert power in global affairs[6, 7, 8]. Achieving 100% renewable energy has the potential to challenge these dynamics. With that in mind, energy independence comes to play an important role on the assertiveness of states’ foreign policies. Asymmetric interdependence can explain the complex relationship between Russia and the European Union members. For instance, the fact that Germany is the single largest consumer of Russian gas influences its position on Russia’s hostile behaviour in Eastern Europe[9]. Germany’s position demonstrates that dependence on foreign energy supplies can limit states’ policy options.

Policy-makers have sought to achieve strategic independence through conventional fuels instead of renewables. However, a reflection on the U.S. efforts towards self-sufficiency through shale fuels, can prove this alternative as ill-fated. Due to the nature of oil and gas as commodities that bind their price to the dynamics of global trade, American consumers will remain susceptible to price hikes caused by energy supply disruptions abroad[10, 11]. The United States will not be able to disengage from the Middle East and rely less on Persian Gulf monarchies without transitioning to renewable energy. States’ willingness to undertake forceful military policies to protect strategic infrastructure of the energy supply chain can be illustrated by international considerations to spend a significant amount of resources[12] to deploy maritime forces and secure the Strait of Hormuz.

Contrary to fossil fuels, renewables represent less centralised and more locally driven energy sources. An energy transition would push the international landscape towards a more multipolar world, where net energy importers have better chances of energy independence, while alignments and dependencies currently based on conventional fuels will rearrange. Moreover, if renewables become mainstream, co-operation on climate change would strengthen and conflicts based on energy resources would eventually be less common[13, 14]. Nonetheless, this transition would not be exempt of shortcomings. For instance, political support of renewables tends to be cyclical, not constant, and a sudden shift from other energy sources might bring societal disruptions. Also, the consolidation of renewables could spark new conflicts and dependencies over newly exploited resources. Hence, a long-term approach that seeks diversification and sectoral transition first might be more beneficial than a full-scale shift to renewables[15, 16].

Renewables and the armed forces

The military represents a strong option among the sectors that could embrace the transformation. This potential arises both from the military’s massive consumption of energy[17] and its ability to promote new technologies as an early adopter. Arguments suggesting that armed forces should focus on their mission rather than saving the environment overlook the fact that renewable energy can actually significantly improve combat effectiveness and readiness. This holds true for domestic and forward bases as well as military vehicles and ships. "These technologies are a way to become more effective in combat'' said Col. Brian Magnuson, the head of the U.S. Marines’ expeditionary energy office: "this is about war-fighting capability”[18].

Domestic bases are vulnerable to power blackouts because they are connected to large power grids[19]. The advantage of renewable energy is that it can be cost-efficiently deployed in smaller units, thus allowing for decentralisation of power production[20]. The issue of energy security is even more critical in forward bases, both on the operational and strategic level. The many fuel convoys which supplied ISAF troops in Afghanistan, for example, were frequently attacked and suffered casualties[21]. There are several technologies already being developed and tested in the field. Among these are bullet-proof solar panels[22] and variations of mobile containers for power production, including hybrid energy production and storage systems. The latter are mainly based on solar power but can intelligently switch between multiple sources[23] and a “mini hydroelectric power station”[24].

A more difficult task is to fuel military vehicles, ships, and planes. Disruptions in global oil supply or even just small price fluctuations pose significant risks. Here, the U.S. Navy is at the forefront of creating a market for biofuels[25]. Ships and aircraft using blends including biofuel have been tested successfully[26]. While it will most likely not be possible in the foreseeable future to run tanks[27] and combat aircraft[28] on electricity, hybrid-electric ground vehicles[29] can reduce noise and dependency on resupply and thus decrease detectability[30] and increase the endurance of operations.

Sources

[1] Hansen, K / Breyer, C, & Lund, H (2019) ‘Status and perspectives on 100% renewable energy systems’, Energy, pp. 471-480, p. 471.

[2] Mathiesen, B / Lund, H / Hansen, K / Ridjan, I / Djørup, S, & Nielsen, S (2015). ‘IDA's Energy Vision 2050: A Smart Energy System strategy for 100% renewable Denmark’, Department of Development and Planning, Denmark, Aalborg University.

[3] Connolly, D / Lund, H, & Mathiesen, B (2016) ‘Smart Energy Europe: the technical and economic impact of one potential 100% renewable energy scenario for the European Union’, Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews, pp.1634-1653.

[4] Wiseman, J / Edwards, T, & Luckins, K (2013), ‘Post Carbon Pathways: Towards a Just and Resilient Post Carbon Future’, Melbourne Sustainable Society Institute, Melbourne, Centre for Policy Development, October 10, 2019, p. 5.

[5] Climate Transparency (2018) ‘Brown To Green: The G20 Transition To A Low-Carbon Economy’, Climate Transparency. Accessed September 10, 2019.

[6] Cunningham, T. (06.07.2016) ‘The Foreign Policy of New Energy,’ Atlantic Council, [online] available from https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/the-foreign-policy-of-new-energy/.

[7] Criekemans, D. (2018) ‘Geopolitics of the Renewable Energy Game and Its Potential Impact upon Global Power Relations,’ in: Scholten D. (eds) The Geopolitics of Renewables. Lecture Notes in Energy, vol 61. Springer.

[8] Dreyer, I. (2013) ‘Renewables: do they matter for foreign policy?,’ European Union Institute for Security Studies.

[9] Keating, D. (07.19.2018) ‘How Dependent is Germany on Russian Gas?,’ Forbes, [online] available from https://www.forbes.com/sites/davekeating/2018/07/19/how-dependent-is-germany-on-russian-gas/#6eb049643b48

[10] Cunningham, T. (2016).

[11] Bordoff, J. (09.18.2019) ‘The Myth of U.S. Energy Independence Has Gone Up In Smoke,’ Foreign Policy, [online] available from https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/09/18/the-myth-of-u-s-energy-independence-has-gone-up-in-smoke/.

[12] Masala, Carlo / Mölling, Christian / Schütz, Torben (2019) ‘Ein Schiff wird kommen? Deutsche Maritime Optionen in der Straße von Hormus,’ DGAPkompakt, Vol. 15.

[13] Criekemans, D. (2018).

[14] Global Commission on the Geopolitics of Energy Transformation (2019) ‘A New World: The Geopolitics of the Energy Transformation,’ IRENA, [online] available from https://geopoliticsofrenewables.org/assets/geopolitics/Reports/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/Global_commission_renewable_energy_2019.pdf.

[15] Dreyer, I. (2013).

[16] Global Commission on the Geopolitics of Energy Transformation. (2019).

[17] Center for International Policy (2019) ‘Sustainable Defense: More Security, Less Spending,’ [online] available from https://static.wixstatic.com/ugd/fb6c59_59a295c780634ce88d077c391066db9a.pdf , accessed on 22nd December 2019, pp. 22, 54.

[18] Gardner, T (2017) ‘ U.S. military marches forward on green energy, despite Trump,’ [online] available from https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-military-green-energy-insight/u-s-military-marches-forward-on-green-energy-despite-trump-idUSKBN1683BL , accessed on 7th November 2019.

[19] Greilich, T (2019) ’Blackout: Zu den Auswirkungen eines Blackouts auf die Bundeswehr,‘ wehrtechnik III/2019, p. 68-69.

[20] American Council on Renewable Energy (2018) The Role of Renewable Energy in National Security Issue Brief, p. 5.

[21] Kosowatz, J (2018) ‘Military Looks to Renewables in Battle Zones,’ [online] available from https://www.asme.org/topics-resources/content/military-looks-renewables-battle-zones , accessed on 7th November 2019.

[22] TNO (n.d.) ‘DEFENCE AND ENERGY,’ [online] available from https://www.tno.nl/en/focus-areas/defence-safety-security/roadmaps/protection-munitions-weapons/protection-and-survivability-of-infrastructure/defence-and-energy/ , accessed on 7th November 2019.

[23] Kosowatz

[24] Khurshid, S (2019) ‘The Green Future of NATO and the Procurement of Environmentally Friendly Defence Merchandise,’ [online] available from http://natoassociation.ca/the-green-future-of-nato-and-the-procurement-of-environmentally-friendly-defense-merchandise/ , accessed on 7th November 2019.

[25] Matthews, W (2012) ‘Bio Fleet,’ [online] available from https://www.govexec.com/magazine/features/2012/01/bio-fleet/35739/ , accessed on 9th November 2019.

[26] Whitlock, R (2016) ‘Defense goes renewable: The adoption of renewable energy by the military,’ [online] available from https://interestingengineering.com/defense-goes-renewable-adoption-renewable-energy-military , accessed on 7th November 2019.

[27] Kohlhoff, J / Müller, S (2014) ‘Technische Implikationen für eine „Postfossile Bundeswehr“,‘ Fraunhofer-Institut, p. 32.

[28] Nätzker, W (2014) ‘All Electric Aircraft,’ Europäische Sicherheit & Technik, June, p. 77.

[29] Union of Concerned Scientists (2014) ‘The US Military and Oil’ [online] available from https://www.ucsusa.org/resources/us-military-and-oil , accessed on 7th November 2019.

[30] Berdikeeva, S (2017) ‘The US Military: Winning the renewable war,’ [online] available from https://www.energydigital.com/renewable-energy/us-military-winning-renewable-war , accessed on 7th November 2019.

[31] Illustration: María Gómez 2019

Climate Change Impact on Natural Resources and Migration Across the Regions of Africa

When asked to identify trends that shape the world today, most commonly listed issues were climate change, the rise of China as a global power, the surge of nationalism, and the potential implications of artificial intelligence1. The World Economic Forum’s Global Shapers found that ‘nearly half (48.8%) of the survey participants chose climate change as their top concern, and 78.1% said they would be willing to change their lifestyle to protect the environment’2. The impact of Climate Change on the environment can be felt in many areas including the intensification of natural disasters, the increasing number of endangered species, arctic ice  melting, and the expansion of the Sahara3. When attempting to comprehend the security implications as a result of climate conditions, it is important to refer to aspects that have the potential to affect everyday life for communities. This piece presents the impact of Climate Change on the Global South and focuses on Sub-Saharan regions in regard to accessibility to natural resources and its relation with intra-regional migration.

By Sawsan Khalife

What makes a country vulnerable to climate change? 

The changing climate is a global phenomenon expected to be felt across all regions. Many countries in the Middle East are already experiencing increasing droughts in wintertime, research by the Journal of Climate points out that 12 of the world’s 15 most water-scarce countries are placed in the Middle East4. The impact of changing climate conditions is too complex to place in one category, the same goes for the reason that one country is impacted more than another. In trying to make sense of the scope and shape of its influence, Niall Smith, an expert who analyses regions’ vulnerability to Climate Change, argues that the countries with the lowest levels of economic development will face greater climate challenges as a result of a combination of socio-economic, governmental, and geographical factors rendering them less equipped to deal with the current and future threats5. Smith further identifies six places in the Global South that will be especially vulnerable to climate changing conditions. In addition to Haiti, due to hurricane frequency and intensity, Lagos in Nigeria is impacted due to the population’s rapid expansion and its strain on infrastructure and resources, especially as it is located on the Gulf of Guinea that is subject to sea levels rise. Furthermore, Yemen is highly vulnerable due to its ineffective government and weak institutions. Having been embroiled in a civil war since 2015, millions are suffering malnutrition, shortage of water, and famine. Wealthy countries can also be at risk from climate conditions, as in the case of United Arab Emirates, due to its geographic location, faces extreme water stress and temperature rise, with tremendous inequality levels6. Even though it has the technology and economic advantages to face climate conditions, it remains unclear whether distribution will be equal amongst the whole population. Finally, Manila in the Philippines and Kiribati in the central Pacific Ocean are also on the list of most vulnerable countries in the Global South. When looking at North and Sub-Saharan Africa regions, though the collective 54 countries’ contribution to greenhouse emissions is only around 2-3% globally, most of the vulnerable regions to the climate conditions are positioned on the African continent. The Climate Change Vulnerability Index 20157 found that seven out of ten countries that are at extreme risk from the temperature conditions are positioned across the regions of Sub Saharan Africa, namely Sierra Leone and Nigeria in West Africa, Chad and Central African Republic in Central Africa and South Sudan, Ethiopia and Eritrea in East Africa. Furthermore, the United Nations (UN) Climate Change conference in Nairobi8 revealed that this region’s countries are most vulnerable to and least prepared for the impact of climate change, already experiencing 0.7C increase in temperature. This is especially crucial because African nations are facing a prolonged drought mainly across three regions in southern, eastern, and the Horn of Africa, driving up the aid needs to approximately 45 million people in 14 countries9. New research warns that there will be many extreme outbreaks of intense rainfall which will hit the continent in coming years leading to floods10. 

Food and Water Security 

The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) research found that the projected changes in Africa’s regions is the critical impact on water security11. As one of the most critical issues facing the continent, climate change imposes pressure on availability and accessibility of water. The research found that current projections place 75-250 million people at risk of increased water stress in the next decade. Furthermore, a UN report predicts that water availability will be the main cause of national conflict in the next 25 years12. Water resources are declining as a result of drying-up rivers, flooding, drought, and inconsistencies in rainfall. This is a severe problem as most nations are heavily dependent on rain for agriculture and food distribution. Unbalanced distribution of rain will lead to reduction in crop yields and livestock productivity, causing significant changes in the landscape across the region13.

According to the IPCC, the Western Sahel region will experience the strongest drought. The area experiences a population growth rate of 2.8% annually which will expedite shrinking land and water resources, and primary dependence on rain-fed agriculture14. Findings show that in addition to the drought conditions, the Sahel has also been challenged with around five million people being displaced in 2019 as a result of armed conflict and 24 million in need of humanitarian assistance, making the resource scarcity even more crucial. The West Africa region will have to adjust to a reduced crop production and risk its food security prospects as a result, and Southern Africa will go through droughts and heat waves in the coming decades. Afrobarometer15 conducted a cross-regional survey between 2016 and 2018 consisting of 45 thousand respondents in 34 countries to observe how climate conditions affect the livelihood of farmers. Respondents16 answered that climate conditions for agriculture production have worsened over the past decade for the participants from 30 of the 34 countries with North Africans less likely to report a negative impact on crops. This negative impact of climate change reaches all dimensions of food security, in relation to availability, economic and physical accessibility, utilisation, and stability over time17.

The Migration-Climate nexus 

The aforementioned impacts on food and water security have direct relation to the internal migration across the regions, they will serve as a significant push factor in internal migration18. Intra-regional migration flows in West Africa can be explained by a well-entrenched tradition shaped by kinship and religious networks, demographic factors, security and livelihood, and a fear of terrorist attacks19. However, strong evidence shows that the climate conditions are compounding migration in West Africa20. The flow of people is shown to arrive mostly from the Sahel (Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger and Chad) as a coping strategy to fight the scarce resources of a dry and deteriorating landscape, to better prospects in the West Africa region in countries with more plantations, mining and coastal activities such as Cote d’Ivorie, Nigeria, Senegal, Ghana and Gambia21. Northwest Africa is facing rising sea levels, desertification, and drought, which will likely add to the number of seasonal migrants22. These migration conditions will intensify if global emissions increase. A Groundswell report by the World Bank on Internal Climate Migration in Sub-Saharan Africa23 reveals that by 2050 the expected number of internal migrants could reach 85 million, around 4% of the total population of the region, if CO2 emissions increase. East Africa, which is highly dependent on rainfed agriculture, could see an average of 10 million climate migrants by 2050 under similar conditions. However, the report also shows that internal migration will increase regardless of the changes in global greenhouse gas emissions. This is mainly due to lower water availability and crop productivity, combined with rising sea levels and storm surges. 

Climate Change is a challenging phenomenon and we are yet to understand its full scope and influence. It is affecting various places in the world, especially the regions in Africa. This piece attempted to map those impacts on the continent by referring to recent findings and analyses. In the future research is needed into how Climate Change impacts are going to shape the national security of countries, and how the regional security is affected as a result.

Sources

1.  https://www.ft.com/content/dc49d2f8-9fe3-11e8-85da-eeb7a9ce36e4

2.  https://www.businessinsider.com/world-economic-forum-world-biggest-problems-concerning-millennials-2016-8

3.  https://www.ft.com/content/72e1092b-1611-3413-8c19-56a43f0661ae

4.  https://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/08/opinion/sunday/friedman-the-other-arab-spring.html

5.  https://time.com/5687470/cities-countries-most-affected-by-climate-change/

6.  https://yaleglobal.yale.edu/content/uaes-unsustainable-nation-building

7. https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Climate_Change_2015_Press_Countries_V01.pdf

8.  https://unfccc.int/files/press/backgrounders/application/pdf/factsheet_africa.pdf

9.  https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/analysis/2019/06/10/drought-africa-2019-45-million-in-need

10. https://www.theguardian.com/science/2019/jun/14/africa-global-heating-more-droughts-and-flooding-threat

11.  https://www.ipcc.ch/site/assets/uploads/2018/03/climate-change-water-en.pdf

12.  https://350africa.org/8-ways-climate-change-is-already-affecting-africa/

13.  Ibid

14. https://www.un.org/africarenewal/magazine/december-2018-march-2019/global-warming-severe-consequences-africa

15.  http://www.afrobarometer.org/

16. https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2019/09/23/african-nations-are-among-those-most-vulnerable-climate-change-new-survey-suggests-they-are-also-least-prepared/

17. http://www.fao.org/climate-smart-agriculture-sourcebook/concept/module-a1-introducing-csa/chapter-a1-1/en/

18.  https://www.brookings.edu/research/the-climate-crisis-migration-and-refugees/

19. https://www.brookings.edu/blog/africa-in-focus/2019/09/20/africas-climate-crisis-conflict-and-migration-challenges/

20.  ibid

21.  ibid

22.  https://www.brookings.edu/research/the-climate-crisis-migration-and-refugees/#footnote-3

23.  https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/29461/GroundswellPN1.pdf?sequence=6&isAllowed=y

Welcome to the Security Distillery 3.0

As we enter a new year, the baton is passed on once more to a new cohort of young and energetic hopefuls who will take over this third year of the Security Distillery. We are full of excitement around this handover as we plan out new posts and additional forms of media content, whilst continuing with the hard work put in by past cohorts. However, it is also a time of great uncertainty in global politics and we have much to follow: the Iran crisis, US President Trump’s impeachment trial, intensifying terrorist violence in West Africa and climate change, to name a few. It may be redundant to say at this point but, globalisation, and all things that go under this umbrella term, is making international security analysis increasingly complex and nebulous.

In order to have as much clarity as one can with security issues, it is important to take a step back and ask oneself the basic questions, as with every subject matter. For the Distillery, these questions are: security of what, from what, for whom and by what means? Why has President Trump proposed to spend a further $7.2 billion on building the wall with Mexico? [1], or why did the European Union spend €98.7 million more to counter terrorism rather than tobacco addiction when in 2016 alone 700,000 Europeans died from tobacco consumption whilst 142 were killed in terrorist attacks [2, 3, 4, 5,]?

By Maria Patricia Bejarano

Securitisation theory

We have chosen to organize our articles by theme, in order to add some continuity to the reader’s experience. Our first theme of the Security Distillery this year is to be case studies of securitisation, as this theory aims to answer the core questions by subverting traditional security studies assumptions, and arguing that security issues are socially constructed and not universally given. This entry will be a short introduction to the theory, and case studies in the next month will delve in to applications of the theory, looking at the securitisation of sex work, refugees, immigration and the case of Brazil.

Securitisation is a theory which focuses on the process of making something a security issue, unlike traditional security theories which focus on the subjects of security themselves (ie. Realists would say that the subject of security is the nation-state and its territorial integrity, while Liberalists would argue for human security). Securitisation, which is closely associated to the Copenhagen School of thought (See: Ole Wæver, Barry Buzan and Jaap de Wilde), was developed in the 1990s and is seen as a constructivist approach to security. Unlike previously mentioned traditional theories, securitisation argues that anything can be a security issue as long as it passes through a specific process whereby a subject is securitised.

The process of securitisation is as follows: a securitising actor identifies an issue they believe is a threat to a referent object, and conveys this as a spoken message to an audience through a speech act, which advocates that extraordinary measures must be taken in order to protect the referent object from this existential threat. In other words, a security issue becomes a security issue because somebody says so. Oft cited examples of securitisation are terrorism and migration, as mentioned above. These phenomena, although statistically-speaking pose much less of a threat than automobile incidents, for example, are considered issues of high security importance and prioritisation. Authors within the Copenhagen School argue that it is precisely because terrorism and migration have become securitised that they are considered more important and more threatening than other potential security issues. From this idea stems the notion of (de)securitisation, which looks at the process of returning a securitised issue back to its normal non-urgent state. There are, of course, criticisms and shortcomings to the theory of securitisation (See: Bill McSweeney). The dependency of speech acts on the securitisation process does not consider other forms of communication, the static nature of the securitisation process does not take into account the fact that language and communication are fluid and constantly evolving processes, and furthermore, the need for a securitising actor to have legitimacy in order to convey their speech act implies that those outside of the elite cannot securitise an issue. However, in spite of these criticisms, it is still important to consider the real-world examples of securitised issues as they have far-reaching consequences in politics, economy and security worldwide. Over the next four weeks we will see examples of these consequences as we publish one case study of securitisation every week. We hope that you find them as compelling as we did and look forward to publishing more series like this one over the coming year at the Security Distillery.

SOURCES

1. The Washington Post, (2020). Lawmakers from both parties criticize White House plan to take $7.2 billion in Pentagon funding for Trump’s border wall. Available at: https://www.washingtonpost.com/immigration/lawmakers-from-both-parties-criticize-white-house-plan-to-take-72-billion-in-pentagon-funding-for-trumps-border-wall/2020/01/14/675838d4-36ed-11ea-bf30-ad313e4ec754_story.html [Accessed 14 January. 2020].

2. European Parliamentary Research Service, Europol, (2016). Terrorism. How Parliament is addressing the threat. Available at: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/infographic/europe-and-terrorism/index_en.html [Accessed 9 January. 2020].

3. European Parliament, (2017). EU budget 2018 approved: support for youth, growth, security. Available at: https://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/press-room/20171127IPR88936/eu-budget-2018-approved-support-for-youth-growth-security [Accessed 9 January. 2020].

4. European Commission, (2004). "Feel free to say no" anti-smoking campaign hits the road again. Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_04_323 [Accessed 9 January. 2020].

5. European Parliament, (2016). 700,000 deaths a year: tackling smoking in the EU. Available at: https://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/headlines/society/20160518STO27901/700-000-deaths-a-year-tackling-smoking-in-the-eu [Accessed 9 January. 2020].

The Rohingya Crisis and the Challenges of Implementing R2P Principles

Rohingya refugees are among the most persecuted ethnic groups in the world. Over the last two decades, the Rohingya people have been systematically persecuted by Myanmar's military and the local Buddhist monks.  Due to the influence of Russia and China, The UN Security Council has thus far failed to take decisive action against Myanmar’s consistent human rights violations in the Rakhine State against the Rohingya people. If the international community continues to ignore the Rohingya crisis on the basis of individual states’ internal affairs, then the situation risks devolving into a crisis on the scale of Rwanda.  

By Md Badrul Islam

Preventing mass atrocities was the founding objective of the United Nations (UN). Since its establishment, the UN has enacted various international humanitarian laws aimed to  protect civilians from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity[1].  The UN also passed laws like ‘Universal Declaration of Human Rights’, and established political commitments such as ‘Responsibility to Protect’ (R2P), which establishes a code of rights directing states to protect individuals within and beyond their borders. It is the responsibility of individual states as well as the international community to uphold these laws to prevent mass atrocities. Nevertheless, at the time of implementation, participants in the assembly refrained from incorporating the word ‘genocide’ in the humanitarian crisis legislation in order to avoid moral and legal condemnation against states who fail to intervene[2]. When a crisis does not serve strategic interests, foreign states are usually reluctant to interfere in the internal matters of another country. Human rights abuses typically result in nothing beyond states formally condemning the perpetrators and distributing humanitarian aid to the victims[3]. A meaningful intervention requires financial support, troops, and military resources. States, both individually and as a collective, typically decide against deploying such resources absent any major perceived benefit from intervention. 

American statesman, George Kennan, argued that diplomatic and political support are employed only when they serve the states’ own interest, without considering the moral implications[4]. The difference in the international response towards the Rwandan genocide and the Bosnian genocide is a good example of this. NATO conducted airstrikes in concert with United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) under the mandate of United Nations in 1994 and 1995 to stop massacres in Bosnia and Herzegovina[5]. However, at the same time in 1994, the United States, Belgium, France, and others ignored the Rwandan genocide where 800,000 people were slaughtered within 100 days[6][7]. Additionally, it is difficult to evaluate the full extent of atrocities due to restricted access to affected areas. International laws and established norms are very important for the protection of human beings, but states are rarely obliged to follow them. Moreover, the principle of the R2P has not yet been fully actioned since R2P is neither a law nor a legally binding framework.  UN member states remain at odds regarding under which cases this principle should be applied. The division between great powers in the Security Council underlies this gridlock.  

The United States, United Kingdom, and France see mass atrocities as a threat to international stability. On the other hand, Russia and China continue to  promote absolute state sovereignty above R2P, though they vocalize their agreement with the R2P principles[8]. The Myanmar government has ignored the calls of the international community and continue to receive political and military support from countries like China and Russia. In 2007, China and Russia vetoed the first ever Burma resolution to stop attacks on ethnic minorities, to release political prisoners including Nobel Peace Laureate Aung San Suu Kyi and to allow humanitarian organizations into the country. It was the first multiple state veto since 1989[9]. China and Russia argued that the situation in Myanmar was not a threat to peace and security. In addition, they argued that the Security Council is not an appropriate venue for discussing other state’s internal affairs. China and Russia have consistently used their veto power against the UN Security Council and General Assembly initiatives in order to prevent intervention in Myanmar. In March 2017, China and Russia blocked a Security Council meeting to discuss the situation in Rakhine State[10]. Moreover, the UN resolution on Myanmar to permit aid workers, safeguard the return of all refugees, and grant full citizenship to the Rohingya was also opposed by China, Russia, Cambodia, Laos, the Philippines, Vietnam,  Belarus, Syria, and Zimbabwe[11]. Experts predict that China and Russia will veto the draft resolution on Myanmar which requires nine votes without any vetoes by the United States, United Kingdom, France, Russia, and China in order to pass. China, however, failed to stop the Security Council briefing that accused Myanmar’s military of genocide against Rohingya Muslims and urged pressuring Myanmar to put an end to human rights abuses[12].

Presently, China and Russia continue to provide political support to Myanmar. For instance, both countries recently voted against the UN Third Committee’s draft resolution on the human rights situation in Myanmar[13]. China is interested in increasing its presence in Myanmar to constrain Western influence because of its economic and strategic objectives and Beijing’s long term strategic interests in the Indian Ocean. Therefore, China is seeking to increase its presence in the Bay of Bengal by building ports in territorial waters of countries in the South Asian coastal region. China is the biggest investor in Myanmar, and is looking to build a seaport in Kyaukphyu, Rakhine State[14]. Moreover, China wants to develop its southwestern region, which shares a common border with Myanmar. It is easier and more cost effective for China to use Myanmar’s port and territory to develop this region. In 2007, Reuters reported that China was looking to take a stake of up to 85% of strategically important seaports in Myanmar for its One Belt, One Road initiative[15].

Russian interest in Myanmar is related to arms sales, and, more importantly, as a potential source of gas reserves, a resource for which Russia is also a major producer.  The Russian oil company Bashneft has invested US $38.3 millions in a central Myanmar oil field[16]. Moscow is one of the main sources of arms for the Myanmar military, particularly advanced weapons[17]. Myanmar signed a contract with Russia in 2018 for the purchase of six Sukhoi Su-30 SM multirole advanced fighter jets worth $38.3 million[18]. Moreover, Russia views Myanmar as its entry point in a pivot to Asia and a gateway to expanding Moscow’s presence in Southeast Asia[19]. Southeast Asia is becoming a strategically important region for economic and military power, while Myanmar’s geographical location offers land connectivity with East Asia, South Asia and Southeast Asia. The rise of China in this region challenges the security of ASEAN countries and the US military presence. Therefore, Russia seeks to serve as a potential counterweight through its relations with countries like Myanmar, Vietnam, Indonesia[20]. Furthermore, Western economic sanctions on Russia due to the annexation of Ukraine intensify Russian focus on Southeast Asian countries like Myanmar as a means to balance its economic and political partners. In a geopolitical context, Russia and China support each other and are seeking to create a bloc against US-led Western initiatives. On the other hand, as a regional and neighboring power, India also supports Myanmar because it shares a large eastern border. In this way, India shares a strategic interest with China because Myanmar is a good source of natural resources, and geopolitical connection for India. 

Finally, Myanmar’s constitutional reform in 2008 remodeled the state into an “eye wash democracy”, a governmental system appearing democratic on the surface that is actually undemocratic. Myanmar remains under strong military rule wherein the military maintains complete autonomy in matters of defense, security, and foreign relations[21]. In addition, prior to 2011, during the five decades of the authoritarian regime and the implementation of the current democratic facade, Myanmar’s military controlled its economy, resources, political system and foreign relations. Therefore, the military remains a prominent political actor in the minds of Myanmar’s civilian population. For that reason, military action against minority groups tends to be supported by most Buddhists citizens. Moreover, Buddhist monks, including the civilian leadership in the government, consistently spread propaganda against Rohingya Muslims[22]. As a result, most of  Myanmar’s citizens support the attack on the Rohingya. Nevertheless, it is imperative to view the Rohingya case in terms of the international community’s, especially the UN Security Council’s, R2P. If the R2P was applicable in the cases of Kosovo and Darfur, then it should be invoked in the case of Myanmar. In Kosovo, NATO commissioned airstrikes without a Security Council mandate nor the UNSC resolution 1769 for the deployment of UN and AMIS troops to end violence and mass killings in Darfur[23][24]. The international division within the council may hamper the process, but if the Security Council continues to ignore this genocide on the grounds of state sovereignty, then the it is likely to result in  a crisis on the scale of Rwanda.     

Sources

 1. United Nations General Assembly, (2009), Implementing Responsibility to Protect, Available at http://responsibilitytoprotect.org/implementing%20the%20rtop.pdf [Accessed 16 November. 2019].

2. Ibrahim, A., (2016). The Rohingyas: inside Myanmar’s hidden genocide. London, Hurst.

3. Li, X. (2018). Rohingya Crisis: What the International Community Should and Can Do. Availableat:http://dukeundergraduatelawmagazine.org/2017/10/30/rohingya-crisis-what-the-international-community-should-and-can-do/ [Accessed 16 November. 2019].

4. Kennan, G.F., (1985). ‘Morality and foreign policy’. Foreign Aff., 64, p.205.

5. Daalder, I., H., (1998). ‘Decision to Intervene: How the War in Bosnia Ended’, Brookings, Available at: https://www.brookings.edu/articles/decision-to-intervene-how-the-war-in-bosnia-ended/ [Accessed 7 January. 2020].

6. Human Rights Watch Report, (1999), Ignoring Genocide, Available at: https://www.hrw.org/reports/1999/rwanda/Geno15-8-01.htm [Accessed 7 January. 2020].

7. BBC, (2019). ‘Rwanda genocide: 100 days of slaughter’. 4 April, Available at https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-26875506. [Accessed 7 January. 2020].

8. Baranovsky, V. and Mateiko, A., (2016). Responsibility to Protect: Russia’s approaches. The International Spectator, 51(2), pp.49-69.

9. Steinberg, D.I., (2007). The United States and its allies: the problem of Burma/Myanmar policy. Contemporary Southeast Asia, pp.219-237.

10. The Irrawaddy. (2017). Analysis: China Backs Myanmar at the UN Security Council. Available at:https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/burma/analysis-china-backs-myanmar-un-security-council.html [Accessed 13 November. 2019].

11. The Guardian, (2018). China and Russia oppose UN resolution on Rohingya. Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/dec/24/china-russia-oppose-un-resolution-myanmar-rohingya-muslims [Accessed 10 Apr. 2019].

12. Nichols, M. (2018). China fails to stop U.N. Security Council Myanmar briefing. Available at https://www.reuters.com/article/us-myanmar-rohingya-un/china-fails-to-stop-un-security-council-myanmar-briefing-idUSKCN1MY2QU [Accessed 16 November. 2019].

13. UN General Assembly Third Committee Seventy Fourth Session, (2019). Third Committee Approves 5 Draft Resolutions on Situations in Iran, Myanmar, Syria, amid Outcry over Targeting of Certain Countries. Available at: https://www.un.org/press/en/2019/gashc4282.doc.htm [Accessed 4 January. 2020].

14. Chau, T. (2019). China-led port project inches ahead in Myanmar. Available at https://www.asiatimes.com/2019/07/article/china-led-port-project-inches-ahead-in-myanmar/ [Accessed 4 January. 2020].

15. Lee, Y. & Myint, S.Y.S. (2017). Exclusive: China seeks up to 85 percent stake in strategic port in Myanmar. Available at: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-silkroad-myanmar-port-exclusive/exclusive-china-seeks-up-to-85-percent-stake-in-strategic-port-in-myanmar-idUSKBN1811DF [Accessed 4 January. 2020].

16. Myanmar Times, (2017), Myanmar-Russia ties reviewed, Available at https://www.mmtimes.com/national-news/25467-myanmar-russia-ties-reviewed.html [Accessed 4 January. 2020].

17. Asrar, S., (2017). ‘Who is selling weapons to Myanmar?’AL Jazeera, Available at https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/interactive/2017/09/selling-myanmar-military-weapons-170914151902162.html. [Accessed 4 January. 2020].

18. Myint, M., (2019). ‘Myanmar Military Chief Inspects Airliner Assembly in Russia’. The Irrawaddy, Available at: https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/burma/myanmar-military-chief-inspects-airliner-assembly-in-russia.html [Accessed 4 January. 2020].

19. Lutz-Auras, L., (2015). Russia and Myanmar–Friends in Need? Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs, 34(2), pp.165-198.

20. Gorenburg, D., & Schwartz, P., (2019). ‘Russia’s Strategy in Southeast Asia’. Ponars Erasia, Available at: http://www.ponarseurasia.org/memo/russias-strategy-southeast-asia [Accessed 4 January. 2020].

21. Yi, T. S. (2018). ‘Myanmar: Under the name of democracy, the military rules’. CIVICUS. Available at: https://www.civicus.org/index.php/who-we-are/about-civicus, [Accessed 4 January. 2020].

22. Ibrahim, A., (2016), op. cit.

23. Gholiagha, S., (2013). From Kosovo to Syria – Why R2P is of no use if the UN Security Council is unable to act together. Available at https://verfassungsblog.de/from-kosovo-to-syria-why-r2p-is-of-no-use-if-the-un-security-council-is-unable-to-act-together/, [Accessed 7 January. 2020].

24. UN Security Council Resolution 1769, (2007). Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan, Available at http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/1769, [Accessed 4 January. 2020].

More is Not Always Better: Intelligence Lessons from the Search for Osama bin Laden

‘We’re now in an age in which our primary adversary is easy to kill, he’s just very hard to find’ - Michael V. Hayden, Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (2007)[1]

by Ricardo Ehe

When US President Donald Trump announced on the 27th of October 2019 the death of the leader of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi, one might have been reminded of the search for and killing of another central figure in Islamic terrorism: Al-Qaeda founder and former leader Osama bin Laden (OBL). Similar to Baghdadi today, the bin Laden case had extensive (western) media coverage on the US raid itself but put less emphasis on the preceding intelligence efforts to find him in the first place. While all the details of the Baghdadi case are still to be revealed, the bin Laden case shows in hindsight the centrality of intelligence analysis. Analysing the search for OBL in more detail gives insight into what the intelligence community is generally capable of. This following provides a short overview and analysis of the lesson learned in one of the most central intelligence operations of the 21st century.

 Summary

After the US’ decision to invade Afghanistan in its declared ‘Global War on Terror’, one specific objective was to capture or kill OBL. Three months after 9/11 this objective became achievable when the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) indicated that OBL’s location was likely to be Tora Bora, a cave complex near the Pakistani border in eastern Afghanistan which also served as al-Qaeda’s headquarters.[2] In early December 2001, as the US approached and fought at Tora Bora, OBL was able to escape through the mountains into Pakistan. According to the Abbottabad Commission Report, OBL went to various places across Pakistan before he ultimately moved with some of his wives and children into the ‘custom-built compound’ in Abbottabad in 2005.[3]

In the beginning, analysts were divided on the question of whether he was hiding in a rural, cave-like compound in the mountains or in a safe-house within an urban environment. A game changer in the first phase of the search was to shift the key question from ‘where is bin Laden?’ to ‘how does he communicate?’. Through various sources, the CIA was able to verify that OBL was using a single, trusted, personal courier to communicate with the outside world and did not use any kind of electronic communication device. Ultimately, through an intercepted phone call, the courier was located in north-western Pakistan which later led the CIA to the compound in Abbottabad. From then on, the challenge was to verify whether OBL was actually there or not. Until right before the raid, the presence of OBL at the Abbottabad compound remained an ‘educated guess’ and could not be undoubtedly confirmed.[4] Eventually, Operation Neptune Spear with the aim to capture or kill OBL was successful. Under the direction of the CIA, a Navy Seals Team entered the Abbottabad compound and killed OBL on 2nd May 2011.[5] 

Lesson learned

When Barack Obama became the US President in 2009, he made the bin Laden search the CIA’s number one priority for fighting al-Qaeda. But even before that the US was not hesitant to commit ‘money, technology and ingenuity to the problem’.[6] After OBL’s escape from Tora Bora, CIA’s Counterterrorism Center increased their personnel from 340 to 1,500, utilised various computer systems, and offered a bounty of twenty-five million dollars.[7] With this in mind it becomes clear that the US was not lacking the political will to deploy any resources available and considering that the CIA is one of the world’s most sophisticated intelligence agencies, their assets were extensive. However, as Dahl points out, simply throwing money at a problem does not necessarily lead to success. The fact that the CIA was not able to find OBL for almost a decade shows that even ‘the best technology, the most money, and the most-brilliant thinking is not always enough’.[8]

This lesson can be drawn from two important findings of the bin Laden search. First, it can be deduced from the attempt to ‘flood the zone’ in Operation Cannonball. When in 2006 the CIA was still clueless about the location of OBL, they decided to send a significant amount of personnel into Afghanistan and Pakistan. The underlying notion clearly followed the logic of ‘the more the better’. A logic that originates from traditional Cold War tactics which was, for instance, applied in the Korean War when the CIA sent 200 officers into the country in an attempt to produce high amounts of human intelligence. As most commentators agree, Operation Cannonball provided only very limited clues on OBL’s whereabouts.[9] Instead, ‘the more agents the CIA deployed to Afghanistan and Pakistan, the more leads were generated and the more wild goose chases resulted’.[10] Considering that OBL was CIA’s top priority, every single lead had to be tracked down even though it did not result in any beneficial outcomes.[11]

Second, this lesson can be similarly deduced from the attempt to verify OBL’s presence in the compound after it was located in Abbottabad. US intelligence agencies (most notably the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency) applied all technical means in their arsenal to confirm the target. However, since the compound had no internet connection or telephone line, their success was limited.[12]

The takeaway from this lesson is certainly not to say that the high prioritisation of the bin Laden search and the resources deployed were overvalued, rather, it relates to the intelligence strategy itself. As Deniston suggests, sometimes you have to follow ‘parallel search tracks’ or apply strategies independent of their starting point.[13] In a scenario where traditional tradecraft does not result in the aspired goal, it is the variation that can make a difference. It is important to emphasise, as mentioned before, that more assets can also lead to negative results, as the overload of input can increase noise and is likely to obscure a clear view in a sea of information. 

 Sources

[1] Michael V. Hayden, ‘A Conversation with Michael V. Hayden’ (Council on Foreign Relations, 9 July 2007), https://www.cfr.org/event/conversation-michael-v-hayden-0.

[2] Peter Bergen, ‘The Account of How We Nearly Caught Osama Bin Laden in 2001’, The New Republic, 30 December 2009, https://newrepublic.com/article/72086/the-battle-tora-bora.

[3] Doug Stanglin, ‘Leaked Pakistan Report Details Bin Laden’s Secret Life’, usatoday, 7 August 2013, https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2013/07/08/pakistan-commission-osama-bin-laden-al-jazeera-leaked-report/2498565/.

[4] Erik J. Dahl, ‘Finding Bin Laden: Lessons for a New American Way of Intelligence’, Political Science Quarterly 129, no. 2 (26 June 2014): 179–210, https://doi.org/10.1002/polq.12183, 191.

[5] Schmidle, Nicholas. ‘Getting Bin Laden’, 1 August 2011. https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2011/08/08/getting-bin-laden.

[6] Dahl, ‘Finding Bin Laden’, 183.

[7] Ibid.

[8] Ibid., 205.

[9] Ibid., 185.

[10] Ibid., 201.

[11] Ibid., 183.

[12] ‘Osama Bin Laden Killed: Phonecall by Courier Led US to Their Target’, 3 May 2011, sec. World, https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/pakistan/8489078/Osama-bin-Laden-killed-phonecall-by-courier-led-US-to-their-target.html.

Emergency Management as a Security Discipline

Emergency Management is a sub-discipline of security relying heavily on planning and co-ordination. Effective emergency management leverages resources during natural disasters and other crises to ensure human security both domestically and internationally. Analysing this field at the United States’ municipal and state-levels allows us to examine the varying command structures and assess how the government ensures its citizenry and critical infrastructure during major incidents.

By Caitlyn Roth and Casey Cannon

The Emergency Management field in the United States (US) holds a unique position in its national security apparatus. Emergency Management (EM) is dissimilar from the more prominent security fields in that its agencies do not contain intelligence divisions, enforcement arms, nor do they ensure national defence. However, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) is positioned within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and is responsible for ‘reducing the loss of life and property and protecting American institutions from all hazards by leading and supporting the nation in a comprehensive, risk-based emergency management program of mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery’ (1). Based on this definition, emergency management would fall into the Human Security school of security theory. Like other security fields within the US, Emergency Management agencies vary to some degree in each state and generally feature a FEMA division responsible for their region, a state Emergency Operation Center (EOC) and municipal emergency management agencies that are tasked with coordinating response between agencies during crises. At each level of government, these agencies have different protocols and Incident Command Structures (ICS) that dictate operations in anticipation of, during, and after major incidents (2). This paper will evaluate two cases: the July 2019 New York City (NYC) power outage, and Hurricane Irma, which hit Florida in 2017. The responses to these incidents will be examined to analyse the ways in which emergency management operations differ on opposite corners of the country and through the lens of two different levels of government. The evaluation of the (NYC) power outage will focus on the response by the NYC agencies and how co-ordination played an essential role during the outage. The Hurricane Irma case will assess how the government at the state-level organises and responds to a major hurricane. These instances will provide an overview of the EM field, and how geography and levels of government influence EM coordinated responses.

New York City Blackout 

On July 13th of 2019, a power outage struck New York City, leaving more than 70,000 residents and critical infrastructure, such as traffic lights, without power (3). Significant power outages such as this pose substantial risk to the citizens living in the affected area. Blackouts can present challenges to public health, medical services, transportation, hospitals, emergency services, as well as several other areas. To co-ordinate incidents that require a multi-agency response, NYC relies on a management structure called the City Incident Management System (CIMS), which defines the strategy and agency roles during an emergency from the start of the incident until stability is restored (4). In the case of a significant blackout, NYC’s power utility provider, Con Edison, is responsible for restoring power and identifying the cause of the blackout. In an outage of this scale, however, other agencies would necessarily be involved. The city’s first priority is to ensure the safety of people that might be endangered by a loss of power. In this instance, the New York Fire Department (FDNY) was dispatched to buildings to rescue individuals trapped in elevators; the Metropolitan Transit Authority (MTA) was responsible for assessing the impact on the subways and addressing risk posed to passengers; the New York Police Department (NYPD) was tasked with, among other things, responding to vulnerable populations (defined as adults over 65 and residents who require assistance with daily activities that rely on electrical power) (5)(6). 

CIMS recognises that a multi-agency response of this scope requires significant co-ordination. In such instances, New York City Emergency Management (NYCEM), an agency that is specifically tasked with managing and providing support in anticipation of and during crises, serves as the Co-ordinating Element. NYCEM is responsible for ensuring that the CIMS command structure is in place and facilitating interagency coordination. In an incident like a power outage, NYCEM would be in consistent contact with Con Edison to get updates on the scope of the outage and estimated time to restoration while updating other agencies, including the mayor's office (7). To facilitate seamless connectivity between agencies, NYCEM has liaisons in nearly every NYC agency and direct lines to gather information and update stakeholders. NYCEM also has a substantial cache of resources and teams of emergency responders available for dispatch. During an incident like a blackout, clear and timely communication is essential to preventing panic and the spread of misinformation. Throughout such instances, NYCEM will put out regular communication through its NotifyNYC program and Twitter account. As the incident unfolded, the NYCEM Twitter account tweeted and retweeted several dozens of messages that provided updates on the outage and affected areas. In this instance, there was public concern that the outage might have been caused by a malicious actor as part of a cyber-attack. Consistent messaging, however, confirmed that the blackout was in fact due to a faulted 13,000-volt distribution cable that relay systems failed to isolate. The fault shut down power to a large portion of the Upper-West Side of Manhattan (8). If the incident were to become so large in scope that the city became unable to manage the crisis, the state and federal emergency management structures can step in and provide support. Fortunately, in this instance, the inter-agency co-ordination structure executed its function and power was restored later that evening with no significant injuries reported. The July power outage demonstrated the essential function that CIMS plays in multi-agency co-ordination during major incidents.

Hurricane Irma

On September 10th, 2017, Hurricane Irma was upgraded to a Category Four hurricane just prior to making landfall on Cudjoe Key, 20 miles north of Key West, Florida. The Florida Keys, a 356 kilometer archipelago at the southernmost part of the State of Florida, received approximately 30 centimeters (cm) of rainfall, and experienced a storm surge of over three meters (9). The average elevation of the lower keys, where Cudjoe Key is located, only sits one metre above sea level (10).  With maximum sustained winds in the Atlantic Basin recorded at 298 kilometres per hour (kph) for 37 hours at its peak, Hurricane Irma was named the strongest hurricane ever observed, according to an analysis by the National Weather Service (11). The hurricane also held seven trillion watts of energy, or twice the amount of energy than that of all bombs reportedly used during World War II. The force of this storm was so powerful that earthquake seismometers recorded it (12). The death toll, encompassing the moment Irma first made landfall on the Leeward Islands in the northeast of the Caribbean, to the storm’s end over South Carolina, reached 134, with 94 casualties recorded in the United States (13).

Hurricane Irma posed an immense risk to the critical infrastructure and residents of Monroe County, which is vulnerable to extreme weather events due to its position in the Atlantic Basin, therefore, disaster mitigation plans were crafted to be extensive and highly organised. Florida’s Division of Emergency Management (FDEM), which reports directly to the Executive Office of the Governor of Florida, is tasked with maintaining a comprehensive statewide emergency management program. Within FDEM, the State Emergency Response Team (SERT) co-ordinates the efforts of the federal government with other departments and agencies of the state, county, and municipal governments, as well as school boards and private agencies having a role in emergency management. Under SERT, all state agency personnel are trained and equipped to work in collaboration during an emergency and to combine resources to provide streamlined and effective disaster mitigation to victims in Florida. Just prior to the storm, an executive order (17-235) by Governor Rick Scott, set limitations and rules for disaster mitigation, and provided a comprehensive framework to lead reaction and response efforts (14). Among the most important aspects of Executive Order 17-235 were provisions for directing all state, regional, and local governmental agencies to identify necessary personnel to assist in meeting the needs created by this emergency. It further suspended any statute, rule, or order that would prevent, hinder, or delay any mitigation, response, or recovery action necessary to cope with the disaster. Additionally, the Adjutant General of Florida was ordered to activate the Florida National Guard, and the Florida Department of Transportation (FDOT) was ordered to waive the collection of toll road fees and other charges used for major public highways to assist in efficient evacuation processes. They also reversed the flow of traffic as necessary, closed roads to facilitate gasoline deliveries and emergency response personnel, and waived size and weight restrictions for vehicles transporting other emergency equipment (15). The FDEM director was designated as the State Co-ordinating Officer for the duration of the emergency and was tasked with executing the the state’s comprehensive emergency management plan. 

As in the case of the 2019 New York City blackout, accurate and timely communication was considered paramount in anticipation of Irma. Misinformation and panic can spread quickly, therefore FDEM and SERT set up 24 hour call centers at the Florida Emergency Operations Center in Tallahassee, staffed with volunteers who could assist people affected by the storm. Additionally, SERT maintained a constant presence on social media, primarily through its Twitter account to disseminate accurate information in real time to Floridians. Both Governor Rick Scott and the FDEM director made a point to bolster communications via regular updates on all major news broadcasts. 

A state of emergency was declared four days before the storm made landfall that covered all 67 Florida counties, and Keys residents were placed under a mandatory phased evacuation due to the fact that there is only one road out of the archipelago (16). This was to ensure a safe and speedy exit and prevent major traffic congestion. In total, 6.5 million people within the state evacuated and 77,000 people sought refuge in hurricane shelters (17). When the storm passed, entrance to the Keys was restricted to emergency personnel and equipment only to begin the initial response process. FDOT was tasked with ensuring the entire overseas highway and its 41 bridges were structurally sound and critical infrastructure had not been washed away (18). The Coast Guard assisted in recovery efforts as well as general policing to reduce looting concerns, and a curfew was put into place restricting movement overnight. Residents were permitted to enter on a scheduled basis with vehicle permits once the highway was deemed safe for travel, but only during specific times. Each vehicle had to be cleared at a checkpoint by the Monroe County Sheriff’s office prior to being granted entry. In total, once adjusted for inflation, Hurricane Irma’s path of destruction cost $50 billion, making it the fifth costliest hurricane on record. Presently, Monroe County has the nation’s highest building standards to mitigate effects from these powerful storms, and the damage caused by Irma could have been significantly worse in a low lying coastal area like the Keys, as there is currently no structure in Monroe County built to withstand the 298 kph winds Irma generated in the Atlantic Basin (19).  

Conclusion

The EM field relies on after-action reports to identify lessons learned and apply them to future disasters. The wide range of stakeholders, both public and private, that may be involved in this process underscores the essential role of an EM agency in co-ordinating responses to these crises. The NYC blackout and Hurricane Irma response efforts demonstrated the importance of the EM offices, but also how emergencies are managed at differing levels of government in different parts of the country. Specific EM agencies, however, are not unique to the US, as the European Union offers the Emergency Response Coordination Centre (ERCC) and the United Nations (UN) contains the UN Disaster Assessment and Coordination (UNDAC), to name but two (20). Threats such as climate change will continue to call upon creative and effective institutions and decision-makers prepared to learn and adapt to developments in the threat landscape. This reality will call for continued investment in planning, personnel, and infrastructure to address the breadth of security threats in this emerging field.

Sources:

1. Witt, J ‘Federal Emergency Management Agency Mission Statement’ https://govinfo.library.unt.edu/npr/library/nprrpt/annrpt/vp-rpt96/appendix/fema.html

2. ‘NEW YORK STATE COMPREHENSIVE EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT PLAN: Volume 3’ http://www.dhses.ny.gov/planning/cemp/documents/NYS-CEMP-Vol3.pdf

3. Barron ,J & Zaveri, M ‘Power Restored to Manhattan’s West Side After Major Blackout’ New York Times

4. Citywide Incident Management System (2017)

5. Bauman, Ali ‘NYC Blackout: Cause Of Massive Manhattan Outage Under Investigation’ New York CBS local: https://newyork.cbslocal.com/2019/07/14/new-york-city-power-outage-cause/

6. Hames, E et al, ‘A GIS Approach to Identifying Socially and Medically Vulnerable Older Adult Populations in South Florida’ (2017) Link: https://academic.oup.com/gerontologist/article/57/6/1133/2632031

7. Citywide Incident Management System (2017)

8. Frehse, R & Romine, T ‘Preliminary report shows faulty relay protection system caused NYC power outage’ CNN https://edition.cnn.com/2019/07/15/us/new-york-city-power-outage-con-edison/index.html

9. Amadeo, Kimberly. (2019) ‘Hurricane Irma Facts, Damage, and Costs’ The Balance: https://www.thebalance.com/hurricane-irma-facts-timeline-damage-costs-4150395

10. Gastesi, R. (2019) ‘Green Keys! A Plan to Create a Sustainable Florida Keys’ Sustainable Action Plan: http://greenkeys.info/intro-policy-outreach/

11. National Weather Service. ‘Detailed Meteorological Summary on Hurricane Irma’ Hurricane Irma Synopsis: https://www.weather.gov/tae/Irma_technical_summary

12. Amadeo, Kimberly. (2019) ‘Hurricane Irma Facts, Damage, and Costs’ The Balance: https://www.thebalance.com/hurricane-irma-facts-timeline-damage-costs-4150395

13. Tropical Weather (2019). ‘Hurricane Irma Facts’:https://www.thebalance.com/hurricane-irma-facts-timeline-damage-costs-4150395

14. Executive Office of the Governor (2017). ‘Executive Order Number 17-235: Emergency Management- Hurricane Irma’: https://www.flgov.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/SLG-BIZHUB17090402490.pdf

15. IBID

16. Monroe County Emergency Management (2017). ‘Evacuation Information’:https://www2.monroecounty.gov/oem

17. Amadeo, Kimberly. (2019) ‘Hurricane Irma Facts, Damage, and Costs’ The Balance: https://www.thebalance.com/hurricane-irma-facts-timeline-damage-costs-4150395

18. Goodhue, David (2017). “No automatic re-entry post-irma, county says’ Florida Keys News: https://www.flkeysnews.com/news/local/article172306727.html

19. Amadeo, Kimberly. (2019) ‘Hurricane Irma Facts, Damage, and Costs’ The Balance:https://www.thebalance.com/hurricane-irma-facts-timeline-damage-costs-4150395

20. United Nations Disaster Assessment and Coordination - UNDAC Field Handbook (2018) https://www.unocha.org/sites/unocha/files/1823826E_web_pages.pdf

The Internet as an Extension of Colonialism

Globally digital technologies and the Internet have been increasingly normalised seeing Western states dominate cyberspace and technological developments. As such, questions have arisen regarding the prominence of Western bias at both the developmental and implementational level leading to negative implications for non-Western users. This article draws upon the concept of digital colonialism seeking to address the potential emergence of colonial attitudes towards integration and usage of digital technologies and the Internet. 

by Heather McDonald

The use of technology across the world has increased rapidly in recent decades resulting in a reshaping of how individuals and states interact, function, and develop. As such, our world is now heavily interconnected and sees digital technologies impacting nations’ ability to thrive politically, socially, and economically.1 The spread of digital technologies has been met with the belief that technological innovation could help liberate and progress the countries of the African continent to ‘catch them up’ with the West. However, the Internet and digital technologies, such as mobile phones, and the process of colonialism can be understood as historically intertwined2 as both have been developed and implemented with Western states and organisations as the driving forces at play. Meaning, globally we have seen the integration and dependency of the Internet and digital technologies spread from the West and imposed on other states, the African continent in particular. These technologies spread often through the likes of government sponsored charity initiatives like ‘Computers 4 Africa’, a United Kingdom based charity who provides schools in African nations with computer supplies. Or through the likes of ‘Free Basics’, a mobile app developed by Facebook allowing users to access a small selection of websites that can be viewed without paying for mobile data,3 which was heavily criticised for encouraging users to pay for digital technologies but also due to the fact the websites offered were majority in English rather than the native language of the country. However, it must be acknowledged that colonialism as a term is situational and  often sees blanketed use to describe the experiences of many different individuals and countries4 and so, as with colonialism, each African country will have a different experience with digital technologies.

The Digital Divide and Digital Colonialism  

From the normalisation of digital technologies across the globe, has stemmed a ‘digital divide’, understood as “the unequal access to and usage of new technology”5. This has seen those in poverty across Western states disadvantaged, but also throughout the global spectrum, less affluent countries are also struggling. Unlike other forms of technology, the Internet provides African nations the ability to interact on an international platform with the rest of the world,  overcoming the previous barriers that have hindered the continent 6. However,  digital technologies and the realm of cyberspace came late to the African continent, largely due to the aftermath of colonialism and the countries focusing on state-building7. Nevertheless, this  delay in progress has not meant digital technologies and the Internet have not progressed at all within African nations, as highlighted through the use of mobile phones and social media in the Arab Spring or in Nigeria where their Nollywood industry has been exported to large Western media streaming sites.   

However, due to the origins, implementation and development of digital technologies and the Internet, cyberspace and cyberculture have arguably become a product of the West. Cyberculture, the way in which people perform online, can at times be perceived as a reflection of Western morality and perceptions of ‘right and wrong’. This mimics behaviours deemed desirable in Western culture, which historically was carried out on a global scale through the process of colonialism8. The sub-Saharan region of Africa has been described as ‘a technological desert’9 and, similar to previous technological revolutions, this process began in the West and was then imposed upon the less developed regions of the world. 

This digital divide has seen the development of digital colonialism, which addresses the multitude of issues that have come from the Westernisation of the Internet but also the enforcement of digital technologies towards less developed countries across the African region. The digital divide arguably goes further than being about those who simply do not have access to digital technologies and the Internet10, rather the digital divide addresses the lack of access to the international markets, increased security threats, and cultural norms that have been brought by the West to the African continent. Digital technologies and the Internet have been reflective of colonial tendencies through the fact that Western states, in an attempt to ‘help’ countries across Africa, have steered them towards the adoption of digital technologies11 and encouraged a dependency on them despite providing only a small handful of benefits such as access to international markets.  This situation is reminiscent of colonial times when Western states approached African countries in an attempt to ‘fix’ or ‘democratise’ their governments,  we may be seeing a modern day equivalent through the deployment of digital technologies to the continent12. 

Digital Native

From this digital divide and digital colonialism, the concept of ‘digital native’ has evolved into the notion that those who are born with access to the Internet and are, in turn, socialized by it are those most likely to thrive online 13. Often during colonial times, the people across the African continent were seen as subservient individuals 14 who were to follow the rules put out by Colonisers.  Through digital colonialism, individuals across the African continent have been subservient to the colonial nature of cyberspace and the ways digital technologies have been spread. Many issues similar to those present during the colonial peak have re-emerged for individuals across Africa in regards to a lack of agency and individual freedom.  Many African people have gained access to these technologies but not the freedom to develop content such as web pages or social media platforms in their own way15. Digital natives have much more power16 and therefore use this to create their own space with their own norms, shaping their online world according to their own outlook. This power dynamic sees the formation of an ‘othering’ concept,17 deeming digital natives the desirable norm and non-natives as needing to be assimilated. Consequently this dynamic is reflective of the types of power dynamics the African continent saw during the colonial period which does not take into consideration the cultural and spatial differences across the continent18. This ‘othering’ of individuals online based on their technological interaction creates a binary ideology of those who are not ‘native’ to the online world.   

Business in Cyberspace 

Finally, cyberspace and the Internet can be viewed as an extension of colonialism in regards to the business world.  The BBC reports that as the Internet spreads across the African continent, more businesses are moving online and reaching a larger market19. Cyberspace has the ability to deconstruct the pre-existed physical borders that put constraints on businesses or governments to trade in the international market therefore providing economic benefits for countries across Africa. However, the countries of the continent that have really benefited from this movement towards cyber activities are those with stable and strong economies and telecommunication systems already in place20. New digital technologies create an environment where “missionaries declare the scriptures” 21 due to the fact that these digital technologies have been beneficial to the societies and environments they were created in and where the developers and users often assume all experiences will then be the same. Simply because digital technologies have revolutionised the business world of the West by providing platforms for smaller business, encouraging e-commerce, and digital banking, does not mean that this is the same for countries across Africa. 

Conclusion

The role of digital technologies across the African continent have minced and furthered patterns that were prevalent during the colonial period. Digital technologies across the African continent have produced an environment where colonialism is able to occur simply on a new platform and in a new manner. While the African continent are not merely passive bystanders in this situation, the issue does not entirely lie with them. Rather it is the mindset of Western states and companies regarding African countries that has furthered this problematic situation. Until the digital divide is breached allowing the African continent to develop their own responses to digital technologies and operate in cyberspace on their own terms, these patterns reflecting colonial prejudice and technological bias may prevail.

Sources:

1. Igun, S.E. (2011). Bridging of Digital Divide in Africa. International Journal of Information and Communication Technology Education, 7(1), pp.11-20.

2. Jandrić, P. & Kuzmanić, A, 2016, ‘Digital Postcolonialism’, IADIS International Journal on WWW/Internet, available at: http://www.iadisportal.org/ijwi/papers/2015131203.pdf

3. Solon, O. (2017). 'It's digital colonialism': how Facebook's free internet service has failed its users. [online] the Guardian. Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2017/jul/27/facebook-free-basics-developing-markets [Accessed 1 Dec. 2019].

4. Bayart, J. and Ellis, S., 2000, ‘Africa in the world: a history of extraversion’, African Affairs, 99(395), pp.217-267.

5. Fuchs, C. and Horak, E. (2008). Africa and the digital divide. Telematics and Informatics, 25(2), pp.99-116.

6. Hillard, R.L., 2002, Getting Ready for Cyberspace and The Structure of Cyberspace. In Hilliard, R.L. and Robins, M. (Eds), Beyond boundaries (pp1-17) and (pp19-26) Portsmouth (N.H.): Greenwood.

7. Hillard, R.L., 2002, Getting Ready for Cyberspace and The Structure of Cyberspace. In Hilliard, R.L. and Robins, M. (Eds), Beyond boundaries (pp1-17) and (pp19-26) Portsmouth (N.H.): Greenwood.

8. Langmia, K., 2016. Globalization and Cyberculture An Afrocentric Perspective, Springer International Publishing, Cham

9. Mbarika, V., Jensen, M. and Meso, P. (2002). Cyberspace across sub-Saharan Africa. Communications of the ACM, 45(12).

10. Fuchs, C. and Horak, E. (2008). Africa and the digital divide. Telematics and Informatics, 25(2), pp.99-116.

11. Jandrić, P. & Kuzmanić, A, 2016, ‘Digital Postcolonialism’, IADIS International Journal on WWW/Internet, available at: http://www.iadisportal.org/ijwi/papers/2015131203.pdf

12. Langmia, K., 2016. Globalization and Cyberculture An Afrocentric Perspective, Springer International Publishing, Cham

13. Brown, C. and Czerniewicz, L. (2010). Debunking the ‘digital native’: beyond digital apartheid, towards digital democracy. Journal of Computer Assisted Learning, 26(5), pp.357-369.

14. Langmia, K., 2016. Globalization and Cyberculture An Afrocentric Perspective, Springer International Publishing, Cham

15. Igun, S.E. (2011). Bridging of Digital Divide in Africa. International Journal of Information and Communication Technology Education, 7(1), pp.11-20.

16. Jandrić, P. & Kuzmanić, A, 2016, ‘Digital Postcolonialism’, IADIS International Journal on WWW/Internet, available at: http://www.iadisportal.org/ijwi/papers/2015131203.pdf

17. Brown, C. and Czerniewicz, L. (2010). Debunking the ‘digital native’: beyond digital apartheid, towards digital democracy. Journal of Computer Assisted Learning, 26(5), pp.357-369.

18. Tickner, A., 2003, ‘Seeing IR Differently: Notes from the Third World’, Millennium: Journal of International Studies, 32(2), pp.295-324.

19. BBC News. (2015). Cyber-crime: Africa's 'next big threat'. [online] Available at: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-34830724 [Accessed 1 dec. 2019]

20. Hillard, R.L., 2002, Getting Ready for Cyberspace and The Structure of Cyberspace. In Hilliard, R.L. and Robins, M. (Eds), Beyond boundaries (pp1-17) and (pp19-26) Portsmouth (N.H.): Greenwood.

21. Haywood, T. 1998, Global Networks and the Myth of Equality: trickle down or trickle away. In Loader, B.D. (Ed), Cyberspace divide equality, agency, and policy in the information society (pp. 19-35), London ; New York: Routledge.

Violence Against Indigenous Women in Canada: Does it Matter if it is Called Genocide?

Sexist and racist policies and practices in Canada have created an environment inimical to the health, safety, and wellbeing of Indigenous women and girls. In light of the finding of the National Inquiry into Missing and Murdered Indigenous Women and girls that the treatment of Indigenous women in Canada amounts to genocide, this piece examines the importance of labeling this issue ‘genocide’ and why this finding has garnered some resistance in Canada. 

By Leilani Roy-Wright

In June of 2019, Canada’s National Inquiry into Missing and Murdered Indigenous Women and Girls (The Inquiry) published its Final Report. The Inquiry concluded that the violence perpetrated against Indigenous women and girls in Canada amounts to genocide.1 It collaborated with a team of legal experts and lawyers to publish a separate report specifically on their findings related to genocide. The conclusion was detailed and based on a meticulous understanding of relevant law.2 The Inquiry’s mandate was to examine and report on all forms of violence against Indigenous women, girls, and 2SLGBTQQIA (Two-Spirit, lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, queer, questioning, intersex and asexual) people. The Inquiry process included truth gathering through a series of hearings as well as research, collaborations with experts and community knowledge keepers, and forensic investigations into police records.3 The Final Report revealed widespread violence and demonstrated that the factors leading to individual acts of violence are the direct result of colonial policies.4 Examination is required into the idea that Indigenous women in Canada have been the victims of genocide as it is presented in The Inquiry’s reports on Missing and Murdered Indigenous Women and Girls (MMIWG) and the implications of calling, or not calling, this violence a genocide. 

Many Indigenous communities in Canada grieve the murder or disappearance of a community member. In 2014, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) recorded at least 1,181 cases of MMIWG spanning the previous three decades.5 The Inquiry reported that Indigenous women have a greater chance of being killed by strangers or acquaintances, seven times more likely to be targeted by a serial killer, and sixteen times more likely than Caucasian Canadian women to be murdered.6 Additionally, Indigenous women and girls make up the majority of people who are trafficked in Canada.7

Despite pressure from Indigenous families and activists, previous Canadian governments have primarily ignored the issue, insisting that murders and disappearances were simply individual criminal acts.8  They failed to acknowledge that the issue lay not only in the commission of the crimes but also in the failure of government and law enforcement to react effectively to prevent and respond to cases involving Indigenous women.9 An example of such a failure was the murder of Helen Betty Osborne who was physically assaulted and brutally murdered after being forced into a car with four men and driven out of town.10 In the Aboriginal Justice Inquiry of Manitoba which investigated the case, RCMP officers stated that ‘they were aware of white youths cruising the town attempting to pick up Aboriginal girls for drinking parties and for sex. The RCMP told the Inquiry that it was not their practice to stop the cars to discover if the girls were of age or in the car willingly.’11 This statement suggests a decided lack of concern for the safety of Indigenous girls. 

In response to The Inquiry’s findings, Andrew Scheer, leader of the Official Opposition, stated that though it is tragic, he does not see it as genocide.12 Scheer’s statement brings up important questions about why this violence constitutes genocide according to The Inquiry. It would be hard to claim that these events are not tragic, but how they constitute genocide is more complicated because in most cases the crimes were not committed by the Canadian state directly or officially endorsed by it. 

The Inquiry argues that the Canadian government and law enforcement have failed to effectively protect Indigenous women and girls from violence. This was clear in the case of fifteen-year old Tina Fontaine, whose body was found in a river after she was murdered.13 The Canadian government had repeatedly interfered with her family and community’s ability to raise her but had not upheld their responsibility to care for her as a ward of the state.14 Nothing was done when she informed a child-welfare worker that she was spending time with a sixty-two year old methadone drug user, though it should be noted that the same man was later acquitted of her murder.15 Additionally, the Native Women’s Association of Canada found that ‘“only 54% of murder cases involving Aboriginal women and girls ha[d] led to charges of homicide,” compared with the national rate of 84%.’16 

One impediment to investigations and the laying of charges has been the fact indigenous women often face prejudicial assumptions that they are involved in sex-work.17 A minority of MMIWG and two spirit people have actually been demonstrated to be sex workers.18 Even so, ‘[b]oth the denial of sex workers’ worth and human dignity and the assumption of Indigenous women’s sexual availability and engagement in sex work are highly problematic.’19 The framing of Indigenous women as deserving of violence because of their assumed promiscuity ignores perpetrators and instead blames victims.20 Additionally, this narrative attributes Indigenous women’s presence in sex work to the women themselves, ignoring the racism and socio-economic strife that often push Indigenous women into sex work.21 Some Indigenous victims reported having their victim statements discredited by police at the time of recording them due to their race, mental health status, or engagement in substance use or sex work at the time of the crime.22 Law enforcement officers have at times contributed to the problem by themselves physically or sexually assaulting victims. In response, many have faced little or no legal action, and some never investigated.23

Participants in the Inquiry’s Truth Gathering Process indicated that the violence against Indigenous women, girls, and 2SLGBTQQIA people comes as a direct result of colonialism and accompanying government policies in Canada. The Residential School System and the ‘Sixties Scoop’ saw families ripped apart, children being deprived of their culture, and being physically and sexually abused, shamed, and neglected. These policies left trauma and wounds in the form of poverty, substance abuse, and violence.24 Overt racism from settler Canadians, paired with sexism, have created an environment that is often hostile towards Indigenous women, girls, and 2SLGBTQQIA people. They are at the apex of a dangerous intersection of two systems of oppression.25 While the Inquiry is a good first step, much remains to be done if Canada is to effectively remedy the wrongs that are described in The Inquiry’s reports.   It is important to consider the way that this issue is framed. In June, Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau stated that he accepted the findings of The Inquiry (though he prefers the term cultural genocide).26 However, since June, Trudeau’s party has gone from having a majority to a minority government. With Andrew Scheer at the helm of Canada’s Official Opposition, it seems that the Prime Minister may encounter some opposition if he wishes to implement concrete action based on the Inquiry’s findings. If Canada continues in its past habits of seeing the murders and disappearances of Indigenous women through the lens of individual, rather than systematic, events, will it be able to combat the issue effectively? Does looking at this violence  as genocidal action allow for better and more meaningful responses to be crafted and implemented? Could looking at these crimes as a human security issue give the issue more status among Canadian politicians who may care less for gender and race issues than they do for security issues? These questions may prove to be important ones for Canadians and their government to ask in order to assess how to move toward remedying past wrongs and creating meaningful change within Canadian politics and society.

Sources

1. National Inquiry into Missing and Murdered Indigenous Women and Girls (2019) Reclaiming Power and Place: Executive Summary of the Final Report, p. 4.

2. National Inquiry into Missing and Murdered Indigenous Women and Girls (2019) A Legal Analysis of Genocide: Supplementary Report of the Inquiry into Missing and Murdered Indigenous Women and Girls, p. 1-33.

3. National Inquiry into Missing and Murdered Indigenous Women and Girls (2015) ‘Our Mandate, Our Mission, Our Vision,’ [online] available from https://www.mmiwg-ffada.ca/mandate/ , accessed on 7th September 2019.

4. National Inquiry into Missing and Murdered Indigenous Women and Girls (2019) Reclaiming Power and Place: The Final Report of the National Inquiry into Missing and Murdered Indigenous Women and Girls Volume 1a, p. 54.

5. Smiley, C (2016) ‘A Long Road Behind Us, a Long Road Ahead: Towards an Indigenous Feminist National Inquiry,’ Canadian Journal of Women and the Law, Vol. 28, No. 2, pp. 309.

6. Ibid.

7. Ibid.

8. Saramo, S (2016) ‘Unsettling Spaces: Grassroots Responses to Canada’s Missing and Murdered Indigenous Women During the Harper Government Years,’ Comparative American Studies An International Journal, Vol. 14, No. 3-4, pp. 208.

9. National Inquiry into Missing and Murdered Indigenous Women and Girls, ‘Reclaiming Power and Place: Executive Summary of the Final Report,’ p. 39-40.

10. Eberts, M (2014) ‘Knowing and unknowing: Settler reflections on missing and murdered indigenous women,’ Saskatchewan Law Review, Vol. 77, No. 1, pp. 82-83.

11. Ibid.

12. Tasker, J (2019) ‘It is 'its own thing': Andrew Scheer disagrees with Indigenous inquiry's genocide finding,’ CBC News, 10th June.

13. Malone, K (2019) ‘“Nothing has changed:” Tina Fontaine's body pulled from river five years ago,’ CBC News, 16th August.

14. Scribe, M (2017)‘Pedagogy of Indifference: State Responses to Violence Against Indigenous Girls,’ Canadian Woman Studies, Vol. 32, No. 1-2, pp. 47, 55.

15. Malone, 2019.

16. Saramo, p. 208.

17. Ibid., p. 213.

18. Ibid., p. 213-214.

19. Ibid.

20. Smiley, p. 310.

21. Razack, S (2016) ‘Sexualized violence and colonialism: Reflections on the inquiry into missing and murdered indigenous women,’ Canadian Journal of Women and the Law, Vol. 28, No. 2, pp. ii.

22. National Inquiry into Missing and Murdered Indigenous Women and Girls, ‘Reclaiming Power and Place: The Final Report of the National Inquiry into Missing and Murdered Indigenous Women and Girls Volume 1b,’ p. 153.

23. Palmater, P (2016) ‘Shining Light on the Dark Places: Addressing Police Racism and Sexualized Violence against Indigenous Women and Girls in the National Inquiry,’ Canadian Journal of Women and the Law, Vol. 28, No. 2, pp. 276-277.

24. National Inquiry into Missing and Murdered Indigenous Women and Girls, ‘Reclaiming Power and Place: The Final Report of the National Inquiry into Missing and Murdered Indigenous Women and Girls Volume 1a,’ p. 113.

25. Ibid. p.104.

26. Tasker, J (2019) ‘It is 'its own thing': Andrew Scheer disagrees with Indigenous inquiry's genocide finding,’ CBC News, 10th June.

North-Eastern Syria: Lasting Peace Unlikely as Instability and Conflict Is Set to Increase

Russia and Turkey’s deal halted the Turkish-led operation in North-Eastern Syria and avoided direct confrontation between Turkey and Syrian forces. The situation remains tenuous, however, as lasting peace settlements between all sides remains a distant prospect. The continuing presence of Turkish-backed rebels in former SDF areas along with a worsening humanitarian crisis will gradually destabilise the area, making conflict likely to resume.

by Keir Watt

On the 6th of October 2019, U.S. President Donald Trump suddenly announced the withdrawal of U.S. forces from areas held by the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in North-Eastern Syria. The move cleared the way for the Turkish-led OPERATION PEACE SPRING against the SDF, which had served as a key U.S. partner in the coalition against the Islamic State (I.S.). 

Within weeks of the announcement, Russia brokered a deal with Turkey which halted their advance and ended the heavy fighting while leaving the SDF precariously reliant on the Syrian government. The deal brought temporary peace to the region, but the Turkish operation has already sowed the seeds of further violence which will hamper lasting peace in the future.

The operation began on October 9th when the Turkish military and their allies the Syrian National Army (SNA) invaded SDF controlled territory along Syria’s north-eastern border with Turkey. Turkey attacked the SDF because the Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG) are the largest of the various groups within the SDF and exert overall control.[i]

The YPG is an affiliate of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), which has been engaged in armed conflict with Turkey since 1984 and is considered a terrorist group by NATO and the European Union. Turkey vowed never to allow the YPG to establish an enclave in Syria which it fears would support the PKK in Turkey. Turkey’s attack has been anticipated since Donald Trump agreed the U.S. would withdraw in December 2018.

On the 17th of October, the U.S. brokered a ceasefire which ended the intense fighting. Shortly after, Presidents Putin and Erdogan agreed to a deal to halt the Turkish advance. It required the SDF to withdraw from a 30km deep ‘safe zone’ along the Syrian-Turkish border whilst Russian and Syrian government forces took over former SDF positions.[ii]

Syrian government forces had already begun to deploy to SDF areas as they quickly agreed to cooperate against the Turkish offensive, but the deal brings Syrian President Bashar al- Assad closer to finally controlling the SDF territories which constitute almost a third of Syria as a whole.

Turning to Assad was simply the best way for the SDF to avoid being defeated by the Turks. The SDF had no effective way of resisting the Turkish offensive without U.S. support, anti-tank and anti-aircraft weapons, and after the U.S. convinced them to dismantle their northern defences to placate Turkish concerns last year. The YPG and SDF have been coordinating with the Assad regime since their substantial victories in 2015.[iii] Moreover, the swift and well-coordinated deployment of regime forces to support SDF positions suggests the two had already planned for a Turkish invasion.

The Turkish operation has brought the Assad regime and the SDF closer together, but the fate of the YPG remains very uncertain. Arab leaders within the SDF such as Sheikh Humaydi Daham al-Hadi, leader of the Shammar tribe, have been discussing peace settlements with Assad for months,[iv] which probably led to the cooperation against the Turkish operation. However, YPG negotiations with the Syrian government have failed whilst their Arab partners’ have progressed; suggesting they could be left isolated as the rest of the SDF join with Assad.

At the same time, the future of the YPG will be impacted by any cooperation between Turkey and Syria. A year ago, Russia suggested the Adana Agreement (1998) could be a path for cooperation between Syria and Turkey. Under the agreement Syria expelled the PKK and ended their presence in Syria until the civil war in 2011. President Erdogan’s recent comments that Turkey will “allow no place for the YPG in Syria’s future” suggests it would still form the basis of cooperation.[v] Such an agreement would suit both parties and be disastrous for the YPG. 

However, the Assad regime remains in talks with the YPG. Unlike the PKK in the 1990s, the YPG’s strong military force means a political settlement is preferable to the Assad regime rather than years of more fighting. Making the expulsion of the YPG an unlikely policy of the Assad regime. 

The Assad regime would also demand Turkey withdraw all its forces from Syria as part of any deal. And while Turkey may be willing to withdraw its military, removing the SNA rebels would be significantly harder.

The SNA is an amalgamation of mostly Turkman and Arab militias which previously formed the Turkish-backed free Syrian Army and the National Liberation Front. These groups were unified under the ‘SNA’ just weeks before OPERATION PEACE SPRING began and frequently clashed in the past. This patchwork of rival groups is likely to destabilize as they establish territory, making it difficult for Ankara to exert the same control as when the operation started.

The SNA groups will also be extremely unwilling to leave now that they control territory and Ankara is unlikely to settle them in Turkey. Ankara would either abandon SNA militias which do not withdraw or incorporate their demands into a deal with Syria; making a final settlement with Assad very difficult.

Meanwhile, the ceasefire brought by Russia’s deal is unlikely to hold before a final peace agreement can be reached. The SNA’s hostility to Kurdish and Christian communities is being condemned as ethnic cleansing as communities are forcibly displaced.[vi] Creating a situation the SDF will struggle to tolerate, as they watch their communities and former territory thrown into chaos. The possibility of SDF retribution also increases as more reports surface of SNA war crimes committed during the Turkish-led offensive in October.[vii] 

Arab contingents within the SDF are also deeply opposed to Wahhabi groups in their territory. Which raises another source of conflict as the SNA have been widely accused of containing Jihadi elements. They were also reported to have recruited former I.S. fighters during the Turkish-led operation in Afrin last year.[viii] If SNA militias begin to assert Wahhabi doctrines upon the local populace hostilities will inevitably erupt. 

At the same time, there is a growing humanitarian crisis in the area caused by the disruption of essential services and the displacement of hundreds of thousands of civilians.[ix]. This crisis will grow in scale and intensity as winter arrives, bringing harsher conditions and reduced food supplies.  

Whilst all sides struggle to agree amongst themselves, they will inevitably fail to manage the humanitarian crisis effectively. Which will further destabilise the area and bring both sides closer to conflict. Russia and Turkey have advertised their deal as a big success, but in reality it has only temporarily halted the conflict. Sources of conflict and instability continue to fester, making a lasting deal more imperative but increasingly hard to achieve.

Sources:

[i] Barfi, B., 2016. Ascent of the PYD and the SDF. The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Research Notes, 32 [online]. Available at: https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/uploads/Documents/pubs/ResearchNote32-Barfi.pdf. [accessed 4 November 2019].p.3.

[ii] Turkey Syria offensive: Erdogan and Putin strike deal over Kurds. 2019. BBC [online]. Available at: https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-50138121.[Accessed 23/10/2019].

[iii] Barfi, B., 2016. Ascent of the PYD and the SDF. The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Research Notes, 32 [online]. Available at: https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/uploads/Documents/pubs/ResearchNote32-Barfi.pdf. [accessed 4 November 2019], pp.5-7.

[iv] Zaman, A., 2019. Syria’s Kurds increasingly isolated as Arab tribes cut deals with regime. Al Monitor [online]. Available at: https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2019/03/syria-kurds-isolated-arab-tribes-deals-damascus.html.

[v] Erdogan quoted in. Zontur, E.C., 2019. Turkey says YPG/PKK has no role in the future of Syria. AA [online]. Available at: https://www.aa.com.tr/en/middle-east/turkey-says-ypg-pkk-has-no-role-in-future-of-syria/1622247. [accessed 4 November 2019].

[vi] OCHA Syria Flash Update #5: Humanitarian impact of the military operation in northeastern Syria 14 October 2019. 2019. OCHA [online]. Available at: https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/ocha_syria_flash_update_5_nes_14_octoberfinal.pdf.[Accessed 21/10/2019].

[vii] Higgins, E., 2019. Video Evidence Sheds Light on Executions Near Turkey-Syria Border. Bellingcat [online]. Available at: https://www.bellingcat.com/news/mena/2019/10/31/video-evidence-sheds-light-on-executions-near-turkey-syria-border/. [accessed 4 November 2019]; Chulov, M., Rasool, M., 2019. Kurdish politician among nine civilians shot dead by pro-Turkey forces in Syria. 2019. Guardian [online]. Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/oct/13/female-kurdish-politician-among-nine-civilians-killed-by-pro-turkey-forces-in-syria-observers-say. [Accessed 21/10/2019]; Seligman, L., 2019. Turkish Proxies Appear to Be Using White Phosphorus in Syria. 2019. Foreign Policy [online]. Available at: https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/10/17/turkish-proxies-chemical-weapons-syria-kurds/. [Accessed 21/10/2019].

[viii] Cockburn, P., 2019. Turkey accused of recruiting ex-Isis fighters in their thousands to attack Kurds in Syria. Independent [online]. Available at: https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/turkey-isis-afrin-syria-kurds-free-syrian-army-jihadi-video-fighters-recruits-a8199166.html. [accessed 4 November 2019].

[ix] UNHCR. Hundreds of thousands in harm’s way in northern Syria. UNHCR [online]. Available at: https://www.unhcr.org/news/press/2019/10/5d9f10eb4/hundreds-thousands-harms-way-northern-syria.html. [accessed 4 November 2019].[x] Photo: Specialist Arnada Jones U.S. Combined Joint Task Force.https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Combined_Joint_U.S.,_Turkey_Patrols.jpg.

Current Challenges to Peacebuilding and Statebuilding in Kosovo

Twenty years after the Kosovo War, which left a scenery of destruction behind, and eleven years after the country’s declaration of independence, the challenges posed to Kosovo are far from solved. The ongoing processes of peacebuilding and statebuilding have had countless positive results for the region, yet have so far been unable to grant Kosovo real legitimacy either internally or externally. Kosovo has reached a deadlock.

by Mariana Garrido

Twenty years ago, Kosovo was victimised by a series of bloody events. First, Former Yugoslavian President Slobodan Milošević’s campaign of stigmatisation and aggression against the Kosovan Albanians culminated in acts of ‘ethnic cleansing and tendencies for genocidal acts’.1 Second, the actions of Kosovo’s Liberation Army (a seperatist militia founded in 1996) which, despite its role in resisting the Serbian aggressions, also committed many atrocities against civilians.2 And third, NATO’s 11-week air intervention against Serbia, which failed to minimize civilian casualties, caused a whole scenery of destruction.3

Today, years after its unilateral proclamation of independence, Kosovo remains a puzzle. Over the past two decades the region has been developing processes of peacebuilding and statebuilding. Though this has mainly been under the supervision of the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo and the parallel European Union mission, EUlex, Kosovo has nevertheless facilitated a growing autonomy.4 Yet, the lack of agreement in regards to what happened during the conflict, the geopolitical interest of certain great powers in the region, the remaining ethnic-religious tensions, and the issues of legitimacy faced by the country at the external and internal levels are putting Kosovo’s peacebuilding and statebuilding processes in a deadlock.

Many of the challenges now encountered by Kosovo mirror the causes of the conflict and/or how it developed. The Kosovo War did not happen solely because of ethnic-religious tensions, but rather as a result of geopolitical and geo-economic interests in place.5 NATO’s intervention occurred without prior authorisation from the UN, making it an illegal aggression against a sovereign state.6 7 Kosovo was the perfect opportunity for NATO, after the fall of the Soviet Union, to reinvent itself from a collective defence alliance to an international security organisation.8 The Kosovo case created the opportunity for NATO to test its capacities of intervention under a high moral legitimisation of stopping the suffering that the people from Kosovo were being subjected to by Milošević’s regime.9 10 After this, Kosovo irremediably became an ally of the United States, forever thankful to the Western world and resentful of those who refused to protect them. In this sense, Kosovo is a crystalised relic of the Cold War confrontation.

Second, and in accordance with  the first point, the peace process taking place in Kosovo is not simply a result of two parties who voluntarily wanted to make peace, but a consequence of a ‘victors’ peace’.11 The Serbian regime, which never wanted to make a truce, was ultimately obliged to due to NATO’s strong military capabilities. The way the war was put to an end naturally created lasting tensions and distrust between the two parties, Kosovo and Serbia. Continuing points of disagreement include the existence of competing narratives about  the conflict,12 lack of agreement in establishing a border between Serbia and Kosovo, mutual impediments to further European integration or to enter other international organisations, ethnic tensions and punctual episodes of violence, and, most notably, other delays in Kosovo’s normalisation and statebuilding.

Third, ethnic tensions and exclusion are still present both between Serbia and Kosovo, as well as in Kosovo at the internal level. Tensions between Albanians and Serbs are often mirrored by incidents of intercommunal hate crime, harassment and obstruction.13 The city of Mitrovica is the mirror of all ethnic divisions, border disagreements, and power-sharing issues.14 Split by the River Ibar, in the South of the city, Kosovar-Albanian people use the Euro and openly exhibit US flags and Albanian symbols. On the Serbian side, the currency is the dinar, the buildings are decorated by Serb and Russian flags, and a mural that states ‘Kosovo is a part of Serbia just as Crimea is a part of Russia’ can also be found. Along with the ethnic polarisation between Albanians and Serbs, the remaining exclusion of other minority communities should equally be mentioned. According to the 2011 census, Kosovo’s minority groups are composed of  1.6% Bosniaks, 1.5% Serbs, 1.1% Turks, 0.9% Ashkali, 0.7% Egyptian, 0.6% Gorani and 0.5% Roma.15 Minority Rights Groups state that since Kosovo’s independence, there has been a lack of attention to protecting Kosovo’s minorities facing social exclusion, discrimination, and lack of political representation.16 Although Kosovo’s political system represents the interests of all ethnic groups, Romans, Ashkali, and Egyptians encounter obstacles when trying to access personal documents, health care, social assistance, and education, which creates polarising effects in the society of this new-born country.17

Legitimacy, both at the external and internal level, seem to be the biggest issues slowing down Kosovo’s progress. Since its independence in 2008, Kosovo has been under a process of statebuilding, focused on creating guarantees of security and stabilisation, the rule of law, and economic and institutional development.18 However, according to experts Oliver Richmond and Gezim Visoka, peacebuilding and statebuilding in Kosovo have been in a permanent struggle between externally set conditions and dynamics of local state formation, and state contestation19. On one hand, it seems that a small political elite aims to maintain domestic stability in exchange for securing external legitimacy at the expense of ignoring other pro-peace social groups’.20 On the other hand, this same domestic stability has revealed itself as quite unstable due to Kosovo’s weak rule of law and judicial system, high levels of corruption, and political stability and credibility being undermined by episodes such as the recent resignation of the Prime Minister Haradinaj as a result of his call to answer for war crimes in The Hague.21 22

At the external level, although 112 states have recognised Kosovo, there is still a significant number of states which refuse such as Spain, Russia, and China. Simultaneously, while Kosovo has become a member of international organisations such as the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and even FIFA, it has not yet become a part of the United Nations, nor the European Union, Interpol, or NATO. Furthermore, even though Kosovo has unilaterally adopted the Euro as its currency and conquered the status of potential candidate for EU integration, such dreams seem more and more unattainable both for internal reasons, such as the lack of agreement with Serbia, and reasons related to the political phase the EU is going through, with enlargements being practically frozen, countries such as Spain opposing any negotiations with Kosovo, and more restrictive immigration policies.23

Kosovo’s deadlock may be explained by matters of internal and external legitimacy. It is clear that geopolitics still get in the way of Kosovo’s recognition and integration into international structures, as well as feed into polarisation, political and ethnic, and contribute to the existence of competing versions of the facts. Simultaneously, internal dynamics of elite-based politics, decision-making impasses, ethnic exclusion, and corruption prevent a widespread internal legitimacy. It is possible that Kosovo would profit more from locally generated peacemaking rather than elite-oriented and externally-influenced liberal peacebuilding and statebuilding. Kosovo’s progress utterly depends on breaking the vicious cycle of external reliance the newborn country has entered. Furthering international recognition strictly depends on internal transformations, such as attaining a border agreement with Serbia, strengthening the rule of law, and political and economic stability. Tackling the issue of internal legitimacy will not be successful if Kosovo remains solely dependant on support from the United Nations, donors, and the European Union, rather than generating and utilising local initiatives.24

Sources:

1. Ristic, M., 2012. Dacic Denies His Party’s Role in Balkan Conflicts. Balkan Insight. Retrieved from: https://balkaninsight.com/2012/09/18/dacic-denies-his-party-s-role-in-war-crimes/ [accessed 11/09/2019].2. Human Rights Watch, 2001. Under orders: War Crimes in Kosovo. Retrived from: https://www.hrw.org/report/2001/10/26/under-orders/war-crimes-kosovo [accessed 14/10/2019].

3. Ibid.

4. De Wet, E., 2009. The Governance of Kosovo: Security Council Resolution 1244 and the Establishment and Functioning of Eulex. The American Journal of International Law, 103(1), 83-96.

5. Yannis, A., 2009. The politics and geopolitics of the status of Kosovo: the circle is never round. Journal of Southeast European and Black Sea Studies, Vol. 9, 2009, Issue 1-2.

6. Rebelo da Cruz, 2014. O Processo de Paz no Kosovo: Percepções dos Militares do Exército Português no Teatro de Operações. Universidade Aberta.

7. Gromes, T. 2019. A Humanitarian Milestone? NATO's 1999 intervention in Kosovo and trends in military responses to mass violence. Peace Research Institute Frankfurt Report 2/2019, p. 1. Retrived from: https://www.hsfk.de/fileadmin/HSFK/hsfk_publikationen/prif0219.pdf [accessed 14/10/2019].

8. Roberts, A., 1999. NATO's ‘Humanitarian War’ over Kosovo. Survival, 41:3, 102-123.

9. Gibbs, D., 2011. Kosovo: a template for disaster. The Guardian. Retrieved from: https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2011/mar/21/kosovo-template-for-disaster-libya [accessed 14/10/2019].

10. Severiano Teixeira, N., 2019. A NATO aos 70. Público. Retrieved from: https://www.publico.pt/2019/03/27/mundo/opiniao/nato-70-1866843 [accessed 14/10/2019].

11. Bono, G., 2010. 'The European Union and ‘Supervised Independence’ of Kosovo: A Strategic Solution to the Kosovo/Serbia Conflict?. European Foreign Affairs Review, Issue 2, pp. 249–264.

12. Ferati-Sachsenmaier, F., 2018. Reconciliation in the Balkans: Twenty Years after the Yugoslav Wars, What Went Wrong?. 21st Century Global Dynamics. Retrived from: https://www.21global.ucsb.edu/global-e/september-2018/reconciliation-balkans-twenty-years-after-yugoslav-wars-what-went-wrong [accessed 14/10/2019].

13. Minority Rights Group. Kosovo: Minorities and Indigenous peoples. Retrived from: https://minorityrights.org/country/kosovo/ [accessed 14/10/2019].

14. Estadão, 2019. Nos 20 anos da Guerra do Kosovo, tensão étnica ameaça paz nos Balcãs. O Estado de S. Paulo. Retrieved from: https://internacional.estadao.com.br/noticias/geral,nos-20-anos-da-guerra-do-kosovo-tensao-etnica-ameaca-paz-nos-balcas,70002864039 [accessed 14/10/2019].

15. Minority Rights Group. Kosovo: Minorities and Indigenous peoples. Retrived from: https://minorityrights.org/country/kosovo/ [accessed 11/10/2019].

16. Ibid.

17. Human Rights Watch (2019) World Report 2019. Serbia/Kosovo: Treatment of Minorities. Retrived from: https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2019/country-chapters/serbia/kosovo [accessed 14/10/2019].

18. Allison, J., 2018. State-building in Kosovo - Challenges of Legitimacy. E-International Relations Students. Retrived from: https://www.e-ir.info/2018/03/09/state-building-in-kosovo-challenges-of-legitimacy/ [10/09/2019].

19. Richmond, O., Visoka, G., 2017. After Liberal Peace? From Failed State-Building to an Emancipatory Peace in Kosovo. International Studies Perspectives, 18, 110-129, p. 111.

20. Idem, p. 113.

21. Transparency International (2014) Kosovo: Overview of Political Corruption. Anti-corruption helpdesk. Providing on-demand research to help fight corruption. European Commission.

22. The Guardian (2019) Kosovo PM resigns before questioning at The Hague. The Guardian. Retrived from: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/jul/19/kosovo-pm-resigns-before-questioning-at-the-hague [accessed 14/10/2019].

23. Allison, J. 2018. State-Building in Kosovo – Challenges of Legitimacy. E-International Relations Students. Retrived from: https://www.e-ir.info/2018/03/09/state-building-in-kosovo-challenges-of-legitimacy/ [accessed 14/10/2019].

24. Richmond, O., Visoka, G., 2017. After Liberal Peace? From Failed State-Building to an Emancipatory Peace in Kosovo. International Studies Perspectives, 18, 110-129, p. 112.

Gender and Terrorism: Women Involved in Terrorism and their Representation in the Media

This piece seeks to analyse the specific intersection of women, terrorism and, media in order to provide an overview of the different ways in which female terrorists are portrayed with relation to their motivations, status, and the societal implication of the representations of their individual and political agency. It focuses on whether the framing of women in politically violent groups (such as ISIS) and who commit acts of political violence challenges gender stereotypes or obscures politically violent women’s participation by portraying them as being victimised or irrational so as to remove their capacity to be active agents and the impact this can have on counter-extremist policies. 

By Laura Bartley

“The media fetishizes female terrorists. This contributes to the belief that there is something really unique, something just not right about the women who kill. We make assumptions about what these women think, why they do what they do, and what ultimately motivates them. Women involved in terrorist violence are demonized more than male terrorists… The common assumption is that female terrorists must be even more depressed, crazier, more suicidal, or more psychopathic than their male counterparts.”1

The phenomenon of ‘foreign fighters’ travelling to Iraq and Syria was an issue which the Western media took a particular fascination with, partly due to the unprecedented level of Western Muslims voluntarily choosing to join ISIS. In 2015, international strategic consultancy The Soufan Group reported that up to 31,000 recruits from over 86 countries had travelled to join ISIS forces, with 5000 of these coming from Western states2 and 600 of them being women. In fact, in 2016 it was estimated that 40 percent of all French migrants in ISIS-controlled territory were women.3 Moreover, according to a report on the issue of Westerners joining ISIS by the Institute for Strategic Dialogue on the topic “the profile of this cohort differs from the norm; there are a higher proportion of women, they are younger, and they are less likely to be known to the authorities.”4 

Yet despite this great empirical evidence of women’s participation in an armed Islamist struggle, media portrayals of women’s violence is continually treated as unnatural or exceptional. This may arise from the preconceived idea that ‘femininity’ is incompatible with violence as women are traditionally represented in culture as ‘nurturers’, ‘carers’ or ‘peacemakers’, whereas men tend to be viewed as more ‘political’ and ‘violent’. This is a phenomenon that was identified by Elizabeth Gardner who argues:

“journalists thus frame female inclusion in political violence as ‘unnatural’ and worthy of explanation, suggesting that women who relocate from the private sphere to the public sphere of political violence necessitate contextual explanations for their actions.”5

Women, terrorism and the media

In “Mothers, Monsters, Whores: Women’s Violence in Global Politics,” Gentry and Sjoberg argue that there are three different narratives in representations of agency of women participating in political violence – mother, monster, and whore – that ultimately serve to ‘other’ violent women.6 It is significant that they highlight the problematic tendency in both academic and policy-related discussions to explain women’s violence as having different motivations from men’s by arguing that “women who commit violence have been characterized as anything but regular criminals or regular soldiers or regular terrorists; they are captured in storied fantasies which deny women’s agency and reify gender stereotypes and subordination.”7 It is these gender norms, such as masculine traits (bravery and strength) and feminine traits (innocence and fragility) which render women’s violence as being “outside of these ideal-typical understandings of what it means to be a woman.”8 This is potentially due to the perceived anomaly of women taking life as opposed to their traditional role as ‘life-giver’ – indeed the idea of motherhood and politically violent women is discussed in reference to the notion of ‘twisted maternalism’ by Gentry.9 

In her discussion of twisted maternalism, Gentry critiques how politically violent women such as Palestinian suicide bombers continued to be objectified and denied agency because their reasons and motivations for engaging in such violent acts is framed in relation to the individual’s marriage, divorce, children or lack thereof and is thus explained in domestic and maternal language. This echoes the pathologisation of women terrorists – that there must be something wrong with a woman’s femininity in order for her to have the capacity to commit a terrorist/violent act. Sjoberg and Gentry specifically argue that the dominant Orientalist narrative in academia, politics, and the media is that the sexually dysfunctional Western woman is violent because she refuses to conform, to please men or in fact revolts against her role as one who ought to please men. Whereas Islamic women are violent because there is something wrong with them that makes them unable to please men.10  This is an important point as typically a Western woman’s decision to join ISIS is seen as an irrational act and it is often assumed that the muhajirat have little autonomy in their decision-making. As outlined by Loken and Zelenz this classifies women’s motivation into two categories: (1) women are motivated by romance or sex, complementing Gentry and Sjoberg’s “erotomania and erotic dysfunction” classification of female violence; (2) women are naive and easily tricked by recruiters who sell an unrealistic portrayal of life in ISIS-controlled territory.11  However on the contrary, the true motivations of women partaking in political violence have been shown to correspond to men’s motivations.

Nacos’ Frames used in media coverage of female terrorists

Since female terrorism is generally perceived as exceptional or unconventional, the media often exploits this sensationalism. Yet as emphasised by Nacos there is no evidence that male and female terrorists differ fundamentally with regards to their recruitment, motivations for joining, ideological devotion or even cruelty of their violence.12 Nonetheless despite this, the media representation and portrayal of female terrorists is continually framed by existing gender stereotypes and in fact reinforces them. In this manner, newsrooms are not exempt to the “prejudices that play perniciously just beneath the surface of American life.”13 Therefore these explanatory frames frequently employed by the media are incredibly important as they have the power not only to reveal insights into and shape a society’s understanding of events but also the wider implication of shaping society’s gender assumptions. Regarding the relationship between framing and female terrorists, Nacos specifically researches this relationship between the media and terrorism and in doing so has identified similar gender stereotypes/framing in the media’s representation of female politicians and female terrorists. Table One located below outlines the five frames Nacos identifies as being frequently used in media coverage of female terrorists.

Conclusion

It is important to grapple with the issue of politically violent women, in order to appreciate the media’s role in framing pre-existing assumptions of these transgressive individuals. The media, policy makers, and the general public tend to rely on overly simplistic tropes concerning what female political violence is and how it manifests. The five frames Nacos identifies as being frequently used in media coverage of female terrorists show how the media frequently represents women terrorists in a different way to their male counterparts which does not challenge gender stereotypes. Instead the common frames that portray women often relate to their victimisation or lack of rationality, and in doing so remove their capacity to be active agents. This has large implications in terms of female political motivations and subjectivity as it de-emphasises their political motivations. As such it is imperative that the understandings and assumptions of female terrorists that have already been made are challenged both in the media and in broader discussions – for example the belief that terrorism is a hyper-masculine space composed of predominantly men may become more nuanced when we recognise the role women play.

Finally, it is of the utmost importance to take into consideration the role of women (and gender more broadly) in political violence because if we continue to take seriously only male terrorists then we are bound to miss the gendered consequences of both female terrorism and the impact that representation of female terrorism has, while also continuing to relegate the political agency of women to the background. Most significantly, the unfair prejudices associated with terrorist women may obfuscate the underlying dynamics of recruitment motivations and participation that could ultimately prejudice the efficacy or outcomes of counter-extremist policies.

Sources:

1. Bloom, M. (2011). Bombshell: The Many Faces of Women Terrorists. London: Hurst and Company., pp. 33-34.

2. For the purpose of this essay, ‘Western’ states refers to EU countries, the United States, Canada, Australia or New Zealand.

3. Rubin, A. and Breeden, A. (2016). Women’s Emergence as Terrorists in France Points to Shift in ISIS Gender Roles. [online] Nytimes.com. Available at: https://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/02/world/europe/womens-emergence-as-terrorists-in-france-points-to-shift-in-isis-gender-roles.html

4. Briggs, R. and Silverman, T. (2014). Western Foreign Fighters: Innovations in Responding to the Threat. [online] Isdglobal.org. Available at: https://www.isdglobal.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/ISDJ2784_Western_foreign_fighters_V7_WEB.pdf

5. Gardner, E. (2007). Is There Method to the Madness?. Journalism Studies, 8(6), pp.909-929.

6. Sjoberg, L. and Gentry, C. (2007). Mothers, monsters, whores. London: Zed.

7. ibid, pp. 4-5

8. ibid, pp. 2

9. Gentry, C. (2009). Twisted Maternalism. International Feminist Journal of Politics, 11(2), pp.242.

10. Sjoberg, L. and Gentry, C. (2008). Reduced to Bad Sex: Narratives of Violent Women from the Bible to the War on Terror. International Relations, 22(1), pp.17

11. Loken, M. and Zelenz, A. (2017). Explaining extremism: Western women in Daesh. European Journal of International Security, 3(01), pp.50.

12. Nacos, B. (2005). The Portrayal of Female Terrorists in the Media: Similar Framing Patterns in the News Coverage of Women in Politics and in Terrorism. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 28(5), pp.436.

13. ibid pp.437

14. Herlitz, A. (2016). Examining Agency in the News: a content analysis of Swedish media's portrayal of Western women. MA. Utrecht University, the Netherlands., pp.40.

The Tense Relationship Between Social Media Intelligence and Privacy

Social media has transformed social life because of the prominent communicative role that its networks and platforms have achieved in the modern era and the new social environments that they have created. However, SOCMINT entails a great challenge as it requires access by default to the private information of social media users, affecting the legitimacy of the intelligence community as well as the morality and legality of carrying out SOCMINT surveillance.

by Alejandra Bringas Colmenarejo

Social media may be considered the most major source of information about societies, individuals, and communities that has ever existed to such an extent that it could become essential to understand the social dynamics and interactions that affect international security. Social Media Intelligence (SOCMINT) could enable the intelligence community to tackle criminal activities and behaviours by providing warnings about outbreaks of public disorders, providing information about extremist and radicalised groups and individuals, or helping policymakers and state agencies to give a response to any kind of situation [1]. However, this intelligence assumption creates strong debates about the public nature of the information collected, the morality of the methods used for such purpose, and the real efficiency of the process.

SOCMINT is defined as ‘the process of identification, validation, collection and analysis of data and information from social media using intrusive and non-intrusive methods [opened, closed and/or clandestine channels], with the aim of developing a product for national security’ [2]. In this sense, the information accessed, processed and analysed by SOCMINT could be classified into four categories: (1) The information obtained through open and closed sources that neither identify nor could identify a concrete person – e.g. aggregated data about locations or public transport. (2) Information accessed through open channels which either identify or could identify a concrete person – such as name, gender, age, nationality. (3) Information either open or closed which is specifically accessed through covert, misleading, or deceiving tactics – e.g. posting provocative messages to tackle the social responses or entering friends-locked groups using fake, personal, or unofficial profiles. (4) Closed information accessed using clandestine tactics – such as decoding technologies or hacking software [3].

Based on this classification, it might be logical to think that, despite intelligence actions carried out to obtain specific information, SOCMINT is mainly focused on the continuous and uninterrupted access and collection of large open data sets, information for which there is no universal agreement regarding its public accessibility. On the one hand, platform companies generally consider users’ information to be publicly available when it is accessible (1) to any member of the user network within the platform; (2) to any other platform user, even though they do not coincide in any common network, or (3) to any third party external to the social media platform through unrestricted methods. On the other hand, platforms users, law enforcement agencies, and  society usually defend more restrictive definitions of privacy and intimacy so that the access to social media information is limited to specific circumstances [4]. 

The lack of consensus between social media and society about this issue leads to the possible obtention of private, sensitive, and intimate information usually without the consent and the knowledge of the social media user. Consequently, SOCMINT either performed through restricted or unrestricted channels could entail an infringement of the right of privacy and an abuse of the expectations of non-state interference in the private lives of its citizens [5]. Added to this, the novel and constantly changing characteristics of social media is complicating the classification of social media platforms as public or private spaces, provoking a number of legal controversies and loopholes. This problem can be worsened due to the number of social media networks that coexist and have different hierarchical levels of privacy; meaning  some information could be unrestricted for one group of people but could be restricted to outsiders in accordance with the pertinent settings.

The legally admissive access to social media data and its moral and ethical acceptance involve a fragile balance of interests, as the intelligence process could be considered an incisive intrusion into an individuals’ privacy. In fact, this problem also relates to people’s indifference to share their private life online without questioning how their data could be used or which level of protection is granted to it. In this regard, the peculiarities of social media have created a sense of disconnection between the real and the virtual world facilitating the sharing of personal information, political opinions, or religious beliefs, exposing the individual’s life with a lack of restriction and an excessive expectation that the state will respect their privacy [6].

Nevertheless, it may  be argued that a reasonable expectation of privacy exists if the user believes their data remains private because of their explicit efforts to achieve that exclusion from third parties’ access or knowledge; or if the whole society considers that such information belongs to the individual’s private sphere [7]. This divergence of opinions between the users, society, and legal systems could negatively affect a user’s privacy. Whilst society and users’ understandings of privacy could differ it is just as true that societal and individual expectations of privacy could collide with the social media platform’s privacy settings or with enforced legislation so that, contrary to the societal expectation, the information is legally considered public or non-directly defined as private making it accessible for  third parties [8].

To this effect, social media is considered as a privately-owned public sphere:  spaces owned by private companies where people voluntarily join and freely share public, private, or even intimate information [9] due to two main reasons. Firstly, because of the users’ willingness to upload and share their personal and intimate lives on these platforms, and secondly, because of the users’ voluntary consent to the terms and conditions of the platforms which normally state the openness and the public nature of the networks [10]. Consequently, although social media users expect a reasonable level of privacy on social media platforms, this expectation is easily undermined since they have voluntarily joined these platforms, accepting that platforms’ rules even when the settings could threaten their right  to privacy. Furthermore, while users may expect different levels of privacy from each option available to communicate and interact within the networks, from the point of view of the owner companies, social media platforms are public spheres where their users can freely communicate with each other and whose data, information, and shared content can be openly accessed and used. The concerns that arise from this lack of consensus are clear; when and how would it be morally justified for the intelligence community to access, store, and analyse the personal data of social media users? 

Social media has created an online society where people can communicate, interact, and share information even on a broader scale than the real world would ever allow. However, this online society affects their physical reality, threatening the security, defence, and safety of the public and private international actors. Consequently, social media has become an incredibly important issue of concern for the intelligence community and security agencies as it appears to be the most innovative and initially effective tool to understand social interactions and dynamics. However, SOCMINT entails a great challenge as it requires access by default to the private information of social media users, affecting the legitimacy of the intelligence community and the morality and legality of carrying out SOCMINT surveillance. The ambiguous nature of social media platforms as public private-owned spaces affects the consideration of the information shared and accessed as publicly available and its protection by the society and the individuals’ legitimate expectations of privacy. No  legislation has been able to offer an adequate delimitation of social media spaces to restrict the collection, use and exploitation of social media private information by private and public actors. However, what is clear is that SOCMINT is intrinsically connected with a reality, social media, that provokes more challenges than certainties and as a consequence, SOCMINT has to deal with great concerns in relation to the individuals’ rights and the legitimacy of the security interest.

Sources:

[1] Vrist Rønn, K., & Obelitz Søe, S. (2019). Is social media intelligence private? Privacy in public and the nature of social media intelligence. Intelligence and National Security, 34(3), 363-378. doi:10.1080/02684527.2019.1553701[2] Liviu, A., Anamaria, C., Codruta, R., & Nicolae, M. (2015). Social Media Intelligence: Opportunities and Limitations. CES Working Papers, VII(2A), p. 506

[3] Edwards, L., & Urquhart, L. (2016). Privacy in Public Spaces: What Expectations of Privacy do we have in Social Media Intelligence? International Journal of Law and Information Technology, Autumn,p. 279-310

[4] Privacy International. (n.d.). Social Media Intelligence. Retrieved from Privacy International: https://privacyinternational.org/explainer/55/social-media-intelligence

[5] Edwards, L., & Urquhart, L. (2016).

[6] Gibson, S. (2004). Open Source Intelligence. The RUSI Journal, 149(1), p.16-22. doi:10.1080/03071840408522977

[7] Omand, D., Bartlett, J., & Miller, C. (2012). Introducing Social Media Intelligence (SOCMINT). Intelligence and National Security, 27(6), 801-823. doi:10.1080/02684527.2012.716965

[8] Edwards, L., & Urquhart, L. (2016).

[9] Privacy International. (n.d.).

[10] Edwards, L., & Urquhart, L. (2016).

2019 Turkish Local Elections: An Explanation of the Ruling Party’s Failure

The Turkish local elections of 2019 resulted in a failure for President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and his ruling party, which lost votes in the country’s three largest cities: Izmir, Istanbul and the capital, Ankara. This crucial breakdown of the Justice and Development Party is an outcome of enduring political, economic, and social struggles within Turkish society which has expressed its discontent through elections, demonstrating its desire to implement fundamental changes. 

by Badri Belkania

The Turkish local elections of 2019 resulted in a major blow to President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and his ruling party, the Justice and Development Party (AKP), which lost control over the three largest cities of the country (Istanbul, Izmir, and the capital, Ankara) for the first time, after sixteen years in power. The phrase uttered by Erdoğan before the vote highlights the importance of the local elections for the government, especially in Turkey’s largest city: ‘if we lose Istanbul, we lose Turkey’ (Barkey 2019). This article examines the crucial reasons behind the AKP’s undeniably historic defeat.

Firstly, the premises behind the AKP’s setback in the 2019 local elections should be placed into the context of the continuous process of Erdoğan’s rising authoritarianism, which had been gradually reaching its peak subsequent to the 2016 failed coup d’etat attempt. 

Since the AKP took power in 2002, this shift toward autocracy and even dictatorship, as it has been frequently labeled in light of the 2016 events, has become more and more apparent. In the first years of his rule, Erdoğan, arguably, worked towards transforming Turkey into a democratic and free market based country, however, after the triumph in the 2007 presidential elections he substituted the party’s pluralistic ruling system for ‘a majoritarian one’ and ‘liberal sensibilities’ with ‘an authoritarian mind-set’ (Özsel et al., 2013, 552). As the 2019 local elections demonstrated, frustration within the Turkish population regarding Erdoğan’s authoritarian tendencies had accumulated throughout the years, which finally came to a tipping point at the ballot boxes. 

The events following the failed 2016 coup d’etat demonstrated Erdoğan’s intentions of seizing absolute power in Turkey. The thwarted coup d’etat, which was immediately attributed to the former ally of Erdoğan, and exiled Muslim cleric and businessman, Fethullah Gülen, became Erdoğan’s justification for launching an extensive purge against his political opponents and opposing journalists. As a result, by 2018 more than 107,000 people were dismissed from their jobs, approximately 1,000 people allegedly related to the coup were imprisoned, and 2,745 judges lost their seats. This ‘massive liquidation movement’ encompassed almost all professions in the country including soldiers, teachers, academics, and police officers (Azeri 2016; Morris 2018).

Frustration among Turkish citizens has risen in lockstep with autocracy in the country and the results of the 2019 local elections should not be perceived as an unexpected turn of events. For instance, the 2013 Gezi Park protests clearly demonstrated this growing civil discontent in the country. The demonstrations originally opposed the demolition of Gezi Park in Istanbul but expanded into a massive riot of crowds from different backgrounds in opposition to larger issues such as curtailment of civil rights, lack of freedom of speech, media control, corruption, and the turn away from secularism (Demiryol 2018).

Secondly, when analysing Erdoğan’s defeat in the largest cities of the country, the protracted Kurdish issue should not be neglected. There is definite hostility between Erdoğan and the Kurds, and they certainly played a role in the AKP’s defeat in the major cities of the country. There are approximately 20 million Kurds in Turkey (CIA 2018). They make up almost 25% of the country’s entire population, and many of these Kurds live in the largest cities of Turkey where the AKP suffered there most important defeats. We can fairly assume that the majority of this Kurdish population would have voted against the AKP which continues to rigidly pursue improper policies towards minorities.

Considering the minor difference between the final percentages of the competing candidates, it can be concluded that the antipathy of the Kurdish population towards the AKP would have played a fairly significant role in the fall of the ruling party’s contenders. This is supported by the fact that the People’s Democratic Party (HDP), the most popular party among Kurds, refrained from putting forward mayoral candidates in seven major municipalities in order to increase chances of the main opposition nominees (Daily Sabah 2019).

Immigration proved to be one of the most crucial points of contention between the public and the government, and to some extent cost Erdoğan votes. The Syrian civil war and Turkey’s involvement in the conflict contributed to the massive flow of Syrian refugees to the country which became an immense challenge for Turkey. 

According to UNHCR (2019), Turkey shelters 3.6 million registered Syrian refugees, which makes it the largest host-country in the world. However, the public position on the AKP’s foreign policy of accepting high amounts of refugees has been critical since the eruption of the Syrian civil war. Turkey witnessed a number of demonstrations against refugee policy in the major cities of the country, some of them ending in violent clashes with authorities (Middle East Eye 2014). 

Lastly, despite rising authoritarianism, oppression, and a number of domestic and foreign political challenges, Erdoğan and his party had still managed to retain public popularity throughout the previous 16 years. The main explanation for this apparent anomaly is found in the rapid economic development of the country during the early years of Erdoğan’s reign. In this particular period, the economy of Turkey reached its highest numbers in the modern history of the republic. However, this situation has worsened gradually since the economic peak in 2008, culminating in a total breakdown in Turkey’s economy last year. Compared to the 7.4% growth in 2017, last year (2018) reached only 2.6% (Pitel 2019). Erdoğan faces his first recession in a decade, while the country suffers from a 20% inflation, 13.5% unemployment rate, and high levels of corruption. 

The AKP’s failure in the 2019 Turkish elections was a complex outcome, one which cannot be explained through consideration of present processes alone and calls for a deeper examination of the party’s political narrative. However, though the existing economic problems cannot solely explain the AKP’s slump in the last vote, it can clarify why this happened this year and not in previous elections. The reason behind this development is that the recent economic crisis became the final piece in the puzzle of the public discontent with the AKP’s rule. Erdoğan’s party managed to retain the necessary popularity throughout previous elections, predominantly due to Turkey’s economic welfare and growth, but last year deprived many supporters of the AKP of their last remaining argument.

Sources:

Azeri, S., 2016. The July 15 Coup Attempt in Turkey: The Erdoğan–Gulen Confrontation and the Fall of ‘Moderate’ Political Islam. Critique: Journal of Socialist Theory, 44(4), pp. 465-478.

Barkey, H., 2019. 'If we lose Istanbul, we lose Turkey': why the mayoral election is so critical to Erdoğan's hold on power. The National. [Online] Available at: https://www.thenational.ae/opinion/comment/if-we-lose-istanbul-we-lose-turkey-why-the-mayoral-election-is-so-critical-to-erdogan-s-hold-on-power-1.876754

CIA, 2018. The World Factbook: Turkey. [Online] Available at: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/tu.html [Accessed 17 April 2019].

Daily Sabah, 2019. HDP says it won’t run candidates for Istanbul, Ankara, 5 other municipalities. [Online] Available at: https://www.dailysabah.com/elections/2019/01/28/hdp-says-it-wont-run-candidates-for-istanbul-ankara-5-other-municipalities [Accessed 18 June 2019].

Demiryol, G. İ., 2018. Turkey’s Arendtian Moment: Gezi Park Protests. Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies, 20(6), pp. 531-546. Middle East Eye, 2014. Istanbul residents in violent protest over Syrian refugees. [Online] Available at: https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/istanbul-residents-violent-protest-over-syrian-refugees [Accessed 19 June 2019].

Morris, C., 2018. Reality Check: The numbers behind the crackdown in Turkey. [Online] Available at: https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-44519112 [Accessed 14 April 2019].

Özsel, D., Öztürk, A. & Ince, H. O., 2013. A Decade of Erdoğan's JDP: Ruptures and. Critique: Journal of Socialist Theory, 41(4), pp. 551-570.

Pitel, L., 2019. Turkey falls into recession as lira crisis takes long-lasting toll. [Online] Available at: https://www.ft.com/content/92818e7c-43c6-11e9-b168-96a37d002cd3 [Accessed 21 April 2019].

Cybercrime in Ecuador: An Asymmetrical Threat

In the digital era we live in, cybercrime represents a direct threat not only for nations but also for corporations and individuals. Nations that lack development in technology and cybersecurity strategies are especially vulnerable to this type of threat. The recent data leak in Ecuador has highlighted the substantial threat of cybercrime to less technologically developed nations and the enormous impact it can have on their populations’ data protection.  

By Fidel Velásquez

In the 21st century, Cybercrime is one of the most relevant and pressing issues in the digital world. The impact and the influence that it can have over individuals, companies, corporations, and States is alarming. There are more than two billion people with access to cyberspace, all potential victims of cybercrime. Since software products required for hacking can be readily and cheaply obtained online, anyone with a computer and a relative amount of knowledge can become a cybercriminal and affect millions of individuals at once. According to the United Nations, more than “431 million people [were victims] of cybercrime in 2013”[i]. The consequences and costs of this contemporary issue are truly enormous, and growing rapidly as computers, smartphones, tablets, and other electronic devices attempt to produce ever-evolving methods to prevent cybercriminals from their aggressive and increasingly sophisticated attacks[ii]. 

The effect of cybercrime in the public and private sector is enormous. It is estimated that “by 2016, the average loss annually by a company due to cybercrime was between $2 million and $5 million”[iii]. Further, according to the “Commissioner of the City of London Police, ‘cyber’ fraud costs the United Kingdom £27 billion per year while ‘cyber breaches’ were recorded by 93% of small and medium businesses in the United Kingdom in 2013”[iv]. As a result, cybercrime generates negative impacts on employment as the monetary loss “has the effect of shifting personnel away from the highest value jobs in developed nations”[v]. Whilst the impact of cybercrime is more evident within the European Union and developed countries such as the United States, the United Kingdom, and Japan, countries that are less technologically developed in matters of cybersecurity are also highly exposed to suffer from cybercrime. Digitalisation is often considered as key to economic development, therefore countries striving for this goal may experience resulting vulnerabilities, or simply may not have the necessary resources to deal with cybercrime effectively such as The Republic of Ecuador.

Ecuador has been a victim of cybercrime for a considerable period of time and it is becoming increasingly apparent that this threat exceeds the country’s capabilities. Cybercrime in Ecuador started to be treated as a serious threat in the year 2009, 3,143 cases were registered in the following five years; however, it is estimated that 80% of cybercrimes are not reported[vi]. Furthermore, as Ecuador decided after seven years to withdraw diplomatic asylum from WikiLeaks founder Julian Assange in April 2019 it received more than 40 million cyberattacks from international activist hacker group Anonymous in one day. The attacks affected entities such as Chancellery, the Presidency, the Central Bank of Ecuador, and multiple other ministries[vii]. 

The problems seem to continue, as on Tuesday 17thof September 2019, the Government of Ecuador announced that it had been a victim of cybercrime as the data of six public entities were leaked through a security breach. According to the BBC, a team of researchers in vpnMentor, a firm specialised in information regarding Virtual Pirate Networks and internet privacy, discovered that the information of about twenty million Ecuadorians had been leaked. This figure exceeds the total population of Ecuador by four million, meaning information of deceased people was also leaked. The data was disclosed from a non-secured server in Miami owned by Novaestrat Company; an Ecuadorian company focused on providing services such as data analysis and strategic marketing. The information contained sensitive data regarding personal, familial, employment, and vehicle-related data which could be used by cybercriminals to commit a diverse range of crimes. Names of relatives, ID numbers, place and date of births, telephone numbers, email addresses, academic histories, professions, job salaries, job positions, civil status’, loan and credit information, credit, were some of the fifty types of data leaked. The data has two origins, public and private. However, most of the stolen information was acquired from the Ecuadorian Institute of Social Security and the Civil Registry of Ecuador[viii]. 

The content stolen from the Civil Registry, the Internal Tax Office, the Higher Education Secretary, the Ecuadorian Institute of Social Security, the Bank of the Ecuadorian Institute of Social Security, and the National Traffic Agency leave Ecuadorians exposed to a diverse set of crimes such as fraud, phishing, identity theft, financial fraud, theft of goods, extortion, and business espionage. The investigators believe that the databases were stolen or illegally bought from ex-public civil servants that used to work in some of the aforementioned six public entities. It is not yet clear for what purpose the data was stolen whether it be for political, commercial, or criminal objectives. However, what is clear is that Ecuador is not technologically nor legally ready to face the challenge of cybercrime. 74% of Ecuadorian public entities still do not have the security apparatus deemed necessary by the International Organisation for Standardisation to avoid cyberattacks[ix]. Also, according to the Global Cybersecurity Index 2018, Ecuador occupies position 98 out of 175 nations showing a lower position than Ghana, Botswana, or Cameroon and a similar position to Venezuela, Samoa, and Gabon. This demonstrates that Ecuador has a medium level of commitment towards engaging in cybersecurity programs and initiatives to face cyber threats[x]. Ecuador is one of the few countries in the region that have not develop a data protection bill yet, therefore, Ecuadorians have stipulated rights regarding the protection of their data but no laws to regulate it. Furthermore, cyberspace and ICT is continuously changing and being developed, therefore, the necessity for a suitably evolving legal framework that will keep up with cybercriminals is imperative for Ecuador, and the world, to prosecute cybercriminals and address their apparent impunity.    

The Ecuadorian Minister of Telecommunications Andrés Michelena has argued that the data of Ecuadorians is ‘well-protected’, but the truth is that in 2019 Ecuador suffered the biggest information leak in its history. Furthermore, as a response to both cybercrime and as a response to the most recent data leak, the Ecuadorian Government announced that a bill regarding data protection has been sent to the National Assembly aiming to support the Integral Criminal Code of Ecuador regarding cybercrimes and that $11 million had been allocated for Ecuador’s data protection[xi]. 

Despite the efforts of the Ecuadorian government, it seems unprepared to deal with the continuing threat of cybercrime, partly due to the issue simply being neglected. Furthermore, the characteristics of the modern technological era means that cybercrime is considered an asymmetrical threat, especially for countries that are underdeveloped in technical matters such as Ecuador. Different from traditional warfare, where attackers and defenders are on equal ground when confronting one another, in cybercrime such equality between parties does not exist; the cybercriminal has the palpable advantage with regard to both attack and defence[xii]. Hence, the tools that Ecuador has are not enough to defend itself, when information is leaked it is unlikely to be recovered, and for investigators it is almost impossible to determine the perpetrators of cybercrimes. The continuing threat of cybercrime calls for the Ecuadorian government to implement an adaptable response to protect the information of its population. 

Sources:

[i]United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), (2013), “Comprehensive Study on Cybercrime”, New York.

[ii]Moskowitz, S (2017) “The Global Cyber Crime Industry”, Butterworth-Heinemann.

 [iii]Ahkgar, et al (2014). “Cyber Crime and Cyber Terrorism Investigator’s Handbook”, Waltham: Elsevier. 

[iv]Ibid

[v]Ibid

[vi] Zambrano, E, (2016), “Computer Crime. Criminal Procedure in Ecuador”.

[vii] El Universo, (2019), retrieved from: https://www.eluniverso.com/noticias/2019/04/15/nota/7287215/ecuador-ha-recibido-40-millones-ataques-ciberneticos-revela

[viii]BBC News, (2019), “Data on almost every Ecuadorian Citizen leaked, retrieved from:https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-49715478

[ix] Diario El Comercio (2019), retrieved from: https://www.elcomercio.com/actualidad/ecuador-ciberseguridad-region-informe-delitos.html

 [x] Global Cybersecurity Index 2018 (GCI), (2019), ITU Publications, retrieved from: https://www.itu.int/dms_pub/itu-d/opb/str/D-STR-GCI.01-2018-PDF-E.pdf

[xi]Diario El Comercio (2019), retrieved from: https://www.elcomercio.com/actualidad/gobierno-ecuatoriano-proteccion-datos-ataque.html

[xii]. Moskowitz, S (2017) “The Global Cyber Crime Industry”, Butterworth-Heinemann.

Don’t depend on Drones in intelligence

Drones have advanced warfare and counterinsurgency operations carried out in the War on Terror, their positive effect on intelligence is less significant however. Whilst drone technology has facilitated better observational intelligence, lethal capacity, and new forms of counterinsurgency strategy, they are limited in their application and not as infallible as policy-makers often believe. It also remains uncertain if drones will remain as applicable to future intelligence operations as they are today. 

By Keir Watt

Drones are commonly considered to be revolutionising warfare. According to P.W. Singer, expert on 21st Century warfare, their impact can even be compared to ‘the introduction of gunpowder, the printing press or the airplane.’[1] Yet, as revolutionary as drones seem, their impact on intelligence is not as dramatic.

Weaponising drones has certainly advanced counterinsurgency operations. When the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) located al-Qaeda founder Osama Bin Laden in Afghanistan in 1998 they had to predict where he would be four to six hours later, accounting for the flight time for cruise missiles.[2] Now drones can observe for days and launch strikes instantly, speeding up the ‘find-fix-finish’ loop so much that counterinsurgency strategy has become shaped around their use. [3]

Drones have not made intelligence gatherers as all-knowing as some officials would like to believe, however. Whilst drones can provide excellent surveillance, this does not remove the need for other sources of corroborating intelligence. Strikes like the “Roboski Massacre” in 2011 emphasise this necessity, as thirty-eight adult smugglers and their children were killed merely for looking suspicious, the drone could not even tell whether or not they were armed.[4]

Signature strikes are, controversially, almost entirely reliant on drones and have become a cornerstone of U.S. strategy against al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and similar enemies. These target individuals solely on patterns of their behaviour, if they ‘bear the characteristics of al-Qaeda and Taliban leaders on the run.’[5] As a senior U.S. military official described, ‘using the all-seeing eye, you will find out who is important in a network, where they live, where they get their support from, where their friends are . . . wait till these people have gone down a lonely stretch of road and take them out with a Hell-fire missile.’[6]

These operations are a significant development in counterinsurgency strategy. Yet what distinguishes them most is not so much drone technology, but their reliance on behavioural analysis. One of its biggest weaknesses is not using a big enough quantity and variety of information to form conclusions. Current operations which use primarily or exclusively drone footage remain crude in their analysis. Developing big data processes which use huge quantities of information could transform these operations into a more accurate and complete model.[7] However, this advancement has not come to fruition and signature strikes remain a flawed strategy.

There also remains a lot more to intelligence than drone missions and behavioural analysis. The main function of agencies like the CIA is developing human intelligence and keeping policy makers informed. Drones may offer an “antiseptic solution” for terrorism in places where we don’t want to send troops, however, seeking a technological “fix” to all problems distracts from investing in less flashy but more important areas. In the United States of America, the transfer of control of drone programmes from the CIA to the Pentagon is a positive sign that things are getting back on track.  

More generally, it’s not clear drones will remain relevant for future conflicts. Drone technology evolved to meet the challenges of the War on Terror War and has been very effective, but  may struggle to address different challenges. Conflict with major powers such as China or Russia, for example, would require different capabilities than counterinsurgency operations in Afghanistan. As the threat environment changes, intelligence will have to develop new responses and drones may not be a part of that.

Drones were first used to provide surveillance during the Vietnam War. They were so successful that the Chief of Staff, General William C. Westermoreland was convinced they were leading a ‘quiet revolution’ in warfare.[8] Once the war was over, however, the drone programmes were scrapped as budgets faced new priorities. Like Vietnam, U.S. commander’s demand for ‘situational awareness 24/7/365’ in Afghanistan made them an integral part of the War on Terror.[9] As new threats emerge, however, it’s possible current drone programmes may be relegated like those of the 1970s. 

This is not to say that drones will become redundant altogether; contemporary drones are increasingly advanced and have more applications than those of the past. But assuming that what makes drones useful for today’s conflicts can be applied to those of the future would ignore the basic lesson of both Vietnam and Afghanistan: that changing contexts and challenges require new responses.

Sources:

[1] Spiegel Online, 2010. Interview with Defence Expert P.W. Singer: ‘The Soldiers Call It War Porn.’ SPIEGEL ONLINE.  Available at: www.spiegel.de/international/world/interview-with-defense-expert-p-w-singer-the-soldiers-call-it-war-porn-a-682852.html. [Accessed 10 July 2019]. 

[2] Logan, L., 2012. Hank Crumpton: Life as a spy. CBS News. Available at: : https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Kdkoqem9s1Y. [Accessed 10 July 2019].

[3] CIA Director Leon Panetta quoted in CNN editor, 2009., Airstrikes in Pakistan called ‘very effective.’CNN. Available at:  edition.cnn.com/2009/POLITICS/05/18/cia.pakistan.airstrikes/. [Accessed 10 July 2019].

[4] Eralp, D.U., 2015. The Role of U.S. Drones in the Roboski Massacre. Peace Review, 27(4), pp. 448-452.

[5] Zenko, M., 2013. Reforming US Drone Strike Policies. Council on Foreign Relations, Special Report 65, p. 14. 

[6] Quoted in Barnes, J.E., 2009. Military Refines ‘A Constant Stare Against Our Enemy.’ Los Angeles Times, November 2nd, 2009.

[7] Atwood, C.P., 2015. Activity-based intelligence: revolutionizing military intelligence analysis. Joint Force Quarterly 77, 2nd Quarterly, p. 29.

[8] William C. Westermoreland quoted in Dickson, P., 1996. The Electronic Battlefield. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, pp. 220-221.

[9] Air Force Secretary Michael Donley quoted in Lubold, G., 2010. As drones multiply in Iraq and Afghanistan, so do their uses.The Christian Science Monitor. Available at: https://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Military/2010/0302/As-drones-multiply-in-Iraq-and-Afghanistan-so-do-their-uses. [Accessed 10 July 2019].

[10] Photo: Sergeant Ross Tilly (RAF)/MOD: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Reaper_Remotely_Piloted_Air_System_MOD_45156829.jpg#filelinks